You are on page 1of 44

Regimes híbridos

 Introdução (1 página)
3ª vaga de democratização
pergunta de partida
definição de robert dahl e schumpeter
huntington
freedom house
há várias abordagens que exploram este fenómeno. Vários termos
diferentes sugeridos por autores diferente. Diamond fala das 6 categorias e
de como se diferenciam, wigell fala de outra:; levintsky et al. Concentram-se
no termo “competitive authoritarianism”; Freedom house fala de
semiconsolidated authoritarian regimes, Zakaria refere-se a “iliberal
democracies” e Schendler “electoral authorianisms”

You ask whether Russia is a hybrid regime or not, but the
definition of a hybrid regime itself is not clear. It mixes democratic
and authoritarian elements, but this mixture can take different
forms.
 O que são regimes hibridos (2 páginas)
 Tipos de regimes hibridos (texto wigell) (2
páginas)
https://ahkyee.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/levitsky-2010competitive-authoritarianism.pdf
http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/Publicac
ao_4618_em_17_11_2008_22_06_36.pdf
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odiassets/publications-opinion-files/4160.pdf
https://repositorio.iscteiul.pt/bitstream/10071/7760/1/ESSP_DCP_Dissertacao_Ana
%20Filipa%20Magalh%C3%A3es%20Gomes%20da
%20Silva.pdf

(é dificil falar em regimes hibridos porque há muitas variações)
 Caso Argentina (2 páginas)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239804977_Gender_and_pathshifting_changes_in_a_hybrid_welfare_regime_Argentina_in_comparative_perspectiv
e

Caso Rússia (2 páginas)

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366509000025
http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/politics/2220-marc-plattner-if-russia-had-becomedemocratic-the-world-would-look-very-different-now
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/overmanaged_democracy_2.pdf

Caso Malásia

http://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/amocz-rp-2011-05.pdf

Caso Venezuela

https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/311084/original/06-0497-3%2Bchap6%2Bver
%2B2.pdf
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/is-venezuela-dictatorship

Caso Singapura

https://www.lsa.umich.edu/UMICH/cseas/Academics/Documents/Tan_DomParty_8Ma
y2014.pdf

Caso México

LEVINSKY
The end of the Cold War posed a fundamental challenge to authoritarian
regimes. Single-party and military dictatorships collapsed throughout Africa,
post-communist Eurasia, and much of Asia and Latin America in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. At the same time, the formal architecture of democracy –
particularly
multiparty elections – diffused across the globe.
Transitions did not always lead to democracy, however. In much of Africa
and the former Soviet Union, and in parts of Eastern Europe, Asia, and the
Americas, new regimes combined electoral competition with varying degrees of
authoritarianism. Unlike single-party or military dictatorships, post–Cold War
regimes in Cambodia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Russia, Serbia,
Taiwan, Ukraine, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere were competitive in that opposition
forces used democratic institutions to contest vigorously – and, on occasion,
successfully – for power. Nevertheless, they were not democratic. Electoral
manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, and varying degrees
of harassment and violence skewed the playing field in favor of incumbents. In
other words, competition was real but unfair.1 We characterize such regimes as
competitive authoritarian. Competitive authoritarian regimes proliferated after the
Cold War. By our count, 33 regimes were competitive authoritarian in 1995 –
a figure that exceeded the number of full democracies in the developing and
post-communist world.2
The study of post–Cold War hybrid regimes was initially marked by a pronounced
democratizing bias.3 Viewed through the lens of democratization,
hybrid regimes were frequently categorized as flawed, incomplete, or “transitional”
democracies.4 For example, Russia was treated as a case of “protracted”
democratic transition during the 1990s,5 and its subsequent autocratic turn
was characterized as a “failure to consolidate” democracy.6 Likewise, Cambodia
was described as a “nascent democracy” that was “on the road to
democratic consolidation”7; Cameroon, Georgia, and Kazakhstan were labeled
“democratizers”8; and the Central African Republic and Congo-Brazzaville were
called “would-be democracies.”9 Transitions that did not lead to democracy
were characterized as “stalled” or “flawed.” Thus, Zambia was said to be “stuck
in transition”10; Albania was labeled a case of “permanent transition”11; and
Haiti was said to be undergoing a “long,”12 “ongoing,”13 and even “unending”14
transition.
Such characterizations are misleading. The assumption that hybrid regimes
are (or should be) moving in a democratic direction lacks empirical foundation.
Hybrid regimes followed diverse trajectories during the post–Cold War period.
Although some of them democratized (e.g., Ghana, Mexico, and Slovakia), most
did not. Many regimes either remained stable (e.g., Malaysia and Tanzania) or
became increasingly authoritarian (e.g., Belarus and Russia). In other cases,
autocratic
governments fell but were succeeded by new authoritarians (e.g., Georgia,
Madagascar, and Zambia). Indeed, some regimes experienced two or more
transitions
without democratizing.15 As of 2010, more than a dozen competitive
authoritarian regimes had persisted for 15 years or more.16 Rather than “partial,”

“incomplete,” or “unconsolidated” democracies, these cases should be
conceptualized
for what they are: a distinct, nondemocratic regime type. Instead
of assuming that such regimes are in transition to democracy, it is more useful
to ask why some democratized and others did not. This is the goal of our
study.
This book examines the trajectories of all 35 regimes that were or became
competitive authoritarian between 1990 and 1995.17 The study spans five regions,
including six countries in the Americas (the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti,
Mexico, Peru, and Nicaragua); six in Eastern Europe (Albania, Croatia, Macedonia,
Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia); three in Asia (Cambodia, Malaysia, and
Taiwan); six in the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova,
Russia, and Ukraine); and 14 in Africa (Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon,
Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe).
The book asks why some competitive authoritarian regimes democratized
during the post–Cold War period, while others remained stable and authoritarian
and still others experienced turnover without democratization. Our central
argument, which is elaborated in Chapter 2, focuses on two main factors: ties to
the West and the strength of governing-party and state organizations. Where
linkage to the West was high, competitive authoritarian regimes democratized.
Where linkage was low, regime outcomes hinged on incumbents’ organizational
power. Where state and governing party structures were well organized and
cohesive, regimes remained stable and authoritarian; where they were
underdeveloped
or lacked cohesion, regimes were unstable, although they rarely democratized.
This introductory chapter is organized as follows. The first section defines
competitive authoritarianism and presents the case for a new regime type. The
second section examines the rise of competitive authoritarianism. It attributes
the proliferation of competitive authoritarian regimes to the incentives and
constraints
created by the post–Cold War international environment. The third section
shows how competitive authoritarian regime trajectories diverged after 1990
and provides an overview of the book’s central argument and main theoretical
contributions.
what is competitive authoritarianism?
“Politics . . . is not like football, deserving a level playing field. Here, you try that and
you
will be roasted.”
– Daniel arap Moi, President of Kenya18
Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic
institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining
power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant
advantage vis-`a-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that
opposition
parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are
not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents.
Competition is thus real but unfair.
Situating the Concept
Competitive authoritarianism is a hybrid regime type, with important characteristics
of both democracy and authoritarianism.19 We employ a “midrange” definition

. illicit government–business ties that create vast resource disparities vis-`a-vis the opposition are not civil-liberties violations per se. we precise it by adding a fifth attribute: the existence of a reasonably level playing field between incumbents and opposition. clientelist social policies. however.” However. and Saudi Arabia) and hegemonic regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist on paper but are reduced to fac¸ade status in practice.25 When incumbent manipulation of state institutions and resources is so excessive and one-sided that it seriously limits political competition.g. We define full authoritarianism as a regime in which no viable channels exist for opposition to contest legally for executive power. For example.g. there are at least two reasons to treat this attribute as a separate dimension. press. monarchies. and association. de facto governing-party control of the private media – achieved through informal proxy or patronage arrangements – is not. scholars have subsequently “precised” the concept of democracy by making explicit criteria – such as civil liberties and effective power to govern – that are implicitly understood to be part of the overall meaning and which are viewed as necessary for competitive elections to take place. pork-barrel spending. . and Uzbekistan.23 Although we remain committed to a procedural-minimum conception of democracy. a degree of incumbent advantage – in the form of patronage jobs.of democracy: one that is procedural but demanding. Attention to the slope of the playing field thus highlights how regimes may be undemocratic even in the absence of overt fraud or civil-liberties violations. militaries. Likewise. Thus. these advantages do not seriously undermine the opposition’s capacity to compete.g. some aspects of an uneven playing field – such as skewed access to media and finance – have a major impact between elections and are thus often missed in evaluations of whether elections are free and fair. whereas closing down a newspaper is a clear violation of civil liberties..21 These definitions are essentially “Schumpeterian” in that they center on competitive elections. Cuba. It is important to distinguish between competitive and noncompetitive authoritarianism. Kazakhstan. and privileged access to media and finance – exists in all democracies. and (4) the absence of nonelected “tutelary” authorities (e. elections served functions (e. elections are so marred by repression. some government actions that skew the playing field may not be viewed as civil-liberties violations. scholars have converged around a “procedural minimum” definition of democracy that includes four key attributes: (1) free. In democracies..27 This category includes closed regimes in which national-level democratic institutions do not exist (e.28 In hegemonic regimes. fair. and/or fraud that there is no uncertainty about their outcome. a means of enhancing regime legitimacy. or religious bodies) that limit elected officials’ power to govern. it is incompatible with democracy. First. 26 A level playing field is implicit in most conceptualizations of democracy.20 Following Dahl. in post–Cold War Egypt. including freedom of speech. candidate restrictions.22 However. and competitive elections. Indeed. (2) full adult suffrage. many characteristics of an uneven playing field could be subsumed into the dimensions of “free and fair elections” and “civil liberties. Second.24 Obviously. China. (3) broad protection of civil liberties. Much of the opposition is forced underground and leading critics are often imprisoned or exiled.

voters. it is not so severe as to make the act of voting meaningless. Although these rights may be violated periodically. and there is no massive fraud. voting and vote-counting processes are reasonably clean but an uneven playing field renders the overall electoral process manifestly unfair. elections are marred by the manipulation of voter lists. Competitive authoritarian regimes fall in between these extremes. In other cases (e. opposition parties are able to campaign publicly.. On the other hand. Elections are held regularly and opposition parties are not legally barred from contesting them.g. (2) broad protection of civil liberties. or (3) fraud is so massive that there is virtually no observable relationship between voter preferences and official electoral results. elections are free. However. the Dominican Republic in 1994 and Ukraine in 2004). Cambodia and Zimbabwe).”35 Civil Liberties In democracies. Although such fraud may alter the outcome of elections. democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power. skewed access to resources and media led one scholar to compare it to a “soccer match where the goalposts were of different heights and breadths and where one team included 11 players plus the umpire and the other a mere six or seven players. in the sense that there is virtually no fraud or intimidation of voters. In some cases. even though Mexico’s 1994 election was technically clean. such abuse is not sufficiently severe or systematic to prevent the opposition from running a national campaign. press.31 In fully authoritarian regimes. and/or falsification of results (e. elections are often unfree and almost always unfair. and poll watchers. such violations are infrequent and do not seriously hinder the opposition’s capacity to challenge incumbents. and even the establishment of opposition “no-go” areas (e. recruit candidates. and politicians are rarely exiled or imprisoned. In these cases. Competitive authoritarian regimes are distinguished from full authoritarianism in that constitutional channels exist through which opposition groups compete in a meaningful way for executive power. or distributing patronage) other than determining who governed29. In short.. and association – are protected. Botswana). in the sense that opposition parties campaign on relatively even footing: They are not subject to repression or harassment.30 Elections In democracies. (2) repression or legal controls effectively prevent opposition parties from running public campaigns.g.generating information.34 Thus. civil liberties – including the rights of free speech. ballot-box stuffing. opponents did not view them as viable means to achieve power. and they are not systematically denied access to the media or other critical resources. and organize campaigns. however. unequal access to finance and the media as well as incumbent abuse of state institutions make elections unfair even in the absence of violence or fraud.33 Elections also may be marred by intimidation of opposition activists. What distinguishes competitive authoritarianism from democracy. and fair.g. In fully authoritarian regimes. and (3) a reasonably level playing field. multiparty elections are either nonexistent or noncompetitive. Opposition activity is above ground: Opposition parties can open offices. On the one hand. basic civil liberties . Elections may be considered noncompetitive when (1) major candidates are formally barred or effectively excluded on a regular basis32. is the fact that incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of three defining attributes of democracy: (1) free elections.. elections are competitive in that major opposition candidates are rarely excluded.

