71 Phil. 140 (1940)


This was originally an action commenced by the plaintiff (respondent)
against the defendant (petitioner) for the purpose of enforcing a contract
entered into on August 9, 1903, by virtue of which the defendant undertook
to pay to the plaintiff a certain debt which his deceased mother had incurred
from the deceased parents of the said plaintiff more than eighteen years
ago. It is submitted that this debt had already prescribed.
Whether or not this action will prosper, considering that the debt incurred by
the defendant's mother had already prescribed.
RATIO: his action is based on the original obligation contracted by the mother
of the defendant, who has already prescribed,but in which the defendant
contracted the August 9, 1930 (Exhibito B) by assuming thefulfillment of that
obligation, as prescribed. Being the only defendant in the original
herderodebtor eligible successor into his inheritance, that debt brought by
his mother in law,although it lost its effectiveness by prescription, is now,
however, for a moral obligation,that is consideration enough to create and
make effective and enforceable obligationvoluntarily contracted its August 9,
1930 in Exhibito B.The rule that a new promise to pay a debt prrescrita must
be made by the same personobligated or otherwise legally authorized by it,
is not applicable to the present case is notrequired in compliance with the
mandatory obligation orignalmente but which would give itvoluntarily
assumed this obligation.It confirms the judgment appealed from, with costs
against the appellant. IT IS SOORDERED.


On July 25, 1956, Primitivo Ansay et al filed against the Board of Directors of
the National Development Company in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955.
Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint
because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law
as a natural obligation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Christmas bonus is demandable.
HELD: No, it is not demandable.
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural.
"Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural
obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law,
do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after
voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has
been delivered or rendered by reason thereof".
It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be
cognizable by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly
retention can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary
performance. But here there has been no voluntary performance. In fact, the
court cannot order the performance.
At this point, we would like to reiterate what we said in the case of Philippine
Education Co. vs. CIR and the Union of Philippine Education Co., Employees
(NUL) (92 Phil., 381; 48 Off. Gaz., 5278) —



From the legal point of view a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable
obligation. It is so when it is made a part of the wage or salary
And while it is true that the subsequent case of H. E. Heacock vs. National
Labor Union, et al., 95 Phil., 553; 50 Off. Gaz., 4253, we stated that:
Even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary or
compensation of an employee, the same may nevertheless, be granted on
equitable consideration as when it was given in the past, though withheld in
succeeding two years from low salaried employees due to salary increases.

still the facts in said Heacock case are not the same as in the instant one,
and hence the ruling applied in said case cannot be considered in the
present action.
Premises considered, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

GANCAYCO. L-48889 May 11. The lower court ruled in favor of the creditor. 1989 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (DBP). agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage. However. Article 1112 of Civil Code provides: Art. said respondent thereby effectively and expressly renounced and waived his right to the prescription of the action covering the first promissory note.R.G. 1112. This Court had ruled in a similar case that – . it remained unpaid. J. Judge of the Second Branch of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and SPOUSES PATRICIO CONFESOR and JOVITA VILLAFUERTE. The appellate court reversed the trial court. ADIL. ISSUE: WON the act of acknowledging the loan after it has prescribed has the force and effect of reviving the enforceability of the said obligation? YES RATIO: The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. The husband then acknowledged said loan via a promissory note in 1961. respondents. Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from acts which imply the abandonment of the right acquired. The creditor filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. petitioner. 1961 whereby he promised to pay the amount covered by the previous promissory note on or before June 15. but not the right to prescribe in the future. when respondent Confesor executed the second promissory note on April 11. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already obtained. Due to their failure to pay the said loan. and upon failure to do so. FACTS: Spouses obtained a loan in 1940. THE HONORABLE MIDPAINTAO L. vs. No. 1940. 1961.: NATURE: The present case is a petition for review on certiorari. Even after the lapse of 10 years. the creditor bank filed a collection suit in 1970. There is no doubt that prescription has set in as to the first promissory note of February 10.

which is to be regarded as reanimating the old promise. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt. either made in express terms or deduced from an acknowledgement as a legal implication. A new express promise to pay a debt barred .. there is something more than a mere moral obligation to support a promise. when a debt is already barred by prescription. will take the case from the operation of the statute of limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the remedy and does not discharge the debt. or as imparting vitality to the remedy (which by lapse of time had become extinct) and thus enabling the creditor to recover upon his original contract. But a new contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable . 3 .. to wit a – pre-existing debt which is a sufficient consideration for the new the new promise.. ... it cannot be enforced by the creditor.... 1 Thus. The consideration of the new promissory note is the pre-existing obligation under the first promissory note. it has been held — Where. It is this new promise. a party acknowledges the correctness of a debt and promises to pay it after the same has prescribed and with full knowledge of the prescription he thereby waives the benefit of prescription. therefore. in fact. a new cause of action. . upon this sufficient consideration constitutes.. 2 This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a new promise to pay the debt.

as in fact. Inc. M. but also . a compromise agreement entered into on March 16. L-23749 April 29. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging the following: 1) Failure to state a cause of action. Q-7751. plaintiff-appellant. Inc. 1964 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. defendantsappellees. dismissing the complaint of appellant Cruz for the recovery of improvements he has made on appellees' land and to compel appellees to convey to him 3. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging two causes of action 1) Reimbursement for improvements he made on the land of Deudors in which defendant was benefited. notwithstanding his having performed his services.. vs.. J.G. (a part of the 20 quinones above) which said defendants had promised to do "within ten years from and after date of signing of the compromise agreement". INC.. Q-135. and (3) the action of the plaintiff has already prescribed. that the Statute of Frauds cannot be invoked by defendants.000 square meters of land occupied by him. not only because Article 1403 of the Civil Code refers only to "sale of real property or of an interest therein" and not to promises to convey real property like the one supposedly promised by defendants to him. (2) the cause of action of plaintiff is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.000 square meters of land on three grounds: (1) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Tuason & Co. unjust enrichment not applicable 2) The compromise agreement is unenforceable 3) The action has already prescribed Plaintiff opposed the motion. insisting that Article 2142 of the applicable to his case.R. BARREDO. INC. TUASON & COMPANY.: NATURE: APPEAL from CFI dismissing complaint Appeal from the order dated August 13. Faustino Cruz vs. the latter have refused to convey to him the 3. and Gregorio Araneta. J. No.M.. 2) Compensation for plaintiff’s services as an intermediary with the Deudors to work for the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. 1977 FAUSTINO CRUZ. J. as consideration for his services. 1963 between the Deudors and the defendants was approved by the court.. and GREGORIO ARANETA.

the plaintiff is seeking to enforce the supposed agreement entered into between him and the defendants in 1952. The allegation in par. ten years after March 16. Under the provisions of See. 1964. sometime in 1952. the Court is of the opinion that the same is well-founded. par. Furthermore. states no cause of action. ISSUE: WON the statute of frauds is applicable to cases which are not included in the enumeration set forth in Article 1403 of the civil code? NO . 12 of the complaint states that the defendants promised and agreed to cede. The trial court’s ruling: On the issue that the complaint insofar as it claims the reimbursement for the services rendered and expenses incurred by the plaintiff.000 square meters of land in consideration of certain services to be rendered then. 1953 and approved by Court on April 11. It is alleged in par. Hence this present appeal. Q-135 and allied cases. 1964. On the issue of statute of fraud. 1963. the date of the approval of the compromise agreement. transfer and convey unto the plaintiff the 3. that is. the same should have been made in good faith and under the mistake as to the title. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. 13 and 14 of the complaint alleged that the plaintiff acted as emissary of both parties in conveying their respective proposals and couter-proposals until the final settlement was effected on March 16. the plaintiff has already performed his part of the agreement. On the issue of statute of limitations. and that his action has not prescribed for the reason that defendants had ten years to comply and only after the said ten years did his cause of action accrue. such agreement is not enforceable as it is not in writing and subscribed by the party charged. it is clear that the alleged agreement involves an interest in real property. hence the agreement has already been partly executed and not merely executory within the contemplation of the Statute. Furthermore in order that the alleged improvement may be considered a lien or charge on the property. the Court believes that same is applicable to the instant case. he. the defendants approached the plaintiff to prevail upon the Deudors to enter to a compromise agreement in Civil Case No.because. It is found that the defendants are not parties to the supposed express contract entered into by and between the plaintiff and the Deudors for the clearing and improvement of the 50 quinones. 11 of the complaint that. and his complaint was filed on January 24. In the present action. the Court holds that the plaintiff's action has prescribed. 2(e) of Article 1403 of the Civil Code. 1953. which was instituted on January 24. which was already prescribed.

or some note or memorandum thereof. evidence.WON the principle of unjust enrichment has application when the claim is based on a contract between the claimant and the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant? none RATIO: We agree with appellant that the Statute of Frauds was erroneously applied by the trial court. what appellant is trying to enforce is the delivery to him of 3. (3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract. (2) Those do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. or miscarriage of another. or the evidences. (Art. of the amount and kind of property sold. chattels or things in action. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action. or who has acted beyond his powers. default. other than a mutual promise to marry. terms of sale. at the time of the sale. but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book. or some of them of such things in action. names of the purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made. and subscribed by the party charged. It is elementary that the Statute refers to specific kinds of transactions and that it cannot apply to any that is not enumerated therein.) In the instant case. be in writing. price. it is a sufficient memorandum: (e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year. of the agreement cannot be received without the writing. 1403. (b) A special promise to answer for the debt. therefore. And the only agreements or contracts covered thereby are the following: (1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation.000 square meters of land which he claims defendants promised to do in consideration of his services as mediator or intermediary in effecting a . unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels. (d) An agreement for the sale of goods. civil Code. or a secondary evidence of its contents: (a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof. unless the same. at a price not less than five hundred pesos. or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein: (f) a representation as to the credit of a third person. or pay at the time some part of the purchase money. (c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage. or by his agent.

