You are on page 1of 45

Chapter II

Chapter II

Hindu Succession Act

The constitutional debates on the Hindu Code which resulted in the formulation of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, unravels the forms, manifestations and effects of both
continuities and disjunctures in the exercise of state power between colonial and postcolonial eras in India. The legal regulation of property rights in post-colonial India is an
important pointer to the status of women in India. Law is constitutive of the modem state
and defines how it exercises power. In the context of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and
2005, this chapter explores the interface of law and state in mitigating the property rights
to Hindu women. It interrogates the way cultural factors affect the outcome of laws and
the extent to which social change and empowerment is precipitated by legal reform. The
link between agency and social change is sought to be understood through judicial
decisions on Hindu property laws.
The framework of rights is important for women's equality and empowerment.
Rights may be understood to reflect agreed political claims or they may be understood as
emanating from and grounded within law. For most purposes, the framework of law is
important to ground rights claims, to provide an effective structure which further
legitimizes such claims and to promote their implementation. The basis of rights as
legitimate claims has important consequences for their ability to bring about change. The
legitimacy of claims presumptively conferred within a legal framework must be
interrogated in the light of legal, historical, political and cultural contexts. Such a
contextual and critical analysis is crucial for effective protection of rights claims through
At the conceptual level, the first section of the chapter deals with the formal
aspects of law, that is, Hindu Succession Act of 1956 and Hindu Succession
(Amendment) Act, 2005. The necessity in analyzing both the laws is to contextualize the
issue of property rights of Hindu women in India. The Hindu Succession Act of 1956,
which governed the laws relating to property rights of Hindu women, was hailed to have
constituted a sJbstantial move towards gender equality. The Act gave equal rights to
males and females to succeed intestate property. It sought to unify the Dayabhaga and


Chapter II
Mitakshara systems and purported to lay down a law of succession whereby sons and

daughters would enjoy equal inheritance rights, as would brothers and sisters. The Hindu
Succession Act was a watershed as for the first time a legal category of a "woman" was
created to include daughters, wives and widows. It is particularly important for the
analysis because it is not only relevant for legal precedents but also because the
judgments on the new Amendment are still under way. The study of judicial decisions
demonstrates the way the legal provisions of the Act fall short of assuring women
substantive gender equality. The second part of this chapter deals with the myriad ways
in which the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and 2004 constructs gendered identities of
women. Its focus is on judicial decisions at the Supreme Court and the High Courts of
India to present the construction of gendered issues emergent in property laws. The
judgments do not simply resonate the laws but are mediated by the cultural perceptions of
the judges and lawyers, by acts of legal translation that revise and recreate gender and can
profoundly affect the intent of legislation. The main argument is that the legal subject is
posited not as the abstract, un-gendered creature but as an ideological construct, endowed
with attributes that vary according to context and compel particular perceptions of a
social world. While some judgments often powerfully reinstate patriarchal and sexist
normative behaviour and institutionalize the legitimation processes of appropriate codes
of female behaviour, others create important spaces for negotiation of new rights and
social change.


As such feminist understanding of law typically addresses and explores the significance
of gender in law. It engages with a wide range of diverse perspectives and traditions to
highlight and explore the gendered content of law. They challenge traditional
understandinr, of social, legal, cultural and epistemological order by placing women, their
individual and shared experiences at the centre of their scholarship. The impact and
implications of law in women's disadvantage with a view to bringing about
transformative and social change is also another concern.
Then.: have been many debates about gender in law in feminist scholarship. A
feminist perspective brings a gendered perception about legal and social arrangements to


Chapter II
bear upon a largely gender neutral understanding of them. Gendered assumptions
embedded in such arrangements are almost rendered invisible. Feminism presupposes
that 'gender' has a much greater structural and discursive significance than is commonly
assumed. The relative invisibility only retains its significance for its practical and to a
lesser extent ideological constructs. Law therefore, is not just a reform mechanism or part
of capitalist and patriarchal oppression but also a body of knowledge which can be
explored and subject to critical scrutiny.
The debate in the feminist movement on law is intertwined legal rights and gender
quality. Within the feminist movement itself the question of legal equality for women has
posed theoretical and practical dilemmas. Some Anglo-American legal theorists have
however suggested that "the rhetoric of rights has become exhausted and may even be
detrimental" to the cause of women's equality. 16 The "rhetoric of (equal) rights is
inadequate", says Carol Smart, "in a situation where women have been demanding for
rights for which there has been no masculine equivalent in the past". 17 Equally pragmatic
is the observation of Martha Fineman who says that "the unequal and inequitable position
of women can only remedied through pervasive legal accommodation of difference ....
there has been a move away from inequality as one of the organizing the principles of
legal thought". 18 Indeed, she argues that a theory of "difference", rather than the
discourse of "equality", may be a more rewarding strategy for legal feminists to pursue.
Other feminist legal theorists such as Catherine Mackinnon argue that both the
"sameness" and the "difference" approaches are subtended by the belief that man is the
ultimate measure of women. Mackinnon says, "Under the sameness rubric, women are
measured according to the correspondence with man, their womanhood judged by the
distance from his measure". 19 She calls instead move towards substantive equality that
recognizes women's realities. In short, Mackinnon's critique of liberal legalism of which
the sameness/ difference binary is fully a part, stops short of a critique of the legal form
itself, arguing instead that the barriers to equality are often legal.


C.Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law, Routledge, London, 1989.

Ibid, pp 67-69.
C .MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
M.Finman, 'Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference it Makes', Columbia Journal of Gender and Law,
2.1, 1992 pp 1-23.


Chapter II
The women's movement in India has been critical of the legal reform project in
the recent times. The early phase of the women's movement was engaged in the struggle
for democratic rights of women like the right to education, employment, right to own
property, the right to vote. They fought for legal reform for a legally equal position in
society. These struggles were beyond the home and the family. The fundamental problem
was the over-reliance on legal reform to bring about change. In the present conjuncture,
feminists have gone beyond legal reforms and are directed towards emancipation of
women. Feminism now includes the struggle against women's subordination to the male
within the home, against her exploitation within the family, against their low status at
work, against their double burden in production and reproduction.
In India, the dilemmas of the sameness/ difference rubric are manifested
particularly in the contestation of personal laws. The theorizing of 'difference' has
become critical in multicultural societies where the 'neutrality' of institutions has only
perpetuated historical and cultural disadvantages. The colonial interregnum in India
produced institutionalized 'differences', which resonate in plural and unequal personal
laws, legally ensuring that women occupy unequal subordinate positions. In India thus,
rethinking the rhetoric of equality necessarily follows a distinct path, which may not
parallel the Anglo-American scholars. In many studies it has been suggested that new
laws are most effective when they legitimize changes that are endorsed by societal norms
and practices and legal transformation reflects rather than initiates political economic or
political change. Consequently, it follows from this argument that laws enacted for
greater redistributive justice are likely to be unsuccessful. Feminist theorists have pointed
out that many times there may be resistance to radical social change to ameliorate status
of women from within the legal transformation itself. This results in the incorporation of
cosmetic, superficial changes that in tum reinforce hegemony of patriarchy. Carol Smart
argues that law can "be understood as a mode of reproduction of existing patriarchal
order, minimizing social change but avoiding the problems of overt conflict" .2 Others
like Srimati Basu contend that law is one of the primary cultural spaces where gender
identity i.s constituted, a crucial site where notions of gender are created and reinforced
through judgments relating to subjects such as family law or sexual violence. 21

C.Mackinnon, op. cit., pp. 45-49.


S. Basu, She Comes to Take Her Rights, Kalifor Women, New Delhi, 2001.


Chapter II
The Indian women's movement is fragmented on the issue of seeking support of
the state in achieving emancipation of women through the institution of law. Feminist
legal discourse in India has addressed the question of whether law has the capacity to
pursue justice. Feminists who favour the intrinsic value of that legal reform brings with it,
consider it to be an important site for negotiation for rights of women. Archana Parashar,
Benda Cossman and Ratna Kapur are some feminists who recognize the emancipatory
potential of law. Parashar calls for are-conceptualisation of categories of law so that it
does not dismiss or marginalize the interests of women? 2 The inclusiveness and
contextuality of any law is important for its agency for social change. But her contention
that feminist critiques of law can emanate from societies where women have achieved
legal equality is a contested issue. Gandhi and Shah argue that legal reform strategies are
fundamentally a part of a larger struggle and not an end in itself?3 It is at the most a
broad strategy to create public awareness and short term redress. Similarly, Haksar argues
that struggles to transform social values are fundamental to the women's movement in
India and as such law reform cannot be separated from it.
The role of the state in regulating legislations and also finding an ally in the state
is a suspect among many feminists. Flavia Agnes makes the point: "If oppression could
be tackled by passing laws, then the decade of the 1980s would be adjudged a golden
period for Indian women, when protective laws were offered on a platter. Almost every
single campaign against violence on women resulted in new legislation. The successive
enactments would seem to provide a positive picture of achievement. But the crime
statistics reveals a different story .... The deterrent value of the enactments was apparently
nil. Some of the enactments were apparently only on paper. Why were the laws
ineffective in tackling the problem?" 24 Though progressive laws are necessary conditions
for women's minimal well being and status, it may also become a conduit for state
control. The tokenist value of legal reform is also elaborated by Omvedt who is critical
of such strategies for not being able to challenge the social and systemic structures that
increase atrocities against women. Abdication law is not a viable option since the only


A. Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1992
N. Gandhi and N. Shah, The Issues at Stake, Kali for Women, New Delhi, 1992.
R. Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State: Women , Law and Citizenship in Post-colonial India,
Permanent Black, New Delhi, 2003, pp.521.