Yet.. In Malaysia. and the media are not even minimally protected (e. Belarus. Anwar Ibrahim.43 In some cases (e. much opposition activity takes place underground or in exile. An Uneven Playing Field .g. An example is Putin’s Russia.are often violated so systematically that opposition parties. By raising the cost of opposition activity (thereby convincing all but the boldest activists to remain on the sidelines) and critical media coverage (thereby encouraging self-censorship). or defamation laws – to punish opponents. in Cameroon.37 On a more modest scale.g. and other government critics are subject to harassment. it clearly exceeds what is permissible in a democracy. the Fujimori government in Peru “perfected the technique of ‘using the law to trample the law.’”38 transforming judicial and tax agencies into “a shield for friends of the regime and a weapon against its enemies. civil liberties are frequently violated. making widespread use of defamation suits to silence critical reporting41. As a result. Independent media are frequently threatened. ex-President Bakili Muluzi. arrest. editors. Egypt and Uzbekistan). even intermittent civil-liberties violations can seriously hinder the opposition’s capacity to organize and challenge the government. independent judges.36 More frequently.”39 Rivals – often internal ones – also may be prosecuted for corruption. in Malawi. and – in some cases – violent attack. arrested on corruption charges. Leonid Kuchma used corruption charges to derail Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko’s presidential candidacy. the threat of legal action led to widespread self-censorship. and media outlets. President Bingu wa Mutharika had his chief rival. civic groups. independent newspapers were hit by more than 230 governmentsponsored libel suits as of 1997.. After Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Independent media exist and civic and opposition groups operate above ground: Most of the time. and Russia). overt repression – including the arrest of opposition leaders. and in Ukraine. they can meet freely and even protest against the government. In competitive authoritarian regimes. human-rights activists. Although such repression may involve the technically correct application of the law. began to finance opposition groups in 2003. Although “legal” and other repression under competitive authoritarianism is not severe enough to force the opposition underground or into exile.” or the discretionary use of legal instruments – such as tax. including “legal repression. the owner of Russia’s largest oil company. journalists. and – in some cases – suspended or closed. civil liberties are nominally guaranteed and at least partially respected. Cambodia. libel. Malaysia and Ukraine). and in Croatia. the repeated use of costly lawsuits led to the disappearance of many independent media outlets. pushing regimes to the brink of full authoritarianism. its use is selective and partisan rather than universal. In some regimes. Mahathir Mohammad used corruption and sodomy charges to imprison his chief rival. attacked. in Malaysia. and the violent repression of protest – is widespread. assaults on civil liberties take more subtle forms. the Mahathir government entered into a “suing craze” in the wake of the 1998– 1999 political crisis. Opposition politicians. Thus. the government jailed him on tax charges and seized his company’s property and stock.. the killing of opposition activists.40 Perhaps the most widespread form of “legal” repression is the use of libel or defamation laws against journalists.g. more than 50 journalists were prosecuted for libel in the late 1990s and several newspapers were forced to close due to heavy fines42. In other cases (e.

. in Cambodia. Malaysia). nearly all competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by an uneven playing field. In Taiwan. the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) was “starved for funds by a business community told by [the government] that financing SRP was committing economic suicide. entrepreneurs who financed opposition parties “were blacklisted. we set a high threshold for unfairness.47 Incumbents also may systematically deploy the machinery of the state – for example. tens of millions of dollars in government bonds were diverted to Yeltsin’s 1996 reelection campaign. media. and (3) the opposition’s ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously handicapped. for example. state contracts. Mexico and Russia). . Incumbents also may use the state to monopolize access to private-sector finance.44 Obviously. governing parties were financed by special public ministries and/or official state subventions to the exclusion of other parties. Russia. state buildings. denied government contracts.48 In underdeveloped countries with weak private sectors. Access to resources is uneven when incumbents use the state to create or maintain resource disparities that seriously hinder the opposition’s ability to compete. governing parties used control of the state to build multibillion-dollar business empires. and the law. benefit crony. vehicles.50 In Ghana.or proxy-owned firms that then contribute money back into party coffers (e.”53 which allowed it to outspend opponents by more than 50-to-1 .g. and Ukraine. In former Soviet states such as Belarus. the $200 million to $500 million in annual profits generated by the $4.g. resource disparities far exceeded anything seen in established democracies. this funding is legal. and [had] their businesses openly sabotaged”51. In Guyana and Zimbabwe in the 1980s. Indeed.49 The state also may be used to deny opposition parties access to resources. in any representative democracy.Finally. and other professionals. for example. Taiwan).”52 In these cases. .. the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) reportedly drew $1 billion in illicit state finance during the early 1990s46.. a degree of incumbent advantage exists in all democracies. To distinguish such cases from those of unfair competition. in Russia. and communications infrastructure – for electoral campaigns. (2) incumbents are systematically favored at the expense of the opposition. such abuse can create vast resource advantages. In Malaysia and Taiwan. businesses that financed the opposition were routinely targeted by tax authorities. licenses. In Ukraine.45 This may occur in several ways. In a few cases. and public employees and security forces may be mobilized en masse on behalf of the governing party. many new democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America are characterized by extensive clientelism and politicization of state bureaucracies. for example. and other resources to enrich themselves via party-owned enterprises (e. First. doctors. Governing parties may use discretionary control over credit. this mobilization included not only low-level bureaucrats but also teachers. In Mexico. Three aspects of an uneven playing field are of particular importance: access to resources. More frequently. We consider the playing field uneven when (1) state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends.5 billion business empire of the Kuomintang (KMT) gave the party a financial base that was “unheard of .g. state finance is illicit. access to resources. or corner the market in privatesector donations (e. incumbents may make direct partisan use of state resources.

In Venezuela. “Before it was Banda. who also owned the popular 1+1 television station. the most important disparities exist in access to broadcast media. the state controls all television and most – if not all – radio broadcasting. incumbents pack judiciaries. bribery. the PRI admitted to spending 13 times more than the two major opposition parties combined during the 1994 election. the electoral authorities’ 2003 ruling invalidating signatures collected for a recall referendum against President Hugo Chavez delayed the referendum long enough for Chavez to rebuild public support and survive the referendum. President Kuchma controlled television coverage through an informal network of private media entities. Thus. or other disputes will be resolved in the incumbent’s favor. and other nominally independent arbiters and manipulate them via blackmail. even after the Banda dictatorship in Malawi gave way to elected President Bakili Muluzi. Banda – every day. Muluzi. they generally reach only a small urban elite. In Peru.59 In Alberto Fujimori’s Peru.58 In Malaysia. In Belarus in 1996. opposition forces are effectively denied access to the media. incumbent control of the media was such that one journalist complained. it allowed Mahathir to imprison his main rival.5 million a month in exchange for limiting coverage of opposition parties. combined with biased and partisan coverage. in Malaysia. When opposition parties lack access to media that reaches most of the population.54 In Mexico. legal and other state agencies that are designed to act as referees rule systematically in favor of incumbents. Media access may be denied in several ways.55 In Russia. Frequently. all major private newspapers and private television stations were controlled by individuals or firms linked to the governing Barisan Nasional (BN).”57 In other cases. a decade later. issued orders (“temnyki”) to all major stations dictating how events should be covered. for example. In many competitive authoritarian regimes. The head of the Presidential Administration. there is no possibility of fair competition. Thus. Although independent newspapers and magazines may circulate freely. In Ukraine. a packed judiciary ensured that a schism in the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) was resolved in Prime Minister Mahathir’s favor in 1988. and/or intimidation. the Yeltsin campaign spent between 30 and 150 times the amount permitted the opposition in 1996. and other illicit means. Banda. This allows incumbents to engage in illicit acts – including violations of democratic procedure – with impunity.56 access to media. Fujimori’s control over judicial and electoral authorities ensured the legalization of a constitutionally dubious third term in 2000.60 biased referees: uneven access to the law. In many competitive authoritarian regimes. patronage. As a result. Anwar Ibrahim. if radio and television are state-run and state-run channels are biased in favor of the governing party. private media is widespread but major media outlets are linked to the governing party – via proxy ownership. electoral commissions. It also ensures that critical electoral. private television stations signed “contracts” with the state intelligence service in which they received up to $1. which facilitated Lukashenka’s consolidation of autocratic rule. . and some observers claim that the ratio may have been 20-to-1.during elections. Now it is Muluzi. Muluzi. the constitutional court terminated an impeachment process launched by parliamentary opponents of President Lukashenka. legal. In such cases. on dubious charges.

Richard Snyder has called for a “conservative bias with regard to concept formation. none of them was democratic and some were not even remotely so. intimidation. Whereas full authoritarian regimes are characterized by the absence of competition (and.Competition without Democracy: Contestation and Uncertainty in Nondemocracies Table 1. Kenya. Madagascar.”64 Similarly. and competitive authoritarian regimes (for a full operationalization. Cameroon. incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes cannot. . and compete seriously in elections. Studies of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s generated hundreds of new subtypes of democracy.” Snyder argues. full authoritarian. We therefore must be able to conceptualize regimes that are sufficiently competitive to generate real uncertainty (and even turnover) but which fall short of democracy. Malawi. hence. and elections are often marred by fraud.61 Stated another way. As suggested in the table.” Rather than fall prey to the “naturalists’ temptation to proclaim the discovery. naming. Belarus. of uncertainty) and democracy is characterized by fair competition. and other abuse. Alternative Conceptualizations of Hybrid Regimes: Do We Need a New Subtype? Scholars should create new regime subtypes with caution. are . Yet such unfairness does not preclude serious contestation – or even occasional opposition victories. Armenia. whereas officials in full authoritarian regimes can rest easy on the eve of elections because neither they nor opposition leaders expect anything but an incumbent victory. Mozambique. As this book demonstrates.1 summarizes the major differences among democratic.63 As Collier and Levitsky warned. scholars should “carefully evaluate the null hypothesis that the political phenomena of interest . In competitive authoritarian regimes. Gabon. their access to media and finance is limited. see Appendix I). harassment. and occasional violence. competitive authoritarianism is marked by competition that is real but unfair. However. At times during the 1990–2008 period. Cambodia. Ukraine. Russia. they are subject to surveillance. electoral and judicial institutions are politicized and deployed against them. such regimes were widespread during the post–Cold War period. incumbents are forced to sweat. However. . and classification of new political animals. Government officials fear a possible opposition victory (and must work hard to thwart it). and Zimbabwe were characterized by considerable uncertainty and. in some cases. Opposition parties are legal. particularly Adam Przeworski and his collaborators.62 Such a conceptualization ignores the real possibility that serious violation of democratic procedure may occur in competitive elections. Influential scholars. What this suggests is that uncertainty and even incumbent turnover are not defining features of democracy. Zambia. elections in Albania. have argued that uncertainty of outcomes and the possibility of electoral turnover are what distinguish democratic from nondemocratic regimes. such an “excessive proliferation of new terms and concepts” is likely to result in “conceptual confusion. incumbent defeat. and opposition leaders believe they have at least some chance of victory. a distinguishing feature of competitive authoritarianism is unfair competition. operate aboveground.

Russia. and Zambia were routinely labeled democracies during the 1990s.g. Others include (1) constitutional oligarchies or exclusive republics. Another strategy is to classify hybrid regimes as subtypes of democracy. and the PRI regime in Mexico was labeled a “hybrid. The problem with such categories is that because democracy is multidimensional. Estonia and Latvia in the early 1990s)74.66 First. El Salvador. Nepal in the 1990s) authorities.”65 We contend that competitive authoritarianism is a new phenomenon and that no existing term adequately captures it. Malawi. such as in Colombia.g. Iran). part authoritarian system” that does “not conform to classical typologies. Even extreme cases such as Belarus. Fareed Zakaria applied the term illiberal democracy to “democratically elected regimes” that “routinely ignore constitutional limits on their power and [deprive] their citizens of basic rights and freedoms. Competitive authoritarianism is only one of several hybrid regime types.g.77 Similarly. Latvia.75 Yet.. whereas in Latvia the main nondemocratic feature was the denial of citizenship rights to people of Russian descent.71 semi-democracy. in which elections are competitive but the power of elected governments is constrained by nonelected religious (e. part-free. To label such regimes democracies is to stretch the concept virtually beyond recognition. The differences among these regimes – and between them and competitive authoritarianism – are obscured by categories such as semi-democratic or partly free. “Semi-democratic” and “partly free” are thus residual categories that reveal little about regimes other than what they are not. military (e. Larry Diamond used the term electoral democracy to refer to cases in which reasonably fair elections coexist with a weak rule of law and uneven protection of human and civil rights. Mozambique. Peru. and the Philippines. and (3) restricted or semi-competitive democracies..”73 for cases that fall between democracy and full authoritarianism. the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was described as “a hybrid perhaps unique in the annals of political science”67. and Russia under Putin occasionally earned a democratic label. there are multiple ways to be partially democratic.76 For example. Guatemala and Pakistan). Haiti.. Ukraine possessed full citizenship and civilian control over the military.. Another conceptual strategy has been to use generic intermediate categories.72 or Freedom House’s “partly free.g. For example. in which elections are free but a major party is banned (e. Madagascar.g. For example. Brazil.actually not sufficiently novel to warrant new categories and labels.70 The problem with such a strategy is straightforward: Regimes with serious electoral irregularities and/or civil-liberties violations do not meet procedural minimum standards for democracy. in El Salvador it was the military’s tutelary power and human-rights violations. Fujimori’s Peru was said to be a “new kind of hybrid authoritarian regime”68. but it was competitive authoritarian. or monarchic (e. Regimes in Ghana. and Ukraine were classified by Freedom House as partly free – with a combined political and civil-liberties score of 6 – in 1992–1993. which possess the basic features of democracy but deny suffrage to a major segment of the adult population (e. Argentina in 1957–1966 and Turkey in the 1990s). Cambodia. such as hybrid regime. Ukraine. these regimes routinely proved difficult for scholars to categorize during the post–Cold War period.”78 Subtypes . (2) tutelary regimes.”69 Which existing regime categories might be appropriate for these cases? One scholarly response has been simply to label them as democracies. India..

