Southern California

International Review
Volume 6, Number 1 • Spring 2016

Southern California International Review
scir.org

Staff
Editor-in-Chief:
Reid Thom
Editors:
Aaron Rifkind
SarahBelle Selig
Patrick Vossler

Katie McDowell
Anna Merzi
Samuel Miller

The Southern California International Review (SCIR) is a bi-annual interdisciplinary print and online journal of scholarship in the field of international
studies generously funded by the School of International Relations at the
University of Southern California (USC). In particular, SCIR would like
to thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund.
Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to foster and enhance discussion between
theoretical and policy-oriented research regarding significant global issues.
SCIR is managed completely by students and also provides undergraduates
valuable experience in the fields of editing and graphic design.

Copyright © 2016 Southern California International Review.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form without the express written consent of the Southern California International
Review.
Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarily
represent those of the editorial board, faculty advisors or the University of Southern California.

ISSN: 1545-2611

We dedicate this journal to those effected by terrorist violence around the
world and to the cause of finding a peaceful solution to
violence in the Middle East.

Contents

1.

Asylum Through Executive Action
Bypassing Flawed Law to Protect Persecuted Children
Jonathan Yost

10

2.

Eyes in the Sky
An Examination of the Determinants of U.S. and Israeli Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) Proliferation
Eric Lenier Ives

26

3.

Germany’s Safe Country of Origin Scheme
The Long Legacy of Anti-Gypsyism
Gabriele Anton

62

4.

Minimizing Historical Memory and Spillover in Trade Relations
Swini Tummala

78

5.

State-Centrism and the Conceptualization of War
How Mainstream IR Fails to Account for New Actors in Contemporary Conflict
Nicholas Babey

88

Editor’s Note:
Dear Reader,
It is with great pleasure that I introduce to you the eleventh edition of the Southern California
International Review (SCIR). This semester’s issue continues our mission of providing a
platform for undergraduate scholars of international affairs to provide their work to a larger,
global audience.
We were incredibly fortunate to have over fifty articles to select from for this issue. Our
editors spent enlightening hours pouring over submissions from all across the country
and many from throughout the world. Of the many impressive submissions, the following
five were outsanding for their original and unique ideas. In reading this journal, you will
understand how.
In the creation of this issue, the SCIR is extremely appreciative of the supportive role that
the University of Southern California’s School of International Relations has played. The
school’s director, Wayne Sandholtz, the Associate Director, Linda Cole, and the rest of the
faculty and staff give us the guidance we need to continually grow. As always, I extend our
thanks to Ms. Robin Friedheim for her generous scholarship that provides the foundation
upon which our endeavor thrives.
As the global community reacts to the overflow of refugees from conflict areas in the Middle
East, two articles in this edition of the SCIR speak to the mistreatment of other civilian
populations in Central America and the Western Balkans. Another article takes a statistical
approach at examining the role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle production in the international
arena. The final two pieces in this journal mark a departure from the current international
environment to discussions of the theory behind the study of international relations in both
academic and professional settings.
I would like to thank you, the reader, since without you, we are nothing. I invite you to read
on, and remember that this journal is just one part of a much larger dialogue.
Please read, ponder, explore and enjoy.
Fight On!
Reid Thom

Asylum Through Executive Action

Bypassing Flawed Law to Protect Persecuted Children
Jonathan Yost

The United States is failing to respond to the worst Central American humanitarian crisis
in decades. In the past seven years, 122,724 Central American children have fled what has
become the most dangerous area not classified as a war-zone in the world. These children are
prime targets of forced gang recruitment by the Mara Salvatrucha and 18th Street gangs of
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, and any resistance could put them at risk of murder.
Instead of granting asylum, the US has deported many of them back into gang-dominated
territory. This is due in part to vague legal definitions of qualifications in US asylum law,
specifically the immutable characteristics necessary to fulfill the category of “membership in
a particular social group.” This article argues that characteristics leading to their persecution
- including age, gender, socioeconomic status, region, exercise of a fundamental right, shared
past experience and political opposition to a de facto state - are immutable and establish social
distinction. Therefore, this article proposes President Barack Obama issue an Executive Order
granting asylum to 17,532 members of this particular social group over a four-year period,
in order to provide children with a well-deserved safe haven without burdening immigration
infrastructure.1 By analyzing the political and logistical feasibility of such an order, this article
seeks to find a solution that will keep these children from being forced back into harm’s way.

Introduction
In the past seven years, 122,724 children fled extreme violence in Guatemala, Honduras,
and El Salvador—commonly referred to as the Northern Triangle.2,3 These children are targets of forced recruitment by two brutal gangs—Mara Salvatrucha (commonly referred to
as MS-13) and Calle Dieciocho (commonly referred to as the 18th Street Gang). Any resistance to recruitment often results in homicide.4 Many fleeing for survival are apprehended
at the US border and deported back into gang control.5 Immigration judges commonly find
that deportees fail to fulfill at least one of the “persecuted on account of ” criteria stated in
US asylum law, including race, religion, nationality, member in a particular social group
1 This number is 1/7th the total number of child refugees from Central America in the past seven years.
2 See Appendix 1.1 for map of region.
3 US Customs and Border Patrol, “Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children Statistics FY 2016,” CBP, accessed
November 21, 2015.
4 Thomas C. Bruneau, Lucía Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner, Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America. Austin,
TX: University of Texas Press, 2011.
5 US Customs and Border Control, “Southwest Border.”

Jonathan Yost is a senior at the University of California San Diego studying
International Studies—Political Science.

Asylum Through Executive Action

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and political opinion. The category most appropriate for children applying for protection is
persecution on account of “membership in a particular social group,” which legally requires
members share “immutable characteristics” and their group possess “social distinction.”
Failure to convince judges of these requirements is the fault of vague legal definitions. This
paper argues that attributes leading to a refugees’ persecution, including age, gender, socioeconomic status, region, exercise of a fundamental right, shared past experience and political opposition to a de facto state, are immutable and possess social distinction. Therefore,
this paper proposes President Barack Obama issue an Executive Order granting asylum to
17,532 members of this persecuted social group over a four-year period.
This paper first describes the violence forcing children to flee. Second, it identifies the
problem with current US asylum law. Third, it proposes a solution, including its implementation and cost. Finally, it analyzes the proposal’s feasibility.

Background
The exceptional brutality of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs has turned the Northern
Triangle into the most dangerous area not classified as a war-zone in the world.6 This brutality is evident in the initiation process, during which male recruits are assaulted and forced to
commit murder and female recruits are excessively beaten and raped.7 According to a report
by the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, children are attempting to escape “join or die”
recruiting tactics, in which resistance can result in the murder of the recruit and their family
members.8 The homicide rates in this region are extremely high relative to those of the US,
indicating an extraordinary level of violence within these communities. For example, according to a 2014 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) report, Northern Triangle
males between the ages of 15 and 30 have a 1 in 300 chance of being murdered, while a 17
year old in the US has only a 0.039 in 300 chance.9 The constant threat of death leaves many
recruits with no choice but to flee.
State solutions to violence against gang-resisters have been ineffective and have exacerbated the situation. Northern Triangle governments responded with “zero tolerance” policies based almost exclusively on heavy-handed enforcement, including joint police-military
gang raids. Zero tolerance approaches, or mano dura, undermine human rights, due process and increase murder rates. In El Salvador for example, 2003 homicide rates increased
from 33 per 100,000 persons to 56 per 100,000 persons by 2006. Mano dura policies have
6 Cynthia Arnson and Eric Olsen, “Organized Crime In Central America: The Northern Triangle,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 2011, accessed November 22, 2015.
7 Bruneau, Maras: Gang Violence, 1, 3.
8 Carlson, Elizabeth, and Anne Marie Gallagher. “Humanitarian Protection for Children Fleeing Gang-Based Violence in the
Americas.” Journal on Migration and Human Security 3, no. 2 (2015): 129-58. Accessed November 21, 2015.
9 Washington Office on Latin America, “Central American Gang-Related Asylum,” WOLA, May 2008, accessed November 23,
2015.

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also resulted in more organized and clandestine gang activity, making it more difficult for
authorities to control.10 In addition to incompetence, there is a strong correlation between
government corruption and unwillingness to protect targets of violence.11

Problem
Currently, adjudication for refugee and asylee protection in the US is determined by
immigration judges, circuit courts and the Bureau for Immigration Appeals (BIA).12 They
base their rulings on the Refugee Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-212), an act closely following the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, which define a refugee as:
“any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a
person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”13
Based on the P.L. 96-212 definition, gang-related asylum claims are regularly denied by
US courts. In most cases, gang-related asylees are viewed as lacking the required connection to any of the five grounds for persecution.14 The category most appropriate for these
individuals is “membership in a particular social group.” To be eligible for protection as a
member of a particular social group, they must share “immutable characteristics” and their
group must possess “social distinction.” According to the BIA, immutable characteristics
are those “beyond the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual
identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed.” Regarding social distinction, the BIA declared: “to be socially distinct, a group need not be seen by society; it must
instead be “perceived” as a group by society. Members of the group may be visibly recognizable, but society can also consider persons to be a group without being able to identify the
members by sight.”15

10 Washington Office on Latin America, “Central American Gang-Related Asylum,” 4.
11 Ibid.
12 Refugee and asylee are used interchangeably for the purposes of this paper.
13 Article 1 (A)(2) of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
14 Kate Manuel, “Asylum and Gang Violence: Legal Overview,” Congressional Research Service, September 5, 2014, accessed
November 20, 2015.
15 Ibid., 13-14.

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The denial of gang-related asylum cases often results not from a failure to meet requirements, but rather from the vague language used to define “membership in a particular social
group.” Lack of clarity has allowed for excessive subjectivity during adjudications, resulting
in rulings based more on opinion than precise legal guidelines.

Solution
To remedy this legal flaw and its tremendous human cost, this paper proposes that the
President issue Executive Order 1371316, declaring gang-related asylum-seekers shall be offered refuge if they meet a more precise definition of a refugee:
1) Any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case
of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided,
2) who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of that country,
2) because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution,
3) and are persecuted on grounds of membership in a particular social group consisting
of age, gender, socioeconomic status, region, exercise of a fundamental right, shared
past experience, and political opposition to a de facto state.
According to numerous case rulings as well as intergovernmental, think tank and scholarly arguments, gang-related asylees do indeed meet all of the above criteria:
1) According to Customs and Border Patrol, 122,724 Guatemalan, Honduran and El
Salvadorian children have been apprehended at the southwestern US border during FY
2009-2015, placing them outside the Northern Triangle.17
2) WOLA reported that government authorities in the Northern Triangle fail to respond effectively to gangs and are currently unable to protect youths targeted by gang
members. Also, there is evidence of government collaboration with gangs. Therefore,
the governments of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have proven they are both

16
17

According to the National Archives and Records Administration, last Executive Action, as of 12/5/15, was EO 13712.
US Customs and Border Control, “Southwest Border.”

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Jonathan Yost
unable and unwilling to protect targets.18 In addition, internal relocation is virtually
impossible. Due to the extensive reach of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, there is no
realistic internal flight alternative to seeking asylum in the US. According to WOLA,
“even if one were able to move to another city, the gang presence is pervasive and relocation would not provide safety from persecution by gangs.”19
3) Resistance to forced recruitment by gangs leads to various forms of violence including, but not limited to, murder, assault, rape, robbery, theft, arson and associated
threats. In the August 2009 7th Circuit Court of Appeals case Francis Gatimi, et al v. Eric
H. Holder, the appellate judge affirmed that violence committed by gangs amounts to
persecution. He considered the previous judge’s ruling of violence suffered by the claimant as mere “mistreatment” to be “absurd” (No. 08-31974). Additional support includes
the March 1999 9th Circuit US Court of Appeals case of Dinora Del Carmen Molina
v. INS, which ruled that forced recruitment into a Guatemalan guerrilla group may
amount to persecution. Furthermore, Sandra --, US Department of Justice, Executive
Office for Immigration Review (Dec. 2008) declared that “being relentlessly stalked,
threatened, and physically and sexually assaulted by members of a violent gang whom
the Guatemalan government has heretofore been unable to control would qualify as
‘infliction of suffering’ and thus be considered past persecution.”20
4) Gang-related asylees are persecuted on account of being 12-17 year olds, male, living
below the international poverty line of $1.90/day, residing in the Central American
cities of San Pedro Sula, San Salvador, Guatemala city and Tegucigalpa, exercising the
fundamental right to not associate with the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, sharing past
experience of resisting recruitment by said gangs and politically opposing gangs acting
as de facto states.21,22

Concerning the validity of said characteristics, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) determined that “gender and age cannot by denied for a particular social group for refugee status.”23 In addition to gender and age, Canada’s Immigration
and Refugee Board recognized that low socioeconomic standing constitutes an immutable
18 Washington Office on Latin America, “Central American Gang-Related Asylum,” 2.
19 Ibid.
20 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Guidance Not on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organized
Gangs,” UNHCR, March 2010, accessed November 22, 2015. 8, 17.
21 2015 World Bank global poverty line estimate.
22 See Appendix 1.2 for Northern Triangle regions with highest levels of child flight.
23 Erika Feller, Volker Türk, and Frances Nicholson, Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on
International Protection, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 70, 71.

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characteristic.24 The September 2014 case of D.V., (unpublished case) IJ Castro and USAID’s
Central American and Mexico Gang Assessment Report reached the same conclusion, adding
that a claimant’s region is also an immutable characteristic.25,26
Regarding the fundamental right not to associate with gangs, supporting evidence includes the UNHCR’s determination that “evading recruitment and opposing gang practices
is a characteristic fundamental to one’s conscience and exercise of human rights,” fundamental enough that one should not be forced to renounce it.27 The right protecting against
association with groups is reinforced by multiple court rulings, including VM (FGM - Risks
- Mungiki - Kikuyu/Gikuyu) Kenya v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2008),
Canadian Supreme Court ruling Lavigne v. Ontario public service employees union, R v.
Advanced Cutting and Coring Ltd., EU Court of Human Rights ruling Sigurjonsson v. Iceland
and Sorensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark.28,29
The shared past experience of resisting recruitment is also an immutable characteristic. The BIA ruled that minors who have been forcibly recruited by and have resisted gangs
may have a shared past experience, which, by definition, cannot be changed and is therefore
immutable.30,31
Lastly, due to gangs’ state-like control over public and private spheres in the Northern
Triangle, asylee resistance is associated with political opposition. According to the UNHCR,
MS-13 and 18th Street gangs do indeed behave as a de facto state and therefore political opposition should be recognized a valid immutable characteristic of their social group.
Furthermore, the case of Emilia Del Socorro Gutierrez Gomez v. The Secretary of State for
the Home Department determined that “the risk of extortion threats from a criminal gang
will not normally be on account of political opinion, but in some societies where criminal
and political activities heavily overlap, the picture may be different.” In Vassilev v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), a Canadian federal court ruled that “in this case
criminal activity permeates state action. Opposition to criminal acts becomes opposition
to state authorities. On these facts it is clear that there is no distinction between the anticriminal and ideological/political aspects of the claimant’s fear of persecution. One would
never deny that refusing to vote because an election is rigged is a political opinion.”32
24 UNHCR, “Guidance,” 15.
25 Washington Office on Latin America, “Central American Gang-Related Asylum,” 3.
26 Information accessed at usaid.gov.
27 UNHCR, “Guidance,” 13.
28 Ibid., 13.
29 Jonathan Orpin, “VSM: does freedom of association include the right not to associate?,” Today’s Dissent, Febuary 24, 2010,
accessed November 22, 2015.
30 Matter of S-E-G (2008).
31 UNHCR, “Guidance,” 13.
32 Ibid.

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Concerning the “social distinction” component of “particular social groups,” several
court decisions state several of the aforementioned immutable characteristics— gender, socioeconomic status, region and shared past experience — also constitute a group with social
distinction. In X v. Canada, MA6-03043, Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
(29 February 2009), the court ruled that “poor Haitian women with HIV/AIDS” do possess social distinction, and therefore granted “X” asylum in Canada.33 In addition, the BIA
recently recognized “young tribal women who are opposed to female genital mutilation,”
“homosexuals in Cuba,” and “former national police members” as having social distinction.34 These determinations strongly support the argument that characteristics possessed
by gang-related asylees fulfill the distinction requirement.
The validity of persecution on account of membership in a particular social group has
several components. The first is comprised of seven immutable characteristics: age, gender,
socioeconomic status, region, exercise of fundamental right to not associate, shared past
experience and political opposition. The second includes four socially recognized characteristics: gender, socioeconomic status, region and shared past experience. This system
is supported by eight court rulings, as well as UNHCR, USAID, WOLA, professional and
scholarly arguments.

Implementation and Cost
The Executive Order itself is only the first step in protecting these persecuted children.
Implementation of the order is critical. Consequently, this article borrows from Carlson and
Gallagher’s suggestions to ensure its execution. These suggestions include protecting due
process rights with adequate access to immigration attorneys and additional immigration
judges to adjudicate asylum claims, as well as replacement of CBP screeners with USCIS
asylum officers.35 In addition, Carlson and Gallagher suggest an increase in asylum referral
staff at US embassies and UNHCR offices in the Northern Triangle.36
The total cost of EO 13713, including processing, admitting and resettling all 17,532
asylees, amounts to $264,750,000. The exact number of asylees is determined by the average level of Central American children encountered at the US’s southwest border during FY
2009-2015.37 The funding required was calculated by the US State Department’s $1.059 billion estimation of costs to process, admit and resettle 70,000 refugees during FY 2015.38 The
proposed quantity of refugees is 25 percent of the State Department’s proposal, and therefore
33
34
35
36
37
38

Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board, “X v. Canada.” February 29, 2009, accessed November 20, 2015. 6.
Manuel, “Asylum and Gang Violence,” 17.
Carlson and Gallagher, “Humanitarian Protection,” 151, 152.
US Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Questions & Answers: Refugees," accessed November 21, 2015.
US Customs and Border Patrol, “Southwest Border.”
Information accessed at state.gov.