Chapter II
permissible identities in modem identities are the ones that are put in place by law. 25
Creative engagement with the legal project could be negotiating space around prescribed
Gender equality definitely demands more that gender specific laws. The need. is to
carefully strategise to do away with universalizing tendencies of metanarratives and
reorient legal theory to become more contextual and inclusive. It is equally important to
explore the limits and possibilities of any law that directs itself towards emancipation of
women. The paradox may be in "demanding that law both privilege women's difference
and overlook in different contexts according to the ends of real and substantive justice" .26




The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 dealing with intestate succession among Hindus came
into force on 19 June, 1956. This Act brought about changes in the law of succession and
gave rights which were hitherto unknown, in relation to women's property. It was
applicable to all states other than Jammu and Kashmir and covered about 86 percent of
the Indian population. 27 The Act lays down a uniform and comprehensive system of
inheritance persons governed by Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools as also to those in
certain parts of Southern Indian, who were previously governed by Murumakkattayam,
Aliyasantana and Nambudri system. 28 The Act applies to any person who is a 'Hindu' by

religion is any of its forms or developments including a Virashiva, a Lingayat or a

follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj; or to any person who is Buddhist, Jain
or Sikh by religion; to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by
religious as per Section 2.
The Hindu Succession Act of 1956 is often considered to have constituted a
substantial move towards gender equality in many ways. It gave equal rights to males and
females to succeed intestate property. It sought the unity of the Mitakshara and


G. Omvedt, Violence Against Women: New Movements and New Theories in India, Kali for Women,
New Delhi, 19!\6.
N. Menon, Gender and Politics in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999, pp.262-295.
In Jammu and Kashmir, the Hindu Succession Act, of 1956 with some modification applies.
There are however special provisions in the Act, for Hindu Matrilineal communities customarily
governed by the Murumakkattayam and Aliyasantana system


Chapter II
Dayahhaga systems and sought to lay down a law of succession whereby sons and

daughters would enjoy equal inheritance rights, as would brothers and sisters.
Under the Act, in the case of a Hindu male dying intestate all his separate or self
acquired property, in the first instance, devolves equally upon his sons, daughter, widow,
and mother. In addition (and simultaneously with the mentioned four categories heirs), if
there is a predeceased son, his children and widow get the share he would have received
if alive: and the children and widow of predeceased son of predeceased son similarly
inherit a share as representatives of the deceased son similarly inherit a share as
representatives of the decreased in question. All these are the primary or class I heirs
under the Act. In the absence of Class I heirs, the property devolves on class II heirs and
in their absence first and agnates and then on cognates. 29 For joint family property, if the
deceased male was earlier governed by the Dayabhaga system, the same rules of
succession as relate to other types of property apply to this as well.
However, for those previously governed by Mitakshara law, the concept of
Mitahhara coparcenary property devolving by survivorship continues to the recognized

with some qualifications: in the case of a male who has in interests in Mitakshara
coparcenary at the time of his death and who leaves behind class I female heirs, his
interest devolves not according to the Mitakshara principle of survivorship but according
to the 1956 Act and his share in the joint property and hence the shares of his heirs are
ascertained under the assumption of a 'notional' partition (that is, as if the partition had
taken place just prior to his death). If the deceased does not leave behind Class I female
heirs or male heirs claiming through female heirs, the devolution is according to the
Mitakshara rules. Either way this does not affect the direct interest in the coparcenary

held by male members of virtue of birth it affect only the interest the may hold in the
share of the deceased.


Class I heirs' consists of son, daughter; widow; mother; son of a pre-decreased son daughter of a predeceased son; son of a pre-decreased daughter; daughter of a pre-decreased daughter son of a pre-deceased
son; daughter of a predeceased son of a pre-deceased son; widow of a pre-deceased son of pre-deceased


Chapter II
Hindu Property Laws and Gender Equality
The Hindu Succession Act has improved the position in favour of the widow and other
owners by abolition of 'widow estate' or 'limited estate' and their conversion into
absolute ones. The Act confers full heritable capacity on the female heir and recognizes
her states as independent and absolute owner. This provision is embodied under Section
14 of the Hindu Succession Act, which enacts as:
( 1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the
commencement of this, Act shall be held by the by her as full owner there of and not as a
limited owner.
In this sub-Section "property" include both movable and immovable property
acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device, or at a partition, or in lieu of
maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or
not before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by
prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her
as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-Section (1), shall apply to any property acquired by way of
gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court or
under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the terms of the
gift, will


other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in

such property.
Thus, Section 14(1) of the Act makes the female Hindu as full owner or absolute
owner. Absolute ownership means and connotes that the owner has certain unqualified
rights over the property such as:(a) The right to its possession,
(b) The right to its management,
(c) The right to its exclusive enjoyment,
(d) The right of disposal by an intervivos or will at pleasure, and
(e) On the death of the owner intestate the property should devolve by succession
on the owner's own heirs.
Where any of these essentials of the content of absolute ownership is lacking the
owner cannot be regarded as an absolute owner. The object of this Section is to do away


Chapter II
with the estate called 'limited estate' or 'widow estate' in Hindu law and to make a Hindu
women, who under old law would have been only a limited owner, a full owner of the
property with all powers of disposition and to make the estate heritable by her own and
not revertible to the heirs of the last male holder. However, it does not in any way confer
a title on the female Hindu where she did not in fact possess any vestige of title. 30
The Act propounds a definite and uniform scheme of succession to the property of
a female Hindu who dies intestate after the commencement of the Act. Section 15 of the
Act lays down general rules of succession in case of female Hindu and Section 15(1)
provides that her property shall devolve(a) Upon the sons and daughter (including the children of any pre-deceased son or
daughter) and husband;
(b) Upon the heirs of the husband;
(c) Upon the mother and father;
(d) Upon the heirs of the father, and
(e) Upon the heirs of the mother.
Section 15(2) embodies two exceptions within it and provides that notwithstanding
contained in sub-Section ( 1)(a) Any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in
the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) or upon the other heirs referred to sub-Section (1) in the order
specified therein but upon the heirs of the father; and
(b) Any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-law
shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the
children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in subSection( 1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband.
Hence after coming into force of this Act of 1956 the female becomes the full
owner and after the death her property shall devolve upon the own heirs mentioned in
Section 15( 1).
The word "possessed" is used Section 14 in a broad sense and in its widest
connotation. It means the state of owning or having in one's hand or power. It need not

D.F.Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law, 15th Edition, Bombay, 1982, pp.980


Chapter II
be actual physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the female but
may be possession in law. It may be either actual or constructive or in any form
recognized by law. This for instance the possession of a license, lessee or a mortgagee
from the female owner would be her possession for the purpose of this Section. The
Section can have no application where a female Hindu never acquired any property at all
or where having acquired it she happens to have lost her title there to by alienation,
surrender or otherwise and of which she was not or could not be in judicial possession at
the commencement of the Act. 31
Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 must be read as a proviso or exception to subSection ( 1) of Section 14 of the Act. It is intended to make it clear that any such restricted
estate created prior to the commencement of the Act will not be enlarged into full
ownership by operation of sub-Section ( 1) if the gift, will, other instrument, decree, order
or award had prescribed a restricted estate. Its operation must be confined to cases where
property is acquired for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right under a
gift, will, instrument, decree, order or aware, the terms of which prescribed a restricted
estate in the property.

While the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 codified the multiplicity of laws
concerning the property rights of women and considerably broadened them, it cannot be
denied that several major gender inequalities have remained. Equity by gender in Hindu
property law lies within a very narrow compass. Janaki Nair rightly comments that the
Succession Act "codified a power structure which continued to exclude women from
having a direct control over assets". 32
In the Hindu system, ancestral property has traditionally been held by a joint
Hindu family consisting of male coparceners. Coparcenary is a narrower body of persons
within a joint family and consists of father, son, son's son and son's son's son. Again a
coperacenary can also be of a grandfather and a grandson or of mothers, or an uncle and


R.L. Chaudhury, Hindu Women's Right to Property: Past and Present, Firma K L Mukhopadhyay,
Calcutta, 1961
J.N air, Women and Law in Colonial India, Kali for Women, New Delhi, 1996

- 61 -

Chapter II
nephew and so on. Thus, ancestral property continues to be governed by a patrilineal
regime wherein property descends only through the male line as only the male members
of a joint Hindu family have an interest by birth in the joint or coparcenary property. A
female cannot become a coparcener. She has no coparcenary rights. Sons' have a right to
succeed to the deceased father's share of coparcenary if the father dies intestate in
addition to the share he has on birth.
The retention of the Mitakshara coparcenary has indeed abrogated all safeguards
for the protection of women's rights .If a joint family gets divided, each male coparcener
takes his share and the female gets nothing. Only when one of the coparceners dies, a
female gets a share of his share as an heir to the deceased. Thus, the law excludes
daughter's participation in copercenary ownership merely by nature of the sex. This has
not only contributed to an inequity against females but has led to oppression and negation
of their right to equality. It appears to be a mockery of the Fundamental Rights
guaranteed by the Constitution of India.
Another related aspect of this gender discrimination apparent in the Hindu
Succession Act is the clause that a coparcener can renounce his rights in the coparcenary
property. This has also weakened the position of the female members. In such cases his
sons would continue to maintain their independent rights to the coparcenary but
daughters and other class I female heirs would lose the possibility of benefiting from such
property. Likewise, after partition, the father can make a gift of his share of the
coparcenary property to his sons thereby defeating the rights of the female heirs. 33
The daughter had equal rights only in the separate or self-acquired property of
their father. But daughters could be denied a share even in this separate property by
throwing the property back into the common stock, using the doctrine of blending or by
fonning new coparcenars. In other words, a man can convert his separate and self
acquired property to coparcenary property in which case his daughters, widow and
neither who would otherwise have engaged equal shares with his sons in such separate


B.Sivaramayya, Women's Rights of Inheritance In India: A Comparative Study of Equality and

Protection, Madras Law Journal Office, Madras, 1973.


Chapter II
and self acquired property, lose out. An incentive for such a move was provided by the
state by conferring tax reliefs for copacenaries, under the Income Tax Act. 34
The Hindu Succession Act at best is a half-hearted measure to improve the
position of women. Apart from the inherent discrimination against daughters arising out
of the retention of the Mitakshara coparcenary, there are ways by which the purpose of
the Act stands defeated. The patrilineal assumptions of a dominant male ideology are
clearly reflected in the laws governing a Hindu female who dies interstate. The law in her
case is different from those governing the Hindu males. Section 15 ( 1) of the Act makes
it clear that the property of a female Hindu shall devolve first to her children and
husband; secondly, to her husband's heirs; thirdly, to her father's heirs and lastly to her
mothers heirs. In case of a male Hindu, the mother is also a class I heir and inherits
equally with the children and wife of the deceased son. But the mother of a daughter
stands excluded by the children and husband of the deceased daughter.
The provisions of section 15 of Hindu Succession Act is indicative again of the
bias towards the male as it provides that in the absence of children the order of succession
in case of Hindu female would vary depending upon the source through which the
property was acquired. Any property that she inherited from her parents would devolve
not upon her own heirs but upon her father's heirs. Similarly, if the property were
inherited from her husband or father-in-law, it would devolve upon her husband's heir.
However, in case of a Hindu male's property, devolution does not depend upon the
source of acquisition. These provisions highlight how property continues to be inherited
by the male line from which it comes back either to her father's family or back to her
husband's family. It also seems to perpetuate the concept that a woman is entitled only to
limited ownership of her property and her dependence on males continues. This strikes a
considerable blow to her economic independence.
Another anomaly in the Hindu Succession Act as per Section 23 is the provision
denying a married daughter the right to residence in the ancestral home. And while
daughters who are unmarried, separated, divorced, deserted or widowed have residence
rights, they cannot demand partition if males do not choose to partition. This right

Under Section 10.2 of the Income Tax Act an exemption is granted to income from the Hindu Undivided
Family (HUF). Under SS.20 and 20A of the Wealth Tax Act, certain tax concessions are granted to
members of HUF at the time of partition.

