You are on page 1of 81

February 26, 1943 G.R. No.

48446
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUIS MENESES
OZAETA, J.:
The question involved in this appeal is whether a competent court, while acquitting an
accused, may permit itself nevertheless to criticize or reprehend his acts and conduct
in connection with the transaction out of which the accusation arose.
Appellant was charged with malversation of public funds
The trial court gave the accused the benefit of the doubt.
On the 14th day after the sentence was read to the accused, the latter filed a motion praying
for the elimination from the decision the reprehension and that it constitutes a penalty which is
contrary to his acquittal.
The trial court denied the motion, whereupon the accused filed a notice of appeal from the
order of denial.
In this connection we note that on the 6th day after the sentence was read to him, the
accused filed a separate motion asking that the reservation to the Government to file a civil
action be stricken out from the decision. That first motion was denied by the court in a
separate order, from which the accused did not appeal.
In this notice of appeal, appellant stated that the appeal is based purely on questions of law
affecting the power and authority of the Court to reprimand or punish the accused, who, in this
case, has been acquitted from the criminal charge of malversation of public funds
What he questions is the authority of the trial court to make such pronouncement in a
sentence of acquittal. Hence his direct appeal to this Court "based purely on questions of
law." The burden of appellant's argument is that he neither having pleaded guilty nor having
been found guilty of the crime charged, the trial court is not empowered by law to impose a
penalty by proclaiming publicly and condemning in no uncertain terms that his conduct was
highly reprehensible; and that "conduct or even negligence is not a crime."
The pronouncement in question whereby the trial court criticizes or reprehends the acts and
conduct of the accused is not intended as a penalty, nor may it be considered as such,
because it is not embodied in the judgment or dispositive part of the decision.
But since it reflects upon and affects the accused, he has the right to question it and to move
for its elimination from the court's opinion if he thinks it is unwarranted and uncalled for, and to
appeal to a higher tribunal if his motion is denied.
The order appealed from is affirmed.

[G.R. No. L-9551. November 26, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEJANDRO PAET Y VELASCO
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Alejandro Paet y Velasco was accused of a violation of Circulars Nos. 20 and 42 of the
Central Bank of the Philippines
Defendant withdrew his former plea of not guilty and to substitute therefor a plea of guilty,
which permission was granted.
Upon recommendation of the prosecution, the trial court in a decision dated June 10, 1955,
found him guilty of the charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of ten (10) days
imprisonment, to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (P100)
A memorandum was filed by the defendant, praying that the sum of money which had been
taken by the authorities from the said Defendant be returned to the latter as the lawful owner.
The trial court either overlooked this prayer or else did not deem it necessary to include it in
its decision. The fact is that the decision did not provide for the confiscation or forfeiture of the
aforementioned amount in favor of the government.
Thereafter, the lower court issued a resolution dated July 30, 1955, expressing the opinion
and holding that the amount of $3,140 should not be confiscated, but should be exchanged
with pesos in the Philippine currency at the Central Bank, and delivered to the accused.
The government, through the Solicitor General, is appealing from the resolution directly to this
Court.
In the first place, the confiscation or forfeiture of the above mentioned sum would be an
additional penalty and would amount to an increase of the penalty already imposed upon the
accused. To reopen the case for the purpose of increasing the penalty, as is sought in the
Government’s appeal, would be placing the accused in double jeopardy, and under Rule 118,
section 2 of the Rules of Court, the Government cannot appeal in a criminal case if
the Defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.
In the second place, the record shows that at the time the appealed resolution was issued on
July 30, 1955, the decision of June 10, 1955 had already become final and no longer subject
to modification for the reason that the accused had already served the sentence, not partially
but totally.
In view of the foregoing, the appeal of the Government from the resolution is hereby
dismissed.

G.R. No. L-27935 August 16, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE JUAN L. BOCAR, Presiding Judge
of Branch XVI, Court of First Instance of Manila, and CESAR URBINO, JOSE GIGANTE
and SERAPION CLAUDIO
MAKASIAR, C.J.:
CESAR S. URBINO, JOSE GIGANTE and SERAPION CLAUDIO was charged of crime of
theft
upon arraignment, pleaded "not guilty"
Proceedings were had and the respondent Judge issued the dismissal of the case
Private prosecutors in the case filed a "motion for reconsideration"
Respondent Court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration
Whether or not respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the order
The parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the respondent
Judge. Moreover, the prosecution never had a chance to introduce and offer its evidence
formally in accordance with the Rules of Court. Verily, the prosecution was denied due
process.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction.
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
The constitutional guarantee is that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense".
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right
of the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the
first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

G.R. No. L-6217 December 18, 1911
THE UNITED STATES vs. YAM TUNG WAY, alias NAM SING
CARSON, J.:
The defendant was charged with the crime of fraud or infringement of literary rights or
property
Defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty
the case was transferred to the division of that court over by the Hon. A. S. Crossfield, before
whom it was tried
the Government closed its case
the defendant moved for a dismissal on the ground that the evidence submitted on behalf of
the Government did not establish the commission of the offense charged in the information, or
of any offense defined and penalized by law. Judgment on this motion was reserved by the
court at the request of counsel for both parties, who desired to submit briefs on the legal
questions raised by the motion. Pending judgment on the motion, defendant submitted his
evidence. Subsequently, upon consideration of the motion to dismiss submitted after the
Government closed its case, and as to which judgment had been reserved, the court below
sustained the motion and discharged the defendant.
The trial court based its judgment dismissing the information and discharging the defendant
on the ground that no copyright law exists in the Philippine Islands and that the complaining
witness could have no exclusive rights in the pamphlet in question which were subject to
violation or infringement, so as to sustain a conviction under article 539 of the Penal Code. No
finding was made as to the alleged facts touching the reproduction by the defendant of the
pamphlet
of
which
ownership
is
claimed
by
the
complaining
witness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The case has been brought here by the Government in an attempt to appeal from the
judgment of the court below. We are asked to reverse that judgment and grant a new trial, on
the ground that the trial judge erred in declaring that no copyright law is in force in these
Islands. But without going into the question of the correctness of the conclusion of the law
upon which the trial judge based his action, we are all agreed that the government had no
right of appeal from the judgment entered by the court below dismissing the information and
discharging the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The allowance of an appeal by the Government would undoubtedly place the defendant twice
in jeopardy in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights, set out in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, as those provisions have been construed by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Kepner vs. United states (195 U. S.,100; 11 Phil. Rep.,
669).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Defendant was regularly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, put upon his trial by the calling of the
government's witnesses against him, and thereafter discharged by the trial court. It is true that
the court made no express finding as to whether the defendant did or did not commit the
specific acts set out in the information, and that the dismissal of the information was based on
the court's conclusion of law that there being no copyright law in force in these Islands, the
acts which it is alleged were committed by the defendant do not constitute the crime with

. No. . at the moment when the first witness is called to the stand and interrogated and it is quite clear that the defendant in this case having been brought to trial after arraignment and plea and all the government's witnesses having testified on his trial. a defendant who has once been brought to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be again put on trial for the same offense after the first trial has terminated by a judgment directing his discharge. is entitled to protection against the peril of being brought to trial for the offense with which he was charged at the trial and this whether the rulings of the trial judge on which he based his order discharging the defendant and dismissing the information were or were not erroneous. So that.which he was charged. S. but against being tried a second time for the same offense. What is said in the following citation from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kepner vs. nor any other defense defined and penalized by law. We are not here dealing with those statutes which give to the Government a right of review upon the steps merely preliminary to a trial and before the accused is legally put in jeopardy. But the reason of the opinion goes further and denies the right to the Government to procure the several of erroneous proceedings and commence anew. This court has frequently held that the legal jeopardy attaches in criminal proceedings in this jurisdiction after arraignment and plea in a court of competent jurisdiction. and the observations of Mr. supra. as amended by Act of the Philippine Commission. the protection afforded by the prohibition against the putting of any person merely against the peril of second punishment. In that court expressly held that: It follows that Military Order No. supra. But the reasoning and authority of the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Kepner vs. or of a ruling of the court upon some question of law arising at the trial. was repealed by the Act of Congress of July. 1902. As indication in the opinion in that case. 194. without his own consent. providing immunity from second jeopardy for the same criminal offense. have a proper place in this opinion as bearing directly on the precise point under consideration. save only in those cases in which the first proceedings did not create legal jeopardy. whether defendant was acquitted on the merits or whether defendant's discharge was based upon the trial court's conclusion of law that the trial had failed for some reason to establish the guilt of the defendant as charged. Such statutes have been quite generally sustained in jurisdictions which deny the right of second trial where a competent court has convicted or acquitted the accused. is conclusively against the right of appeal by the government from a judgment discharging the defendant in a criminal case after he has been brought to trial. Bishop therein quoted. 58. in so far as it undertakes to permit an appeal by the Government after acquittal.U. as where a discharge is had upon motion to quash or a demurer to the indictment is sustained before jeopardy has attached. United States. whether his discharge be the result of a formal acquittal. The appeal entered in this case on behalf of the Government should dismissed with costs against the appellant.

