ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima

G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
FACTS:
1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status
2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only
in consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation
of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional.
In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of oversight
embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it
has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power
itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional
per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of
powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it

prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond
the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related
constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its
members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its
legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined
to the following:
(1)
scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation and
(2)

investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or
"power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such,
a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form
of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other
than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.

[G.R. No. 130872. March 25, 1999]
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque,
while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the
Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a
member of its SanguniangBayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang
Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won the KB
Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President
Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of
the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as
member of the municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his
appointment. When Red finally received his appointment papers, President Aquino
was already in power. But still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative
in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to
receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment
papers from the Aquino administration after three years and nine months from the
date he received his appointment paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the
Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the
position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa
through falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1)
information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a
decision finding the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with
respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019, The Sandiganbayan acquitted
Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for reconsideration,
the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is
appointed or chosen or has qualified.

Held: YES.
To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of
KB youth sectoral representatives to the SB and of the KB Federation Presidents.
Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of the KB Constitution respectively provide -

Unless sooner removed for cause. a condition which may result in an executive or administrative office becoming. this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB although in a holdover capacity since his term had already expired. there can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB. Resultantly. by statute. 7. In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay councils and the president of the federation of kabataang barangay. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. In the instant case. even though it be beyond the term fixed by law. it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. The Sandiganbayan however rejected this postulate declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 7 of B. the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it. neither did he take a valid oath of office. otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same. The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB since he did not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers. 51. an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in the KB. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify.Sec. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary. their terms of office shall be coterminous with their tenure is president of their respective association and federation . xxxx Sec 1. Blg. This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy. which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980. Term of Office. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold office until the last Sunday of November 1985 or such time that the newly elected officers shall have qualified and assumed office in accordance with this Constitution. but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified. . Indeed. all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years.P. clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. the law abhors a vacuum in public offices. wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. The Supreme Court disagree with the Sandiganbayan. although BP Blg.and courts generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create. for any period of time.The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment. for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from . Where this provision is found.

3135 April 15. the Court treats as a consolidated: (1) Second Motion for Reconsideration of the decision dated 23 July 1987 rendered by the Third Division of the Court in the Consolidated Petitions in G. Fortunate Borromeo. 62895 (entitled "Jose Cuenco Borromeo v. No. MARCELO B. G."). G. No. Fortunato Borromeo").R. petitioner.M. L-41171 (entitled "Intestate Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo. No. 55000 (entitled "In the Matter of the Estate of Vito Borromeo. Court of . considering the melange confus of allegations therein. No. v. et al.suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions A.R.R. Pilar N. complainant. Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera v. 1988 MIGUEL CUENCO. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: Complainant Miguel Cuenco has filed an untitled pleading dated 27 March 1988 which. et al. Deceased. FERNAN. Borromeo. HON. vs.

et al."). There is thus no need to discuss here the arguments made by complainant Cuenco in respect of the Court's decision therein on the matter of attomey's fees of Mr. and G. 65995 (entitled "Petra Borromeo. and (3) Compliance with the directive in aforesaid Resolution of 17 February 1988 requiring complainant Cuenco "to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for having made unfounded and serious accusations against Mr.R. now Justice Fernan in Cebu City. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court in Administrative Case No. expression less. No. Mr. et al. so that he did not assert any influence [during] long deliberations [of the Consolidated Petitional]. 2. (2) Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's En Banc Resolution of 17 February 1988 in this case. removal from office of a Member of the Supreme Court can be effected only through impeachment." . et al. under the Constitution. 3135 The present administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Cuenco against Mr. Justice Fernan. v. without uttering words. Justice Fernan "had a stony face. B. G. his own counsel for himself and judge of himself — three conflicting positions rolled into one.. The Court also held that. et al. et al. No. 63818 (entitled "Domingo Antigua. and not indirectly through disbarment proceedings." but he also acted as respondent. Court of Appeals. opinions." A. complainant would now seek reconsider consideration of the Court's Resolution on the following grounds: 1. was motionless. Burgos.")." consequently. Justice Fernan not only "voted for his exoneration which is naturally seriously anomalous. hence. Justice Fernan. Justice Fernan "made up his mind that some persons have to be declared heirs of Vito Borromeo" and that the several petitions for declaration of heirs were heard jointly at the law office of Atty. Mr. Francisco P. On the Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in the Consolidated Petitions The record of the Vito Borromeo estate proceedings discloses that the 23 July 1987 decision of the Court in the five (5) Consolidated Petitions mentioned became final and executory on 19 October 1987 and that Entry of Judgment was made on 24 March 1988. Cuenco and all the other lawyers concerned. views. v. Justice Fernan was previously dismissed by the Court "for utter lack of merit" in a Per Curiam Resolution issued on 17 February 1988 on. That in the estate proceedings of the late Vito Borromeo. the ground that complainant had failed altogether to substantiate his charges against Mr. etc."). To the extent that the Court can understand complainant Cuenco's untitled pleading. "it is impossible to deny Justice Fernan's participation in the preparations of the 32-page decision of the Third Division of the Supreme Court [in the Consolidated Petitional].R. That it is unlikely that Mr. inter alia.Appeals.

3. That "[t]he theory that Mr." Complainant Cuenco. Special Proceedings No. continues simply to ignore this express statement on the record and.3." and 4." We find in the present instance that complainant Cuenco. Justice Fernan had already withdrawn as counsel for two (2) of the instituted heirs in the Vito Borromeo estate proceedings. 1." It will be noted from the 23 July 1987 decision of the Court in the Consolidated Petitions that said petitions for declaration of heirship were heard jointly by the trial judge — not by Mr. in fact. The record. and after Mr. In its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in this case. As pointed out in the Court's 17 February 1988 Resolution of this case. has once more failed to submit any proof whatsoever to substantiate the statements made by him therein which are so extravagant as to be preposterous. however. presents his own personal notions of the "true" facts and circumstances of this case. Justice Fernan — sometime during or after the month of December 1968. and Attys. is not absolute. Justice Fernan had in any way influenced any Member of the Third Division of the Court or participated in the deliberations and resolution of the estate cases. That "[t]he decision of the Third Division in the five cases is open to the suspicion that Justice Fernan is protecting Judge Burgos. Justice Fernan "made up his mind that some persons have to be declared heirs of Vito Borromeo. 2. the Court found complainant Cuenco's charges against Mr. however. after probate of the will had been disallowed by the probate court." . We are unable to understand Cuenco's assertion that the Decision of the Courts' Third Division in the Consolidated Petitions "is open to the suspicion that Justice Fernan is protecting Judge Burgos. instead. 916-R for probate of the will of the late Vito Borromeo was instituted in 1952. no rational basis for the assertion of complainant Cuenco that Mr. Justice Fernan's signature: "No part — I appeared as counsel for one of the parties. long after said "heirs" had surfaced and asserted their respective claims against the decedent's estate. Upon the other hand. is entirely bereft of any suggestion that Mr. while it was in 1954 that the "heirs" referred to by complainant Cuenco in his pleading claimed rights of ownership over thirteen (13) parcel of land which they sought to be excluded from the estate of the decedent. did not take part in the resolution thereof. in his untitled pleading. Justice Fernan is not accountable for any grave misconduct except by impeachment proceeding. therefore. Antigua and Estenzo for violating the provisions of the Civil Code. Justice Fernan to be "completely unsupported by the facts and evidence of record. and Attys. Justice Fernan inhibited himself from participating in the deliberations on the Vito Borromeo estate cases and. Justice Fernan's involvement in the Vito Borromeo estate proceedings began only on 7 August 1965 and ended on 19 February 1968. now Justice Fernan in Cebu City. There is. The record explicitly shows that Mr." Complainant Cuenco further asserts that the several petitions for declaration of heirs filed by the different claimants to the estate of the late Vito Borromeo "were heard jointly at the law office of Atty. Antigua and Estenzo for violating the provisions of the Civil Code. This fact of non-participation is manifested in the annotation appearing beside Mr. Mr.