- 63-

Chapter II
however is not denied to a son. The Supreme Court in its recent judgment in
Narshimhamurthy v.Sushilabilla held that the female heirs right to claim partition of the

dwelling house of a Hindu dying intestate under section23 of the Hindu Succession Act
will be deferred or kept in abeyance during the lifetime of even a sole surviving male
heirs of the deceased until he chooses to separate his share or ceases to occupy it or lets it
out. 35 The idea of this section, being to prevent the fragmentation and disintegration of
the dwelling house at the instance of the female heirs to the detriment of the male heirs in
occupation of the house and thus, rendering the male heirs homeless/ shelterless. The
main object of the section is said to be the primacy of the rights of the family against that
of an individual by imposing a restriction on partition. Why is it that this right of primacy
of family is considered only in the case of a female member of the family? 36
If we take this argument further then, the serious implications of this clause
become even more evident. In fact this clause has facilitated the capitalist and
consumerist forces to transform the ancient system of Stridhana into a modem distortion
called dowry. Under its modem guise, daughters lost control upon their property, which
was presumably given on her behalf, to secure her happiness in her matrimonial home. In
fact the subsequent years, the demand for dowry became an instrument of violence and
subjugation of the newly married bride. 37
The right to will away property has also restricted women's inheritance rights
under the Hindu Succession Act. A man has full testamentary power over all his property
including his interest in the coparcenary. This freedom of testation, a legacy of English
law in India, is an anomaly according to standards of comparative jurisprudence. In fact,
the English concept of alienation through testamentary succession was incorporated into
Hindu Succession Act but the protection granted to the family members under the
English law did not find mention here. 38 So, individual men could will away both their
share in the joint family property as well as the whole of their separate property with


Narshimhamurthy v.Sushilabilla, AIR 1996 SC 1826.

Government of India, Towards Equality: Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India,
Department of Social Welfare, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, December, 1974.
F. Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality: The Politics of Women's Rights in India, Oxford University
Publication, Delhi, 1999.
The English Statute, Inheritance Act of 1958 (subsequently re-enacted as Matrimonial. Causes Act,
1965)-placed a divorced wife in a superior position vulture to the surviving spouse. A further statute was
enacted entitled as inheritance (provision for family and d dependent) Act, 1975 through which the
surviving spouse could claim not only maintenance but also share in the capital.


Chapter II
absolute abandonment. In practice this was used to disinherit females. In fact, it led to a
diminution in the status of a wife/widow.
Section 24 of the Hindu Succession Act provides that the three classes' widows
specified in the section shall not be entitled to succession if they have remarried. This
appears to be logical if one were to examine section 25, 'unchastity' of a female here is
no longer considered as a ground for exclusion. If a widow is living in adultery from the
date succession opens, she would not be excluded from inheritance but would be
excluded if she has married again. This law thus, appears to favour adultery but punish
legal marriage.
Allied to this is another clause in this Section which states that a step mother who
remarries is not excluded from the succession despite the fact that she succeeds not on the
strength of direct blood but only as a father's widow and on remarriage she ceases to be
such a widow. Unlike other three classes widows specified in Hindu Succession Act, she
is not excluded from the inheritance. This is indeed discriminatory and violative of the
right to equality as it amounts to unreasonable classification without any rational nexus.
Thus, it is evident that differentiation among the category of 'women' has been
discriminatory. Justice for one category of women cannot be secured at the expense of
Another critical source of gender inequality which will be dealt with in details in
the chapter III of thesis is the question of agricultural land. The Hindu Succession Act of
1956 in Section 4(2) exempts significant interests in agricultural land. Section 4(2) of the
Act provides that: ".... Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the
provisions of any law for the time being in force providing for the prevention of
fragmentation of agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilings or for the devolution
of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings."
Hence, interests in tenancy land devolve according to the order of devolution
specified in tenurial laws, which vary by state. Broadly, states fall into three categories(i)

In most central and eastern states, the tenurial laws are silent on devolution, so that
inheritance can be assumed to follow the personal law, which for Hindus is
governed by the Hindu Succession Act of 1956. 39


E.g. Andhra Pradesh, Kamataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Gujarat. Maharashtra, Orissa, West Bengal.


Chapter II

In a few states, the tenurial laws explicitly note that the Hindu Succession Act or
the personal law will apply. 40

(iii) In north western states of Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh
and Jammu and Kashmir the tenurial laws not only specify an order of devolution
that is highly gender unequal. Here, retaining the vestiges of the Mitakshara system,
primacy is given to male lineal descendants in the male line of descent and women
come very low in the order of heirs. Also, a woman gets any a limited estate, and
loses the land if she remarries (as a widow) as fails to cultivate it for a year or two.
Moreover in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi, a 'tenant' is defined so broadly that this
unequal order of devolution effectively covers all agricultural land.
Agricultural land is the most important form of rural property in India and
ensuring gender equal rights in it is significant not only for gender justice but also for
economic and social empowerment. Gender equality in agricultural land can reduce not
just woman's but her whole family's risk of poverty, increase her livelihood options,
enhance prospects of child survival, education and health, reduce domestic violence and
empower women. It is thus critical to bring all agricultural holdings within the Act's
On the whole, it becomes evident the underlying motive of the Hindu Succession
Act of 1956 which is still projected as the ideal piece of legislation for having 'liberated'
Hindu women was consolidating the powers of the state and building an integrated
nation. This crucial objective could be achieved only by diluting women's rights, to
arrive at a minimum level of consensus so that the agenda of reform could be effected
without much opposition.

It is apparent from the previous Section of the study that discrimination against women is

writ large in relation to property rights. The retention of the Mitakshara coparcenary has
indeed abrogated all safeguards for the protection of women's rights. Equal treatment for
women in both social and economic sphere is essential for women's empowerment. The
exclusion of daughters from participating in coparcenary property ownership merely by

E.g. Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan.

- 66-

Chapter II
reason of their biological identity (i.e. sex) is unjust. A long felt social need is thus to
radically reform the Mitakshara law of coparcenary to provide equal distribution of
property not only with respect to the separate or self acquired property of the decreased
male but also in respect of his undivided interest in the coparcenary property.
There are five states in India- Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu Maharashtra
and Kamataka- have taken cognizance of the fact that this right by birth and the
discrimination inherent in it can be amended. 41 According to the law of four of these
states, excluding Kerala, in a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law, the
daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same
manner as the son. Kerala however, has gone one step further and abolished the right to
claim any interest in any property of an ancestor during his or her lifetime founded on the
ground that he or she is born in the family. In fact, it has abolished the joint Hindu family
system altogether including the Mitakshara, Marumakkattayam Aliyasantana and
Nambudri systems. Thus, enacting that joint tenants be replaced by tenants -in -common.

The approach of the Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Kamataka state
legislature is distinct from that of Kerala. These four states instead of abolishing the right
by birth have strengthened it but at the same time they have broadly removed gender
discrimination in the Mitakshara coparcenary. Barring essential changes, the texts of the
amending Acts are the same while Karnataka effected marginal changes only. These state
legislations provide equal rights to a daughter in the coparcenary property and contain a
non-obstante clause. In these four states:
The daughter of a coparcenary in the joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law(a)

shall become a coparcener by birth in her own right in the same manner as the son
and shall have similar rights in the coparcenary property and be subject to similar
liabilities and disabilities.


The Kerala Joint Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975.

The Hindu Succession (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1986.
The Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989.
The Hindu Succession (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1994.
The Hindu Succession (Kamataka Amendment) Act, 1994.


Chapter II

On partition of the Joint Hindu family of the coparcenary property, she will be
allotted a share equal to that of a son. The share of the predeceased son or a
predeceased daughter on such partition would be allotted to the surviving children
of such predeceased son or a predeceased daughter on such partition would be
allotted to the surviving children of such predeceased son or predeceased daughter,
if alive at the time of partition.


This property shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and
shall be regarded as property capable of being disposed off by her by will or other
testamentary disposition.


The state enactments are prospective in nature and do not apply to a daughter who
is married prior to or to a partition which has been effected before the
commencement of the Act.
However, these four Hindu Succession (Amendment) Acts have not been fool

proof as they have given rise to multiple difficulties at various levels of

operationalisation. These Acts have in fact, altered the concept of the Mitakshara joint
family and coparcenary by elavating the daughter to the position of a coparcener. The
underlying assumption of these Acts is that these legislatures are clearly of the view that
Mitakshara right to birth re violates equality before the law. 42 Again, once a daughter

becomes a coparcener she naturally continues to be a member of the natal joint family
and after marriage, she will also be a member of her marital joint family. 43
It may be mentioned that during the parliamentary debates on the Hindu
Succession Bill, 1955, Pataskar, the then Minister of Law, observed "to retain the
Mitakshara joint family and at the same time put a daughter on the some footing as a son

with respect to the right by birth, right of survivorship and the right to claim provide for a
joint family unknown to the law and unworkable in practice". 44
In a mu.:h broader context, the issue of making daughters coparceners at birth in
ancestral property raises some critical questions. To begin with, the amendment will
benefit those '"omen who are born into families that have ancestral property there is no

B. Sivaramayy~t , 'Of daughter, Sons and Widows Dissimilation in Inheritance Laws', Manushi, MayJune, 1997.
B. Sivaramayya. 'Coparcenary Rights to Daughter-Constitutional and Interpretational issues', 3 SCC (J),
1997, pp 25.
Ibid, pp 27-34.

