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The construct of team decision theory developed by J. Marschak and R. Radner provides
a useful framework for the conceptualization and evaluation of information within or-
ganizations. Quadratic teams concern team decision problems where the organizational
objective criterion is represented by a quadratic function of the action and state variables.
The purpose of this paper is to explicitly relate the analysis of quadratic team decision
problems to recent research on optimal decision rules for aggregate planning-for example,
as reported by Holt et al [5], Theil [9], van de Panne [10], and others. A numerical example
is presented based on the well known microeconomic model of production and employment scheduling in a paint factory.
choose actions during each of t= 1, 2, ..., T time periods. Let the action of member
i in period t be denoted by ait, and let xi, correspond to a state of the world observed by member i in period t. The states xi, are random variables, which will be
identified by the notation xit, and are elements of the space X. Suppose the objective function which the organization seeks to optimize is3
(1) c(a, x) = X0-2a'(x)+a'Qa
where 20 is a scalar; a is a (column) vector of team actions with elements ait; A(x) is
a measurable vector-valued function on the space X, which is partitioned to con-
form with a; and Q is a square symmetric matrix with (N T)2 elements, also
partitioned to conform with a. That is,
T
where q(ij),, are elements of the partitioned matrix Qt, for i,j = 1, 2, ..., N; and
Q, are ordered matrices from the partitioned Q for t, z = 1, 2, ..., T.
Since the states xit occur randomly, the optimization of (1) necessarily involves
the computation of expectations on c(a,x), viz., for the elements of x(x). To con-
Naval Research and under a Ford Foundation Grant. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted
for any purpose of the U.S. Government.
2 The basic propositions of team theory are presented in Marschak [3]. The discussion in this and the
next section is based on Radner [6] and [7].
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QUADRATIC
TEAMS
531
the information function hi, defines a mapping from xi, in X into hi,(x) in Z. More
generally, h(.) corresponds to a random function, such that hr(xx)=z rs with
probability P(ZriXs, hr). The (NT)-tuple of all information functions in the organization,
like) that is available to each individual in the organization at each instant of time.
To distinguish the computation of expected values in the remaining discussion,
the following conventions are employed :4 Ex is taken with respect to the marginal
joint probability measure on the state space X; Exlz,h or EXlZ is taken with respect
to the conditional joint probability measure on the state space X given the infor-
mation system h and the observations z e Z; and E, is taken with respect to the
marginal joint probability measure on the observation space Z, given h E H, where
X = ., Xil, ..XN1). (X1T .XiT. XNT)) and
response to each item of information available. That is, cxi is a real-valued measurable function on Z which defines a mapping from zi, in Z into cij (z) in A, the action
The function for c (a, x) in (1) is convex if the matrix Q is positive definite. In this
case, necessary and sufficient conditions for optimization of the function with
respect to team actions direct that the partial derivatives of the components of a
are equated to zero.5 Let 0/0a denote taking partial derivatives with respect to a
column vector. Then
(2) a* = Q- 1 i(x)
Now suppose i (x) can be written
(3) A(x) = Rx
where R is a square matrix with (N T)2 elements, and x' is the column vector of
state variables defined above. Then from (2), the best team decision rule given an
a priori probability distribution on xZ is
4 For example, see [8], for further discussion on the relative importance of these distinctions within
the Bayesian framework of applied statistical decision theory.
5 A general discussion of quadratic optimization is available in [1].
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(4) Ex(*=Q-lRExxI,
or
T
where Q - and R have been partitioned as Q by actions and time periods, and the
submatrices of the partitioning by time periods are identified as Qt,r and Rt,
respectively. The form of the solution in (5) is particularly useful in distinguishing
optimal strategy dynamic decision rules, which are discussed more fully below.
THEOREM: Let E i2 (x)< oo, for i= 1, 2, ..., N; t= 1, 2, ..., T; then for any
information system h, the unique (a.e.) best tream decisionfunction is the solution of
T
(6) q(ii), -it + E q(ii)Z , Ex,, (ai, hit) + E E q(ij),, Exlz (ail hit) = Exlz (2itI hit)
t#t
=1
person" optimality requirements which, when taken in conjunction with (2) or (4),
specify a procedure for the evaluation of information system alternatives. In this
regard, the decision theory constructs of "perfect" and "null" information provide
explicit criteria for normative analysis under uncertainty. Let V'0) represent a
(theoretically) perfect information system, such that h((x)W=x', where x corresponds (a posteriori) to the true states of the world; let h(?) represent a (theoretically) null information system, such that h(?) (x) = y, where y is an (N T) vector
of constants (independent of x). The value of a particular information system,
V(h(k)), is defined as the net change in the expected payoff of the optimal team
decision rule that obtains from implementing the system h(k) in lieu of the null
system, h(0 .i More specifically, for c(a, x) in (1), an objective cost (or loss) function,
the expected value of perfect information is
6 This theorem is proved in [7] and can be interpreted as follows: The computed expected value of
the decision rule oi, is the action aj, Then if the conditions on 4j, in (6) are met simultaneously by each
ait (for i= 1, 2, ..., N; t= 1, 2, ..., T), the function c(a,x) is stationary at the optimal value, since a' =
aQa in (1).