P. in the Municipality of Nueva Era. the court a quorendered a decision acquitting the accused. Dilig for plaintiff and appellant.1äwphï1. inflicting upon the latter wounds that immediately caused his death. plaintiff and appellant. We ordered it docketed herein. 1966 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. On February 1. Rolando de la Cuesta for defendant and appellee. assault and stab one. Order of trial. No appellee's brief was filed. Said testimony. unlawfully and feloniously attack. CONTRARY TO LAW. 17. Republic Act 296).R. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. J. with intent to kill. M. could not be taken as a trial on the merits. 1966. vs. to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. did then and there willfully. As stated. 1965. on March 6.: This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal. 1965. defendant and appellee. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. At his de oficio counsel's petition. 81 Phil. 563). 3. on behalf of the People of the Philippines. And on August 5. After being submitted for decision without appellee's brief. therefore. No. 1964. for the purposes of fixing the penalty. he was assisted by counsel. BENGZON. as involving questions purely of law (Sec. the appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July 14.ñët The sole assignment of error is: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE LATTER'S PLEA OF GUILTY WHEN ARRAIGNED. To this charge the accused. The information alleged: That on or about December 3. In doing so. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Subsequently. he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the accused. In this case. 1965. Assistant Solicitor General I. the herein accused. entered a plea of guilty. Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant's contention is meritorious. the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances. AURELIO BALISACAN. Ng Pek. Appellant filed its brief on September 9.. upon being arraigned. Leonicio Bulaoat. — The plea of not guilty having been entered.G. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. C. province of Ilocos Norte. must offer evidence in support of the . L-26376 August 31. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. however. in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court: SEC. the proper course should have been for the court a quo to take defendant's plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the case. the prosecution appealed therefrom. J. (People v. Philippines. 1966. Borromeo and T. Alafriz. the trial must proceed in the following order: (a) The fiscal. In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused.

445). that he acted in complete selfdefense. Said testimony. in furtherance of justice. People v. McCleary v. 58 Phil. it clearly acted without due process of law. or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him." The present state of jurisprudence in this regard is that the above provision applies even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy (People v. 1960). In doing so. is whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite. Subsequently. We deem it proper to remand this case to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of the same court. its action is perforce null and void. there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. This was not done. 851. (d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been concluded. the court a quo not only erred in procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People v. The next issue. and judgment thereafter. Quimsing. he testified. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal. . L-12102. (b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense. Ylagan. the attorney for the defense must follow. which provides that: "The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. permit them to offer new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question. June 30. being a nullity for want of due process. or partly written. 1964). 2d. October 23. L-19860. So ordered. The argument by either attorney may be oral or written. L-14160. without in any way doubting the integrity of said trial judge. the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. however. Jur. that is. 61 Phil. It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal. in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances. (c) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only. In fairness to the prosecution. 121. the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of said court. Ferrer. is no acquittal at all. but only the written arguments. therefore. December 23. People v. the fiscal must open the argument. 235. People v. Wherefore. unless the court. therefore — as the court a quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge. therefore. in one of the two other branches of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag. In the present case. L-9072. Hudspeth 124 Fed. or such portions of the same as may be in writing. as afore-stated. it is true. Cabero.1 Furthermore. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. No costs. The acquittal. In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial. De Golez.charges. the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. for plea by the defendant. 21 Am. and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People v. trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense. shall be preserved in the record of the case. Bao. This Court now turns to Section 2. the trial judge below already gave credence to the testimony of the accused. 2d. unless the case is submitted to the court without argument. 1956. 1959. September 29. and the fiscal may conclude the same.

the accused is acquitted from the information and the bond filed for his temporary liberty. to justify (establish) the commission of the crime. vs. after the four years fixed by law. Hodges alleged: (1) That Marcelo Buenaflor. No. to annul the judgment rendered on March 26. rebuttal or corroborative. (Sec. In view of the fiscal's conformity. 1931. 114. DIAZ. the judgment is already final as he did not appeal therefrom. N. petitioner. 190. respondents. however. The petitioner is not mentioned therein. L-45151 July 24. abided by the petition and conceded that the action has actually prescribed. Among other defenses. Act No. inasmuch as the last payment was made on April 24. the truth. Hon. no action can be prosecuted unless in the name of the real party in interest. Hodges. and not the petitioner. certiorari cases not excepted. is that the herein accused then charged usurious interest up to April 29. the herein respondent C. N. When this case was called today for the continuance of the trial. 11213 of the Court of First of Iloilo. that is. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. as the prosecution has rested its case and the motion to dismiss filed by the counsel for the accused has been denied by the then judge of this court. counsel for the accused renewed his motion to dismiss. that the action for usury has already prescribed because the corresponding complaint was filed on May 2. and in holding that the crime has prescribed. 11213 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. of the same year. after the latter's petition to dismiss was denied by the former Judge Geronimo Paredes. According to the petitioner. MARIANO BUYSON LAMPA. and a simple order of dismissal not being in order herein because the prosecution has already rested its case.G. The fiscal opposed the petition alleging that. cancelled.R. the very facts set out in his judgment show otherwise.) Under the law. The questioned judgment was couched in the following language: This case is pending to receive the evidence of the accused. (2) that the respondent judge had jurisdiction to act as he did. while the last payment was really made on April 24. 1936. after both parties had adduced their respective arguments for and against the petition. 1931.: This petition for certiorari was instituted on April 20. . Geronimo Paredes. It was a usury case wherein the judgment sought to be annulled acquitted the accused. and (3) that the writ of certiorari prayed for is not the proper remedy. 1933. N. 1936 ADOLFO O. by the respondent judge in criminal case No. according to the petitioner. said fiscal. HODGES. J. with a zeal that is worthy of mention. however. Hodges. was the offended party in criminal case No. but contends. expressly alleged that the usurious loan had been made to Marcelo Buenaflor. The information filed in the case wherein the judgment just quoted was rendered. and C. among other grounds. However. RAMOS. whereas. N. that it should be annulled and the trial continued as usual to enable him to adduce "documentary and oral evidence. (Exhibit A. 1935." The ground of his petition is that the respondent judge exceeded his powers and was without jurisdiction in dismissing the case and absolving C. with the costs de oficio. So ordered. the respondent C. alleging.

829. vs. less than P50 and not more than P200. The judgment acquitting the respondent C. . Llorente.. Court of First Instance of Cavite. and the motion to reconsider the order denying C.. N. 522. This remedy has not been established to correct errors of fact or of law. A judge who substitutes for or succeeds another may reconsider the acts of the latter. 3763 (November 26.certiorari is not the proper remedy. Campbell and Gutierrez Hermanos. (Vera Moguer vs. he is not thereby deprived of his jurisdiction of power to continue hearing the case. Kepner vs. Regala. vs. S. Revilla. 67. 100. 190.. Frank & Co. 632. when in fact it had not. Said law provides: Violations penalized by special acts shall. . Juan Carballo. assuming that C.. approved on December 4... but only excesses of power or jurisdiction committed by inferior courts. Kilayko. and subsequently amended by Act No. Clemente. 1930). as the usury law. 34 Phil.. 1932. This is the more so because when he took cognizance of said case. Odlin. (Sec. but less than two years.) There is another reason for holding that in the case at hand the remedy of certiorari does not lie. 21 Phil." does not imply any pronouncement or finding of fact by the respondent judge that C. . By Act No. 114. Santos vs. U. with . Parcon. 344. in the same way that he may reconsider his own decrees.. But even granting that the respondent judge erred in holding that the crime had prescribed. U. 34 Phil. 846. S. the respondent judge undoubtedly had jurisdiction to try the case and to render the judgment of acquittal in question. 25 Phil. Low. 398.) In 1921. And if in so acting he commits any error. Springer vs. the truth. 1926. Gordillo and Martinez vs. the crime of usury was penalized by a fine of not. necessarily concluded the case charging him with usury in such a way that it can no longer be reopened for any reason because it is forbidden by the doctrine that a person cannot be placed twice in jeopardy. vs. The reference in his judgment to the fiscal's allegation to the effect that "the fiscal objects to the petition alleging that. boards or officers clothed by law with judicial functions.. . 1931. 49 Phil.... N.. 5 Phil. Concepcion. 32 Phil. or both. Hodges actually committed the crime with which he was charged when Act No. the prescriptive period of crimes penalized by special acts. is four years.S. 1933. 195. Mercader vs. In view of the penalty.Abendan vs. Gala vs. (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month. while he was acting as such in substitution of Judge Geronimo Paredes. is that the herein accused then charged usurious interest up to April 29. 1933.) That would be the necessary consequence if the petitioner's prayer in his petition is granted. 39 Phil. Government of the Philippine Islandsvs. 157. 195 U. 3998 on December 5. 3998 was already in force. 2992 which was amended by Act No. 217. (Perlas vs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo and Bantillo. .. Yam Tung Way.. 43 Phil.. Act No. who had ceased to be such. 36 Phil. 44 Phil. 244. he did so in substitution of Judge Geronimo Parades. 559.. 28 Phil.. Hodges' motion to dismiss was presented to him personally. . 34 Phil. however. 669. 216. S. Oria vs. 274. 213. or both. 3326. N. De la Cruz vs. has been done in the legitimate exercise of a power within his jurisdiction. Cui and Rodriguez. 11 Phil. 3 Phil. 10 Phil. N.) What the respondent judge did. 19 Phil. orders. 6 Phil. 30). 850. Hodges. unless otherwise provided in such acts. Nuñez vs. Government of the Philippine Islands vs. 34 Phil. S. Moir. prescribe in accordance with the following rules: .Wislizenus. it is hereby denied.. U. while the last payment was really made on April 24. if he deems it proper. 49 Law. Del Rosario. 57. 619. or by imprisonment not exceeding six months. ed.. it being manifest that the remedy invoked does not lie. (U. U.S. vs. supra. The amendment consisted principally in raising the penalty to a fine of not more than P500 or to imprisonment not exceeding one year. Hodges was in fact usurious interest up to April 29.. Marquez and Jurado vs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo and Bantillo. under Act No. vs. or resolution. Wherefore.