frail health and prior service to the country. Because the Court cannot assume that complainant Cuenco is totally unaware of the nature and gravity of the charges he has made against Mr.M. not by a disbarment proceeding. Complainant Cuenco is hereby severely REPRIMANDED and WARNED that the same or similar misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely by the Court. Justice Fernan but has also chosen to make additional statements and charges so extravagant and so clearly uninformed as to require no discussion. Were it not for complainant Cuenco's advanced age. Complainant. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT. RESOLUTION . On the statements made by complainant Cuenco concerning the rule referred to in the per curiam Resolution of 17 February 1988 that a Member of the Supreme Court may be removed from office only through impeachment. L-41171. the Court would have imposed a more severe penalty in this case A. b) to DENY. 55000. 3135. 3135. On Compliance with the Resolution of l7 February 1988 in Administrative Case No. has failed to present a shred of evidence to support the very serious charges he has made against Mr. 63818 and 65995. Complainant Cuenco vehemently denies acting in bad faith in filing the present administrative complaint against Mr. complainant Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No. In his untitled pleading. with finality. it suffices to furnish Mr. however. Justice Fernan and suggests that his acts have been "misunderstood" by the Court.Cuenco a copy of the extended Resolution of this Court dated 15 April 1988 on this same topic. Cuenco's Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated 23 July 1987 in G. and c) to FIND Mr. The Court finds the explanation given by complainant Cuenco to be totally unsatisfactory. complainant Cuenco has not only declined to prove the accusations he has made against Mr. 88-4-5433 April 15. the Court is compelled to conclude that those accusations were made in bad faith.4. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B. No. 62895. Cuenco guilty of misconduct as a lawyer and an officer of the Court. 1988 IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. Justice Fernan. said decision having become final and executory. Nos. the Court Resolved: a) to DENY Mr. C. Justice Fernan and which he has completely failed to support with anything but his own bare assertion. ACCORDINGLY.R.

an anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. where Mr. Raul M. First. "Tanodbayan/Special. Justice Marcelo B. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. such public officer. be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2]. Raul Gonzalez. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Raul M. 3135 entitled "Miguel Cuenco v. Cuenco. dated 17 February 1988 of the Court in Administrative Case No. the Court denied with finality Mr Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration. Gonzalez "to file responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's intervention. The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No. Administrative Case No. encourages Mr. cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Gonzalez. the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. in the opinion of Mr. during his incumbency. Upon request of Mr. Fernan a "letter-complaint. nonetheless. Justice Fernan. Further. Cueco. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement. Mr. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment. Insofar as Administrative Case No. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No." together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco. for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office. Raul M Gonzales a copy of the per curiam Resolution. Gonzalez "to do something about this. 3135 in the following terms: There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be dismissed. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to. Constitution). which. Members of the Supreme Court must. 3135. The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency. This principle may be succinctly formulated in the following terms. under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988. Fernan" in which Resolution. The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments.PER CURIAM: The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court. It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. Mr. In the same Resolution. cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office. 3135 is concerned. the Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. Gonzalez. Honorable Marcelo B. would in effect be to circumbent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate theat Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of ." Mr. Fernan and asking Mr. Cuenco. made improper any "intervention" by Mr. the Court had granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988. inter alia. 3135.

treason. Chief Justice Enrique M. and conviction of. including those in government-owned or controlled corporations. and punishment. Id. like constitutional officers. culpable violation of the Constitution. other high crimes. states that "judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor. in his authoritative dissertation on the New Constitution. and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not thereby removed. The above provision is a reproduction of what was found in the 1935 Constitution.). 2 The President. Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides: Sec. culpable violation of the Constitution. on impeachment for. in accordance with law. Id. and the Ombudsman may be removed from office. the above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method. a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2]. the filing of a criminal action "in accordance with law" may not prosper. There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of the impeachment process (The Constitution f the Philippines. other high crimes.certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution.). bribery. particularly those declared to be removed by impeachment. however. pp." The clear implication is. 2 The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial. and conviction of. graft and corruption. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2]. Id. to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office." Thus. Fernando. Sandiganbayan. 2 The President. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution: Sec." There are exceptions. or profit under the Republic of the Philippines. trust or profit under the Republic. the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject of prosecution. tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law. trial and punishment according to law. and the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1]. (Emphasis supplied) This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. otherwise. treason. 1 the Court said: The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over "public officers and employees. or betrayal of . bribery. and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for. Section 2. trust. the Members of the Constitutional Commissions. In Lecaroz v. would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. or graft and corruption. It is equally manifest that the party this convicted may be proceeded against. the Vice-President. 465-466). It is quite apparent from the explicit character of the above provision that the effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor. the Members of the Supreme Court. the Members of the Supreme Court.

It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. Gonzales and Mr Miguel Cuenco.public trust. . Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who. trial and punishment according to law. for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings. he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. Without the protection of this rule. but not by impeachment. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. Raul M. 3 xxx xxx xxx (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Resolution upon Hon. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior.

Lecaroz v Sandiganbayan. Without the rule. Tanodbayan – special prosecutor like a fiscal. It is just that. Proscribes the removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method. ombudsman. before criminal and other actions. Members of the SC would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who. would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. Impeachment first. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment. Important principles of AC 3135 Article 8. cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. The Court is not saying that a Member of the SC is absolutely immune from disbarment and criminal actions against him. Fernan” in which Resolution. Section 7 (1987 Constitution). the Court resolved to dismiss the charges made by Cuenco against Fernan for utter lack of merit. this member must first be removed from office via impeachment proceedings before other actions will prosper against him. otherwise. to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office.” The action against Fernan was filed in the Tanodbayan. . The letter was addressed to Gonzales referring to charges for disbarment brought by Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan and asking “to do something about this. he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any misbehavior that may be proven against him. There is fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. The Court resolved to require Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Fernan. Reason for ruling.In Re Gonzales. 160 SCRA 771 (1988) Fast facts Raul Gonzales forwarded an anonymous letter by “Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court” to Justice Fernan. 3135 Resolution dated February 1988 entitled “Miguel Cuenco v Honorable Marcelo B. Administrative Case No. Should the tenure of the SC Justice be thus terminated by impeachment.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form. former President Joseph E. betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives. Francisco vs.. Jr. Davide. al. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Held: The court’s power of judicial review.for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.. is subject to several limitations. (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the . most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. The only ones who could be disbarred are the impeachable officers. the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. On 2 June 2003." Issue: Whether or not the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact. superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution. the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution. in aid of legislation. (2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge. or will sustain. direct injury as a result of its enforcement. and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. no justiciable issue was presented before it. Davide Jr. Various petitions for certiorari. Can judges be disbarred during their term? Yes. which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation." but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. et. House of Representatives GR 160261 10 November 2003 Facts: On 28 November 2001. he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained. adding that as of the time of filing of the petitions. on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings. prohibition. On 22 July 2002. like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution. The following day or on 23 October 2003. and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives.

What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice… courts of justice determine the limits of powers of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. Political questions are “those questions which. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. Beyond this. . not legality. under the Constitution. This is not only a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature…” a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of the political law doctrine. or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. and the Judiciary. The Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of the judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none. the Executive. and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. of a particular measure. This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Citing Chief Justice Concepcion. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.earliest possible opportunity. when he became a Constitutional Commissioner: “…The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.

FERDINAND R. GAITE. any discussion of this would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello. RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE). EDRE OLALIA. ATTY. JR. No. Petitioner v. FELIPE PESTAÑO. then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. DANILO RAMOS. 193459 : February 15. ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE’S LAWYERS (NUPL). JR. More importantly. COCHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO.The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. REYES. 2011 MA. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE. private respondents known as the Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner. FACTS: Before the 15th Congress opened its first session. GUTIERREZ.. RespondentIntervenor. LIM. EVELYN PESTAÑO. RENATO M. and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS). If there are. MERCEDITAS N. Respondents. CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY. SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN). ..R. RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL. DANILO D. MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN. SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP). The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint. CHAIRPERSON. FELICIANO BELMONTE. G.

and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation. Petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction. Private respondents collectively known as the Reyes group filed another impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares. Whether or not the simultaneous complaints violate the one-year bar rule. et al. Jr. the Secretary General of the House of Representatives transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial. using the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles.A day after the opening of the 15th Congress. which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. found the two complaints. The Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. who directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business. HELD: The petition lacks mert. sufficient in substance. Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. ISSUES: Whether or not petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication. quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature. After hearing. First issue: . The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group’s complaint to Speaker Belmonte who also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business. by Resolution. public respondent.