- 68-

Chapter II
precise definition of 'ancestral property'. Given the fact that the families have long since
been fragmented and the fact that joint family is on the decline, it is not at all clear whom
the law will benefit.
The position of women married into the joint family will actually become worse
under this Act. All women of the family, be they daughters or wives, were members of
the Hindu Joint Family they had an absolute right to the maintained out of the joint
family properties. Daughters have a right to Stridhana and marriage expenses. Wives and
widows had the right to be maintained for life out of joint family property. It was this
regime of property laws among Hindus that was sought to be 'reformed' by Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 and by other Hindu laws. It was in the 1950s that this unqualified
right to be maintained was eroded, with the introduction of the right to divorce. Under
unmodified Hindu law, a woman's marital status could not be altered by divorce, as
divorce was not permitted. This right to maintenance could be secured by a charge on the
property of the joint family. However, the reforms in the 1950s introduced the right to
divorce without simultaneously giving the divorced wife the right to her share of the joint
family property. Divorce meant an expulsion from the joint family and the loss of the
right to be maintained. Thus, the seemingly progressive right to divorce has turned out to
be nothing more than the right to divorce along with the loss of the right to the use of
joint family property. The right of daughters to become coparceners makes the position of
the female members of the joint family worse with the daughter along with the sons
acquiring a birth right, which she can presumably partition at any time, the rights of other
members of the joint family get correspondingly diminished. While the reforms of the
1950s disadvantaged a divorced wife, the Andhra model disadvantages married women
as well. Until now, the only protection women had in the marital home was the status of
being married, which carried with it the right to be maintained, not only by the husband,
but by the joint family and its assets as a whole. Thus, married women who lived in joint
family property had the protection of the family home. This protection gets eroded, to the
extent that the total divisible amount gets reduced.
These state enactments explicitly lay down that the right of a daughter who was
married prior to the commencement of the Act will be excluded from the coparcenary
property. However, a daughter who is married after the coming into force of the


Chapter II
Amendment Act is spared of such discrimination. One can only surmise the reasons
behind the exclusion of a married daughter from the scope of the Act. The patriarchal
notion that the married daughter belongs to another family or the practice of giving
dowry and sometimes property at the time of marriage may account for the practice of
excluding daughters. But it is undoubtedly true that the share of property or material
wealth which daughters receive is smaller in value compared to what the son inherits. In
fact, the gifts that parents give seldom include immovable property. It becomes apparent
that there is no persuasive justification for the blanket exclusion of the married daughters.
Again, the distinction between a married and an unmarried daughter is not a reasonable
classification and is grossly unfair. A recent Supreme Court decision lends support to this
view. In Savita Samvedi v. Union of India it was held that the distinction between a
married and an unmarried daughter may be unconstitutional45 The observation made by
Justice Punchi is relevant: "The eligibility of a married daughter must be placed on par
with an unmarried daughter (for she must have been once in that state), so as to claim the
benefit. ...... " 46
Another infirmity of these state enactments is that conferment of equal
coparcenary rights on sons and daughters implies that the widow's success ional share
gets reduced. This is because with the increase in the number of coparceners, the interest
of the husband decreases. This is unfortunate as it goes against the concept of marriage as
equal partnership of the husband and wife.

It is definitely birth right, in Hindu laws that is the root of the problem. Birth
rights as we have discussed, is by definition a conservative institution, belonging to the
era of feudalism, coupled as it was with the rule of primogeniture and the inalienability of
land. When property becomes disposable and self-acquired, different rules of succession
have to apply. It is in the making of those rules that gender justice has to be located. What
the Andhra Model does is reinforce the birth right without working out its consequence
for all women. Justice cannot be secured for one category of women at the expense of



Savita Samvedi v. Union of India, AIR 1996 680.

Ibid, Para 7, pp 683-684.


Chapter II

Kerala was the first state to vehemently criticize the right by birth and the gender
inequalities embedded in it. It enacted the Kerala Joint Family system (Abolition) Act,
1976 which abolished the concept of coparcenary following the recommendation of the
Hindu Law Committee called B.N. Rau Committee. The logic behind this move is clear
in the observation of P.V. Kane47 : "And the unification of Hindu law will be helped by
the abolition of the right by birth which is the cornerstone of the Mitakshara School and
which the Draft Hindu Code seeks to abolish."
The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 abolished the right
of birth of males under the Mitakshara as well as the Marumakkattayam law. It states that
after its commencement, a right to claim any interest in any property of an ancestor,
during his or her life time founded on the mere fact that the clamant was born in the
family of the ancestor, shall not be recognized. Thus, the Act is wholly prospective and
fails to confirm rights of daughters in the existing coparcenary property unlike the
Andhra Model legislation. Section 4 (1) of the Kerala Act lays down that all the members
of Mitakshara coparcenary will hold the property as tenants-in-common on the day the
Act comes into force as if a partition had taken place and each holding his or her share
separately. The major drawback in the legislation is that it fails to protect the share of the
daughter from being defeated by the making of a testamentary or other disposition.

It was conceded that the Kerala Model probably resulted in maintenance of

greater family harmony and it appeared to be a fair decision as in Kerala both matrilineal
and patrilmeal joint families existed. If the joint family was abolished today in the other
states then a deemed partition would take place and women not being coparceners would
get nothing more. Whereas,if they were made coparceners, then they would become
equal shan.:rs.
However, one common drawback of both the Kera1a Model and the Andhra
Model is that it fails to protect the share of the daughter, mother or widow from being
defeated by making a testamentary disposition in favour of another, or by alienation. This
criticism of course against testamentary disposition can be also used to disinherit a son.


M.P. V.Kane, History of Dharmashastras, Vol. III, 1946, pp. 823.

- 71 -

Chapter II
It is noteworthy, that there is hardly a case of a daughter claiming equal rights to

property in the parental family, even though her dowry may not be equal to the son's
share. This is mainly due to overweighing consideration of modesty and desire for amity
and the fear of social disapproval. A study prepared for the Ministry of Education and
Social Welfare on the succession rights of women in Andhra Pradesh, is very revealing in
this regard. 48 It is observed that 38 percent of women in Godavari and 12 percent of
women in Krishna district, 27 percent of the respondents in both the district reported
consideration of getting bad name among the relatives and others, for not taking resort to
the Court of law in getting their due share in property. Cost of litigation, complicated
procedures of law and uneconomic nature of the deal in terms of cost involved in
property are the other reasons stated by respondents.
In view of limited assertion of equal rights to property by women, it is necessary
to understand that unless there exists majority awareness and approval of the majority of
the people, it cannot be realized by a section of women socialized in the tradition of
inequality, thus, there is need to create social awareness and to educate people to change
their attitude towards the concept of gender equality.

The Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act in 2005 needs to be located within the
critical re-examination of the Hindu Succession Act as well as the consequences of the
modified versions of it which are operational in some states like Kerala, Andhra Pradesh,
Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Kamataka.
The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Bill, 2004 was cleared by the Union Cabinet
and was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 20th December, 2004. The Statement of
Objects and Reasons of the proposed law referred to the guarantee of equality for women
under Article 14 and 15 as a justification for the amendments. This Amendment has been
undertaken almost five decades since the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 was passed and
the government's move was considered a "milestone" by many feminists. The most


Law Commission of India, Property Rights of Women: Proposed Reform under the Hindu Law, 1741h
Report, No.6 (3) (59) I 99 LC (LS), May 5, 2000.


Chapter II
important feature of the Amendment is to include daughters as coparceners in the Hindu
joint family along with son. She can claim partition, become the 'karta' and also share the
liabilities. The Act includes two generations of the children of pre-deceased daughters as
class I heirs and thus, makes the heirs of the pre-deceased sons and daughters more equal.
The other most significant change is omission of section 4(2) of the Hindu
Succession Act of 1956. It brings agricultural land at par with all other forms of property.
This implies that now Hindu women have equal rights in agricultural land. In many ways
such a reform has overridden inconsistent state laws and customary practices which have
governed inheritance of agricultural land. In the context of growing feminization of
agriculture, Bina Agarwal argues that these rights will provide women with
supplementary subsistence. 49
The third important aspect of the Hindu Succession Act 2005 is the equal
residence rights to daughters and sons in the parental dwelling house. Now the daughters
also have the right to seek partition in the dwelling house. Again remarriage is no longer
a ground for disinheritance. It has deleted section 24 of the Hindu Succession Act which
barred certain widows from inheriting the deceased property if they remarried.
Criticism of the new Amendment rests on several counts. The retention of the
Hindu Joint Family and the introduction of daughters as coparcerners are two
oppositional features. It has been suggested that such a perplexing situation could be
avoided by abolition of the joint family. Pradhan Saxena observes that a daughter who is
born in the family will be a coparcener and a member of the joint family of her
father. 50 She would retain her rights to be coparcener even after marriage, and
consequently, upon marriage she would be member of two joint families at the same
time, one of her father, and the other of her husband. Further, her own daughter would be
a member of two joint families by birth, one that of her own father and the other of her
maternal grandfather, and third, upon her marriage of that of her husband. This would
lead to legal complexities and in practice, would be a space for marginalization of
women. Making daughters coparceners will decrease the shares of other class I female

Bina Agarwal , ' Disinherited Peasants, Disadvantaged Workers: A Gender Perspective on Land and
Livelihhod,' in Thorner, A. (ed.), Land, Labour and Rights: Daniel Thorner Memorial Lectures, Tulika
Books, New Delhi, 2001.
P.Saxena, opp.cit.pp.21

- 73-

Chapter II
heirs, such as the deceased's widow and mother, since the coparcenary share of the
deceased male from whom they inherit will decline. In states where the wife takes a share
on partition, as in Maharashtra, the widow's potential share will now equal the son's and
daughter's. But where the wife takes no share on partition, as in Tamil Nadu or Andhra
Pradesh, the widow's potential share will fall below the daughter's. 51 Finally, the
unrestricted testamentary power or right to will away property could be a threat to
women's inheritance rights. Very often, fathers will away their property to their sons or
close male kins, as discussed in the later section of this chapter.
The amendment has far reaching implications for women in India. However, it
will be impossible to deal with succession laws in isolation. One has to simultaneously
look at laws of matrimonial property, divorces and succession to ensure gender just
regime of laws. A critical observation made by Indira Jaising in this regard is that the
exercise undertaken to reform succession laws only of Hindu women will enforce the
system of separate and discriminatory personal laws. Reforms must be sought in those
commonly agreed areas that will benefit women. "There is no law concerning the family
that does not have a negative impact on women of all communities". 52 The major gap in
our laws is the absence of rights of women within marriage. Thus, reform in marital
property law and succession law must be discussed simultaneously. Thus, the Hindu
Succession Act has ample lacunae which can be amended to end the gender
discrimination which results from the asymmetrical property relations in which women
and men have differential access to resources and distinct degrees of control over

Indian women's lives continue to be characterized by formidable amount of pervasive

discrimination and substantive inequalities. The concepts of equality and social justice
which form the foundation of the Constitution are at odds with inequalities gender
inequality embedded in the traditional values and practices of Indian society. Despite



The Hindu, September 25, 2005.

I. Jaising,'Unequal Reforms', Communalism Combat, Vol. no.104, January, 2004.


Chapter II
guarantees of formal equality being enshrined in the Indian law, there is sex
discrimination. The judicial approaches that have evolved to address the questions of
both equality and gender difference has been problematic. Constitutional law has been
influenced by two competing paradigms of equality. First, the formal equality paradigm
is a traditional understanding of equality. Equality has been interpreted as "treating like
alike" and its constitutional manifestation is evident in the expression of equal protection
doctrine. The principle is that all persons are to be treated alike except where
circumstances require different treatment. Equality is thus, equated with sameness. The
entitlement to equality is based on sameness and discrimination is defined as any
difference in treatment between similarly situated individuals. 53 This 'similarly situated'
test requires the Court to begin by providing a definition of the relevant groups and
classes for comparison. 54 The legal mandate of equal treatment- both as systemic norm
and a specific legal doctrine- becomes a matter of treating like alike and unlikes unlike,
while the sexes are socially defined as such by their mutual unlikeness.