1961. Tuason & Co. We have declared the same rescinded and of no effect. however. In other words. We cannot. We repeated this observation in J. as pointed out by appellees. Thus. the agreement in question has already been partially consummated. 1963. Civil Case No. In no sense may such alleged contract be considered as being a "sale of real property or of any interest therein. Teodosio Macalindong. on Article 2142 of Civil Code is misplaced. vs. promulgated on May 30. escape taking judicial notice. not to mention the undisputed fact that. on March 16. 6 SCRA 938. Tuason & Co. upon which Sanvictores predicates his right to buy the lot he occupies. voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. in fact. as recognized by this Court in its decision in G. As regards appellant's third assignment of error. considering that the compromise agreement that he invokes did not actually materialize and defendants have not benefited therefrom. We hold that the allegations in his complaint do not sufficiently Appellants' reliance. Tuason. Inc. and is no longer merely executory.R. a compromise agreement between these parties was approved by the court. the Court held: It is also worthy of note that the compromise between Deudors and Tuason. No. Moreover. appellant's complaint clearly alleges that he has already fulfilled his part of the bargains to induce the Deudors to amicably settle their differences with defendants as. Inc. Deudor vs. 4 SCRA 123. in relation to the compromise agreement relied upon by appellant. not all dealings involving interest in real property come under the Statute. L-13768..compromise of the civil action. We entertain grave doubts as to whether or not he can successfully maintain his alleged cause of action against defendants. Predicated on the principle that no one should be allowed to unjustly enrich . In J.M. vs. And it is likewise a fundamental principle governing the application of the Statute that the contract in dispute should be purely executory on the part of both parties thereto." Indeed. 135. it is obvious that a presumed qauasi-contract cannot emerge as against one party when the subject mater thereof is already covered by an existing contract with another party. has been validly rescinded and set aside. through his efforts. between the defendants and the Deudors. Said article provides: Certain lawful. viewed from what would be the ultimate conclusion of appellant's case. that in several cases We have decided.000 square meters via the judicial enforcement of the compromise agreement in which they were supposed to be reserved for him has already been repudiated by the courts. Bienvenido Sanvictores.. From the very language of this provision. M. appellant's other attempt to secure the same 3.

. VI." (Ambrosio Padilla. The reason why the law creates a juridical relations and imposes certain obligation is to prevent a situation where a person is able to benefit or take advantage of such lawful. It is unilateral. As one distinguished civilian puts it. Jose Duran. his cause of action should be against the latter. sold the property for P1. XXX WHEREFORE. because it arises from the sole will of the actor who is not previously bound by any reciprocal or bilateral agreement.) In the case at bar. executed before a notary a public instrument. "The act is voluntary. It is essential that the act by which the defendant is benefited must have been voluntary and unilateral on the part of the plaintiff. 1914 FACTS: On and before Februaru 14. No costs. seek relief against the party benefited. if there is any ground therefor. with Orense’s knowledge and consent. in the sense contemplated in Article 2142. Engracio Orense had been the owner of a parcel of land in Guinobatan. GUTIERREZ HERMANOS vs ORENSE G. 748. p. a nephew of Orense.himself at the expense of another. since appellant has a clearer and more direct recourse against the Deudors with whom he had entered into an agreement regarding the improvements and expenditures made by him on the land of appellees. 1969 ed. Civil Law. the appeal of Faustino Cruz in this case is dismissed.R. Article 2124 creates the legal fiction of a quasi-contract precisely because of the absence of any actual agreement between the parties concerned. 9188 December 4. 1907. it Cannot be said. The said public instrument contained a provision giving Duran the right to repurchase it for the same price within a period of four years from the date of the said instrument. because the actor in quasi-contracts is not bound by any pre-existing obligation to act. Corollarily. No.500 to Gutierrez Hermanos. On February 14. Vol. who in turn may. Albay. 1907. that appellees have been enriched at the expense of appellant. voluntary and unilateral acts at the expense of said actor. if the one who claims having enriched somebody has done so pursuant to a contract with a third party.

Orense was presented as witness of the defense. The principal must therefore fulfill all the obligations contracted by the agent. authority to convey the land. power of agency upon his nephew Duran.) Even should it be held that the said consent was granted subsequently to the sale. and Orense'r ratification produced the effect of an express authorization to make the said sale. (Civil Code. it follows that the defendant conferred verbal. it is unquestionable that the defendant. arts. 1710 and 1727. Gutierrez asked Orense to deliver the property to the company and to pay rentals for the use of the property. (Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Orense is bound by Duran’s act of selling the former’s property HELD: It having been proven at the trial that he gave his consent to the said sale. . or at least implied. who acted within the scope of his authority. During trial. 1888 and 1892.Orense continued occupying the land by virtue of a contract of lease. arts. He claimed that the sale was void because it was done without his authority and that he did not authorize his nephew to enter into such contract. 1709. Duran was acquitted of criminal charges and the company demanded that Orense execute the proper deed of conveyance of the property. who accepted it in the same way by selling the said property. Because of such testimony. Duran. approved the action of his nephew. Orense refused to do so. He states that the sale was done with his knowledge and consent. it was ascertained that he did give his nephew.) Article 1259 of the Civil Code prescribes: "No one can contract in the name of another without being authorized by him or without his legal representation according to law. who in this case acted as the manager of his uncle's business. After the lapse of four years. the owner of the property.

The contract of sale of the said property contained in the notarial instrument of February 14. If the defendant Orense acknowledged and admitted under oath that he had consented to Jose Duran's selling the property in litigation to Gutierrez Hermanos. it is not just nor is it permissible for him afterward to deny that admission. expressive of his consent to the sale of his property. null and void under the provisions of paragraph 5 of section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The sale of the said property made by Duran to Gutierrez Hermanos was indeed null and void in the beginning. and which testimony wiped out the deception that in the beginning appeared to have been practiced by the said Duran. who gave P1. pursuant to article 1309 of the Code. Jose Duran. the latter was acquitted. it is unquestionable that the defendant did confirm the said contract of sale and consent to its execution.A contract executed in the name of another by one who has neither his authorization nor legal representation shall be void. Moreover. The sworn statement made by the defendant. and. On the testimony given by Engacio Orense at the trial of Duran for estafa.500 for the said property. the plaintiff would have been the victim of estafa. remedies all defects which the contract may have contained from the moment of its execution. . which determined the acquittal of his nephew. 1907. Duran. but afterwards became perfectly valid and cured of the defect of nullity it bore at its execution by the confirmation solemnly made by the said owner upon his stating under oath to the judge that he himself consented to his nephew Jose Duran's making the said sale. to the prejudice of the purchaser. who then acted as his business manager. pursuant to article 1313 of the Civil Code. for. had it not been for the consent admitted by the defendant Orense. and. the right of action for nullification that could have been brought became legally extinguished from the moment the contract was validly confirmed and ratified. while testifying as a witness at the trial of Duran for estafa. Orense. and it would not be just that the said testimony. virtually confirms and ratifies the sale of his property effected by his nephew. is alleged to be invalid. in the present case. unless it should be ratified by the person in whose name it was executed before being revoked by the other contracting party. should not now serve in passing upon the conduct of Engracio Orense in relation to the firm of Gutierrez Hermanos in order to prove his consent to the sale of his property.