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power.
Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took
the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding
should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.
Second issue:
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.” However, the term “initiate” means to file the complaint
and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint
which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking
initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the
complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.

Petition is DISMISSED.

Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions of Sept. 1 and 7,
2010 finding two impeachment complaints against the petitioner, simultaneously
referred to the House Committee on Justice, sufficient in form and substance on
grounds that she was denied due process and that the said resolutions violated the
one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings for impeachable officers.
Court dismissed the petition.
Facts:

22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private
respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestaño (Baraquel
group) filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez upon endorsement of
Party-List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao

27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker
Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in
the Order of Business


3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John
Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes
group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed by
Representatives Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus

HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment
Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to
House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules
to include it in the Order of Business

11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House
Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both
complaints sufficient in form

2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the
th
15 Congress was published

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the two
complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, sufficient in substance

Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging Resolutions
of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and that these
violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings

Issue/s:
1. Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy
2. Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment
Proceedings of the 15th Congress denied due process to the Petitioner
3. Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the
Constitution

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.
Ratio:
1.

NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

– Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of the judiciary
– the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to
initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner
of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the
same official.

-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,
“judicially discoverable standards” for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion,
through the power of judicial review
2.
DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode of promulgation the
Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings?


(P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance of the impeachment
complaints is tainted with bias as the Chairman of the HCOJ’s, Rep. Tupas, father has a pending
case with her at the Sandiganbayan

Presumption of regularity


The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the express grant of rule-making
power in the HOR

the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements
and providing that there must be a “verified complaint or resolution”, and that the
substance requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee”

The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of promulgating the Rules.


impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the
punishment of the offender

3.

THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE


(P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against
her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She
posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be
accepted and referred to public respondent.

INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action
of said complaint (referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice)

IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate


Rationale of the one-year bar: “that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: 1)”to
prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task
[of] legislation,”
“…that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle
starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.” (Gutierrez vs. HOR,
2011)

CJ Corona vs. Senate
GR No. 200242
July 17, 2012
Facts:

being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay. Renato C. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. 2. 10 thereof. In such cases. there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence under Par. it is clear under Sec. . The present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause. II of the complaint which. Art. (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. bringing no real protection to petitioner. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. assuming arguendo that the retention of Par. much less ultimate facts. No. In fact. Issue: Had the constitutional issues raised in this case been mooted out? Ruling: The impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. aside from being a “hodge-podge” of multiple charges. People of the Philippines vs Sandiganbayan and Bienvenido Tan. assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines.Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court. Jr. 2. (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioner’s right to due process because first. Art.A.4 and therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief. and second.3 is correct. and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act (“fruit of the poisonous tree”) considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 2.3. Corona. the ruling of the Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2. do not constitute allegations in law. II does not mention “graft and corruption” or unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment. Unarguably. XI of the Constitution that “graft and corruption” is a separate and distinct ground from “culpable violation of the Constitution” and “betrayal of public trust”. 8 of R. as vehicle to prove Par. 2. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees. the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.

HELD: No. The error basically imposed tax on top of another tax which if allowed would be unfair to the taxpayer. if its assessment is excessive or erroneous. The CIR has the power to abate or cancel the whole or any unpaid portion of a tax liability. No mutual concessions need be made. It was therefore proper to have the tax be reduced from P302 million to P22 million. without any word from SMC. because an excessive or erroneous tax is not compromised. Tan granted the request and eventually he reduced the tax liability to P302 million. Various BIR officials reviewed the case and they recommended that SMC’s tax liability be reduced to P22 million (a significant reduction from the original P342 million). his act of accepting the P10 million compromise offer caused undue injury to the government and it gave SMC unwarranted benefits due to the significantly reduced tax liability. Allegedly. of lessening or moderating. the matter was referred to various BIR officials who agreed and recommended to Tan that he should accept the compromise offer. The reduction was justified by the BIR officials on the ground that the tax examiners had made some errors in computing SMC’s tax liability. issued an assessment against San Miguel Corporation (SMC) demanding payment of P342 million in taxes. But in October 1987. So SMC was demanded to pay P22 million but then SMC asked for a compromise of P10 million. SMC filed a request for reinvestigation. He acted upon concurrence and recommendation of the various BIR officials. This is actually abatement (not compromise as termed by SMC). . But is it proper for Tan to accept the P10 million compromise by SMC? Tan is well within his power to accept the P10 million compromise offer. Tan cannot be said to have acted in bad faith. inclusive of increments. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) Bienvenido Tan.In July 1987. Tan referred the case to the Legal Service Division of the BIR. Jr. Abatement is the diminution or decrease in the amount of tax imposed. The Sandiganbayan originally convicted Tan but it reversed its own decision upon motion of Tan. It was found by the Sandiganbayan that there was an improper computation in the tax liability of SMC. Tan is actually prudent to accept the P10 million offer so as to avoid a protracted and costly litigation. Again. This resulted to a criminal case against Tan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. ISSUE: Whether or not Tan should have been convicted of the crime charged. To abate is “to nullify or reduce in value or amount”. or if the administration costs involved do not justify the collection of the amount due. it is abated or canceled. Only correct taxes should be paid. Tan accepted the P10 million compromise offer. Further. It refers to the act of eliminating or nullifying.

R.R. requesting the approval of the amendment of qualification standards for Director II positions in the Central Administrative Service and Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus. s.Ombudsman vs CSC Case Digest G. exclusive and discretionary constitutional and statutory power as an independent constitutional body to administer and supervise its own officials and personnel. it is mandated by the Constitution to administer all levels in the civil service. The Office of the Ombudsman asserts that its specific. filed a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside and nullify CSC Opinion No. 2004. 2002 ). No. The Commission argued that. No. 1997 are as follows: Education: Bachelorsdegree Experience: 3 years of supervisory experience Training: None required. 1 dated January 24. thus. 44. Inok vs. Inok for security of tenure as Director III of the Commission on Audit despite the absence of a CES eligibility. CSC issued Opinion No. including that of the third level. being third level eligibility. the Supreme Court held that the Judiciary. Marcelo wrote a letter dated July 28. s. July 2. 2003 to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). the Office of the Ombudsman and the Commission on Human Rights are not covered by the CES governed by the Career Executive Service Board. the Constitutional Commissions. 2004 disapproving the request on the ground that Director II position. The Office of the Ombudsman. in the case of Khem N. Ombudsman Simeon V. July 30. as follows: Education : Bachelors Experience : 3 years of supervisory Training : None Eligibility : Career Service Professional/Relevant Eligibility for Second Level Position degree experience required. as the central personnel agency of the government. Eligibility : Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE)/Career Executive Service (CES) However. including the authority to administer . Said Decision effectively granted the petition of Mr. Civil Service Commission (G. is covered by the Career Executive Service. 44. 2007 FACTS: The qualification standards set for Director II positions in the Central Administrative Service and Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 148782. 162215.

x x x x x x x x x (emphasis supplied) Thus. a person occupying the position of Director II in the Central Administrative Service or Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman is appointed by the Ombudsman. is constitutionally and legally infirm. cannot be curtailed by the general power of the CSC to administer the civil service system. such as what the CSC did when it issued Opinion No. all of whom are appointed by the President. Book V. Undersecretary. Subtitle A. except the Deputy Ombudsmen. ISSUES: Whether or not the Director II positions in the Central Administrative Service and the Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman are covered by the Career Executive Service HELD: No. The Career Service shall include: (1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required. Thus. these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities. – The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination.” provides: SECTION 7. (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions. Title I. and (3) security of tenure. 44. Career Service. Any unwarranted and unreasonable restriction on its discretionary authority. Section 7 of EO 292. Assistant Regional Director. Assistant Secretary. namely. (3) Positions in the Career Executive Service. s. Regional Director. the Ombudsman is the appointing authority for all officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman. the CES covers presidential appointees only. or based on highly technical qualifications.competitive examinations and prescribe reasonable qualification standards for its own officials. Bureau Director. 2004. Assistant Bureau Director. Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board. otherwise known as “The Administrative Code of 1987. Chapter 2. not by . and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems. (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific. or highly technical in nature. Under the Constitution.