C. The Solicitor General for petitioners.000.000. 1961.000.000. It is so ordered. 4 The Surigao Development Bank formally started operations on April 19. FELIPE PLAZA CHUA and MELCHOR AVILA CHUA. Martinez wrote herein private . respectively.000.00 by private stockholders. The antecedent facts are as follows: On April 14. composed of the first five above-named stockholders and the directors-representatives of DBP. father and son.00 Marinela G.00 TOTAL P500. petitioners. said respondents started withdrawing from the deposit various amounts by means of checks drawn against the Pacific Banking Corporation amounting to a total of P999. 1961.00 Celerina Chua 200.00. were authorized to sign checks and withdrawal slips to effect withdrawal from the depository bank .00 which increased to P555. of the Surigao Development Bank.000.000. seeking to annul and set aside the decision 2 of respondent Court of Appeals acquitting private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua of the crime of estafa.00 Melchor Avila Chua 20. the other P500. On the same date. On September 12.00 as of December 31. Acting Superintendent of Banks Jose S. were elected President and Treasurer. 1961.000. P500. THE COURT OF APPEALS. an examination of the books of accounts as well as the operations of the Surigao Development Bank was conducted by the examiners of the Central Bank of the Philippines.000. 6 Based on their findings. duly subscribed and paid-up. Out of its total capitalization.00 was subscribed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in accordance with Section 9 of Republic Act No. herein private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua. with a capital of Pl Million. No. J. Rama for private respondents. Napoleon G. a private development bank. FERNAN.000.000. 41859 March 8.: This is a special civil action for certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.000. vs. as follows: Felipe Plaza Chua P200. The examination revealed a shortage of P480. leaving a balance of Pl. the capital of Pl Million was deposited with the Pacific Banking Corporation in Manila and private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua as President and Melchor Avila Chua as Treasurer.000.000. respondents.costs to the petitioner.00 Lucia Limchiu 60. 198 9 CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Rama 10.00 Benjamin Lozada 5.R.00 3 Pursuant to a resolution of the Board of Directors. 85 as amended.00 5 as of June 1962.00 Eufemio Darunday 5. 1961. Benigno Orig and Anatolio Viray. G.

asking them to authorize the Pacific Banking Corporation to furnish the Central Bank with the records of deposits of Surigao Development Bank together with photocopies of the checks drawn against the latter. Due to the refusal of private respondents to come to Manila for the conference. and by virtue of a Certificate of Authority granted by the Monetary Board on March 29. an information 7 was filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila. 1961.000. In another order dated July 30. Surigao del Norte. in Surigao. 1964 in CA-G. which is a private development bank organized under the provisions of Republic Act 2081. Philippines. the same Court directed the Pacific Banking Corporation to produce the bank statements of deposits and withdrawals of the Surigao Development Bank.000. which funds of the Surigao Development Bank were deposited in trust with the depository bank. did then and there wilfully. 1582. On July 2. withdrew and received from the said Pacific Banking Corporation. but the Central Bank could not conduct the necessary examination due to an injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on February 5. 1961.00. being then the President and treasurer. 1964. as such President and Treasurer. 1968. 50% of the preferred shares with voting rights is owned by the Development Bank of the Philippines. respectively. during the aforesaid period of time. Surigao del Norte. charging herein private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua with the crime of estafa. inclusive. 1962.000. On August 11.R. On January 10. On October 30. on application by the Central Bank. of the Surigao Development Bank. once in possession of the aforesaid sum and far from complying with their . 3315 which was lifted only on September 7. No. but the said accused.00 for the purpose of turning over the said amount so withdrawn by them to the Surigao Development Bank in Surigao. unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Central Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank of the Philippines. banking institutions duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. being then the only persons duly authorized in the Surigao Development Bank to sign checks against. is in common shares. to require their permanent separation as President and Treasurer. and further asking them for a conference regarding the examination. as follows: That in or about and during the period comprised between April 1961 to December 31. began operations on April 19. the said accused.00. 6th Judicial Region. Manila. to disqualify them from being directors thereof and/or holders of such other positions therein as will enable them again to exercise influence over the management of the affairs and operations of said bank. 1961. in the City of Manila. of the said Surigao Development Bank. the Monetary Board passed a resolution directing private respondents to refund and deposit with Pacific Banking Corporation the shortage of P555. to wit: The said Surigao Development Bank. respectively. the Superintendent of Banks was appointed receiver pendente lite of the Surigao Development Bank by the Court of First Instance of Surigao in Civil Case No. as the case may be. 1964. 1962. as such private development bank. and to limit the bank's activities to accepting loan re-payments and servicing of its deposit liabilities. On July 10. respectively. 1964. Surigao del Norte. and the said accused. the total sum of P555. conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other. or withdraw funds from the said Surigao Development Bank's deposit account with the Pacific Banking Corporation. Manila. while the remaining 50% also in the amount of P500. or upon demand. the Pacific Banking Corporation. 1962.respondents. Resolution No. 1281 was passed by the Monetary Board denying the request. located at Surigao. the private respondents wrote the Monetary Board denying the shortage and asking for a reconsideration of its decision. as follows. the Acting Superintendent of Banks referred the matter to the Monetary Board. Branch V. with the said accused Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua as its President and Treasurer. and under the express obligation of accounting for the same to the Central Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines from time to time.

00. Power of Appellate Court on Appeal — Upon appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals may thus re-examine and re. which represented the total unrecorded withdrawals. at most.00 and the DBP's prepared shares of P500. to indemnify the offended parties Surigao Development Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines in the sum of P499. On May 21. the Court finds the accused Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of swindling (estafa). 12 Neither do these erroneous findings and conclusions render the appellate court vulnerable to the corrective writ of certiorari for where the court has jurisdiction over the case. the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision. SO ORDERED. Contrary to law. wantonly failed and refused to do so. Section 11 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court defines the power of the appellate court on appeals taken to it. misappropriated. they would. in the aforesaid amount of P555. It is true that the accused-appellants disposed of the amount of P499. the appellate court may reverse. it is clear that there is no damage caused to the Surigao Development Bank or to the Development Bank of the Philippines. affirm or modify the judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial. We rule in the affirmative. or dismiss the case.weigh all the evidence on record and affirm. Both accused-private respondents pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. remand the case to the Court of First Instance for new trial or retrial. Both private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. even if its findings are not correct. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. as defined in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized in its 1st penalty paragraph.00. despite repeated demands made upon them to that effect and the length of time that has elapsed.000. The reason behind this rule is that an appeal of a criminal case opens its entire records for review in order to resolve not only questions of law but also questions of facts. the amount of shortage proved was P499. 9 reversed the decision of the trial court and acquitted private respondents. without the attendance of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance to modify their liability and hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate term ranging from twelve (12) years of prisionmayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. thus: Section 11. and with intent to defraud. and to pay the costs. must result in damage or prejudice to another.000.000.72.000. as maximum. to constitute estafa. to the damage and prejudice of the Central Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines.00. constitute errors of law and not . modify or reverse the findings of facts and conclusions of the lower court. At the trial. holding that: The private stockholders having received the refund of their investments in the total amount of P499.00 without right or authority. capable of pecuniary estimation.000.350. On May 24. 1973. the trial court rendered its decision 8 finding private respondents guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE.000. Philippine Currency. arrived at by comparing the ledger of the Surigao Development Bank as against the Statement of Account issued by the Pacific Banking Corporation.00 being fundable from the assets of P557. misapplied and converted the said amount to their own personal use and benefit. 11 That its findings of facts or conclusions are erroneous do not thereby deprive it of its jurisdiction over the appealed criminal care as the mere fact that the court decides the question wrongly is utterly immaterial to its jurisdiction.aforementioned obligation. but conversion. 1975.

in effect. To determine their validity would entail a review and re. 13 In the case at bar. In so doing. The writ of certiorari cannot be legally used for any other purpose. 16 Thus.evaluation of the evidence on record as well as the procedure taken vis-a-vis the conclusions arrived at by the appellate court. that the court had committed a mistake. a review of the judgment of acquittal. petitioners' attack on the appellate court's jurisdiction is premised on the conclusions that (a) the findings of facts of the appellate court were based on conjectures and speculations. But how valid and tenable these premises are remains a question. or on misapprehension of facts and contrary to the documents and exhibits. the appeal of private respondents having been regularly taken to the Court of Appeals. or on a misapprehension of facts and contrary to the documents and exhibits of the case. is not for us to determine in a petition for certiorari wherein only issues of jurisdiction may be raised. 19 Ordinarily. and (c) the appellate court gave to a document a meaning contrary to its contents. the decision involved being one of acquittal. which we cannot do in a petition for certiorari and without violating the private respondents' constitutional right against double jeopardy. Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. is not available in the case at bar. It is available only for these purposes and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings or conclusions. 17 The writ ofcertiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." The argument that the judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore. 14 The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. 18 If the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person. An appeal therefrom by the People would run counter to the accused's constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. is flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. the appellate court was clothed with the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. . errors of judgment may be corrected in a timely appeal from the judgment on the merits. We discern in this petition for certiorari a subtle attempt to have us review the judgment of the appellate court on the merits. assuming arguendo. Whether this conclusion was based merely on speculations and conjecture. the error does not vitiate the decision considering that it had jurisdiction over the case. the orders and rulings upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders and rulings within its jurisdiction and cannot be corrected by certiorari. null and void. 15 The mere fact that the court decides the question wrong is utterly immaterial to the question of its jurisdiction. however. Neither can we determine whether the constructions given by the appellate court to a document is right or wrong as errors in the appreciation of evidence may not be reviewed by certiorari because they do not involve any jurisdictional question. While the petition at bar is denominated a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and the issues raised therein ostensibly dealt with the jurisdiction of the appellate court.an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. (b) the exhibit relied upon by the appellate court has not been offered nor admitted in evidence during the trial. it re-examined and re-weighed the evidence on record and came to the conclusion that private respondents were not guilty of the crime charged as the withdrawal of the alleged shortage was done without intent to defraud nor was damage or prejudice caused thereby to Surigao Development Bank or the Development Bank of the Philippines. Such remedy. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision.