20 Phil. and. they produce the effects of an express power of agency. Araneta and Guanko. Rep. The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed.. so it should be affirmed. Such consent was proven in a criminal action by the sworn testimony of the principal and presented in this civil suit by other sworn testimony of the same principal and by other evidence to which the defendant made no objection. 22 Phil. 15 Phil. . Gallemit vs. as they are a full ratification of the acts executed by his nephew Jose Duran. Rep. The judgment appealed from in harmony with the law and the merits of the case. Kuenzle & Streiff vs. and the errors assigned thereto have been duly refuted by the foregoing considerations. meet the requirements of the law and legally excuse the lack of written authority. 387. 110. but the record discloses satisfactory and conclusive proof that the defendant Orense gave his consent to the contract of sale executed in a public instrument by his nephew Jose Duran. Therefore the principal is bound to abide by the consequences of his agency as though it had actually been given in writing (Conlu vs...because the authority which Orense may have given to Duran to make the said contract of sale is not shown to have been in writing and signed by Orense. with the costs against the appellant. Rep. Tabiliran. 241. wherein he affirmed that he had given his consent to the sale of his property.) The repeated and successive statements made by the defendant Orense in two actions. Jiongco.

Josefa. 6 There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense. 5 While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety. First with Bernabe Adille. that did not make him the owner of all of it. ISSUE: Whether or not a co-owner may acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common. Under the Civil Code: . Domingo. She was married twice in her life time. Second with Procopio Asejo. it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Article 1613 of the present Code. and Santiago.Adille vs CA Facts: Felisa Alzul owned a certain property in Albay. representing himself as the only heir and child of Felisa. YES RATIO: The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share alone. Rustico Adille. with whom she begot Emeteria. Rustico. In other words. NO Whether or nor Rustico had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor. repurchased the said property and secured a title in his own name. it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption within the period required by law. giving the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of the entire property. with whom she begot a son. ISSUE: The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common? Essentially. His siblings then filed a case for partition on the basis that Rustico was only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed the property. Teodorica. shouldering the expenses therefor. She sold said property in pacto de retro to 3rd persons but she died before the redemption period expired. subject to his right to collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner.

Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. if there is one. The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of the private respondents. in which event. While his halfbrothers and sisters are. 7 But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his name terminate the existing co-ownership. The aforequoted provision therefore applies. ." the redemption by one coheir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. did so either on behalf of his co-heirs. The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.ART. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name. as we said. under Article 1613 of the Code. the person obtaining it is. he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under Article 2144 of the Civil Code. in taking over the property. liable to him for reimbursement as and for their shares in redemption expenses. 1456. 488. While a vendee a retro. It operates as a mere notice of existing title. The petitioner's pretension that he was the sole heir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he executed preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a clear effort on his part to defraud his brothers and sisters and to exercise sole dominion over the property. "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption. by force of law. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a coownership. The Civil Code states: ART. It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner. he cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in common. that is. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud. We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the registration of the property. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes.

of course. in which case. He cannot therefore be said to have "made known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership. Moreover. Emeteria Asejo. the property was registered in 1955 by the petitioner. the result would be the same whether it is one or the other. 10 but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not . Prescription. The petitioner would remain liable to the Private respondents. It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title. yet. (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners. and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. We are not convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership. As a matter of fact. as the respondent Court itself affirms. on the contrary. he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. and only after the private respondents had first sought judicial relief. 8 In the case at bar. must have been preceded by repudiation (of the coownership). The act of repudiation. he is guilty of fraud. is occupying a portion of the land up to the present. In any case. Has prescription then. He cannot therefore be said to have assume the mere management of the property abandoned by his co-heirs. the private respondents being the beneficiaries. set in? We hold in the negative. continuous. as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership. the situation Article 2144 of the Code contemplates. 9 The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites. the party in possession acquires title to the property and the state of co-ownership is ended . points to the second alternative the petitioner having asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the property and having acted in fraud of his co-heirs. The evidence. in turn is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership. and (4) he has been in possession through open. solely in his name. one of the private respondents. under the Article 1456. he sought to recover possession of that portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim. This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that prescription bars any demand on property (owned in common) held by another (coowner) following the required number of years.or for his exclusive benefit. his co-heirs. (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive. the petitioner has not taken pains to eject her therefrom. while the claim of the private respondents was presented in 1974. In that event. and must act as trustee. exclusive.

the petitioner never raised that defense. No pronouncement as to costs. prescription is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer otherwise it is deemed waived. are not prepared to count the period from such a date in this case. 15 According to the respondent Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE.furnish a shield for fraud. the petition is DENIED. assuming there was one." 14 Accordingly. we cannot dismiss the private respondents' claims commenced in 1974 over the estate registered in 1955. notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title. they "came to know [of it] apparently only during the progress of the litigation. but the petitioner has not shown why they apply. prescription is not a bar. we hold that the right of the private respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered the petitioner's act of defraudation. The Decision sought to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Moreover. and as a rule. We note the petitioner's sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is "the only heir and child of his mother Feliza with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name also." 16 Hence. 12 reckoned from the date of the registration of the property. . there being no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals. 17 and here. 11 It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation. 13 we. While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years. For the same reason. as we said. SO ORDERED. 18 There are recognized exceptions to this rule.

324.R.000 remittance it had delivered to petitioner . After Mantrust effected the transfer. 82670 SEPTEMBER 15.” On August 28. unaware that petitioner had already received the remittance. informed private respondent and amended its instruction y asking it to effect the payment to Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) instead of PNB. Facets informed FNSB about the situation.000. using the business name “Irene’s Wearing Apparel” was engaged in the manufacture of ladies garments. FNSB instructed Manufacturers Hanover and Trust Corporation (Mantrust) to effect the transfer by charging the amount to the account of FNSB with private respondent. Private respondent. men’s apparel and linens for local and foreign buyers. Private respondent asked petitioner to return the second remittance of $10. petitioner received the remittance of $10. instructed PCIB to pay $10. Facts. FNSB discovered that private respondent had made a duplication of remittance. NO.” Private respondent sent PNB another telex stating that the payment was to be made to “Irene’s Wearing Apparel. also unaware that petitioner had already received the remittance. Manila branch.ANDRES VS MANTRUST G. Cruz. Sometime in August 1980. the payment was not effected immediately because the payee designated in the telex was only “Wearing Apparel. Among its foreign buyers was Facts of the United States. Hence.000 to petitioner. children’s wear.000 which was charged again to the account of Facets with FNSB. petitioner received another $10. 1980.000 to Irene’s Wearing Apparel via Philippine National Bank (PNB) Sta. Facts instructed the First National State Bank (FNSB) of New Jersey to transfer $10. 1989 FACTS: Andres. ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent has the right to recover the second $10. After learning about the delay.000 but the latter refused to do so contending that the doctrine of solution indebiti does not apply because there was negligence on the part of the respondents and that they were not unjustly enriched since Facets still has a balance of $49.

000. 2154 of the New Civil Code which provides that: Art. petitioner has no right to apply the second $10. as regards the sale of garments and other textile products.324. On the other hand.000.00. it is argued that petitioner had the right to demand and therefore to retain the second $10. 558.00 remittances are credited to petitioner's receivables from FACETS. petitioner was not thereby unjustly enriched. There being no contractual relation between them. However. Petitioner. (2) that payment was made by reason of an essential mistake of fact" [City of Cebu v.00 remittance. The contract of petitioner. it is argued that the last $10.00 remittance being in payment of a pre-existing debt. and it was unduly delivered through mistake. It is undisputed that private respondent delivered the second $10.00 remittance delivered by mistake by private respondent to the outstanding account of FACETS. The contention is without merit. does not apply because its requisites are absent. 2154.00 remittance. the contract for the transmittal of dollars from the United States to petitioner was entered into by private respondent with FNSB. petitioner contends that the doctrine of solutio indebiti. the latter allegedly still had a balance of $49. It was the latter and not private respondent which was indebted to petitioner. Hence. although named as the payee was not privy to the contract of remittance of dollars. First.000. Petitioner next contends that the payment by respondent bank of the second $10. 563 (1960)]. If something received when there is no right to demand it. and. XXX For this article to apply the following requisites must concur: "(1) that he who paid was not under obligation to do so. Neither was private respondent a party to the contract of sale between petitioner and FACETS. Piccio. was with FACETS.000.000. the obligation to return it arises. It is alleged that even after the two $10.00 remittance was not made by mistake but was the result of negligence of its employees.HELD: Yes. The resolution of this issue would hinge on the applicability of Art. 110 Phil.000. .

not negligence. five hundred and ten days had elapsed before private respondent demanded the return thereof. 1145 of the New Civil Code]. in her attempt to defeat private respondent's claim. petitioner makes much of the fact that from the time the second $ remittance was made. in the second remittance. WHEREFORE. X X X Finally. the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Needless to say.00 remittance well within the six years prescriptive period for actions based upon a quasi-contract [Art. It was evident by the fact that both remittances have the same reference invoice number.X X X There was a mistake. private respondent instituted the complaint for recovery of the second $10. .