That is, gender

is socially constructed as difference epistemologically and sex discrimination law bounds

gender equality by difference doctrinally. The same /difference doctrine ignores an
important aspect- how to get a woman access to everything women are or have been
allowed to become or have developed as consequence of their struggle either not to be
excluded from most of life's pursuits or to be taken seriously under the terms that have
been permitted to be women's terms. The sameness approach cannot distinguish between
'differential treatment that disadvantages and differential treatment that advantages', as
K&pur and Cossman put it.
In fact, in the recent times there has been a perceptible shift in the approach from
formal equality model to substantive equality model but the latter continues to be

H. Reddy, 'Equality Doctrine and Indian Constitution', Andhra Law Times, 45, 1982, pp 57-58.
R.Kapur and B.Cossman, op. cit., pp7.
' The philosophy underlying the sameness/difference approach applies liberalism to women. Sex is a
r.atural difference, a division, a distinction, beneath which use a stratum of human commonality, sameness.
rhe emphasis of the sameness principle is that it conforms to normative rules to analyze empirical reality
'JY granting women access to what men have: to the extent are no different from men, women deserve what
men have. The difference legal feminists, which view women for what they are or have become
distinctively as women- by which is meant unlike men, or to leave women as " different" as equality law
finds them. It continues to insist that the only way for women to achieve legal recognition of their equal
status to men is to deny the legal relevance of their difference to the degrees that it exists. Women should
be recognized as gender-neutral legal persons.


- 75-

Chapter II
thwarted by the deeply embedded assumptions regarding equality as formal equality. 56
Subsequently, the question of the relevance of gender difference can be examined
through three competing approaches- protectionist, sameness and corrective. These
debates form the context of the Supreme Court and the High Court cases in the next
Section of the chapter which seeks to examine and illustrate how the legal system itself
contributes to the gap between the formal guarantees of gender equality and substantive
inequality that plagues women's lives.
The second paradigm is the substantive equality paradigm of equality is critical of
the formal equality and its emphasis on sameness. It recognises the fact that equality
sometimes requires that individuals be treated differently. The problematic linkage
between equality and sameness has been elaborated by Martha Minnow: "The problem
with this concept of equality is that it makes the recognition of difference a threat to the
premise behind equality. If to be equal you must be the same, then to be different is to be
unequal". 57 The substantive equality approach emphasizes on the actual impact of the
law rather than focusing on the equal treatment under the law. Its main aim is to eliminate
substantive inequality in the form of individual, institutional and systemic discrimination
against the marginalized and disadvantaged groups in society. It seeks to enable such
groups to engage in full and equal social, economic and cultural participation in
society. 58 Th is is attempt to make law more sensitive to a more complex notion of equality
which takes into account the comparative disadvantages of persons under existing
unequal conditions.
The argument further gains currency when the paradigm of equality analysis
shifts from sameness and difference to disadvantage. The substantive equality model
views differ\!nces not to preclude an entitlement to equality. It is embraced within the
concept of equality. Differential treatment may be required but "not to perpetuate the


R.Kapur and B.Cossman , 'On Women, Equality and the Constitution- Through the Looking Glass of
Feminism', l'v<Itionaf Law School Journal, 1993
M. Minno\\, 'Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference- Bilingual and Special Education', Law
and Contempurary Problems, 1985, pp. 157-207.
The main agument of this line of thinking is that Courts must adopt an approach which considers the
effect of the r Jle or practice being challenged to determine whether it contributed to the actual inequality of
women and whether changing the rule will actually produce an improvement in the specific material
condition ofue women affected.

- 76-

Chapter II
existing inequalities; to achieve and maintain a real state of effective equality". 59 The
substantive equality approach is illustrative of the problematic nature of the discourse of
legal rights. The inherent assumption is that of independence and separateness of the
judiciary and the legal system from the institutions of the state and the economic and
cultural practices which constitute the present condition of inequality. "It seems to
suggest that all hat is required is for judges to be sensitized to the notion of substantive
equality and social conditions will be gradually transformed by law". 60 The apparent
objection to this is that if the morality underlying the notion of substantive equality were
so self-evident and unthreatening to the dominant social order there would no need for
law to bring about social justice. On the whole, in Frug's words, "Sameness feminists
have been thwarted by the repeated recognition of difference; difference feminists by the
devaluing of women's differences". 61
Again, there has evolved different approaches to understand the question of
relevance of gender differences within the judiciary. The discrimination law 1s
fundamentally undercut by its concept of sex, inequality and law. It reflects more or less
the same arguments of the judicial approaches to the interpretation of equality rights. The
formal model of equality largely informs the sex discrimination law. Its focus on
sameness led to the question of relevance of gender difference. There are three distinct
judicial approaches - protectionist, sameness and corrective. Each of them has conceded
to the assumptions of formal equality and indeed represents a problematic approach to
gender difference.
The protectionist response has favoured the construction of women as weak,
marginalized and subordinate justifies the need for protection to them. Differential
treatment is accorded as this is precisely the Court's understanding of women's
difference. This 'essentialisation' of difference- to take the existence of difference as the
natural and inevitable point of departure is deemed to be preferential treatment.
Unfortunately, in the name of protecting women, this approach endorses and reinforces
the ideology of male domination and subordination of women. The second approach, the
sameness approach conceives equality and gender as issues of sameness and difference.

R. K. Gupta, 'Justice: Unequal but Inseparate', Journal of Indian Law Institute, 1969, pp 57-76.
Menon, Gender and Politics in India, Oxford University Press, 1999
n M. J. Frug, Post- Modern Legal Feminism, Routledge, New York, 1992.



Chapter II
Equality is an equivalence and not a distinction and gender is a distinction, not an
equivalence. Gender difference is considered as irrelevant and women ought to be treated
exactly the same a men. 62 The third response is known as the corrective Approach: In this
perspective, special treatment for women is justified on the ground of past discrimination.
Gender difference is held to be relevant and also considered to require recognition in law.
Gender differences have to be recognized to avoid the reinforcement and perpetuation of
the difference and the inequalities underlying it. Gender difference is not essentialised.
The simple gender neutrality in law based on male standards and values. Thus, as long as
women conform to these male standards, they qualify for equality. The corrective
approach is critical of such assumptions and argues that substantive equality for women
necessarily must account for gender difference in its analysis of women's experiences.
Gender difference is contextualised in terms of the historical disadvantages and
discrimination. Though it has often been conceded that the corrective approach is most
promising and balanced but such


conclusions cannot be drawn. In fact, the

question of relevance of gender difference is contextual. In a particular context, treating

women differently may further enhance their chance of disadvantage and thus conclude
that women ought to be treated the same. In some contexts the substantive approach may
require a sameness approach while in other context it will require a corrective approach. 63
Marc Galanter's work attempts to introduce into the law, a conception of
'identity', which is constituted by interacting and negotiating with other elements of
society. This understanding of identity requires the Courts to be informed by an
'empirical' approach which stands in contrast to a 'formal' approach. 64 The latter views
the individual to have single membership status of one group only and thus, have rights
which that group is entitled to. Contrastingly, the empirical approach accepts multiple
group membership of individuals. It addresses cases according to its contexts. Galanter is

S.Jahwari, 'Women and Constitutional Safeguards in India', Andhra Law Times Journal, 40, 1979, ppll.
He observes: " The true meaning of the principle of equality between men and women is to be treated as
normally is irrelevant in law and that consequently is not to be treated as constituting in itself a sufficient
justification for unequal treatment
One can explain this with the help of an example, like, right to vote is a political right. Here, gender is
considered as irrelevant in pursuit of equality. Any recognition of gender would only reinforce or
contribute to women's subordination. In contrast, with regard to employment rights, a substantive approach
may require recogniton of women's reproductive differences in so far as the pursuit of equality will require
that women are prowd with maternity leave and benefits.
M.Galanter, Competing Equalities, Law and Backward Classes in India, Oxford University Press,

- 78-

Chapter II
aware that this approach may lead to a gap between judicial formulation and actual
administration. He hopes that Courts will make reasonable distinctions, which has to be
translated into workable rules. 65
All these different approaches to the understanding of gender equality become
operational when judges decide on different succession cases relating to property rights.
In fact, the question of dispensing property cases dealing with the exclusion of women is
indeed a complex matter. The study of these cases shows that there is an oscillating
tendency between the protectionist and the corrective approaches. Often extra-legal
ideologies are also invoked in legal decision making which either favour or not favour
gender discrimination. Family law becomes a crucial site for the examination of the
intricate dynamics of the working of "heteropatriarchy" and for studying what Patricia
Oberoi calls, ''judicial ethnosexology", the ways in which "a set of widely shared cultural
assumptions" inform the substance of legal decisions. 66 Ratna Kapur and Brenda
Cossman have extensively analysed women and law in post- Independence India.
According to them, "the legal regulation of women is informed by and serves to
reinscribe family ideology".


Family ideology is defined as "a set of norms, values and

assumptions about the way, family life is and should be organized; a set of ideas that
have been so naturalised and universalized that have come to dominate common-sense
thinking about the family". 68 The culture of modem Hindu family law is embedded in the
traditionally defined specific roles of women as subservient and dependent on 'other
relationships' .69 The dominant conceptions of family and familial ideology get
interpolated in complex ways with in the practice of law.
Challenging Sex Discrimination
Constitutional challenge to family laws on the ground of sex discrimination have met
with mixed results. In some cases, the Courts have held that laws which treat women
differently than men, are discriminatory and thus, violates equality guarantees. Such

Ibid, pp.167.
P. Uberoi, 'Hindu Marriage Law and the Judicial Construction of Sexuality' ,in R. Kapur (ed.) Feminist
Terrains in Legal Domains. Kali For Women, New Delhi, 1996, pp 184-209.
R. Kapur, and B. Cossman, Subversive Sites: Feminist Engagements with Law in India, Sage
Publications, New Delhi, 1996 .
q Here. the 'other relationships' constitute women's relationship with other male relatives of the family,
such as father, brother, husband etc.