They are intimately connected to the power to appoint as well as to the power of administrative supervision. This must be so if the constitutional intent to establish an independent Office of the Ombudsman is to remain meaningful and significant.the President. otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of 1989. as well as to prescribe and approve its position structure and staffing pattern. This is complemented by Sec. in violation of the Constitution or (2) including in the CES a position not held by a presidential appointee. As such. except his deputies. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman. Qualification standards are used as guides in appointment and other personnel actions. prescribing and administering the standards for the officials and personnel of the Office. he is neither embraced in the CES nor does he need to possess CES eligibility. This power necessarily includes the power of setting. Thus. the Ombudsman has been vested with the power of administrative control and supervision of the Office. contrary to the Administrative Code. the Ombudsman has the power to appoint all officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman. To classify the positions of Director II in the Central Administrative Service and the Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman as covered by the CES and require appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure will lead to unconstitutional and unlawful consequences. it also includes the authority to determine and establish the qualifications. This includes the authority to organize such directorates for administration and allied services as may be necessary for the effective discharge of the functions of the Office. duties. functions and responsibilities of the various directorates and allied services of the Office. As a guaranty of this independence. 6. To further ensure its independence. as a corollary to the Ombudsman’s appointing and supervisory . Article XI of the Constitution provides: Sec. in determining training needs and as aid in the inspection and audit of the personnel work programs. 11 of RA 6770. shall be appointed by the Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law.” Under the Constitution. Section 6. the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent body. Necessarily. other than the Deputies. It will result either in (1) vesting the appointing power for said position in the President.

R. 196231 and G. before the Office of the City Prosecutor.R. 2004 SET ASIDE.the Office of the Ombudsman. July 30. all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. vs. which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman. Petition GRANTED and Opinion No. The CSC cannot substitute its own standards for those of the department or agency. 44. filed a similar charge. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III. No.R. PERLAS-BERNABE. Christian M. OCHOA. grave threats.R. While said cases were still pending. FACTS: G. 2007) G. No.A. 196232 WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT. the role of the CSC is limited to assisting the department or agency with respect to these qualification standards and approving them. 2012 EMILIO A. 196231 September 4. Since the responsibility for the establishment.powers. Kalaw.) No.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. G. G. 162215. Petitioner. No. J. s. the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over. Private complainant. Meanwhile. No. vs. No.R. the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the complainant had not . GONZALES III. (Ombudsman vs Civil Service Commisison. No.R.: These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong . Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman. 6770. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. specially in a case like this in which an independent constitutional body is involved. robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp. JR G. The cases. acting through and represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. administration and maintenance of qualification standards lies with the concerned department or agency. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R. otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. he possesses the authority to establish reasonable qualification standards for the personnel of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The inaction is gross. the government. recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. No. which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals. At the conclusion of these public hearings. Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses. . in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service. a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). represented by petitioner. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Garcia. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23. the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers.R. for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice. Hence the petition. the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. a Decision finding P/S Insp. his wife Clarita D. Garcia. Hence the petition. the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. However. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. 3. Rolando Mendoza." Similarly. G. their sons Ian Carl Garcia. considering there is no opposition thereto. In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident. Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions.been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged. the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines. However. The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification. Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval. upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III.

for that matter. no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. Indubitably. respectively. Section 8(2). By enacting Section 8(2) of R. the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions . with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. whether appointive or elective. Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority. which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials.Section 8(2) and Section 21 . HELD: YES. while Section 21 of R. For. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor. including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor. The Power of the President toRemove a Deputy Ombudsmanand a Special Prosecutor isImplied from his Power toAppoint. grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. It would not be incongruous for Congress. he claim that Section . on the other hand. the Constitution itself. A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R. there is.A. or a Special Prosecutor.A.ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces. therefore. under Section 2. who are not subject to impeachment. Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials. authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers. Granting the President the Powerto Remove a Deputy Ombudsmandoes not Diminish theIndependence of the Office of theOmbudsman. to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices. that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. 6770. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities. By granting express statutorypower to the President to removea Deputy Ombudsman and aSpecial Prosecutor. No. Congressmerely filled an obvious gap inthe law. The Ombudsman's administrativedisciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. however.A. In fact. through the person of the President.

by itself." The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request. March 20. Vs. WHEREFORE. do notconstitute betrayal of public trust. political independence. Office Of The Special Prosecutor. No. Special Prosecution Officer Iii. be considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous.A. that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust. Hence. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates. falling short ofconstitutional standards. After all. that the decision was immediately implemented. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements. Sandiganbayan. the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians. Berbano. or of any corrupt intention or questionable motivation. We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No.R. in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office. Roger C.. 196231." Petitioner Gonzales may not beremoved from office where thequestioned acts. Nos. 196232. Sr.R. taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place. as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. 105965-70. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside.8(2) of R. even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. the President. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately. 2001 ] . Respondents. cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman. Petitioner. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. [ G. while he may be vested with authority. George Uy. there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust. the salary. The Hon. the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge. In G. in G. No.R. The Hon. Ombudsman And The Hon. Petitioner Emilio A. The Office of the President is vestedwith statutory authority to proceed administratively against petitionerBarreras-Sulit to determine theexistence of any of the grounds forher removal from office as providedfor under the Constitution and theOmbudsman Act. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is. essentially. No.

It is the court-martial. pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. which was denied. August 9.” In this connection. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. RONALDO P. No. which has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 6758. not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. it is the prosecutor. unjust. improper or inefficient. 3019. In passing RA 6770. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. the petitioner does not fall within the “rank” requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law. who was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification of official documents and violation of RA 3019. As to the violations of Republic Act No. 105965-70. RENATO A. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and ATTY. petitioner Uy. 8249. In February 20. petitioner. at its inception. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance. respondents. municipal trial court. as amended. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.A. or military and PNP officers mentioned above. TAPIADOR.D. misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office. and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that. not the Sandiganbayan. who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. 129. The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts. thus. which states that “In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher. 1999 and resolution dated February 22. 1999]. not the Ombudsman. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9. arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the offense. Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of theOmbudsman then (to be known as the Tanodbayan). RULING: No. exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court. Nos. as the case may be. vs.FACTS: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G. DECISION . as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor filed. 2000. 2000. and municipal circuit trial court.R. the Office of theOmbudsman was already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts. The court ruled that : 1. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal. metropolitan trial court. “Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines” 2. 1850. The petitioner filed a motion to quash. exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts . LEDESMA. as amended by R.

Beck. 1994 to follow-up his visa application. IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. Vigo. Terencio which essentially seeks to corroborate the alleged payment of the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10. Jr. the petitioner alleged that Beck and his wife. BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. a U. the Ombudsman found the petitioner liable for grave misconduct in the administrative aspect of the case and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the government service. JR. BID Special Investigator and assigned as Technical Assistant in the office of the then Associate Commissioner Bayani M. This incident prompted the petitioner to file a criminal complaint for oral defamation before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila. Subido. Renato A. in her affidavit dated July 15. The incipience of the case could be traced to the complaint-affidavit[3] dated July 4. the petitioner filed the instant petition for review[9] which raises the following assignment of errors: I THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT DESPITE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT. unless the latter pay an additional amount of Seven Thousand Pesos (P7. The petitioners allegations were corroborated by Rosanna C. 1994 that he demanded nor received any amount of money from Walter Beck in consideration for the issuance of the latters ACR. Accompanying the complaint was the affidavit[4] executed by a certain Purisima C.. 1997 denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.00) by Walter Beck and his wife to the petitioner in consideration for the issuance of the subject ACR.000. the criminal charge was dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of evidence. THUS CONSTITUTING A VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. recommended that criminal and administrative charges be filed against the petitioner. Tapiador. On the said occasion.00) in exchange for the issuance of an alien certificate of registration (ACR for brevity) which was subsequently withheld deliberately by the petitioner despite repeated demands by Beck. 1994. citizen. a BID employee and officemate of the petitioner. J. The complaint alleged in substance that petitioner Tapiador demanded and received from Walter Beck the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10. 1997.00). . Beck and his wife shouted invectives at him and charged the petitioner with having demanded money from them.[6] After investigation. came to the BID office in Manila on June 29.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution[1] dated January 22.S. The petitioner categorically denied in his counter-affidavit[5] dated July 11. when the petitioner advised the couple to accomplish first all the requirements for a visa application. III THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WITHOUT CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND ACTUAL HEARING IN VIOLATION OF ITS OWN RULES.000. against the petitioner. Ledesma found the petitioner liable for violating existing civil service rules and regulations as well as penal laws and thus. In addition.000.[8] His subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied on April 7.DE LEON. 1994 lodged with the Resident Ombudsman at the main office in Manila of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID for brevity) by Walter H. Monica Beck.[7] however. Upon review of the case. II THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION ONLY AFTER ALMOST THREE YEARS. 1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMBADM-0-94-0983 dismissing the petitioner from the government service for grave misconduct and the Order[2] dated April 7.