NCC).PUYAT & SONS INC vs CITY OF MANILA G.This is manifest from the reply of appellant City Treasurer stating that sales of manufactured products at the factory site are not taxable either under the Wholesalers Ordinance or under the Retailers' Ordinance. it is exempt from the payment of taxes being a manufacturer of various kinds of furniture. Appelle categorically stated that the payment was not voluntarily made. that they . and it was unduly delivered through mistake. thru an error or mistake.. which places said act of payment within the pale of the new Civil Code provision on solutio indebiti. denied the said request for refund. at the very start. it would seem clear that the taxes collected from appellee were paid. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is obliged to refund the amount which the plaintiff paid HELD: Yes RATIO: Appellants do not dispute the fact that appellee-companyis exempted from the payment of the tax in question. the obligationto retun it arises" (Art.R. notwithstanding the Ordinance imposing the Retailer's Tax. The City Treasurer. had no right to demand payment thereof. L-17447 April 30. however. the defendant City Treasurer of Manila assessed from plaintiff retail dealer’s tax the sales of furniture manufactured and sold by it and its factory site.but on the erronoues belief. All assessments were paid by plaintiff without protest in the erroneous belief that it was liable thereof not knowing that pursuant to an ordinance. After learning about the ordinance. (a fact found also by the lower court). No. plaintiff filed with defendant City Treasurer of Manila a formal request for refund of the retail dealer’s taxes unduly paid. "If something is received when there is no right to demand it. With this admission. 1963 FACTS: Plaintiff Gonzalo Puyat & Sons Inc is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling all kinds of furniture.. The appellant City of Manila. 2154. Acting pursuant to an ordinance.

were due. Under this circumstance, the amount paid, even without protest is
recoverable. "If the payer was in doubt whether the debt was due, he may
recover if he proves that it was not due" (Art. 2156, NCC). Appellee had duly
proved that taxes were not lawfully due. There is, therefore, no doubt that
the provisions of solutio indebtiti, the new Civil Code, apply to the admitted
facts of the case..
With all, appellant quoted Manresa as saying: "x x x De la misma opinion son
el Sr. Sanchez Roman y el Sr. Galcon, et cual afirma que si la paga se hizo
por error de derecho, ni existe el cuasi-contrato ni esta obligado a la
restitucion el que cobro, aunque no se debiera lo que se pago" (Manresa,
Tomo 12, paginas 611-612). This opinion, however, has already lost its
persuasiveness, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code, recognizing "error
de derecho" as a basis for the quasi-contract, of solutio indebiti. .
"Payment by reason of a mistake in the contruction or application of a
doubtful or difficult question of law may come within the scope of the
preceding article" (Art. 21555)..
There is no gainsaying the fact that the payments made by appellee was due
to a mistake in the construction of a doubtful question of law. The reason
underlying similar provisions, as applied to illegal taxation, in the United
States, is expressed in the case of Newport v. Ringo, 37 Ky. 635, 636; 10 S.W.
2, in the following manner:.
"It is too well settled in this state to need the citation of authority that if
money be paid through a clear mistake of law or fact, essentially affecting
the rights of the parties, and which in law or conscience was not payable,
and should not be retained by the party receiving it, it may be recovered.
Both law and sound morality so dictate. Especially should this be the rule as
to illegal taxation. The taxpayer has no voice in the imposition of the burden.
He has the right to presume that the taxing power has been lawfully
exercised. He should not be required to know more than those in authority
over him, nor should he suffer loss by complying with what he bona fide
believe to be his duty as a good citizen. Upon the contrary, he should be
promoted to its ready performance by refunding to him any legal exaction
paid by him in ignorance of its illegality; and, certainly, in such a case, if be
subject to a penalty for nonpayment, his compliance under belief of its
legality, and without awaitinga resort to judicial proceedings should not be
regrded in law as so far voluntary as to affect his right of recovery.".

"Every person who through an act or performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal grounds, shall return the same to him"(Art. 22,
Civil Code). It would seems unedifying for the government, (here the City of
Manila), that knowing it has no right at all to collect or to receive money for
alleged taxes paid by mistake, it would be reluctant to return the same. No
one should enrich itself unjustly at the expense of another (Art. 2125, Civil
The decision appealed from is affirmed, in all other respects. No costs. .

G.R. No. 179337 April 30, 2008
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far
Eastern University when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security
guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Rosete was
brought to the police station where he explained that the shooting was
accidental. He was eventually released considering that no formal complaint
was filed against him.
Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy
Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted
by respondent FEU to provide security services within its premises and
Mariano D. Imperial (Galaxy’s President), to indemnify them for whatever
would be adjudged in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach of
student-school contract for a safe and secure environment and an
atmosphere conducive to learning.
WON FEU was not negligent and such shooting was tantamount to a caso
fortuito? NO, it was negligent and such is not a fortuitous case.
In Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals,13 we
held that:
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which
both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to
equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of
providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in
attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no

At the same time. On petitioner's part. no evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for the university was offered. however. it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the campus. On the other hand. Indeed. After a thorough review of the records. They failed to prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the requirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Necessarily. there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its students. As such.15 In the instant case. we find that. respondent FEU. prima facie.16 and that they complied with their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for their students by having exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy. when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises. however. Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the . we find that respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their students.student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. as a learning institution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education or a profession. there was created a contractual obligation between the two parties. the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify. In order to avoid liability. certain documents about Galaxy were presented during trial. he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of the school.14 It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law student in respondent FEU. respondents aver that the shooting incident was a fortuitous event because they could not have reasonably foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by Rosete as he was not their employee. a corresponding right of relief. It is settled that in culpa contractual.

Total reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure to check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents. psychiatric test results. A learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it hired. They cannot be construed as the element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete. Consequently. 2180 of the Civil Code because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One's negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another. the petition is GRANTED. XXX WHEREFORE. showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. 87050 nullifying the Decision of the trial court and dismissing the complaint as well as the August 23. It was not proven that they examined the clearances. The June 29. 201 files. neglect or failure to act . The . respondents' defense of force majeure must fail. respondents must show that no negligence or misconduct was committed that may have occasioned the loss. XXX On the issue of solidarity: We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents cannot be held liable for damages under Art. CV No.R. and other vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy.qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. 2007 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's participation whether by active intervention. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students. 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. nonetheless. In order for force majeure to be considered.the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a principal and a security agency.

298. c.000. Imperial are ORDERED to jointly and severally pay respondent FEU damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner. b. plus 6% interest per annum from the filing of the complaint until the finality of this Decision.000. SO ORDERED.00. the applicable rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum until its satisfaction. Branch 2. respondent FEU is also ORDERED to pay petitioner temperate damages in the amount of P20. 9889483 finding respondent FEU liable for damages for breach of its obligation to provide students with a safe and secure learning atmosphere.00. and attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P50.25. the award of exemplary damages is DELETED. Mariano D. . in Civil Case No.00. De Jesus is DISMISSED.000. The counterclaims of respondents are likewise DISMISSED. After this decision becomes final and executory. is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: a.Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) is ORDERED to pay petitioner actual damages in the amount of P35. The Complaint against respondent Edilberto C. Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy) and its president. moral damages in the amount of P100.

from the mere fact that plaintiff-appellee was the owner of the property and the defendant-appellant the occupant. the Alien Property Custodian of the United States of America took possession. reissuance of the title in favor of the plaintiff. rights. cancellation of the claims.R. interest of the Alien property Custodian. and intimidation. The trial court ordered defendant to pay the back rentals. and occupant National Coconut Corporation’s ejection from the property. When it vacated the property.SAGRADA ORDEN VS NACOCO G. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is obliged to pay rentals to the plaintiff HELD: No. so easily jumped to the . 1952 FACTS: The land in question belongs to plaintiff Sagrada Orden in whose name the title was registered before the war On January 4. control. it was occupied by defendant National Coconut Corporation The plaintiff made claim to the said property before the Alien Property Custodian. L-3756 JUNE 30. 1943. duress. and custody of the property pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act The property was occupied by the Copra Export Management Company under a custodian agreement with US Alien Property Custodian. the land was acquired by a Japanese corporation by the name of Taiwan Tekkosho After liberation on April 4. during the Japanese military occupation. which used for its own benefit but by the express permission of the Alien Property Custodian of the United States. 1946. Alien Property Custodian denied such claim It bought an action in court which resulted to the cancellation of the title issued in the name of Taiwan Tekkosho which was executed under threats. RATIO: We can not understand how the trial court. NO. title. Defendant contests the rental claims on the defense that it occupied the property in good faith and under no obligation to pay rentals. A right was also vested to the plaintiff to recover from the defendants rentals for its occupation of the land from the date it vacated.