Chapter II
discriminatory treatment is based on sexist attitudes and practices which reinforce
women's subordination. The approach adopted by those Courts is one of formal equality
and sameness. However, other cases have rejected the challenges to family laws. These
are cases, though also adopting a formal equality, emphasise the differences between men
and women, and thus, preclude interrogation of substantive inequalities.
Challenges made to the laws of succession on the ground that it discriminated on
the basis of sex, brought overwhelming by men have been rejected buy the Court. For
example, in Kaur Singh v. Jaggar Singh, Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, which
provides a female Hindu with the right of absolute ownership over her property, was
challenged as discriminatory. 70 While the Court acknowledged that the Hindu Succession
Act did create an apparent anomaly in the power of alienation of property it held that
removal of such remained the prerogative of the legislature, not the Courts. The Court
held that " it may well be that in view of the inferior status enjoyed by the females, the
legislature thought fit to put the females on a higher pedestal", which was within the
purview of Article 15 (3) of the Constitution. 71 It further held that women as a class were
different from men as a class and the legislature had merely removed the disability
attaching to the women.
In Pratap Singh vs. Union of India, Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act
was again challenged as violating Article 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution. 72 The Court
found that Section 14( 1) was enacted to address the problem faced by the Hindu women
who were unable to claim absolute interest in property inherited from their husbands, but
rather, who could only enjoy these properties with the restrictions attached to widow's
estates under the Hindu law. As a special provision intended to benefit and protect
women who have traditionally been discriminated against in terms of access to property,
it was not open to Hindu males to challenge the provision as hostile discrimination.
Rather, the Court concluded that the provision was protected by Article 15(3), which in
its view, "over reads clause 15(1)", while the Court thus upheld the provision, the

The plaintiffs argued that tl:.e effect of Section 14 was discrimination in the powers of alienation of
property between women and men. While women had by virtue of Section 14 absolute ownership and thus,
absolute right of alienation, me::-~ who were still governed by the Punjab Customary Jaw were not free to
dispose off ancestral immovabk property by will.
Ibid, 493, Para 13.
Pratap Singh v. Union o.f!ndiu, AIR 1985 S.C. 1695.

- 80-

Chapter II
approach to equality and to gender on which it did so remains unclear. 73 The decision
could be informed by either a protective approach or a corrective approach. The Court's
reference to the traditional problem that women faced in property ownership is suggestive
of the latter.
In Sonubhai Yeshwant Jabhar vs. Bala Govinda Yadav and Others, Section 15(2)
of the Hindu Succession Act was challenged as discriminating on the basis of sex and
thus, being in violation of Articles 14 and 15. 74 Section 15(2)(b) provides that the
property inherited from a husband of a female Hindu dying intestate will devolve upon
the heirs of the husband, whereas Section 8, dealing with the property of the male Hindu
dying intestate does not make any such provision regarding property inherited from his
wife. In rejecting the challenge the Court held that the rules were enacted with the clear
intention of ensuring the continuity of the property within the husband's line. The
assumption that property should be passed down through the male line is so deeply
entrenched that the Court reinforced the gender biasness of the assumption. The historic
discrimination against women in inheritance has created a norm - that property passed
through the male line- and it is against this norm which any challenges to the practice are
measured, and ultimately rejected.
Judicial Immunity to Land Laws: Engendering Ceilings on Land
The different levels and spheres where women's rights as equal citizens of the nation
have been denied have resulted in many contradictory provisions through which women
have to establish their equal rights as individuals. Since land ownership is an important
source of power- social, cultural as well as political- often disputes have emerged on this
question. Over the years some of the ceiling acts which have been elaborately discussed
in Chapter III of the Thesis, have been challenged in the Court of law. However, though
they have been largely unsuccessful, the grounds for challenging them have often been
sex discrimination against women. 75 However, the First Amendment to the Constitution
of India, enacted in 1951 had introduced a device for the protection of validity of land

'' Ibid, 1697, Para 6.

'~ Sonubhai Yeshwant Jabhar v. BaJa Govinda Yadav and Others, AIR 1983 Bombay 156.
~ Article 14 of the Constitution of India promises equality before the law and Article 15 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex, etc. Both constitute part of Fundamental Rights

- 81 -

Chapter II
reform legislation. Under Article 31 b of the Constitution, it provided that none of the
Acts mentioned in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution could be deemed to be void on
the ground that they infringed on the Fundamental Rights. This provision provides the
basis for dismissing pleas challenging the ceiling laws on various grounds, including
grounds of gender discrimination.
The Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960 was
challenged in Ambilw Prasad Mishra v. State in Uttar Pradesh in 1980. The question of
gender justice arose as a collateral issue but it was taken up by the Supreme Court. The
Court not only reiterated the general assumption of women sacrificing their rights for
community welfare and family interest bit also held that agrarian legislation must be
judged, not meticulously for every individual injury but by the larger standards of
abolition of fundamental inequalities, frustration of basic social fairness and
unconscionability. 76 Among the grounds for challenging it were that it discriminated
against the major unmarried daughters by not providing extra land to the fathers as it did
for the adult sons and also that it discriminated against women in the fixation of ceilings,
by regarding the husband as the tenure holder even when the wife was the owner. Justice
Krishna lyer stated: "No submission to destroy this measure can be permitted using sex
discrimination as a means to sabotage what is socially desirable". 77 Here, the language of
law perpetuates the disadvantages of women. While admitting that the advantage granted
to major sons and not daughters was discriminatory, he nevertheless justified the rule on
the ground that in effective terms the entire land goes to the father as the tenure holder
(not to the son) " for feeding this extra mouth". The question that arises then don't adult
daughters need to be fed? The explanation for the exclusion of women as tenure holders
was provided as: "When all is said and done, married women in our villages do need their

Section 5 (3) (a) of this Act provides for the addition of two hectares of irrigated land each of the tenure
holder's sons where family has a strength of less than five. Section 5(3) (b) similarly provides for two
additional hectares of irrigated land for each of the tenure holder's adult sons where the strength of the
family is more than five. The father is allowed by Section 5(3) to hold an extra two hectares if the
unmarried major is a son. Section 3(7) defines 'family' as : 'family' in relation to a tenure holder, means
himself or herself and his wife or her husband, as the case may be (other than a judicially separated wife or
husband), minor sons and minor daughters (other than married daughters); Section 3(17) makes the
husband tenure holder even when the wife is the owner. These imply that the expression 'adult son' in
clause (a) and (b) includes an adult son who is dead and has left surviving behind him minor sons or minor
daughters (other than married daughters) who are not themselves tenure holders or who hold land less than
two hectares of irrigated land.
Ambika Prasad Mishra v. The State ofU.P. and Others, Supreme Court Cases, 1980,719,3, pp 719-34.

- 82-

Chapter II
husbands' services and speak through them in public places". 78 Underlying these
justifications was clearly the prioritization of class interests at the expense of gender
concerns. "Large land holders cannot be allowed to outwit socially, imperative land
distribution by putting female discrimination as a mask". 79 The success of land reform
programmes in redistributing land between households is but a contested issue.
Similarly in the context of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on
Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act was invoked
for daughters of a Hindu joint family to acquire rights as a coparcener in a joint Hindu
family and be treated on the same footing as major sons, thereby treat them as additional
members of the family while ceiling on land is fixed. Here, the definition of the "family
unit" as elaborated in the A.P. Land Reforms Ceiling includes an individual or his or her
spouse and their minor sons and their unmarried minor daughters. Married major
daughters are not included in this definition. The ceiling area for a family unit consisting
of not more than five members is to the extent of land equal to one standard holding. An
additional extent of one-fifth of one standard holding for each such member in excess of
five but not exceeding two standard holding is prescribed. Again, an additional benefit is
conferred on only 'major sons' by increasing the ceiling area.
Now in B. Chandrasekhar Reddy (D) By Lrs. V. State of Andhra Pradesh, the
appellants claimed that such an advantage should be allowed for major unmarried
daughters too. 80 Section 29A was referred which gave daughters the right to be treated as
members of the coparcenary and are entitled to equal shares as sons. The case was
dismissed on the ground that Section 29A could only be invoked by major daughters if
they are not married prior to the commencement of the Act and the claimant was married
before such commencement. However , the point to be noted here is contention of Senior
Counsel Shri M.N. Rao that if unmarried daughters are not treated as the member of the
family unit and there is denial of justice to daughters, vis -a -vis sons, there is clear
violation of principles of equality and there is discrimination between unmarried major
daughters on the one hand, and the major sons and minor children on the other hand, in
the matter of fixation of ceiling are under A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural

Ibid, pp 729.


B.Chandrasekhar Reddy (D) By Lrs. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2003 SC 2322.

- 83-

Chapter II
Holdings) Act, 1973, the appellant had not challenged the provisions of the Act and it
would not be proper to look into the plea of discrimination at this stage, especially in
relation to a legislation on agrarian reforms. 81 The limitation of the judgment has been
clearly stated and there is consensus that constitutional validity of such gender biased
land legislation could be challenged.
The assessment of ceiling surplus land has been yet another issue which has been
a cause of dispute and has required judicial intervention. The dispute stems from the fact
that often in deciding the amount of land to be declared as surplus and consequently
forfeited, consultation with the female owner of the land is avoided. This leads the wife's
land being forfeited without her having any say in the matter. Cases in which the wife has
been able to establish her claim has been rare. In the Kunjalata Purohit v. Tahsildar,
Samba/pur and Others, the government revenue officer in making an assessment of the

ceiling surplus land, aggregated the land of both spouses as 'family land', including, land
separately registered in the wife's name and inherited from her father. 82 But he gave
notice only to the husband as the 'person interested'. The two men settled the matter
between them and the wife's land was declared surplus. The wife appealed to the High
Court asking that her separate land be excluded from the ceiling surplus, on the ground
that since the land concerned was her separate property, she was the 'person interested' to
whom prior notice should have been given. This, she argued would have given her a
chance to ask the revenue officer to let her retain her land and instead declare part of her
husband's land as surplus. The Court under the constitutional principle of 'natural justice'
accepted her appeal.
Essentialist Ideas of Indian Womanhood and Legal Entitlements
The issue of inheritance and succession is interpolated with culturally constructed ideas
of gendered entitlements in diverse ways. The conflict between post colonial legal reform
and male privileges inform judicial processes and decision-making. Often the space of
law becomes the battlefield for reinvention of gendered identities and in this case, law
becomes the space for distribution of new gendered entitlements through the judicial

P.K. Das, Hindu Succession Property Rights of Women and Daughters, Universal Law Publishers, New
Delhi. 2005
KunJalata Purohit v Tahsildar, Sambalpur and Others, AIR 1986a, Orissa 11 S.