7Note, the statement of (1) implies that information costs are independent of the actions, a, and
hence can be evaluated separately, i.e., simply by subtracting the cost of the system from V(h(k)). This
assumption would be inappropriate if Q was not stationary over time and, for example, depended upon
x. The practical consequences of assumed independence between decision and information processing
costs are discussed at length in [2].
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QUADRATIC
TEAMS
533
In [6] Radner analyzes several information systems for quadratic team decision
models. Variants on two of these partially decentralized information system models
are detailed below for the case where the team decision rule is partitioned by
member actions and time periods. In the final section, these models are specialized
to the aggregate production planning problem of Holt, Theil, and others (cf.,
[5, 9, andlO]), and a numerical example is presented.
Suppose the state of the world is such that each team member observes a
random variable Yi, from the information process which generates xi,, where
Yit= Oi, () on X, and Oit(*) corresponds to an observational function for member i
in period t, Oi,e hit. For the physical structure of many organizations it is often
reasonable to assume that the observational functions Oi= {Oil, ..., Oit, ..., OiT} are
statistically independent for all i. Clearly, this assumption does not mean that the
information system, which we will identify as h(1). Then h')-= 0i for all i, and the
place the converse applies generally. Suppose, however, that we initially assume
information system, which we will identify as h(1). Then h) = Oi for all i, and the
(vector) information functions are also statistically independent. Referring to the
theorem in (6), independence implies that
mation system h(1) is given directly by (6) and (2). For example, the optimal
strategy dynamic decision rules (cf. [9]) for the first period are
T
T=
j#i
Following the previous discussion, the expected value of the completely decentralized information system h(1) gives
8 If c(a, x) in (1) corresponded to a payoff function, the signs in (7) would be reversed.
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534
CHARLES
H.
KRIEBEL
T N
where the notation Oit = {Oil, Oi2, Oit} the t-tuple of observations by member i
up to and including period t, for t= 1, 2, ..., T. That is, assuming the team objective function in (1) represents operating costs, the relative worth to the organization of employing this system is the reduction in expected costs that is
possible by acknowledging the variance in the state variables (or a transformation
of these variables) a posteriori. The value of the system is linear in the variance
component and hence exhibits constant returns to scale relative to the posterior
variance of the linear component in (1). The obvious distinction between h(l) and
the null system is that in the latter case no observations are made on the information processes, and hence there is no formal basis on which to revise an a priori
distribution on x.
For example, suppose the random state variables xit are independently distributed according to a normal probability law, with density function fN(xitlpit, ai 2)
for all i, t. The joint distribution of the xit, which we identify as the random vector
x, is also normally distributed, according to fN(x I tt, Z), where the expected value
of the random vector is p and the covariance matrix is Z. That is,
where R is the matrix defined above. Then from (12) it follows that the distribution
(14) i isfN(QJRI,RZR').
Assume further, for computational convenience, that the precision of the process
is known exactly, i.e., that Z is in fact the true covariance matrix, but the process
mean, say yA, is not known with certainty. Then a natural conjugate a priori
distribution (cf., [8]) for the random vector jA is the normal probability distribu-
tion fN(IlIm, S) with m=Ry and S=(RZR'). The quantity S as a measure of the
precision of the information available on pA can be expressed in units of the process
mean precision, say s. The information S can be defined in terms of the parameter
n, for n S/s. Then, using the notation cb and 6c to denote prior and posterior
parameters, respectively, the prior distribution on Pi can be expressed as fN (i Im,
sh). As the observations Oit(x) are recorded by the team members, they are comparable to "samples" providing statistics (i, n) on the normal process. In this
regard (cf., [8, Chapter 12]), the posterior distribution of Pi will also be normal
with parameters
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QUADRATIC
TEAMS
535
in (11) corresponding to the expected value of the completely decentralized information system h(l1, can be rewritten
T N
The second information system model we now wish to examine relaxes the
each team member communicates some function of his observations, say dit=
6i(zit), to a centralized agency in the organization, which computes all such information received and then periodically disseminates this compilation to each
member as a report.9 We will define this information system as "partially decentralized information reporting" and identify it by the symbol h 2). Then the infor-
mation function for each member under h(2) is given by V)(x)={Oit(x),6}, for
i= 1, 2, . N; t= 1, 2, ..., T; where the collection of reports by the central staff
to each member is
given 6(()=(1(.)-, .)-, 6N(.)); and Oit(x)={ Oil ...I Oit) as above.