Neither is it a trustee of the former owner. 189). the enemy owner. namley. 50 U. to the late of judgment on February 28. 50 U.C. 249. crime.S. to the exclusion of. The Allien Property Administration had the control and administration of the property not as successor to the interests of the enemy holder of the title. But there is another ground why the claim or rentals can not be made against defendant-appellant. 347. even if defendant-appellant were liable to the Allien Property Administration for rentals.A. its obligations.A. which preceded the defendant-appellant. as though it were the absolute owner. Chemical Foundation [C. (Youghioheny & Ohio Coal Co. The existence of an implied agreement to that effect is contrary to the circumstances. [2d]. the owner.A..C. because it entered the premises and occupied it with the permission of the entity which had the legal control and administration thereof. must arise from any of the four sources of obligations.. 40 Stat.. (Article 1089.. does not appear to have paid rentals therefor.W." and there is no provision therein for the payment of rentals or of any compensation for its . as it occupied it by what the parties denominated a "custodianship agreement.conclusion that the occupant is liable for the value of such use and occupation. in its own right. If defendant-appellant is liable at all. law. 282-283.. The copra Export Management Company. Atty. which had secured the possession of the property from the plaintiff-appellee by the use of duress. 1946. 1948. Allien Property Administration had the absolute control of the property as trustee of the Government of the United States. 1925]. contract or quasicontract. the Taiwan Tekkosho. There was no agreement between the Alien Property Custodian and the defendant-appellant for the latter to pay rentals on the property. Gen. There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between the Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho.S.) Therefore.S. vs. these would not accrue to the benefit of the plaintiff-appellee.) From August. Lasevich [1920]. 355.S vs. Del. Spanish Civil Code.C. 191. U. 50 U. in the possession and use of the property.C. but a trustee of then Government of the United States (32 Op.. (U. 5 F. 283). the plaintiff-appellee herein.A.S. 171 Wis. Neither was there any negligence on its part. with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise. but by express provision of law (Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States. 179 N. when defendant-appellant took possession. and against the claim or title of. but to the United States Government. the Allien Property Administration.) Defendantappellant is not guilty of any offense at all. 411. such that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee (defendant-appellant) may be held responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho.C. 283.A. or negligence.

In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. or any principle in quasi contracts or equity. because the Allien Property Administration was neither a trustee of plaintiff-appellee. (Resolution. Wherefore. So that the circumstances do not justify the finding that there was an implied agreement that the defendant-appellant was to pay for the use and occupation of the premises at all. it is only fair and just that it may not be held liable therefor. as defendant-appellant entered into possession without any expectation of liability for such use and occupation. On the contrary. Costs of this appeal shall be against the plaintiff-appellee. which sentences defendant-appellant to pay rentals from August. . hence. National Coconut Corporation vs. the same should accrue to it as a possessor in good faith. if no right to claim for rentals existed at the time of the reservation. nor a privy to the obligations of the Taiwan Tekkosho.) Lastly. the part of the judgment appealed from. is hereby reversed. it must have been also free from payment of rentals. 83 Phil. and steps where then being taken by the Philippine Government to secure the property for the National Coconut Corporation. the reservation of this action may not be considered as vesting a new right. to February 28.custody and or occupation and the use. The Trading with the Enemy Act. upon which the claim can be supported. its title being based by legal provision of the seizure of enemy property. We have also tried in vain to find a law or provision thereof. 1946. express or implied. was purely a measure of conversation. no rights can arise or accrue from such reservation alone. Geronimo. 1949. And as to the rents it collected from its lessee. or any contract. as this Court has already expressly held. When the National coconut Corporation succeeded the Copra Export Management Company in the possession and use of the property. The above considerations show that plaintiff-appellee's claim for rentals before it obtained the judgment annulling the sale of the Taiwan Tekkosho may not be predicated on any negligence or offense of the defendantappellant. as originally enacted. especially as it was Government corporation. 467. it is very unlikely that rentals were demanded for the use of the property.

vandalism.000.. consent. which limits defendant's liability for the amount of loss or damage to any property of plaintiff to "P1. 1973 FACTS: People’s Car entered into a contract with Commando Security to safeguard and protect the business premises of the plaintiff from theft. the car of plaintiff’s customer. without any authority. 1970.00 per guard post. approval. pilferage. defendant’s security guard on duty at plaintiff’s premises. and all other unlawful acts of any person/s prejudicial to the interest of the plaintiff. suffered extensive damage besides the car rental value for a car that plaintiff had to rent and make available to its customer.PEOPLE’S CAR VS COMMANDO SECURITY G. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is obliged to indemnify the plaintiff for the entire costs as result of the incident? YES HELD: Paragraph 4 of the contract. Joseph Luy. which had been left with plaintiff for servicing and maintenance. Defendant claimed that they may be liable but its liability is limited under paragraph 4 of the contract which provides that its liability shall not exceed P1. abandoning his post and while driving the car lost control of it causing it to fall into a ditch." is by its own terms applicable only for loss or damage 'through the negligence of its guards . As a result. or orders of the plaintiff and/or defendant brought out the compound of the plaintiff a car belonging to its customer and drove said car to a place or places unknown. to enable him to pursue his business and occupation. L-36840 MAY 22. robbery.R.. Said paragraph is manifestly inapplicable to the stipulated facts of record. which involve neither property of plaintiff that has . during the watch hours" provided that the same is duly reported by plaintiff within 24 hours of the occurrence and the guard's negligence is verified after proper investigation with the attendance of both contracting parties. around 1:00am. On April 5. Plaintiff instituted a claim against defendant for the actual damages it incurred due to the unlawful act of defendant’s personnel citing paragraph 5 of the contract wherein defendant accepts sole responsibility for the acts done during their watch hours.000 per guard post for loss or damage through the negligence of its guards during the watch hours provided that it is reported within 24 hours of the incident.

Defendant is therefore undoubtedly liable to indemnify plaintiff for the entire damages thus incurred. But if Luy instituted the action against the plaintiff and the defendant. which had been caused directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts of defendant's security guard in breach of their contract. instead of defendant. If Luy accepted the challenge and instituted an action against the plaintiff.been lost or damaged at its premises nor mere negligence of defendant's security guard on duty. it should have told Joseph Luy.489. vandalism and all other unlawful acts of any person or persons. which had been entrusted into its custody. it was not liable for the damage but the defendant and had Luy insisted on the liability of the plaintiff..489." 9 was unduly technical and unrealistic and untenable. due to the wanton and unlawful act of defendant's guard. defendant in turn was clearly liable under the terms of paragraph 5 of their contract to indemnify plaintiff in the same amount. it should have filed a third-party complaint against the Commando Security Service Agency. As ordained in ." defendant's own guard on duty unlawfully and wrongfully drove out of plaintiffs premises a customer's car.10 caused said customer. Plaintiff therefore was in law justified in making good such damages and relying in turn on defendant to honor its contract and indemnify it for such undisputed damages. Joseph Luy. through its assigned security guards. The trial court's approach that "had plaintiff understood the liability of the defendant to fall under paragraph 5. owner of the car. the latter should have challenged him to bring the matter to court. Here. robbery.10. for the undisputed damages of P8. complying with its contractual undertaking 'to safeguard and protect the business premises of (plaintiff) from theft. the plaintiff should have filed a crossclaim against the latter.. Plaintiff was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the customer's car. lost control of it on the highway causing it to fall into a ditch. since under paragraph 5 of their contract it "assumed the responsibility for the proper performance by the guards employed of their duties and (contracted to) be solely responsible for the acts done during their watch hours" and "specifically released (plaintiff) from any and all liabilities . to the third parties arising from the acts or omissions done by the guards during their tour of duty. its customer." As plaintiff had duly discharged its liability to the third party. that under the Guard Service Contract. thereby directly causing plaintiff to incur actual damages in the total amount of P8.

the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffappellant the sum of P8. notwithstanding his plainly valid claim. ACCORDINGLY. . Civil Code. could hardly create any goodwill for plaintiff's business. that "under the Guard Service Contract it was not liable for the damage but the defendant" — since the customer could not hold defendant to account for the damages as he had no privity of contract with defendant.489.Article 1159. It is so ordered. Such an approach of telling the adverse party to go to court." Plaintiff in law could not tell its customer. aside from its ethical deficiency among others. since the court dockets are unduly burdened with unnecessary litigation. as well as the costs of suit in both instances. in the same way that defendant's baseless attempt to evade fully discharging its contractual liability to plaintiff cannot be expected to have brought it more business. "obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. the administration of justice is prejudiced. Worse.10 as and by way of reimbursement of the stipulated actual damages and expenses. as per the trial court's view.

in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants. he arose from his seat. The company’s defense was that granting that its employees were negligent in placing an obstruction upon the platform. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Cangco accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice because it was already 7:00pm and it was dim when it happened. L-12191 OCTOBER 14. from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say. its liability is direct and immediate. It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage. As the train drew near to his destination. if at all. imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. HELD: It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated. His right arm was badly crushed and lacerated which was eventually amputated. to-wit. the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributing negligence. Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Company where he was an employee. and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability. he slipped and fell violently on the platform.R. 1915. As a result. and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. 1918 FACTS: On January 20. When he was about to alight from the train. differing essentially. the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined. which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and .CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G. that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train. Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its employees placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company’s trains.