the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment[10] on February 20.000. the petitioner adverted to the minutes[15] of the preliminary hearing on July 18. That no preliminary conference had been conducted in the case was primarily due to the petitioners manifestation to dispense thereof and submit the case for resolution inasmuch as he has already filed his memorandum of evidence.[11] The petitioner filed a Reply[12] thereto on August 14. Moreover. which act was personally witnessed by complainants witness. . 1996 addressed to the investigating officer requesting for a copy of the case records to enable him to prepare for his defense. we required the public respondent to file his comment to the instant petition. the allegations in the complaint.[17] In dismissing the petitioner from the government service the Office of the Ombudsman reasoned out. Vitaliano M. Purisima C. Atty. we directed the Office of the Ombudsman to file directly its own comment which it did on May 12. 1997. the complainant has the burden of proving. 1998 which essentially recommended that the petitioner be exonerated from the subject administrative charge on the ground that the assailed resolution of the Ombudsman was rendered in violation of procedural due process and that it was not supported by substantial evidence. However.IV THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN CONTRADICTING ITS OWN FINDING RELATIVE TO THE CRIMINAL ASPECT OF THIS CASE DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE. the administrative proceeding was conducted shortly thereafter. it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In administrative proceedings. the Ombudsman opined that the petitioner was absolved of criminal liability during the preliminary investigation of this case due to insufficiency of evidence constituting probable cause contrary to his claim that there was absolutely no evidence against him. 1998 and contended that it was the hearing officer. In the Resolution dated July 7. substantially established the administrative liability of the petitioner for grave misconduct by demanding from complainant Beck a sum of money in exchange for the issuance of the latters ACR. V THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL AGAINST PETITIONER. 1998. After several extensions of time given by this Court. there was no undue delay in the conduct of the administrative proceedings since the preliminary investigation was conducted immediately after the complaint was filed in 1994.00 from spouses Walter and Monica Becker (sic). Likewise. petitioner should be imposed the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the government service. rather. Consequently.[14] By way of reply. by substantial evidence. and for that offense. as follows: xxx [E]vidence for the complainant clearly established that respondent Tapiador unlawfully received the amount of P10. The petitioner reiterated that the Office of the Ombudsman found no evidence against him in its investigation of the criminal aspect of the case and thus. he argued that the instant administrative charge should also have been dismissed. who instructed him and his counsel to simply file a memorandum within fifteen (15) days after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. this case was submitted for decision after the petitioner.[16] Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case. the Ombudsman asserts that the sworn statements of Walter Beck a and his witness. 1998. Mendoza. and that after the criminal aspect of the case was resolved. DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS HIS FIRST OFFENSE IN HIS THIRTY YEARS IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE.[13] The Office of the Ombudsman maintains that the petitioner was accorded due process of law inasmuch as he was duly informed and furnished a copy of the complaint against him as evidenced by his letters dated July 22 and 26. Purisima Terencio. the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Solicitor General had filed their respective memoranda. Thereafter.

2. Moreover. 3. Neither did they appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their respective sworn statements despite prior notice before the investigating officer who subsequently dismissed the criminal aspect of the case upon finding that the charge against the petitioner was not supported by any evidence. That sometime in February 1993 my wife went to see Mr. Becker (sic) also claimed that respondent demanded an additional amount of P7. manifested on July 29. Purisima Terencio.00. 13. The pertinent portion of his affidavit reads.Terencio. a perusal of the affidavit executed by Walter Beck does not categorically state that it was petitioner Tapiador who personally demanded from Beck the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10. the said declaration of witness Terencio appears to be credible and worthy of belief since there is no apparent reason for her to impute false statements against the respondent. Mrs.[18] Notably. however. A thorough review of the records.00 from them for the release of the ACR. but it was never mailed. In quoting. On this basis alone. who in her affidavit dated July 01.00 on February 23. Ledesma. a foreigner. 1996 that he was submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the documents on record[20] while the petitioner agreed to simply file his memorandum. To us.00 was given I waited but no ACR was given to me.00) in consideration for the issuance of the latters ACR.000. witness Terencio states That said spouses paid the full amount of P10. in his capacity as Technical Assistant. showed that the subject affidavits of Beck and Terencio were not even identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding investigation conducted by the BID Resident Ombudsman at the BID office in Manila. That when we tranfered (sic) our residence to Negros Occ[idental] we arranged with Mr.[21] Consequently. for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10. Nonetheless. both from the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise. Worse. is authorized to receive payment for the processing of ACR. then BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. That during the months of Sept[ember] and Oct[ober] 1992 a certain Baby (Purisima)Terencio informed us that I could be granted an ACR and will be allowed to stay in the Philippines permanently thru Mr. Tapiador to pick up the ACR before we will leave for that place. 1992 to Mr. Tapiador and Mr. Manila and the fees was agreed at P10. Angeles.000. It is also significant to observe that the said declaration of Terencio was aptly corroborated by complainant Walter Becker (sic). Beck and that of his alleged witness.[22] Hence.000. Record). The preliminary conference required under Republic Act No.000. Terencio allegedly informed the couple that Beck could be granted the same and would be allowed to stay in the Philippines permanently with the help of the petitioner and a certain Mr. it appears that Walter Beck and his wife sought the assistance of Purisima Terencio sometime in the later part of 1992 in facilitating the issuance of his ACR and in the process. 4. and when my wife went again to see Mr. although Beck claimed to have subsequently paid Ten Thousand Pesos (P10. Tapiador as payment for the Alien Certificate of Registration with the promise for the immediate release of the same (p.00).000. On the other hand. Beck and his wife did not appear to have any direct or personal knowledge of the alleged demand of the petitioner except through the information allegedly relayed to them by Terencio.[23] . That after completing all the requirements and the amount of P10. official receipts inclussive (sic). Angeles who was also with the BID. there is no showing that respondent.000. 1994 positively identified the respondent as the person to whom spouses Becker (sic) gave the money. Tapiador and was informed that he will hold my passport while I have my ACR. Becks affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. the only basis for the questioned resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the petitioner from the government service was the unverified complaint-affidavit of Walter H. the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman should have dismissed the administrative complaint against the petitioner in the first instance. his affidavit is silent as to the identity of the person who actually received the said amount from him. who in his desire to stay permanently in the Philippines became a victim of such irregularity. 6770[19] was dispensed with after the nominal complainant. Tapiador to pick up the ACR he was not in the office.00). Hence.000. which I refused. and that Baby Terencio promised to (sic) us that the ACR will be mailed to us. thus: 1. the instant administrative complaint was resolved by the Ombudsman merely on the basis of the evidence extant in the record of OMB-ADM-0-94-0983.