000. SIXTH JUDICIAL REGION.:p Acting on a complaint to enjoin the operation of the small town lottery by the Province of Antique. a criminal complaint against Judge Maceda for issuance of an unjust interlocutory order in violation of Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code. Judge Misajon could not legally dismiss the criminal .This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be. Antique. however. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIQUE. Monina Misajon of that court dismissed the complaint. 2 On March 27. Sadio flied before the Municipal TriaI Court of San Jose.R. Abraham-Singson of the Regional Trial Court of Antique. for insufficiency in form and substance. Judge Ma. 2. 3 His motion for reconsideration having been denied. Judge Abraham-Singson could not motu proprio dismiss the petition for certiorari and mandamus. Hon. Sadio's reaction was to file a petition for certiorari and mandamus to reverse Judge Misajons order of May 16. doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process. which was approved by Judge Misajon on May 15. Velasco – homicide and frustrated homicide – Requisites to successfully invoke double jeopardy (refer to Obsania). the Molitor Management Corporation and herein petitioner Edgar Sadio.00. 1990. Mariano R. 21 People v. 1 On the basis of this order.000. the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes (PCSO). the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or an appeal on a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule. 94143 September 24. alleging that: 1. G. holding that the challenged order of March 16. 1990. contrary to the allegations of the complainant. 1991 EDGAR SADIO. J. This was dismiss by Judge Marvie R. petitioner. 1990. that he was accorded every opportunity to present his side before the order was issued. BRANCH 10. declared such lottery illegal and ordered MOLITOR and Sadio in solidum to pay PCSO and the Province of Antique damages in the amount of P25. Where an acquittal is concerned. 6 His motion for reconsideration was also denied. 4 On May 16. after hearing. Sadio filed a notice of appeal. respondents. Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of the Regional Trial Court of Antique. this being the prerogative of the prosecutor. Antique. The petitioner now comes to this Court on certiorari. 20 The rule therefore. An acquittal is final and unappealable ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY whether it happens at the trial court of before the Court of Appeals. in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is not reviewable by a higher court. for an appeal by the government from the judgment would put the accused in second jeopardy for the same offense. No. San Jose. CRUZ. clearly showed. Under the rule on summary procedure. Branch 10. 1990. vs. she issued an amendatory order recalling the original order and withdrawing her earlier approval of the notice of appeal. Pefianco for petitioner. and BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA. 5 Her reason was that the offended party had no standing to appeal from the dismissal of a criminal complaint.

followed by the legal conclusion that Judge Misajon committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the said order. and if he pleads. of the Rules of Court. together with a copy of the petition." She treated this as the respondent judge's counter-affidavit required in the aforecited rule. Additionally. 6. It is clear that the petition was also insufficient in substance and for that additional if no less important reason deserved to be dismissed. It cannot be overstressed that the court is not obliged to waste its time on inadequate pleadings that can only burden its docket and impair the orderly administration of justice. and to that effect the petitioner shag file sufficient copies thereof. the petition merely confined itself to a recital of the material facts and dates. may render judgment forthwith. While it is true that Judge Maceda did not submit his counter-affidavit as required in the order of Judge Misajon dated March 23. An order approving a notice of appeal can no longer be withdrawn. The offended party in a criminal case has a right to appeal if the case is dismissed. no jurisprudence cited. 1990. Lacking such sufficiency. the petitioner's contention is that since he had not waived or reserved his right to file the civil action arising from the criminal charge. in Civil Case No. Judge Misajon declared in her order dismissing the criminal complaint that she had received and considered the order of Judge Maceda dated March 23. 2405. Judge Maceda's defense against the criminal charge was after all embodied in that order and it would have been a useless formality to simply reproduce it as a counter-affidavit. directing the defendants to appear and submit his counter-affidavits and those of his witnesses at a specified date not later than ten (10) days from receipt thereof. — If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such process. his right to appeal from the civil . On the third issue. reading as follows: Sec. Duty of the court. 10. the pertinent provision is Section 6.complaint without the counter-affidavit of the accused. or a judge thereof. 1990. the court shall make a preliminary determination whether to dismiss the case outright for being patently without basis or merit. shall issue an order requiring the defendant or defendants to answer the petition within ten (10) days from the receipt of a copy thereof. That deficiency was by itself alone adequate ground for dismissal. 1990. As correctly noted by Judge Abraham-Singson. In the latter case. the court may set the case for immediate arraignment of an accused under custody. the applicable rule is Section 10 of the Rule on Summary Procedure. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. in disregard of the express requirement of Rule 65. Order to answer. Mijares v. no law or Rule of Court invoked to support that conclusion. On the second issue. 3. On the first issue. or for some other similar shortcoming. the petition may be dismissed outright. No argument was adduced. The very first clause of this section requires that the petition be sufficient in form and substance before further action may be taken thereon by the court. for being uninteligible or clearly without legal basis. and 4. the court in which it is filed. Section 1. or to require further proceeding to be taken. Province of Antique. The petition must fail on all counts. — On the basis of the complaint or information and the affidavits accompanying the same. Such order shall be served on the defendants in such manner as the court may direct. entitled "Rolly R. the court shall issue an order accompanied by copies of all affidavits submitted by complainant. which reads: Sec. as determined by the court itself. and in all other cases. We ourselves have given short shrift to many a petition for non-compliance with the procedural requisites. was not attached to the petition. We agree that this was sufficient compliance with the said rule. a certified true copy of the order of May 16. et al. If he pleads not guilty.

J. BENGZON. 1952. vs. Luciano for appellant. Torres and Solicitor Augusto M. L-6247 November 27. 1990.: The pertinent facts in this action for prohibition are described in the appellant's brief:chanrobles virtual law library 1. was issued only to rectify the error. as we have held in several cases. But only the prosecutor could have done this because he had complete direction and control of the prosecution of the case. Respondent-Appellant. Section 1. This averment is subject to qualification. The rectification was a valid act. 14452 before the Justice of Peace Court of Caloocan. Judge Misajon in effect completely exonerated Judge Maceda and thus also extinguished the civil action connected with the criminal case. Petitioner-Appellee. We here limit ourselves to the issues raised in the proceedings at bar as above discussed and resolved. 1953 FELINO LIM. Justice of the peace of Caloocan. 1990. Rizal. 1990. WHEREFORE.aspect of the case was not extinguished with the dismissal of the criminal charge. with costs against the petitioner. On September 4. Not having the right to appeal. HON. 9 The case at bar does not come under any of the above exceptions. We do not deal here with the merits of the order of Judge Maceda dated March 16. It is so ordered. The above ruling renders the fourth issue irrelevant or moot. the Petitioner-Appellee Felino Lim with twenty-one others was charged for gambling in criminal case No. ORETA. Judge Misajon declared in her order dismissing the charge that Sadio was in fact given the opportunity to be heard and offered testimonial and documentary evidence on February 26 and 28. No. The civil action was deemed dismissed with the criminal action.R. It is not challenged in this petition. the petitioner cannot invoke his notice of appeal on April 27. Rizal. That order is still under motions for reconsideration that remain unresolved to date. JOSE F. of the Constitution. Cardenas and Casal for appellee. and only to those issues. neither the notice of appeal nor its initial approval would have been effectual because of the petitioner's lack of legal standing to prosecute the appeal. 1990. the Defendants were arraigned before the RespondentAppellant and all of them pleaded guilty. 7 (2) the decision contains a declaration that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil. the petition is DENIED. The petitioner's criminal complaint alleged that Judge Maceda had issued the interlocutory order in violation of Sadio's right to due process under Article III. Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. declaring the small town lottery conducted in the Province of Antique illegal and enjoining its continued operation. the order of dismissal became final and unappealable after the lapse of the reglementary 15-day period. 8 or (3) the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. 1990. The notice of appeal should not have been approved in the first place. G. The criminal aspect of the order could have been appealed since double jeopardy had not yet attached because the accused had not yet been arraigned. In this situation. and the recall of the order of May 16. "which (Judge Maceda) considered in issuing his order of March 16. the petitioner could not have. as a mere complaining witness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library ." In finding that the petitioner had not been denied due process. The Court has held that acquittal in a criminal case does not bar continuation of the civil case connected therewith where: (1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt. 10 No appeal having been filed by him. appealed the dismissal of the criminal action even on its civil aspect only. or protest the withdrawal of its approval by Judge Misajon on May 16. 1990. That same day. In any event.