Indeed.” “managed democracy. Otherwise you could get a rough shave. you should wet your beard. Linz proposed “the addition of adjectives to ‘authoritarianism’ rather than to ‘democracy. Our conceptualization is more restrictive. .. Russia. Furthermore. Nigeria. are closer to ours in that they refer to nondemocracies with multiparty elections.” – Julius Nyerere. President of Tanzania85 . the value of such labels is questionable. they “should be clear that they are not democracies (even using minimum standards). and Uzbekistan. More than 40 countries – including Malaysia. competitive authoritarian regimes easily outnumbered democracies in Africa and the former Soviet Union. “post-totalitarianism” and “bureaucratic authoritarianism”) in large part because these regimes are noncompetitive. violate minimal democratic norms so severely that it makes no sense to classify them as democracies. competitive authoritarianism is widespread.” To avoid confusion. These electoral regimes . Thus. . such as electoral authoritarianism and semi-authoritarianism. As Diamond noted. The time has come to abandon misleading labels and to take their nondemocratic nature seriously. Serbia. is very much a product of the contemporary world. governments and opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes face a set of opportunities and constraints that do not exist in either democracies or other forms of authoritarian rule. Taiwan.83 However.79 However. Such a narrow definition is not a mere exercise in conceptual hairsplitting. they have generally been defined broadly to refer to all authoritarian regimes with multiparty elections – both competitive and hegemonic. and Venezuela – were competitive authoritarian at some point after 1989.”82 Newer subtypes of authoritarianism. are instances of authoritarian rule.” and “quasi-democracy” are employed in a similar manner. the conceptual space we are carving out – that of competitive nondemocracies – may be narrow.such as “defective democracy. . Juan Linz argued that although scholars “might positively value some aspects” of hybrid regimes. Kazakhstan. which is now so common. . As we argue later in this chapter. but it is both densely populated and substantively important.’”81 Competitive authoritarianism does not easily fit existing subtypes of authoritarianism (e.84 Thus. many hybrid regimes: . Competitiveness is a substantively important regime characteristic that affects the behavior and expectations of political actors. the rise of competitive authoritarianism “[Why liberalize?] When you see your neighbor being shaved. none of Linz’s seven principal types of authoritarianism even remotely resembles competitive authoritarianism – and “for good reason. As Andreas Schedler argued. This type of hybrid regime. however qualified. the concept of electoral authoritarianism encompasses both competitive authoritarian regimes and noncompetitive regimes such as those in Egypt. Mexico.80 Similarly.g. We limit the category to regimes in which opposition forces use democratic institutions to contest seriously for executive power.

First.”98 These efforts went farthest in Eastern Europe. military and diplomatic pressure. the “new political conditionality” induced many autocrats to hold multiparty elections. Western governments and multilateral institutions began to condition loans and assistance on the holding of elections and respect for human rights. President of Georgia86 Competitive authoritarianism is a post–Cold War phenomenon. For example.87 they proliferated after the fall of the Berlin Wall. where full democracy was a requirement for European Union (EU) membership.100 . the United States. Effectively “[r]eading the handwriting on the (Berlin) wall. Beginning in the late 1980s. they also were seen in the Americas.” – Eduard Shevardnadze. where the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted new mechanisms for the collective defense of democracy.” many autocrats adopted formal democratic institutions in an effort to “position their countries favorably in the international contest for scarce development resources. and then they will calm down and life will go on as usual.95 Although it was never applied consistently.99 However. and ideological alternative to the liberal West had a major impact on peripheral states.91 Yet diffusion was also rooted in an instrumental logic: The primary sources of external assistance were now located almost exclusively in the West.89 the disappearance of a military.94 In 1990. major changes in the international environment undermined the stability of many closed regimes and encouraged the rise of electoral ones. the elimination of Cold War subsidies coincided with mounting economic crises.-backed anti-communist regimes faced a precipitous decline in external military and economic assistance.93 With the disappearance of the Soviet threat. the United States and other Western powers stepped up efforts to encourage and defend democracy through a combination of external assistance.”90 which encouraged the diffusion of Western democratic models. States became bankrupt. in which the West – particularly the United States – emerged as the dominant center of economic and military power. which undermined the stability of many autocracies.88 The collapse of the Soviet Union also led to a marked shift in the global balance of power.97 Thus. In the post–Cold War era. as in interwar Eastern Europe. Soviet-backed Leninist regimes and U. and France announced that they would link future economic assistance to democratization and human rights. Although a few competitive authoritarian regimes existed during the interwar and Cold War periods. the 1990s saw the emergence of an “international architecture of collective institutions and formal agreements enshrining both the principles of democracy and human rights. patronage resources disappeared.”92 The end of the Cold War was also accompanied by a major shift in Western foreign policy. leaving autocrats with little choice but to liberalize or abandon power. it created an “almost universal wish to imitate a way of life associated with the liberal capitalist democracies of the core regimes. United Kingdom.“Don’t you know how these Westerners are? They will make a fuss [about electoral fraud] for a few days. and unprecedented political conditionality. and – in many cases – coercive apparatuses began to disintegrate.S.96 Political conditionality was accompanied by efforts to create permanent international legal frameworks for the collective defense of democracy. the end of the Cold War led to a withdrawal of external support for many superpower-sponsored dictatorships. This was not a coincidence. In many cases. economic.

In an age of images and symbols. external pressure was often superficial. (How do you televise the rule of law?).110 Partial liberalization – usually in the form of holding passable elections – was often “sufficient to deflect international system pressures for more complete political opening. the post–Cold War period saw the emergence of a transnational infrastructure of organizations – including international party foundations. it did not necessarily bring democracy. which deterred an increasing number of governments from attempting fraud. the growing number and sophistication of international election-observer missions helped call international attention to fraudulent elections. which often led Western powers to take punitive action against violating states.107 As Zakaria observed: Inthe end.105 and in postcommunist Eurasia.”111 In short. The change was particularly striking in sub-Saharan Africa. it was applied selectively and inconsistently. . electionmonitoring agencies. full democratization often required a strong domestic “push. . with important countries and regions (e. elections are easy to capture on film.109 Governments “learned that they did not have to democratize” to maintain their international standing.106 Second. but the new standard was multiparty elections. where only one de jure one-party regime (Turkmenistan) endured through the 1990s. .104 These changes in the international environment raised the external cost of authoritarianism and created incentives for elites in developing and postcommunist countries to adopt the formal architecture of Western-style democracy.Finally. External democratizing pressure was limited in several ways. Even in the post–Cold War international environment.102 Due to the presence of these networks. . and helped protect and empower domestic opposition groups. Washington and the world will tolerate a great deal fromthe resulting government. Western democracy promotion was “electoralist” in that it focused almost exclusively on multiparty elections while often ignoring dimensions such as civil liberties and a level playing field. China and the Middle East) largely escaping pressure. transnational human-rights and democracy networks drew international attention to human-rights abuses. which – at a minimum – entailed multiparty elections.” Where favorable domestic conditions such as a strong civil society and effective state institutions were absent . and a plethora of international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) – that were committed to the promotion of human rights and democracy.108 The international community’s focus on elections left many autocrats – both old and new – with considerable room to maneuver. rights abuses frequently triggered a “boomerang effect:” they were widely reported by international media and human rights groups.103 At the same time. First. If a country holds elections. not democracy. lobbied Western governments to take action against abusive governments. elections trump everything. the post–Cold War international environment raised the minimum standard for regime acceptability.101 Strengthened by new information technologies such as the Internet.g. .. therefore. Yet if the post–Cold War international environment undermined autocracies and encouraged the diffusion of multiparty elections. where the number of de jure single-party regimes fell from 29 in 1989 to zero in 1994. In much of the world.

Madagascar in 2001. they risk losing power. In 1985. Peru and Serbia in 2000. Thus. the Dominican Republic in 1994. incumbents either repeatedly thwarted opposition challenges or maintained such effective control that no serious challenge emerged.112 In other words.113 By 1995. However.g. The proliferation of competitive authoritarian regimes in the early 1990s was striking. the government changed but the regime did not. Ukraine (2004). they may retain power without egregiously violating democratic institutions. Because such challenges are legal and generally perceived as legitimate (both at home and abroad). if incumbents allow democratic procedures to run their course. these challenges may be regime-threatening. Indeed. Malaysia in 1998–1999. they were likely to result in competitive authoritarianism. The “fourth wave” was at least as competitive authoritarian as it was democratic. at the cost of possible defeat. and when incumbents lack public support. In other cases. judiciaries. transitions were more likely to result in regimes that combined multiparty elections with some form of authoritarian rule.117 . authoritarian governments manage these arenas of contestation without difficulty.g. such challenges force incumbents to choose between egregiously violating democratic rules. the existence of multiparty elections. nearly three dozen countries were competitive authoritarian. At times. In effect. Botswana and Peru in the mid-1990s) and/or face very weak opposition (e.114 diverging outcomes: competitive authoritarian regime trajectories. and Zimbabwe in 2008.g. incumbents were defeated by opposition challenges but successors ruled in a competitive authoritarian manner – in other words. Russia in 1993 and Belarus in 1996) or the judiciary. 19 of our 35 cases remained competitive authoritarian for 15 years or more. at the cost of international isolation and domestic conflict. although the end of the Cold War triggered a wave of democratization. and Zimbabwe (2008).(e.”116 Yet competitive authoritarian regimes were not bound to collapse. On the one hand. they also may emerge from parliament (e. Tanzania). When incumbents enjoy broad public support (e. In several cases. The result is often a regime crisis. It is perhaps for this reason that Huntington wrote that “liberalized authoritarianism” is “not a stable equilibrium. Armenia in 1996. Kenya in 2007.. opposition challenges take place at the ballot box.g. many of them proved strikingly robust.. nominally independent legislatures.. However. as occurred in Cambodia and Russia in 1993. only a handful of competitive authoritarian regimes existed in the world. much of the former Soviet Union and sub-Saharan Africa).. On the other hand. Ukraine in 2004. stealing elections or closing parliament). The halfway house does not stand. it also triggered a wave of hybridization. and media creates opportunities for periodic challenges.e. thwarting the challenge often requires a blatant assault on democratic institutions (i. Kenya (2002). and allowing the challenge to proceed. as in Serbia (2000). 1990–2008 Competitive authoritarian regimes are marked by an inherent tension. when Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader. Most frequently. openly repressing them may be quite costly. in fact.. The existence of meaningful democratic institutions creates arenas of contestation through which oppositions may legally – and legitimately – challenge incumbents.115 Such contestation poses a serious dilemma for incumbents.

10 of our 35 cases remained stable and nondemocratic: Armenia. In these cases. Macedonia. and (2) incumbents’ . and Slovakia. and organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital. In these cases. political. Malaysia. The second outcome is unstable authoritarianism. Successors inherited a skewed playing field and politicized state institutions. as in Croatia. Russia). Mexico. Gabon. These regime patterns suggest that – contra Lindberg and others – multiparty elections are not by themselves an independent cause of democratization. Peru. Kenya. Belarus. or the establishment of free and fair elections. 15 of our 35 cases democratized: Benin.. Mozambique.120 all of our democratizing cases experienced turnover. Botswana. Guyana. Ghana. Georgia.123 Indeed. Ukraine. the Dominican Republic. most (20 of 35) of our cases failed to democratize between 1990 and 2008. During the 1990–2008 period. Romania. Moldova.a lifespan that is comparable to even the most durable bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in South America. and Zambia. Serbia. Competitive authoritarian regimes followed three distinct paths between 1990 and 2008 (Table 1. Although the removal of authoritarian incumbents is not necessary for democratization. Cameroon.2). Cambodia. or they may occur after those governments fall from power. Moldova. Senegal. people. The first is democratization.g. Neither the breakdown of authoritarian regimes nor the holding of multiparty elections necessarily led to democratization during the post–Cold War period. it appears that many halfway houses do stand. Senegal. Nicaragua. and information) between particular countries and the United States and the EU. authoritarian incumbents were removed at least once but new governments were not democratic. authoritarian incumbents or their chosen successors remained in power for at least three presidential/ parliamentary terms following the establishment of competitive authoritarian rule. which they used to weaken and/or disadvantage their opponents. Haiti. Croatia. Madagascar.124 They also make it clear that electoral turnover – even where longtime autocrats are removed – should not be equated with democratic transition. Belarus.121 Ten cases fell into the unstable authoritarian category: Albania. and Zimbabwe. broad protection of civil liberties. Russia. As a starting point. diplomatic. Malawi. Mali.119 Democratization may be overseen by authoritarian governments. Mexico. Kenya.122 This category includes cases that became more closed over time (e. Serbia. and Ukraine. Peru. This diversity of outcomes challenges the democratizing assumptions that underlie much of the post–Cold War literature on regime change. Tanzania. as in Ghana. and Madagascar in the 2000s – the removal of explaining divergent outcomes: the argument in brief This book explains the diverging trajectories of competitive authoritarian regimes since 1990. Between 1990 and 2008. and Zambia in the 1990s to Georgia. goods and services. Malawi. or the density of ties (economic. Slovakia. and a level playing field. Nicaragua. we assume that incumbents seek to retain power and that they are willing to use extralegal means to do so. and Taiwan. In many cases – from Albania. social. Taiwan. We argue that incumbents’ capacity to hold onto power – and the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes more generally – hinges primarily on two factors: (1) linkage to the West.118 Hence. The third outcome is stable authoritarianism. or cases that undergo one or more transition but do not democratize.