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25 percent of the costs. In order to minimize burdens on US immigration infrastructure,
propose embracing 17,532 children over a four-year period, at 4,383 per year, with an annual
cost of $66,187,500.

Feasibility
Given the current political climate, the viability of this proposal is strong. This conclusion is based on 1) President Obama’s status as a “lame duck” president, 2) vocal support for
such a proposal by influential members of Congress, 3) favorable public opinion polls and
4) an effective and politically diverse pro-refugee lobby.
Given that midterm elections have passed, and the President is in his final term, he
is considered a “lame duck” president. Historically, political costs for Executive Actions
during the final term period are reduced after midterm elections. As a result, presidents have
issued Executive Actions considered risky prior to this period. On January 19th, 1981, the
last day of his only presidential term, President Jimmy Carter ordered the release of frozen
Iranian assets and the establishment of an arbitration process to settle private claims against
Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages.39 Furthermore, prior to his lame
duck status, Obama proved he is willing to issue controversial Executive Orders. Examples
include orders to prohibit discrimination against LGBTs, protect undocumented immigrants from deportation, boost environmental protections, reform No Child Left Behind
and raise minimum wages for federally contracted workers, among others.40 Obama’s lame
duck status and record of politically risky Executive Actions increases the likelihood of his
willingness to issue the proposed order.
In addition to the President’s willingness, influential members of Congress have vocally
expressed their support for Executive Action to protect Central American children. Among
these proponents is former presidential candidate and long-time Arizona Senator John
McCain. During an interview with Reuters, he argued that emergency refugee status for
these minors is “key” to addressing the humanitarian crisis at the border. Further support
was expressed by 23-year Illinois representative Luis Gutierrez, as well as 20-year California
representative Zoe Lofgren, who added that her position was endorsed by a Republican
member of the House Judiciary Committee.41 Beyond those in the interview, support of
protection for Northern Triangle asylees would likely be found among opposition of House
bill H.R. 3009 and its Senate twin S. 2146 — bills demonizing those emigrating from Central
America.
39 Kenneth Mayer, “Executive Orders and Presidential Power,” The Journal of Politics 61, no. 2 (May 2009): 445-466, accessed
November 20, 2015. 451.
40 Information accessed at whitehouse.gov.
41 Richard Cowan, “Calls in US Congress for Refugee Status for Central American Kids,” Reuters, June 27, 2014, accessed
November 20, 2015.

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Jonathan Yost

The House and Senate versions of the bill were primarily supported by Republicans,
including S. 2146 co-sponsors and Presidential candidates Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio.42
The bills received more support than opposition in both chambers, but the deficit in proimmigrant votes is unlikely to threaten this proposal. If the level of the bills’ support were
an indication of opposition to EO 13713, Republicans would still fall short of the total votes
needed for obstruction.
Moreover, public opinion is strongly in favor of an order protecting asylee children.
According to a July 2014 poll from the Public Religion Research Institute, 70 percent of
Americans agreed that these minors are refugees, not illegal immigrants.43 In addition, the
Pew Research Center found in August 2014 that 56 percent of Americans were in favor of
allowing these children to attend public school and 69 percent were in favor of them joining existing family while waiting for asylum adjudications.44 Furthermore, a July 2014 ABC
News/Washington Post poll found that 53 percent of Americans are in favor of a proposed
$3.7 billion bill to provide care for Central American children while their cases are evaluated.45 Fiscally, the $264 million price tag of this proposal is 99.3 percent less, and includes
processing, admittance and resettlement costs. While the latter two opinion polls do not
directly support Executive Order 13713, they express empathy towards asylees and therefore
apply little pressure on lawmakers to obstruct the order.
Finally, the strength and political stance of pro-refugee interest groups bolsters the feasibility of this order. According to a June 2013 report by the Council of Foreign Relations,
refugee advocates are influential and effective when lobbying Congress.46 Powerful advocates include the large, predominately secular coalition RefugeeCouncilUSA. Of the 20 organizations, influential members include Asylum Access, International Rescue Committee,
RefugePoint, Center for Victims of Torture, Human Rights First and HIAS, among others.47
In addition to the secular lobby, a powerful Christian coalition has taken up the mantel of
refugee protection. The faith-based lobby consists of World Relief, US Council of Catholic
Bishops, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, Church World Service and many
Evangelical organizations.48 The latter of the two coalitions may be more effective against
obstruction, as they are part of the Republican’s core constituency.
42 Information accessed at house.gov and congress.gov.
43 See appendix 1.2 for polling graph.
44 Pew Research Center, “Pew Research Center Poll August 20-24, 2014,” polling report, accessed November 20, 2015.
45 ABC News/Washington Post, “ABC News/Washington Post Poll July 9-13, 2014,” polling report, accessed November 21,
2015.
46 Council on Foreign Relations, “The Global Human Rights Regime,” CFR, June 19, 2013, accessed November 21, 2015.
47 Refugee Council USA, “Members,” RCUSA, accessed November 23, 2015.
48 Nahal Toosi, “Christian groups break with GOP over Syrian refugees,” Politico, November 17, 2015, accessed November 20,
2015.

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Congress does have the power to pass a bill blocking the implementation of EO 13713.
However, this bill could then be vetoed by the President, and only a two-thirds vote in both
chambers could overrule his veto.49 Vocal support from influential members of Congress,
favorable public opinion polls and an effective and politically diverse pro-refugee lobby
reduce the likelihood that opponents could achieve an obstructive vote.

Conclusion
Extreme gang violence in the Northern has increased youths’ forced migration northward. The vague legal language used to define “membership in a particular social group”
with “immutable characteristics” and “social distinction” has failed to offer the refuge these
children deserve. Characteristics that lead to their persecution - including age, gender, socioeconomic status, region, exercise of a fundamental right, shared past experience, and
political opposition to a de facto state - are immutable and constitute social distinction.
Therefore, President Barack Obama should issue Executive Order 13713, which grants
asylum to 17,532 members of this particular social group over a four-year period. While
the implementation of this order would require replacement of CBP screeners with USICS
asylum officers and an increase in asylum referral staff at US embassies and UNHCR offices in the Northern Triangle, costs of processing, admitting and integrating the asylees
are very reasonable when compared to less ambitious, more expensive proposals. Given the
President’s lame duck status and support from Congress, the public and interest groups, the
feasibility of the proposed Executive Action is strong. Offering asylum to persecuted children is not only a legal obligation, but also a moral responsibility.

49 John Malsberger, From Obstruction to Moderation: The Transformation of Senate Conservatism, 1838-1952, London, UK:
Associated University Presses, 2000.

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Appendix 1

1.1 Northern Triangle Map

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1.2 Northern Triangle Regions with Highest Levels of Child Flight

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1.3 Polling Graph

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Works Cited
ABC News/Washington Post. “ABC News/Washington Post Poll July 9-13, 2014.” Polling
Report. Accessed November 21, 2015.
Arnson, Cynthia and Eric Olsen. “Organized Crime In Central America: The Northern Triangle.” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. November 2011. Accessed
November 22, 2015.
Bruneau, Thomas C., Lucía Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner. Maras: Gang Violence and
Security in Central America. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011.
Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board. “X v. Canada.” February 29, 2009. Accessed
November 20, 2015.
Carlson, Elizabeth, and Anne Marie Gallagher. “Humanitarian Protection for Children
Fleeing Gang-Based Violence in the Americas.” Journal on Migration and Human Security 3, no. 2 (2015): 129-58. Accessed November 21, 2015.
Council on Foreign Relations. “The Global Human Rights Regime.” CFR. June 19, 2013.
Accessed November 21, 2015.
Cowan, Richard. “Calls in US Congress for Refugee Status for Central American Kids.”
Reuters. June 27, 2014. Accessed November 20, 2015.
“Executive Orders.” The White House. Accessed December 1, 2015.
Feller, Erika, Volker Türk, and Frances Nicholson. Refugee Protection in International Law:
UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
“Final Vote Results for Roll Call 466.” US House of Representatives. July 23, 2015.
Accessed November 22, 2015.
International Human Rights Council. “No Place to Hide: Gang, State, and Clandestine Violence in El Salvador.” Human Rights Program of Harvard Law School. February 2007.
Accessed November 24, 2015.
Malsberger, John. From Obstruction to Moderation: The Transformation of Senate
Conservatism, 1838-1952. London, UK: Associated University Presses, 2000.
Manuel, Kate. “Asylum and Gang Violence: Legal Overview.” Congressional Research Service. September 5, 2014. Accessed November 20, 2015.
Mayer, Kenneth. “Executive Orders and Presidential Power.” The Journal of Politics 61, no.
2 (May 2009): 445-466. Accessed November 20, 2015.
Obama, Barack. “Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2015.” President of the United States. Accessed November 23, 2015.
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Jonathan Yost

Orpin, Jonathan. “VSM: does freedom of association include the right not to associate?”
Today’s Dissent. Febuary 24, 2010. Accessed November 22, 2015.
Pew Research Center. “Pew Research Center Poll August 20-24, 2014.” Polling Report.
Accessed November 20, 2015.
Public Religion Research Institute. “Survey: Nearly 7-in-10 Americans See Unaccompanied
Children at Border as Refugees, Not Illegal Immigrants.” PRRI. July 7, 2014.
Accessed November 22, 2015.
Refugee Council USA. “Members.” RCUSA. Accessed November 23, 2015.
“S.2146 - Stop Sanctuary Policies and Protect Americans Act.” Library of Congress.
October 20, 2015. Accessed November 20, 2015.
Snyder, Howard N. Juvenile Arrests 1999. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2000.
Toosi, Nahal. “Christian groups break with GOP over Syrian refugees.” Politico.
November 17, 2015. Accessed November 20, 2015.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Guidance Not on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs.” UNHCR. March 2010. Accessed November 22,
2015.
US Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Questions & Answers: Refugees.” Accessed
November 21, 2015.
US Customs and Border Patrol. “Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children Statistics FY 2016.” CBP. Accessed November 21, 2015.
Washington Office on Latin America. “Central American Gang-Related Asylum.” WOLA.
May 2008. Accessed November 23, 2015.
World Bank. “FAQs: Global Poverty Line Update.” September 30, 2015. Accessed
November 22, 2015.

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Eyes in the Sky

An Examination of the Determinants of U.S. and Israeli
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Proliferation
Eric Lenier Ives

Since the inception of the Missile Treaty Control Regime in 1987, Israel and the United States
have accounted for over three-quarters of the world’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) exports.
Departing from previous discourse about UAVs that examines the topic from a legal and ethical standpoint, this paper uses multivariate regression to analyze UAV transfer data from the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) along with data on UN voting affinity, military capability, polity, domestic stability and the number of soldier and terrorism
casualties. The results suggest that smaller nations are more likely to import UAVs from the
U.S. and Israel and that more ideological similarity between nations leads to a decreased likelihood of UAV trade. In addition, nations with a large but contracting military are more likely
to import UAVs from the U.S., while nations with a small but expanding military are more
likely to import UAVs from Israel. Rising state fragility increases the likelihood of UAV imports
from both the U.S. and Israel, but the U.S. is more likely to trade with fragile nations. Lastly,
the results do not suggest that higher UAV imports correlate with lower soldier casualties. This
paper examines which factors influence the export and import of Israeli and U.S. UAVs.

Introduction

UAVs, known more commonly as drones, have exploded in popularity in the last 14
years. According to a 2012 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO),
the number of tactical UAV-capable countries grew from 41 in 2005 to 76 in 2011.1 The Teal
Group, a private defense systems analysis firm, estimates that “UAV spending will nearly
double over the next decade,” from $6.5 billion in 2014 to $11.5 billion in 2024, meaning
that the popularity growth of UAVs shows no signs of stopping.2 The current analysis offers
only estimates of UAV arsenals with the 2012 GAO report indicating 76 UAV-capable nations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies indicating only 56 UAV nations in
its 2012 report.
UAVs have been at the forefront of legal and ethical discussions of the War on Terror,
extrajudicial killings, and excessive domestic surveillance yet little research has been done
1 Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports,” July 30, 2012, publicly released September 12, 2012.
2 Teal Group, “Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total $91 Billion in Its 2014 UAV Market Profile and Forecast,” July 14, 2014.

Eric Lenier Ives graduated from New York University in 2015 with a degree
in International Relations and German Literature. After teaching English in
Germany on a Fulbright Grant, he will attend law school to focus on national
security and international law.

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27

on international UAV proliferation as a topic in itself. In other words, most literature focuses
on the theory of UAVs rather than their actual sale. This paper takes a statistical approach
to the topic of UAV proliferation to explore the macroscopic trends of the two largest UAV
exporters in the world – the U.S. and Israel – in order to determine the characteristics of the
countries that import UAVs.
UAVs are governed internationally by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
which aims to control the proliferation of WMD-delivery systems, ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as UAVs.3 Thirty-four countries are currently partners to the MTCR. In 2015,
the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to the MTCR while simultaneously relaxing export
regulations on UAVs sold by U.S. firms.4 Though Israel has yet to sign the MTCR, Appendix
3 in the GAO report outlines that Israel imposes regulations on UAV exports based on the
guidelines of the MTCR. Currently, only the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel
operate militarized drones equipped with surface-to-ground missiles, with the U.S. and
Israel driving international exports. Since the inception of the MTCR in 1987, the combined
UAV exports of the U.S. and Israel comprise over 75 percent of the global total. Because of
the limited adoption of the MTCR and the discrete nature of arms deals, getting an exact
number of international UAV transactions remains difficult.
The proliferation of UAVs is a central concern of U.S. foreign policy as advanced systems have lethal payloads and incredibly accurate surveillance systems. Current holders of
military drones are mostly democratic countries. However, as data from the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) shows, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and China all continue to
pursue domestic military UAV programs.5 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute) arms trade data also shows that many importing countries, such as Turkey,
Georgia, Colombia, and Ivory Coast, are autocratic.
Though the Israeli UAV sector is regulated, it thrives on an international market of autocratic countries. A marketing official for Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), the state-owned
Israeli UAV producer, has bluntly stated their industry exists “because of the international
market … We’re too big for Israel, to our delight.”6 IAI exports to 49 nations and “80 percent
of its UAV products are designed for foreign markets.”7 IAI produces the high endurance
Heron TP and Heron-1 models, which both have sophisticated sensor systems for surveillance in inhospitable weather. The recently-launched Heron TP was widely discussed for its
endurance capabilities, notably its ability to fly to Iran from Israel.
3 The MTCR defines and is most concerned with Category I or II equipment. Category I UAVs have complete rocket systems,
exceed a 300 km range and a 500 kg payload. Category II also include complete rocket systems but have a range less than 300 km.
4 Missile Technology Control Treaty (MTCR).
5 Simon Rogers, “Drones by Country: who has all the UAVs?,” The Guardian, August 3, 2012.
6 Tia Goldberg, “Israel leads global drone exports as demand grows,” The Times of Israel, June 6, 2013.
7 Ibid.

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In the past, U.S. competitors, such as General Atomics and Northrop Grumman, faced
more stringent export restrictions. In February 2015, the U.S. Department of State issued a
new policy regarding commercial UAV exporters to help them compete in the global market.8 The new policy distinguishes between military UAVs and commercial UAVs, and it
allows commercial UAVs to be governed by Export Administration Regulations (EAR) as
opposed to the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy.9,10 This shift maintains licensing requirements for “non-military” UAVs, but relaxes the requirements of CAT Policy,
which require proposed transfers to consider, among other factors,“U.S. regional stability interests,” “human rights, democratization, counterterrorism” and “the likelihood the
recipient would use the arms to commit human rights abuses or serious violations of international humanitarian law.”11 Commentators believe this policy shift is a direct result of
increased Israeli and Chinese competition in the global market. While the U.S. maintains a
strong global presence in armed UAVs with the iconic Predator “Hunter-Killer” UAV and
the newer MQ-9 Reaper model, less expensive UAVs equipped with advanced sensory systems rather than surface-to-ground missiles have become the more popular export product.
Though both the U.S. and Israel embrace the increased competition, each country has
taken a different approach to export regulation. In 2006, Israel’s Ministry of Defense established the Defense Export Control Agency (DECA) that reviews applications for defense
exports. Under DECA, an MTCR Committee specifically handles exports regulated by the
MTCR. Thus, Israel adheres to the policies of the MTCR even though it is not a signatory to
the regime. DECA maintains responsibility for exports and imposes licensing restrictions
preventing the resale of exports.12 Under this system, Category I UAVs, such as the Heron
TP, are controlled under a “presumption of denial” standard akin to the United States. On
the other hand, Category II UAVs, lighter models often used in surveillance, are reviewed by
DECA and may be approved with a declaration that the buyer adheres to MTCR controls.13
My results suggest that both the U.S. and Israel export to smaller, more autocratic nations. Israel exports UAVs to nations expanding their militaries while the U.S. exports to nations with large but declining militaries. While Israel and the U.S. both export UAVs to more
unstable nations with civil unrest, the U.S. is more likely to export to unstable nations. The
results suggest that deeper trade ties— in the form of more UAVs—occur in stable nations

8 U.S. Department of State, February 17, 2015.
9 Export Administration Regulations, (UAVs to be found in Category 9 – Aerospace and Propulsion Section 9A012).
10 Conventional Arms Transfer Policy.
11 Ibid.
12 Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports,” July 30, 2012, 48, publicly released September 12, 2012.
13 Ibid.

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with less civil unrest. The relationship between terrorism and soldier casualties remains
elusive , with only Israel exporting to nations with a lower incidence of soldier casualties.