filed a notice of appeal from this order of the Court of First Instance of .000 which has been taken from the pocket of one of the herein accused. the Honorable Bienvenido A. 1952. presiding. Instead of complying with his previous commitment. 1952.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Wherefore.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (Sgd. the accused Jose Lajon and Felino Lim as maintainer and banker. Oretachanrobles virtual law library Justice of the Peace" 4. On October 6.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 7. Petitioner-Appellee through counsel questioned during the hearing the right of Respondent-Appellant to proceed further on grounds of double jeopardy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The amount of P42. On October 25.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3.000 which was seized from his pocket during the gambling raid by the peace officer and which was then in the custody of the authorities of Caloocan was not a part of the proceeds or instrument of the Crime and for this purpose requested the court to set a day to enable him to introduce such evidence with the assistance of counsel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 9. freely and voluntarily enter the plea of guilty as charged. to suffer each of the said accused the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment. the court also directed the Respondent-Appellant to issue an order for the refund of the P1. is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government. that is.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is so ordered.m. 1952. the Court of First Instance of Rizal. and the rest as bettors. 1952.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Caloocan. are hereby sentenced to pay each a fine of P100.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 6. at 2:30 p. respectively. in view of Respondent-Appellant's insistence in hearing the case over and above Petitioner-Appellee's opposition. the Petitioner-Appellee immediately paid the fine of P100 and his proportionate share of the costs imposed upon him by RespondentAppellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 5. with the costs proportionately. In compliance with the above-quoted decision. On September 15. at P50 each. September 4.55 seized and presented as part of the evidence in this case.000 to PetitionerAppellee. 1952. 1952. Rizal. In its order granting the relifed. since he had no lawyer at the time.000. he was reserving his right to present evidence to prove that the sum of P1.2. in order to determine whether said amount should be confiscated in favor of the government or not. whether or not it should be decreed confiscated to the Government or returned to its lawful owner. Tan. the Respondent-Appellant called the case for hearing in order to pass upon the remaining question of the disposition of the said amount of P1. in representation of the Respondent-Appellant. After making his plea. granted the petition by ordering the Respondent-Appellant to desist from further hearing the case in question. As regard to the sum of P1.) Jose F. the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. the court hereby sets the hearing of this case for September 15. On November 5.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 8. Whereupon the Respondent-Appellant rendered a decision which reads as follows: "SENTENCEchanrobles virtual law library All the accused in the above-entitled case upon being duly informed today of the nature of the complaint.. a petition for prohibition was filed by the latter against the former before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. the Petitioner-Appellee manifested to the court that. in case of insolvency of the fines above imposed. however.

Such appears to be the petitioner's position. modifying his decision. They promptly paid it. And when His Honor declared "once the accused is found guilty and has paid the fine the decision is final" he obviously meant.S. 895). said court has lost jurisdiction to hear further the said case. . the decision expressly reserved decision on the particular issue as to disposition of the money.S. He took further steps in consonance therewith. Here the justice of the peace had expressly reserved the power to continue hearing the matter. the judgment of the court in U. the accused (for gambling) pleaded guilty and were sentenced to pay a fine.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In ordering the respondent to desist from further proceedings the judge a quo reasoned thusly:chanrobles virtual law library "In a criminal case once the decision is promulgated or once the accused is found guilty and has paid the fine. In making payment he accepted the verdict.. 1952 could be legally considered "final". (Moran op. it left nothing to be done further. vs. unwarranted by the law on jeopardy. Whereas in this case.)chanrobles virtual law library Yet even if payment by the accused of the fine accorded finality to the judgment. together with the reservation. Vol. decreed the confiscation. Vol. Hart. the justice of the peace had not attempted to "modify" his decision. Unless and until that issue (expressly reserved for subsequent adjudication) was passed upon. the decision could not be "modified" .and that justice of the peace Oreta was attempting to "modify" his decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library "When the order or judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits" it is not final (Moran.. It left something to be done later. In the present case the accused having already paid the fine imposed upon them by the Justice of the Peace Court. i.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library However there is reason to doubt whether the decision of September 4. Although it was quite irregular. the judgment could not be regarded final. without costs."chanrobles virtual law library Apparently His Honor overlooed both the reservation made by the accused. Comments Rules of Court 1952 ed. (24 Phil. here the proposed hearing was not a modification of the decision but a procedural step in furtherance thereof. vs. said the Supreme Court. I p.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Wherefore it was a mistake to prohibit the justice of the peace of Caloocan to further act on the case. the decision is final. 897.he may not prevent further actuation as to the money seized in his possession because the judgment itself reserved that point. the decision of this court in U. for it does not completely dispose of the case.e.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Had the judgment been silent on the matter. i cannot be held that he lacked jurisdiction. cit. Judgment reversed.a proper issue in the criminal proceeding. and of which he was informed only after promulgation of the decision. For instance in an action for dissolution of a partnership the judgment dissolving the partnership and ordering the defendant to render accounts is not final and appealable. I. Hart was final. executory .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In other words. Afterwards the fiscal asked that the judgment be "modified" to dispose of the money which had been seized. the determination of the question whether the money should be confiscated . This is distinguishable from the Hart precedent wherein the judge had said nothing about confiscation in his decision imposing a fine. p. In the Hart case any pronouncement as to the money was a modification of a final judgmen.Rizal. 578) invoked by the appellee would be clearly applicable. which wa part and parcel of his sentence.no appeal. In that case. Reversible error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the instance case however.and the directive of the justice of the peace calling for a hearing on September 15. 1952. The judge.

TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES: 1) Swelling.000. along the anterior midline. concur. There were feces hanging from his anus. accused-appellants.00 as exemplary damages.00 as actual damages. and as judgment was rendered on the pleadings.000. So his wife Orlene Orola and Leonilo Mangua went to the municipal building to look for another vehicle.m. Vladimir Villaseñor of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory showed the following: FINDINGS: Body belongs to a fairly nourished. J. C. and SPO1 RANDY M. Madali. Reyes. and Labrador. and Randy M. Romblon.J.000. and to pay the costs.. When Helen woke up at around 1 a. Accused-appellant Eleazar M.800. Helen went to bed ahead of her husband in their bedroom on the second floor of their house.00 as attorney’s fees. plaintiff-appellee. fairly developed previously embalmed male cadaver. Helen became hysterical and went outside the house for help.000.00 as moral damages. SPO2 EUSTAQUIO V. she found her husband lying with his head towards the wall. However. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Reynaldo was declared dead on arrival in the hospital. drove the tricycle. She looked for him in the bathroom but could not find him there either. Eduardo Galang. measuring 1. measuring 9 x 7 cm. Branch 81. Reynaldo Abrenica and his wife Helen came home at the house of Harry Mindo in Romblon. and Landoy Galang so that it could be taken to the hospital. and P60. Bautista Angelo.000. Pablo. Jugo. But such facts were alleged in the answer. was going to drive the jeep but found that its headlights were not functioning. guilty of the murder of Reynaldo M.00 for loss of earning capacity..00 as death indemnity. crying that her husband had accidentally fallen from the stairs. Padilla. ROGERO. JJ.[2] He was wearing a white sleeveless undershirt (sando) with a towel over his bare buttocks. An autopsy conducted on Reynaldo’s cadaver by Dr.P150.3 x 0. Romblon where Reynaldo had some drinks. 1992. P70. Montemayor. who was on duty at that time. Helen did not find any trace of blood on the body of her husband nor in the place where it lay.5 cm. fronto-parietal region. Reynaldo’s body was loaded in a jeep by neighbors Joey Salgado. Eustaquio V.. she found that her husband was not beside her. his left hand placed on his back and his right arm pinned under his body. they must be deemed admitted. vs. The following facts are undisputed: On February 4. With the tricycle ahead. at around 11 p. Romeo Ibal.[3] When she touched her husband she found he was dead.. SPO2 ELEAZAR M. P50.m. accused-appellants’ preventive imprisonment was ordered credited in their favor. also a neighbor of the Abrenicas. Segundo Orola. She turned on the light and went to the stairs and there.: This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court. P124. MADALI. In accordance with Art.00 as expenses of litigation.000. all members of the Philippine National Police. . 29 of the Revised Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 1 The appellee asserts there is no proof of the facts stated in this paragraph.. Madali. Romblon finding accused-appellants Eleazar M. RUBIO. Accused-appellants were also ordered jointly and severally to pay the heirs of the deceased P50. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. P150. Rogero. Rubio. on the landing of the stairs.library Paras. They found a tricycle they could use to guide the jeep.[4] After it was dressed. superimposed lacerated wound. the way was lighted for the jeep bearing Reynaldo. Abrenica and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua. DECISION MENDOZA.