even relatively weak regimes survived.. High linkage created powerful incentives for authoritarian rulers to abandon power. and shifting the balance of resources and prestige in favor of oppositions. and Romania). By heightening the international salience of autocratic abuse. incumbents were able to manage elite conflict and thwart even serious opposition challenges (both in the streets and at the ballot box). and Ukraine. low organizational power was associated with unstable competitive authoritarianism. Where Western leverage was high. Guyana. or where assistance from counter-hegemonic powers blunted the impact of that pressure (e. Cameroon. First. in the absence of close ties to the West or a strong domestic push for democracy. not a single authoritarian government remained in power through 2008 and nearly every transition resulted in democracy. Consequently. Where state and/or governing parties were well organized and cohesive. or the scope and cohesion of state and governing-party structures. therefore. Where state and governing-party structures were underdeveloped and lacked cohesion. steal elections. they were vulnerable to even relatively weak opposition challenges. Russia).g.. Like all theories of regime change. This outcome occurred even where domestic conditions for democracy were unfavorable (e. Regime outcomes are influenced by a variety of factors – including economic performance. We make a three-step argument. that some of the regimes analyzed in this study follow trajectories not . Malawi.g. in nearly all low-linkage cases in which incumbents had developed coercive and/or party organizations. Where countries’ strategic or economic importance inhibited external pressure (e. Macedonia. and Zambia). In low-linkage cases.. It is not surprising. Indeed. rather than crack down. in the face of opposition challenges. turnover created an opportunity for democratization. regime outcomes were driven primarily by domestic factors. leadership. and post-1994 Belarus). Gabon. fragile democracies emerged in Benin.organizational power. In this context. transitions frequently brought to power new authoritarian governments (e. Georgia. the strength and strategies of opposition movements. ours cannot explain all cases. external democratizing pressure was weaker. Among high-linkage cases. and historical contingency – that lie outside of our theoretical framework. regimes were more open to contingency than in other cases.g. and competitive authoritarian regimes survived. In these cases. autocrats or their chosen successors remained in power through 2008. However. linkage raised the cost of building and sustaining authoritarian rule. competitive authoritarian regimes democratized during the post–Cold War period. expanding the number of domestic actors with a stake in avoiding international isolation. increasing the likelihood of Western response. Indeed. as in most of Africa and the former Soviet Union. Because incumbents lacked the organizational and coercive tools to prevent elite defection. It also created incentives for successor governments to rule democratically. a third factor – states’ vulnerability to Western democratizing pressure (which we call Western leverage) – was often decisive. as in Eastern Europe and the Americas.g. such governments were more likely to fall. where linkage to the West was extensive. Consequently. Where linkage was low. particularly the organizational power of incumbents.. or crack down on protest. therefore. as in Malaysia and Zimbabwe. Mali. regimes were less stable.

and new information technologies. Africa and the former Soviet Union).g.127 Neither of these phenomena occurred on a large scale prior to the transitions in Latin America. it contributes to the emerging literature on the international dimension of regime change. to a large degree. Moreover. Africa. Second. the societal push for democratization was meager. and that this variation was rooted.. The recent literature highlights a dizzying array of international influences including diffusion. even well-organized and cohesive opposition challenges often failed. and organizational power explain a striking number of cases. regimes often democratized – even in the absence of favorable domestic conditions.g. as a result. democratization in Benin. Recent studies of democratization have given considerable attention to the role of societal or opposition-centered factors. theoretical implications Our research has a range of implications for the study of contemporary political regimes and regime change. in the extent of countries’ ties to the West. leverage. and post-communist Eurasia. This framework enables us to capture cross-national variation in the nature and degree of external democratizing pressure.130 mass protest. However. Changes in the post–Cold War international environment heightened the cost of suppression in much of the developing world. Where incumbents possessed a powerful coercive apparatus and/or party organization. We find that the impact of the international environment varied considerably across cases and regions. By contrast. or communist Eurasia. including civil society. regime outcomes were rooted less in the character or behavior of opposition movements than in incumbents’ capacity to thwart them. The massive wave of democratization that swept across the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s defied nearly all established theories of democratization.131 and opposition cohesion. What did change was the international environment. not changes in domestic conditions. that contributed most centrally to the demise of authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s. or (2) a strengthening of civil society or opposition forces – often a product of socioeconomic modernization – increases the cost of repression.125 many leading theories expect stable democracy to emerge when either (1) increased societal wealth or equality reduces the cost of toleration126. where it was low (e. in much of post-Cold War Africa. where incumbents lacked the organizational . conditionality.133 In many of these cases. Ghana.132 in undermining authoritarianism and/or installing democracy. Asia. linkage. Thus. Nevertheless. domestic factors predominated.129 organized labor. Where linkage was high (e.predicted by our theory (e.. we find that although political conditionality and other forms of direct (or leverage-based) pressure may be effective. civil societies and opposition parties were weak and fragmented. this book highlights the role of incumbent organizational power in shaping regime outcomes. and Ukraine).128 This book presents a new framework for analyzing the international influences on regime change. demonstration effects. For example. We organize these various mechanisms into two dimensions: Western leverage and linkage to the West. the democratizing impact of conditionality is far greater in countries with extensive linkage to the West. Eastern Europe and the Americas).. transnational civil society. it was an externally driven shift in the cost of suppression. Framed in terms of Dahl’s cost of toleration versus cost of suppression.g.

Informal Institutions One characteristic of competitive authoritarianism is the centrality of informal institutions. and Ukraine (2004) was provided by ex-government officials who had defected only weeks or months before the transition. Kenya (2002). Indeed. they also are critical to stable authoritarianism. As a result. or mobilization of opposition forces. such as constitutional design. their role in such regimes may be particularly important. Two implications are worth noting. Because both institutional and societal checks on successor governments tended to be weak. the assumption that hybrid regimes were “in transition” to democracy biased analyses in important ways. electoral and party systems. and civil societies – conditions that were hardly propitious for democratization.139 Informal institutions exist in all regimes but.. which – in important areas of political life – generate distinct patterns of political behavior. this book shows that successful opposition movements were often rooted in state and party weakness. First. successful state. or crack down on protest. transitions often gave rise to new authoritarian incumbents. were left underexplored. In a competitive authoritarian context. executive–legislative relations.. Much of the financial and organizational muscle behind successful opposition challenges in Zambia (1990–1991). and voting behavior. as well as the internal dynamics of these regimes. We examine some of these areas in the following sections. democratic) rules and actual behavior that is inherent to competitive authoritarianism. strategies. parties. The coexistence of meaningful democratic institutions and authoritarian incumbents creates distinctive opportunities and constraints for actors.g.134 Where incumbents lacked strong state and party organizations.g. the factors that contribute to building and sustaining contemporary nondemocracies. scholars often assumed that political processes (e. many post–Cold War transitions were rooted more in the weakness of incumbent governments than in the strength.137 Until recently. Transitions by collapse generally occurred in a context of weak states. Zimbabwe in the 1980s. Such transitions were marked by a paradox: The weakness of state and governing-party organizations made it more likely that an autocrat would be forced from power but less likely that the transition would result in democracy. electoral campaigns. Scholars gave disproportionate attention to factors that shaped the performance and stability of democracy. and Russia in the 2000s) may contribute not to democratization but rather to authoritarian consolidation. they rarely survived during the post–Cold War period. therefore. and legislative politics) worked more or less as they do under democracies. candidate selection. Armenia and Cambodia in the 1990s. given the disjuncture between formal (i. Georgia (2003). Second.138 In treating competitive authoritarian regimes as “transitional” democracies. co-opt opponents. transitions occurred even when oppositions were weak.. although strong parties and states are widely – and correctly – viewed as critical to democratic stability.tools needed to steal elections. Recent work suggests that actors frequently employ informal . Yet such assumptions are often misguided.e.or party-building (e. the distinctive logic of competitive authoritarian politics This book also highlights the importance of taking seriously the dynamics of contemporary authoritarian regimes.

while attempting to distance themselves from human-rights abuses. For example.142 For example. Finally. including possible seizure of . . blackmail.institutions as a “second-best” strategy when they cannot achieve their goals through formal institutions but find the cost of changing those institutions to be prohibitive.g.. single-party) authoritarian rule.”145 Examples include organized war veterans in Armenia and Zimbabwe. or the discretionary use of legal instruments – such as tax authorities and libel laws – to target opposition and the media. but carried out by nonstate actors. . Russia. corruption networks played a central role in ensuring the compliance of state actors during the 1990s. Senegal.”146 They therefore help incumbents achieve the goal of “containing the broad popular challenge to their government. practices such as ballot-box stuffing (e. Peru. Although such repression is formal in the sense that it entails the (often technically correct) application of the law. Competitive authoritarian governments also employ informal mechanisms of repression. Peru. proxy ownership. and “divine mobs” in Nicaragua. institutionalized corruption and patronage and proxy-ownership networks bound key economic.143 In Malaysia. paramilitaries. and manipulation of the vote count.g. Succession poses a serious challenge to most autocracies.141 Although they are frequently ad hoc.. Because such thug groups are not formally linked to state security forces.148 Unlike most democracies.. they provide a “certain invisibility as far as international opinion is concerned. Mexico) and vote-buying (e. authoritarian succession is often a high-stakes game. incumbents who cannot cancel elections or ban opposition candidates frequently turn to illicit strategies such as vote buying. Taiwan) may be institutionalized. the post–Cold War international environment created incentives for incumbents to employ informal mechanisms of coercion and control while maintaining the formal architecture of democracy. miners in Romania. practices.140 By raising the cost of formal (e. chim´eres in Haiti. it is an informal institution in that enforcement is widely known to be selective. Another informal institution found in many competitive authoritarian regimes is organized corruption.”147 Succession Politics Competitive authoritarianism also generates distinct challenges in the realm of executive succession. and civil-society actors to governing parties. Because informal means of coercion are more difficult for international observers to identify than formal mechanisms of repression (e.144 When the cost of imposing martial law or banning opposition activity is prohibitively high.g. “ethnic warriors” in Kenya. “kick-down-the-door gangs” in Guyana. and militias. authoritarian incumbents employ informal or “privatized” violence to suppress opposition. incumbents may opt for violence that is “orchestrated by the state . such as vigilantes. Ukraine. media.. Russia. Mexico. The value of this form of repression is its legal veneer: Prosecution for tax fraud or corruption can be presented to the world as enforcement of the rule of law rather than repression. for example. This book highlights a range of informal rules. Bribery. they were often critical to the survival of post–Cold War autocracies. in Cambodia. and organizations used by incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes. and Taiwan. and elsewhere. party “youth wings” in Kenya and Malawi. Outgoing incumbents often face serious risks. In the electoral arena. many of them use “legal” repression. ballot-box stuffing. and other illicit exchanges are often critical to sustaining authoritarian governing coalitions. press censorship or bans on opposition).g.

In Ukraine. Zambia (1996). Kenya (2002). Cameroon (1992 and 1997). oppositions may boycott elections in an effort to undermine their domestic or international legitimacy. electoral or parliamentary) strategies with extra-institutional ones. On the one hand. but the unpopular Yanukovych lost the 2004 election. outgoing rulers erred on the side of safety. In Malawi (1994).157 Major opposition parties boycotted at least one round of presidential or parliamentary elections in Ghana (1992). seeking to maximize votes. Serbia (1997). parties must take seriously elections and other democratic institutions. conventional vote-maximizing strategies are complemented – and sometimes trumped – by strategies aimed at shoring up or undermining the existing regime. On the other hand. Benin (2001). parties take the political regime as given and work within it: They participate in elections. they face a challenge that does not exist in other authoritarian regimes: the need to win competitive elections. and Ukraine (2004).156 opposition parties combined conventional (i. party behavior is distinct under competitive authoritarian regimes. such politicians often lack the voter appeal to win elections.149 Indeed. particularly if their close connection to the regime makes them vulnerable to blackmail. and Senegal (2007). however. When opposition parties participate in elections. parties often play a “dual game” that encompasses both electoral and regime objectives. that parties are vote-maximizing – hold only where elections are the “only game in town. for example. President Kuchma chose Viktor Yanukovych – a corrupt official with a criminal past – apparently because he could be controlled via blackmail. competing on a skewed playing field often requires strategies that have little to do with vote-maximization. In Peru. which make them more difficult to control. In unconsolidated democracies and hybrid regimes. Thus. incumbents often seek a successor who they can trust to protect them.150 For this reason. in part – on their ability to win votes and control legislatures. many former rulers in competitive authoritarian regimes have been exiled or imprisoned after leaving office. . Mali (1997).”153 In such a context. By contrast. successors won elections but subsequently turned on their patrons. Parties clearly play a dual game in competitive authoritarian regimes.154 In other words. choosing loyal but weak candidates who lost elections. ill-fated) third term in 2000. standard assumptions about party behavior – for example. As Scott Mainwaring has noted.152 Finding a successor who is both electable and trustworthy is often difficult. unlike most authoritarian regimes. the inability to find a viable successor contributed to Fujimori’s decision to seek an illegal (and. On the other hand. the most electorally viable candidates are often figures with independent resources and/or support bases. Peru (2000). however. Haiti (1995 and 2000).155 On the one hand. For example. Trustworthiness and electability are often in tension with one another. ultimately. Zimbabwe (1996 and 2008). A loyal successor is of no value if he or she loses elections. regime insiders – particularly those who lack independent stature or resources – are more likely to remain loyal.wealth and prosecution for corruption or human-rights violations. in Malawi (2004) and Zambia (2001). if they lose. their ability to gain or maintain power hinges – at least.e.. in all but a few of our cases. However. they turn to parliamentary opposition.151 At the same time. however. Party Behavior Finally. conditions may induce them to adopt strategies that differ markedly from those seen in democratic regimes.