Figure 1 UAVs exported each year by the U.S. and Israel

Literature Review
In the last decade, there has been an explosion of interest in the application and procurement of unmanned aerial vehicle systems. Cultural, normative and practical military
arguments have all been put forth to explain the rapid spread of UAV technology.
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In “The global diffusion of unmanned aerial vehicles” (2014), Ulrike E. Franke argues
that UAVs are symbols of a modern army, desired more because they are ‘must-haves’ more
so than a practical military technology. Countries, therefore, desire an unmanned capability to ‘seem advanced.’ Franke offers contemporary examples in which a country’s leader
proudly presents the new technology rather than keeping the development clandestine.
Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez both publicly announced
the acquisition of new drone technologies, shortly followed by Vladmir Putin’s public announcement that Russia would invest $12 billion to grow its unmanned capabilities before
the year 2020.
In “Limiting the Unintended Consequences of UAV Proliferation” (2013), Dennis M.
Gormley argues that despite governance by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
and “common goals about the non-proliferation of missile systems capable of WMD delivery,” the MTCR has been unsuccessful in controlling the spread of UAVs due to “uneven
implementation” and “virtually non-existent norms governing UAV proliferation.”14
In “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare” (2013) Michael J. Boyle offers a
vision of normative drift in regulating UAV sales and development. He states that, “a final,
and crucial, step towards mitigating the strategic consequences of drones would be to develop internationally recognized standards and norms for their use and sale.” According
to Boyle, “the genie is out of the bottle: drones will be a fact of life for years to come. What
remains to be done is to ensure that their use and sale are transparent, regulated and consistent with internationally recognized human rights standards.” Boyle foresees a world in
which drones will be held by more unscrupulous hands, that drones will be misused by
governments and non-state actors unless there a set of internationally recognized standards
governing their sale and use. Boyle concedes that “enforcement of these guidelines and adherence to rules on their use will be imperfect and marked by derogations, exceptions and
violations,” however, the existence of international standards will encourage more restraint
than might otherwise been seen.
Derek Gregory in “The Everywhere War” (2011), notes that “the advanced technology
that makes the UAV campaign possible – the combination of sensor and shooter in a single
platform – does not dispel the fog of war.” Countries can still make mistakes based on poor
or misinterpreted information. He writes that UAV technology exploits a legal grey area
that makes the battlespace even less transparent. Drones increase the ability of a country to
project power via both technological advancement and legal ambiguity. They are capable
of operating in previously inaccessible theatres, such as treacherous mountain ranges and
urban environments in which insurgents might hide.
14 Dennis Gormley, “Limiting the Unintended Consequences of Unmanned Air System Proliferation,” Whitehead Journal of
Diplomacy & International Relations, Winter/Spring 2013, Vol. 14, Issue 1, pp. 67.

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Though UAVs are a modern technology, they could be reasonably compared to the
development of the German Dreadnought battleship at the turn of the 20th century. In
“German Dreadnoughts and the Saudi Bomb: Why We Should Be Wary of Saudi Arabia,”
Thomas Grant outlines the social and political advantages of replacing soldiers with the
Dreadnought battleship, which he characterizes as “the most awesome and technologically
advanced weapon of the turn of the century.” He suggests, “for a country that desired to multiply its military force—but, for social, political, and demographic reasons, also to conserve
the number of men at arms—a fleet [of dreadnoughts] offered the ideal security solution.”15
“Technological force multipliers,” as Grant calls the Dreadnought, embody the modern use
of UAVs in military contexts.

Figure 2 UAV Imports by Country 1987-2013

Theoretical Framework

As a highly practical and desirable product, UAVs have become a powerful source
of revenue for exporters. For importing countries, UAVs are long-term investments that
promise extended surveillance capabilities, force projection and, in some instances, strike
capability. They also promise the social and political benefit of military personnel reduc15 Thomas Grant, “German Dreadnoughts and the Saudi Bomb: Why We Should Be Wary of Saudi Arabia,” International Relations 1993 11:405.

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tion. For exporting countries, domestic industry reaps financial rewards as well as increased
market share with every international order.
UAVs bring several practical advantages: they are inexpensive compared to conventional aircraft, replace military personnel, remove the risk of hostage scenarios and can
operate covertly within and across borders. UAVs fall in a space of legal ambiguity because
many nations do not have robust aviation regulations regarding their domestic and international use.
This paper hypothesizes that nations will benefit from UAVs if they value soldier’s lives
highly and are willing to invest in technology to protect them. This idea is most consistent
with democratic nations in which soldiers can vote leaders out of office if they do not feel
valued. Nations seeking to cut military spending might turn to UAVs to replace both conventional aircraft and paid military personnel. Nations operating across borders or combatting terrorism might also turn to UAVs because of their ability to operate clandestine
missions and operate in terrain that might be unfamiliar or harsh for manned operations.
However, UAVs are not desirable for every nation. They have a high start-up cost: infrastructure for launch and technological operation systems must be either developed or
imported. Although UAVs are meant to replace ground troops, additional military personnel must be trained to operate UAVs. The disadvantages of UAVs are more likely to
outweigh the benefits in smaller nations that do not already have a significant military infrastructure to operate UAVs. Nations that do not face domestic pressure to protect their
soldiers are likely more autocratic. Because soldiers in autocracies do not vote, their leaders
are not as concerned about replacing military personnel.
Nations seeking to expand or establish their unmanned capabilities have two options:
develop a domestic program or import foreign systems. Domestic UAV development is a
long and costly catch-up process: firms must both design technologically advanced UAV
systems and build manufacturing infrastructure. Importing foreign UAVs, while more costeffective in most cases, means that a nation must meet the standards, norms, and regulations of the exporting nation.
The number of firms exporting attractive UAV systems remains relatively small with
U.S. producers accounting for 45 percent of the global market share in 2013 and with Israel following closely in second place.16 This means that importing nations must adhere to
Western export regulations that often fall in line with the MTCR. The U.S. is a signatory of
the MTCR and even though Israel is not, they still adhere to most of the MTCR regulations.
The first point of concern for exporting nations is their own security. Exporting nations
do not want to sell UAVs to nations that will turn around and use the technology against
the exporter. Exporters seek to sell UAVs to nations with a high level of bilateral affinity and
high levels of domestic stability. In many cases, exporting to ideologically aligned nations
16

Aerospace America, “UAV Roundup 2013,” Aerospace America, August 2013.

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also provides the advantage of increasing the military capabilities of the exporting country’s
allies

Second to security is the profit motivation behind UAV exportation. Exporting nations
already have established a domestic UAV industry; there is significant utility in maintaining these firms’ research and development capabilities. Nations can support their domestic
UAV industries by either purchasing the UAVs themselves or by allowing these firms to
export their products. The chief tension in exporting nations is balancing security-driven
export regulations with the financial incentive to allow exports as a means of supporting
domestic UAV producers.
Despite this common framework, different market conditions in Israel and the U.S.
might lead to a different export profile. In Israel, the UAV market was destined for export as
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domestic production vastly outpaced government purchases, while in the U.S. the Department of Defense went through a long period of ‘procurement’ following September 11th.
During this time, government contracts subsidized the development of UAVs and therefore
allowed tighter export regulations.
Based on these theoretical arguments, this article puts forward the following theoretical models.

I. Political Affinity

Returning to Franke’s argument that countries want to appear advanced, government
type may not matter as the U.S. and Israel export to maintain market presence rather than
ensure advanced weapon systems are only in democratic nations’ possession. She uses the
examples of Russia and Iran to emphasize that autocratic countries have a significant interest in not only growing their military capabilities, rather in seeming to grow their military
capability. The most significant UAV users—the United States, the United Kingdom and
Israel—are, however, strongly democratic and presumably have an interest in increasing
the capability of their allies, while withholding technology from non-aligned nations. Balancing the high demand from autocratic nations and the competitive democratic supplier
market, how does government type and affinity between importer and exporter affect UAV
trade?

II. Replacement Technology
a. Soldier Casualties

UAVs replace soldiers and provide additional safety to soldiers already on the ground.
For instance, the ability to send an unmanned drone on surveillance and strike missions
provides an alternative for manned reconnaissance and attack missions. The value of a soldier depends on the type of government. An autocracy would, in most cases, not value a
soldier as highly as a democracy would because soldiers can vote on elected officials who
could lose their office by not valuing soldiers enough.

b. Small, but increasing military size

UAVs have the capability to act as “technological force multipliers” and offer significant
capability returns on lower levels of manpower. Nations with small army sizes, as measured
by the number of soldiers, have an interest in the force multiplying power of UAVs. Therefore, nations with a small, but growing army size have an interest in importing UAVs.

c. Large, but decreasing military size

Similarly, nations seeking to reduce the size of their armies while maintaining their
military capabilities would have an interest in a UAV’s ability to multiply force while decreasing the amount of ground troops needed.
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III. Advanced Capabilities in Combating Civil Unrest and Terrorism

As Derek Gregory argues in “The Everywhere War”, UAVs increase the ability of nations to operate in unfavorable terrain and strike in previously inaccessible areas. UAVs also
take advantage of the legal ambiguity between civilians and insurgents and open up the possibility of operating missions against a country’s own citizens in order to combat civil unrest
and terrorism. UAVs, then, are valuable technology in countries with civil unrest and a high
incidence of terrorist attacks. Officials in both autocratic and democratic governments face
reprisals from civil unrest and terrorism.
Yet this theory must be qualified precisely because UAV trade is regulated on a bilateral
level. Nations with a high degree of civil unrest and deaths resulting from terrorism present
a liability to exporting nations. Despite market pressures to export competitively, exporting
to unstable nations is unlikely to occur. An importing nation must have a stable enough
government to carry out international arms deals.

Hypotheses

The literature establishes cultural, technological, and pragmatic arguments for UAV
proliferation. The following hypotheses will test these arguments for UAV trade and will
also examine a political theory approach to the use of UAVs as replacement technology in
democratic nations with compulsory military service:
• H1: Countries with higher ideological similarity to the exporting nation are more
likely to import UAVs.
• H2: Democratic countries with high incidence of soldier casualties are more
likely to import UAVs.
• H3: Countries with smaller armies that seek to increase military size are more
likely to import UAVs.
• H4: Countries with large military spending that seek to reduce military expenditure are more likely to import UAVs.
• H5: Countries with domestic unrest or conflict, terrorism are more likely to
import UAVs.
• H6: Countries with stable governments but which experience domestic unrest,
terrorist attack, or conflict are more likely to import UAVs.

Empirical Design:

To determine the relationship between UAVs and factors that may contribute to UAV
exporting and importing, this paper uses dyadic zero-inflated negative binomial regression
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models. The unit of analysis is the number of military UAVs traded between a dyadic country pair in a year beginning 1987—the year the MTCR was first signed—and ending 2013,
the most current year of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIRPI)
Arms Transfer Database. The series covers dyadic trade between the U.S. and Israel and 185
other countries. The definition of “military UAV” in this paper refers to a UAV that meets
either the MTCR classification of Category I or II, or is a surveillance drone used in military
operations and counted in the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database. 17
The author used a zero-inflated negative binomial regression because of the large number of missing values present in the data. Though Poisson and zero-inflated Poisson regressions were considered, Poisson regressions assume a uniform mean and variance in the
data, which is not the case with UAVs. Because zero-inflated negative binomial regressions
do not allow for clustering, the Vuong test is used in each regression to determine the significance of a zero-inflated model over a non-inflated negative binomial model. In each
model, the Vuong test affirms the appropriateness of a zero-inflated model. It is important
to note that zero-inflated negative binomial models create two models—the negative binomial model that determines the count of UAVs in a country and an inflated model detailing
the logit likelihood of a country receiving one UAV and, then, being a UAV nation. The
results, then, handle both the count of UAVs traded and the logit likelihood of UAV trade
occurring at all.

Independent Variables:

17 The MTCR defines and is most concerned with Category I or II equipment. Category I UAVs have complete rocket systems,
exceed a 300 km range and a 500 kilogram payload. Category II also include complete rocket systems but have a range less than
300km.

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Dependent Variables:

Where B indicates the marginal effect of the independent variable on the likelihood of
the outcome, ndrone, the model for this equation appears generally as:

Controls

These models control for population size of each country because a single UAV imported to a state with 50,000 people will likely have a larger marginal effect than a UAV imported to a nation with 50,000,000. The model also adjusts for the gross domestic product
of the country.

Results
Ideological Similarity

In order to determine the relationship between ideological similarity and UAV trade,
Polity IV and UN Voting Affinity were tested individually and then together. Polity 2 data
on both Israel and the U.S. remains robust over the entire time series at 9 or 10. 18 Therefore, a higher Polity 2 score in importing nations indicates similarity in regime type to
either the U.S. or Israel.

U.S.

Nations with lower UN affinity scores with the U.S. are more likely to import at least
one UAV . In the zero-inflated logit model UN Affinity is significant at the 1 percent level in
the separate model and at the 5 percent in the aggregated model. This suggests that nations
with low UN Affinity scores with the U.S. increases the likelihood of a UAV being imported.
Population, too, plays a key role in UAV import. Using a log transformation of population ,
a smaller population size increases the likelihood of UAV import suggesting that larger nations are less likely to import UAVs. Nations with a low level of UN affinity scores with the
U.S. and small populations are more likely to import UAVs from the United States. Nations
18 Polity scores measure the regime type of a country on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10
(consolidated democracy).

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with high UN affinity to the U.S. are 6.6 times less likely to import UAVs. Large nations
that are ideologically similar to the U.S. can likely afford domestic UAV production, while
smaller autocratic nations must seek advanced technology abroad.
The Polity 2 variable is not significant on its own or in the aggregated model, yet its
coefficient indicates that a lower Polity 2 score leads to a higher likelihood of importing U.S.
UAVs. In the count model, the Polity 2 variable is similarly not significant, but a higher Polity 2 score leads to fewer UAV imports. Because low ideological similarity leads to a higher
likelihood of UAV import, this result does not support H1, that countries with ideological
similarity to the exporting nation are more likely to import UAVs. (See Appendix B, Table
1 U.S. UAV Exports and Ideological Similarity)

Israel

UN voting affinity does not appear to be a determining factor in Israeli UAV exports,
while a lower Polity 2 score leads to more UAV imports from Israel. A 1 percent decrease in
Polity 2 score leads to a 1.16 percent increased likelihood of Israeli UAV trade. Population
remains positive and significant, suggesting that larger nations are more likely to import
UAVs from Israel.
In the negative binomial model for Israel, UN affinity is significant at the 5 percent level
with a strong positive relationship to UAV trade and remains significant in the aggregated
model at the 1 percent level when coupled with Polity 2, which has a slight negative coefficient and is significant at the 0.1 percent level. This indicates that a lower Polity 2 score
leads to a higher likelihood of importing at least one UAV from Israel, while a higher level
of UN affinity and a lower Polity 2 score leads to more UAVs being imported. The results
suggest that larger autocratic nations with strong UN voting affinity with Israel should be
more likely to import UAVs. (See Appendix B, Table 2 Israeli UAV Exports and Ideological
Similarity)

Replacement Technology for Soldiers
a. Soldier Casualties

To determine the role of UAVs as both replacement technology and force multipliers,
several models were constructed including the number of soldier battle deaths and Polity 2
score of importing nations.

U.S.

Battle deaths do not appear to be significant, while population and Polity 2 score remain
significant factors in determining UAV trade. A lower Polity 2 score leads to a greater likelihood of at least one UAV being imported from the United States, while a higher Polity 2
score leads to more than one UAVs being imported from the U.S. The aggregated model
suggests that smaller, more democratic nations with higher battle casualties are more likely
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to import at least one UAV from the U.S., while smaller, more democratic countries are then
more likely to import more UAVs from the United States. The U.S. might trade with smaller
more democratic nations with fewer battle casualties to support ideological partners during
times of war, while these small democracies seek to increase their military capability while
protecting soldiers’ lives, but battle casualties remain insignificant in both the logit likelihood model and negative binomial model, suggesting that they may not play a large role in
determining UAV trade. (See Appendix B, Table 3 U.S. UAV Exports, Battle Casualties and
Government Type)
In the count and logit likelihood models of U.S. exports, battle casualties are positively
correlated with UAV imports, but are not significant. Polity 2 is significant at the 5% level,
p<0.05, with a positive coefficient (0.167) in the aggregated model. Though battle casualties are not significant in the aggregated model, this would suggest that democratic nations
with a high incidence of soldier casualties would be more likely to import UAVs from the
United States.
Population remains significant in both the negative binomial model and the inflated
logit likelihood model at the 0.1% level with large, negative coefficients. By examining the
negative binomial aggregated model we see that smaller, more democratic nations with
battle casualties are more likely to import U.S. UAVs, yet because battle casualties remain
insignificant in both models, this result does not support H2.

Israel

Interestingly, a higher incidence of soldier casualties in autocratic nations is negatively
correlated with Israeli UAV imports in the logit likelihood model. Therefore, Israel is more
likely to export at least one UAV to smaller, more autocratic nations with fewer battle casualties. (See Appendix B, Table 4 Israeli UAV Exports, Battle Casualties and Government
Type)
In the negative binomial model, no variables are significant. In the logit likelihood
model, battle casualties have a negative coefficient (-0.122) significant at the 5% level, and
Polity 2 and population are significant at the 0.1% level with negative coefficients. This suggests that as battle casualties, Polity 2 score and population increase, the likelihood of importing UAVs from Israel decreases. As battle casualties, population, and Polity 2 decrease
in a country, the likelihood that that country will import UAVs from Israel increases. This is
reasonable evidence against H2—that nations export to democracies with battle casualties.
b. Shifting army size
To determine the role of UAV trade in the changing size of an importing nation’s army,
a model was constructed including the log transformation of an importing country’s army
size and a factor variable to determine the change in army size over time. The U.S. and Israel
are run separately and then together in this model to determine macro trends of the two
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largest UAV exporters.