1 cm. distal 3rd of the left leg. 5) Abrasion. measuring 6 x 4 cm. parietal region. 12) Contusion. proximal 3rd of the right arm. middle 3rd of the right leg. 10) Contusion. lateral to its posterior midline. proximal 3rd of the left leg.. lateral to its anterior midline. medial to its posterior midline. 6 cm. More pronounced at the right upper lobe. measuring 1. measuring 13 x 4 cm. medial to its anterior midline. Cut section reveals widening of the white matter and congestion.. 8) Contusion. 11) Abrasion. measuring 2 x 0. 15) Contusion. from the anterior midline. Microsection shows varying degrees of neuronal degeneration and focal dilated blood vessels. lumen of which are filled by blood fluid. 2 cm. 6) Abrasion. measuring 5 x 3 cm. along the midsagittal line. measuring 8 x 6 cm. 3. 16) Sore. PLEURAL. right clavicular region.5 cm. measuring 7 x 1 cm. Assessment: Cerebral edema and congestion.. measuring 3 x 2.5 cm. medial to its anterior midline. proximal 3rd of the left arm. from the anterior midline. measuring 5 x 4. lateral to its posterior midline. 9) Contusion. measuring 6 x 6 cm. left clavicular region.. PERICARDIAL AND PERITONEAL CAVITIES: The pleural. measuring 2 x 1. 6 cm.... along the midsagittal line. 2 cm. There are subdural hemorrhage noted at the anterior lobes of both cerebral hemispheres. 14) Contusion.5 x 0. distal 3rd of the left leg. medial to its anterior midline.... measuring 6 x 1 com.5 cm. measuring 7 x 5 cm. LUNGS: Both lungs are dark gray in color with areas of anthracosis. pericardial and peritoneal cavities are free from adhesions and fluid accumulations. 7) Contusion. measuring 6 x 3 cm. middle 3rd of the left thigh. medial to its anterior midline. 17) Swelling.2) Scalp hematoma. The primary and secondary bronchi contain minimal amount of dark reddish fluid. BRAIN: The brain is pale white in appearance with shallow sulci and gyri. middle 3rd of the left arm. measuring 5 x 3 cm.8 cm. frontal region. 2 cm. 11 cm.. along its anterior midline. lateral to its anterior midline. distal 3rd of the left leg. medial to its posterior midline. measuring 2 x 1. . medial to its anterior midline. Serial section shows areas of focal congestion.5 cm. 13) Contusion.5 cm. Circle of Willis shows minimal amount of atheromatous deposits but otherwise patent.. 4) Area of multiple abrasions. 5 cm. 2 cm.5 cm.. middle 3rd of the left thigh.. distal 3rd of the left leg. There is crepitancy on pressure. 4 cm. middle 3 rd of the right thigh. 3) Scalp hematoma. 17 cm. 4 cm.

moderate Congestion. Capsules are stripped-off with difficulty. leaving a fine granular cortical surface. Coronary arteries patent with slight thickening of its vascular wall. spleen PANCREAS: The pancreas is pale yellowish brown in color. thick while the right ventricular wall measures 0. after an alleged eyewitness. 1995. the above-named accused. conspiring and confederating . and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Other areas show focus of pseudocyst formation. Valvular leaflets are soft and pliable. doughy to firm in consistency. Focal emphysema noted. enveloped in moderate amount of epicardial fats. lobulated with petechial hemorrhages noted at the head and tail of the pancreas. mildly infiltrated with mononuclear cell infiltrates. Cut section reveals clotted blood embedded on both chambers. slightly thickened ducta filled with impessated secretions. Microsection shows moderate to extensive acute tubular necrosis with tubular degenerations and focal thickening of its vascular wall. three years after the death of Reynaldo Abrenica. ventricle Atherosclerosis . The sinusodial spaces are filled with red blood cells.[5] On December 1. Assessment: Acute tubular necrosis Tubular degeneration SPLEEN: The spleen is dark gray in color. Cut section reveals a well-defined cortico-medulary junction. firm and slightly wrinkled. surfaced and implicated accusedappellants in the death of Reynaldo. The information against accused-appellants alleged ¾ That in or about the early morning of February 5. Cut section reveals congestion. Scanty germinal follicles are noted.Microsection shows severe congestion at the alveolar capillaries and the pulmonary alveoli are filled with eosinophilic fluid. in Romblon. this case was filed. liver KIDNEYS: Both kidneys are reddish brown in color. Mercy Villamor. Bronchial smooth muscle wall is slightly thickened and mildly infiltrated with round cell infiltrates. Microsection shows congestion and hemorrhage on both the red and white pulp. Assessment: Congestion and hemorrhage. Assessment: Dilatation. Microsection shows separation of the myocardial muscle fiber by edema and is mildly infiltrated by round cells. HEART: The heart is pale reddish brown in color. moderate to severe Chronic Bronchitis. Assessment: Pulmonary edema and congestion. 1992. A nut-meg liver pattern on section with focal areas of congestion. Romblon.5 cm. Microsection shows focal hemorrhages within the parenchyma and areas of dilated. Stomach is ¼ full of partially digested food particles consisting mostly of rice. thick. with multiple petechial hemorrhages noted in the surface. CONCLUSION: Cause of death is Intracranial hemorrhage as a result of traumatic head injury. liver. Microsection shows focal areas of vacuolation of the hepatic cells.30 – 40% LIVER: The liver is yellowish brown in color. doughy in consistency. Assessment: Fatty changes. The left ventricular wall measures 1. Coronary artery shows minimal amount of atheromatous deposits. Assessment: Acute hemorrhagic Pancreatitis There are subdural hemorrhages noted on both cerebral hemispheres.3 cm.

according to Mercy. he said he had run over a dog. 1992. the two men in her life met. Mercy said she and Mayet then proceeded to Reynaldo’s house. Leonora Orboc). with intent to kill. ano ngayon?” (“So.00 bill inside with a note saying. On their way. Madali arrived at the Boulevard Music Lounge. Mercy said accused-appellants Rogero and Rubio. Mercy claimed that Reynaldo M. Mercy Villamor was a former bar girl at the Boulevard Music Lounge in Bagacay. When she asked him why there was blood on his uniform. at around 9 p. According to Mercy. as a result of which Reynaldo fell on the ground. she met Reynaldo who was on a motorcycle. Hilda Yap. you seem to have been talking with Mercy”). It was accused-appellant Madali.” (“Pal. Thereafter. Mercy testified that while she was walking around town on February 4. Mercy told him that she was going swimming with Reynaldo on February 4. in his jeep then parked outside his house. 1990 to April 1992 and met accusedappellants who became her customers. She said Reynaldo apologized to her for not going swimming with her on that day because his wife had arrived from Manila. Madali hit Reynaldo on the head three times with his gun. She worked there from June 2. 1992. and with treachery and evident premeditation.with each other. but Madali did not believe her. Mercy. She claimed that she had a son by Madali. According to Mercy. At around 1 a. According to Mercy. someone walking towards them. Mercy noticed that his uniform was stained with blood. Mayet Espinosa (a. 1992. "Nakasagasa ka ng aso o pumatay ka ng tao?” (“You ran over a dog or you killed someone?”) In fact. Mercy said she then went upstairs and lay beside Madali. was born on November 10. before Reynaldo left.m. “I love you. Abrenica was also her customer at the night club.” Mercy claimed that she and a friend.m.k. Mercy said that while she and Reynaldo were talking. on that date. one evening in December 1991. Romblon. 1991. whereupon they were tried.m. Mercy said they were going home. Mercy answered in the affirmative. Abrenica thereby causing the latter’s death. “Pare.a. they met Madali. He gave her an envelope and told her to meet him that same night at 11:30 p. Reynaldo was inside his jeep.. named Mark Anthony. After Reynaldo left. The boy. Madali tried to dissuade her but she was adamant. Mercy said Madali was the brother of the boyfriend of the owner of the night club. on the jeep’s side mirror. Mercy was at Reynaldo’s table at the Boulevard Music Lounge when Madali entered through the back door. Madali then pulled his gun and hit Reynaldo on the head with it. kausap mo yata si Mercy. did then and there wilfully. after witnessing the incident. When Madali asked whether Reynaldo was her boyfriend. when she .[6] Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. came and helped Madali carry Reynaldo’s body inside the latter’s house. When Reynaldo asked whether Madali was her boyfriend. Mercy asked Madali why he was there when his wife was supposed to be in town.. 1992. “Eh. accused-appellants closed the door. went to meet Reynaldo at 11 p. Madali approached Reynaldo and asked. who were also in uniform. He asked where they were going. Mercy then rejoined Reynaldo. Reynaldo allegedly courted her in October 1991 and became her boyfriend on December 22. Mercy retorted. The two women then joined him inside the jeep. to which Reynaldo replied. and the two hurriedly got off the jeep and hid behind a pile of boxes nearby. Romblon. who was in uniform and riding his motor tricycle. although she was still having an affair with Madali at that time. She testified that accused-appellant Madali courted her in September 1990 and became her boyfriend in November of that year. they agreed to go swimming on February 4. who was then pregnant.m. what?”). According to Mercy. Mayet saw. she and Mayet returned to the Boulevard Music Lounge. unlawfully and feloniously inflict mortal wounds upon the person of one Reynaldo M. Mercy opened the envelope and found a P500. Madali told her that he wanted to sleep at the music lounge and proceeded to the second floor.