g. oppositions must “clearly show they are ready to use violence to fight back in case of repression.g.. after oligarch Yulia Tymoshenko’s bank accounts were frozen in the late 1990s. Rather than confine its activities to parliament. civil society and the private sector are generally small and impoverished. . coalitional strategies are often suboptimal. and other benefits. Malawi (1994). An alliance with the government allowed Tymoshenko to regain her assets and build a powerful organization before moving back into opposition. Belarus and Gabon). In countries characterized by extreme underdevelopment (e. Nicaragua and Slovakia) or established organizations. Security forces must realize they cannot resort to violence without risks. As Zoran Dind—ic´. leaving the opposition with limited access to resources. . and Kenya (2002). Alternatively. she abandoned the opposition and created the progovernment Fatherland Party. candidates’ ability to win votes may be just as important as their ability to physically protect or deliver them. joining the government may be the only viable means of securing the resources and media access necessary to remain a viable political force. identities.164 Wade won the presidency in 2000. although recruiting and deploying armed thugs rarely enhances parties’ electoral appeal. Thus. opposition parties may adopt a coalitional strategy.160 Although often characterized as “naked opportunism. From a vote-maximizing standpoint. and core constituencies (e.”161 coalitional strategies may be critical to party survival. Ukraine (1993).162 However. Joining an unpopular (and. Opposition strategies also differ between elections.163 Similarly.”159 Indeed. In Kenya. Venezuela (2002)..” Coalitional strategies at times have been successful. and Malaysia). Such tactics were adopted in Cameroon (1991). where access to resources is so limited that four or five years in opposition can be tantamount to political suicide (e. it can be critical to their ability to campaign and protect the vote. Haiti (2003).. In Ukraine. Serbia (2000).g. Madagascar (1991 and 2009).g. Albania. joining the government in pursuit of state resources. media access. while other opposition parties languished.One is thug mobilization. successful oppositions mobilized both votes and thugs in Benin (1991). Guyana.g. much of Africa and the former Soviet Union). and Georgia (2003 and 2007).. .158 In a context of widespread violence or lawlessness. in many cases. Unless parties have a generous external patron (e. where she would become a major player in the Orange Revolution. stated. the main architect of Serbia’s “bulldozer revolution” in 2000. Albania (1991 and 1997). Cambodia and Malawi) or extensive state control of the economy (e. corrupt and repressive) government may erode opposition parties’ electoral and activist bases. oppositions in competitive authoritarian regimes may engage in mass protest aimed at toppling the government (or forcing it to undertake democratizing reform) before the end of its mandate. politicians may conclude that joining the governments is the best means of preserving their organizations in order to “play another day.. opposition leader Raila Odinga led his National Development Party (NDP) into a “partnership” with the Moi government during the late 1990s in exchange for police protection and access to patronage . protection. the entry of Abdoulaye Wade’s Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) entry into government coalitions in 1991 and 1995 brought the party access to patronage resources that it used for organization building.

they may adopt strategies (e. Because violations do not directly affect mainstream political competition. Thailand. or an uneven playing field (i. and Morocco)167. opposition parties play a dual game.171 Our criteria for scoring cases (and the actual coding) are elaborated in Appendix I. (2) regimes in which top executive positions are filled via elections but the authority of elected governments is seriously constrained by the military or other nonelected bodies (e.165 In 2001. mass protest) aimed at undermining the regime. and (3) competitive regimes under foreign occupation (e. such hybrid regimes are not competitive authoritarian. alliances with unpopular governments) that – although suboptimal from a vote-seeking standpoint – allow them to compete and survive on a skewed playing field. including a variety of regimes in which political competition exists but nonelected officials retain considerable power. We exclude from the analysis other types of hybrid (or “partly free”) regimes. This means that although opposition parties must take seriously electoral competition and vote-maximization.169 as well as cases in which state collapse makes it difficult to identify any kind of organized political regime. the NDP joined the cabinet.. Regimes “cross the line” from democratic to competitive authoritarian if we find evidence of centrally coordinated or tolerated electoral manipulation. Pakistan. Thus.g.g. we scored Botswana as competitive authoritarian .. Our method of scoring may be illustrated with reference to a few cases that fall near the border between competitive authoritarianism and democracy. therefore.e. which “permitted Odinga to organize dissent from within. we limit our study to regimes that were competitive authoritarian prior to 1995 in order to evaluate the impact of our variables over a significant period (at least 13 years).... trying to win by the existing rules while simultaneously seeking to change them. Odinga led a massive defection that helped ensure the 2002 electoral defeat of the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Guatemala. the power of actors outside the electoral process generates a distinct set of dynamics and challenges not found under competitive authoritarianism. Kuwait. in which mainstream parties compete on a reasonably level playing field but widespread human. cases that became competitive authoritarian after 1995 (e.”166 A year later. Jordan. Colombia and Sri Lanka in the early 1990s).e.g. opposition parties are denied significant access to finance or mass media or state institutions are systematically deployed against the opposition).. and Turkey in the early 1990s)168.or civil-rights abuse – often targeting nonmainstream political parties or ethnic groups – persist (e. they may also pursue strategies (e. Our criteria for democracy are strict. case selection and methods Our study examines all 35 regimes in the world that were or became competitive authoritarian between 1990 and 1995. We also exclude cases in which competitive authoritarianism collapses before the completion of a single presidential or parliamentary term. Nigeria and Venezuela) are excluded from the sample. In all of these regimes. systematic civil-liberties violations (i.. Moreover. such as (1) those in which the most important executive office is not elected (e. We also exclude “illiberal” electoral regimes.resources.g.g. During the initial period (1990–1995). electoral boycotts.170 Finally.. abuse is a repeated rather than an exceptional event and is orchestrated or approved by the national government).g.. thug mobilization. Lebanon in the early 1990s).g. Iran. Under competitive authoritarianism.

Malaysia was scored as competitive because. critics suffered no systematic harassment. then regimes were scored as noncompetitive and excluded from analysis. Second. Serbia. Brazil and the Philippines suffered serious problems of democratic governance – including extensive clientelism. On the other side of the line. Egypt was scored as noncompetitive because the Muslim Brotherhood was banned and thousands of its activists were imprisoned.g. Singapore. either formally or effectively. Russia and Zimbabwe in the mid-2000s). the Dominican Republic as competitive authoritarian due to the Balaguer government’s packing of the electoral commission and large-scale manipulation of voter rolls.g. despite highly institutionalized authoritarian controls. Azerbaijan was scored as fully authoritarian because all major opposition candidates were excluded from the 1993 election. and Slovakia as competitive authoritarian due to Meˇciar’s abuse of media and harassment of parliamentary opposition.174 Two points are worth noting here. opposition parties operated legally and seriously contested nearly al parliamentary seats. corruption. By contrast. Guyana. With respect to the line between competitive and full authoritarianism. Likewise.. If parties or candidates are routinely excluded. few of these borderline cases appear to run counter to our theory (see Chapter 8). Indeed.” or near-full authoritarian cases (e. Cambodia. and Uganda) for inclusion. and we scored Georgia as competitive authoritarian due to harassment of major media in the 2004 elections and closure of television stations during the 2007 state of emergency. we scored Benin as democratic because the 2006 election was widely characterized as clean and we found no evidence of serious abuse under President Yayi Boni.g. Namibia and Philippines) or insufficiently competitive (e. Likewise. and Ukraine were scored as democratic because – notwithstanding repeated institutional crises and serious problems of corruption – elections were clean.172 or if electoral fraud is so extensive that voting is essentially meaningless. Azerbaijan. we scored Senegal as competitive authoritarian due to harassment and arrest of opposition politicians and journalists. both cases were scored as competitive . our main criterion is whether opposition parties can use democratic institutions to compete seriously for power. Turning to regime outcomes in 2008. and/or a weak rule of law – in the early 1990s. and opposition parties enjoyed access to media and finance. there exist borderline cases that arguably could be included in the sample but that we judged to be either insufficiently authoritarian (e. Romania. civil-liberties violations against political opposition. these cases were scored as democratic and excluded from the analysis. Singapore was scored as fully authoritarian because restrictions on speech and association made it nearly impossible for opposition groups to operate publicly and because legal controls and other institutional obstacles prevented opposition parties from contesting most seats in parliament. the Dominican Republic and Slovakia in the early 1990s) to “hard.g. or skewed access to media or finance. despite considerable political reform in Kenya and Senegal between 1991 and 2008.. Nevertheless. Hence. First.” near-democratic cases (e.. and Zimbabwe in the 1990s were scored as competitive because – notwithstanding widespread state violence – opposition parties were able to seriously contest national elections.173 Based on these criteria. but we found no evidence of systematic electoral abuse. On the other side of the line. allowing Heydar Aliyev to win with 99 percent of the vote.. as in any study of this type.due to extreme inequalities in access to media and finance. from competing in elections for the national executive. Serbia. Macedonia. competitive authoritarianism is a broad category that ranges from “soft.

the causes of democratization changed considerably after 1989. per capita military spending as a proxy for coercive capacity). Likewise. The indicators used for each variable. it appears that the factors that explain regime outcomes during the 19th century or the Cold War era differ from those that explain regime outcomes during the post–Cold War era.176 Rather than relying on preexisting datasets that were not designed to measure competitive authoritarianism (e.e... are provided in the appendices. Intensive case analysis also allows us to test alternative explanations by examining whether the causal mechanisms posited by rival approaches (e. regime outcomes) and various potential explanatory factors. detailed case studies allow us to examine and test for causal relationships in a way that large-n cross-national studies generally fail to do.17 Our research design also has important advantages. We do not expect ties to the West to have had similar effects during the Cold War period. the case studies demonstrate the causal processes by which low state or party cohesion undermines regime stability (e. for example.. or proxy variables whose measurement validity is often questionable (e. First.and medium-n analyses are limited to one or two regions. The medium-n analysis employed in this study has both limitations and advantages. our case analyses show – over multiple observations – how linkage shapes actors’ behavior in ways that make democratic outcomes more likely. intensive case analysis yields greater measurement validity than is possible in most large-n crossnational studies.g. Sweden. the problem is hardly unique to competitive authoritarianism: Germany. Our theory of linkage’s democratizing effects is relevant only for periods of Western liberal hegemony. First. by preventing governments from cracking down or facilitating elite defection) during crises. and Mongolia were all widely considered democracies in 2008. Second. as well as the actual coding of cases. we developed measures that closely approximate our concepts. by Freedom House. this study compares cases across five regions. Rather than simply show a correlation between theory and outcome among the universe of competitive authoritarian regimes. Whereas most small. our study is bounded historically. As this book suggests.. If that is the case. offer a general theory of regime change. although our coding process is “subjective. Hence. Second. institutional design) are at work. economic crisis.g.178 Our research design sets a high bar for testing our hypotheses. Polity IV).authoritarian throughout the given period. with the international dimension having a far more important role than in earlier periods.177 This method allows us to maximize measurement validity while retaining a level of rigor and standardization that is sometimes lacking in more qualitative studies. our medium-n analysis yields considerable variation in terms of both the dependent variable (i.g. therefore. we must demonstrate that the predicted causal processes are at work in each case. Although this may be unsatisfying. consistent across cases and regions. Thus. it is bounded by regime type. and easily falsifiable – characteristics that are not shared. We do not. At the same time. El Salvador.g.179 which . Our analysis is bounded in two ways.” in the sense that we make the scoring decisions in each case. Freedom House. The fact that our sample includes only competitive authoritarian regimes – and thus is not representative of the broader universe of regimes – limits our ability to make general claims about the effects of linkage and organizational power.. then the generalizability of theories based on analyses of other historical periods also may be limited. inequality. Thus. it is transparent.

instances of democracies . it is worth bearing in mind that complex phenomena such as democratisation are never linear. to recreate . To gain a better understanding of the reasons for such attention.MORLINO It is well known that the principal macropolitical phenomenon of the last half century or thereabouts has been democratisation. the view of Croissant and Merkel that “partial types of democracy are the dominant trend in democratic theory and democratisation studies” comes as no surprise. and what prevents partial democracies from sliding back to autocracy” and that “the determinants of the behaviour of the partial democracies elude our understanding”. ‘semiauthoritarianisms’ (Ottaway). literature on this topic has become predominant in the field of comparative politics. Throughout the same period. the growth of democratisation and the development of associated research has aroused considerable interest in the more specific theme of the spread of hybrid or ‘transitional’ regimes. ‘electoral democracies’ (Diamond). ‘semiconsolidated authoritarian regimes’ (Freedom House).going all the way back to stable authoritarian regimes have been much less frequent. ‘defective democracies’ (Croissant and Merkel).1 Neither does the assertion by Epstein and colleagues that ‘partial democracies’ “account for an increasing portion of current regimes and the lion’s share of regime transitions”. ‘competitive authoritarianisms’ (Levitsky and Way). As a result. Nonetheless. from Southern Europe to Latin America and from Eastern Europe to many areas of Asia and Africa.). though they add that there is little available information about “what prevents full democracies from sliding back to partial democracies or autocracies.even if minimal ones . ‘hybrid regimes’ (in the strict sense of the term). In more recent times. ‘illiberal democracies’ (Zakaria).3 ‘partial democracies’ (Epstein et al.4 as it is more difficult.2 It is no surprise either that such a variety of labels have been coined for these regimes by different authors: ‘semi-consolidated democracies’. albeit still possible. and cases of a return to more ambiguous situations have by no means been an exception to the rule in recent years. that is. These are just some of many the expressions used by scholars investigating the phenomenon that will henceforth be referred to in this paper with the broader term of hybrid regimes. and ‘electoral authoritarianisms’ (Schedler). the transition from nondemocratic to democratic regimes in various parts of the world.