a member of the Davao Pilots Association. Tapiador as payment for the Alien Certificate of Registration with the promise for the immediate release of the same[24] on the mere assumption that there is no apparent reason for her to impute false statements against the petitioner who is employed with the government for more than thirty (30) years. It also appears that Beck and the petitioner would eventually meet personally for the first time only later. EDWARD F. it is not necessary anymore to pass upon the other grounds raised by the petitioner in his petition. SO ORDERED. (DTASI) filed an . of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. subparagraph (3).. Under Section 13.00) on February 23.[27] Besides. 1992. The petitioner is hereby ordered REINSTATED immediately to his position in the government service more particularly in the Bureau of Investigation and Deportation. 1998. more particularly from his position in the BID.[25] On the contrary. Anent the affidavit of Purisima Terencio. This glaring inconsistency more than sufficiently impeached Terencios credibility thereby belying the assessment of the Ombudsman in the assailed resolution. This significant omission in his affidavit is fatal in establishing the alleged administrative liability of the petitioner. In view of the foregoing. Angeles. A close scrutiny of the allegations in her affidavit show that the alleged pay off had taken place as early as February 23. Beck claimed in his own affidavit that he was informed by Terencio only between the period from September to October 1992 that the processing of his ACR could be facilitated through the assistance of the petitioner and a certain Mr. EDGARDO V. RANADA Respondent. Inc. 1994.00) in grease money to the petitioner on February 23. ESTARIJA. Manila. to the public official concerned. assuming arguendo. Petitioner. vs. Consequently. WHEREFORE. 1997 dismissing the petitioner from the government service and the Order dated April 7.xxx xxx xxx Walter Beck could have easily stated in his affidavit that he paid the said amount directly to the petitioner if it were indeed the latter who actually received the same.000. petitioner even informed him that his ACR had been approved but that he still needed to submit his quarantine clearance before the same could be issued to him. Besides. that petitioner were administratively liable. it appears that Purisima Terencio had apparently been doing most of the legwork for the Beck couple in facilitating the release of the subject ACR. the instant petition is GRANTED.000. On August 10. On the said occasion. 1997 in OMB-ADM-0-94-0983 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman dated January 22. with substantial evidence. but he did not. 1992 even without categorically stating that she had personal knowledge or had actually witnessed the alleged pay off. the Ombudsman gave full faith and credit to her statement that the spouses paid the full amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10.[28] the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault. The complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary to prove the charge in the subject administrative case. However. Ranada. there is logical basis to assume that it was to Terencio that the alleged payment was made by the Beck couple. The Ombudsman should have been more prudent in according credence to the allegations of Terencio coming as they do from a supposed fixer. respondent Edward F. that is. at the office of the latter. more specifically on June 23. the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service. 1992 to Mr. (DPAI) and Davao Tugboat and Allied Services. without loss nor diminution in his salaries and benefits. Purisima Terencio was adroit enough to make it appear in her affidavit that the Beck spouses had paid Ten Thousand Pesos (P10. Inc. so Becks affidavit went on to state. Before the said date however. the rule that witnesses are presumed to tell the truth until proven otherwise[26] does not apply to the case at bar for the reason that Terencio had the motive to impute falsities to avoid the inevitable wrath of the Beck spouses for reneging on her promise to send them by mail the subject ACR.

1998. He claimed that Adrian Cagata.administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct before the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao.000 from Cagata because the association had no pending transaction with the PPA. Estarija filed a Petition for Review with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction before the . The Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration in an Order 11 dated October 31. 3019. Estarija claimed that dismissal was unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to remove government officials. Estarija claimed that Cagata made him believe that the money was a partial remittance to the PPA of the pilotage fee for July 1998 representing 10% of the monthly gross revenue of their association. and that Republic Act No. Inc. an employee of the DPAI. who are not removable by impeachment. petitioner denied demanding sums of money for the approval of berthing permits.. Consequently. He maintains that under the 1987 Constitution. the Ombudsman ordered petitioner’s preventive suspension and directed him to answer the complaint. He claimed that the entrapment and the subsequent filing of the complaint were part of a conspiracy to exact personal vengeance against him on account of Ranada’s business losses occasioned by the cancellation of the latter’s sub-agency agreement with Asia Pacific Chartering Phil. Branch No. had been demanding money ranging from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing permits. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 2000. Sasa. The complaint alleged that prior to August 6. the association reported Estarija’s activities to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Port of Davao. against petitioner Captain Edgardo V. Davao City. finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989". called to inform him that the DPAI had payables to the PPA. is unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided for in the Constitution. before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). On August 6. Estarija seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration. the Ombudsman’s administrative authority is merely recommendatory. 1998. Nonetheless. he received the money but assured Cagata that he would send an official receipt the following day. On August 31. In his counter-affidavit and supplemental counter-affidavit. 6770. and P5000 as monthly contribution from the DPAI. 2000. Estarija. and although he went to the association’s office. he was hesitant to get the P5. whether elective or appointive. the NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5..000 marked money used by the NBI to entrap Estarija. Thus. the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative case. 8. who as Harbor Master issues the necessary berthing permit for all ships that dock in the Davao Port. which was eventually awarded to a shipping agency managed by Estarija’s son. The complaint alleged that Estarija. The Ombudsman filed a criminal case against Estarija for violation of Republic Act No. in order to stop the mulcting and extortion activities of Estarija.

fine. 6770 is unconstitutional because the Ombudsman has only the powers enumerated under Section 13.1: Whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold Estarija liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct The petition is DENIED. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Solicitor General maintains otherwise. demote. Moreover. Act No. petitioner had been dishonest about accepting money from DPAI. Thus. Act No. They gave Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in character. clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are manifest. which powers do not include the power to directly remove. more particularly. instrumentalities and agencies except members of Congress and the Judiciary (Ledesma v. Article XI of the Constitution. or censure a government official. He was likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions. since the purpose of the Constitution is to provide simply a framework within which to build the institution. dismissed the petition and affirmed the Ombudsman’s decision. fine. Act No. the public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct. the money which he demanded from the DPAI as monthly contribution. the Ombudsman’s power is merely to recommend the action to the officer concerned.Court of Appeals. Act No. In his petition for review on certiorari. suspend. suspend. According to him. an employee of the DPAI. Since there was no pending transaction between the PPA and the DPAI. the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. Issue No. or censure erring officials is constitutional Rep. on February 12.2: Whether or not the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove. Even if he was authorized to assist in the collection of money due the agency. Patently. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. The Court of Appeals. demote. arguing that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to spell out. Rep. Estarija did not deny that he went to the DPAI office to collect. Estarija is liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct. unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. Court of Appeals) . each act which the Ombudsman may or may not do. in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and conduct investigations. Issue No. 2003. And when the elements of corruption. Estarija contends that he can not be liable for grave misconduct because he did not commit extortion as he was merely prodded by Adrian Cagata. Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. he had no reason to go to the latter’s office to collect any money. to receive the money and that it makes no sense why he would extort money in consideration of the issuance of berthing permits since the signing of berthing permits is only ministerial on his part. In passing Rep. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action. 6770. He also maintains that Rep. but he did not do so. he should have issued an official receipt for the transaction. restrictively. the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with the power to punish for contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants. and that he actually received.

Issue: . and the months beginning January up to September 1990. we hold that under Republic Act No. but allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Maceda v. 1951 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences. except members of Congress. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary. Sections 15. April. seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18. Vasquez G. J. Through the enactment of Rep. and (2) the Order dated November 22. On the other hand. 102781. or for a total of seventeen (17) months. Thus. Article XI of the 1987Constitution. 6770 are constitutionally sound. respondent Napoleon A. In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18. the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and employees. Abiera of the Public Attorney’s Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6. Act No. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February. July and August. 1989. 3. petitioner contends that he had been granted by the Supreme Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases. 1998. No. April 22.” when in truth and in fact. 21. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. 6770. May. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution. par.R. 1993.The Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13. 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner. Facts: Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. by certifying “that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31. Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique. all in 1989. and the Judiciary. specifically Section 15. Nocon. 22 and 25 of Republic Act No. June.

The Ombudsman cannot compel the Supreme Court. and assuming that it can. . In fine. as the Supreme Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter. it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws. section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. Article VIII. as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court Held: In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Supreme Court with regard to his certificates of service. the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. By virtue of this power. from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. to submit its records. in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus. No other branch of government may intrude into this power. as one of the three branches of government.whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge’s certification submitted to the Supreme Court. and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties. the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner’s certificates of service to the Supreme Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load.

involves an administrative matter. Facts: On May 23. it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge.Caoibes vs. referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. Article VIII of the Constitution. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it. Alumbres alleged that on May 20. filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. 1997. rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable. petitioner blurted "Tarantado ito ah. Ombudsman Under Section 6. a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries. . He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner. that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking. Las Pinas City. or court employee. and assault upon a person in authority. Alumbres. he requested petitioner Judge Caoibes (Presiding Judge of RTC 253) to return the executive table he borrowed from respondent. respondent Florentino M. malicious mischief for the destruction of complainant’s eyeglasses. Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City." andboxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away. 1997. at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice.

are under its exclusive supervision and control. or court employee. On June 25. and refer the same to the SC which is already investigating the case. The Ombudsman cannot dictate to. It likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 1997. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit. 1997." praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case. Issue: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case pending resolution of the administrative case Held: It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. On August 22. Vasquez. 6770. he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court. For. referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. and bind the Court. 1997. the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counteraffidavit within 10 days from receipt thereof. To do so is to deprive the Court of the . has the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who. petitioner filed on an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. not the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent Judge lodged an administrative case with the SC praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer using the same facts as above. Prescinding from this premise. Petitioner contended that the SC. Under Section 6. the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the SC stating that under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. it is within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges.On June 13. aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it. involves an administrative matter. the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns. both being members of the bench. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it. it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved. Article VIII of the Constitution. the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge. to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative implications.