when his wife heard about the rumor that Mercy bore him a child. He set his alarm clock to 11:40 p. 1994[7]before the Commission on Human Rights. he took Rubio to their headquarters and then went to the front of the post office. but Mercy said she did not spread any rumor about her having a child by Madali. When Orlene Orola and Leonilo Mangua arrived. of the next day. and she said that she heard the sound of something falling and thought that it was their plastic container which fell. Rogero had the same schedule as Madali. He was joined by Madali who had the same schedule of duty. Rogero said he and Rubio then proceeded to the hospital where they were told by Madali that Reynaldo fell from the stairs. where he stayed until 6 a. She was then nine months pregnant. Madali later followed them to the police station. to 12 midnight. he woke accused-appellant Randy Rubio up and the two of them proceeded to the Abrenica residence. According to Rogero. his tour of duty as foot patrol and vigilante was from 12 midnight to 8 a. Accused-appellant Rogero testified that on February 4. According to Madali. his wife summoned Mercy to their house. when Orlene Orola and Leonilo Mangua came for assistance in bringing Reynaldo Abrenica to the hospital. before going home. 1992. Madali left with Orlene Orola and Leonilo Mangua aboard the police tricycle. Accusedappellant Madali testified that. in his jeep. and stayed for awhile with accused-appellant Rogero in the latter’s jeep. she noticed that his shoes were also stained with blood. 1992. and other policemen were introduced to her by Hilda Yap at the Boulevard Music Lounge. Madali said he had the chance to talk to Reynaldo’s wife Helen in the hospital. He stated that he only came to know her sometime in December 1991 when he and the other accused-appellants. In fact. According to Rogero.[9] Leonora Orboc.[8] Accused-appellants denied liability for the death of Reynaldo Abrenica. at the end of the ninth day. He saw accused-appellant Rubio. He said that he and his wife in fact attended the nine-day prayers (pasiyam) for the soul of Reynaldo and. at about 11 p. after she had been informed about the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice. Rogero and Rubio.m. Rogero said he stayed in his jeep for sometime until it was time to begin his duty. Then.m.m. he said. He said he arrived at the station at around 11:50 p. 1992. Madali denied having an affair with Mercy Villamor. He arrived at the police station at about 11:40 p.m. She said that she only implicated accused-appellants in her sworn statement on December 14. Rogero said he and Rubio were told by Susan Ybañez that Reynaldo fell from the stairs and was taken to the hospital. She stated that she worked from 10 p. standing outside the station. of February 4. Mercy was entered in the program only on April 15. he took the police motor tricycle and went with the two to the Abrenica residence. because he was on duty at the police station from 12 midnight to 8 a. also known as Mayet Espinosa.m. 1992 at the cash register at the Boulevard Music Lounge.m.m. She said she did not report what she had seen because she was afraid for her life as Madali had threatened her.washed Madali’s clothes. Madali attended to them. with him leading the way because the jeep’s headlights would not function. Madali denied having a child by Mercy. 1995. Abrenica near the latter’s house on February 4. whose duty as station guard and desk officer was from 8 p. Madali likewise denied he bore the Abrenicas ill will. They stayed at the hospital’s lobby for about two hours and then returned to their station. he was in his house asleep. testified for the defense. they took Reynaldo Abrenica to the hospital. She said that she knew that Mercy was at the Boulevard Music Lounge that night because she tried to . of February 4. He was later asked by Madali to follow him to the Abrenica residence. She denied being with Mercy Villamor when the latter met Reynaldo M.m.m. they were invited by Helen to dinner together with others who had condoled with her.

RUBIO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under the Information. (2) SR. the trial court rendered its decision. His request to be allowed to appear on behalf of the complainant was denied for lack of merit.[10] On May 25. (3) P150.00 for expenses of litigation. widow of the deceased Reynaldo M. [12] On June 2.[16] On November 20.000. POLICE OFFICER II EUSTAQUIO V. and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[14] On July 16. (6) P50. this appeal. complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief. (2) P124. she filed a Memorandum for the Private Complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil liability arising from the crime. are ORDERED to pay the heirs of the deceased Reynaldo M. Mayet likewise denied that she witnessed the murder described by Mercy in court. by way of answer to the brief of accusedappellants. Reynaldo Z. complainant stated that her memorandum had already been noted by the Court and.[11] Hence. Accused-appellants assign the following errors as having been allegedly committed by the trial court: I. The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be credited in their favor to its full extent pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. such as the complainant who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceedings. 1997. When required to comment on complainant’s motion for leave to file a separate brief. 1997 a Manifestation and Motion to be Allowed to File Brief. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.00 as moral damages. the same should be considered in the resolution of this appeal. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE DOUBTS AND DISCREPANCIES IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE.” It has been held that the word “party” in the provision in question includes not only the government and the accused but other persons as well. (5) P70.[17] In view of the position taken by the Office of the Solicitor General. in the interest of a balanced presentation of facts and the issues. unless of course he has reserved to bring a . Abrenica the following sums. but Mercy refused to get up. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING CREDIBLE THE TESTIMONIES OF TWO PIVOTAL WITNESSES.00 as death indemnity. §1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that “(a)ny party may appeal from a judgment or final order. the Solicitor General stated that since complainant had already filed a memorandum. Abrenica. Atty.00 for attorney’s fees and appearance fees. 1998. POLICE OFFICER II ELEAZAR M. Calabio filed a Notice of Appearance[13] has counsel for complainant Helen M. jointly and severally. and to pay the costs. 1995. dated December 1. MERCY VILLAMOR AND DR. with the accessory penalties of the law.[15] This was likewise denied for lack of merit. 1996. II.000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased. Abrenica.800.000.[18] On February 13. ROGERO and (3) SR. complainant filed on December 8. there was no further need for a brief sustaining the decision on appeal.rouse her from her sleep as many customers were looking for her.[19] which was noted in the Court’s resolution of March 25. SO ORDERED. MADALI.00 as actual damages. the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Appellee’s Brief recommending the acquittal of accused-appellants. and (7) P60. 1997.000. 1997. separate from that which the Office of the Solicitor General would file.000. (4) P150. 1998. unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.000. namely. this Court finds the accused (1) SR.00 as exemplary damages. Rule 122. These three (3) accused. (1) P50. POLICE OFFICER I RANDY M. VLADIMIR VILLASENOR. On the other hand.

another prosecution witness. According to Mercy. The sight of uniformed policemen carrying a body would attract attention. At any rate. 1992. as the appellee. 1992. where the Office of the Solicitor General takes a contrary position and recommends. In the interest of justice and equity and to provide perspective for this appeal. however. First. therefore. In the opposite direction are the market and the post office. (3) Mercy claimed that at around 1 a. In fact Helen Abrenica said that when they arrived home on February 4. we agree with the Solicitor General that the evidence is insufficient to sustain accused-appellants’ conviction and. the appeal of criminal cases involves as parties only the accused. in the prosecution of the offense. Mayet Espinosa. if the State were simply to seek the affirmation of a judgment of conviction. bringing Reynaldo inside his house. Nevertheless. represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. they meet instead at 11:30 p. The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the supposed eyewitness. and Rubio holding the two legs. as in this case. Mayet Espinosa denied that she and Mercy went to meet Reynaldo M. (1) Mercy testified that. in his jeep which was parked in front of the Abrenica residence. after considering the records of this case.separate civil action to recover the civil liability. The participation of the private offended party would be a mere surplusage. the complainant’s role is that of a witness for the prosecution. (4) Mercy said that Reynaldo’s jeep was parked along Republica Street in front of his house. Reynaldo Abrenica asked that. that accused-appellants would do this because they were in their uniforms and they could easily be noticed. Rogero by the right arm. Reynaldo Abrenica never suffered any stab or incised wound. and the theory of the prosecution was simply that he was clubbed to death. who said that the jeepney was facing the direction of the market and the post office. The jeep was facing the pier. the decision of the trial court should be reversed and accused-appellants should be acquitted. and the State. Madali holding him by the nape. accused-appellant Madali arrived at the Boulevard Music Lounge and she noticed that he had blood on his uniform and his boots. .[20] Hence. 1992. testified that there was no blood on her husband’s body or on the floor or on the wall when she found him on the landing of their staircase. This is incredible. It was. therefore. the Court hereby allows in this case the memorandum filed by complainant which is hereby admitted as part of the records of this appeal. while they were seated inside the jeep. who were in their uniforms. This was also the position of the vehicle when Segundo and Orlene Oroloa arrived at the Abrenica in response to the cry for help of Helen. of February 5.[21] Ordinarily. If Reynaldo allegedly called off their date because his wife was in town. why would he instead appoint a place for their tryst right in front of his house where it was more likely they would be seen by his wife? (2) Mercy testified that she saw accused-appellants.m. Helen Abrenica and the spouses Segundo and Orlene Orola. It is inconceivable. on February 4. the acquittal of the accused. Accused-appellant was allegedly coming from the direction of the market and the post office. Abrenica parked the vehicle it was facing in the direction of the market and the post office. Indeed. as appellants. Mercy Villamor. saw accused-appellant Madali on the side mirror of the vehicle. her companion.m. the complainant’s right to be heard on the question of award of indemnity and damages arises. as they could not go out because his wife had arrived from Manila. However. they passed through the pier so that when Reynaldo M. not possible for Mayet Espinosa to have seen accused-appellant on the side mirror of the vehicle. But Helen Abrenica. therefore. This is contrary to the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses. despite its many improbabilities and inconsistencies which renders it doubtful.