It is.supervision. if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence. by implication. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place. the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. and cites many authorities in support of the contention. being contractual. In this particular instance. That duty. the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. article 1258). We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. Defendant contends. We are of the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day life. that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual. important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence. XXX The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it. the damages should be apportioned. XXX . Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra). but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the technical form of expression. no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year. the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code. and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants. therefore. The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains. that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting. and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. was direct and immediate. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu. that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it.

Torres. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence. C. There could.. . and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger. JJ. Again.. The decision of lower court is reversed. Street and Avanceña. and should be considered. concur. it has been observed. it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. therefore. whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the age. Women. and for the costs of both instances.25.290. as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions.In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act — that is to say. sex. and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3. as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. So ordered.J. Arellano. be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting.

not controverted. it is uniformly held that the head of a house. and the evidence. 660. At the same time. While these facts are not as clearly evidenced as are those which convict the other defendant. Missell vs. as has been done in other cases. that of contract which. and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. Plaintiff is the passenger of the bus who as a result of the incident fractured his right leg to his damage and prejudice.Gutierrez vs Gutierrez Facts: On February 2. the owner of an automobile. we think. In its broader aspects. Thus. namely. who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children. whom he designates or permits to run it. the speed in operating the machine. son of the car’s owners. plaintiff sued the boy. has been sufficiently demonstrated by the allegations of the complaint. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business. the owner of the truck. The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge. where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it. Hayes [1914]. 6th ed. sec.) The liability of Saturnino Cortez. (Huddy On Automobiles. so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant. we nevertheless hesitate to disregard the points emphasized by the trial judge. we believe that. and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis. The driver of the car is an 18 y/o boy. the bus driver and its owner for damages. his parents as owners of the car. the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow . It was found by the trial court that both the boy and the driver of the auto bus were negligent by which neither of them were willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other. a passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Piñas. we can take cognizance of the common law rule on the same subject. 91 Atl. In the United States.. 1930. 322. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff. Hence. this appeal. Issue: how should the civil liability be imposed upon parties in the case at bar HELD: We are dealing with the civil law liability of parties for obligations which arise from fault or negligence..

the evidence bearing out this theory of the case is contradictory in the extreme and leads us far afield into speculative matters. with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident. aside from the fact that the defense of contributory negligence was not pleaded. XXX . In this connection. which occasioned his injury. with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other.bridge from opposite directions. consisting principally of his keeping his foot outside the truck. The defendants Velasco and Cortez further contend that there existed contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. it is sufficient to state that.

1991. 1179 of the NCC applies. the payroll deduction is merely a convenient mode of payment and not the sole source of payment for the loans.O. 17. · The loans were paid through automatic salary deductions. 2007. 178610 NOV. · The spouses obligation to pay HSBCL-SRP is a pure obligation because they do not contain a period. · Because of the dismissal. Demands to pay were made. They are also members of HSBC. · On July 31. the loans of the Sps.00. They were considered delinquent. 1990.R. HSBCLSRP filed a manifestation withdrawing the petition against Gerong because she already settled her obligations. · The employees filed an illegal dismissal case before the NLRC against HSBC. · Art. HSBCLSRP made a demand to enforce a pure obligation.000. · A labor dispute arose between HSBC and its employees. · On Sept. the spouses Broqueza have already . which is now pending before the CA. HSBCL-SRP filed a civil case against the spouses. They are immediately demandable. NO. · The same never agreed that if Editha Broqueza ceases to be an employee of HSBC.780. · The RTC reaffirmed the decision but the CA reversed it.N. · Despite the spouses Broquezas protestations. · On Oct. · Petitioner Gerong. her obligation to pay the loans will be suspended.00 on June 2. · HSBCL-SRP never agreed that the loans will be paid only though salary deductions. Both suits were civil actions for recovery and collection of sums of money.HSBCL-SRP vs SPOUSES BIENVENIDO AND EDITHA BROQUEZA G. HSBCL-SRP filed another civil case. · Majority of HSBCs employees were terminated among them the petitioners. HSBCL-SRP has the right to demand immediate payment. · The loans secured by their future retirement benefits to which they are no longer entitled are reduced to unsecured and pure civil obligations. petitioner Broqueza obtained a car loan in the amount of P175. she again applied and was granted an appliance loan in the amount of P24. · On Aug. · Once Editha Broqueza defaulted in her monthly payment. Staff Retirement Plan. · The MeTC ruled that the nature of HSBCs demands for payment is civil and has no connection to the ongoing labor dispute. Ltd. ISSUE: W.000. 1996. 1. 6. · The Plan is a retirement plan established by HSBC through its BOT for the benefit of the employees. 1993. 1996. · On Dec. 12. 19. 2010 FACTS: · Petitioners Gerong and Editha Broqueza are employees of Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). · HSBCL-SRP can immediately demand payment of the loans anytime because the obligation to pay has no period.00. Broqueza is a pure obligation and demandable at once even if they were dismissed by HSBC. petitioners were not able to pay the monthly amortizations of their respective loans. on the other hand applied and was granted an emergency loan in the amount of P35. HELD: · The RTC is correct in ruling that since the Promissory Notes do not contain a period. · Moreover.

the enforcement of a loan agreement involves debtor-creditor relation founded on contract and does not in any way concern the employee relations. . · Finally. As such it should be enforced through a separate civil action in the regular courts and not before the Labor Arbiter.incurred in default in paying the monthly instalments.

is demandable at once (Art. Every obligation whose performance does not depend upon a future or uncertain event. June 28. The petition was filed fifteen years after its issuance. L-29900. or upon a past event unknown to the parties. 1974] 20 APR FACTS The promissory note indicated payment “upon demand”. ISSUE Whether or not a promissory note to be paid “upon demand” is immediately due and demandable. Petitioner relied on this to mean that prescription would not lie unless there is demand from them. No. The obligation being due and demandable in this case. Palanca [G. 1179 of the New Civil Code).R. RULING YES. it would appear that the filing of the suit after fifteen years was much too late.Pay v. .

denied the plaintiff¶s allegations. ± This isnot guaranteed. Inc.The lower court absolved the defendants from the complaint insofar as the tanks and the electricmotors were concerned. Under these stipulations. The defendant.000. They allege that due toplaintiff¶s delay in the delivery of goods. Plaintiff hasto deliver (1) two steel tanks shipped from New York to Manila within three or four months . and (3) two electric motors with ³approximate delivery within ninety days. with legal interest and cost. Plaintiff alleged that the expellers and motors were in goodcondition. v Sotelo Matti (1992)FACTS Plaintiff Smith. and the motorson 27 February 1919.. From the record it appears that thee contracts were executed at the time of the worldwar when there existed rigid restrictions on the export from the united States xxx.Both parties appealed to the Court. railroading . there is a final clause as follows: ³The sellers are not responsible for delays cause by fires. the expellers on 26 October 1918. Bell & Co and the defendant Mr. (2)two expellers shipped from SanFrancisco in the month of September 1918 or as soon aspossible..Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant. Upon notification from plaintiff. strikes or other causes known as µforce majeure¶ entirely beyond the control of thesellers or their representatives. ISSUEWhat period was fixed for the delivery of the goods? Did the plaintiff incur delay in thedelivery of goods?HELD In all these contracts. Vicente Sotel entered into a contract. regarding ³Government regulations.Smith. hence clauseswere inserted in the contracts. Bell & Co. riots on land or on thesea. ManilaOil Refining and By-Products Co. ´The tanks arrived at Manila on 27 April 1919. xxx. but rendered judgment against them ordering them to receive expellersand pay the sum of P50. it cannot be said that any definite date was fixed for the delivery of thegoods. Mr Sotelo and intervenor. defendant refused to receive any of thegoods or to pay for their price. the intervenor suffered damages.

.It is sufficiently proven in the record that the plaintiff has made all the efforts it could possibly beexpected to make under the circumstances. At thetime of the execution of the contracts. time is regarded unessential.embargoes. Whether of not the delivery of the machinery in litigation was offered to the defendantwithin a reasonable time. to bring the goods in question to Manila. the parties were not unmindful of the contingency of theUnited States Government not allowing the export of the goods xxx. Xxx Reasonable time for the delivery of thegoods by the seller is to be determined by circumstances attending the particular transactions.the delivery must be made within a reasonable time. is a question to be determined by the court. In such cases. the exigencies of the requirements of the United States Government´ xxx. The delivery was subject to a condition thefulfillment of which depended not only upon the effort of the plaintiff. but upon the will of thirdpersons who could in no way be compelled to fulfill the condition. lack of vessel space. When the time of delivery is not fixed in the contract. as a matter of fact. those articles could be brought to manila or not. Theobligation must be regarded as conditional. Xxx it is obvious that the plaintiff has complied with its obligation.We cannot but conclude that the term which parties attempted to fix is so uncertain that oncecannot tell just whether. as soon aspossible. Xxx The plaintiff hasnot been guilty of any delay in the fulfillment of its obligation.