132177. and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. Petitioner found that only acts of lasciviousness have been committed and filed a case under such. Prior to this. Provincial Prosecutor or Cebu. No other branch of government may intrude into this power. Petitioner was filed with an administrative complaint for grave misconduct. insubordination. The Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas then referred the matter to the Provincial Prosecutor and later to petitioner. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino M. as it does. She and the Provincial Prosecutor refused or failed to file a criminal charge of attempted rape against Municipal Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. . Ombudsman. without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. No. Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action. G. it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws. (Caoibes vs. However. WHEREFORE. gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime and a charge for indirect contempt.R. the Ombudsman Vasquex disapproved the recommendation and directed that the Mayor be charged in the RTC. on judicial independence. from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. This is a dangerous policy which impinges. a complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who found no prima facie evidence and recommended dismissal. Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. 2001) LASTIMOSA V VASQUEZ FACTS Petitioner is First Asst. They were also placed under 6 mos preventive suspension. the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED.exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. July 19.

ISSUES W/N the Ombudsman has authority to file an administrative case against the petitioners and preventively suspend them. In September 1. 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Ismael G. Atty. The office also has the power to punish for contempt under Rule 71. S3 of the Rules of Court. 2000 and in the Philippine Star in August 5. RULING YES. repeal or modify findings of their subordinates. 2000. Such supervision and control would mean that they can alter. vs. Atty. Rizalino T.The Ombudsman’s power to investigate and prosecute include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless if such were related to. or arise from. or connected with. The Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance under S31 fo RA 67701 .” These advertisements appeared in the July 5. Simbillo was charged for improper advertising and solicitation of legal services. Khan Jr. Ismael G. and further research showed that similar advertisements were published in the Manila Bulletin in August 2 and 6. Simbillo Facts: Simbillo advertised himself as an “Annulment of Marriage Specialist. he is subject to supervision and control of the Ombudsman. 2000. When a prosecutor is deputized. Atty. . Khan. filed by Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of Public Information Office. the performance of his official duty.

Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. 118141 September 5. PASCASIO FACTS: Florencio V. and therefore. 27 of the Rules of Court. and violated rules 2. while Dr. and again in October 5. 2001. however. Jr. Sec. G. husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda. Repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Six hours after the surgery. who was the surgeon.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibilty. and Rule 138. No. Simbillo professed repentance and beg for the Court’s indulgence. the NBI ruled that . 1997 GARCIA-RUEDA vs. petitioner requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body. and Rule 138. Consequently.R. underwent surgical operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. Rueda. Florencio died of complications of "unknown cause." according to officials of the UST Hospital.03 and 3. Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital.03 and 3. section 27 of the Rules of Court. suspended from the practice of Law for One year. Domingo Antonio. 2001. Rulings: Rizalino Simbillo was found to have violated Rules 2. this rings hollow as he again advertised his services in an issue of Buy and Sell Free Ads Newspaper in August 14. He was attended by Dr.Simbillo’s advertisement undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The case was initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. the NBI recommended that Dr. the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. what transpired was a confounding series of events which we shall try to disentangle." recommended that the case be re-raffled on the ground that Prosecutor Carisma was partial to the petitioner. Carisma. Thus. Arizala. The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Santos Sioson. 3019. Reyes from any wrongdoing. who had to inhibit himself because he was related to the counsel of one of the doctors. Aggrieved. However.Florencio's death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia. disqualified on motion of the petitioner since he disregarded prevailing laws and jurisprudence regarding preliminary investigation. 1994. allegedly in grave abuse of discretion. refusing to find that there exists probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R. Antonio be dismissed. Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence. a resolution which was approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G. who recommended that Dr. Pursuant to its findings. ISSUE: Whether or not expert testimony is necessary to prove the negligent act of the respondent. where a volte face occurred again with the endorsement that the complaint against Dr. Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero. the case was re-raffled to Prosecutor Norberto G. No. The case was then referred to Prosecutor Ramon O. petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to review the recommendations of the government prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same. Israel. on July 11. Eudoxia T. the In fine. Dimagiba. a corresponding information be filed against Dr. in the "interest of justice and peace of mind of the parties. Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman. and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. While the recommendation of Prosecutor Gualberto was pending. Reyes be included in the criminal information of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. 3019 3 against Prosecutors Guerrero. During the preliminary investigation. As a result. Macaraeg. questioning the findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba. Petitioner faults the Ombudsman for. the investigative "pingpong" continued when the case was again assigned to another prosecutor. Reyes be dismissed and instead.A. who resolved to exonerate Dr. Antonio. the case was transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R. Domingo Antonio and Dr. who issued a resolution recommending that only Dr. petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. however. Leono who was. Erlinda BalatbatReyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the City Prosecutor. Gualberto. . Pending the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration regarding Prosecutor Dimagiba's resolution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Reyes be held criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr.

Floresto Arizala and Dr. Section 1 of which provides: Sec. Jr. Nieto Salvador. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge. — Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof. a doctor in effect represents that. otherwise known as the "1993 Revised Rules on Appeals From Resolutions In Preliminary Investigations/Reinvestigations. . Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations. Further. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. dismiss outright the appeal on specified grounds. 223 states: "The Secretary of Justice may reverse. What May Be Appealed. it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. he will employ such training. 1. the Ombudsman acted within his power and authority in dismissing the complaint against the Prosecutors and this Court will not interfere with the same. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised. 223. having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field." On the other hand." In exercising his discretion under the circumstances. Petition is dismissed. 359. The better and more logical remedy under the circumstances would have been to appeal the resolution of the City Prosecutors dismissing the criminal complaint to the Secretary of Justice under the Department of Justice's Order No." as amended by Department Order No.RULING: In accepting a case. care and skill in the treatment of his patients. "He may motu proprio or on motion of the appellee. What action may the Secretary of Justice take on the appeal? Section 9 of Order No. affirm or modify the appealed resolution.

1998 elections for vice-mayoralty of Makati City. 1955 in San Francisco. Daza III. three candidates competed for the post: Eduardo B.MERCADO v. Mercado. California. Manzano. USA to Filipino parents) . Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was suspended due to a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril alleging that Manzano was an American citizen (he was born September 4. Ernesto S. and Gabriel V. MANZANO FACTS: On the May 11.

No. HELD: No .A. Under Philippine law. Manzano opposed the motion to intervene. Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati City. he has not lost his Filipino citizenship since he has not renounced it and has not taken an oath of allegiance to the USA. after the age of majority. he no longer had US citizenship. Manzano. WON he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice-mayor in Makati City. being born in the USA.The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. by being born to Filipino parents. 7160). On May 7. (d) Those with dual citizenship. 1998. which disqualifies him according to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. 1998. The motion was unresolved. by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the right of blood). 1995.” This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Manzano natural born Filipino citizen. obtained US citizenship by operation of the US constitution and laws under principle of jus soli (basis is place of birth). the COMELEC en banc (with 1 commissioner abstaining) reversed the Second Division’s ruling on the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and directing the proclamation of Manzano as winner. . registered himself as a voter and voted in the 1992. . and 1998 Philippine elections which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law.Yet. which declares as “disqualified from running for any elective local position: . But on August 31. saying: Manzano. Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and holds and American passport. the Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the grounds of his dual-citizenship. Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. ISSUE: WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so.