the whole adult demos has the right to vote. c) more than one party. propose a typology of hybrid regimes. To better understand this definition. In so doing. possibly an intermediate one marked by varying degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity. authoritarian crises and the ensuing initial phases of change should be more frequent. such institutions still bear traces of the previous political reality. competitive. with the spread of democratisation.that is. A minimal definition can be established whereby all regimes that have at least the following should be regarded as democratic: a) universal suffrage. even if they are not formal. authoritarian and post-totalitarian) and a democratic one. recurrent and fair elections. So. ‘authoritarianism’ and ‘democracy’. d) different and alternative media sources. this paper will reach a number of unexpected conclusions. it is worth stressing that in a regime of this kind. finally. then the regime in question is no longer democratic. starting with definitions of the terms ‘regime’.5 Furthermore. fair and recurrent elections as an expression of the veritable existence of freedom of speech and thought. attempt to answer the key question posed in the title. secondly. hybrid regimes . there needs to be more than one effectively competing party. b) free. An adequate conceptualisation of the notion of a ‘hybrid regime’ must start with a definition of both the noun and the adjective thus combined to describe a form of government effectively “trapped” between a non-democratic set-up (particularly in the sense of being traditional. One important aspect of this definition is that.in other words. and fourthly. thus providing proof of the existence of the above-mentioned liberties. it is worth stressing that this minimal definition focuses on the institutions that characterise democracy: elections. even if only as the result of an imitation effect. Such rights are assumed to exist subject to the following conditions: firstly. While they no longer belong to some kind of non-democracy.become more frequent. which constitutes the supreme expression of political rights . there must be free. thirdly. With regard to the term ‘regime’. to focus on phases of uncertainty and change. Finally. but do not yet form a complete democracy.that is. Rather. and. pinpoint the pertinent analytic dimensions. indeed opportune. that exist at a given moment in a given nation.conditions of stable coercion once the majority of a given society has been involved and become politically active in the course of transition. consideration will be given here to “the set of government institutions and norms that are either formalised or are informally recognised as existing in a given territory and with respect to a given population. is that the type of regime in question does not fulfil the minimum requirements of a democracy . there must be a real guarantee of civil and political rights. more generally. This paper will outline the quantitative terms of democratisation. competing . it is fully justified. in periods of democratisation. it constitutes some other political and institutional set-up. As will become clear. The second point that can be established. it does not meet all the more immediately controllable and empirically essential conditions that make it possible to establish a threshold below which a regime cannot be considered democratic. regimes characterised by uncertainty and transition . If nothing else. there must be authentic universal suffrage. both male and female. then. as Dahl noted many years ago.”11 Emphasis will be placed on the institutions. or at some point ceases to be so. but also. there must be different media sources belonging to different proprietors. Consequently. demonstrating the existence of a genuine right of association. greater coercive resources would be required. this question is not only closely bound up with prospects for change in the nations that have such ambiguous forms of political organisation. if the goal is to examine and explain how regimes move towards democracy. if just one of these requirements is not met.

the degree of participation and political mobilisation. fourthly. it should be pointed out that we are not in the ambit of the electoral democracies defined by Diamond solely with regard to “constitutional systems in which parliament and executive are the result of regular. a hegemonic party or even a monarch with pretensions to influencing decisionmaking processes.”16 As for authoritarian regimes. but actually quite predictable. in which there are effectively applied norms to sustain and preserve pluralism and individual and group freedoms. economic oligarchies. the presence of ambiguous and ill- . or rather. competitive. they are typically legibus soluti regimes. in which there is interinstitutional accountability that is. religious hierarchies. access to the media on the part of the principal parties and open electoral campaigns. out of a maximum of twelve. Another point to note is that it is also important. fair and competitive elections with the guarantee of a secret ballot and voter safety. secondly. in the second case. According to the application of the term by Freedom House. except at some points in their development.parties (at least potentially so). or. a small group. in which there is no room for “reserved domains” of actors who are not electorally responsible. without either extensive or intense political mobilisation. a score equal to or above seven. reference must at least be made to traditional and authoritarian regimes. all democracies are ‘electoral democracies’. the responsibility of one organ towards another as laid down by the constitution. where the sovereign’s arbitrary decisions are not limited by norms and do not need to be justified ideologically. ‘non-elected actors’ or exponents of other external regimes. occasionally. according to Schmitter and Karl.12 The former refers to the armed forces. once again regarding political society.17 This definition permits the identification of five significant dimensions: firstly. exercise power from within formally ill-defined. the presence and composition of the group that exercises power. we are referring to his notion of minimal liberal democracies. even those regimes that do not have a maximum score in the indicators for elections continue to be considered electoral democracies. The former are “based on the personal power of the sovereign. is sufficient for partially free nations to be classified as electoral democracies (see Table 1). then. which mainly concerns the political actors who determine the regime and its policies. Therefore. or at least the overall functioning of a democracy.15 As regards the definition of non-democratic regimes. multiparty elections with universal suffrage”. the degree of political pluralism. To avoid terminological confusion. that these institutions and rights should not be subject to. In these regimes. or conditioned by. but with distinctive mentalities.14 The term ‘electoral democracies’ is also used by Freedom House with a similar meaning: an electoral democracy is understood as a multi-party. and in which a leader. fifth and lastly. directly or indirectly. More specifically. as usually occurs with a single party. competitive system with universal suffrage. the definition advanced by Linz is still the most useful one: a “political system with limited. Power is thus used in particularistic forms and for essentially private ends. the ideology. while there is an evident lack of any form of developed ideology and any structure of mass mobilisation. without an elaborated and guiding ideology. and finally. the political set-up is dominated by traditional elites and institutions. a regime might be conditioned by an external power that deprives the democracy in question of its independence and sovereignty by pursuing non-democratic policies. and media pluralism. thirdly. non-responsible political pluralism. who binds his underlings in a relationship of fear and reward. limits”.13 Instead. the ideological justification behind the regime. the armed forces and police play a central role. but not all are liberal. Basically.

legitimating significance. which is invariably of marked importance in many transitional cases.security services. The notion of limited pluralism suggests the importance of identifying the pertinent actors in each authoritarian regime in order to better understand both the structure of the regime and the policies it pursues. This situation has two implications at the regime level. then. do not offer the expression of rights and freedoms and the genuine competition to be found in democratic regimes. which also point more generally to the nature of the rules and procedures adopted in the authoritarian regime. while the fifth may also relate to traditional regimes. it implies the partial weakness or the absence of mobilisation structures. it is particularly important to pinpoint the significant actors. the most important aspect that needs to be considered is mobilisation . through free. the bureaucratic system or a part thereof and.defined rules. albeit low. the latter include the Church. Furthermore. in some cases. may be desired and controlled from above. such as the single party or similar state institutions . In any case. the dimensions that are genuinely important for an understanding of non-democratic regimes are the first three mentioned. it is exercised at the level of “invisible politics” in the real relations between. In terms of the interaction between society and institutions. an expression of consensus and support for the regime on the part of a controlled. there is also another implicit aspect that must not be forgotten: the absence of real guarantees regarding the various political and civil rights. such as direct consultations through plebiscites.which may be autonomous or part of the military structure.in other words. have no democratic significance and. structures capable of simultaneously generating and controlling participation. Such actors are not politically responsible according to the typical mechanism of liberal democracies . Firstly. Once institutions have been created and then become stable over a certain number of years. in phases of greater stability. then.that is. above all.that is. a certain degree of participation. Examples of the former are the army. These can be divided into institutional actors and politically active social actors. military leaders and economic groups or landowners. However. elections or the other forms of electoral participation that may exist. frequently neglected. a single party. This term is understood in broad terms as the set of politically active social groups that support the regime as it is being established and in successive periods . to refer to the concept of the dominant coalition. the rulers of a non-democratic regime will adopt policies designed to keep civil society outside the political arena.that is. nonautonomous civil society. industrial or financial groups. This may range from monism to a certain number of crucial active actors in the regime. They mainly have a symbolic. where applicable. non-extensive and nonintense. It makes it possible. Secondly. For every non-democratic regime. even when it has become firmly democratic. competitive and fair elections. even unions or transnational economic structures with a major interest in the nation concerned. for instance. The degree of limited. it implies the existence of efficient. A further. non-responsible pluralism is also of central importance. landowners and. If there is “responsibility”. the quantum of mass participation induced and controlled from above. Obviously. they often leave behind a significant legacy in a new regime. for instance . The fourth needs to be considered in relation to the first. repressive apparatuses capable of implementing the abovementioned demobilisation policies . The term is also understood in a more restricted sense as the elites .which constitute the direct or indirect . Political society has no recognised autonomy or independence. but nonetheless important dimension should also be added and emphasised: the institutional structure of the regime. therefore. in that it essentially specifies it. groups that lie at the social core of the regime.

and such agreement is in turn easier if certain ideologies.that is. either in the sense that minority players are marginalised. or. Certain authoritarian regimes are distinguished by the fact that they are legitimated on the basis of “mentality”.principally. there is a consensus to reject certain types of fracture that existed in or were just prefigured in the previous regime. Above all. It is. when it is established. again iii) subordinating different interests to his or her power. Political marginalisation is achieved thanks to a combination of police repression and the use of the ideological apparatus adopted by the regime’s elites for their own legitimation. it is always a relative notion with respect to the resources employed in the political arena. Once a regime is established. for instance. The point that deserves attention is that such groups. He or she may do so by i) effectively acting as an arbitrator or mediator between different interests. then. promises. a coalition of this kind may be more homogeneous than a democratic one: even when there is no agreement on the (nondemocratic) method. etc. or in the sense that some actors acquire greater prominence over others in the wake of the events and developments that characterise the setting up of the regime. including peasants or workers who were previously active in political life to a greater or lesser degree by virtue of their membership of political parties or unions. the homogeneity and solidity of the coalition increases in direct proportion to the breadth of agreement between the various actors with regard to substantive problems. an authoritarian coalition may appear more homogeneous and more solid in that there is some substantive agreement. simply . On the other hand. and the related elites. while in others it is the result of an explicit. and may exclude and marginalise all others. conscious agreement on concrete ways of resolving political conflicts .). either in negative or positive terms. with regard to class conflict and the specific issues associated with it. while also using a variety of strategies to keep those interests bound together (personal loyalty ties. A very important role in defining the features and the concrete functioning of the dominant coalition may be played – and often is in quite concrete terms – by a leader who interacts with all the components of the coalition itself. or ii) favouring. then.in other words. but nonetheless real coalition.expression of the afore-mentioned groups . In any case. according to the term borrowed from the German sociologist Geiger . or due to the internal ramifications of external events. regarding the concrete settlement of conflicts. and sometimes in supporting certain solutions in a positive sense. This does not preclude the possibility that other resources of the same type may exist but are not employed at certain crucial moments. certain interests over others. when it follows on from a democratic regime. influence and status. dominant above all at the moment when the regime is established. more or less consciously and perhaps by making an ideological choice. the establishment of a non-democratic regime is often the result of a coalition that is “anti-something” rather than for something . The third characteristic concerns the degree of elaboration of the ideological justification for the regime. the coalition may gradually undergo modification. principles or values become prevalent in the governing coalition. It should also be added that predominance in terms of resources also entails consideration of the field of potential or real opponents to the regime and the coalition that supports it. it is a negative coalition. As such. A coalition is dominant in terms of coercive resources. sometimes form an implicit. forms of coercion. This agreement is to the advantage of the actors who form part of the coalition.that contribute to governing the regime itself in that they occupy positions of command in key structures of the authoritarian set-up. which are used concretely by the actors in the political arena to achieve their objectives. Basically.

be backed by tradition. where both traditional and modernising positions can. ad hoc constitutional organs. however. military juntas. These groups are allowed to participate in the political process. institutionalises characteristic new political structures. respect of civil rights. and to what extent. we might talk. liberalisation and a partial relaxation of the restrictions on pluralism. like the traditional ones. three possible hypotheses for a definition that takes account of the context of origin. There are. thanks also to a partial. in defining hybrid regimes. have either retained some authoritarian or traditional features. distinct forms of parliamentary assembly. one of which remains hegemonic and dominant in semi-competitive elections.that is. at the . above all – which place restrictions on competitive pluralism without. order. hierarchy and authority. a number of opposition groups have clearly taken root. the regime is not supported by any complex. the only effective justification for the regime is personal in nature . they can be said to be all those regimes preceded by a period of authoritarian or traditional rule. These may include a single party. and relative. To use expressions common in the Iberian world. see the intervention of nonelected bodies – the military. followed by the beginnings of greater tolerance. a given authoritarian regime creates and.on the basis of a number of “mental” or “intellectual attitudes”. the regime arises out of a traditional regime. If at least the first and second of these hypotheses are developed further – though the majority of cases in recent decades would seem to fall into the first category – it can be seen that alongside the old actors of the previous authoritarian or traditional regime. and sometimes have.20 However. following a period of minimal democracy in the sense indicated above. unions (which may be vertical ones admitting both workers and employers). of certain values (which may be more or less explicitly articulated or may remain ambiguous) around which it is easier to find an agreement between actors who have different inherent characteristics and often very divergent interests. it is now possible to start delineating hybrid regimes as those regimes that have acquired some of the characteristic institutions and procedures of democracy. possibly based on the functional and corporative representation of interests (see below). found common ground. at the same time. in the case of a monarch who has acceded to power on a hereditary basis. but have little substantial possibility of governing. a number of parties.19 Having established definitions for the types of regime bordering on the ones analysed here. a monarchy or sultanism. then. Alternatively. which can be better explained as follows: the regime arises out of one of the different types of authoritarianism that have existed in recent decades. to serve a certain leader. it seems more appropriate to start from the context in which they originate. From this perspective. creating a more or less stable authoritarian regime.18 These values include notions like homeland. distinctive electoral systems. In any case. as certain Latin American scholars have done. who form part of a coalition that is no longer dominant or united. In other regimes. The fourth significant dimension concerns the political structures that are created and institutionalised in the non-democratic regime. perhaps. or even earlier. then. nation. but not others. which is an important clarification of the second: the regime is the result of decolonialisation that has never been followed by either authoritarian or democratic stabilisation. of dictablandas and democraduras. articulated ideological elaboration. who may. or other specific organs different from those that existed in the previous regime. To these must be added a fourth. What needs to be examined here is if. or the regime arises out of the crisis of a previous democracy. There are. or lost some elements of democracy and acquired some authoritarian ones. they can be defined as all those regimes which. and.