Chavez vs. 168338 | February 15. Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution? Held: (1) No.” Meanwhile. 2008 Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Raul M. No. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer .R. subject to arrest by anybody. who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press. he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media. failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny. Finally. revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments. including broadcast media. Gonzales (2008) (Political Law) Francisco Chavez vs. Gonzales and NTC | G. respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape. Respondents.

It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. (2) Yes. for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. such as a speech uttered. Otherwise. . the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test. Any act done. It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars.

Despite the demand. the Baldomar and Fernando continued their occupancy. The defense of Baldomar and Fernando was that the contract with Singson Encarnacion authorized them to continue occupancy indefinitely while they should faithfully fulfill their obligation with respect to payment of rentals. BALDOMAR 77 PHIL 470 FACTS: Vicente Singson Encarnacion leased his house to Jacinta Baldomar and her son. Lefrando Fernando upon a month-to-month basis. Singson Encarnacion contended that the lease had always and since the beginning been upon a month-tomonth basis. Singson Encarnacio notified Baldomar and her son Fernando to vacate the house because he needed it for his office as a result of the destruction of the building where he had his office before. ISSUE: Was it tenable for Singson Encarnacion to discontinue the lease of Baldomar and her son? .INGSON ENCARNACION VS. After Manila was liberated in the last war.

The defense of Baldomar and Fernando would leave to the sole and exclusive will of one of the contracting parties the validity and fulfillment of the contract of lease. completely depriving the owner of all say in the matter. For if this were allowed. the lessee could effectively thwart his purpose if he should prefer to terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment of the rentals. . within the meaning of Article 1256 of the Civil Code. so long as the lessee elected to continue the lease by continuing the payment of the rentals the owner would never be able to discontinue the lease. conversely.RULING: The continuance and fulfillment of the contract of lease cannot be made to depend solely and exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessees between continuing paying the rentals or not. although the owner should desire the lease to continue.

. As a result the plaintiff filed a case for unlawful detainer for the restitution of the land claiming that article 1569 of the Civil Code provided that a lessor may judicially dispossess the lessee upon the expiration of the conventional term or of the legal term. in defect of the conventional. The defendant is in the belief that there can be no other mode of terminating the lease than by its own will. an English association (represented by Mr. the conventional term — that is. No.Eleizegui v. fixed for leases by articles 1577 and 1581. as what they believe has been stipulated. 1903 Facts: A contract of lease was executed on January 25. . the lessee can make improvements deemed desirable for the comfort and amusement of its members. 1980 over a piece of land owned by the plaintiffs Eleizegui (Lessor) to the Manila Lawn Tennis Club. the law which was in force at the time the contract was entered into. 967 May 19. "When the term has not been fixed for the lease. Under the contract. the legal term. the one agreed upon by the parties. Williamson) for a fixed consideration of P25 per month and accordingly. as the case requires that a term be fixed by the courts under the provisions of article 1128 with ." The lower court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on the basis of Article 1581 of the Civil Code. for months when the rent is monthly. The Manila Lawn Tennis Club G.R. It appeared that the plaintiffs terminated the lease right on the first month. it is understood to be for years when an annual rental has been fixed. 1581 which provides that. . It is of the opinion that the contract of lease was terminated by the notice given by the plaintiff. to last at the will of the lessee." The second clause of the contract provides as follows: "The rent of the said land is fixed at 25 pesos per month. The judgment was entered upon the theory of the expiration of a legal term which does not exist. The Plaintiffs argued that the duration of the lease depends upon the will of the lessor on the basis of Art.

Moreover. and still less as a perpetual lease since the terms of the contract express nothing to this effect. first. 1257 of the Civil Code. or by provision of law. an emphyteusis must be perpetual. given this implication. or for an unlimited period. it would last. 1581 is inapplicable.respect to obligations which. second. It would be absurd to accept the argument of the plaintiff that the contract was terminated at its notice. just as by reason of its nature. inasmuch as he who contracts does so for himself and his heirs. being a lease. the parties have agreed upon a term hence Art. (Art. during all the time that he may have succession. the contract should not be understood as one stipulated as a life tenancy. ISSUE: a) Whether or not the parties have agreed upon the duration of the lease b) Whether or not the lease depends upon the will of the lessee RULING: a) YES.) The lease in question does not fall within any of the cases in which the rights and obligations arising from a contract can not be transmitted to heirs. are terminable at the will of the obligee. Interestingly. (Art. as long as the will of the lessee — that is. 1608. even if they implied this idea. either by its nature. 1543. If the lease could last during such time as the lessee might see fit. as is the present. albeit implied that the lease is to be dependent upon the will of the lessee. by agreement. The legal term cannot be applied under Art 1581 as it appears that there was actually an agreement between the parties as to the duration of the lease. (Art. because it has been so stipulated by the lessor. all his life. then it must be for a determinate period.) By its very nature it must be temporary.) .

and not the unlawful detainer action which has been brought — an action which presupposes the expiration of the term and makes it the duty of the judge to simply decree an eviction. The term within which performance of the latter obligation is due is what has been left to the will of the debtor. whether conventional or legal. as laid down by the authorities. . in order to decree the relief to be granted in the former action it is necessary for the judge to look into the character and conditions of the mutual undertakings with a view to supplying the lacking element of a time at which the lease is to expire. sec. 1128. (Art. The Civil Code has made provision for such a case in all kinds of obligations. In speaking in general of obligations with a term it has supplied the deficiency of the former law with respect to the "duration of the term when it has been left to the will of the debtor.) In every contract. The only action which can be maintained under the terms of the contract is that by which it is sought to obtain from the judge the determination of this period. It cannot be concluded that the termination of the contract is to be left completely at the will of the lessee simply because it has been stipulated that its duration is to be left to his will.B) The duration of the lease does not depend solely upon the will of the Lessee (defendant). In bilateral contracts the contracting parties are mutually creditors and debtors. in this contract of lease. This term it is which must be fixed by the courts. and a debtor upon whom rests the obligation to perform the undertaking. the lessee is the creditor with respect to the rights enumerated in article 1554. To maintain the latter action it is sufficient to show the expiration of the term of the contract. 2. Thus. and is the debtor with respect to the obligations imposed by articles 1555 and 1561." and provides that in this case the term shall be fixed by the courts. there is always a creditor who is entitled to demand the performance.

.The lower court’s judgement is erroneous and therefore reversed and the case was remanded with directions to enter a judgment of dismissal of the action in favor of the defendant. the Manila Lawn Tennis Club.

Justina Santos enjoined her heirs to respect the lease contract made. that "as the lease contractwas part of a scheme to violate the Constitution it suffers from the same infirmitythat renders the other contracts void and can no more be saved from illegality thanthe rest of the contracts."The present motion is for a new trial and is based on three documents (1 Codiciland 2 wills) executed by Justina Santos which. constitute newlydiscovered material evidence: Codicil. 1958. after failing to secure naturalization and after finding that adoption does not confer thecitizenship of the adopting parent on the adopted. that on November 18. the parties entered into the lease contract (in favor of Wong Heng) for 50years: that ten days after. 3) is so separable from the rest of the contracts that itshould be saved from invalidation. deceased. 1967. FACTS: This is the second motion that the defendant-appellant has filed relativeto this Court's decision of September 12. vs. less than a month after.In denying the motion.Justina Santos not only named TitaYaptinchay LaO the administratrix of her estate with the right to buy the propertiesof the estate. Accepting the nullity of the other contracts (Plff Exhs. and theconditional option given. so it is claimed. but also provided that if the said LaO was legally disqualified from buying she was to be her sole heir. the parties entered into two other contracts extending the lease to 99 years and fixing the period of the option to buyat 50 years which indubitably demonstrate that each of the contracts in questionwas designed to carry out Justina Santos' expressed wish to give the land to Wongand thereby in effect place its ownership in alien hands. 4-7).LUI SHE. in favor of Wong. deceased.1957.Wills. representing the estate of JUSTINIASANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO.defendant-appellant. . we pointed to the circumstances — that on November 15. they entered into another contract giving Wong Heng the option to buy the leased premises should his pending petition for naturalization be granted. the defendant-appellant nevertheless contended that thelease contract (Plff Exh. they amended the contract so as to make it cover theentire property of Justina Santos. in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of WongHeng.PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION. plaintiff-appellant.

.ISSUE: WON the lease contract executed by Santos is valid. HELD: This is a misrepresentation of the grossest sort.