Before proceeding to the derivation of the best team decision rule under h
Now suppose we assume, as before, that the observations Oit(x) are independent
' For example, the functions bi(.) might correspond to a weighted average of the observations
zi overr =1, 2, ..., t.
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536
CHARLES
H.
KRIEBEL
for all j#A i; i, j = 1, 2, ..., N. Applying the lemma in (18) to the stationarity theorem
in (6) gives'0
and
r=
j#i
fori=1,2,...,N; t=1,2,..., T.
For any given set of observations, the right-hand side of (21) can be expressed as
(23) E q(jj)r=1
Exjz(aiT56)
+ Y jti
, q(ij)tr Exlz (j I )=Exlz (it dt)
r=1
for i= 1, 2, ..., N; t= 1, 2, ..., T. Subtracting (23) from (21) gives
(24) ctit = Exjz (aitl 6)+ (q(j)j [Exjz (ijtI ht) -Exjz (jitI dt)]
for i= 1, 2, . N; t= 1, 2, ..., T. On the other hand the relation in (23) could be
solved directly to obtain
and the coefficients q(ik)tT are elements from the partitioned Q- 1, as defined above.
Proceeding as before, the expected value of the "partially decentralized in-
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QUADRATIC
TEAMS
537
T N
where "Var(.)" and "Cov( )" correspond to the variance and covariance, respectively.
The first summation component in the decision rule of (26) is the counterpart
of, say (4) given (3), where the expectation is over the distribution of states conditioned on the reported observations. The second component in (26) represents
an adjustment for the current period (t) between the reported observations for the
ith member and his own observation, where the weighting factor, say wit, for the
current period conditioned on the report is wit = q(LL)tt -(1/q(ii)tt), for all i, t.
The expression for V(h(2)) in (27) for the a posteriori distribution on the state
variables is most easily explained by again continuing the example discussed
under the previous system h(l). Assuming (12), (13), and (14) hold, recall the posterior distribution on jl was determined under h(l) on the basis of the individual
respect to the pooled observations for each period, in the form of a report, dt.
Following the earlier notation, the covariance matrix of the posterior distribution
of i? based on dt, that is comparable to (16b) based on Oit only, is now
In [9] Theil presents a general discussion of optimal decision rules for aggregate
planning problems under quadratic preferences (i.e., criterion functions). One
empirical study reported in detail is the well known analysis of production and
employment scheduling in a paint factory by C. Holt, F. Modigliani, J. Muth, and
H. Simon (cf. [5]). We now wish to consider this planning problem within the
framework of the preceding team decision models.
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538
CHARLES
H.
KRIEBEL
The basic decision problem posed by Holt and his associates was to determine
values for production (Pr) and work force (WV) levels in each of t= 1, 2, ..., T time
periods which minimize total variable costs of operations, estimated by the quadratic function
T
variable, P, and WV, respectively, and records observations on one of the indepen-
dent state variables for sales (St) and absentees (r,), in t= 1, 2, .... T time periods.
That is, following our earlier notation, let alt-Pt and a2t- Wt, and let x 1tSt
and x2t- rt for t= 1, 2, ..., T and N=2. Substituting into (3) for the relations in
(31) and (32), it is clear that this cost function is a special case of the general quadratic in (1).12 Then, given a planning horizon, T, an optimal solution to the static
decision problem in (3), follows directly from (2). More specifically, estimates for
the cost coefficients in (30), provided by the original authors are
problem in (30) is obtained by selecting the decision rule of the first period, updating forecasts of the state variable and initial conditions in each successive time
period on the basis of the most recent information available. For a planning
" In the original analysis presented in [5], no explicit provision was made for absenteeism, so that
L,= W, for all t, in (30) and (32). The modification for absentees is introduced here to permit a simple
interpretation of the team decision model and, as such, is nominally a generalization of the original
problem.
12 See Theil [9, Chapters 3 and 5] (particularly, pages 163-166), for the specific algebraic detail of(1),
given (30). In the interests of brevity this detail is not repeated.
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539
Term
TABLEI
P*(optimalrducn)
W*(optimalwrkfce)
OPTIMALSCDENRUFHWKX-PAIGOZ
6-.95301287 4650.219
5-.619032874 .1026
4-3.680719 2 .4078
3-1.58904627 .59
20.485193 70.65
1.83076945 2.03168
6-89.0125374 8
5-39.0281746 93
4-3.80267159 4
31.57064829-
278.501463-9
152.80946-3 7
tConsaWOSI-r,23456
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540
CHARLES
H.