Chapter II
pronouncements on property cases. There are a range of intriguing questions that
determine the judicial understanding of the complexities in division of property in
discourse on property rights of women like "extra-judicial ideas of family responsibility
(who does elder care? Who support the family?), resources distribution (what really
constitutes dowry and how does it measure against the total family resources?) and
meanings of access to property (what does it mean for women to have affinal family
property?)". 83

Thus, it becomes important to analyze the construction of gendered

subjects, the post-colonial state, and legal entitlements and responsibilities, which are
highlighted in the legal cases studied.
The legal cases, which are dealt with herein, reveal how in many of these cases
the judges invoke the essentialist depictions of "woman" in the form of moral
righteousness, helplessness, and weakness as deserving grounds for judicial support to
women. In Joti Dadu Navale v. Monikabai Kashinath Mohite, the judge rebuked a
brother's attempt to disinherit his sister from their parental property. 84 The manipulative
intention of the brother was condemned as it was observed: "The defendant has not
succeeded in painting a very glorious picture of himself before the Court. On his own

showing, he is a grabber. He has no regard for the right of his own sister; that she wants
only a quarter share but he was not inclined to give even that pittance." 85 The underlying

meaning to the judgment becomes prominent when it is contextualized. The very

language of the judgment reveals that the sister's claim for a share less than what she is
actually entitled to is glorified. Thus, here the "subject" (sister) has been constructed to
be "passive" and thus, the "Indianness" depicted by the women are upheld through law.
The Court invoked sympathy for age and lack of legal knowledge as the basis of
the protec!ionist approach to decide some cases related to property entitlement top
widows. In A. Venkappa Bhatta v. Gangamma, the widow wanted a share from the joint
family property, which was under the control of the brother-in-law. 86 The vulnerability of
the widow was taken into account when the judgment pronounced the verdict as: "an old
lady in thl: late sixties and literate, not well versed in the ways of the world .... leading a


S. Basu, op.cit, pp.l34.

Jote Dadl. Navale v. Monikabai Kashinath Mohite, AIR 1988 Bombay 348.
A.Venkappa Bhatta v. Gangamma, AIR 1988 Kerala 133.

- 85-

Chapter II
sheltered life of a widow in an orthodox family .... very much under the influence of the
first defendant, 'kartha' 87 of the family and brother of the late husband. She had no sons
of support to look to". The justification for a favorable verdict to the widow was indeed
based on the patrilineal assumption that sons are invariably responsible for the financial
and social support of parents. The fact that she did not have sons was emphasized, while
ignoring that she was the mother of two daughters. Here, again it becomes evident that
the Court assumes that the role of daughters was passive as daughters often retained no
interest in property or rather, were socialized to be "good sisters" and thus, the conclusion
was drawn that the widow had no support to sustain her. In both these cases it is found
that the ideology underlying the judgments becomes clear. Women's perceived
helplessness and weakness are taken to be strong and valid grounds for judicial support to
them. The judiciary, in the name of delivering gender justice, appreciated the conformity
to a hegemonic favourable image of 'woman'.
Yet another reason, which the Court took into consideration while deciding
property cases, was the question of "eldercare". However, the decision of the Court in
this regard has oscillated between the validation of strong inequities in Hindu property
laws on one hand, and an understanding of inheritance as a reward for care giving on the
other. In Sushi/a Bala Saha v. Saraswati Monda!, the judge declared the validity of the
will where the mother who had two daughters and a son, left her property to one of the
daughters. 88 This was because this daughter had resided with the mother and "looked
after her comforts", whereas the son had not only failed in his "bounded duty'' to
maintain his mother but had also stolen from her, tried to defraud her and forced her to
leave her home in fear of her life. The judge ignored gendered rights but favoured
"eldercare" as the basis of property division. Son's right to deserve property share was
legitimized on the ground that son's duties to maintain the parent was fulfilled. Again, in
Ram Piari v. Bhagwant, the Court favoured "eldercare" when a will was contested by one

of the two daughters and only the sons of one the daughters were the heirs.



the basis of entitlement is a gendered one, where the primary entitlement is that of a son.

'Kartha' is defined as the titular head, usually senior male member of the Hindu joint family and
manager of the coparcenary property with discretion to sell or acquire property in the family's best interest.
Women cannot be karthas in accordance with the texts of Hindu law.
Sushila BaJa Saha v. Saraswati Monda!, AIR 1990 Cal 166.
Ram Piari v. Bhagwati, AIR 1989.

- 86-

Chapter II
The boundaries for such entitlement are based upon the obligation to support. In this case
it opens up the possibility of change and entitlement of the daughter within these
Hindu Joint Family: Gendering Subjectivity
In other cases, like Paramma v. Chikarangappa, inheritance rights of male were
protected90 Often the legal notion of "joint family" to which only males could become
coparceners restricted parents' from giving daughters a share in that property. The father
made a gift of one acre of land to the daughter he was residing with. He called the son
lazy and vagabond. Since the land was a part of joint family property the daughter was
not directly entitled to inherit it. The only way to enable the daughter a share in it was to
claim that the land was a gift for pious purpose. The sons claimed that they were deprived
of livelihood as the land that was gifted to their sister was the most productive in the joint
family estate. The Court focused on the jointness of property and held that the gift was
too large and thus, unjustifiable. Despite the attempts to overcome gender roles which
rationalise their disentitlement, women face persistent obstacles in getting family
property. In yet another case, R. Kuppayee v. Raja Gounder, the Supreme Court in
dealing with the gift related property held that the father can gift of ancestral immovable
property within a reasonable limits in favour of his daughters. 91 This judgment brings us
to the question whether "the reasonable limit" was reasonable enough to allow
disentitlement of women to property rights?
Gender Stereotyping and Role Conflict: Interpreting Testamentary Power
There are times when the Court has invoked extra-legal ideologies about family roles and
property whtch has indeed made legal reform appear superficial and illusory. In

Chandania v. Cyan Chand, a man had left a will which disposed the property to his
nephew and left only maintenance rights to his wife92 The Court had to decide the
question of the validity of the will. The judge argued: "He appears to have decided to
keep the property within his family ..... There was apprehension in the mind of the testator

Paramma v. Chikarangappa, AIR 1989 Kamataka.

R. Kuppayee v. Raja Gounder, AIR 2004 SC 1284
Chandania v. Cyan Chand, AIR 1989 Allahabad 75.


- 87-

Chapter II
that after his death his brother-in-law usurps the immovable property". The contention
that was accepted was that among the Hindus it is uncommon that if the owner of the
property has no children he wills his immovable property in favour of some member of
his family in whom he has implicit confidence so that the property is prevented from
being transferred from the widow to her natal family. The judge implicitly accepted the
predominance of the customary rules in deciding the legality of property transmission and
ignoring the fact the Hindu customs were overridden by the new legislation. The
contradiction that was apparent here was that the property in question was "self-acquired"
and there could have been a scope to entitle the widow a share in it as it was also the
result of her lifelong contribution through labour and savings. The ideology that was
reinforced was that women after marriage had no responsibility towards their natal
families. They could at best be thankful recipients rather than co-sharers of marital
In Balwant Kaur v.Chanan Singh, the pre-existing right of a daughter in father's
property was the issue of contestation. 93 The father had executed a Will that gave his
widow daughter rights in landed property. However, the dilemma of the father even while
having willed the property after his death is evident as he restricts his daughter's right to
full ownership to the concerned property. While he entitles the daughter 113 rd interest in
the suit land and 2/3rd to his brothers, he adds that on her daughter's death the property
would revert back to his brother's family.
A close reading of the will suggests the ways in which gendered norms
manipulate the father's concern for the welfare of the widow daughter and the conflictual
pulls about what happens to the property after her death. The issue here is whether the
daughter has the right to will way her share or even gift her share to someone outside the
lineage. The father writes: "Unfortunately I have no male issues. Not only this, Waheguru
is much angry with me that the daughter of the executant namely, Musammat Balwant
Kaur, having become a widow is serving me and the real brothers of the executant Beant
Singh and TeJa Singh, who for the satisfaction and welfare of the executant also serve me
and give every help, financial and otherwise to my daughter aforesaid and look after my
daughter in every way and I have full confidence that in the future too they will serve me

Bal want Kaur v. Chan an Singh, AIR 2000 SC 1908.

- 88-

Chapter II
and the brothers of the executant will maintain proper relations and good behaviour with
the daughter of the executant and shall not leave ant stone unturned in performing the
custom after my death. Since in the absence of male issue, in the present time there
remains dispute in respect of the rights of heirship of the female issue, as a result of
which the property due to litigation is ruined and the owner is dishonoured in his world
and among the relatives .... therefore, I.. .. execute this Will". 94 This will is representative
of the social values and norms that engender behavioural patterns when the question at
hand is that of property rights to a daughter. The father admits that the right to ownership
of land by female is a disputed one and therefore justifies his reason for 'willing' a part of
his land to his daughter. He however also asserts the dependent relationship that his
widowed daughter shares with other members of the extended family. His helplessness is
evident when he is optimistic that even after his death his daughter would be taken care
of. Probably that is yet another reason for his giving a share in his property to his brother
and his family thereafter. That the daughter would benefit from the property only during
her lifetime restricted her right to property. In other words the patriarchal control over
property relations and the dominant paradigm of not allowing property to pass through
the daughter to members of another lineage is found here. In fact often such a concern is
legitimized to build an argument to deny women right to property on this ground.

N aturalising Disinheritance of Daughters

Again in several other cases of property dispensation was considered to be "natural"
when daughters were disentitled and were justified as adherence to customs. In Khusbir
Singh v. The State, the Court claimed that a man's will made out to the son and excluding

a daughter of a second marriage was quite rational because the " may well have wanted to
solemnize his daughter's marriage during his lifetime and that may have led him to
disinherit her."


The Court in this judgment lent legitimacy that dowry or marriage

expenses can be regarded as equivalent to property share. In other words dowry was
considered to be legitimate ground for disinheritance. It cannot be denied that dowry is
undoubtedly a much smaller share than what a woman can actually inherit.


Khushbir Singh v. The State, AIR 1990 Delhi 59.


Chapter II
From the above legal cases on sex discrimination relating to women's property
rights in both movable and immovable property, it becomes evident that mostly, the
formal model of equality has informed the judgments. Women's complex inscription
within the legal system in contemporary India has been paradoxical. While largely
women's legal claims were not entirely discarded, there have been cases where the judges
have felt squeamish about the entry of question of law into the holy precincts of the
family. For instance, in the Harvinder Singh v. Harminder Singh the Court did not accept
the fundamental concept of equal rights of women in the family. 96
The Supreme Court in Narashima Murthy v. Sushilabai, held that a female heir's
right to claim partition of the dwelling house of the Hindu dying intestate under Section
23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would be deferred or kept in abeyance during the
lifetime or even sole surviving male heir of the deceased until he chose to separate his
share or ceases to occupy it or lets it out. 97 Once again, the fear is that of the dwelling
house at the instance of the female heirs and suspicion that the male heirs would be
homeless and shelterless. Such a baseless fear needs reality check in a country where
women are either scared to claim their right to property or are socialized to voluntarily
forfeit such a claim.
In another case, Vallikannu v. R. Singaperumal, the Court disqualified the
women's right to property. 98 This was a case where the daughter-in-law was claiming
right in father-in-law's property on the ground that the son had murdered his own father.
The Court went through the matter on the ground of justice, equity and good conscience.
The sole male survivor, the son was disqualified by murdering his own father. His wife
who claimed to the property through him was disqualified too. This is a clear example of
how property rights of women are meditated through men and therefore can be
Inspite of the gendered role that law has largely played in the lives of women in
their struggle for property rights and others, one needs to consider its positive
implications as well. The Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao held
that the right of a female heir to the interest inherited by her in the family property gets


Harvinder Singh \ s. Harminder Singh, AIR 1984 Delhi 66.