In Sec. a foreign country. No. and practiced his profession here. he made these statements under oath on March 27.” “I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected.5 Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship. 1998: “I am a Filipino citizen…Naturalborn”. such persons with dual citizenships have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. by some positive act. Hence. persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Section 40(d) and in R. 7854.A. or immigrant to . where a person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. it arises out of circumstances of birth or marriage. leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. 7160. it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes. Dual allegiance is a result of a person’s volition. together with the fact he has spent his life here.RATIO: The Court said that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. the concern was not with dual citizenship per se.A. effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen. . “I am not a permanent resident of. loyalty to two or more states. No. received his education here. Dual citizenship is involuntary. It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy. but with naturalized citizens who maintain allegiance to their countries of origin even after naturalization. Manzano’s oath of allegiance. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto…” The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship. and has taken part in past Philippine elections. the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.” Consequently. Section 20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance. In private respondent’s certificate of candidacy.

and Gabriel V. 1955 in San Francisco. Mercado. Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was suspended due to a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril alleging that Manzano was an American citizen (he was born September 4. Ernesto S. 1998 elections for vice-mayoralty of Makati City. MANZANO FACTS: On the May 11. USA to Filipino parents) .MERCADO v. Manzano. California. three candidates competed for the post: Eduardo B.

registered himself as a voter and voted in the 1992. ISSUE: WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so. obtained US citizenship by operation of the US constitution and laws under principle of jus soli (basis is place of birth). (d) Those with dual citizenship. by being born to Filipino parents. he has not lost his Filipino citizenship since he has not renounced it and has not taken an oath of allegiance to the USA. being born in the USA. the Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the grounds of his dual-citizenship. 7160). WON he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice-mayor in Makati City. 1995.Yet. Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati City. 1998. he no longer had US citizenship. Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and holds and American passport. Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.A.” This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. Manzano natural born Filipino citizen. . the COMELEC en banc (with 1 commissioner abstaining) reversed the Second Division’s ruling on the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and directing the proclamation of Manzano as winner. Manzano opposed the motion to intervene. On May 7. But on August 31. and 1998 Philippine elections which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law. after the age of majority.The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. The motion was unresolved. . No. Manzano. saying: Manzano. Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. which declares as “disqualified from running for any elective local position: . by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the right of blood). 1998. HELD: No . which disqualifies him according to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

but with naturalized citizens who maintain allegiance to their countries of origin even after naturalization.A.RATIO: The Court said that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. it arises out of circumstances of birth or marriage. In private respondent’s certificate of candidacy. or immigrant to . persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. where a person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. No. Manzano’s oath of allegiance. . In Sec.” Consequently. by some positive act. 7854. it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes. the phrase “dual citizenship” in R. Dual citizenship is involuntary. Dual allegiance is a result of a person’s volition. loyalty to two or more states. effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen. the concern was not with dual citizenship per se. “I am not a permanent resident of. Hence. 1998: “I am a Filipino citizen…Naturalborn”.” “I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. a foreign country. he made these statements under oath on March 27. No. received his education here.5 Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship. and has taken part in past Philippine elections. such persons with dual citizenships have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy. leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto…” The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship. Section 20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance. and practiced his profession here. together with the fact he has spent his life here. 7160. Section 40(d) and in R.A.

1999] FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11. 1998 elections. 135083.R. May 26. .Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G. No.

By electing Philippine citizenship. 7160 Sec. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992. for candidates with dual citizenship. The determination whether such . upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. It may be that. Unlike those with dual allegiance. The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position. loyalty to two or more states. his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc. ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. The former arises when. Article IV Sec. 1995 and 1998. they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. 7854 Sec. it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. by some positive act. as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states. When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31. From the facts presented. such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. 40 (d) and R. who must. Dual allegiance on the other hand. from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws. Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. While dual citizenship is involuntary. RULING: The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.Based on the results of the election. Thus the present petition. refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes. a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 1998. be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status. the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.A. therefore. it should suffice if. That is of no moment.A. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." Consequently. However. However.

that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country. there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. . In Yu v. effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship. Defensor-Santiago. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that. after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen. and taken part in past elections in this country. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. private respondent has. in electing Philippine citizenship. private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines.renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen. The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. received his education. renounces his foreign nationality. but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. Should he betray that trust. On the other hand. as far as the laws of this country are concerned. when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who. practiced his profession as an artist. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

68. hence. On the back of the card. the green card that was subsequently issued by the US Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN." Miguel's answer was. was sought by Mateo Caasi on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a green card holder. so state). but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. "Permanently. 1988. In the"Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before hisdeparture for the United States in 1984. Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18. 1987 for the ratification of the1987 Constitution and the congressional elections on May 18. His disqualification. 48 provides: Sec. the upper . Held: Yes. It held that the possession of a green card by the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code. unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card. a permanent resident of the USA and not of Bolinao.Caasi v Ca Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U. Miguel's answer to Question No. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status areconclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the United States. Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of the United States such that it would disqualify him to run for any elective local position. He argued that he obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. including the plebiscite on February 2. however. Sec.S. 1987. After hearing. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao. the Comelec dismissed the petition. Pangasinan and that he voted in all previous elections." On its face. Disqualifications .

Issue: Whether Miguel. did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. 1988. Hence. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. 1988. he was "disqualified to run for any elective office. Miguel admits that he holds a green card." Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U. ." Therefore. the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office.portion. therefore. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines. his election was null and void. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as hisapplication for it. We. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18. which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States. Without such prior waiver. hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.S. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.” Despite his vigorous disclaimer. Held: Yes.S. 1988 local elections. He entered the US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. the following information is printed: “Alien Registration Receipt Card. Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18. waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States Held: No.S. his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines. by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18. He did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there.

● Section 18." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here. they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof. 1988. (G. 1990) .Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of thequalifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess. 88831 November 8. Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18.R. No. not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao. the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. ● In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion. Pangasinan.

the aggrieved party. paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3. and Juanito Ordoveza. Asset Privatization Trust. dated 15 July 1993. is a special law. Marcos. the PCGG consultant detailed with the COMMITTEE. and if the same be not known at the time. creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. Development Bank of the Philippines. such as the complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968. Inc. the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the “beneficiaries of the loans. R. 3019. as alleged. Department of Justice. which provides. with the Chairman of the PCGG as Chairman. the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman.PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE vs DESIERTO. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because. i. The so-called imprescriptibility as provided in Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Government Corporate Counsel. In its FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON BEHEST LOANS to President Ramos. as amended. and not to criminal cases. Fernando C. On 2 March 1996. Ordoveza. Osias. otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. Philippine National Bank. it was well-nigh impossible for the State.R. ISSUE: Does the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth apply to both civil and criminal cases? RULING: No. and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who approved the loans for violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. filed with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint against the Directors of PSI namely. the COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine Seeds. (hereafter PSI) of which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were the Directors. Department of Finance. Since the law alleged to have been violated. Jose Z.e. the COMMITTEE through Orlando O. No.. No. from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. President Fidel V.A. and one representative each from the Office of the Executive Secretary. was one of the twentyone corporations which obtained behest loans. 130140. 1999) FACTS: On 8 October 1992.” Thus. “Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law. as amended. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No.. October 25. to have known the violations of R.” In the present case. This is clear from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. Eduardo V. and the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation as members. Pacifico E.A. 528 SCRA 9 (G. 3326. Romualdez. 3019. 13. Salvador. No. the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from .

AO No. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine.the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission. exercised through the Ombudsman Prosecutors. Not being penal laws. in the exercise of his discretion. or those that define crimes. DESIERTO (CONSTITUTIONAL. except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. ADMINISTRATIVE) An EX POST FACTO law has been defined as one: which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal. the following elements must be established: . which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only. and punishes such action. and the authority to determine the presence or absence of probable cause. It merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans and provides the frame of reference in determining the existence of behest loans. or which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled. but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when exercised was lawful. treat of their nature. 13 does not mete out a penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. and provide for their punishment. which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. Penal laws are acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts ad establish penalties for their violations. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. Art 12 PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC V. such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal. or a proclamation of amnesty. As a rule. which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed. courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman's investigatory power. whether probable cause exists and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. For one to have violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019. AO No 13 and Memo Order No. The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of penal laws.

evident bad faith. in the discharge of his functions. On the other hand. while the negligent deed should be both gross and inexcusable. he must have acted with manifest partiality. in the first place. . It is required that the act constitutive of bad faith or partiality must. or inexcusable negligence. there must be a showing that private respondents entered into a grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government. to be listed under Section 3(g). mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law. be evident or manifest. Further. including the government or given any private party unwarranted benefits. advantage. judicial. it is necessary to show that any or all of these modalities resulted in undue injury to a specified party. or official functions.the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative. Evidently. or preference. Petitioner did not satisfy either criterion. and he must have caused undue injury to any party.