KRIEBEL
horizon of six time periods, the optimal strategy dynamic decision rules for pro-
- 0.004St + 5-0.022rt + 5
and
0.0106St + 0.0601rt
0.0094St + 1 + 0.0535rt + 1
0.0049St + 4 + 0.0278rt + 4
_0.0030St+5 +0.0168rt+ 5_
where Et[xt+,] corresponds to a forecast of the state variable x in period t+?based on information available at the start of period t. The decision rules in (34)
follow directly.from (33) and (5) for t=1. It is these dynamic rules which will
occupy our attention for the remainder of this discussion. In this regard, the optimal decision rule coefficient values are relatively insensitive to changes in the
planning horizon parameter for 6 < T < oo (cf., [9, Chapter 5]). For computational
convenience, therefore, a six-period planning horizon will be employed in subsequent analysis of the paint factory case.
formation uncertainty. The perfect information criterion in (7) for the paint
factory cost coefficient estimates in (33) gives
2
where the elements a (xitxjT) are the covariance terms for St and rt, t= 1, 2, ..., 6;
and the coefficients k(ij), = k(jJrt are given in Table II. If we assume that sales and
absentees are independently distributed random variables and that the underlying
stochastic process generating each variable is stationary over time, (35) simplifies to
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QUADRATIC
S
6
3
4
TEAMS
541
TABLEI
25.3160
10.479-6
25.1796-03
10.26-57
25.143-0697
10.26-35798
24.9765-0831
10.284-563
24.675-01893
10.358-92476
23.857-01469
10.45-367289
tij12
1 23456
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VALUESOFk(iJ),:CRINWGHTPMY
542
CHARLES
H.
KRIEBEL
The structure of the matrix K in Table II evolves directly from the R and Q ma-
trices (cf., equation (7)), which in turn depend on the cost coefficients {C7, C3, C4,
C5, C2} and {C7, C9, C3, C4, C12}, respectively in (30). The covariance terms in (35) are
those of the underlying stochastic process generating the state variables. (If these
covariances are unknown a priori they can be estimated from subjective and/or
constant returns to scale in the process covariance. More specifically, for production and workforce decisions the expected value of increasingly accurate forecasts
coefficients in (33), the optimal strategy dynamic decision rules under h(') in (9) are
(34.2), respectively, and the terms E(.Idt) and E(.I )h() are forecasts of the state
variables based on the report of observations (dt) and each member's knowledge
of the reporting system and his own observations (hW)). Concerning the latter, the
optimal strategy dynamic rules in (38) permit adjustment of the forecasts of the
local state variables in each case on the basis of improved information.
From the decision rules given in (34), (37), and (38), it is apparent that the
economics of introducing a formal description of information systems into the
forward segment of the decision functions and the relative increased accuracy
such systems provide for state variable forecasts. In this regard, the team decision
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QUADRATIC
TEAMS
543
model has been a convenient analytical framework for detailing the normative
evaluation. Some practical considerations based on this discussion for the design
of computer-based decision and information systems in the firm are analyzed in [2].
Carnegie-Mellon University
REFERENCES
[1] BOOT, J. C. G.: Quadratic Programming, North-Holland Publishing Company and Rand McNally and Co., 1964.
[21 KRIEBEL, C. H.: "Information Processing and Programmed Decision Systems," Management
Sciences Research Report No. 69 (April, 1966), Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh,
Pa.
[31 MARSCHAK, J.: "Towards an Economic Theory of Organization and Information," Chapter
XIV in R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs, and R. L. Davis (eds.), Decision Processes, J. Wiley, 1954.
[5] HOLT, C. C., F. MODIGLIANI, J. F. MUTH, AND H. A. SIMON: Planning Production Inventories and
the Work Force, Prentice Hall, 1960.
[61 RADNER, R.: "The Evaluation of Information in Organizations," pp. 491-533 in J. Neyman (eds.),
[7] "Team Decision Problems," Annals of Mathematical Statistics (September, 1962), pp.
857-881.
[81 RAIFFA, H., AND R. SCHLAIFER: Applied Statistical Decision Theory, Division of Research, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, 1961.
[91 THEIL, H.: Optimal Decision Rules for Government and Industry, North-Holland Publishing Co.
and Rand McNally and Co., 1964.
[101 VAN DE PANNE, C.: "Optimal Strategy Decisions for Dynamic Linear Decision Rules in Feedback Form" Econometrica (April, 1965), pp. 307-320.
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