Narashima Murthy v. Sushilabai, AIR 1996 SC 1826.
Vallikannu v. R. ~ingaperumal, AIR 2005 SC 2587.


Chapter II
fixed on the date of the death of a male member under Section 6 of the Act but she cannot
be treated as having ceased to be a member of the family without her concurrence as
otherwise it will lead to strange results which could not have been in the contemplation of
Parliament when it enacted that provision and which will also not be in the interest of
such females.


The Apex Court in P.S. Sairam v.P.S. Rama Rao held that the shares of

the parties in the joint family property have to be determined in accordance with the
provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and accordingly decreed in
favour of seven daughters of the joint family along with male heirs. 100

Some Pro-Woman Judgments: Legal Precedents to be followed

Post amendment of the Hindu Succession Act, there has been few judgments that have
indeed established the right of women as equal stakeholders in property. In Pravat

Chandra Pattnaik and Others v. Sarat Chandra Pattnaik and Another, the Orissa High
Court had the occasion to consider the effect of the Amending Act and the new Section 6
of the Act. 102 It was a case relating to partition of Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary
property. After decision by the lower Court, an appeal was preferred to the High Court.
The Court held that the Amending Act was enacted to remove the discrimination
contained in Section 6 of the Act by giving equal rights and liabilities to the daughters in
the Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property as the sons have. The Amending Act came
into force with effect from 9-9-2005 and the statutory provisions create new right. The
provisions are not expressly made retrospective by the Legislature. Thus, the Act itself is
very clear and there is no ambiguity in its provisions. The law is well settled that where
the statute's meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. The words used
in provisions are not bearing more than one meaning. The amended Act shall be read
with the inter:tion of the Legislature to come to a reasonable conclusion. Thus, looking
into the substmce of the provisions and on conjoint reading, Sub-Sections (1) and (5) of
Section 6 of the Act are clear and one can come to a conclusion that the Act is
prospective. It creates substantive rights in favour of the daughter. The daughter got the


State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao, AIR 1985, SC 716.

C.A. Appeal ~o. 817 of 2002 decided in February 4, 2004.
Pravat Chandra Pattnaik and Others v. Sarat Chandra Pattnaik and Another, AIR 2008 Orissa 133.


- 91 -

Chapter II
right of coparcener from the date when the amended Act came into force i.e., 9-92005.The Court also did not accept the contention that only the daughters, who are born
after 2005, will be treated as coparceners.
The same issue also arose before the High Court of Kamataka in Sugalabai v.
Gundappa A. Maradi and Others. 103 The Court was considering appeals where pending

the appeals the Amending Act was passed by the Parliament. The Court held that as soon
as the Amending Act was brought into force, the daughter of a coparcener becomes, by
birth, a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son. Since the change in
the law had already come into effect during the pendency of the appeals, it is the changed
law that will have to be made applicable to the case. The daughter, therefore, by birth
becomes a coparcener and that there is nothing in the Amending Act to indicate that the
same will be applicable in respect of a daughter born on and after the commencement of
the Amending Act. Such a judgment in both the Courts discouraged vested interests from
disinheriting daughters.
The Supreme Court has ruled that a widow, even after her remarriage, is legally
entitled to get a share of her first husband's inherited property. This reiteration of the
legal provision came from a Bench comprising Justices S B Sinha and V S Sirpurkar
while it dismissed a petition by C. Sugathan's heirs, who had challenged a Kerala High
Court judgment allowing inheritance rights to their paternal uncle's widow even after her
remarriage. 104 The property in question belonged to Pervakutty, who willed it in favour of
his sons - Sugathan, Surendran and Sukumaran. Sukumaran, who died in 1976, was
married to Bharathi. Bharathi married Sudhakaran, who also died in 1979. But, when the
question of sharing the property inherited from Pervakutty arose between his heirs, none
were ready to give any share to Bharathi on the ground that she had remarried after
Sukumaran's death. The High Court held that in the facts of the case, coupled with the
provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, Bharathi was entitled to her share in the
property. The apex Court, rejecting the appeal against the High Court judgment, said,
"The succession law brought about a sea change in Shastric Hindu Law. Hindu widows
wen.: brought on equal footing in matters of inheritance and succession along with the

Sugalabai v. Gundappa A. Maradi and Others ILR 2007 KAR 4790 2008 (2) Kar LJ 406.


Times oflndia, 24 February 2005.


Chapter II
male heirs." Justice Sirpurkar wrote, "Section 14(1) stipulates that any property
possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the
Act, will be held by her as a full owner thereof'. 105
From the above discussion it becomes clear that law can be an instrument of
empowerment of women. The politics underlying the processes of adjudication and
justice dispensation is complex. The institutionalization of engendered meanings into the
structure of law is problematic. The problem is epistemological and political. Legal
discourse becomes a crucial site for examination of social and political ideologies. Within
social contexts, social identity is shaped through the judgments and appraisals made by
others as evidenced by their interpretative responses and their interactional behaviour.
The rejection of the legal-juridical framework in totality would be only counterproductive in the long run. At the same time, women's rights should not be collapsed
entirely into the question of law and legislation on the assumption that the legal system is
secular or gender neutral. The legal system itself establishes the equation between gender
justice and law (arrogating to itself the role of social reformer) to legitimize the
domination of the judiciary. 106 Apart from this, the role of the judges per se, in
interpreting the legal cases is of utmost importance. It has been quite rightly commented
by Justice M. Hidayatullah that "Judges have been swayed unconsciously by their own
notions of equality and equal protection of law, by their reaction to the social structure of
society, by their conception of protection of certain basic rights and even, by their respect
foe legislature. To some the written word has a meaning which they do fit into their
scheme of thinking while others read their own notions and theories into the law itself,
some others look at law with blinkers on".

Any possibility of social change has to recognize that non-discriminatory

legal frameworks provide the starting point for any negotiation of rights. The
politics that constitutes the ways in which such frameworks are used to interpret
legal provistons to discriminate against women is embedded in that cultural and



M.Mukhopadhyay, Legally dispossessed: Gender, Identity and the Process of Law, Stree, Calcutta, 1998

- 93-

Chapter II
social contexts in which such laws operate. Thus, rethinking of legal regimes in
terms of its effectiveness in achievement of justice for women needs to address
and analyse extra-legal factors that mediate its impact on women's lives. Such
spaces can also be the site for restructuring gender inequalities. For instance, the
rules that bind individuals are not only codified law but also customary practices,
religious rules and social norms. Often these customary practices are in contravention to
statutory laws but in the context of patriarchies that permeate them, one finds
interpolation between the two. In addressing the structural constraints of legal
frameworks, legal pluralism offers to broader perspective on law as multilocational, with
various centres of power beyond the state to include the family and other social
In India, there are plural systems of law that impinge upon lives of women.
Customary laws other than formal laws often compete with each other as well constitute
the understanding of women's rights in particular contexts. As such, the rules which bind
individuals are not only codified law, but customary practices, religious rules and other
social norms. Such customary practices bind individuals to their communities and also
play an important role in their identity formation. In the case of property rights of Hindu
women, such normative systems affect not only their understanding of their independent
succession right but also define the contours of such claims in terms of legitimacy. The
complex relationship between law and women's lives need to recognize such normative
plural systems of customary practices. It provides for an understanding "of legal norms
or legal sources as being engendered by different, overlapping, coexisting, co-operating
and/or competing structures ... a more profound examination and evaluation of both
diverse types of norms and of the different values underlying such different normative
systems". 108 In the context of property rights of Hindu women, it is essential to explore
the inter-linkages between statutory law and customary laws to know the dynamics of
politics underlying women's lack of property rights and gendered access to resources. In
the larger context, it can also unravel a comprehensive understanding of how both
systems of law integrate ideas of justice in the discourse on property rights. The

W. Bentzon et al, Pursuing Grounded Theory in Law: South- North Experiences in Developing
Women's Law, Tano Aschehoug, Oslo, 1998, pp 66-67.


Chapter II
commonality between the two lies in interdependence on cultural values, religious norms
and gendered ideologies that inform their understanding of women's rights to property.
The potential for social change in such multiple systems can be addressed through
broader reconceptualization of gendered perspectives in law within different contexts.
The importance of statutory laws in creating non-discriminatory frameworks is
the starting point for redressing discrimination on the basis of gender. Law is an arena of
power, of potential change and a site for negotiation of dominant ideologies. It is one of
the spaces in which "struggle to displace ideas of women's role and identities" continues
and cannot be denied. 109 Formal laws do play an important part as they allow arbiters to
use them to steer through the myriad issues involved in dispute. The role that law can
play and its limitations have been rightly observed in a perceptive analysis of gender and
justice that "without a fundamental reordering of cultural values, women cannot hope to
secure true equality in employment opportunities, economic security and social status. In
that constructive enterprise, law can play a modest but more effective role". 110 In the
specific post colonial context, any discussion on family laws need to evaluate what would
constitute 'just' family law. Legal theory would have to be informed by sociological,
historical and economic contexts or what Cotterrell, 'politics of jurisprudence' . 111
Greater transparency and fewer ambiguities in the law help to bridge the gap
between the law, the judiciary and the changing social reality. Discrimination against
women can be direct or indirect. Indirect discrimination requires particular scrutiny by
the judiciary, there is a need to ensure not only formal but also substantive equality for
women and for that purpose affirmative action may be adopted if necessary. Legal
solutions to pervasive gender discrimination must take into account the ways in which
such discrimination receives meaning in and through other structures of Indian society. It
is important also to critically evaluate the ways and extent to which law is both
constructed by and constructs existing social and gender relations. Only by doing this can
we develop strategies for change at relevant points of coherence or disjuncture between

R. Kapur ,md B. Cossman, op. cit., pp. 38

D. Rhode. 'Justice, gender and the justice', in L. Lawra and H. Winifred (eds.) Women, The Courts and
Equality, Ox ford University Press, Delhi, 1987.
R. Cottendl, The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy, University of
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1989. In this text, he defines politics of jurisprudence in terms of ideas
about the nature of law as inevitably influenced by the wider political context.

- 95-

Chapter II
rules of law and the overall normative context provided by society. Legal strategies can
mitigate the removal of entrenched inequalities in society which exclude or preclude
women's equal access to resources. The extent that the issue of equality needs to be taken
beyond generating neutral structures and towards creating structures for the
empowerment of women to achieve equality in fact rather than only in principle, the
commitment of the state, its institutions, laws and political processes need to be