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Bel-Air Village
328 SCRA 836
G.R. No. 135962
March 27, 2000
Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a
Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. BelAir Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from
the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The
said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of
persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA
law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that
the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall,
filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed
that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the
Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it
has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of
the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public
traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.
Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police
power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police
power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development
authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise
police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of
the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area.

Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several
cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4,
1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances
before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court
of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement
ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or
suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are
in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should
not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere
ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings
for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of
casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D.
1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs.

Court of Appeals
G.R.No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in
order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable
development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have
shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.

EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and
enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de
Bay Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the
municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal
corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal
waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish
cages to the consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen
operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore
municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the
current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other
aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are
declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the
Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those
declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle
their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2
of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal
waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws
creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de
Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute,
latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly
than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.

The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On
the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and
other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating &
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control and
management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most
pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including
the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid
exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting
Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect
to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters
affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA
4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits
for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by
its charter vested on it.

San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission

GR No. 92299, 19 April 1991
Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal
Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and the
latter quickly assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended
private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the ground that she was the most
qualified. This appointment was subsequently approved by the DBM. Petitioner
protested the appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil Service
Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest on his
contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to
the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In
support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112.
Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not expressly
nominated by the provincial governor.
Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to recommend is
subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO.
Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall
short of the required standards, the appointing authority, public respondent DBM is
expected to reject the same. In the event that the Governor recommends an
unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies?

Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of the local
chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance
with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution
under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to
recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public
respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case
the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied
in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and
principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized
power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be
weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to
"general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the
executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only
supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute. The
exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution.
Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may
appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If
none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining
why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have
the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

Pimentel v. Aguirre
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from
implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal
revenue allotments.
HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal
autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by
way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are
consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by
the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A
directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The
AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to

undertake cost- reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the
country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal
matters, provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector
deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of
the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local
leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than
30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which
orders the withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution
and the law.


G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local
Government Code
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act
Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of
Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and
the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.
Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite
for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending
that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local
Government Code because:
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living
within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the
The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only
be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the
governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the
Consititution, which states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected? NO.

Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial
alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in
the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new
province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of
the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries
would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of
those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed
province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or
compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is
applicable, to wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the
people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at
bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the
adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC GR 133495

G.R. No. 133495; 295 SCRA 157
September 3, 1998
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor upon the death of
the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected Mayor for a
term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected Mayor for another term of three years ending July 30, 1998. On March 27,
1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Pateros relative to the May
11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for
Mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would already
have served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would
thereafter be ineligible to serve for another term after that. The COMELEC ruled in
favor of Capco saying that In both the Constitution and the Local Government
Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official
was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not
elected. Capco won in the elections against Borja.
Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and

serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office
for the purpose of the three-term limit.
The Court ruled in favor of Capco. The term served must therefore be one for which
the official concerned was elected. If he is not serving a term for which he was
elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his
voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. There is a difference between
the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who
succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from
office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other
hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore,
such representative serves a term for which he was elected. To consider Capco to
have served the first term in full (when he succeeded the mayorship upon demise of
Cesar Borja) and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not
only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose
whom they wish to govern them. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

Abella v. Comelec (see PDF)

Ordillo vs Comelec (192 SCRA 100)
Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in
a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed
that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only
the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest
of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259
stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by
majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the
Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid
Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
Issue: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao,
being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords

provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that

region is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term
region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is
supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the
Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of
contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a
region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant
characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting
of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that:
SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions
necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a
single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we
would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a
set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising
their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.