U.S. and Israel

The negative binomial model shows that the US primarily exports to nations with large
but declining army sizes while Israel exports to nations with small but increasing army sizes. The relationship between army size and its expansion or contraction remains significant
across all three negative binomial models, but the source of the UAV indicates an inverse
relationship. In the aggregated model, the scope of Israeli exports outweighs U.S. exports,
and nations with smaller but expanding military size are more likely to import UAVs. (See
Appendix B, Table 5 U.S. and Israeli Exports to Nations and their Military Size)
Moreover, the logit likelihood aggregate model shows with significance at the 1% level
that nations with smaller but growing armies are still more likely to import UAVs in general, despite relatively stringent export regulations in both the U.S. and Israel. This could indicate that larger countries with higher military capabilities are less likely to import UAVs,
perhaps in favor of domestic production.
In the U.S. model, population is significant in both negative binomial and logit likelihood models (p<0.0001 and p<0.001, respectively), yet in both models, the coefficient is
strongly negative. This indicates that the U.S. is more likely to export to smaller nations
with large but decreasing army size and smaller nations are also more likely to import UAVs
from the United States.
These results support H3 and H4 of this paper: nations with smaller but expanding
military sizes and larger but declining military sizes are more likely to import UAVs.

Civil Unrest and Terrorism

Modeling the relationship between civil unrest and high-casualty terrorist attacks, the
Major Episodes of Political Violence and High-Casualty Terrorist Attacks from the Center
for Systemic Peace were used. Civil Unrest and High-Casualty Terror Attacks were included
individually and then into an aggregated model for both the U.S. and Israel.

U.S.

It appears that neither civil unrest or terrorism is a factor in UAV trade for the U.S.
Civil unrest is positively correlated with UAV imports from the U.S. while the number of
terror deaths in a country is negatively correlated. While the results are not significant, this
suggests that higher incidence of terrorist deaths leads to fewer UAVs being exported to a
nation and civil unrest leads to more UAVs being imported. Population remains significant
at the one percent level in all logit likelihood models, indicating once again that a smaller
nation is more likely to import UAVs. This indicates that larger nations with low levels of
terrorist attack casualties and higher levels of civil unrest would be less likely to import
UAVs. Yet neither terrorist attack casualties nor civil unrest is significant, and this result
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does not support H5. (See Appendix B, Table 6 U.S. UAV Exports, Civil Unrest and Terrorism Casualties)

Israel

Civil unrest and terrorist casualties appear to have some impact on Israeli UAV export.
Nations with higher civil unrest and terrorist attack casualties are more likely to import
more UAVs from Israel. In the negative binomial model, higher levels of civil unrest and
higher terrorist casualties are significant at the five percent level and positively correlated
with Israeli UAV exports, but lose their significance in the aggregated model. A 10 percent
increase in civil unrest will lead to a 2.28 percent increase in UAV exports, while a 10 percent increase in terrorism casualties will lead to a 3.24 percent increase in exports.
In the logit likelihood model, neither is significant. However population remains
negatively correlated and highly significant at the 0.1 percent level, indicating that smaller
nations with low levels of civil unrest and terrorist attack casualties are more likely to be
import at least one UAV from Israel. (See Appendix B, Table 7 Israeli UAV Exports, Civil
Unrest and Terrorism Casualties)
Based on these results, H5, which claims that countries with civil unrest and terrorism
are more likely to import more UAVs, is supported, though not robustly. Civil unrest and
terrorist attack casualties appear to have some effect on UAV imports from Israel, though
further research is required.

Government Stability & Civil Unrest and Terrorism

Because exporting nations have a significant interest in trading with nations that are
stable, that will not use the UAVs against the exporter, the State Fragility Index (sfi2) is
included to determine the role of government stability in nations with civil unrest and terrorist attacks. A higher Fragility score means that a nation is more fragile and therefore less
stable.

U.S.
State fragility appears to affect U.S. UAV exports, but there also appears to be significant interaction effects between the three variables. Without factoring in civil unrest and
terror attack casualties, an increase in state fragility increases the likelihood of at least one
UAV import—the odds ratio of SFI is 1.28, indicating a strong association between higher
fragility and UAV imports.19 In the count model, we see that an increase in civil unrest
and a decrease of terrorist attack casualties and state fragility increases the total number of
UAVs imported. In other words, more stable nations with fewer terrorist attack casualties
and higher civil unrest are more likely to import U.S. UAVs. (See Appendix B, Table 8 U.S.
19

Odds ratio (U.S. UAV [SFI] ) = e^0.243 = 1.275069

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UAV Exports, Civil Unrest, Terrorism Casualties and State Fragility).
In the U.S. negative binomial model, civil unrest, terror, and state fragility are not
significant, yet in the aggregate model all three become significant, suggesting strong
interaction between variables. Civil unrest has a positive relationship to UAV imports
while terror and state fragility have a negative relationship. In the logit likelihood model,
State Fragility is significant at the 0.1 percent level with a positive coefficient of 0.243. This
indicates that nations facing increases in state fragility are more likely to import at least
one UAV from the U.S. while, as civil unrest rises, nations are likely to import more UAVs
from the United States. Population continues to be significant in all four models as smaller
nations are more likely to belong to import UAVs from the United States.
Interestingly, State Fragility is positively correlated with U.S. UAV trade—the more
fragile a nation is, the more likely they are to import U.S. UAVs. This is directly contrary to
theoretical thinking and does not support H6 of this paper that more stable nations with
terrorist attack casualties and civil unrest are more likely to import UAVs.

Israel
In the negative binomial model for Israeli exports, civil unrest and terror are significant
on their own, but when aggregated together with state fragility, they lose significance. No
other values in this model are significant. (See Appendix B, Table 9 Israeli UAV Exports,
Civil Unrest, Terrorism and State Fragility)
In the logit likelihood model, however, state fragility is significant at the one percent
level on its own and at the 0.1 percent level in aggregate. This indicates that as state fragility
rises, the likelihood of buying a UAV from Israel increases. Civil unrest also becomes significant on the 0.1 percent level in aggregate suggesting interaction between the variables.
Population remains negatively correlated with UAV trade and is significant at the 0.1 percent level providing further evidence that smaller nations are more likely to import UAVs.
It is important to note the reduction in observations in the aggregated model. The
aggregated models use only 2479 of 5008 possible observations due to gaps in the State
Fragility Index.
Because of a significant number of missing values in the State Fragility Index in the
Israeli model and the strong likelihood of interaction between variables in the U.S. model,
it is also difficult to accept H6, which factors government stability into the model. H6 is, then,
inconclusive based on this data.

Civil War and Violence & Ethnic War and Violence

Because of strong interaction effects between variables in the previous model, this
model breaks down the Civil Unrest variable into its constituent parts to determine the
varying degrees of civil unrest and state fragility. The aggregated variable for civil unrest is
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broken down into civil violence and war and ethnic violence and war. Two new variables
are then generated using civil and ethnic violence and civil and ethnic war. The underlying
logic is that while civil and ethnic violence is more indicative of civil unrest, while civil and
ethnic war is indicative of deeper-seeded state instability that might lead to a nation being
precluded from UAV trade.

U.S.
Civil unrest and war were run in separate models and then run together in an aggregated model. Only in the aggregated negative binomial model is civil unrest significant at
the 5 percent level; it is positively correlated with UAV trade (0.41) suggesting that as civil
unrest rises, UAV trade also increases. Civil war, however, remains negatively correlated
with UAV trade, but remains insignificant. This finding makes it more credible to say that
more moderate civil unrest leads to UAV trade, even though civil war is insignificant. (See
Appendix B, Table 10 U.S. UAV Exports, Civil Unrest versus Civil War)
GDP is negatively correlated with UAVs in the civil unrest and aggregated models, suggesting that if the U.S. is going to trade UAVs to nations with civil unrest, these nations are
more likely to have a smaller GDP. Population is significant in the individual models, but is
not significant in the aggregated model; in all three models it is negatively correlated with
UAV trade, indicating that smaller nations are more likely to import UAVs.
In the logit likelihood model, however, we see again that population is the strongest
indicator of UAV trade likelihood. Population remains significant in all three “certain-zero”
models at least at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, smaller nations are more likely to import
UAVs from the United States.
Also interesting in both models is Polity 2. As Polity 2 score decreases and a nation becomes more autocratic, it is more likely to import at least one UAV but as Polity 2 increases,
a nation will import more UAVs from the United States.

Israel

While neither civil unrest nor war is significant in any model, smaller, more autocratic
countries are more likely to import at least one Israeli UAV. In the logit likelihood model
Polity 2 and population are significant across models at the 0.1 percent level. As Polity 2
and population decrease, the likelihood of a nation importing a UAV increases, indicating
that larger democracies are less likely to import UAVs from Israel, controlling for civil unrest and even war. Even with this additional attempt to determine the magnitude of unrest
in a country, H6 remains inconclusive. (See Appendix B, Table 11 Israeli UAV Exports, Civil
Unrest versus Civil War).

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Discussion
Despite falling costs and more accessible export regulations from countries such as
Israel, the U.S. and China, UAVs are military technology and export regulations remain
relatively stringent. Across nearly all models and theories, small population is consistently
an indicator of UAV trade from either the U.S. or Israel, suggesting that smaller nations
prefer importing UAV technology to domestic production. Ideological similarity seems to
play a role as nations with low UN Affinity with the U.S. or Israel are more likely to import
UAVs from either nation, but even this result is complicated by incomplete UN Affinity
data for Israel. Soldier casualties remain insignificant in the U.S. models yet significant for
Israeli exports, as Israel is more likely to trade with smaller autocratic nations with fewer
battle deaths.
While both the U.S. and Israel are more likely to trade with smaller, more fragile nations, each has a different tolerance for instability and military capability in the importing
nation. The U.S. is more likely to export to a fragile nation than Israel.20 The U.S. exports to
nations with a large but declining military size while Israel exports to nations trying to grow
their military. It is interesting to note here that despite these distinctions in military expansion and contraction—both the U.S. and Israel export to smaller nations. This suggests that
regardless of whether or not a nation is seeking to grow its military or scale it down, nations
seek the “force multiplier” effect highlighted in the Dreadnought case. U.S. UAV importers
seek to scale down military size without hindering capability and Israeli UAV importers seek
to scale up military size more efficiently.

Conclusion

These results have compelling implications for the future of UAV proliferation. The
United States and Israel have remained undisputed leaders of the international UAV market, yet the two have approached global sales very differently. Israeli UAVs were, as an Israeli
UAV marketer stated, always meant for international sale as the domestic market simply
could not absorb the production of large Israeli defense firms. Conversely, from 1987 to
2013, the U.S. could afford to be more parsimonious about its exports because of substantial
Department of Defense (DoD) contracts and research investments. Yet in 2015, the Department of Defense reduced its UAV expenditure from $3.9 billion to $2.4 billion and stated
quietly that, in the coming years, “the DoD will not be the bulk user within that market.”21
The period of DoD “procurement” is over, and a new period of so-called ‘sustainment’ has
begun. Despite past U.S. export trends, the future of U.S. UAV exports may follow the Israeli
model and look to the international market to support industry growth and maintain mar20 Odds Ratio (U.S. UAV [SFI])= 1.275069 || Odds Ratio (Israeli UAV [SFI])=1.082461
21 Abigail Adams, “The UAV Industry’s Winners and Losers in the 2015 Defense Department Budget,” The Motley Fool, May
18, 2014.

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ket share. However, this shift may also entail exporting UAVs to nations with higher levels
of civil unrest and lower levels of ideological similarity.
Despite the MTCR, the UAV game remains largely bilateral. Exporting nations create
their own policy balancing security and market interests; importing nations seek UAVs for
their use in growing a military more efficiently or reducing military size without compromising national security. Both Israel and the U.S. are more likely to trade with ideologically
dissimilar nations, and Israel’s UAV production is still dependent on sales to the international market. Israel exports broadly and trades with nations with more battle deaths, while
the U.S. exports to nations with higher instability.
As domestic contracts dry up, private UAV producers must work to secure export approval from domestic governments in order to survive. Boyle’s fears of unmonitored proliferation and Gregory’s anxieties about extended theatres of war therefore become especially
salient as security concerns give way to market necessity, with international UAV competition fueling a global race to the bottom.

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APPENDIX A

Eric Lenier Ives

Empirical Models
Ideological Similarity
UAV USA-country b t = β0 + β1(Polity 2)it + β2(UN Affinity)it + β3(log(Population))
it + β4(log(GDP))it +ε
UAV Israel-country b t = β0 + β1(Polity 2)it + β2(UN Affinity)it + β3(log(Population))
it + β4(log(GDP))it + ε

Replacement Technology
Battle Deaths
UAV USA-country b t = β0 + β1(log(Battle Deaths))it + β2(Polity 2)it +
β3(log(Population))it + β4(log(GDP))it + ε
UAV Israel-country b t = β0 + β1(log(Battle Deaths))it + β2(Polity 2)it +
β3(log(Population))it + β4(log(GDP))it + ε
Shifting Army Size
UAV USA-country b t = β0 + β1(log(ArmySize))it + β2(Δlog(ArmySize)it +
β3(log(Population))it + β4(log(GDP))it + ε
UAV Israel-country b t = β0 + β1(log(ArmySize))it + β2(Δlog(ArmySize)it +
β3(log(Population))it + β4(log(GDP))it + ε
UAV Israel & USA-country b t = β0 + β1(log(ArmySize))it + β2(Δlog(ArmySize)it +
β3(log(Population))it + β4(log(GDP))it + ε

Civil Unrest and Terrorism
Civil Unrest and Terrorism
UAV USA-country b t = β0 + β1(Civil Unrest))it + β2(log(Terror Deaths))it +
β3(log(Population)it+ β4(log(GDP)it + ε
UAV Israel-country b t = β0 + β1(Civil Unrest))it + β2(log(Terror Deaths))it +
β3(log(Population)it+ β4(log(GDP)it + ε
State Fragility, Civil Unrest and Terrorism
UAV USA-country b t = β0 + β1(Civil Unrest))it + β2(log(Terror Deaths))it + β3(State
Fragility Index)it+ β4(log(Population)it + β5(log(GDP)it + ε
UAV Israel-country b t = β0 + β1(Civil Unrest))it + β2(log(Terror Deaths))it + β3(State
Fragility Index)it+ β4(log(Population)it + β5(log(GDP)it + ε

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Civil Unrest versus Civil War
UAV USA-country b t = β0 + β1(Civil Violence))it + β2(Civil War))it+ β4(log(Population)it +
β5(log(GDP)it + ε
UAV Israel-country b t = β0 + β1(Civil Violence))it + β2(Civil War))it+ β4(log(Population)it +
β5(log(GDP)it + ε

APPENDIX B
Datasets
The data in this paper comes from a variety of sources: data on UAV transfers from
the Arms Transfer Database from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI); United Nations General Assembly Voting Data from Anton Strezhnev and Erik
Voeten; Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV), the State Fragility Index, High
Casualty Terrorist Bombings (HCTB), and Polity IV from the Center for Systemic Peace;
the Armed Conflict Dataset from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program; and finally, World
Development Indicators on population, gross domestic product, military size and expenditure from the World Bank.

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Table 1 U.S. Ideological Similarity

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Table 2 Israel Ideological Similarity

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Table 3 U.S. Exports to Nations with Battle Deaths

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Table 4 Israeli Exports to Nations with Battle Deaths

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Table 5 U.S. and Israeli Exports to Nations and their Military Size

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Table 6 U.S. UAV Exports, Civil Unrest and Terrorism Casualties

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Table 7 Israeli Exports, Civil Unrest and Terrorism Casualties

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Table 8 U.S. UAV Exports, Civil Unrest, Terrorism Casualties and State Fragility

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Table 9 Israeli UAV Exports, Civil Unrest, Terrorism Casualties and State Fragility

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Table 10 U.S. UAV Exports, Civil Unrest and Civil War

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Table 11 Israeli UAV Exports, Civil Unrest and Civil War

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Works Cited
Adams, Abigail. “The UAV Industry’s Winners and Losers in the 2015 Defense
Department Budget” The Motley Fool. May 18, 2014. http://www.fool.com/investing/
general/2014/05/18/the-uav-industrys-winners-and-losers-in-the-2015-d.aspx.
Arms Transfers Database. 2014.
Distributed Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. http://armstrade.sipri.
org/armstrade/page/values.php.
Boyle, Michael. “The costs and consequences of drone warfare”. International Affairs.
Vol. 89: 1 (2013). The Royal Institute of International Affairs. pp. 1-29.
Franke, U.E. “The global diffusion of unmanned aerial vehicles”. Precision Strike
Warfare, Routledge 2015. New York. pp. 52-72.
Gormley, Dennis. “Limiting the Unintended Consequences of Unmanned Air System
Proliferation”. Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy & International Relations. Winter/
Spring 2013, Vol. 14, Issue 1, pp. 67.
Government Accountability Office (GAO). “Agencies Could Improve Information
Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports.” July 30, 2012.
Publicly Released September 12, 2012. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-536.
Grant, Thomas. “German Dreadnoughts and the Saudi Bomb: Why We Should Be Wary
of Saudi Arabia” International Relations 11, (1993):405.
http://ire.sagepub.com/content/11/5/405.citation.
Gregory, Derek. “The everywhere war”. The Geographical Journal, Vol. 177, No. 3,
September 2011. The Royal Geographical Society. pp. 238-250.
High Casualty Terrorist Bombings 1989-2013. 2014.
Distributed by The Center for Systemic Peace. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
Marshall, Monty G., Benjamin R. Cole. State Fragility Index 1995-2013. 2014.
Distributed by The Center for Systemic Peace. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
Marshall, Monty G. Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) 1946-2014. 2014.
Distributed by The Center for Systemic Peace. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
Marshall, Monty G. Polity IV Annual Time Series 1800-2013. 2014.
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Distributed by The Center for Systemic Peace. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.

Missile Technology Control Treaty (MTCR). MTCR Annex Handbook. Revised 2009.
pp. iii. http://www.mtcr.info/english/MTCR_Annex_Handbook_ENG.pdf.
Pettersson, Therése, Peter Wallensteen. Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014. 2015. Distributed by
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/.
Strezhnev, Anton, Erik Voeten. United Nations General Assembly Voting Data. 2013.
Distributed by Harvard Dataverse. http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379.
Teal Group. “Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total $91 Billion in Its
2014 UAV Market Profile and Forecast” July 14, 2014. http://www.tealgroup.com/index.php/about-teal-group-corporation/press-releases/118-2014-uav-press-release.
World Development Indicators. 2014. Distributed by The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 6 No. 1

Germany’s Safe Country of Origin Scheme
The Long Legacy of Anti-Gypsyism
Gabriele Anton

Introduction

September 2015: The atmosphere at the Munich train station is vibrant as Germany receives thousands of Syrian asylum seekers with welcoming applause. German police smile,
citizens hand out food and the children are greeted with stuffed animals. Colorful banners
declaring solidarity and support frame the background. These images have quickly spread
around the world. National and international media headlines spread congratulatory remarks, praising Germany’s deep humanitarian commitment to shelter and safeguard those
who have fallen victim to war and political persecution. The event in September marked
a milestone in Germany’s immigration history as local administrations worked hand-inhand with volunteer organizations to comfort and guide asylum seekers through the application process. Undoubtedly, Germany’s generous gesture marks a radical change from
the country’s image as a fortress against foreigners, to one of a nation embracing a culture
of welcome. The new image of Germany as an immigration country cannot, however, withstand scrutiny from their historical culture.
National and international mainstream media focuses solely on Syrian refugees even
though asylum seekers from the Western Balkans, predominately the Roma population,
constitute roughly 30 percent of the total number of asylum seekers in Germany and receives almost no media coverage On the international level, the Roma are often called Gypsies. They are a distinct ethnic minority group that has lived in Europe for hundreds of
years. In fact, the Roma constitute Europe’s largest minority with the Council of Europe estimating their European population to be 10 to 12 million. Roma history in Europe is one of
deprivation and systematic social exclusion at the hand of European majority groups. Roma
from the Western Balkans must resort to seeking asylum in Germany to escape severe marginalization that has left them trapped in poverty. Yet, the international mainstream media
largely ignores this well-known issue in Europe. In the weeks following the scene at the
Munich train station, it became clear that Germany would have to deal with overwhelming streams of migrants. Germany’s initial positive and upbeat attitude turned negative.
National mainstream media, while remaining sympathetic to the plight of refugees, more
often focuses on political discussions about how to stem the ongoing influx of migrants into
the country.
The German press focused especially on the urgent need to distinguish between people
who deserve the right to obtain asylum seeker status in Germany, designated as “refugees”

Gabriele anton is a senior at California State University, Long Beach graduating
with a Bachelor of Arts in International Studies.

Germany’s Safe Country of Origin Scheme

63

and those who are undeserving. The latter group is more often referred to as asylum seekers.
Frequently, local and state governments turn to the federal government, headed by Chancellor Angela Merkel, to express their discontent over allowing further refugee streams
into the country. The German public more frequently demands to address the challenge
to house, feed and process the multitude of migrants. While this increasingly unattainable
goal expanded, political pressure built up in the federal government as politicians implemented policies and procedures to stem the immigration flood to Germany. The initial
emphasis on humanitarian aid and integration shifted to the more political focus of sorting out the “good refugees” from the “bad asylum seekers.” Under mounting pressure, the
Federal Government, began to pursue a more decisive immigration policy. There were talks
about pressing for a more equal distribution of refugees among EU member states, and
the need to intensify negotiations with transitory countries to limit refugee migration to
Europe. Eventually, immigration reforms were implemented to sort out and speed up the
asylum application processes aimed at designated economic migrant populations from the
Western Balkans.
The distinction between deserving and undeserving asylum seekers is based on a seemingly rational argument: migrants from safe countries of origin are not a persecuted group
and are ineligible to qualify for asylum seeker status. German legislators use this rationale to
implement time-efficient procedures for distinguishing the “deserving” migrants from “undeserving” migrants. Discussion about economic migrants in Germany is predominantly
aimed at asylum seekers from the Western Balkans. Both Serbia and Macedonia entered
the application process for EU accession. The EU law, as articulated in the Asylum Procedure Directive, found that both Serbia and Macedonia qualify as safe countries of origin.1
The German political discourse focuses on the argument that asylum applications from
Serbian and Macedonian nationals are fabricated since there is no substantiated concern
of persecution in these countries. While this argument may hold merit at face value, closer
inspection illustrates that such reasoning ignores the fact that a substantial number of asylum seekers from these countries belong to the Roma population. This ethnic minority has
been systematically excluded from mainstream society throughout Europe., which should
qualify them as a persecuted group.
There is well-documented evidence produced by national NGOs, various EU offices
and the international community exposing persistent discrimination and marginalization
against the Roma populations in Serbia and Macedonia. Nonetheless, the German Government, upholding the concept of nationality, refuses to acknowledge the Roma as a perse-

1 One of the key criteria for EU accession as defined by the EU Commission in Copenhagen “Copenhagen criteria” is: Stable
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.

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Gabriele Anton

cuted ethnic group.2 Furthermore, despite Germany’s sober history of Roma persecution
and genocide under the Nazi Regime, German immigration legislation meets little public
and political resistance when labeling the Roma as undeserving Western Balkan asylum
seekers who attempt migrating to Germany for purely economic reasons. The German immigration law continues its legacy of Roma exclusion, this time under the guise of the EU
safe county designation.
While the Roma issue remains complex within the framework of the EU, this paper
highlights key aspects of German national interest as well as supranational interest to expose two dominant factors that account for marginal interest in Europe’s Roma minority:
historically-rooted prejudice against Europe’s largest minority group and the EU’s prioritization of economic interests.
The first part of this paper will address historical prejudice against the Roma in Europe, with a special focus on Germany. Current German popular attitude toward the Roma
will also be analyzed. The second part will assess some aspects of EUs power structure to
highlight political mechanisms that determine participation and agenda in addition to the
driving forces that inform EU politics and who determines the prioritization of interests.
This paper will use the 2014 EU Commissioner progress report for Macedonia and Serbia, assessments by the international community and national NGO reports to inspect the
concept of safe country designation. In addition, the paper will consider observations and
assessments by the international community and national NGOs.

Europe’s Long Legacy of Anti-Gypsyism
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Unity (2008) reads:
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society
in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”3

2 Deutsche Welle is Germany’s international news broadcaster; on November 4, 2015 it reported that nine out of ten asylum
seekers from Serbia belong to the Roma minority. Mihajlovic, President of the National Council of Roma Minorities in Serbia
states, “The problem of poverty has existed for generations. With it comes discrimination from birth until death – every aspect of
life from education to the job market to the healthcare system.
3 Official Journal of the European Union, Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On European Union, May 9, 2008, accessed
October 27, 2015.

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The EU questionably proclaims to be committed to human rights and devoted to democratic values while it continues to tolerate Anti-Gypsyism.4 The term “Anti-Gypsyis” alludes to deeply embedded social and structural discrimination against the Roma minority
in Europe. It refers to constructed images and stereotypes of the Roma that have been perpetuated and reaffirmed by European majority groups. Historical records from the 15th and
16th centuries demonstrate the widespread and enduring character of anti-Roma attitudes
in Europe. For example, the Roma were driven out of England, Portugal, the Netherlands,
and the cities of Venice and Milan. At the beginning of the 18th century, the local government of the German city Mainz legitimized the execution of Roma based on the notion that
their lifestyle poses a threat to society.5 The Migration Policy Institute found evidence that
the Roma had been enslaved for 500 years in certain regions of modern Romania.6 Even in
the 21st Century, Europe’s Anti-Gypsyism persists, and during the 20th century, almost all
of the Roma population in Germany was exterminated in Nazi death camps. In the former
communist Czechoslovakia, Roma women were coerced to accept sterilization.7 Amnesty
International reports that the Roma in the Western Balkans continue to endure extreme
forms of discrimination in modern times. In many former Eastern Bloc countries, far-right
political parties capitalize on Anti-Roma sentiments as a means to boost numbers in their
constituency. The extremist party Jobbik of Hungary, which was very outspoken against the
Roma, won four seats in the 2009 European Parliament election.8 In 2010, The Economist
published an article about leading Romanian politicians who proposed an official name
change for their Roma minority; they argued that the name “Roma” sounded too similar
to their country name Romania, which might damage its image abroad. It was suggested to
rename the Roma as “Tigan.”9 Roma groups protested that this term is associated with the
collective memory regarding the Romanian enslavement of the Roma from 1385 to 1856,
and also with forced deportations during World War II. Romania withdrew the proposal
when the media publicized this political move. A Deutsche Welle article published in August
2015 refers to a statement from the Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic, who said that

4 In May 2012, the Council of Europe issued a Descriptive Glossary of terms relating to Roma issues. It defines Anti-Gypsyism
as a specific racism directed towards the Roma, “it is persistent both historically and geographically (permanent and not decreasing); it is systematic (accepted by virtually all the community); it is often accompanied by acts of violence.”
5 Margareta Matache, “The Deficit of EU Democracies: A New Cycle of Violence Against Roma Population,” Human Rights
Quarterly 36, no. 2 (May 1, 2014), 328.
6 Arno Tanner, “The Roma of Eastern Europe: Still Searching for Inclusion,” Migration Policy Institute, May 01, 2005, accessed
November 10, 2015
7 Christina Zampas, and Adriana Lamačková, “Forced and Coerced Sterilization of Women in Europe,” International Journal of
Gynecology & Obstetrics 114, no. 2 (March 23, 2012), 163-166.
8 Amnesty International, Human Rights on the Margins Roma in Europe, issue brief, 2008.
9 “Ire of the Ţigan,” The Economist, December 08, 2010, accessed November 10, 2015.

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“The Roma just want German money.”10 There is a volume of evidence indicating that the
Roma are denied equal opportunity, societal inclusion and legitimization of their identity
as an ethnic minority.
The Roma typically migrate from Eastern to Western European countries. At the EU
level, the Roma’s Western migration pattern is predominantly explained by economic disparity between Eastern and Western nation-states. However, it must not be concluded that
Roma asylum seekers, because of their low economic status, are exclusively economic migrants. Rather, it should be recognized that their low economic status is symptomatic of
an ethnic minority group that has been systematically excluded from educational and economic opportunities. Push factors for the Roma migration may include economic hardship. Nevertheless, the fact that the Roma constitute a low socioeconomic stratum throughout Europe affirms a pattern of exclusion and discrimination. The Roma asylum seekers
are not mere economic migrants as economic hardship in context of the Roma should be
viewed as the outcome of persevering social and political marginalization. When referring
back to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Unity, it becomes apparent that within the EU
framework, persecution of the Roma minority group remains largely ignored and inconsequential.11 Therefore, the German rationale to treat the Roma asylum seekers as Serbian
or Macedonian nationals implies willful avoidance of the widespread existence of AntiGypsyism. Within the context of German history, such immigration law reveals an even
more daunting political strategy.

Germany’s Roma and Sinti

Germany recognizes a distinction between the Roma and Sinti peoples, while the umbrella term of “Roma” or “Romani” is widely used on the international level. Dispersed
migration patterns resulted in different national affiliations of the Roma minority group in
Europe. The group that left southern and western regions of Europe to immigrate to German territory during the 14th century identifies as “Sinti.”12 Roma populations from Eastern
European territories that started to immigrate to Germany in the 19th century identified as
“Roma.” In Germany this distinction is significant, as the Sinti identify as German nationals
on the grounds of 600 years of shared history. This shared history is one of structural discrimination, persecution and marginalization at the hand of mainstream German society.
For the purpose of this paper the term “Roma” will be used to refer to both Sinti and Roma.

10 Nemanja Rujevic, “Roma: Discriminated in Serbia, Unwanted in Germany,” Deutsche Welle, August 10, 2015, accessed
October 29, 2015.
11 Official Journal of the European Union.
12 Gilad Margalit, Germany and Its Gypsies: A Post-Auschwitz Ordeal, Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002, 4.

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German Formulation of Roma Identity

In Germany, the use of the term “Gypsy” in German is no longer politically correct,
as it is a historically derogatory term. In the context of German national identity, the term
Gypsy has traditionally served to demarcate the German majority group as the lead culture.
German lead culture alludes to a form of ethnic nationalism that is based on the principle
of jus sanguinis. Historically, German national identity was based on the idea of cultural
homogeneity, which cultivated xenophobia and was expressed in institutionalized discrimination.
Prior to the German Industrial Revolution, the Roma population maintained a nomadic way of life travelling through the German countryside as peddlers, entertainers, musicians, fortune tellers, and day laborers. As vagrant subsistence laborers, the Roma were
an impoverished group of people under suspicion and contempt from the German people.
The German majority group perceived the Roma way of life to be an outcome of a presumably lazy lifestyle stemming from an inferior character trait or as a God-given punishment
for their alleged pagan culture. The German term “Gypsy” became a synonym for an unwelcome foreigner. Historically, the majority group attempted to suppress the Roma way
of life through legal orders. In Germany, between 1497 and 1774, there were 146 edicts
against Gypsies.13 For many centuries, German mainstream society used the term “Gypsy”
to imply abnormal physical appearance in terms of darker skin tone, unusual clothing and
a vagabond lifestyle. The German narrative of the Roma was based on the idea that the minority was inherently of inadequate human quality. Therefore, the Roma was a vulnerable
group that frequently became the target of false accusations. The common German attitude
toward the Roma population can be characterized by the majority’s persistent attempts to
assert control over the minority. Interpreting the Roma lifestyle through a cultural lens, the
majority group consistently denied them the right to their own identity.
It should be noted that the 18th and 19th century marked the emergence of a romanticized Gypsy image. Gypsy protagonists were a popular focal point during the height of the
German Romanticism movement.14 The traditional image of the Gypsy was transformed
into a free spirit character, and the typical vagrant lifestyle was explained by the notion
of a carefree and cheerful nature. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, a revered German novelist, dramatist, poet, humanist, scientist and philosopher was instrumental in popularizing
romantic Gypsy motifs, known as Gypsy romanticism. Such literary discourse is based on
orientalism, as it creates stereotypical Gypsy images void of reference to the harsh reality of
marginalization and stigmatization of the Roma in Germany at that time. In this context,
it may be said that, historically, one of the German national identity traits has involved the
13 Aitor Gomez and Rosa Valls, “Roma’s Contribution to European Identity,” in Who Is the European? A New Global Player?,
edited by Michael Kuhn, 105-17, New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007, 105-117.
14 Gilad Margalit, Germany and Its Gypsies: A Post-Auschwitz Ordeal, 3-20.

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“Gypsy” as the archetypical other.
With the arrival of the German Industrial Revolution, the majority of the Roma population, no longer able to support their way of life due to changing economic structures, was
pushed into the outskirts of German cities where they constituted the lowest socioeconomic strata. Forced to a sedentary lifestyle, this marginalized minority fell into bitter poverty;
unable to find work, they depended on social welfare. As a socially excluded group, many
families resorted to begging as a means of survival. At the same time, mingling with the
general public posed the threat of falling victim to physical or verbal abuse.
During the 20th century, in the Weimar Republic, the Roma were registered with special
passes to acknowledge their status as a German minority. However, their newly granted
legal status proved to be short-lived. Under the Nazi regime in the 1930s, the Roma’s German citizenship status was revoked. With the enforcement of the Nuremberg race laws in
1935, the Roma lost all civil rights. During the Third Reich, German national identity had
been reduced to racial classification. The Roma were classified as a foreign inferior race and
further excluded from public life. Ultimately, the Roma were transported to death camps.
More than half a million Roma lost their lives in these Nazi camps.

Germany Continues to Exclude the Roma
In the decades following World War II, it was a common practice for German local
authorities to prevent Roma survivors from moving into their municipalities. Consequently, the small Roma population was forced to live in sub-standard housing arrangements located in city and town peripheries with no access to public transportation.
Isolated from the the rest of the German population, the Roma were condemned to life
in the ghetto. Segregation from public life also meant that the Roma minority was unable
to participate in Germany’s prosperity or take advantage of the educational opportunities
available to the remainder of the population.15 While the German government apologized
for the Roma persecution during the Nazi regime, the German integration policy has not
resolved social economic challenges for the Roma in Germany. This is especially disconcerting since the Roma’s collective memory of genocide has been transmitted to younger
generations, and the relationship between Roma and non-Roma populations remains
tense.
Information on the poverty rate for national minorities, including the Roma, is not
available because German law prohibits collecting data based on ethnicity.16 Since the German Basic Law prohibits any form of discrimination based on ethnicity, effective political
15 Walter Hanesch, Promoting Social Inclusion of Roma – Germany, report, July 11, 2011, accessed November 17, 2015.
16 According to The German Interior Ministry the German Government does not collect demographic or socioeconomic data
based on ethnicity. The official justification includes German historical context, concerns of international law, and also concerns
of German minority groups who fear discrimination.

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anti-discrimination measures can only be implemented by means of collecting census data
of ethnic minorities. According to estimates from various Sinti and Roma organizations,
there are currently between 70,000 to 150,000 Roma in Germany. In 2012, a sample study
funded by the Stiftung Oeffentlichen Rechts (Foundation of Public Rights) found that more
than 80 percent of Sinti and Roma in Germany experienced some form of discrimination
the majority of school-aged interviewees failed to obtain a high school degree. While living
in the same country, the German majority group and the Roma minority group are disconnected; German politics has put forth little effort to educate mainstream society about culture and history of the Roma. The German nation has never sought to engage in an honest
discussion about prevalent Anti-Gypsyism attitudes.
The German Federal Anti-Discrimination Office published a study conducted in 2014
that looked at popular attitudes towards the Roma.17 The study revealed that interviewees
showed a general lack of interest in and knowledge of the Roma minority in Germany; the
term “Gypsy” continues to be linked to a vagabond lifestyle and is associated with crime
and begging. Romanticized Gypsy images are rare; 31 percent claim to be able to identify a
Roma person by means of physical appearance and social behaviors such as begging. Only
those who match these characteristics are recognized as members of the Roma minority
group, which demonstrates that stereotypical thinking about the Roma people continues in
contemporary German society. Also, the Roma minority is still perceived as a non-German
immigrant group, meaning the majority group continues to view the German Roma and
Sinti as foreigners. This study found that, overall, there is marginal sympathy for the Roma
while attitudes of indifference to their circumstance dominate. Germany’s attitude remains
one of ignorance at best and persisting prejudice and discrimination at worst.
Prevalent indifference towards the Roma in the majority group is problematic especially when coping with an influx of refugees. German media outlets tend to portray increased
immigration to Germany as a crisis situation and public fear of being overrun by foreigners
who will drain their welfare state has intensified. This fear has, in turn, created a political
climate of division which has strengthened populist platforms that feed on stereotypical
ideas of “deserving” and “undeserving” asylum seekers. It has set the stage for populist
strategies that, on the surface, appear to be informed by rational arguments while they are
anchored in undercurrents of ethnic discrimination. Labeling the Roma asylum seekers
as mere economic migrants lacks merit for two reasons: one, this argument perpetuates
historically-rooted stigmatization of the Roma as inferior human capital, and two, it refuses
to acknowledge that the Roma are a persecuted ethnic minority. The European Commission states, “The Roma people are Europe’s largest minority, […] many Roma in the EU are
17 Antidiskriminierungsstelle Des Bundes (Federal Anti-Discrimination Office), Zwischen Gleichgültigkeit Und Ablehnung
- Bevölkerungseinstellungen Gegenüber Sinti Und Roma (Popular Attitudes toward Sinti and Roma in Germany), publication,
September 3, 2014, accessed October 30, 2015.

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victims of prejudice and social exclusion, despite the fact that EU countries have banned
discrimination.”18 Despite their recognition as an ethnic minority, the Roma are still denied
asylum seeker status. The EU designated Serbia and Macedonia as safe countries of origin
on the concept of nationality while making no provision for the Roma. To understand this
seemingly paradoxical position it is important to investigate the EU power structure. This
paper will examine the driving forces responsible for prioritization of interests.

The European Union – Supranational versus National Interests

The EU was created in the aftermath of World War II. Historically, its guiding principles have been based on economic and political interests. Within the last decade, the EU
has seen a considerable expansion of common marketplaces as large parts of Eastern European countries have joined. Geopolitically, the EU assumed strength by incorporating former East Bloc countries. As a global economic player, the EU asserted and expanded influence. However, as a political institution it is void of inherent sovereignty; executive power is
solely inferred by member states. The EU may not assert its own interests but rather acts on
behalf of its member states that are responsible for prioritizing political interests.
The Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy article provides a more pointed analysis by
asserting that European leaders focus on fiscal integration while little attention is paid to
the fact that the EU currently resembles a passive democratic structure, meaning there is
very limited citizen participation in governance.19 Without democratic integration, the EU
is at risk of being reduced to a primarily economic government. Direct citizen participation holds the opportunity for direct representation of minority group interests at the EU
level. Europe’s largest minority group will have to depend on national legislation to protect
their rights of equal access to social and economic opportunities. Pervasive Anti-Gypsyism
holds little hope for the Roma because integration efforts rest in Europe’s nation-states.
Even though Germany has become a country of immigration, its open-door policy does
not include the Roma. German immigration legislation utilized the adoption of the EU
safe country designation as a political tool to reject and deport unwelcome Roma migrants
while avoiding political incorrectness. Germany’s rejection of Roma asylum seekers from
the Western Balkans aligns with the tradition of exclusion and persecution of the Roma
people.
Roma demands for protection of their rights and social inclusion has failed to garner political support on the EU level due to persisting prejudices. They are not considered
stakeholders because of their geopolitical and economic insignificance. The Roma are a
nationality without a state, they have no territory and they constitute a low socioeconomic
18 EU and Roma – European Commission
19 Gary Minda, “Freedom and Democracy in a World Governed by Finance: Habermas and the Crisis in Europe--A Free
Labor Response,” Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy 10, no. 3 (Spring 2013), 244-300.

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stratum. EU members perceive the Roma as an economic burden and a liability; therefore,
the safe country designation needs to be understood as political tool to legitimize the expulsion of the Romani people. In Germany’s case, the government adopted the non-binding
safe country designation as a national prescription to legitimize faster deportation procedures for Serbian and Macedonian nationals who, to a large extent, constitute the Roma
minority. In this respect, the EU has created a politically sound solution to halt the Roma
immigration “problem” to Western European member states such as Germany.

Macedonia and Serbia – How Safe are These Countries and For Whom?

Both Macedonia and Serbia have been designated as strong candidates for EU accession. As such, both nations qualify as safe countries by EU standards. The safe country
designation, by implication, denies asylum seeker status to migrant populations originating
from these countries. The 2014-2015 assessment report of Macedonia and Serbia will serve
as a case study to gain more insight into guiding EU principles.
The EU Commission assesses the national and economic policies of an applicant country and, in the case of Macedonia, found several issues of concern: state institutions continue to assume control of the media, and the report implies pluralistic views are being
suppressed. There is a political crisis between ruling parties and opponents that points to
hardening political fronts that may take on oppressive character considering Serbia’s recent history. There is persisting inter-ethnic tension between the majority group and the
Albanian minority group, and both central and local institutions engage in discriminatory practices. Democratic safety mechanisms, such as transparency and accountability, are
not sufficiently implemented. Interestingly, persisting marginalization and discrimination
against the Roma minority in Macedonia is mentioned rather late in this report. While the
EU Commission expressed concerns about weak democratic structures, it praised Macedonia’s progress in implementing economic adjustment requirements.
The 2014 Serbia Progress Report includes similar findings: corruption in the private
sector and in public institutions remains prevalent in Serbia.20 There is a lack of credible
track records of investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in connection with corruption and organized crime cases. The country lacks an effective independent judiciary,
which implies there is a cronyism structure. The report also mentions that the Roma minority is still marginalized and discriminated against; this minority group lacks access to
quality education, adequate housing and continues to be excluded from employment opportunities. Despite these findings, the EU Commission considers both Macedonia and
Serbia to be well underway to full EU membership.
Both assessment reports clearly illustrate the concerns raised by Habermas, a renowned
German political philosopher, warned that European leaders have been preoccupied with
20

European Commission, Syria Progress Report, report, October 8, 2014, accessed November 2, 2015.

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fiscal integration while neglecting democratic principles.21 Macedonia and Serbia are fragile
democracies. Both countries continue to severely marginalize the Roma minority. The cumulative experience of such stigmatization may be considered a form of persecution. However, the German government willfully ignores the Roma plight by upholding the concept
of nationality by means of the EU safe country designation. On the EU and national level,
it is argued that poverty may constitute hardship but that it does not constitute persecution.
The international community and national organizations disagree with this argument by
pointing to the fact that Europe has a long legacy of tolerating and ignoring Anti-Gypsyism
attitudes. The Roma minority has become victim to structural violence.
A 2010 sub-regional UNICEF study found that, in Macedonia, about 28 percent of
the Roma people live in improvised dwellings or so called “slums” (Country Report: A
Situation Analysis of Girls and Boys in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2013).
The same study refers to a 2003 study that assessed over 60 percent of the Roma in Serbia’s
capital, Belgrade, live in slum settlements. Living in illegal settlements often prevents the
Roma from registering for health care and education systems since such services require
official residency registration. It also means those living in illegal slum settlements are not
included in national census data; thus, large numbers of the Roma remain an invisible part
of society. A 2010 UNICEF article on Roma children in Serbia found that compared to
non-Roma children, the Roma children were twice as likely to be born underweight, and
also twice as likely to die before their fifth birthday. Poor nutrition and deprived living
conditions are identified as main causes for high mortality rates and bad health conditions
in Roma children (Hawke, UNICEF Media Centre). UNICEF reported similar findings in
Macedonia: low birth weight in Roma children is twice as prevalent as in non-Roma children, stunting rates in Roma children are more than three times higher than in nonRoma children and more than half of the Roma children do not attend secondary school.
The Roma life is characterized by severe marginalization, extremely high unemployment,
dire poverty, inadequate housing and limited access to health services (Country Report: A
Situation Analysis of Girls and Boys in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2013).
In an article published in 2015, Amnesty International discussed a case of forced eviction from an illegal settlement in the outskirts of Belgrade of more than 100 Roma families.
Despite massive EU funding to resettle these Roma families, the city of Belgrade refused to
offer housing project sites that meet international human rights standards. Amnesty International criticized the EU strongly for considering a remote housing project site that would
withhold access to social, educational and economic opportunities for the displaced families. In addition, the project would create a racially segregated settlement in breach of international law. Three years after the forced eviction, despite availability of adequate funding,
21 Gary Minda, “Freedom and Democracy in a World Governed by Finance: Habermas and the Crisis in Europe--A Free
Labor Response.”

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these families are still living in substandard metal container settlements on the outskirts of
Belgrade. Without the ability to commute, many of these Roma families lost the means to
support their families and are dependent on charity and meager welfare benefits (Serbia:
Forcibly Evicted Roma Still Awaiting Resettlement despite EU Millions 2015).
Pro Asyl, an independent German human rights organization, published a report in
2013 about the Roma situation in Serbia and Macedonia. They sent a delegation of lawyers
and refugee representatives to assess Roma living conditions in these countries. They found
impoverished Roma people living in slums without electricity and water. Some of these
illegal settlements had been bulldozed prior to their arrival. According to the Pro Asyl organization, this is grounds for asylum under international refugee law (Criticism against
Immigration Reform and Deportations 2015).

Conclusion

Germany cannot claim to be a country of open immigration. The German government
has opened the door for some and closed it for others. The Roma minority, although permitted to live in Germany, has been shut out of the country’s social, political, and economic
life and more generally persecuted for hundreds of years. For instance, the Bavarian State
Minister Seehofer enforced a strict deportation regiment by moving asylum seekers from
the Western Balkans to separate reception centers. Under the banner of safe country of
origin designation, the Roma are rejected as “undeserving” asylum seekers.
On the
one hand, the country claims to be a haven for persecuted humanity while, on the other
hand, it pushes out members of Europe’s largest minority group. Germany’s claim to have
reached higher moral ground is therefore inconsistent with their practices.
Unlike other asylum seekers, the Roma have no stake in national or supranational politics;
they bear no geopolitical or economic influence because they have no claim to territory and
are trapped in poverty. The EU will have little say in determining their fate since it is a political institution is run by nation-states and it is void of inherent sovereignty. Additionally,
the EU has very limited executive power. That is why, ultimately, the EU member states are
in charge of prioritizing interests and setting a political agenda. European history is full of
Anti-Gypsy sentiment, which is still alive when aggression and institutional discrimination
against the Roma remains largely tolerated or ignored in EU member states.
There should be no doubt that Europe’s largest minority group is still subjected to human rights violations. The Roma resemble a subjugated minority group trapped in dire
poverty because of structural violence. They constitute a persecuted group who has a right
to equal access and protection. The German government, however, has instrumentalized
the EU safe country scheme to deny the Roma people minority status by categorizing them
by nationality alone. Germany refuses to acknowledge that this group is subjected to severe
marginalization and institutional discrimination which constitutes persecution.
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As long as there are no sincere commitments on national level to come to terms with
historically rooted prejudice against the Roma, this ethnic minority will remain on the
fringe of European main societies. Germany’s immigration reform targeted at the Roma
asylum seekers stands as a sober reminder of legislation informed by a long legacy of
Anti-Gypsyism.

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2014 Accessed November 11, 2015. http://www.unicef.org/tfyrmacedonia/SitAn_
Macedonia_5May2014.pdf.
Zampas, Christina, and Adriana Lamačková. “Forced and Coerced Sterilization of Women in Europe.”International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics 114, no. 2 (March 23,
2012): 163-66. doi:10.1016/j.ijgo.2011.05.002.

Southern California International Review - Vol. 6 No. 1

Minimizing Historical Memory and Spillover
in Trade Relations
Swini Tummala

As time passes, it seems that globalization has spun an increasingly more complicated web
between otherwise separable issues. This is especially true when examining the role of carrots
and sticks in negotiations where economic sanctions are implemented in order to force an actor towards a path of desired behavior. However, there is a new trend of separating economic
issues from security concerns. Nations that were historically political enemies are finding ways
to overcome the institutionally ingrained obstacles that prevent trust and cooperation on trade
agreements. This paper looks at Sino-Israeli, Iranian-Turkish, and Sino-Indian relations to
examine how these nations have been able to separate trade agreements from quarrels on
security and political matters.

Introduction

Many liberal theories argue that political friendships and historical relationships will
define the future interactions of nations, whether positive or negative. The idea of political spillover explains that cooperation, or lack thereof, over policy matters will flow into
economic relations. The value of trust in relationships underscores the importance of spillover between multiple spheres of international interaction. This implies that the status of
a nation as a historical ally or enemy would determine the trade partner preferences of a
related nation. Another aspect of the spillover effect is the use of economic incentives and
disincentives to guide a nation’s behavior. Lack of cooperation from one party can lead to
reciprocation from the other party in other aspects of their interaction with the intention of
producing more favorable behavior related to the original interaction. However, this logical implication of cooperative spillover explaining trade relations decreased in more recent
years. This article examines Sino-Israeli, Iranian-Turkish and Sino-India relationships since
they are prime examples of political conflict and yet they all champion strong trade partnerships.

Trust Relationships

States engage in relationships that allow for trust in one arena to translate into trust in
other, seemingly unrelated international arenas. Cole and Kehoe explain this effect in terms

Swini tummala is a senior studying Economics and International Relations at
the University of Southern California.

Minimizing Historical Memory and Spillover in Trade Relations

79

of reputations between national debt and other areas of interaction.1 The authors argue
that sovereign governments repay debts in order to maintain positive relationships and
create a reputation of responsibility that spills over to other beneficial spheres. However,
their general assertion is applicable to the larger process of economic relations between
sovereign governments. Consistency in a nation’s behavior under similar conditions must
be assumed. The uncertainty of a government’s actions in all possible scenarios calls for
some sort of mechanism to predict behavior. Trust between two nations in an area, such as
defense, would provide useful information which a partner country could use to predict
behavior in other areas.
When combined with the Democratic Peace Theory, the spillover effect should hold
even more power over partner-of-choice trading preferences. One of the reasons democratic nations do not fight with one another is because they share liberal ideals.2 The commitment to similar political systems and ideals fuels predictability. The ideals create a moral compass that supposedly dictates the actions of a nation in domestic and international
arenas. Predictability then partially reduces the risk premium that comes with trading and
investing with other nations. Therefore, higher volumes of economic interaction are likely
to occur between democracies, if the opportunities exist.
Democracies approach other nations that are not committed to democratic ideals
with higher levels of skepticism. This trend, combined with a history of mistrust, explains
why Russia and the US were unable to build a positive relationship despite the signing of
the START in 2010 to expand cooperation and reduce nuclear stockpiles. These nations
have intensely ingrained Cold War mentalities that eclipse most potential opportunities
for economic collaboration.3 While Russian businesses are somewhat free from geopolitical disagreements and would like to increase business with the US, American companies
are susceptible to pressures from the attitudes dictating the political environment. In 2013,
the total value of American exports to Russia was $11 billion, less than 0.1% of US Gross
Domestic Product, illustrating that there is room for expanded economic interaction.4
Better trade relations between the two countries and a more open Russian economy would
significantly reduce tariffs on American goods in Russia and increase market access for US
agricultural and industrial exports.5 Russian Trade Representative Aleksander Stadnik asserts that, in the view of many American businessmen, “Russia is not a simple market but
1 Harold L. Cole and Patrick J. Kehoe, “Reputation Spillover Across Relationships: Reviving Reputation Models of Debt,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, March 2009.
2 Jeff Pugh, “Democratic Peace Theory: A Review and Evaluation,” Center for Mediation, Peace, and Resolution of Conflict,
April 2005.
3 Andrew J. Spindler, “Get Past the Cold War Mentality,” Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2015.
4 Fortune, “U.S.-Russian trade relationship? There really isn’t one,” March 2014.
5 Anders Aslund, The US Should Establish Permanent Normal Trade Relations with Russia, Peterson Institute, January 2012.

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it is very hard to find another such market where work would be so profitable.”6 The history
of fighting on opposite sides during the latter half of the 20th century and the subsequent
mistrust undermined efforts to initiate new economic collaboration.

Trade Policy as Carrot and Stick

It is also valuable to consider the use of economic opportunities as incentives in interstate relationships. Unlike trust relationships, where trust fills information gaps, the use of
economic incentives assumes knowledge of how a nation will likely react to these economic
carrots and sticks. The predicted behavior allows the international community to guide or
pressure a nation towards behaving in a desirable fashion. The effect of historical relationships and the use of sanctions is most easily revealed in the assessment of the US’ reaction
to prospects of a nuclear Iran compared to the US’ reaction to the open secret concerning
the Israeli nuclear program.
Iran has historically opposed the US’ movements in the Middle East that fall in opposition to the Middle East country’s goal of becoming a regional hegemon. Iran assisted the
US when American troops were stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s. Even
so, George W. Bush included Iran in the Axis of Evil based on Iran’s history of funding terrorist groups in other regions.7 American commitment to Israel is in juxtaposition to Iran’s
support of Hezbollah and Hamas, two recognized terrorist organizations. The US continues
to protect Israel even though the nation has threatened to preemptively strike Iran.8 Based
on historic relations, the development of an Iranian nuclear program was interpreted as a
security threat of the utmost importance, despite claims of its civilian nature. Years of nuclear negotiations resulting in non-agreements have negatively affected cooperation in other
unrelated spheres. These security conflicts have spilled over to trade agreements, since the
US and other western nations have used sanctions as sticks during nuclear negotiations.
American actions over the years have been driven by the presence of oil in the Middle East.
Despite the presence of an estimated 158 billion barrels of oil reserves in the nation, the US
was still the most enthusiastic promoter of crippling sanctions on Iran.9
Israel, on the other hand, faced no extreme international backlash when it began developing its nuclear program. In fact, France provided the Middle Eastern nation with access
to French nuclear research sites, possibly driven by the guilt of failing Israel in the 1956
Suez Conflict.10 Israeli possession of nuclear armaments has been exposed since the 1980s,
when an Israeli nuclear technician leaked details of the relationship to a British newspaper.
6
7
8
9
10

Ekaterina Zabrovskaya, “The US-Russian trade relationship still hasn’t reached full potential,” Russia-Direct, July 24, 2015.
Greg Bruno, “State Sponsors: Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 13, 2011.
Haviv Rettig Gur, “Netanyahu Makes a Case For a Preemptive Strike,” Times of Israel, October 15, 2013.
Nick Cunningham, “If Iran Gets Green Light to Export Its Oil, Expect This,” CNN Money, July 2015.
Jeffrey Cavanaugh, “Why Isn’t Anyone Talking About Israel’s Nukes?,” Mint Press News, March 2015.

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Israel has broken numerous international laws restricting the trafficking of nuclear materials and technology as well as an international treaty banning nuclear tests.11 The US found
itself conflicted as one of its greatest allies had moved against efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. However, the US saw its relationship with Israel as too important to reprimand
the nation’s actions and risk political friction. This relationship dates back to the Cold War
when Israel was an asset against Soviet influence in the Middle East. In the 21st century,
Israel is a counterweight to radical groups in the region, rendering it extremely valuable to
the Western world.12 Between the ideological similarities that started the American-Israeli
relationship their current security collaboration in the Middle East, the US has not officially
admitted to the existence of an Israeli nuclear program to this day. Instead, it believes it can
encourage responsible behavior from Israel, behavior that it cannot expect from Iran.

No-Strings-Attached Trade Relationships

One international relations issue spills over to others aspects of interstate interaction,
meaning that international trade is naturally influenced by historic relationships. However,
many important trade partnerships seem to be exclusively determined by economic opportunity and not by symbolic relationships. Some nations have determined a beneficial
method for isolating their mutually beneficial relationships to the economic sphere.

Sino-Israeli Relations

The relationship between China and Israel is especially surprising considering the importance of symbolic relationships to Israeli international relations. China refused to recognize the state of Israel until 1992 and called it the “dagger thrust by US imperialism” amidst
Cold War hostility in the 1970s.13 China was also the first non-Arab nation to open diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1964 and maintains strong
political ties with Iran. The spillover effect asserts that a historically unhealthy relationship,
such as Sino-Israeli relations, should have plagued subsequent interactions between the
nations, like trade.
Chinese and Israeli trade relations, however, have proved that prediction incorrect. The
nations have quietly maintained trade relations since the 1980s and are publicly looking
for opportunities to expand. The nations have found economic friendship through providing one another with expertise in complementing sectors. Bloomberg News named Israel
the world’s leading country for research and development intensity.14 In the same report,
11 Julian Borger, “The Truth About Israel’s Secret Nuclear Arsenal,” The Guardian, January 15, 2014.
12 Michael Esienstadt and David Pollock, “Friends with Benefits: Why the U.S.-Israeli Alliance is Good for America,” The
Washington Institute, November 7, 2012.
13 Evan Gottesman, “Israel’s China Option,” World Policy Journal, January 14, 2015.
14 Wei Lu and Marcus Chan, “In Global Innovation Race, Taiwan Is Tops in Patents, Israel Leads in R&D,” Bloomberg.com,
January 23, 2014.

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China topped the list for manufacturing. This story of advantage is showcased when Israeli
Chief Scientist Avi Hassan claims that, “What China needs, [Israel has] to offer. [Israel is]
good at innovation and technology transfer, and [China] can scale up manufacturing and
beyond.” Additionally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, “China is Israel’s
largest trading partner in Asia and fast becoming perhaps Israel’s largest trading partner period as [Israel] moves into the future.” In 2012, the nations signed a deal worth $300 million
to export Israeli water technology to improve Chinese agricultural output. In May of 2014,
nearly 400 Chinese government and business officials accompanied Chinese Vice Premier
Liu Yandong on a visit to Jerusalem to find new paths for economic collaboration.15 During this period of warming Sino-Israeli relations, China vetoed United Nations resolutions
aimed at isolating Syrian president al-Assad, revealing simultaneous political conflict and
economic strength in the relationship.

Iranian-Turkish Relations

Historically, Iran and Turkey have been politically incompatible nations. Turkey’s
NATO membership and bid for EU membership is often viewed by Iran and the Middle
East as a rejection of its Islamic heritage.16 The spread of anti-Western sentiment in the
Middle East, paired with Turkey’s perceived subservient role to the West, does not benefit
their relationship with Iran. The two nations have overwhelmingly taken opposite sides
in Middle Eastern security concerns. Bilateral ties nearly collapsed in the 1990s when the
two nations competed for regional leadership after the creation of independent post-Soviet
states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The relationship continued to sour with the withdrawal of Turkish and Iranian ambassadors in 1997. The main turning point in the states’
relations came when Turkish President Necdet Sezer officially visited Iran for the first time
in years in June 2002.17 A dialogue has since been opened, but the states continue to fight on
opposing sides of regional conflicts. In Yemen, Turkey supports the Saudi-led Sunni coalition against Shiite Houthi rebels supported by Iran. Additionally, Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan believes Iran has been backing Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria to fill the
power vacuum with groups friendly to Tehran. In Syria, Turkey has been supporting Ahrar
al-Sham, ally of al-Nusra Front, while Iran has backed the al-Assad regime. Not only have
the two states been supporting opposing sides in Middle Eastern war zones, but Iran has
also openly criticized Turkish airstrikes against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.18
Despite the clear differences in security goals and historical tension in the relationship,
15 Gregoy Noddin Poulin, “Sino-Israeli Economic Ties Blossoming,” The Diplomat, December 1, 2014.
16 Vartan Oskianian, “Iran and Turkey: Unlikely duo amid turmoil,” Al Jazeera, June 16, 2014.
17 Bayram Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits,” Insight Turkey, Vol 14. No 2. 2012, 137156.
18 Tara Beeny and J. Matthew McInnis, “Are Iran-Turkey relations on the rocks?,” American Enterprise Institute, August 24,
2015.

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Turkey has been eager for sanctions on Iran to be lifted. Their economic relationship used
to be dominated by transportation and bilateral commerce, which was heavily influenced
by politics. The economic relationship since developed to include direct investments, energy cooperation and tourism. Iran is Turkey’s second most important provider of oil and
gas. Since the 1990s, Turkey’s demand for energy has seen an annual increase of six to
eight percent. In order to secure its gas supply, Turkey sought to diversify its suppliers of
the natural resource. This was met with Iran’s desperate need for foreign exchange earnings.
The trade explains Turkey’s staunch opposition to sanctions on Iran. When Tehran was hit
with US and EU sanctions, it invested a significant amount of capital in Turkey in order
to prevent the disappearance of its international network, making clear Turkey’s role as a
trustworthy economic ally. Before the nuclear deal was established in early 2016, Erdogan
and Iranian President Hasan Rouhani had met several times regarding their trade relationship in case sanctions were lifted. “Turkey is the most prepared country for Iran to be free
of sanctions, for Iran’s economy to normalize,” Turkish Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci
asserted.19 Given Turkey’s position on the sanctions provoked by Iran’s nuclear program,
it appears that the two were regional allies, though a closer look at geopolitical tensions
reveals that this is not the case.

Sino-Indian Relations

The Sino-Indian relationship is one wrought with tension over a shared border and
other regional conflicts. After a border war in 1962, bilateral ties were essentially severed.20
The rise of China has also motivated increased cooperation between the US and India over
defense issues. Furthermore, China has made its support of Pakistan, a long-time rival of
India, very clear since the 1970s. As recently as April 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping
visited Pakistan bringing commitments of a $46 billion investment in energy and infrastructure. Upon visiting, Jinping likened going to Pakistan for the first time to visiting the
home of his brother. Pew surveys reveal that approximately 78 percent of Pakistanis regard China warmly while a mere 13 percent view India in positive light.21 Despite China’s
clear friendship with Pakistan, India still desires to expand economic ties with its Eastern
neighbor. As two of the largest economies in Asia and the two most populous nations in
the world, India and China have the potential to be mutually beneficial partners or warring
superpowers struggling to control the region.
Since 2000, trade between India and China has grown twice as quickly as trade between
either nation and a third party because of their complementary comparative advantages. In19 Emre Peker, “Turkish President Seeks Closer Economic Ties on State Visit to Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 2015.
20 Anil K. Gupta and Haiyan Wang, “China and India: Greater Economic Integration,” China Business Review, September
2009.
21 Ishaan Tharoor, “What China’s and Pakistan’s Special Friendship Means,” The Washington Post, April 21, 2015.

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dia currently has a troublingly large portion of its labor force based in agriculture.22 India’s
investments in manufacturing and the “Made In India” campaign, promoting manufacturing in India, reveal India’s attempts to move away from agriculture to diversify its economy.
The Chinese manufacturing sector is about five times larger than India’s. Since production
of machinery is cheaper in China, both relatively and absolutely, much of its export to India
consists of machinery and manufactured goods. Importing other capital goods produced in
China, like turbines, can help India build its manufacturing sector in a more cost-effective
manner. India, on the other hand, has large reserves of iron ore, bauxite and manganese.
India exports these raw materials to China to support its growing steel and automotive sectors. China has become India’s largest trade partner by compensating for gaps in each others’ economies.23 Understanding the high value of a trade partnership with China, Indian
Finance Minister Arun Jaitley said:
“We have some contentious issues of the past between us, but even while those issues
would be resolved in the due course, I think our economic relations have become a
symbol of strength and therefore mutual investments in each other’s country will be a
win-win situation for both of us.”
Their differing preferences in the future of regional geopolitics did not hinder the signing of 24 cooperative agreements on mining, railways, industrial parks, urbanization, and
training during Prime Minister Modi’s trip to China in May 2015.24 They also signed a
trade agreement in 1984 giving each other the status of Most Favored Nation (MFN). With
numerous trade agreements, shared roles as BRIC nations and being dialogue partners in
ASEAN, it is clear that India and China have not let their tense history or their differing
security goals smear the bright trade future they have together.

Conclusion

Some nations have been able to form highly effective trade relationships while maintaining opposing positions in international politics. An individual nation’s need for economic expansion or diversification triggers openness to one of these trade relationships and
the trade partner is chosen because of their complementary comparative advantage. Tense
historical relations become irrelevant if a nation fulfills the other’s economic needs. Spillover is contained as rationalization policies maximize economic growth for both nations.
The emphasis on symbolic relationships is a thing of the past for rapidly growing eastern
22 Carter Dougherty, “China’s Rise and the U.S. Trade Was With India.” Foreign Policy. September 28, 2015.
23 Anil K. Gupta and Haiyan Wang, “China and India: Greater Economic Integration,” China Business Review, September
2009.
24 “Trade has brought India-China closer: Indian FM,” The BRIC Post, September 21, 2015.

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nations. The rising importance of economic relations may one day surpass that of historical
animosity between nations, leading to a world in which international relations is dominated
by the influence of economics rather than military power.

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Works Cited

Aslund, Anders. The US Should Establish Permanent Normal Trade Relations with Russia.
Peterson Institute, January 2012.
Beeny, Tara and McInnis, J. Matthew. “Are Iran-Turkey relations on the rocks?”
American Enterprise Institute. August 24, 2015. https://www.aei.org/publication/are-iranturkey-relations-on-the-rocks/
Borger, Julian. “The truth about Israel’s secret nuclear arsenal.” The Guardian. January 15,
2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/15/truth-israels-secret-nucleararsenal
“Trade has brought India-China closer: Indian FM.” The BRIC Post. September 21,
2015.
http://thebricspost.com/trade-has-brought-india-china-closer-indian-fm/#.
VmXkNN-rT-Y
Bruno, Greg. “State Sponsors: Iran.” Council on Foreign Relations. October 13, 2011. http://
www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362
Dougherty, Carter. “China’s Rise and the U.S. Trade Was With India.” Foreign Policy.
September 28, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/28/china-india-trade-modiobama/
Cavanaugh, Jeffrey. “Why Isn’t Anyone Talking About Israel’s Nukes?” Mint Press News.
March 2015. http://www.mintpressnews.com/why-isnt-anyone-talking-about-israelsnukes/203040/
Cole, Harold L. and Kehoe, Patrick J. “Reputation Spillover Across Relationships: Reviving Reputation Models of Debt.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. March 2009.
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr209.pdf
Cunningham, Nick. “If Iran gets green light to export its oil, expect this.” CNN Money. July
2015. http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/01/investing/iran-oil/
Esienstadt, Michael and Pollock, David. “Friends with Benefits: Why the U.S.-Israeli Alliance is Good for America.” The Washington Institute. November 7, 2012. http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/friends-with-benefits-why-the-u.s.-israeli-alliance-is-good-for-america
Fortune. “U.S.-Russian trade relationship? There really isn’t one.” March 2014. http://fortune.com/2014/03/18/u-s-russian-trade-relationship-there-really-isnt-one/
Gottesman, Evan. “Israel’s China Option.” World Policy Journal. January 14, 2015. http://
www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2015/01/15/israel%E2%80%99s-china-option

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Gupta, Anil K. and Wang, Haiyan. “China and India: Greater Economic Integration.” China
Business Review. September 2009. http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/china-andindia-greater-economic-integration/
Gur, Haviv Rettig. “Netanyahu makes a case for a preemptive strike.” Times of Israel. October 15, 2013. http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-makes-a-case-for-preemptivestrike/
Lu, Wei, and Marcus Chan. “In Global Innovation Race, Taiwan Is Tops in Patents, Israel Leads in R&D.” Bloomberg.com. January 23, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-01-22/in-global-innovation-race-taiwan-is-tops-in-patents-israel-leadsin-r-d.html.
Oskianian, Vartan. “Iran and Turkey: Unlikely duo amid turmoil.” Al Jazeera. June 16, 2014.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/iran-turkey-unlikely-duo-amidre-20146166750259170.html
Peker, Emre. “Turkish President Seeks Closer Economic Ties on State Visit to Iran.” Wall
Street Journal. April 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkish-president-on-statevisit-to-iran-seeking-closer-economic-ties-1428411176
Poulin, Gregoy Noddin. “Sino-Israeli Economic Ties Blossoming.” The Diplomat. December 1, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/sino-israeli-economic-ties-blossoming/
Sinkaya, Bayram. “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits.” Insight
Turkey. Vol 14. No 2. 2012. Pp 137-156. http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insightturkey_vol_14_no_2_2012_sinkaya.pdf
Spindler, J. Andrew. “Get Past the Cold War Mentality.” Carnegie Corporation of New York.
2015. http://perspectives.carnegie.org/us-russia/get-past-cold-war-mentality/
Tharoor, Ishaan. “What China’s and Pakistan’s Special Friendship Means.” The Washington Post. April 21, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/
wp/2015/04/21/what-china-and-pakistans-special-friendship-means/
Zabrovskaya, Ekaterina. “The US-Russian trade relationship still hasn’t reached full potential.” Russia-Direct, July 24, 2015. http://www.russia-direct.org/qa/us-russia-trade-relationship-still-hasn%E2%80%99t-reached-its-full-potential

Southern California International Review - Vol. 6 No. 1

State-Centrism and the Conceptualization of War
How Mainstream IR Fails to Account for New Actors
in Contemporary Conflict
Nicholas Babey

This paper argues that theories that have been considered part of mainstream International
Relations (IR), while dedicating themselves to the study of conflict, miss the notion that conflict
is no longer primarily between states, and that the discipline’s modes of understanding and
resolving conflict (if it even attempts to do the latter) are not suited to the realities of conflict
today. Integral to this is the fact that IR has not paid sufficient attention to intrastate war and
the emergence of a new primary actor in global conflict – the non-state armed group. The first
section of this paper defines “contemporary conflict,” citing up-to-date reports and giving the
reader a picture of the types and trends of conflicts occurring today. The second section of this
paper reviews some of IR’s major paradigms, demonstrating their state-centrism and focus on
interstate war, and the ways which they exclude new actors and types of conflict. The third section of this paper is a post-modern critique of these mainstream IR theories, utilizing discourse
analysis to explain how the mainstream project might be updated to better understand the
realities of current conflicts.

Introduction

The dominant paradigms in the study of International Relations (IR) have had a central
focus; the “causes of war and conditions of peace.”1 As an extension of this, mainstream IR
includes other foundational concepts– that states are the primary units of the international
system, and that they interact within a system of anarchy. In his 1985 review of the discipline, K.J. Holsti posits that states are seen as the “essential actors” simply because they are
the only actors that can create peace and wage war.2 In other words, states are the main
actors in the international system because they have a monopoly on global conflict. Thus,
mainstream IR focuses primarily on war between states, or interstate war.
However, since the end of WWII and certainly the end of the Cold War, the actors in
global conflict have progressively changed. Interstate conflict has markedly decreased,3 and
though absolute levels of conflict have fallen,4 intrastate conflict is experiencing a swell of
1
2
3
4

K.J. Holsti, “The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory,” Boston: Allen and Unwin (1985).
Ibid.
Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict, 1946-2014” Journal of Peace Research 52 (2015): 536-550.
Steven Pinker, and Andrew Mack, “The World is not Falling Apart,” Slate, December 22, 2014.

Nicholas Babey is a third year student in the University of British Columbia’s
Faculty of Arts studying International Relations.