Both courts found petitioner Rosa Lim guilty of twice violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and imposing on her two one-year imprisonment for each of the two violations and ordered her to pay two fines. She wrote out a check with the same amount. dated August 25. Petitioner issued another check payable to “cash” dated August 16. Upon demand. FACTS On August 25. each amounting to P200.00 from Maria Antonia Seguan. 130038 Sep.668.000. payable to “cash” drawn on Metrobank and gave the check to Seguan. the jewelry received or its value with interest. The checks were returned with a notice of dishonor. 1990.Lim vs People Posted on November 20. Petitioner’s account in the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed. Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. 2012 Lim vs People G.R.00. The next day. . petitioner again went to Seguan’s store and purchased jewelry valued at P241. 1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P241.000.668. petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks. attorney’s fees and costs. but she never did.007 and sent the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera. to pay moral damages. Cebu City. petitioner bought various kinds of jewelry worth P300. 1990. No. 2000 INTRO The case is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto that of the Regional Trial Court.00. The trial court also ordered petitioner to return to Maria Antonia Seguan.18.

without any valid cause. Blg. but the same was dismissed by the CA in its October 15.P. 1991. The act is malum prohibitum. Under BP No. Branch 23. or that there was damage.On June 5. two informations against petitioner for violations of BP No. and the terms & conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks. Cebu City. or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment. No. ordered the bank to stop payment. After due trial. . 22. pernicious and inimical to public welfare. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.P. one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation. 22 are: “(1) The making. 22. HELD The elements of B.P. Why and to whom the check was issued. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. 1996 Decision wherein it affirmed in toto the RTC’s Decision.” The gravamen of B. ISSUE WON Lim violated B. on December 29. 22. an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the RTC. No. 1992. drawer. the trial court rendered a decision in the two cases convicting petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the CA. are irrelevant in determining culpability. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. and “(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer. drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value. “(2) The knowledge of the maker.

If not rebutted. 22. B. “has the law been violated?” When dealing with acts mala prohibita –“it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent. The prison sentence imposed on petitioners is deleted. Consequently. she must prove that the second element was absent. In many crimes. The two fines imposed for each violation. No. However. No. that in acts mala prohibita. Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written.It was ruled in United States v.P. each amounting to P200.P. it was held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.000. the prison sentences imposed on petitioner are deleted. Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption and she failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor. 22. Court of Appeals [298 SCRA 658 (1998)]. B. the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial…” This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita. the only inquiry is. it suffices to sustain a conviction. the penalty imposed on petitioner must be modified. 22 was clearly violated. and imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the check issued. Go Chico. The award of moral damages and order to pay attorney’s fees are deleted for lack of sufficient basis. In Vaca v.P. The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly present. To escape liability. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material.00 are appropriate and sufficient. No. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. .

Lt. SUGAR ESTATES DEVELOPMENT CO. is unable to finish the construction of the street in the Northeast side because a certain third-party. Gregorio Araneta. Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co.. Both buyer and seller know of the presence of squatters that may hamper the construction of the streets by the seller. among in the contract of purchase and sale with mortgage. Tuason & Co.. by the name of Manuel Abundo. Inc. seeking to compel the . On May 7. But the seller. Domingo Church and Convent while the seller for its part will construct streets. and instance.ARANETA VS PHIL. 1950. The parties stipulated. M. Inc. 1958...] sold a portion thereof to Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. [through Gregorio Araneta. Ltd.. M. refused to vacate the same. filed its complaint against J. which began constructing the streets. Inc. 20 SCRA 330 FACTS: J. is the owner of a big tract land situated in Quezon City.. who has been physically occupying a middle part thereof. and on July 28. that the buyer will build on the said parcel land the Sto. Tuason & Co. Inc.

within which to comply with its obligation under the contract. ISSUES: Was there a period fixed? RULING: Yes. resorted to a petition for review by certiorari to this Court. Annex "A". gave petitioner Gregorio Araneta." . a period of two (2) years from notice hereof. and gave defendant Gregorio Araneta. Inc. The lower court and the appellate court ruled in favor of Phil..latter to comply with their obligation. and/or to pay damages in the event they failed or refused to perform said obligation.. The fixing of a period by the courts under Article 1197 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is sought to be justified on the basis that petitioner (defendant below) placed the absence of a period in issue by pleading in its answer that the contract with respondent Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. Sugar estates. Gregorio Araneta. Ltd. as stipulated in the above-mentioned deed of sale. Inc. Inc. "reasonable time within which to comply with its obligation to construct and complete the streets.

however. then the court should declare that petitioner had breached the contract. still the amended decision is defective in that no basis is stated to support the conclusion that the period should be set at two years after finality of the judgment. then there was a period fixed. that it lay within the Court's power to fix the period of performance. Granting.” . a "reasonable time. Was it within the powers of the lower court to set the performance of the obligation in two years time? NO. the court could not proceed to do so unless the complaint included it as first amended. Even on the assumption that the court should have found that no reasonable time or no period at all had been fixed (and the trial court's amended decision nowhere declared any such fact) still." and all that the court should have done was to determine if that reasonable time had already elapsed when suit was filed if it had passed. the complaint not having sought that the Court should set a period. The law expressly prescribes that “the Court shall determine such period as may under the circumstances been probably contemplated by the parties.If the contract so provided. The list paragraph of Article 1197 is clear that the period can not be set arbitrarily.

." but from the nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended" (Art. and this very indefiniteness is what explains why the agreement did not specify any exact periods or dates of performance. 3). and decide what period was "probably contemplated by the parties" (Do. this is not warranted by the Civil Code. since no circumstances are mentioned to support it. 1197. The Court must first determine that "the obligation does not fix a period" (or that the period is made to depend upon the will of the debtor). This preliminary point settled. par. the Court must then proceed to the second step. the trial Court appears to have pulled the two-year period set in its decision out of thin air. the Court can not fix a period merely because in its opinion it is or should be reasonable. ultimately. 1 and 2). pars. Yet. As the record stands. Does “reasonable time” mean that the date of performance would be indefinite? The Court of Appeals objected to this conclusion that it would render the date of performance indefinite.. Plainly. but must set the time that the parties are shown to have intended.It must be recalled that Article 1197 of the Civil Code involves a two-step process. So that. the circumstances admit no other reasonable view.

on 1 September 1980. and fixing monthly rentals thereunder at P700. Mrs. the lessor allegedly stated that the amount of monthly rentals could be resolved at a later time since "the matter is simple among us". In response. payable in arrears.00 a month was made by the lessee. On 22 July 1980. At this point. The first . Mrs.00 a month. and on the term of the renewed contract. a counteroffer of P700. Before the expiration of the lease contract.00 monthly rentals and by depositing the P700 monthly rentals in court.Millare v Hernando [FULL CASE] FACTS Petitioner Pacifica Millare as lessor and private respondent Elsa Co. The parties agreed to rent out a commercial unit for a monthly rate of P350.00 a month.200. the lessor informed them that the lessee can continue renting the unit as they were amenable to paying increased rentals of P1. the lessor and the lessee conspicuously failed to reach agreement both on the amount of the rental to be payable during the renewal term.200.00 a month. Millare filed an ejectment case against the Co spouses in the Municipal Court of Bangued. 1434? RULING In the instant case. Lessees responded by reiterated their unwillingness to pay the Pl. The judge rendered a "Judgment by Default" ordering the renewal of the lease contract for a term of 5 years counted from the expiration date of the original lease contract. Abra. Millare wrote the Co spouses requesting them to vacate the leased premises as she had no intention of renewing the Contract of Lease. The respondent judge cited Articles 1197 and 1670 of the Civil Code to sustain the "Judgment by Default" by which he ordered the renewal of the lease for another term of five years and fixed monthly rentals thereunder at P700. ISSUE Whether or not private respondents have a valid cause of action against petitioner? Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. as lessee executed a 5-year contract of lease. which alleged remark was supposedly taken by the spouses Co to mean that the Contract of Lease had been renewed.

the courts may fix the duration thereof. The second paragraph of Article 1197 is equally clearly inapplicable since the duration of the renewal period was not left to the will of the lessee alone. but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended. Once fixed by the courts. Prohibition and mandamus is granted. The implied new lease during the continued occupancy could not possibly have a period of five years. the period cannot be changed by them. Article 1670 of the Civil Code reads thus: If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing left for 15 days with the acquiescence of the lessor and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given. have been probably contemplated by the parties. In every case. the courts shall determine such period as may. but rather to the will of both the lessor and the lessee. the Petition for Certiorari. not for the period of the original contract but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The terms of the original contract shall be revived.paragraph of Article 1197 is clearly inapplicable. It follows that the respondent judge's decision requiring renewal of the lease has no basis in law or in fact since courts have no authority to prescribe the terms and conditions of a contract for the parties. but rather would have been a month-to-month lease since the rentals (under the original contract) were payable on a monthly basis. . RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE Article 1197 of the Civil Code provides as follows: If the obligation does not fix a period. since the Contract of Lease did in fact fix an original period of five years. WHEREFORE. under the circumstances. It is understood that there is an implied new lease. The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor.