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133565

Inre:LIBORBasedFinancialInstrumentsAntitrustLitigation

UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS
FORTHESECONDCIRCUIT
AugustTerm,2015

(Argued:November13,2015Decided:May23,2016)
DocketNos.133565cv(L),133636cv(CON),15432cv(CON),15441cv
(CON),15454cv(CON),15477cv(CON),15494cv(CON),15498cv(CON),
15524cv(CON),15537cv(CON),15547cv(CON),15551cv(CON),15611cv
(CON),15620cv(CON),15627cv(CON),15733cv(CON),15744cv(CON),
15778cv(CON),15825cv(CON),15830cv(CON)
x
ELLENGELBOIMetal.,
PlaintiffsAppellants,
v.
BANKOFAMERICACORPORATIONetal.,
DefendantsAppellees.
x

Before:

JACOBS,RAGGI,andLYNCH,CircuitJudges.

Plaintiffsappellants,comprisingindividualsandentitiesthathelddiverse

financialinstruments,allegethatthedefendantbankscolludedtodepressa
benchmarkincorporatedintothoseinstruments,therebydecreasingthe
instrumentsfinancialreturnsinviolationofSectionOneoftheShermanAct.
TheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork
(Buchwald,J.)dismissedthelawsuitforfailuretoallegeantitrustinjury.We
vacatethejudgmentandremandforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththis
opinion.
THOMASC.GOLDSTEIN(withEric
F.Citrononthebrief),
Goldstein&Russell,P.C.,
7475WisconsinAvenue,Suite
850,Bethesda,MD,20814,for
PlaintiffsAppellantsEllenGelboimand
LindaZacherinCaseNo.133565.

ROBERTF.WISE,JR.(with
ArthurJ.Burke&PaulS.
Mishkinonthebrief),DavisPolk&
WardwellLLP,450LexingtonAvenue,
NewYork,NY,10017,forDefendants
AppelleesBankofAmericaCorporation,
BankofAmerica,N.A.,andMerrillLynch,
Pierce,Fenner&Smith,Inc.(f/k/aBancof
AmericaSecuritiesLLC)
(additionalcounselforthemanyparties
andamiciarelistedinAppendixA)

DENNISJACOBS,CircuitJudge:
Appellantspurchasedfinancialinstruments,mainlyissuedbythe
defendantbanks,thatcarriedarateofreturnindexedtotheLondonInterbank
OfferedRate(LIBOR),whichapproximatestheaveragerateatwhichagroup
ofdesignatedbankscanborrowmoney.Appellees,16oftheworldslargest
banks(theBanks),wereonthepanelofbanksthatdeterminedLIBOReach
businessdaybased,inpart,ontheBanksindividualsubmissions.Itisalleged
thattheBankscolludedtodepressLIBORbyviolatingtheratesettingrules,and
thatthepayoutassociatedwiththevariousfinancialinstrumentswasthusbelow
whatitwouldhavebeeniftheratehadbeenunmolested.Numerousantitrust
lawsuitsagainsttheBankswereconsolidatedintoamultidistrictlitigation
(MDL).
TheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork
(Buchwald,J.)dismissedthelitigationinitsentiretyonthegroundthatthe
complaintsfailedtopleadantitrustinjury,whichisonecomponentofantitrust
standing.ThedistrictcourtreasonedthattheLIBORsettingprocesswas
collaborativeratherthancompetitive,thatanymanipulationtodepressLIBOR
thereforedidnotcauseappellantstosufferanticompetitiveharm,andthatthey
3

haveatmostafraudclaimbasedonmisrepresentation.Thecomplaintswere
thusdismissedonthegroundthattheyfailedtoallegeharmtocompetition.
Wevacatethejudgmentonthegroundthat:(1)horizontalpricefixing
constitutesaperseantitrustviolation;(2)aplaintiffallegingaperseantitrust
violationneednotseparatelypleadharmtocompetition;and(3)aconsumerwho
paysahigherpriceonaccountofhorizontalpricefixingsuffersantitrustinjury.
Sincethedistrictcourtdidnotreachthesecondcomponentofantitruststanding
afindingthatappellantsareefficientenforcersoftheantitrustlawsweremand
forfurtherproceedingsonthequestionofantitruststanding.TheBanksurge
affirmanceonthealternativegroundthatnoconspiracyhasbeenadequately
alleged;werejectthisalternative.

BACKGROUND
Despitethelegalcomplexityofthiscase,thefactualallegationsarerather
straightforward.Inre:LIBORBasedFin.InstrumentsAntitrustLitig.,935F.
Supp.2d666,677(S.D.N.Y.2013)(LIBORI).Appellantsenteredintoavariety
offinancialtransactionsatinterestratesthatreferenceLIBOR.BecauseLIBORis
acomponentorbenchmarkusedincountlessbusinessdealings,ithasbeencalled
4

theworldsmostimportantnumber.1Issuersoffinancialinstrumentstypically
setinterestratesataspreadaboveLIBOR,andtheinterestrateisfrequently
expressedintermsofthespread.LIBORratesarereportedforvariousintervals,
suchasonemonth,threemonths,sixmonths,andtwelvemonths.
TheLIBORbasedfinancialinstrumentsheldbytheappellantsincluded:
(1)assetswaps,inwhichtheownerofabondpeggedtoafixedratepaysthat
fixedratetoabankorinvestorwhilereceivinginreturnafloatingratebasedon
LIBOR;(2)collateralizeddebtobligations,whicharestructuredassetbacked
securitieswithmultipletranches,themostseniorofwhichpayoutataspread
aboveLIBOR;and(3)forwardrateagreements,inwhichonepartyreceivesa
fixedinterestrateonaprincipalamountwhilethecounterpartyreceivesinterest
atthefluctuatingLIBORonthesameprincipalamountatadesignatedendpoint.
Theseexamplesarebynomeansexhaustive.
TheBanksbelongtotheBritishBankersAssociation(BBA),theleading
tradeassociationforthefinancialservicessectorintheUnitedKingdom.During
therelevantperiod,theBBAwasaprivateassociationthatwasoperatedwithout

1SeeMarkBroad,Theworldsmostimportantnumber?BBCNEWS(October
20,200810:29p.m.),http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7680552.stm.
5

regulatoryorgovernmentoversightandwasgovernedbyseniorexecutivesfrom
twelvebanks.2TheBBAbegansettingLIBORonJanuary1,1986,usingseparate
panelsfordifferentcurrencies.Relevanttothisappeal,theU.S.Dollar(USD)
LIBORpanelwascomposedof16memberbanksoftheBBA.
ThedailyUSDLIBORwassetasfollows.All16bankswereinitially
asked:Atwhatratecouldyouborrowfunds,wereyoutodosobyaskingfor
andthenacceptinginterbankoffersinareasonablemarketsizejustpriorto11
a.m.?Eachbankwastorespondonthebasisof(inpart)itsownresearch,and
itsowncreditandliquidityriskprofile.ThomsonReuterslatercompiledeach
bankssubmissionandpublishedthesubmissionsonbehalfoftheBBA.The
finalLIBORwasthemeanoftheeightsubmissionsleftafterexcludingthefour
highestsubmissionsandthefourlowest.Amongthemanyusesandadvantages
oftheLIBORsettingprocessistheabilityofpartiestoenterintofloatingrate
transactionswithoutextensivenegotiationofterms.
ThreekeyrulesgovernedtheLIBORsettingprocess:eachpanelbankwas
toindependentlyexercisegoodfaithjudgmentandsubmitaninterestratebased
2ThesebanksincludedBarclaysBankPLC(Barclays),CitibankNA,Credit
Suisse,DeutscheBankAG,HSBCBankplc,J.P.MorganEuropeLtd.,andthe
RoyalBankofScotlandplc(RBS).
6

uponitsownexpertknowledgeofmarketconditions;thedailysubmissionof
eachbankwastoremainconfidentialuntilafterLIBORwasfinallycomputed
andpublished;andall16individualsubmissionsweretobepublishedalong
withthefinaldailyrateandwouldthusbetransparentonanexpostbasis.3
ThusanysinglebankwouldbedeterredfromsubmittinganoutlyingLIBORbid
thatwouldrisknegativemediaattentionandpotentialregulatoryorgovernment
scrutiny.Collectively,thesethreeruleswereintendedassafeguardsensuring
thatLIBORwouldreflecttheforcesofcompetitionintheLondoninterbankloan
market.4
AlthoughLIBORwassetjointly,theBanksremainedhorizontal
competitorsinthesaleoffinancialinstruments,manyofwhichwerepremisedto
somedegreeonLIBOR.Withcommercialpaper,forexample,theBanksreceived
cashfrompurchasersinexchangeforapromissoryobligationtopayanamount

3SecondConsolidatedAmendedComplaint,Mayor&CityCouncilof
Baltimore&CityofNewBritainFirefighters&PoliceBenefitFund,Texas
CompetitiveElectricHoldingsCompanyLLCv.CreditSuisseGroupAGetal.,In
re:LIBORBasedFin.InstrumentsAntitrustLitig.,No.1:11md2262(S.D.N.Y.
Sept.10,2013)at2462(Doc.406)(hereinafterOTCSecondAmended
Complaint).
4Id.65.
7

based,inpart,onLIBORataspecifiedmaturitydate(usuallyninemonths);in
suchtransactions,theBankswereborrowersandthepurchaserswerelenders.
Similarly,withswaptransactions,theBanksreceivedfixedincomestreamsfrom
purchasersinexchangeforvariablestreamsthatincorporatedLIBORasthe
referencepoint.
ALIBORincreaseofonepercentwouldhaveallegedlycosttheBanks
hundredsofmillionsofdollars.Moreover,sinceduringtherelevantperiodthe
Bankswerestillreelingfromthe2007financialcrisis,ahighLIBORsubmission
couldsignaldeterioratingfinancestothepublicandtheregulators.
AppellantsallegethattheBankscorruptedtheLIBORsettingprocessand
exerteddownwardpressureonLIBORtoincreaseprofitsinindividualfinancial
transactionsandtoprojectfinancialhealth.Inanutshell,appellantscontend
that,beginningin2007,theBanksengagedinahorizontalpricefixing
conspiracy,witheachsubmissionreportinganartificiallylowcostofborrowing
inordertodriveLIBORdown.Thecomplaintsrelyontwosources.
Thevastmajorityofallegationsfollowdirectlyfromevidencecollectedin

governmentalinvestigations.5TheUnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice(DOJ)
unearthednumerouspotentiallyrelevantemails,communications,and
documents,someofwhicharereferencedinthecomplaintsandonlyafewof
whicharereferencedforillustrativepurposes.PromptedbytheDOJ
investigations,threebanksBarclays,UBS,andRBShavereachedsettlements
overcriminalallegationsthattheymanipulatedandfixedLIBOR.
Inaddition,thecomplaintsrelyonstatistics.TheDOJcompiledevidence
thatfromJune18,2008untilApril14,2009,UBSsindividualthreemonthLIBOR
submissionswereidenticaltothelaterpublishedLIBORbenchmarkthatwas
basedonall16submissions;thestatisticalprobabilitythatUBSindependently
predictedLIBORexactlyoverapproximatelytenconsecutivemonthsis
5See,e.g.,SecondAmendedComplaint,TheCityofPhiladelphia&The
PennsylvaniaIntergovernmentalCooperationAuthorityv.BankofAmerica
Corporationetal.,Inre:LIBORBasedFin.InstrumentsLitig.,No.1:11md2262
(S.D.N.Y.Oct.6,2014)at33104(Doc.667)([A]Barclaysmanagerconcededin
arecentlydisclosedliquiditycalltotheFSAtotheextentthat,um,theLIBORs
havebeenunderstated,areweguiltyofbeingpartofthepack?Youcouldsaywe
are.(boldingandemphasisinoriginal)(internalquotationmarksomitted));id.
at41122(UBSmanagersdirectedthatthebanksUSDLiborsubmissionsbe
artificiallysuppressedsoastoplaceUBSinthemiddleofthepackofpanelbank
submissions....(boldingandemphasisinoriginal)(internalquotationmarks
omitted));id.at47140(OneRBStradergloated,[i]tsjustamazinghowLibor
fixingcanmakeyouthatmuchmoney....ItsacartelnowinLondon.(bolding
andemphasisinoriginal)(internalquotationmarksomitted)).
9

minuscule.Furthermore,priorto2007,thevalueofLIBORhadmovedintandem
withtheFederalReserveEurodollarDepositRate(FRED),withLIBOR
trackingslightlyaboveFRED.Beginningin2007,however,thetworates
switchedpositions,andLIBORdidnotconsistentlyagainriseaboveFREDuntil
aroundOctober2011,whentheEuropeanCommissionbegananinquiryinto
allegationsofLIBORfixing.Thecomplaintsadduceotheranalysesand
phenomenatosupportthehypothesisthattheBanksconspiredtodepress
LIBOR.
ProceduralHistory
ThissprawlingMDLinvolvesahostofparties,claims,andtheoriesof
liability;thepresentappealhastakenacircuitousroutetothisCourt,having
alreadyoncebeentotheSupremeCourt.
FourgroupsofplaintiffsfiledcomplaintsthatbecamesubjecttotheBanks
motionstodismiss;threeofthecomplaintswerepurportedclassactions.The
membersofoneputativeclassarethepurchasersofhundredsofmillionsof
dollarsininterestrateswapsdirectlyfromatleastone[d]efendantinwhichthe
rateofreturnwastiedtoLIBOR.LIBORI,935F.Supp.2dat681(quotingOTC
SecondAmendedComplaintat712).Thedistrictcourthelpfullylabeledthis
10

groupasoverthecounter(OTC)plaintiffs;theleadOTCplaintiffsarethe
MayorandCityCouncilofBaltimoreandtheCityofNewBritainFirefighters
andPoliceBenefitFund.Themembersofthesecondputativeclassare
bondholderswhoallegethattheconspiracyreducedthereturnsondebt
securitiesinwhichtheyheldaninterest.Theleadbondholderplaintiffsare:
EllenGelboim,thesolebeneficiaryofanindividualretirementaccountthat
ownedaLIBORbaseddebtsecurityissuedbyGeneralElectricCapital
Corporation;andLindaZacher,asimilarlysituatedbeneficiarywithrightstoa
LIBORbaseddebtsecurityissuedbyIsrael.
Third,theSchwabplaintiffs,whofiledthreeseparateamended
complaints,6eachassertinjuriessubstantiallysimilartothoseclaimedbythe
6ThefirstofthesewasfiledbySchwabBank,whichconsistsofthefollowing
entities:(i)theCharlesSchwabCorporation;(ii)CharlesSchwabBank,N.A.,a
whollyownedsubsidiaryoftheCharlesSchwabCorporation;and(iii)Charles
Schwab&Co,Inc.,anotherwhollyownedsubsidiaryoftheCharlesSchwab
Corporation.ThesecondamendedcomplaintisattributabletotheSchwabBond
plaintiffs,whoarecomprisedof:(i)SchwabShortTermBondMarketFund,(ii)
SchwabTotalBondMarketFund,and(iii)SchwabU.S.DollarLiquidAssets
Fund.Finally,theSchwabMoneyamendedcomplainthassevenplaintiffs:(i)
SchwabMoneyMarketFund,(ii)SchwabValueAdvantageMoneyFund,(iii)
SchwabRetirementAdvantageMoneyFund,(iv)SchwabInvestorMoneyFund,
(v)SchwabCashReserves,(vi)SchwabAdvisorCashReserves,and(vii)Schwab
YieldPlusFund.ContingentinterestsofSchwabYieldPlusFundhavepassedto
plaintiffSchwabYieldPlusFundLiquidationTrust.SeeInre:LIBORBasedFin.
11

OTCandbondholderplaintiffs.Finally,themembersofthethirdputativeclass
(theExchangebasedplaintiffs)claiminjuryfromthepurchaseandtradingof
contractsbasedonU.S.dollarsdepositedincommercialbanksabroad
(Eurodollarfuturescontracts).ThebuyerofatypicalEurodollarfuturescontract
paysthesellerafixedpriceattheoutsetandthesellerinexchangepaysthe
buyerasettlementpriceattheenddate,calculatedonthebasisofthethree
monthLIBOR.OptionsonEurodollarfuturescontractscanbetraded,andtheir
valuedependsonthesettlementprice.Thesevenleadplaintiffs7allegethatthe
BankssuppressionofLIBORcausedEurodollarcontractstotradeandsettleat
artificiallyhighprices,reducinggainsmadeintrades.LIBORI,935F.Supp.2d
at683.

InstrumentsAntitrustLitig.,No.1:11md2262(S.D.N.Y.Apr.30,2012)(Docs.146
148).
7Thesesevenplaintiffsare:(1)MetzlerInvestmentGmbH,aGermancompany
thatlaunchedandmanagesinvestmentfundstradinginEurodollarfutures;(2)
FTCFuturesFundSICAVand(3)FTCFuturesFundPCCLtd.,fundsbasedin
LuxembourgandGibraltar,respectively,thateachtradeEurodollarfutures;(4)
AtlanticTradingUSA,LLCand(5)303030Trading,LLC,Illinoislimitedliability
companiesthatlikewisetradeEurodollarfutures;and(6)GaryFrancisand(7)
NathanialHaynes,Illinoisresidentsengagedinthesamecourseofbusiness.See
LIBORI,935F.Supp.2dat683.
12

TheExchangebasedplaintiffscommencedproceedingsonApril15,2011;
theOTCplaintiffsfollowedacoupleofmonthslater;andnumerousindividual
casesaccumulated.TheJudicialPanelonMultidistrictLitigationtransferredand
consolidatedthecasesintheSouthernDistrictofNewYork.SeeInre:LIBOR
BasedFin.InstrumentsAntitrustLitig.,802F.Supp.2d1380,1381(J.P.M.L.2011).
TheSchwabandbondholderplaintiffssubsequentlyenlisted.Inadditiontothe
federalantitrustclaims,thecomplaintsassertnumerousfederalandstatelaw
causesofactionirrelevanttothisappeal.8Aftereachgroupofplaintiffsamended
theirrespectivecomplaints,theBanksmovedtodismiss.Severalnewcomplaints
wereadded.Asamanagementmeasure,thedistrictcourtstayedthefilingof
newcomplaintsuntilresolutionofthependingmotionstodismiss.SeeLIBORI,
935F.Supp.2dat677.
Themotionstodismissweregrantedbasedonthefindingthatnoneofthe
appellantsplausiblyallegedthattheysufferedantitrustinjury,thus,onthat
basisalone,theylackstanding.Id.at686.Thisrulingrestedonthreepremises:

8Theexceptionisthebondholderplaintiffscomplaint,whichassertssolely
federalantitrustclaims.
13

[1]Plaintiffsinjurywouldhaveresultedfrom[d]efendants
misrepresentation,notfromharmtocompetition,becausethe
LIBORsettingprocesswascooperative,notcompetitive.Id.at688.
[2]Althoughthecomplaintsmightsupportanallegationofprice
fixing,antitrustinjuryislackingbecausethecomplaintsdidnot
allegerestraintsoncompetitioninpertinentmarketsandtherefore
failedtoindicatethatplaintiffsinjuryresultedfroman
anticompetitiveaspectofdefendantsconduct.Id.

[3]SupremeCourtprecedentforeclosesafindingofantitrustinjury
iftheharmalleged...couldhaveresultedfromnormal
competitiveconductashere,becauseLIBORcouldhavebeen
depressedifeachdefendantdecidedindependentlytomisrepresent
itsborrowingcoststotheBBA.Id.at690.
ThedistrictcourtrejectedthenotionthatLIBORoperatedasaproxyfor
competitionanddistinguishedcasescitedbyappellantsonthegroundthatthey
involvedharmtocompetitionwhichisnotpresenthere.Id.at693.
Theensuingmotionstoamend,madebytheOTC,bondholder,and
Exchangebasedplaintiffs,weredeniedonthegroundthat,giventhenumberof
originalcomplaintsthathadbeenfiledandtheobviousmotivationtocraft
sustainablefirstamendedcomplaintscontainingallfactualandlegalallegations
thatsupportedplaintiffsclaims,the[districtcourt]wasentitledtorelyonthose
pleadingstocontainthestrongestpossiblestatementofplaintiffscasebasedon
thecollectiveskillsofplaintiffscounsel.Inre:LIBORBasedFin.Instruments
14

AntitrustLitig.,962F.Supp.2d606,626(S.D.N.Y.2013)(LIBORII).Thedenial
ofthemotionstoamendwasalsopremisedonthealternativegroundoffutility
becausetheproposedamendmentslackedallegationsthattheprocessof
competitionwasharmedbecausedefendantsfailedtocompetewitheachotheror
otherwiseinteractedinamanneroutsidetheboundsoflegitimatecompetition.
Id.at62728.
AppealsfiledbythebondholderplaintiffsandtheSchwabplaintiffsin
2013weredismissedsuasponteforlackofsubjectmatterjurisdictionbecausea
finalorderha[d]notbeenissuedbythedistrictcourtascontemplatedby28
U.S.C.1291,andtheordersappealedfromdidnotdisposeofallclaimsinthe
consolidatedaction.Inre:LIBORBasedFin.InstrumentsAntitrustLitig.,Nos.
133565(L)&133636(Con),2013WL9557843,at*1(2dCir.Oct.30,2013).Ona
writofcertiorari,theSupremeCourtunanimouslyreversed,holdingthat
[p]etitionersrighttoappealripenedwhenthe[d]istrict[c]ourtdismissedtheir
case,notuponeventualcompletionofmultidistrictproceedingsinallofthe
consolidatedcases.Gelboimv.BankofAm.Corp.,135S.Ct.897,902(2015).
Toalleviateanyensuingrisksofpiecemeallitigation,theSupremeCourt
highlightedFederalRuleofCivilProcedure54(b),whichprovidesfortheentryof
15

partialjudgmentonasingleorsubsetofclaims:[d]istrictcourtsmaygrant
certificationsunderthatRule,therebyenablingplaintiffsinactionsthathavenot
beendismissedintheirentiretytopursueimmediateappellatereview.Id.at
906.NumerousplaintiffsintheMDLactionavailedthemselvesofthis
mechanism,andtheseappealswereconsolidatedonApril15,2015.SeeInre:
LIBORBasedFin.InstrumentsAntitrustLitig.,No.133565(2dCir.Apr.15,2015)
(Doc.231).Afterextensivebriefingonbothsides,includingthesubmissionof
numerousamicusbriefs,thisappealisnowripefordisposition.

DISCUSSION
Wereviewthegrantofamotiontodismissdenovo,acceptingastrueall
factualclaimsinthecomplaintanddrawingallreasonableinferencesinthe
plaintiffsfavor.Finkv.TimeWarnerCable,714F.3d739,74041(2dCir.2013).
Thedenialofleavetoamendissimilarlyrevieweddenovobecausethedenial
wasbasedonaninterpretationoflaw,suchasfutility.PantherPartnersInc.v.
IkanosCommcns.,Inc.,681F.3d114,119(2dCir.2012).
Anantitrustplaintiffmustshowbothconstitutionalstandingandantitrust
standing.SeeAssociatedGen.ContractorsofCalif.,Inc.v.Calif.StateCouncilof
16

Carpenters,459U.S.519,535n.31(1983)(Harmtotheantitrustplaintiffis
sufficienttosatisfytheconstitutionalstandingrequirementofinjuryinfact,but
thecourtmustmakeafurtherdeterminationwhethertheplaintiffisaproper
partytobringaprivateantitrustaction.);PortDock&StoneCorp.v.Oldcastle,
Northeast,Inc.,507F.3d117,121(2dCir.2007)(Antitruststandingisdistinct
fromconstitutionalstanding,inwhichamereshowingofharmwillestablishthe
necessaryinjury.).Likeconstitutionalstanding,antitruststandingisathreshold
inquiryresolvedatthepleadingstage.SeeGattCommcns.v.PMCAssocs.,
L.L.C.,711F.3d68,75(2dCir.2013).Inthiscase,theharmcomponentof
constitutionalstandingisuncontested,andeasilysatisfiedbyappellants
pleadingthattheywereharmedbyreceivinglowerreturnsonLIBOR
denominatedinstrumentsasaresultofdefendantsmanipulationofLIBOR.See
Sannerv.Bd.ofTradeofCityofChi.,62F.3d918,924(7thCir.1995)(holding
thatfarmerswhosoldcropatallegedlydepressedpricessufferedharmsufficient
forArticleIIIstanding).
Lessclearisappellantsdemonstrationofanantitrustviolationand
antitruststanding.Theinterplaybetweenthesetwoconceptshasengendered

17

substantialconfusion.9Toavoidaquagmire,thisCourt(amongothers)assumes
theexistenceofaviolationinaddressingtheissueof[antitrust]standing.
Danielv.Am.Bd.ofEmergencyMed.,428F.3d408,437(2dCir.2005)(Thus,
whiletheissueofanantitrustviolationinthiscaseisbynomeansclear,for
purposesofthisappealweassumetheallegedviolationandassessonly
plaintiffsstandingtopursuetheirclaim.).Thisexpedientcancauseitsown
problems.10Thedistrictcourtproceededdirectlytothequestionofantitrust
injuryomittinganymentionofantitrustviolationbutthenelidedthe
distinctionbetweenantitrustviolationandantitrustinjurybyplacing
considerableweightonappellantsfailuretoshowharmtocompetition.
LIBORI,935F.Supp.2dat688.Althoughwewouldnotordinarilyconsider
whetherthecomplaintsstateanantitrustviolationwhenassessingantitrust

9SeeSASofP.R.,Inc.v.P.R.Tel.Co.,48F.3d39,43(1stCir.1995)([C]ourts
sometimeshavedifficulty,welljustifiedincertaincases,inseparatingstanding
orantitrustinjuryissuesfromtwootherproblems:whethertherehasbeenan
antitrustviolationatall,andwhethertheplaintiffhassufferedanyinjury
causally(inthebutforsense)relatedtothechallengedconduct.).
10SeeGatt,711F.3dat76n.9(Theconditionalphrasingofthisstepofthe
analysishintsatitsdifficulty.Whenassessingantitrustinjury,weassumethat
thepracticeatissueisaviolationoftheantitrustlaws,andare,thus,inthe
difficultpositionofpositingarationalefortheantitrustlawsprohibitionof
conductthatmay,infact,notbeprohibited.(citationomitted)).
18

standing,itiseasytoblurthedistinctionbetweenanantitrustviolationandan
antitrustinjury,asthedistrictcourtdid;sowewillexaminebothforpurposesof
judicialeconomy.

I.ANTITRUSTVIOLATION
Toavoiddismissal,appellantshadtoallegeanantitrustviolation
stemmingfromtheBankstransgressionofSectionOneoftheShermanAct:
Everycontract,combinationintheformoftrustorotherwise,orconspiracy,in
restraintoftradeorcommerceamongtheseveralStates,orwithforeignnations,
isdeclaredtobeillegal.15U.S.C.1;seeBellAtl.Corp.v.Twombly,550U.S.
544,55363(2007).Schematically,appellantsclaimsareuncomplicated.They
allegethattheBanks,assellers,colludedtodepressLIBOR,andthereby
increasedthecosttoappellants,asbuyers,ofvariousLIBORbasedfinancial
instruments,acostincreasereflectedinreducedratesofreturn.Inshort,
appellantsallegeahorizontalpricefixingconspiracy,perhapstheparadigmof
anunreasonablerestraintoftrade.NCAAv.Bd.ofRegentsofUniv.ofOkla.,
468U.S.85,100(1984).

19

SinceappellantsallegethattheLIBORmustbecharacterizedasan
inseparablepartoftheprice,andsincewemustacceptthatallegationastruefor
presentpurposes,theclaimisoneofpricefixing.Catalano,Inc.v.TargetSales,
Inc.,446U.S.643,648(1980).Inurgingotherwise,theBanksarguethatLIBORis
notitselfaprice,asitisnotitselfboughtorsoldbyanyone.Thepointis
immaterial.LIBORformsacomponentofthereturnfromvariousLIBOR
denominatedfinancialinstruments,andthefixingofacomponentofprice
violatestheantitrustlaws.Seeid.;seealsoUnitedStatesv.SoconyVacuumOil
Co.,310U.S.150,222(1940)([P]ricesarefixed...iftherangewithinwhich
purchasesorsaleswillbemadeisagreedupon,ifthepricespaidorchargedare
tobeatacertainleveloronascendingordescendingscales,iftheyaretobe
uniform,orifbyvariousformulaetheyarerelatedtothemarketprices.Theyarefixed
becausetheyareagreedupon.(emphasisadded));PlymouthDealersAssnof
No.Cal.v.UnitedStates,279F.2d128,132(9thCir.1960)(holdingthatuseofa
commonfixedlistpriceconstitutedpricefixingdespiteindependentlynegotiated
departuresfromsaidlistprice).
Horizontalpricefixingconspiraciesamongcompetitorsareunlawfulper
se,thatis,withoutfurtherinquiry.SeeLeeginCreativeLeatherProds.,Inc.v.
20

PSKS,Inc.,551U.S.877,886(2007)(Restraintsthatareperseunlawfulinclude
horizontalagreementsamongcompetitorstofixprices....);Catalano,446U.S.
at647(Ahorizontalagreementtofixpricesisthearchetypalexampleofsucha
practice[thatisplainlyanticompetitive].Ithaslongbeensettledthat[such]an
agreementtofixpricesisunlawfulperse.).Theunfamiliarcontextofappellants
horizontalpricefixingclaimsprovidesnobasistodisturbapplicationoftheperse
rule.SeeArizonav.MaricopaCty.Med.Socy,457U.S.332,349(1982)(Weare
equallyunpersuadedbytheargumentthatweshouldnotapplytheperserulein
thiscasebecausethejudiciaryhaslittleantitrustexperienceinthehealthcare
industry.TheargumentquiteobviouslyisinconsistentwithSoconyVacuum.In
unequivocalterms,westatedthat,[w]hatevermaybeitspeculiarproblemsand
characteristics,theShermanAct,sofaraspricefixingagreementsareconcerned,
establishesoneuniformruleapplicabletoallindustriesalike.(alterationin
original)(quotingSoconyVacuum,310U.S.at222)).
Appellantshavethereforeplausiblyallegedanantitrustviolation
attributabletotheBanks,forwhichappellantsseekdamages.

21

II.ANTITRUSTSTANDING
AlthoughappellantschargetheBankswithhatchingandexecutinga
horizontalpricefixingconspiracy,apracticethatisperseunlawful,theyarenot
absolve[d]...oftheobligationtodemonstrate[antitrust]standing.Daniel,428
F.3dat437.Twoissuesbearonantitruststanding:
[1]haveappellantssufferedantitrustinjury?
[2]areappellantsefficientenforcersoftheantitrustlaws?
Thesecondraisesacloserquestioninthiscase.
Theefficientenforcerinquiryturnson:(1)whethertheviolationwasa
directorremotecauseoftheinjury;(2)whetherthereisanidentifiableclassof
otherpersonswhoseselfinterestwouldnormallyleadthemtosueforthe
violation;(3)whethertheinjurywasspeculative;and(4)whetherthereisarisk
thatotherplaintiffswouldbeentitledtorecoverduplicativedamagesorthat
damageswouldbedifficulttoapportionamongpossiblevictimsoftheantitrust
injury.SeePortDock,507F.3dat12122;seealsoAssociatedGen.Contractors,
459U.S.at54044.Builtintotheanalysisisanassessmentofthechainof
causationbetweentheviolationandtheinjury.AssociatedGen.Contractors,
459U.S.at540.
22

Thedistrictcourt,havingfoundthatappellantsfailedtoplausiblyallege
antitrustinjury,hadnooccasiontoconsidertheefficientenforcerfactors.We
concludethat,althoughthedistrictcourterredinfindingthatappellants
sufferednoantitrustinjury,remandisnecessaryforproperconsiderationofthe
efficientenforcerfactors.
A.ANTITRUSTINJURY
Section4oftheClaytonActprovides:
[A]nypersonwhoshallbeinjuredinhisbusinessorproperty
byreasonofanythingforbiddenintheantitrustlawsmaysue
...inanydistrictcourtoftheUnitedStatesinthedistrictin
whichthedefendantresidesorisfoundorhasanagent,
withoutrespecttotheamountincontroversy,andshall
recoverthreefoldthedamagesbyhimsustained,andthecost
ofsuit,includingareasonableattorneysfee.
15U.S.C.15(a).TheSupremeCourtconstruestheClaytonActtorequirea
showingofantitrustinjury.SeeBrunswickCorp.v.PuebloBowlOMat,Inc.,429
U.S.477,489(1977)(Wethereforeholdthattheplaintiffs...mustprovemore
thaninjurycausallylinkedtoanillegalpresenceinthemarket.Plaintiffsmust
proveantitrustinjury,whichistosayinjuryofthetypetheantitrustlawswere
intendedtopreventandthatflowsfromthatwhichmakesdefendantsacts
unlawful.).Anantitrustinjuryshouldreflecttheanticompetitiveeffecteither
23

oftheviolationorofanticompetitiveactsmadepossiblebytheviolation.Id.It
isthereforeevidentthatCongressdidnotintendtheantitrustlawstoprovidea
remedyindamagesforallinjuriesthatmightconceivablybetracedtoan
antitrustviolation.AssociatedGen.Contractors,459U.S.at534(quoting
Hawaiiv.StandardOilCo.,405U.S.251,263n.14(1972)).
Appellantshavepledantitrustinjury.Generally,whenconsumers,
becauseofaconspiracy,mustpaypricesthatnolongerreflectordinarymarket
conditions,theysufferinjuryofthetypetheantitrustlawswereintendedto
preventandthatflowsfromthatwhichmakesdefendantsactsunlawful.
Brunswick,429U.S.at489.SeeKirtsaengv.JohnWiley&Sons,Inc.,133S.Ct.
1351,1363(2013)([T]heprincipalobjectiveofantitrustpolicyistomaximize
consumerwelfarebyencouragingfirmstobehavecompetitively.(alterationin
original)(quoting1Areeda&Hovenkamp,AntitrustLaw100,p.4(3ded.
2006)));NCAA,468U.S.at10607(Theanticompetitiveconsequencesofthis
arrangementareapparent....Priceishigherandoutputlowerthantheywould
otherwisebe,andbothareunresponsivetoconsumerpreference.Thislatterpointis
perhapsthemostsignificant,sinceCongressdesignedtheShermanActasa
consumerwelfareprescription.(emphasisadded)(quotingReiterv.Sonotone
24

Corp.,442U.S.330,343(1979)));StateofNewYorkv.HendricksonBros.,Inc.,
840F.2d1065,1079(2dCir.1988)(Ingeneral,thepersonwhohaspurchased
directlyfromthosewhohavefixedpricesatanartificiallyhighlevelinviolation
oftheantitrustlawsisdeemedtohavesufferedtheantitrustinjurywithinthe
meaningof4oftheClaytonAct....).
True,appellantsremainedfreetonegotiatetheinterestratesattachedto
particularfinancialinstruments;however,antitrustlawisconcernedwith
influencesthatcorruptmarketconditions,notbargainingpower.Any
combinationwhichtamperswithpricestructuresisengagedinanunlawful
activity.Eventhoughthemembersofthepricefixinggroupwereinnoposition
tocontrolthemarket,totheextentthattheyraised,lowered,orstabilizedprices
theywouldbedirectlyinterferingwiththefreeplayofmarketforces.Socony
Vacuum,310U.S.at221;seealsoPlymouthDealersAssn,279F.2dat132
([T]hefactthatthedealersusedthefixeduniformlistpriceinmostinstances
onlyasastartingpoint,isofnoconsequence.Itwasanagreedstartingpoint;it
hadbeenagreeduponbetweencompetitors;itwasinsomeinstancesinthe
recordrespectedandfollowed;ithadtodowith,andhaditseffectupon,price.

25

(footnoteomitted)).Thisconsiderationmaywellbearuponcontestedissuesof
causation,butitdoesnotforecloseantitrustinjury.11
ThisconclusionissettledbySupremeCourtprecedentsbeginningwith
SoconyVacuum,theseminalcaseholdingthathorizontalpricefixingremains
perseunlawful.Toddv.ExxonCorp.,275F.3d191,198(2dCir.2001).The
defendantoilcompaniesinSoconyVacuumcollusivelyraisedthespotmarket
pricesforoil,which(likeLIBOR)weredeterminedbyaveragingsubmittedprice
quotes;thisconductviolatedSectionOnebecause[p]ricesroseandjobbersand
consumersintheMidWesternareapaidmorefortheirgasolinethantheywould
havepaidbutfortheconspiracy.Competitionwasnoteliminatedfromthe
markets;butitwasclearlycurtailed,sincerestrictionofthesupplyofgasoline...
reducedtheplayoftheforcesofsupplyanddemand.SoconyVacuum,310U.S.
at220.Althoughthepricefixingconspiracywasnotsolelyresponsibleforthe

11SeeKnevelbaardDairiesv.KraftFoods,Inc.,232F.3d979,989(9thCir.
2000)([T]hatargumentmerelydeniesthattheplaintiffsweredamagedinfact.
Itdoesnotspeaktothecomplaint,whichallegesthattheplaintiffsweredamaged
whenthedefendantsfixedmilkpricesatartificiallylowlevelsandthereby
causedplaintiffstoreceive[]lessformilkthantheyotherwisewouldhave
receivedintheabsenceofthedefendantsunlawfulconduct.Thesedisputed
claimsofcausationandinjurycannotbedecidedonaRule12(b)(6)motion.
(alterationinoriginal)(internalquotationmarksomitted)).
26

increasedprices,[t]herewasampleevidencethatthebuyingprogramsatleast
contributedtothepriceriseandthestabilityofthespotmarkets,andtoincreases
inthepriceofgasolinesoldintheMidWesternarea....Thatotherfactorsalso
mayhavecontributedtothatriseandstabilityofthemarketsisimmaterial.Id.
at219(emphasisadded).Similarly,thefactthatsalesonthespotmarketswere
stillgovernedbysomecompetition[wa]sofnoconsequence.Id.at220.
SoconyVacuumdeemedhorizontalpricefixingillegalwithoutfurther
inquirybecausehorizontalpricefixingisanathematoaneconomypredicatedon
theundisturbedinteractionbetweensupplyanddemand.Seeid.at221(Ifthe
socalledcompetitiveabusesweretobeappraisedhere,thereasonablenessof
priceswouldnecessarilybecomeanissueineverypricefixingcase.Inthatevent
theShermanActwouldsoonbeemasculated;itsphilosophywouldbe
supplantedbyonewhichiswhollyalientoasystemoffreecompetition;itwould
notbethecharteroffreedomwhichitsframersintended.);id.at224n.59(The
effectivenessofpricefixingagreementsisdependentuponmanyfactors,suchas
competitivetactics,positionintheindustry,[and]theformulaunderlyingprice
policies.Whatevereconomicjustificationparticularpricefixingagreementsmay
bethoughttohave,thelawdoesnotpermitaninquiryintotheirreasonableness.
27

Theyare...bannedbecauseoftheiractualorpotentialthreattothecentral
nervoussystemoftheeconomy.(emphasisadded)).
BuildinguponSoconyVacuum,theSupremeCourtruledinBlueShieldof
Va.v.McCready,457U.S.465(1982),thatasubscribertoaninsuranceplan
sufferedantitrustinjurybyreasonoftheinsurersdecision,madeincollusion
withapsychiatricsociety,toreimbursesubscribersforpsychotherapyperformed
bypsychiatristsbutnotpsychologists:[a]saconsumerofpsychotherapy
servicesentitledtofinancialbenefitsundertheBlueShieldplan,wethinkitclear
thatMcCreadywaswithinthatareaoftheeconomy...endangeredby[that]
breakdownofcompetitiveconditionsresultingfromBlueShieldsselective
refusaltoreimburse.Id.at48081(secondalternationinoriginal)(quotingInre
MultidistrictVehicleAirPollutionM.D.L.No.31,481F.2d122,129(9thCir.
1973)).
Brunswicksexpansivedefinitionofanticompetitiveeffectrelievesa
SectionFourplaintiffofprov[ing]anactuallesseningofcompetitioninorderto
recover....[W]hileanincreaseinpriceresultingfromadampeningof
competitivemarketforcesisassuredlyonetypeofinjuryforwhich4
potentiallyoffersredress,thatisnottheonlyformofinjuryremediableunder
28

4.Id.at48283(citationomitted)(quotingBrunswick,429U.S.at489n.14).The
consumerinMcCreadywasfoundtohavepledacognizableantitrustinjury,
havingchargedapurposefullyanticompetitivescheme....Although[she]was
notacompetitoroftheconspirators,theinjuryshesufferedwasinextricably
intertwinedwiththeinjurytheconspiratorssoughttoinflictonpsychologists
andthepsychotherapymarket.Id.at48384.
AsinMcCready,theanticompetitiveeffectoftheBanksalleged
conspiracywouldbethatconsumersgotlessfortheirmoney.TheSupreme
Courthaswarnedoftheantitrustdangerslurkingintheactivitiesofprivate
standardsettingassociations:Thereisnodoubtthatthemembersofsuch
associationsoftenhaveeconomicincentivestorestraincompetitionandthatthe
productstandardssetbysuchassociationshaveaseriouspotentialfor
anticompetitiveharm....Accordingly,privatestandardsettingassociations
havetraditionallybeenobjectsofantitrustscrutiny.AlliedTube&Conduit
Corp.v.IndianHead,Inc.,486U.S.492,500(1988)(footnoteandcitation
omitted).
Appellantshaveplausiblyallegedantitrustinjury.Theyhaveidentifiedan
illegalanticompetitivepractice(horizontalpricefixing),haveclaimedanactual
29

injuryplacingappellantsinaworsepositionasaconsequenceoftheBanks
conduct,andhavedemonstratedthattheirinjuryisonetheantitrustlawswere
designedtoprevent.Gatt,711F.3dat76(quotingBrunswick,429U.S.at486).
***
Thedistrictcourtscontraryconclusionrestedinpartonthesyllogismthat
sincetheLIBORsettingprocesswasacooperativeendeavor,therecouldbeno
anticompetitiveharm.LIBORI,935F.Supp.2dat688.Butappellantsclaim
violation(andinjuryintheformofhigherprices)flowingfromthecorruptionof
theratesettingprocess,which(allegedly)turnedaprocessinwhichtheBanks
jointlyparticipatedintoconspiracy.[T]hemachineryemployedbya
combinationforpricefixingisimmaterial.SoconyVacuum,310U.S.at223.12
ThedistrictcourtdrewaparallelbetweentheLIBORsettingprocessandthe
collaborativeventureinAlliedTube(thoughthestandardsettinginAlliedTube
likewiseposedantitrustconcerns):LiketheLIBORsettingprocess,theprocess
offormingthesafetystandard[inAlliedTube]wasacooperativeendeavorby
12Aleadingantitrusttreatisehassimilarlyseizedonthisdefect.SeeIIA
Areeda&Hovenkamp,AntitrustLaw337p.100n.3(4thed.2014)(labeling
LIBORIatroublesomeholdingthatpurchasersofinstrumentssubjecttoLIBOR
ratemanipulationdidnotsufferantitrustinjurybecauseLIBORagreementswere
neverintendedtobeanticompetitivebutrathertheproductofjointproduction).
30

otherwisecompetingcompaniesundertheauspicesofatradeassociation.
LIBORI,935F.Supp.2dat693.TheBankswereindeedengagedinajoint
process,andthatendeavorwasgovernedbyrulesputinplacetoprevent
collusion.ButthecrucialallegationisthattheBankscircumventedtheLIBOR
settingrules,andthatjointprocessthusturnedintocollusion.See,e.g.,Allied
Tube,486U.S.at50607([P]rivatestandardsettingbyassociationscomprising
firmswithhorizontalandverticalbusinessrelationsispermittedatallunderthe
antitrustlawsonlyontheunderstandingthatitwillbeconductedina
nonpartisanmannerofferingprocompetitivebenefits....);MapleFlooring
Mfrs.Assnv.UnitedStates,268U.S.563,58283(1925)(distinguishingbetween
disseminationofpertinentinformationthatstabilizesproductionandprice,
whichisnotunlawful,andimproperuseofthatinformationthroughany
concertedactionwhichoperatestorestrainthefreedomofactionofthosewho
buyandsell).
Equallyunsoundwasthedistrictcourtsdismissalonthegroundthat
appellantsfailedtopleadharmtocompetition.SeeLIBORI,935F.Supp.2dat
68889.[A]4plaintiffneednotproveanactuallesseningofcompetitionin
ordertorecover.McCready,457U.S.at482(quotingBrunswick,427U.S.at489
31

n.14).Ifproofofharmtocompetitionisnotaprerequisiteforrecovery,itfollows
thatallegationspleadingharmtocompetitionarenotrequiredtowithstanda
motiontodismisswhentheconductchallengedisaperseviolation.See
MaricopaCty.,457U.S.at351(Theanticompetitivepotentialinherentin...
pricefixingagreementsjustifiestheirfacialinvalidationevenifprocompetitive
justificationsareofferedforsome.);Catalano,446U.S.at650([S]inceprice
fixingagreementshavebeenadjudgedtolackanyredeemingvirtue,[theyare]
conclusivelypresumedillegalwithoutfurtherexamination....(internal
quotationmarksomitted)).13TheThirdCircuitmadethatpointinPaceElecs.,
Inc.v.CanonComput.Sys.,Inc.,213F.3d118,12324(3dCir.2000):
[W]ebelievethatrequiringaplaintifftodemonstratethataninjury
stemmingfromaperseviolationoftheantitrustlawscausedan
actualadverseeffectonarelevantmarketinordertosatisfythe
antitrustinjuryrequirementcomesdangerouslycloseto
transformingaperseviolationintoacasetobejudgedundertherule
ofreason....Implicitinthe[Supreme]Courtsapproachisthata
plaintiffwhohadsufferedlossasaresultofananticompetitive
aspectofaperserestraintoftradeagreementwouldhavesuffered

13Althoughthesecasesapplytheperseruletopricefixingagreements
generally,theSupremeCourthasclarifiedthattheruleofreason,notaperse
ruleofunlawfulness,[is]theappropriatestandardtojudgeverticalprice
restraints.Leegin,551U.S.at899.Thishasnobearingonthiscaseinwhich
appellantsallegeahorizontalpricefixingconspiracy.
32

antitrustinjury,withoutdemonstratingthatthechallengedpractice
hadanactual,adverseeconomiceffectonarelevantmarket.
Appellantshaveallegedananticompetitivetendency:thewarpingof
marketfactorsaffectingthepricesforLIBORbasedfinancialinstruments.No
furthershowingofactualadverseeffectinthemarketplaceisnecessary.This
attributeseparatesevaluationofperseviolationswhicharepresumedillegal
fromruleofreasonviolations,whichdemandappraisalofthemarketplace
consequencesthatflowfromaparticularviolation.14
ThedistrictcourtobservedthatLIBORdidnotnecessarilycorrespondto
theinterestratechargedforanyactualinterbankloan.LIBORI,935F.Supp.2d
at689.Thisisadisputedfactualissuethatmustbereservedfortheproofstage.
ButevenifnoneoftheappellantsfinancialinstrumentspaidinterestatLIBOR,
SoconyVacuumallowsanantitrustclaimbasedontheinfluencethata
conspiracyexertsonthestartingpointforprices.SeeInreHighFructoseCorn
SyrupAntitrustLitig.,295F.3d651,656(7thCir.2002)(Thethirdtrapisfailing

14SeeCapitalImagingAssocs.,P.C.v.MohawkValleyMed.Assocs.,Inc.,996
F.2d537,543(2dCir.1993)(Inthegeneralrunofcasesaplaintiffmustprovean
antitrustinjuryundertheruleofreason.Underthistestplaintiffbearstheinitial
burdenofshowingthatthechallengedactionhashadanactualadverseeffecton
competitionasawholeintherelevantmarket....).
33

todistinguishbetweentheexistenceofaconspiracyanditsefficacy.The
defendantspointoutthatmanyoftheactualsales...weremadeatpricesbelow
thedefendantslistprices,andtheyintimate...thatthereforeevenabaldfaced
agreementtofixlistpriceswouldnotbeillegalinthisindustry....Thatis
wrong.Anagreementtofixlistpricesis...aperseviolationoftheShermanAct
evenifmostorforthatmatteralltransactionsoccuratlowerprices.).
Thedistrictcourtdeemeditsignificantthatappellantscouldhave
sufferedthesameharmundernormalcircumstancesoffreecompetition.
LIBORI,935F.Supp.2dat689.True;butantitrustlawreliesontheprobability
ofharmwhenevaluatingperseviolations.SeeCatalano,446U.S.at649([T]he
factthatapracticemayturnouttobeharmlessinaparticularsetof
circumstanceswillnotpreventitsbeingdeclaredunlawfulperse.).
Thetestfashionedbythedistrictcourtwasbasedonanoverreadingof
BrunswickandofAtlanticRichfieldCo.v.USAPetroleumCo.,495U.S.328
(1990)(ARCO).Atmost,thesecasesstandforthepropositionthatcompetitors
whocomplainoflowfixedpricesdonotsufferantitrustinjury.SeeARCO,495
U.S.at34546(Wedeclinetodilutetheantitrustinjuryrequirementherebecause
wefindthatthereisnoneedtoencourageprivateenforcementbycompetitorsof
34

theruleagainstvertical,maximumpricefixing....[P]rovidingthecompetitora
causeofactionwouldnotprotecttherightsofdealersandconsumersunderthe
antitrustlaws.).NeitherARCOnorBrunswicktreatedantitrustinjuryasone
thatcouldnothavebeensufferedundernormalcompetitiveconditions.15As
ARCOexplains:[t]heantitrustinjuryrequirementensuresthataplaintiffcan
recoveronlyifthelossstemsfromacompetitionreducingaspectoreffectofthe
defendantsbehavior;riggingapricecomponenttothwartordinarymarket
conditionsisonesuchaspectoreffect.495U.S.at344.Thedistrictcourt
opinionemphasizesthatappellantshavenotallegedanystructuraleffect
whereindefendantsimprovedtheirpositionrelativetotheircompetitors.
LIBORI,935F.Supp.2dat692.However,appellantssustainedtheirburdenof
showinginjurybyallegingthattheypaidartificiallyfixedhigherprices.

15Thedistrictcourtsmusingthatthesameharmcouldhaveoccurredifthe
defendantseachindependentlysubmittedaLIBORquotethatwasartificially
lowissimilarlyinaptandamountstoforcingantitrustplaintiffstoruleoutthe
possibilityofunilateralactioncausingtheirassertedinjury;thisnotionis
unsupportedbyprecedent.LIBORI,935F.Supp.2dat691.
35

WhethertheBankscompetitorswerealsoinjuredisnotdecisive,andpossibly
notgermane.16
***
Congressdidnotintendtoalloweverypersontangentiallyaffectedbyan
antitrustviolationtomaintainanaction....[T]hepotencyofthe[4]remedy
impliestheneedforsomecareinitsapplication.McCready,457U.S.at477.At
thesametime,theunrestrictivelanguageofthesection,andtheavowedbreadth
ofthecongressionalpurposeinenactingthisremedialprovisioncautions
[courts]nottocabin4inwaysthatwilldefeatitsbroadremedialobjective.Id.
Accommodationofbothaimsrequirescourtstoconsidertherelationshipofthe
injuryallegedwiththoseformsofinjuryaboutwhichCongresswaslikelyto
havebeenconcerned,inmaking...conductunlawfulandinprovidingaprivate
remedyunder4.Id.at478.TheShermanActsafeguardsconsumersfrom
marketplaceabuses;appellantsareconsumersclaiminginjuryfromahorizontal
pricefixingconspiracy.Theyhaveaccordinglyplausiblyallegedantitrustinjury.
16ThisCourthassaidindictathatharmtocompetitionisnecessarytoshow
antitrustinjury.SeePaycomBillingServs.,Inc.v.MastercardIntl,Inc.,467F.3d
283,294(2dCir.2006)(Withoutharmtocompetition,therecanbenoantitrust
injuryandconsequently,noantitruststanding.).Thispositioncannotbe
reconciledwithSupremeCourtprecedent.
36

B.THEEFFICIENTENFORCERFACTORS17
Thesecondquestionthatbearsonantitruststandingiswhetherappellants
satisfytheefficientenforcerfactors.SeeDaniel,428F.3dat443(Evenifwewere
toconcludethattheplaintiffshadadequatelystatedanantitrustinjury,that
wouldnotnecessarilyestablishtheirstandingtosueinthiscase.Ashowingof
antitrustinjuryisnecessary,butnotalwayssufficient,toestablishstanding.
(quotingCargill,Inc.v.MonfortofColo.,Inc.,479U.S.104,110n.5(1986))).The
districtcourtdidnotreachthisissuebecauseitdismissedforlackofantitrust
injury.Wearenotinapositiontoresolvetheseissues,whichmayentailfurther
inquiry,norareweinclinedtoanswertheseveralrelevantquestionswithout
priorconsiderationofthembythedistrictcourt.
Thefourefficientenforcerfactorsare:(1)thedirectnessorindirectnessof
theassertedinjury,whichrequiresevaluationofthechainofcausation
linkingappellantsassertedinjuryandtheBanksallegedpricefixing;(2)the
existenceofmoredirectvictimsoftheallegedconspiracy;(3)theextentto
whichappellantsdamagesclaimishighlyspeculative;and(4)theimportance
17JudgeLynchdoesnotjointhissection,believingthatitisunnecessarytothe
resolutionofthecaseandthatitispreferabletoallowthedistrictcourttoaddress
thequestionfirst,withtheaidofbriefing.
37

ofavoidingeithertheriskofduplicaterecoveriesontheonehand,orthedanger
ofcomplexapportionmentofdamagesontheother.AssociatedGen.
Contractors,459U.S.at54045.
Thesefactorsrequirecloseattentionheregiventhattherearefeaturesof
thiscasethatmakeitlikenoother,andpotentiallybearuponwhethertheaimsof
theantitrustlawsaremostefficientlyadvancedbyappellantsthroughthesesuits.

Therearemanyotherenforcementmechanismsatworkhere.Inaddition

totheplaintiffsinthenumerouslawsuitsconsolidatedhere,theBanksconduct
isunderscrutinybygovernmentorgans,bankregulatorsandfinancialregulators
inaconsiderablenumberofcountries.Thisbackgroundcontextbearsuponthe
needforappellantsasinstrumentsforvindicatingtheShermanAct.
Thefactorsareconsideredinorder.

A.

Causation.Astothedirectnessorindirectnessoftheasserted

injury,id.at540,anumberofquestionsarise,includingtherelevantmarket
(whetherforLIBORdenominatedinstruments,forinterestbearingproducts
generally,orsimplyformoney)andtheantitruststandingofthoseplaintiffswho
didnotdealdirectlywiththeBanks.Umbrellastandingconcernsaremostoften
38

evidentwhenacartelcontrolsonlypartofamarket,butaconsumerwhodealt
withanoncartelmemberallegesthathesustainedinjurybyvirtueofthecartels
raisingofpricesinthemarketasawhole.SeegenerallyInreProcessedEgg
Prods.AntitrustLitig.,No.08MD2002,2015WL5544524,at*14(E.D.Pa.Sept.
18,2015);WilliamH.Page,TheScopeofLiabilityforAntitrustViolations,37
STAN.L.REV.1445,146574(1985).Theantitruststandingofumbrellapurchasers
undersuchcircumstanceshasproducedasplitinauthorityamongoursister
circuits.CompareU.S.GypsumCo.v.Ind.GasCo.,350F.3d623,627(7thCir.
2003)(Acartelcutsoutput,whichelevatespricethroughoutthemarket;
customersoffringefirms(sellersthathavenotjoinedthecartel)paythishigher
price,andthussufferantitrustinjury,justlikecustomersofthecartels
members.),andInreBeefIndus.AntitrustLitig.,600F.2d1148,1171n.24(5th
Cir.1979)(Itisimmaterialwhetherornotasteerpurchasedfromaplaintiff
founditswayintothehandsofaconspiratorretailer.Itisenoughif,asalleged,
theconspiratorsactivitiescausedageneraldepressioninwholesalepricesand
theintermediarypurchasingfromaplaintiffbasedhispricingdecisiononthe
depressedwholesalebeefprice.),withMidWestPaperProds.Co.v.ContlGrp.
Inc.,596F.2d573,58087(3dCir.1979)(notingriskthattrebledamages,
39

spreadingbeyondareaofdefendantsdirectsales,wouldresultinanoverkill,
duetoanenlargementoftheprivateweapontoacaliberfarexceedingthat
contemplatedbyCongress(quotingCalderoneEnters.Corp.v.UnitedArtists
TheatreCircuit,Inc.,454F.2d1292,1295(2dCir.1971)).
Atfirstglance,herethereappearstobenodifferenceintheinjuryalleged
bythosewhodealtinLIBORdenominatedinstruments,whethertheir
transactionswereconducteddirectlyorindirectlywiththeBanks.Atthesame
time,however,iftheBankscontrolonlyasmallpercentageoftheultimate
identifiedmarket,seeLIBORI,935F.Supp.2dat679(observingthatLIBOR
affectsthepricingoftrillionsofdollarsworthoffinancialtransactions),this
casemayraisetheveryconcernofdamagesdisproportionatetowrongdoing
notedinMidWestPaper,596F.3dat58087.RequiringtheBankstopaytreble
damagestoeveryplaintiffwhoendeduponthewrongsideofanindependent
LIBORdenominatedderivativeswapwould,ifappellantsallegationswere
provedattrial,notonlybankrupt16oftheworldsmostimportantfinancial
institutions,butalsovastlyextendthepotentialscopeofantitrustliabilityin
myriadmarketswherederivativeinstrumentshaveproliferated.

40

B.ExistenceofMoreDirectVictims.Thisconsiderationseemstobear
chieflyonwhethertheplaintiffisaconsumeroracompetitor,andinthis
litigationappellantsallegestatusasconsumers.Butconsumerstatusisnotthe
endoftheinquiry;theefficientenforcercriteriamustbeestablishedirrespective
ofwhethertheplaintiffisaconsumeroracompetitor.SeeSunbeamTelevision
Corp.v.NielsenMediaResearch,Inc.,711F.3d1264,1273(11thCir.2013).
Implicitintheinquiryisrecognitionthatnoteveryvictimofanantitrust
violationneedstobecompensatedundertheantitrustlawsinorderforthe
antitrustlawstobeefficientlyenforced.Moreover,onepeculiarfeatureofthis
caseisthatremotevictims(whoacquiredLIBORbasedinstrumentsfromanyof
thousandsofnondefendantbanks)wouldbeinjuredtothesameextentandin
thesamewayasdirectcustomersofatheBanks.Thebondholders,forexample,
purchasedtheirbondsfromothersources.Creditingtheallegationsofthe
complaints,anartificialdepressioninLIBORwouldinjureanyonewhobought
bankdebtpeggedtoLIBORfromanybankanywhere.Sointhiscasedirectness
mayhavediminishedweight.

C.SpeculativeDamages.Themostelementaryconceptionsofjustice
41

andpublicpolicyrequirethatthewrongdoershallbeartheriskofthe
uncertaintywhichhisownwronghascreated.InreDDAVPDirectPurchaser
AntitrustLitig.,585F.3d677,689(2dCir.2009)(alterationomitted)(quoting
Bigelowv.RKORadioPictures,Inc.,327U.S.251,265(1946)).Still,highly
speculativedamagesisasignthatagivenplaintiffisaninefficientengineof
enforcement.
Anydamagesestimatewouldrequireevidencetosupportajustand
reasonableestimateofdamages,anditisdifficulttoseehowappellantswould
arriveatsuchanestimate,evenwiththeaidofexperttestimony.U.S.Football
Leaguev.NatlFootballLeague,842F.2d1335,1378(2dCir.1988)(quoting
Bigelow,327U.S.at264).Atthesametime,somedegreeofuncertaintystems
fromthenatureofantitrustlaw.SeeJ.TruettPayneCo.,Inc.v.ChryslerMotors
Corp.,451U.S.557,566(1981)(Ourwillingnesstoacceptadegreeofuncertainty
inthesecasesrestsinpartonthedifficultyofascertainingbusinessdamagesas
compared,forexample,todamagesresultingfromapersonalinjuryorfrom
condemnationofaparcelofland.Thevagariesofthemarketplaceusuallydeny
ussureknowledgeofwhatplaintiffssituationwouldhavebeenintheabsenceof
thedefendantsantitrustviolation.).Impedimentstoreachingareliable
42

damagesestimateoftenflowfromthenatureandcomplexityofthealleged
antitrustviolation.SeeDDAVP,585F.3dat689.
Theissuehereiswhetherthedamageswouldnecessarilybehighly
speculative.AssociatedGen.Contractors,459U.S.at542.Andastothat,this
casepresentssomeunusualchallenges.Thedisputedtransactionsweredoneat
ratesthatwerenegotiated,notwithstandingthatthenegotiatedcomponentwas
theincrementaboveLIBOR.Andthemarketformoneyisworldwide,with
competitorsofferingvariousincrementsaboveLIBOR,orratespeggedtoother
benchmarks,orratessetwithoutreferencetoanybenchmarkatall.

D.DuplicativeRecoveryandComplexDamageApportionment.The
complaintsreferencegovernmentandregulatoryinvestigationsandsuits,which
areindeedthebasisformanyoftheallegationsmadeanddocumentsreferenced
inthecomplaints.Thetransactionsthatarethesubjectofinvestigationandsuit
arecountlessandtheramifiedconsequencesarebeyondconception.Related
proceedingsareongoinginatleastseveralcountries.Someofthosegovernment
initiativesmayseekdamagesonbehalfofvictims,andforapportionmentamong
them.Othersmayseekfines,injunctions,disgorgement,andotherremedies
43

knowntoUnitedStatescourtsandforeignjurisdictions.Itiswhollyunclearon
thisrecordhowissuesofduplicaterecoveryanddamageapportionmentcanbe
assessed.
***
Theefficientenforcerfactorsreflectaconcernaboutwhethertheputative
plaintiffisaproperpartytoperformtheofficeofaprivateattorneygeneraland
therebyvindicatethepublicinterestinantitrustenforcement.Gatt,711F.3dat
80(quotingAssociatedGen.Contractors,459U.S.at542).Weremandforthe
districtcourttoconsiderthesemattersinthefirstinstance.

III.
TheBanksurgeaffirmanceonthealternativegroundthatappellantshave
notadequatelyallegedconspiracy.Thedistrictcourtsopinionexpressedno
viewonthisissue,havingdismissedappellantscaseforlackofantitrust
standing.Butthereisnopointinremandingforconsiderationofthisquestion
becausethedistrictcourtexpresseditspositioninarecentdecisionadjudicating
motionstodismissnewcomplaintsthatassertedclaimsidenticaltothose

44

presentlybeforeus:18parallelconductneednotimplyaconspiracy,and
certainlynotwhereeachsupposedconspiracyindependentlyhadthesame
motive(namely,toprotectitsownreputationforcreditworthiness)toengage
independentlyinthesamemisconduct....Plaintiffsremainingallegationsdo
notsupportthepleadingofabroadbasedconspiracytomanipulateUSDLIBOR
fortradersbenefitortosuppressLIBORduringthefinancialcrisis.Inre
LIBORBasedFin.InstrumentsAntitrustLitig.,No.11MDL2262,2015WL
4634541,at*41*44(S.D.N.Y.Aug.4,2015)(LIBORIV).Thepartieshave
briefedthisissueonappeal;judicialeconomyisaccordinglyservedbyour
considerationofthequestionnow.Tosurvivedismissal,theplaintiffneednot
showthatitsallegationssuggestinganagreementaremorelikelythannottrueor
thattheyruleoutthepossibilityofindependentaction,aswouldberequiredat
laterlitigationstagessuchasadefensemotionforsummaryjudgment,oratrial.
AndersonNews,L.L.C.v.Am.Media,Inc.,680F.3d162,184(2dCir.2012)
(citationsomitted).Rather,[b]ecauseplausibilityisastandardlowerthan

18Thesecomplaintswerefiledbynewplaintiffs,includingtheFederalHome
LoanMortgageCorporation(FreddieMac),whosoughttojointhepresent
appealasamici.Thatmotionwasdeniedbecausetheseplaintiffselectednotto
jointheappealattheoutsetasinstructedbyGelboim.SeeInre:LIBORBased
Fin.InstrumentsAntitrustLitig.,No.133565(2dCir.Sept.18,2015)(Doc.557).
45

probability,agivensetofactionsmaywellbesubjecttodiverging
interpretations,eachofwhichisplausible....Thechoicebetweentwoplausible
inferencesthatmaybedrawnfromfactualallegationsisnotachoicetobemade
bythecourtonaRule12(b)(6)motion.Id.at18485(citationsomitted).
Skepticismofaconspiracysexistenceisinsufficienttowarrantdismissal;a
wellpleadedcomplaintmayproceedevenifitstrikesasavvyjudgethatactual
proofofthosefactsisimprobable,andthatarecoveryisveryremoteand
unlikely.Twombly,550U.S.at556(quotingScheuerv.Rhodes,416U.S.232,
236(1974)).
Inordertoestablishaconspiracyinviolationof1...proofofjointor
concertedactionisrequired;proofofunilateralactiondoesnotsuffice.
AndersonNews,680F.3dat183.Circumstancesmustrevealaunityofpurpose
oracommondesignandunderstanding,orameetingofmindsinanunlawful
arrangement.Id.(quotingMonsantoCo.v.SprayRiteServiceCorp.,465U.S.
752,764(1984)).Itfollows,then,thatacomplaintallegingmerelyparallel
conductisnotsustainable.Id.at184.Atthesametime,conspiraciesarerarely
evidencedbyexplicitagreementsandnearlyalwaysmustbeproventhrough
inferencesthatmayfairlybedrawnfromthebehaviorofthealleged
46

conspirators.Id.at183(quotingMichelmanv.ClarkSchwebelFiberGlass
Corp.,534F.2d1036,1043(2dCir.1976)).Atthepleadingstage,acomplaint
claimingconspiracy,tobeplausible,mustpleadenoughfactualmatter(takenas
true)tosuggestthatanagreementwasmade....Id.at184(quotingTwombly,
550U.S.at556).
Thelineseparatingconspiracyfromparallelismisindistinct,butmaybe
crossedwithallegationsofinterdependentconduct,accompaniedby
circumstantialevidenceandplusfactors.Mayor&CityCouncilofBalt.v.
Citigroup,Inc.,709F.3d129,136(2dCir.2013)(quotingTodd,275F.3dat198).
Theseplusfactorsinclude:(1)acommonmotivetoconspire;(2)evidence
thatshowsthattheparallelactswereagainsttheapparentindividualeconomic
selfinterestoftheallegedconspirators;and(3)evidenceofahighlevelof
interfirmcommunications.Id.(quotingTwomblyv.BellAtl.Corp.,425F.3d
99,114(2dCir.2005)).[T]heseplusfactorsareneitherexhaustivenorexclusive,
butratherillustrativeofthetypeofcircumstanceswhich,whencombinedwith
parallelbehavior,mightpermitajurytoinfertheexistenceofanagreement.Id.
n.6.
Closecasesaboundonthisissue,butthisisnotoneofthem;appellants
47

complaintscontainnumerousallegationsthatclearthebarofplausibility.19
Theseallegationsevinceacommonmotivetoconspireincreasedprofitsandthe
projectionoffinancialsoundnessaswellasahighnumberofinterfirm

19See,e.g.,OTCSecondAmendedComplaintat3387(Barclaysalsoknew
thattheotherpanelbanks,actingasapack,weresubmittingUSDLIBORrates
thatweretoolow.BarclaysemployeesrevealedthatalloftheContributor
Panelbanks,includingBarclays,weresubmittingratesthatweretoolow.
(boldingandemphasisinoriginal)(internalquotationmarksomitted));id.at36
92(OnMay21,2008,aWallStreetJournalreporteraskedUBS,byemail,why
backinmidApril...UBShadbeenpaying12basispointsfor[commercial
paper]morethanitwaspostingasaLiborquote?Theseniormanager...
forwardedaproposedanswer...stating:theanswerwouldbebecausethe
wholestreetwasdoingthesameandbecausewedidnotwanttobeanoutlierin
theliborfixings,justlikeeverybodyelse.(boldingandemphasisinoriginal)
(internalquotationmarksomitted));id.at40108(Forexample,aNovember
29,2007emailshowsthatBarclaysknew,inadvanceofthesubmissiondeadline,
theproposedconfidentialsubmissionsofeveryUSDLIBORpanelbank.
On29November2007,allthecontributingbankssubmissionsfor
onemonthUSdollarLIBORincreasedbyarangeof35to48basis
points.Barclayssubmissionincreasedfrom4.86on28Novemberto
5.3on29November(anincreaseof44basispoints).Theofferthat
Barclayssawinthemarketwas30basispointshigher,at5.60.
BarclaysSubmitterhadintendedtosubmitarateof5.50onthat
day.Howeverhewasoverruledonaconferencecallduringwhich
thesubmissionswerediscussed,asarateof5.50wasexpectedto
drawnegativemediaattention(asthiswouldhavebeen20basis
pointsabovethenexthighestsubmission).ManagerEsaidonthe
callthatitsgoingtocauseash*tstorm.).
(boldingandemphasisinoriginal).
48

communications,includingBarclaysknowledgeofotherbanksconfidential
individualsubmissionsinadvance.Theparallelismisaccompaniedbyplus
factorsplausiblysuggestingaconspiracy,tosaynothingoftheeconomic
evidenceinthecomplaintssuchastheLIBORFREDdivergencefurther
supportinganinferenceofconspiracy.20TheBanksarguethatthepack
behaviordescribedinthecomplaintsisequallyconsistentwithparallelism.
Maybe;butatthemotiontodismissstage,appellantsmustonlyputforth
sufficientfactualmattertoplausiblysuggestaninferenceofconspiracy,evenif
thefactsaresusceptibletoanequallylikelyinterpretation.SeeAndersonNews,
680F.3dat184(Becauseplausibilityisastandardlowerthanprobability,a
givensetofactionsmaywellbesubjecttodiverginginterpretations,eachof
whichisplausible.).

20SeealsoOTCSecondAmendedComplaintat4411617(Further
demonstratingUBSsubmittersstunningabilitytoconsistentlytargettheactual
publishedLIBORratesdespiteavolatilemarket,theDOJfoundthatfromJune
18,2008,andcontinuingforapproximatelythesame10monthperiod,UBSs3
monthLIBORsubmissionswereidenticaltothepublishedLIBORfix,andlargely
consistentwiththepublishedLIBORfixintheothertenors.Usingprobability
analysis,theconsultingexpertthencalculatedthelikelihoodtobelessthan1%
thatUBScouldhaveachievedthisremarkableconsistencybasedon
considerationofthepriordaysinterquartilerangeLIBORPanelBank
submissions.(boldingandemphasisinoriginal)).
49

Becauseappellantshaveplausiblyallegedtheexistenceofaninterbank
conspiracy,thedistrictcourtsdecisioncannotbeaffirmedonthealternative
basisurgedbytheBanks.

IV.
Thisdecisionisofnarrowscope.Itmaybethattheinfluenceofthe
corruptedLIBORfigureoncompetitionwasweakandpotentiallyinsignificant,
giventhatthefinancialtransactionsatissuearecomplex,LIBORwasnot
binding,andtheworldwidemarketforfinancialinstrumentsnothinglessthan
themarketformoneyisvast,andinfluencedbymultiplebenchmarks.Thenet
impactofataintedLIBORinthecreditmarketisanissueofcausationreserved
fortheproofstage;atthisstage,itisplausiblyallegedonthefaceofthe
complaintsthatamanipulationofLIBORexertedsomeinfluenceonprice.The
extentofthatinfluenceandtheidentityofpersonswhocansue,amongother
things,aremattersreservedforlater.
Moreover,commonsensedictatesthattheBanksoperatednotjustas
borrowersbutalsoaslendersintransactionsthatreferencedLIBOR.Banksdo
notstockpilemoney,anymorethanbakersstockpileyeast.Itseemsstrangethat
50

thisorthatbank(oranybank)wouldconspiretogain,asaborrower,profitsthat
wouldbeoffsetbyaparityoflossesitwouldsufferasalender.Ontheother
hand,therecordisundevelopedanditisnotevenestablishedthattheBanks
usedLIBORinsettingratesforlendingtransactions.Nevertheless,thepotential
ofawashrequiresfurtherdevelopmentandcanonlybeproperlyanalyzedat
laterstagesofthelitigation.
Althoughnovelfeaturesofthiscaseraiseanumberoffactissues,wethink
itisclearthat,onceappellantsallegationsaretakenastrue(asmustbedoneat
thisstage),theyhaveplausiblyallegedbothantitrustviolationandantitrust
injuryandthus,haveclearedthemotiontodismissbar.Itisaccordingly
unnecessaryforustoreachordecidewhetherthedistrictcourterredbydenying
appellantsleavetoamendtheircomplaints.

CONCLUSION
Fortheforegoingreasons,wevacatethejudgmentofthedistrictcourtand
remandforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.

51

AppendixA
AdditionalCounselforAppellantsontheBrief

KarenL.Morris&PatrickF.Morris,Morris&MorrisLLC,
Wilmington,Delaware;DavidH.Weinstein&RobertS.Kitchenoff,
WeinsteinKitchenoff&AsherLLC,Philadelphia,Pennsylvania,for
PlaintiffsAppellantsEllenGelboimandLindaZacherinCaseNo.
133565.

DavidKovel,KirbyMcInerneyLLP,NewYork,NewYork;
ChristopherLovell,LovellStewartHalebianJacobsonLLP,New
York,NewYork,forExchangeBasedPlaintiffsAppellantsandthe
ClassinCaseNo.15454.

WilliamChristopherCarmody&ArunSubramanian,Susman
GodfreyLLP,NewYork,NewYork;MarcSeltzer,SusmanGodfrey
LLP,LosAngeles,California;MichaelD.Hausfeld,WilliamP.
Butterfield,HilaryK.Scherrer&NathanielC.Giddings,Hausfeld
LLP,Washington,D.C.,forPlaintiffsAppellantsBaltimore,New
Britain,TexasCompetitiveElectricHoldingsLLC(TCEH)andthe
ProposedOTCPlaintiffClassinCaseNo.15498.
52

StevenE.Fineman&MichaelJ.Miarmi,Lieff,Cabraser,Heimann&
Bernstein,LLP,NewYork,NewYork;BrendanP.Glackin,Lieff,
Cabraser,Heimann&Bernstein,LLP,SanFrancisco,California,for
SchwabPlaintiffsAppellantsinCaseNo.15432andforBayArea
TollAuthorityinCaseNo.15778.

NanciE.Nishimura&MatthewK.Edling,Cotchett,Pitre&
McCarthy,LLP,Burlingame,California;AlexanderE.Barnett,
Cotchett,Pitre&McCarthy,LLP,NewYork,NewYork,for
PlaintiffsAppellantsTheRegentsoftheUniversityofCalifornia,
EastBayMunicipalUtilityDistrict,SanDiegoAssociationof
Governments,CityofRichmond,TheRichmondJointPowers
FinancingAuthority,SuccessorAgencytotheRichmond
CommunityRedevelopmentAgency,CityofRiverside,The
RiversidePublicFinancingAuthority,CountyofMendocino,
CountyofSacramento,CountyofSanDiego,CountyofSanMateo,
TheSanMateoCountyJointPowersFinancingAuthority,Countyof
SonomaandDavidE.Sundstrom,inhisofficialcapacityas
TreasureroftheCountyofSonomainCaseNo.15733.
53

RichardW.Mithoff&WarnerV.Hocker,MithoffLawFirm,
Houston,Texas;NanciE.Nishimura&MatthewK.Edling,Cotchett,
Pitre&McCarthy,LLP,Burlingame,California;AlexanderE.
Barnett,Cotchett,Pitre&McCarthy,LLP,NewYork,NewYork,for
PlaintiffAppellantCityofHoustoninCaseNo.15744.

SteigD.Olson,DanielL.Brockett,DanielP.Cunningham&JacobJ.
Waldman,QuinnEmanuelUrquhart&Sullivan,LLP,NewYork,
NewYork,forPlaintiffsAppellantsTheCityofPhiladelphiaandthe
PennsylvaniaIntergovernmentalCooperationAuthorityinCaseNo.
15547;DarbyFinancialProductsandCapitalVenturesInternational
inCaseNo.15551;SalixCapitalUSInc.inCaseNos.15611and15
620;PrudentialInvestmentPortfolios2onbehalfofPrudentialCore
ShortTermBondFundandPrudentialCoreTaxableMoneyMarket
FundinCaseNo.15627.

DavidC.Frederick,WanJ.Kim,GregoryG.Rapawy&AndrewC.
Shen,Kellogg,Huber,Hansen,Todd,Evans&Figel,P.L.L.C.,
Washington,D.C.,forPlaintiffAppellantNationalCreditUnion
AdministrationBoardinCaseNo.15537.
54

MichaelJ.Guzman&AndrewC.Shen,Kellogg,Huber,Hansen,
Todd,Evans&Figel,P.L.L.C.,Washington,D.C.;StuartH.McCluer,
McCulleyMcCluerPLLC,Oxford,Mississippi,forPlaintiff
AppellantGuarantyBank&TrustCompanyinCaseNo.15524.

JeffreyA.Shooman,LiteDePalmaGreenberg,LLC,Newark,New
Jersey,forPlaintiffAppellant3335GreenPondAssociates,LLCin
CaseNo.15441.

ScottP.Schlesinger,JeffreyL.Haberman&JonathanR.Gdanski,
SchlesingerLawOffices,P.A.,FortLauderdale,Florida,for
PlaintiffsAppellantsAmabile,etal.inCaseNo.15825.

JasonA.Zweig,HagensBermanSobolShapiroLLP,NewYork,New
York,forPlaintiffsAppellantsCourtyardAtAmwell,LLC,
GreenwichCommonsII,LLC,JillCourtAssociatesII,LLC,
MaidencreekVenturesIILP,RaritanCommons,LLCandLawrence
W.GardnerinCaseNo.15477.

AdditionalCounselforAppelleesontheBrief

DarylA.Libow&ChristopherM.Viapiano,Sullivan&Cromwell
LLP,Washington,D.C.,forDefendantAppelleeTheBankofTokyo
55

MitsubishiUFJ,Ltd.

DavidH.Braff,YvonneS.Quinn,JeffreyT.Scott&MatthewJ.
Porpora,Sullivan&CromwellLLP,NewYork,NewYork;Jonathan
D.Schiller&LeighM.Nathanson,Boies,Schiller&FlexnerLLP,
NewYork,NewYork;MichaelBrille,Boies,Schiller&FlexnerLLP,
Washington,D.C.,forDefendantsAppelleesBarclaysBankPLC,
BarclaysplcandBarclaysCapitalInc.

AndrewA.Ruffino,Covington&BurlingLLP,NewYork,New
York;AlanM.Wiseman,Covington&BurlingLLP,Washington,
D.C.,forDefendantsAppelleesCitibank,N.A.,CitigroupInc.,
CitigroupFunding,Inc.,CitigroupGlobalMarketsInc.,Citigroup
GlobalMarketsLimited,CitiSwapcoInc.andCitigroupFinancial
Products,Inc.

HerbertS.Washer,ElaiKatz&JoelKurtzberg,CahillGordon&
ReindelLLP,NewYork,NewYork,forDefendantsAppelleesCredit
SuisseGroupAG,CreditSuisseInternational,CreditSuisseAG,
CreditSuisseSecurities(USA)LLCandCreditSuisse(USA),Inc.

DavidR.Gelfand&SeanM.Murphy,MilbankTweedHadley&
56

McCloyLLP,NewYork,NewYork,forDefendantAppellee
CoperatieveCentraleRaiffeisenBoerenleenbankB.A.

MosesSilverman&AndrewC.Finch,Paul,Weiss,Rifkind,Wharton
&GarrisonLLP,NewYork,NewYork,forDefendantsAppellees
DeutscheBankAGandDeutscheBankSecuritiesInc.

DonaldR.Littlefield&JackD.Ballard,Ballard&Littlefield,LLP,
Houston,Texas,forDefendantsAppelleesHSBCHoldingsplcand
HSBCBankplcinCityofHoustonv.BankofAmericaCorp.,etal.,
CaseNo.1:13cv05616(S.D.N.Y.).

ThomasC.Rice,PaulC.Gluckow&ShannonP.Torres,Simpson
Thacher&BartlettLLP,NewYork,NewYork,forDefendants
AppelleesJPMorganChase&Co,JPMorganChaseBank,N.A.,J.P.
MorganSecuritiesLLC(f/k/aJ.P.MorganSecuritiesInc.)andJ.P.
MorganDublinplc(f/k/aJPMorganDublinplc)(f/k/aBearStearns
Bankplc).

AlanM.Unger&AndrewW.Stern,SidleyAustinLLP,NewYork,
NewYork,forDefendantAppelleeTheNorinchukinBank.

ChristopherM.Paparella,HughesHubbard&ReedLLP,NewYork,
57

NewYork,forDefendantsAppelleesPortigonAG(f/k/aWestLB
AG)andWestdeutscheImmobilienBankAG.

EdDeYoung&GregoryT.Casamento,LockeLordLLP,NewYork,
NewYork;RogerB.Cowie,LockeLordLLP,Dallas,Texas;J.
MatthewGoodin&JulieC.Webb,LockeLordLLP,Chicago,Illinois,
forDefendantsAppelleesHSBCHoldingsplc,HSBCBankplc,
HSBCSecurities(USA)Inc.,HSBCBankUSA,N.A.,HSBCUSA,Inc.
andHSBCFinanceCorporation(exceptwithregardtoCityof
Houstonv.BankofAmericaCorp.,etal.,CaseNo.1:13cv05616
(S.D.N.Y.)).

MarcJ.Gottridge&LisaJ.Fried,HoganLovellsUSLLP,NewYork,
NewYork;NealKumarKatyal,HoganLovellsUSLLP,Washington,
D.C.,forDefendantsAppelleesLloydsBankingGroupplc,Lloyds
Bankplc(f/k/aLloydsTSBBankplc)andHBOSplc.

ChristianT.Kemnitz,KattenMuchinRosenmanLLP,Chicago,
Illinois,forDefendantsAppelleesRoyalBankofCanada.

StevenWolowitz&HenningerS.Bullock,MayerBrownLLP,New
York,NewYork,forDefendantAppelleeSocitGnrale.
58

PeterSullivan&LawrenceJ.Zweifach,Gibson,Dunn&Crutcher
LLP,NewYork,NewYork;JoelSanders,Gibson,Dunn&Crutcher
LLP,SanFrancisco,California;ThomasG.Hungar,Gibson,Dunn&
CrutcherLLP,Washington,D.C.,forDefendantsAppelleesUBSAG,
UBSSecuritiesLLCandUBSLimited.

FraserL.Hunter,Jr.,DavidS.Lesser,AlanE.Schoenfeld&JamieS.
Dycus,WilmerCutlerPickeringHaleandDorrLLP,NewYork,New
York,forDefendantsAppelleesTheRoyalBankofScotlandGroup
plcandTheRoyalBankofScotlandplcexceptastoPrudential
InvestmentPortfolios2.

RobertG.Houck,CliffordChanceUSLLP,NewYork,NewYork,for
DefendantsAppelleesTheRoyalBankofScotlandGroupplc,The
RoyalBankofScotlandplcandRBSSecuritiesInc.(f/k/aGreenwich
CapitalMarketsInc.)exceptastoYaleUniversityandtheFederal
HomeLoanMortgageCorporation.

RichardD.Owens&JeffG.Hammel,Latham&WatkinsLLP,New
York,NewYork,forDefendantsAppelleesBritishBankers
Association,BBAEnterprisesLtd.andBBALIBORLtd.
59

AmiciCuriae

RishiBhandari,MandelBhandariLLP,NewYork,NewYork,for
AmiciCuriaeFinancialMarketsLawProfessorsJordanM.Barry,
BrianJ.Broughman,EricC.Chaffee,ChristophHenkel,RobertC.
Hockett,MichaelP.Malloy,PeterMarchetti,ChristopherK.Odinet,
CharlesR.P.PouncyandAndrewVersteininsupportofPlaintiffs
Appellants.

DrewHansen,SusmanGodfreyLLP,Seattle,Washington;Arun
Subramanian,JacobW.Buchdahl&WilliamChristopherCarmody,
SusmanGodfreyLLP,NewYork,NewYork,forAmicusCuriaeYale
UniversityinsupportofPlaintiffsAppellants.

RichardWolfram,LawOfficeofRichardWolfram,NewYork,New
York,forAmiciCuriaeScholarsDarrenBush,MichaelCarrier,Peter
C.Carstensen,JohnM.Connor,JoshuaPaulDavis,BethFarmer,
SharonF.Foster,EleanorFox,ThomasL.Greaney,JeffreyL.
Harrison,ThomasHorton,HerbertHovenkamp,J.GordonHylton,
JohnB.Kirkwood,StephenMartin,MarkPattersonandLawrenceJ.
WhiteinsupportofPlaintiffsAppellants.
60

RichardM.Brunell,VicePresidentandGeneralCounsel,forAmicus
CuriaeAmericanAntitrustInstituteinsupportofPlaintiffs
Appellants.

JonR.Roellke,MichaelL.Whitlock&GregoryF.Wells,Morgan
Lewis&BockiusLLP,Washington,D.C.;IraD.Hammerman&
KevinM.Carroll,Washington,D.C.,forAmicusCuriaeSecurities
andFinancialMarketsAssociationinsupportofDefendants
Appellees.

DonaldI.Baker,W.ToddMiller&LucyS.Clippinger,Baker&
MillerPLLC,Washington,D.C.,forAmiciCuriaeAntitrustScholars
KeithN.Hylton,MichaelJacobs,GeoffreyA.Manne,JustinMcCrary
andWilliamJ.MurphyinsupportofDefendantsAppellees.

61