State-Centricism and the Conceptualization of War

89

relative growth.5 Indeed, numbers of battle deaths have been increasing as intrastate conflicts have emerged and intensified, rendering 2014 “the most violent year in the entire
post-Cold War period.”6 New actors have emerged due to the changing face of war, which is
now often fought between non-state armed groups and states alike.7 One might expect that
mainstream IR, with its focus on causes of war, would have incorporated these non-state
actors in its analysis of international politics, but it has not. While this paper does not argue
that mainstream IR must shift its focus away from conflict, new actors do require new subject matters. Given their destructiveness, persistence and toll on life, economy and society,
intrastate wars need to be at the center of any study of international relations.8
The first section of this paper defines “contemporary conflict” by citing up-to-date reports and analyzing types and trends of conflicts occurring today. The second section of this
paper reviews some of IR’s major paradigms, demonstrating their state-centrist frameworks
and focuses on interstate war, and the ways in which they exclude new actors and types of
modern conflict. This is done through examining texts written by key figures behind those
theories. These include Kenneth N. Waltz on neorealism, Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane on neoliberalism or institutional liberalism, and Alexander Wendt on constructivism.
Neorealism is, by a large extent, the theoretical paradigm central to the study of international politics, especially in the United States. Though less prominent today than in the
past, neoliberalism emerged as the major response to neorealism’s disciplinary dominance
in the 20th century. Constructivism has also been included because it  is considered the
“mainstream alternative,” having galvanized a broad range of support from practitioners
around the world.9 Furthermore, it is demonstrated that constructivism reifies the same
state-centrism and focus on interstate war that are included in neorealism and neoliberalism. The third section of this paper is a post-modern critique of these mainstream IR theories, utilizing discourse analysis to explain how the mainstream project might be updated
to better confront the realities of current conflicts.

5 Human Security Report, The Decline in Global Violence: Evidence, Explanation, and Contestation (Vancouver: Human
Security Press, 2013).
6 Pettersson and Wallensteen, Armed Conflict, 539.
7 Human Security Report.
8 Collier, Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers
61 (2009): 1-27.
9 Maliniak, Peterson and Tierney, 2012, “TRIP around the World: Teaching, Research, and Policy Views of International
Relations Faculty in 20 Countries,” published by the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project, Williamsburg,
Virginia: The College of William and Mary.

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Nicholas Babey

Trends in Contemporary Conflict

Interstate conflicts have largely declined, and those that have lingered pale in comparison to prior conflicts.10 In fact, in 2014 only one minor interstate conflict remained between
Pakistan and India, causing under 50 battle deaths that year.11 In contemporary conflict
analysis, there is seemingly unanimous agreement that interstate conflict has virtually disappeared in the 21st century relative to the pre-WWII period. Furthermore, wars between
great power states such as the United States or China have disappeared entirely since the
Cold War. This is significant because mainstream IR tends to not only give primacy to
states, but its greatest concern around war is the behavior of great powers, which are no
longer the only relevant actors in global conflict.
Though absolute levels of war have declined in the post-war period, total global conflict numbers are holding steady at a relatively high number.12 This data indicates that interstate war is decreasing while new forms of conflict are rising. The most prominent of
these new forms is intrastate war, between a state’s government and one or more non-state
armed groups.13 Currently, these conflicts make up the global majority.14 They also constitute many of the occuring high intensity conflicts, defined as conflicts resulting in over
1000 battle deaths.15 Additionally, these conflicts can become highly complex, catastrophic
and persistent,16 lasting up to 10 times longer than the interstate wars of the past.17 In recent
years, a relative spike in intrastate conflict has resulted in a significant increase in global
battle deaths.18
Non-state conflicts have also been increasing relative to other forms over the long
term, and are characterized by fighting between only non-state armed groups.19 These conflicts are highly volatile, and resulting battle deaths have increased dramatically, making up
a frightening portion of the total death count from year to year.20 This relative increase in
non-state conflicts, especially when compounded with their human toll, further indicates
the increasing importance of non-state armed groups in contemporary conflict.
Not surprisingly, there are a great number of factors and hypotheses related to the
decline of interstate war and rise of conflict involving non-state armed groups. Although
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Human Security Report, 87.
Pettersson and Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict, 1946-2014,” 537.
Human Security Report, 88.
Ibid., 87.
Pettersson and Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict, 1946-2014,” 539.
Human Security Report, 87.
Pettersson and Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict, 1946-2014,” 537
Collier, Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed,” 1.
Human Security Report, 89.
Ibid., 95-7.
Ibid., 98-9.

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the goal of this paper is not to provide a comprehensive explanation for this phenomenon,
the following outlines a plausible account for both the rise of new kinds of war and the preeminence of new actors in conflict.
Hans Martin Sieg explains that war in the contemporary era is increasingly asymmetrical. Weaker actors have a higher than proportional impact through the use of force, which
reduces the relative military power of stronger actors.21 This change is attributed to two
major factors: technological evolution and social structures and values. New technologies
have revolutionized “weapons, communications, transportation, and infrastructure,” allowing traditionally weaker actors to increase the efficiency, potency and affordability of their
war efforts.22 Social structures and norms that affect actors determine their willingness to
make sacrifices and use force, resulting in particular strategies of warfare.23 For example,
those in social conditions that decrease risk aversion are more conducive to committing
atrocities such as mass killings or more selective tactics such as suicide bombings. Weaker
actors are less constrained by social norms and are therefore more willing to adopt strategies that stronger actors, such as states, are restrained from by international law or public
opinion. Sieg’s analysis of evolving conflict asserts that asymmetry explains the emergence
of newer actors who would not have previously been able to impact stronger established
actors.24 Asymmetry has provided non-state armed groups with unprecedented advantages
over states in conflicts, which may be a significant contributing factor to the rise of intrastate conflict.25
In conclusion, this section demonstrates that interstate wars have all but disappeared
from the picture of global conflict, replaced by wars that feature newly emerging actors,
non-state armed groups. The intrastate conflicts that these groups take part in are highly
complex, tending to last much longer than interstate wars of the past. One reason that this
change may have occurred is the asymmetry that conflicts now take on, where traditionally
weaker actors are able to exercise disproportionate amounts of force against stronger actors.

Fallacies in Mainstream IR
Neorealism

Neorealism has been dominant in IR study for some time, which is in part due to its apparent parsimony. Simply put, neorealism conceives an anarchical international system in
which states interact with the utmost concern for their own survival. It prioritizes states as
the main, if not only, actors in the international system. Indeed, in Waltz’s writing, states are
21
22
23
24
25

Sieg, “How the Transformation,” 333.
Ibid., 337-40.
Ibid., 340.
Ibid., 334.
Ibid., 341.

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referred to in passing as “actors” or “units,”26 restricting the discourse around international
actors to states alone. Critiques of neorealism have raised the importance of new actors,
such as non-governmental organizations, claiming that they may influence the behaviour
of states, but in Waltz’s response there is a consistent assumption that states, especially great
powers, are the only actors worthy of theorizing.27 Their primacy is impervious neither to
interdependence between them nor other forces such as international institutionalization.28
The neorealist perspective assumes an anarchic international system with great power states
serving as the primary influence.
The occurrence of war in a neorealist model pertains to the “major units” in the international system, referring to states as “units” and great power states as the “major units.”29
Because states have a primary interest in their continued survival, they are perpetually
concerned with their own security, especially militarily.30 This stresses the importance of
the security dilemma, where one state’s military security is another state’s insecurity. One
particular allusion made to the sub-state level is in Waltz’s explanation of the causes of war,
which are linked to phenomena both within the state and from larger forces pertaining
to the anarchic international system.31 Regardless of domestic concerns, neorealism conceptualizes war as solely a conflict between states, explaining nothing about the majority
of conflicts today that concern non-state actors. War becomes the catalyst to maintaining
sovereignty and power within the international system. Neorealism is incapable of accounting for the emergence of non-state armed groups and modern forms of war due to two of its
most fundamental assumptions: that states, namely great powers, are the only actors within
the international system, and that war occurs only between those states. It seems that neorealism is becoming markedly less applicable to the study of conflict today.

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism, a popular response to the dominance of neorealism, adopts the neorealist foundation that the international system is anarchic. Neoliberals such as Axelrod
and Keohane acknowledge that such anarchy can result in conflict between actors, but they
posit that cooperation between these actors is an element of international politics largely
missed by other mainstream theories, especially neorealism. Due to the assumption that we
live in “a world of independent states,”32 the focus on states as the primary actors and inter26 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs 44 (1990): 21-37.
27 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25 (2000): 5-41.
28 Ibid., 26.
29 Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” 29.
30 Ibid., 36.
31 Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 13.
32 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World
Politics 38 (1985): 226-254.

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state relations as the drivers of war and peace is foundational to neoliberalism.
For neoliberalism, international institutions are key to the achievement of cooperation
between states. However, these institutions hold little importance without a principal concern for states. International institutions are constituted by the “principles, norms, rules, or
procedures” that govern the actions taken and decisions made by states,33 and they can be
either organizations of states or abstract concepts, such as social norms. These institutions,
in any form they take, are created by interacting states, and they are only important insofar
as they affect the behaviors of states.34 Also, because conflict spawns from the decisions
made by states in “ambiguous settings,” where the intentions of other states are unintelligible, international institutions play roles of conflict avoidance by improving transparency.35
The primary concern of neoliberalism, then, is the reduction of interstate war.
From the neoliberalist perspective, the sub-state level is only important when domestic
politics influence state behavior and “exacerbate international conflict.36 Conflict within
states is consequential only because it might cause conflict between states. In this way, neoliberalism makes the incorrect assumption that states, as primary actors, have a monopoly
on violence in the international system. This assumption means that neoliberalism does not
account for conflict involving non-state actors, which is the dominant form of conflict that
is seen today.
In summary, neoliberalism sees states as the international system’s primary actors and
lays out principles for cooperation between them in order to avoid interstate war. International institutions are set up by interacting states, which are in turn the units acted upon by
these structures (in a way that intends to increase cooperation), meaning that states have
the utmost theoretical importance. No exception is given to actors other than states when
it comes to conflict, thus demonstrating that a neoliberalist model fails to account for contemporary conflict.

Constructivism

Constructivism, a popular alternative to the mainstream theories discussed above,
maintains a focus on states, but insists that the behavior of states is driven by fluid identity
and interest formation as opposed to the anarchic structure of the international system.37
Constructivism critiques the structural assumptions of more mainstream theories but not
their state-centrism. In fact, this state-centrism is fully adopted, as Wendt claims that states
33 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” 228.
34 Ibid., 238.
35 Ibid., 237.
36 Ibid., 242.
37 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46 (1992): 391-425.

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are “the dominant political actors in the international system.”38 States act on the basis of
adopted identities and interests that are assumed through interaction with other states.39 A
state assigns itself a particular role in relation to the roles of others. Because identities and
interests of states drive their action and behavior, a state’s actions are a product of interaction with others.40
Like the former paradigms, constructivism is concerned with interstate conflict. Its
project is the creation of a cooperative international system in order to reduce the hazard
of states going to war with each other. However, constructivists believe that a cooperative
order can only come about when “the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of
all.”41 In other words, states must reconceptualize their identities and interests to foster cooperation. Institutions, which are “[structures] of identities and interests,” play a key role by
ordering the behaviors of states. For example, the current system is one of “self-help,” where
states have to fend for themselves under anarchy. States ultimately distrust one another, and
conflict between them arises out of that distrust.42
Wendt expects international conflict to occur under the current international system.
He is so concerned with the potential for interstate war that he explains a way out of the
self-help system, whereby a breakdown of “identity commitments” allows states to reconceptualize their identities and interests, forming new institutions around cooperation.43
Thus, constructivism is explicitly state-centric and, in terms of conflict, is concerned only
with interstate war. Even though this model is an alternative to mainstream IR, it has the
same limitations that render it incapable of anticipating the rise of intrastate war involving
new non-state actors.

A Post-Modern Critique

Holsti identifies that newer, post-positive and post-modern IR theories reconceptualize the world in an attempt to be more representative of contemporary realities, but he
speaks of this shift in a darker tone, fearing that it has negative implications for relevant and
coherent research agendas. However, while mainstream IR misses the integral actors and
phenomena in what it mainly endeavours to study (namely, global conflict), its theoretical project can evolve through the application of post-modern and critical approaches. By
adopting an awareness of post-modern ideas, mainstream IR could expand to account for
increasingly relevant non-state actors. This is primarily because a post-modern assessment
38
39
40
41
42
43

Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 424.
Ibid., 397-398.
Ibid., 403.
Ibid., 400.
Ibid., 406.
Ibid., 420-421

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allows for the simultaneous existence of multiple levels of analysis as opposed to just the
system-level or state-level.44 Discourse analysis allows skepticism of what is normally taken
as fact and is especially useful for an examination of IR theory.
Mainstream IR and its major alternatives isolate the state as the unitary actor in the international system through language, giving primacy to certain concepts by way of differentiation and hierarchical signification.45 Discourse is also productive in the sense that it can
form and shape common sense understandings, upholding norms of thinking or acting.46
Indeed, because states are given theoretical dominance in mainstream IR, interstate wars
are largely the only kind that are theorized, shaping the common sense understanding of
what war is. The consequence of this is that it may create the misinterpretation that all wars
contain the essential qualities of interstate wars. This is a mistake, as new actors bring with
them new norms of conduct and new forms of interaction amongst themselves and with
other actors. Because we theorize almost exclusively about interstate war, we do not know
how to properly deal with intrastate war where the existing interstate model may not apply.
Indeed, viewing the state “as a given” unit of international relations allows the systemic
approaches of neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism to work.47 These conceptualizations, however, contain what are called the “fallacy of composition,” which refers to
the common extrapolation from the individual to the state level of analysis.48 There is an
assumption in mainstream IR that the same principles will apply to both; because the individual has a “self,” the state must also have “essential” or “pre-social” qualities upon which
an identity or norm can be built.49 This can be called a “black box” approach to statehood,
where any level of analysis below the state is not of concern because the state is seen as having a unitary “self.” This is where the primacy of the state as the world’s essential actor forms.
This conceptual approach to states is a fundamental limitation of mainstream IR. It
should not be assumed that the state is made up of any given “core properties” that render
it the sole primary actor in the international system.50 In mainstream IR, the state is given
its “self ” through discourse, where the state is individualized and given symbolic significance.51 It follows that, once individualized, the state can take on essential qualities. For example, neorealism reduces the state to a unitary actor with the ultimate goal of survival and
44 Charlotte Epstein, “Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Politics,” European
Journal of International Relations 17 (2010): 327-350.
45 Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” European
Journal of International Relations 5 (1999): 225-254.
46 Ibid., 236.
47 Epstein, “Who Speaks?” 331.
48 Ibid., 330.
49 Ibid., 332-9.
50 Ibid., 333.
51 Ibid., 336.

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a monopoly over war in the international system. This approach downplays the importance
of subnational and non-state actors. The predetermined essential qualities of “state” leave
no room in the international system for entities, such as non-state armed groups, non-governmental organizations and trans-national corporations, that may share those qualities,
including the ability to wage war, create peace or trade in global markets.
Discourse approaches do not give primacy to certain actors, which is what renders
them so useful for shedding light on the “excessive state-centrism” of mainstream IR.52 Epstein explains that discourse analyses, at their core, question “who speaks” in a given issue
area. Those who make up the “relevant actors” at any time depend on the issue area under
examination. When applied to mainstream IR’s approaches, a discursive model could allow
for a study of conflict that is inclusive of states as well as non-state armed groups, non-governmental organizations and any other actors relevant to a particular context. This would
allow mainstream IR theory to not only better analyze the reality of contemporary conflict,
but it would also allow mainstream IR to break free of its spatial and temporal chains. By
moving away from state-primacy towards a study of all the relevant actors in a given issue
area, mainstream IR paradigms would be capable of evolving alongside the dynamic movement of international relations and global politics.

Conclusion

“Global conflict” has assumed a new meaning in the post-Cold War era, and these
changes demand evolving theoretical frameworks. Mainstream IR has kept a strict focus on
states as the primary actors of international relations and maintains that interstate conflict
is the main issue area of international politics. Through continued discourse that has reified
states and interstate conflict as the topics of importance, mainstream IR has become disconnected from reality. Post-modern critique can provide a theoretical solution.
The role of post-modern analysis is not to create new paradigms of IR, but to examine
the fallacies that may be found in existing ones.53 The discourse analysis used herein does
not seek to call for an entirely new conception of warfare, but instead works as an efficient
critique of mainstream IR, highlighting the roots of some core issues in the theoretical
study of conflict today. The hope is not that mainstream IR is discarded, but instead that
positivistic, empirical research may be used to capture a truer picture of the world. Rather,
the hope here is that mainstream IR is able to adapt to shifting realities by opening its doors
to new actors demanding to be seen as relevant in contemporary conflicts. Making mainstream IR theory more applicable to contemporary and dynamic global situations can be
done if it continually asks the key question brought up by post-modern discourse analyses:
52 Epstein, “Who Speaks?,” 342.
53 Chris Brown, “Turtles All the Way Down: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations,” Millennium
23 (1994): 213-236.

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“who speaks?” IR must rid itself of the universal primacy of states and interstate war, opening itself to issue-by-issue applications of theoretical models that allows for the focus on
relevant actors in each issue area.

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Works Cited

Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics.” International Organization 46(1992): 391-425.
Charlotte Epstein, “Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Politics,” European Journal of International Relations 17 (2010): 327-350.
Chris Brown, “Turtles All the Way Down: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations,” Millennium 23 (1994): 213-236.
Collier, Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil
War,” Oxford Economic Papers 61 (2009): 1-27.
Hans Martin Sieg, “How the Transformation of Military Power Leads to Increasing Asymmetries in Warfare? From the Battle of Omdurman to the Iraq Insurgency,” Armed
Forces & Society 40 (2013): 332-356.
Human Security Report, The Decline in Global Violence: Evidence, Explanation, and Contestation (Vancouver: Human Security Press, 2013).
J.D.B. Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility of War: Peace and the Public Mind (London:
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Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” European Journal of International Relations 5 (1999): 225-254.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs
44 (1990): 21-37.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25 (2000):
5-41.
K.J. Holsti, “The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory,”
Boston: Allen and Unwin (1985).
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and Policy Views of International Relations Faculty in 20 Countries.” Published by the
Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project. Williamsburg, Virginia
(2012): The College of William and Mary.
Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies
and Institutions,” World Politics 38 (1985): 226-254.
Steven Pinker, and Andrew Mack, “The World is not Falling Apart,” Slate, December 22,
2014.
Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict, 1946-2014” Journal of Peace
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