to continue to maintain order and the previous distributive set-up. In order to gain a better understanding of hybrid regimes. There is. however. Potentially. a powerfully distorting electoral system allows the hegemonic. of recent creation or re-creation. Evident forms of police repression are also absent. Finer seemed to have detected the existence of hybrid regimes when he analysed “façade democracies” and “quasi-democracies”. These include constitutions which claim to guarantee rights and free elections. if there have ever been any. There is some degree of real participation. dominant party to maintain an enormous advantage in the distribution of seats. by moderate governmental actors in the previous authoritarian or traditional regime to resist internal or external pressures on the dominant regime. In fact.obviously prior to 1976 .21 Looking more closely at these two models. no genuine respect for civil and political rights. the next step that is necessary to understand what effectively distinguishes these regimes (see Table 1) is to develop some kind of typology. and so the role of the relative apparatuses is not prominent. three possible directions could be taken to achieve this goal: the drawing up of a classification based on the origins mentioned above. the party in question is a bureaucratic structure rife with patronage favours. In the face of this variety in the origin and ambiguity of internal structures. it is clear that the former can be tied in with the category of traditional regimes. the distinguishing characteristics at a given point in time – for example. while the position of the armed forces is even more low key. are just a memory of the past. the participation of whom is also contained within limits.and certain African nations with a one-party system. not even merely on the basis of all-encompassing and ambiguous values. above all. it is also worth noting that they often stem from the attempt. . an examination of the processes of change undergone by the nations in question and the consequences for the institutional set-up that emerges.same time. there is already some form of real competition amongst the candidates of the dominant party. and only have a small following. The other parties are fairly unorganised. at least temporarily successful. and to partially satisfy – or at least appear to – the demand for greater democratisation on the part of other actors. Many years ago. but rather to instances of authoritarian regimes with certain exterior forms of the democratic regime. and therefore on the legacy of the previous regime. that is. but do not reflect an even partially democratic state of affairs. if not a full-blown process of de-institutionalisation. though it is still less explicit and direct. however. which is trying to survive the on-going transformation. The notion of “pseudodemocracy” also refers not to a hybrid regime. in many cases. but it is minimal and usually limited to the election period. Often. which says a good deal about their potential significance. then. typical examples of “quasi-democracies” are considered to be Mexico . maintain an evident political role. The armed forces may. considers the result. in 2007 – of those nations that fall within the genus of hybrid regimes. and consequently no form of political competition either. more ‘simply’. Other forms of participation during the authoritarian period. Many cases could be fitted into this model. This means that there is no longer any justification for the regime. while the latter falls within the broader authoritarian genre. there is little institutionalisation and. there are as many different variants of transitional regimes as there are types of authoritarian and traditional models. organisation of the “state”. In abstract terms. Overall. and a third line which.

proposes four categories on the basis of the degree of existing competition: hegemonic electoral authoritarian. The first category is comprised of regimes with an average rating from 3. as has been done here. electoral democracy (see above) and a residual category of ambiguous regimes.25 The main difference between the four proposals lies in the fact that. Diamond. and the third.99. Using its own data.is to cite the simplest solution.99.00 to 3. the authors point to different factors as being the crucial elements for explaining what these regimes really are.00 and 4. proposed by Freedom House. which took the third approach mentioned above. and semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes. who starts from the more general notion of the hybrid regime. . of regimes whose average lies between 5. the second. competitive authoritarian.A suitable starting point – albeit not an exhaustive answer . Freedom House broke down the ensemble of nations defined as ‘partially free’ into semi-consolidated democracies. of regimes whose average lies between 4. while also having explanatory objectives.99 (see Table 1) Finally.00 and 5.24The regimes in three out of these four categories fail to provide the minimum guarantee of civil rights that would grant them the status of electoral democracies. transitional or hybrid regimes in the strict sense.

A wave of democratisation originating in Portugal and Spain in the 1970s swept across the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s. unpredictable. many of these new regimes have become stuck in transition. the modernisation approach espoused in the mainstream literature of the 1960s and 1970s5 emphasised that democracy was more likely to emerge in countries with high(er) levels of socio-economic development.6 Some studies also emphasised the importance of cultural and religious factors. combining a rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy with essentially illiberal and/or authoritarian traits.3 however imperfect they might be. or both. hybrid regimes tend to be unstable. because a broad consensus to uphold democracy as the ‘only game in town’ is lacking. 123 of 192. or about three-fifths. previous experiences with democratisation).4 The advent of the Third Wave of democratisation challenged many of the assumptions that scholars and policymakers alike had made about the relationship between democracy and development.Alina Rocha Menocal A wave of democratisation swept across the developing world from the 1980s onwards. The article concludes by arguing that a deeper understanding of the problems besetting these regimes helps to provide a more realistic assessment of what these incipient and fragile democracies can be expected to achieve. only a limited number of countries have succeeded in establishing consolidated and functioning democratic regimes. This so-called ‘Third Wave’2 moved across Latin America and Eastern Europe. by 2006. This article analyses the emergence and key characteristics of these ‘hybrid regimes’ and the challenges of democratic deepening. Such structuralist approaches to democratisation . In particular. However. of all the world’s states were considered ‘electoral democracies’. despite the momentous transformation that this so-called ‘Third Wave’ has brought to formal political structures in regions ranging from Africa to Asia to Latin America. and of historical legacies (i. The transformation in the nature of political regimes was remarkable: whereas in 1974 there were 41 democracies among the existing 150 states.e. and later Asia and Africa. It suggests that. Instead.

This was very visibly the case in the democratisation processes in the Phillippines in the 1980s and South Africa in the early 1990s as well as in the so-called ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine in 20042005.13 this process-oriented model of democratisation tends to focus on internal dynamics almost exclusively. these transitions were the result not only of the determination of national political actors. while acknowledging the importance of structural factors in shaping actor choices to varying degrees. the emergence of a bourgeoisie. with limited exceptions. a budding literature has emerged since the 1980s that seeks to understand democratic transitions from a processoriented approach.9 Thus. only a limited number of countries that have undergone transitions to democracy have succeeded in establishing consolidated and functioning democratic regimes. In many cases. many of the movements towards formal democracy from the 1980s onward took place in countries where such transformation would not have been expected based on low levels of economic development and other socio-economic indicators.8 The only region that seems to remain relatively outside this wave of democratisation is the Arab World. While the modernisation argument provides an explanation for transition in South Korea. in Asia and especially in Africa (and possibly low-income and aid-dependent countries elsewhere). many of these new regimes have . a broad consensus has emerged that economic development per se is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for democratic transition.10 In response to the perceived limitations of modernisation theory. where democratisation transitions were driven mostly from within. such as Kenya and Nigeria. Thailand and Chile. diplomatic pressure and the withholding of aid from repressive regimes).12 The focus of this literature is on elite interactions. it is essential to keep in mind that democratisation processes are not linear. widespread social mobilisation and (the threat of violent) protest from below were instrumental in bringing about democratic change. economic development. ideas and the interaction among strategic domestic political actors in bringing about transitions in ‘unlikely places’. increasing urbanisation. but also of external pressures and incentives (for example. In some cases.understood the emergence of democracy as a consequence of the transformation of class structure.14 In contrast. Third Wave transitions also defied cultural arguments positing that democracy is incompatible with certain faiths and religious values. Challenges to democratic deepening: the emergence of ‘hybrid’ regimes Hybrid regimes Despite the momentous transformation that the Third Wave has brought about to formal political structures in much of the developing world.11 This literature emphasises the importance of decisions. Taiwan. In addition. Instead. however. external actors played a much stronger role in these political transformations. A large number of countries experiencing a transition to democracy7 during the Third Wave fell in the bottom third of the Human Development Index. It thus has most relevance in the Eastern European and Latin American experiences. In fact. the prior development of democratic values and other socioeconomic factors.

16 or. In the African region. whereas others may be slipping towards more authoritarian and personality-driven practices. they have come to occupy a precarious middle ground between outright authoritarianism and fully-fledged democracy. where formal institutional processes seem to fall short in terms of substance. Zambia and Mexico offer interesting examples of . including the promotion of economic development. representation and effectiveness. quality. progress towards more formalised democratic institutions is definitely moving forward. the inability of many of these new democracies to meet the demands and basic needs of their citizens. In all cases. and Argentina and Brazil. some incipient democracies may be moving (however slowly) in the direction of consolidation as formal rules gradually begin to displace informal ones not only in rhetoric but also in practice. In particular. efficiency and sustainability over time. democratic deepening in general has thus far remained more limited.’18 Thus. ‘hybrid’ regimes. more generally. or reverting to more or less authoritarian forms of rule.ended up ‘getting stuck’ in transition. Still. has led to critical questions about their nature. In Latin America.22 There is growing recognition that the holding of elections alone does not offer a cure for the deeper political and social problems besetting states in many developing countries. it is important to recognise that democratisation processes are not static or linear. Other countries. Over the past few years. Although the general tendency has been toward some kind of hybridisation of democratic structures and institutions. may be moving even further down the route of formal institutional deterioration towards a situation of political meltdown. However. the existence of some formal democratic institutions and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits. Nigeria or Uganda to address some of the challenges besetting their incipient democratic structures. countries like Ghana and Mozambique seem to be much more firmly positioned than others like Kenya. These incipient democracies. for instance. there is a considerable difference between the quality of democratic politics in places like Bolivia and Ecuador.20 The wave of ‘democratic optimism’ in the 1990s associated with the global triumph of democracy and capitalism around the world * what Francis Fukuyama21 enthusiastically described as ‘the end of history’ * has now given way to more sober appraisals about the current health of democratic systems in the developing world. like Malawi and Ethiopia. where despite considerable ups and downs and abrupt and unexpected changes. especially those that emerged during the Third Wave.15 ‘delegative’. so that democratic quality in any given country is likely to fluctuate and experience progress and reversals over time.17 constitute ‘ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy. academics and policymakers alike have focused increasing attention on the challenges and dilemmas that these ‘grey zone’ countries confront in regions across the globe.19 and their democratic structures remain fragile (see Table 1). it is also important to recognise that there is considerable variation in terms of democratic developments within democracies in the developing world. which have been variously described as ‘illiberal’.

g. Some theorists and observers of countries like Egypt claim they are stable and can be sustained indefinitely. The elections in Kenya in December 2007 provide a particularly poignant (and violent) example of this. analysing public opinion data in several countries in the region. Some appear to be quite stable and durable. in the sense that authority tends to be personalised and to be governed by more informal understandings than by formal rules. Because. once democratisation forces are unleashed. and institutional conditions and legacies * may have a considerable impact on the prospects of democratic consolidation. However. as noted above. In these regimes. the most recent literature on transitions to democracy emphasises that there are very few preconditions for the emergence of democracy. or both. and this is the main challenge hybrid regimes are facing today. for the most part. Michael Bratton. the building and strengthening of such a democratic political culture is bound to take a long time. but that it remains quite shallow. analysts seem to be reaching a consensus that structural factors * such as underlying economic. based on performance) and not ‘principled’ (i.’ According . such states. Challenges to democratic deepening Whereas. As noted above. but have limited knowledge or commitment to its specific component institutions. Admittedly. hybrid regimes tend to be either unstable. In addition. parties. In other words. some hybrid regimes may be more stable than others. also can be quite effective. the democratic process needs to be viewed as the only legitimate means to gain power and to channel/process demands. in essence. all outcomes are in principle unknown and are open to contest among key players (e. As Bratton28 put it. it appears to be more difficult to maintain a stable equilibrium. if there is astute political leadership and if the resources exist to keep public demands at bay. forces and institutions view and accept democracy as ‘the only game in town’. there is an ongoing debate in the literature about how unstable hybrid regimes are. The only certainty is that such outcomes will be determined within the framework of preestablished democratic rules. as illustrated by the highly problematic presidential election that took place in 2006. who will win an electoral contest or what policies will be enacted). ‘people may be attached to the general idea of a democratic regime.such tendencies. Robert Mattes and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi27 found that popular support for democracy is wide. but they still lack predictability. Here once again the case of Mexico comes to mind. a broad consensus among both the elites and the mass public to uphold democracy as the only viable system of rule is lacking. organised interests. This. In a democracy.e. while considerably authoritarian. Above all. based on political attributes). There is a considerable debate in the literature on this issue.e.25 or unpredictable. commitment to the rules of the game is at best ‘instrumental’ (i. democratic consolidation requires the evolution of a democratic political culture where all the main political players (both in the elite and the mass public). is the main concept embedded in Adam Przeworski’s definition of democracy24 as ‘institutionalised uncertainty’. In the main. social.26 In the particular case of Africa.

34 some general traits may be observed:35 Presidentialism and governmental accountability These regimes tend to be characterised by populist politics. in hybrid regimes many formal institutions that are crucial to make democracy work suffer from a lack of credibility and/or trust. In a much discussed quantitative analysis.33 Thus. Looking at cross-regional data from 1950 to 1990 on a wide variety of well-performing and poor-performing democracies. a figure that seems high. As Nicholas van de Walle36 noted in several African countries where party systems have emerged. as highlighted above. formal reversals to authoritarianism even among the poorest countries may offer some solace. controls in many cases a large proportion of state finance without accountability. with particular weaknesses in East Asia. economic development has a very important impact on the sustainability of democratic systems. expectations for these incipient democracies to deliver tend to be rather high and unrealistic.. Przeworski and Fernando Limongi30 found that. unaccountable ‘delegative’/ strong-man leadership. power is intensely personalised around the figure of the president .. especially in the area of elections.31 The fact that. although there is no minimum level of economic development (measured in terms of per capita income) that is necessary for a country to be able to make a transition to democracy.32 But it remains true in any case that democracies that have failed to produce developmental outcomes remain much more fragile and unstable * again because commitment to them is instrumental and not principled. contrary to what Przeworski and Limongi would have predicted. This may be due in part to the fact that.. which adds to the considerable strain they are often under. In an article on public opinion and democracy . the authors found that the less successful democratic regimes are in generating economic growth.. In addition.’ Moreover.. and opaque decision-making processes. the more likely they are to break down. given the current international discourse in favour of democracy (at least formally). there is considerable variation among hybrid regimes. Bratton37 also highlighted that in many African countries. despite considerable democratic advancements. and delegates remarkably little of his authority on important matters . popular perceptions about democracy are still based in terms of whether individuals enjoy special access/ties to the incumbent president. including in particular Africa and Latin America. one out of three of those interviewed did not prefer democracy to any other form of government. He is literally above the law.to Afrobarometer data. Only the apex of the executive really matters. outright authoritarian ‘solutions’ to domestic problems are a lot less likely to be tolerated. and it does not seem to be improving with the advent of democratic politics. there have been few fullfledged. This kind of leadership has a long tradition in many parts of the developing world. Characteristics of hybrid regimes Although.. ‘[r]egardless of constitutional arrangements . However. recent data from Freedom House29 suggest declining support for democracy almost everywhere in the world. Levels of credibility and/or trust in formal (democratic) institutions Trust in state institutions is essential for political stability and compliance with the law.

if any. As highlighted by many of the electoral contests that took place in the region in 20052006. is. the armed forces. Political participation In general. political participation often takes place outside formal institutional channels. As above. such as political parties and the judiciary.46 Informal practices (including presidentialism. This leads to the further de-institutionalisation of fragile democratic structures (Bolivia in particular comes to mind). Nonetheless. cannot be trusted or are not adequately representative. In short.42 Institutions that are meant to check the executive. They often lack a structure that can penetrate the national territory. indeed. On the positive side. In the case of Africa. clientelism. Yet many people seem to harbour doubts that elections can actually result in alternations of power. ranking well below the Church and. African parties are weakly institutionalised and characterised by poor organisational capacity. there is no ‘institutionalised uncertainty’ as defined by Przeworski. and therefore cannot secure compliance. at best. the quality of its democracy will equally suffer. Marta Lagos38 found that. applied unevenly. as Gretchen Helmke and . which is intended to establish formal rules and regulations a priori to order political interactions and make politics more transparent and predictable. In addition. for example. Because there is a widespread feeling that key institutions. This means that the equality of citizens before the law cannot be guaranteed. national legislatures and political parties have been shown to be the institutions least trusted by the population.47 The rule of law. between 1996 and 2001. shallow political participation outside elections43 and weak governmental accountability lead to a sense of collective public frustration about what democracy can deliver and what can be achieved through formal political institutions. and corruption) persist and often take precedence. are widely perceived as performing below par. including the judiciary. this lack of faith in political parties and legislatures seems to remain unabated.41 In addition.39 This state of affairs is particularly troubling if one considers that parties play a crucial role in nurturing and sustaining democratic governance: if the health of the party system in a particular country deteriorates (or is never established in the first place). have dormant organisations between elections and few. Formal institutions are often perceived as biased or unfair. organisational resources.in Latin America. with formal and informal institutions coexisting in ways that are often not complementary. all of these practices and dynamics lead to the ongoing deterioration of already weak formal democratic structures. Bratton40 found that many key formal institutions of the state fail to meet popular demands. public support for other formal institutions of democracy * such as multiple parties and legislative and judicial independence * continues to lag considerably behind. Rules of the game As Goran Hyden44 noted in the case of Africa and Guillermo O’Donnell45 argued in the case of Latin America. there is growing evidence that regular elections are becoming routinised and institutionalised features of political life. civil society organisations and media critical of the incumbent government often find themselves harassed or otherwise victimised by government sanctions. in these types of regimes the rules of the game are contested.

55 Many of the elections that took place in Latin . for the first time in 2005. but at the same time more actors demand to be included in decision-making processes and expect better services and enhanced state accountability. The state may be overwhelmed by the new demands brought about by democratic pressures. personalised ties may be essential in providing legitimacy for fragile democratic structures. mass satisfaction with democracy fell under the critical threshold of 50%. a poor record of service delivery. and unable to respond adequately because it lacks the necessary institutional and administrative capacity. the elections in May 2005 triggered more than a year of civil unrest concerning the results.Steven Levitsky48 have shown. through government-controlled procurement processes)..50 Elections themselves can be a source of corruption. practices like corruption or the selective application of justice undermine trust in formal institutions. The resulting disillusionment about how democracy is seen to be working in practice can be potentially destabilising.’ He also noted that. it is important to recognise that informal institutions may cut both ways for democracy in terms of having both positive as well as negative impacts.53 This dual dynamic reinforces the prospects for instability. including unruly political discourse. especially when citizens have few means of holding elites to account beyond 34 A. ‘Malawi has a hybrid. In the case of Africa. The distribution of the spoils of office takes precedence over the formal functions of the state. For example. severely limiting the ability of public officials to make policies in the general interest. and even the legitimacy and credibility.51 The civil service often continues to suffer from a mix of ethnic/regional and political clientelism * ranging from the creation of additional ministries to accommodate important support groups to the abuse of civil servants to rally support for incumbents during pre-election periods. Downloaded By: [Rocha Menocal. Rocha Menocal et al. Nigeria and Kenya offer stark examples of such endemic problems related to corruption and to patronclient networks. Clearly. As David Booth and co-authors52 noted with reference to Malawi. since campaigning is expensive. There seems to be a growing nostalgia for a return of the army to politics * even though the proportion of people who reject military rule remains relatively high (73% in 2005). in Ethiopia.’ Popular expectations and state capacity State capacity remains persistently weak.g.49 Corruption and clientelism As has been noted. But where formal institutions remain weak. hybrid regimes are driven by personalised interests. ‘‘neopatrimonial’’ state. and new opportunities for corruption. and public officials often act to further their own gains without much concern about a broader sense of the public good. The result is often the persistence of clientelistic structures and high levels of corruption. to do so.. where there is a framework of formal law and administration but the state is informally captured by patronage networks. Bratton54 found that popular support for democracy fell from 2000 to 2005 as people began to perceive that ‘democracy has distinctive shortcomings . This reflected wider discontent with the ruling party and was followed by bloody repression in November of that year. Alina] At: 17:29 1 October 2008 elections. and politicians often seek to raise funds or win votes in various illicit ways (e.

In particular.America in 2006 also reflected this growing disillusionment with (incomplete) democracy and pointed to the resurgence of populist candidates in the region.59 However. but one that is well worth pursuing. a number of presidents in these incipient democracies in the developing world have sought to reverse the term limits imposed on them by amending the constitutions adopted in the 1990s.56 Elite reversals In a number of cases. . According to Richard Rose.58 for example. at the very least in terms of an (almost) universal recognition of the primacy of democratic forms. How to give substance to these forms so that they do not ossify as the hollow core of democracy is a formidable endeavour. democratic reversals initiated by political elites have often been met with acquiescence from broad sectors of the population. expectations are raised that are very difficult to satisfy. democracy is still better than the available alternatives. For example. as was the case of Alberto Fujimori in Peru for many years until his eventual fall from grace. Concluding reflections: Where are we now? Based on this discussion about the emergence of hybrid regimes. it must also be acknowledged that the emergence of hybrid regimes entails important risks as well. On the positive side. the overall trend towards democratisation can be said to have both advantages and disadvantages. reversals have been induced by political elites rather than by pressures from below. it is also undeniable that some considerable gains have been made. Highlighting the challenges embedded in hybrid regimes does not imply that the risks of democratisation are not worth undertaking. A deeper understanding of the problems that these regimes face is desirable because it provides a more realistic assessment of how democratic politics function in settings that remain undefined as well as a sobering appraisal of what these incipient and fragile democracies can be expected to achieve. Alina] At: 17:29 1 October 2008 recent data from the New Europe Barometer suggests that 63% of respondents in Belarus say it is better to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader. These elites are perceived as strong leaders who will be able to provide some order to the disorder and lawlessness often associated with (incomplete) democratisation. In many cases. and clientelistic systems continue or even intensify where the potential for authoritarian topdown control is not replaced by effective checks and balances and accountability to citizens. We have certainly not reached the end of history. However imperfect. This has helped to institutionalise leadership changes. a serious challenge under previous authoritarian regimes.57 Political leaders have justified such reversals on the grounds that more authoritarian measures are needed to strengthen state capacity. Despite this. even ‘unfinished’ democratisation processes have opened up new opportunities for participation and for the alternation of power through formal institutions. South African Journal of International Affairs 35 Downloaded By: [Rocha Menocal.

de rumo aos autoritarismos abandonados. 1992. surge um aprofundamento daquele que é o meio caminho entre os autoritarismos fechados e as democracias eleitorais . mas a alguma memorabilia institucional ou atitudinal deixada por estes. Dahl prevê: uma “participação efectiva”. uma “compreensão esclarecida”. de participação inclusiva. muitos deles existem e têm a aparência democrática mas falham no “teste substantivo”. com recurso aos novos casos da terceira vaga (O’Donnel. Croissant e Merkel. Se estas categorias forem todas preenchidas estamos perante um regime democrático pluralista. Muitos autores têm-se debruçado nas novas tipologias de regime. controlo do processo democrático e cidadania activa. 1996. a “igualdade de voto”. 1993) e o conceito de “autoritarismo competitivo” (Levistsky and Way. inclusive. 2002. 2004. inteira ou parcialmente. 2003. Para o funcionamento de um governo democrático. Levitsky and Way. 2008. 37). no entanto. não somente num sentido linear. um “controlo da agenda” e a “inclusão de adultos”. 2006. Para Diamond (2002: 22). 2002). verifica-se. com eleições regulares. Morlino. gerador de oportunidades iguais. Diamond. Entre o surgimento do conceito de “democracia delegatória” (O’Donnel. Olcott e Ottaway. competitivas e multipartidárias” mas. 2009. Snyder. 1999) e reportado um tipo de regime que fica algures cristalizado dentro do processo de democratização. 1996). há agora “mais do que nunca” muitos regimes que “adoptam formas de democracia eleitoral. 1993. Para o conceito de democracia recorremos aos cinco critérios estipulados por Dahl (1998) definidores de democracia que assentam no princípio-raíz de que todos os sujeitos são actores “politicamente iguais” (pp.ISCTE O certo é que a third reverse way (terceira vaga invertida) anunciada por Huntington (1991. Schmitter.

continuam a desviarse significativamente das preferências populares.A questão de fundo nestas tipologias relaciona-se o caminho escolhido para os períodos transitórios. São regimes onde “o poder efectivo dos governantes eleitos é tão limitado. são regimes que estagnaram durante um período transitório. onde as instituições democráticas preservam laivos do regime autoritário anterior.esse que medeia as democracias liberais e eleitorais dos autoritarismos hegemónicos e politicamente fechados e cujos autores cunham de “semidemocracias”. 2002) apresentam um resumo daquilo que é um regime misto .persistiriam na mesma forma de governação (instituída durante o processo de transição) ou seja. (apud Diamond. e onde não são garantidas todas as liberdades civis e/ou todos os direitos políticos. Diamond et al. A terceira e última classificação aqui em destaque. e/ou onde as liberdades civis e políticas são tão limitadas que algumas orientações e interesses políticos não se conseguem organizar e expressar por si próprios” (Diamond. num regime “cinzento”. Entre os quais aquele que é cunhado pelos autores. ou a competição partidária é tão restrita. A partir destes três caminhos são então postulados novos tipos de regime. Morlino em Hybrid Regimes or Regimes in Transition? (2008) define estes regimes como “formas de governo “presas” entre um arranjo não-democrático (particularmente no sentido de ser tradicional. embora competitivos. De acordo com Brill Olcott e Ottaway (1999) depois de uma transição inacabada existem três caminhos: ou o sistema político retorna às origens fechadas autoritárias (“fully closed authoritarism”). . autoritários e pós-totalitário) e um democrático”. ou a liberdade e justiça das eleições estão tão comprometidas que os resultados eleitorais. de “semi-autoritarismo”. 2002: 25). ou avançariam face à democracia ou – finalmente . Ou seja.