Abrenica in front of his house on the night of February 4.. Q . Q .Yes.Why did you hide? A . Harry Mindo.You alighted from the jeep when you saw Madali coming because you were afraid and you wanted to hide from him. Mayet’s testimony is more credible. 4 arms length. The risk of being seen carrying the body inside the house up to the first flight of stairs to the landing where it was found was too great.We were not afraid.I don’t want because we told him we are going home. Q .It is near. Q . do you remember . refusing to get up despite the fact that customers of the night club wanted to have her. and that they left that place at around 10:30 p. If accused-appellants killed Reynaldo. In addition to the inconsistencies and improbabilities in her testimony. of February 4. they could just have left him on the street or placed him inside his jeepney. So small indeed was the space constituting the landing of the stairs that Reynaldo’s body had to be crumpled so that his knees were bent toward his chest while his left hand had to be placed on his back and his right arm pinned under his body. At the time of the incident she was heavy with a child. she saw Reynaldo riding on his motorcycle and she was told that they could not go out that night because Madali’s wife was around.Because Bebot might see us. sir. . they would have made noise and would have been detected by the occupants of the house. Reynaldo was found lying in a prone position with knees bent toward his chest and his head facing the wall.And you were how many meters away while watching and hiding behind the kamada of kahon? A . 1992.m. This is not what he had on when he was found. Mercy’s testimony shows hedging and trimming as is clear from the following portion of the transcript of stenographic notes: Q .That is why you hid so that you will not be seen by Madali. she was at the Boulevard Music Lounge while Mercy was upstairs sleeping. 1992.During the direct you answered apat (4) na dipa. Reynaldo was wearing a white sleeveless undershirt and was naked from the waist down with only a towel placed over his buttocks.m.. if he would see us because we told him we are going home.. (7) Mercy said she saw Reynaldo being carried by accused-appellants into his house. we told him before that we are going home.[23] It was so small that if three men carried his body and dumped it there.You did not want that any portion of your body could be seen by Madali at that time? A . Why should she go with Mercy who had a date with her lover? It is more probable that she worked at the cash register in the Boulevard Music Lounge than that. is that correct? A . from here to there. This is contrary to Helen Abrenica’s testimony that at that time Reynaldo was having drinks in the house of his friend.[22] (6) Mercy claimed that Reynaldo was wearing shorts and was half naked when they met inside his jeep. is that not right? A . Mayet testified for the defense.[24] This is not the only instance where Mercy gave confused and unsure statements. as Mercy claimed. Mercy said: Q . The space in which his body was found was only 25 inches by 41 inches. She said that at the time and on the date in question. When he was found. she went with her to see the latter‘s lover. (5) Mercy said that at around 9 p. Testifying concerning the distance between the place where she and Mayet were hiding and the place where they saw Madali allegedly hitting Reynaldo several times on the head.

dalawang (2) metro lamang? A . and I will let you refresh your memory. sir. sir.Yes. ARIAS: Doon sa pinagpukpukan. ATTY.[26] The inconsistencies. ATTY.Yes. when you said. ARIAS continuing: Q .I am showing to you Exhibit A-2. do you remember having given that answer? A . Q .And that was the distance you said apat (4) na dipa. it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself be credible. Q . The suspicion cannot be helped that she was a rehearsed witness.So.Two (2) arms length.And you know that two (2) arms length is shorter than apat (4) na dipa? A .And you stated in the affidavit two (2) meters. at paglapit ni Bebot Madali sa kinauupoan ni Rey sa loob ng jeep (harapan ng manibela) ay binati pa ni Bebot si Rey ng “kausap mo yata si Mercy”. Q .As a matter of fact the Court measured the distance you pointed earlier. sir..Yes. sir. . No.Yes.Yes. CALABIO: From where? ATTY. line 18. about two (2) arm’s length.You know that a meter is shorter than one (1) dipa? A .This distance. 15.. do you remember having stated that? A . I cannot remember.that? A .[27] It cannot be too often repeated that for evidence to be believed.No. according to you? A ..The same. ARIAS: I want to make of record that the witness had shown to us the distance by stretching her two (2) arms and pointing a little bit near and later on when she looked at the private prosecutor she changed her answer and said .[25] .All right.And you now discover that what you told earlier that Madali was four (4) arms length is not correct but only dalawang (2) metros or according to you pareho lang dalawang (2) dipa. Q . ATTY. Q . ATTY. two (2) meters that should be dalawang (2) dipa. how far were you? ATTY. The evidence must . Q . four (4) arms length. sir.. . You saw Madali struck the victim. and uncertainties in Mercy’s testimony are many. you stated that in your affidavit that you are four (4) arms length away from where the pokpoking occurred? A .. Q . do you remember that? A . and they relate to material points.Yes. ARIAS Continuing: Q . is that correct? A . . ARIAS Continuing: Q .I do not know. sir.. sir. . A . dinig na dinig namin ito ni Mayet sapagkat ang kinaroroonan namin ay dalawang (2) metro lamang.Madam Witness. improbabilities.

Dr. of February 4. . L-80845 March 14.m. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.[29] Third. No. When asked when she was allegedly threatened. petitioner. Bukidnon.be what the common experience and observation of mankind would approve of as probable under the circumstances. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. MENDOZA. G. she had to be cued by the prosecutor by timely manifestations. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery.[31] In this case. and Randy M. Branch 10. Villaseñor tried to explain the prior inconsistent statement by means of the lame excuse that he failed to include some matters in his statement because he did not then have his files with him. Abrenica was not accidental but intentional and that accused-appellants were guilty of killing him. 1992. and that was because Mercy Villamor came out with a claim that she saw accusedappellants kill Reynaldo. Rogero. In her dire attempt to explain away the irreconcilable statements in her affidavits and in her testimony in court. Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay. she admitted she only entertained the fear that Madali would harm her if she talked about what she allegedly knew. Municipality of Romblon.R. Abrenica. the prosecution failed to prove beyond doubt that the death of Reynaldo M. she stated that it was at 9 a. it was signed by Dr. Second. they are ordered forthwith released from custody unless they are being lawfully held for another cause. and JUAN MAGALOP y SALVACION. In fact. Villaseñor that the head injuries sustained by Reynaldo were caused by a blunt instrument is contrary to the statement he gave before the Office of the Ombudsman that the cause of Reynaldo’s death could not have been a blunt instrument. This case was not filed until three years after the death of Reynaldo M. At that time. respondents. the incident had not yet occurred. There were several instances when she did not make sense when confronted with her conflicting statements. Fourth. In fact. The remark was certainly provocative and Reynaldo knew that his reply would invite a retaliation.[28] We cannot help noticing that. she used lame and shallow excuses. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Eustaquio V. WHEREFORE.[30] Although this statement was prepared by the investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman. vs. Reynaldo allegedly said “Eh. Contrary to the observation of the trial court. the testimony of Dr. Romblon is REVERSED and accused-appellants Eleazar M. Mercy never explained the circumstances under which she was threatened. however. On the other hand. 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Reynaldo could not have been surprised by Madali’s alleged attack. She claimed that she could not reveal earlier what she knew about the crime because of threats made by accused-appellant Madali. Mercy had to be asked leading questions by the private prosecutor. in order to go through her direct examination. HON. the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Public Attorney's Office for private respondent. Consequently. Branch 81. SO ORDERED. she was not consistent on cross-examination. Madali. Presiding Judge. However. Rubio are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. ano ngayon? to Madali when the latter demanded to know whether he (Reynaldo) was talking to Mercy. Villaseñor. Thus. ERNESTO M. In sum.

The two-paged. In the course of the proceedings. and these were all allegedly sold to said Babie Tan who refused to testify on the matter. the police found themselves at a loss as to the identity of the culprit or culprits. Petitioner prays that respondent Judge be ordered to reverse his judgment exonerating Magalop and. The evidence of the prosecution failed to prove that the three accused were responsible for stealing these three articles or tools. Except for the accused Juan Magalop who pleaded guilty. responsibility for the robbery with force upon things was laid on accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion. INP. some of the stolen things were in the possession of a certain Babie Tan. and a coping saw. hence the trial was separate for accused Petronilo Fernandez and Juan Magalop. The evidence discloses that on 20 January 1987. The prosecution presented Pat. the case was submitted for decision. 1987 was ransacked as shown by the testimonies of the policemen and by the keepers of the storeroom. No evidence was introduced to show that the accused sold the stolen things to Babie Tan. it was not established how Juan Magalop and Petronilo Fernandez participated in the looting. The value of the missing articles was estimated at P15. private respondent herein. was ransacked. The defense having opted to waive its right to present evidence. Magalop pleaded "guilty" while Fernandez pleaded "not guilty. the plea of Juan Magalop was not intelligently done. who investigated the break-in. in behalf of the People of the Philippines. the identity of the perpetrators remained a problem. to impose upon him the proper penalty for the offense to which he pleaded guilty. a pair of ordinary pliers colored blue. Mendoza in Crim. The prosecution likewise offered in evidence colored pictures of the ransacked storeroom. To the Court. instead. Bukidnon. J. a pair of long-nose pliers colored red. on January 20. On 8 October 1987. Accused Ricarte Dahilan is mentally deranged. All three (3) were represented by District Citizens Attorney Isidro L. Bukidnon. the policemen were at a loss to identify the person or persons responsible thereof.BELLOSILLO. assailing the judgment of respondent Judge Ernesto M. it was not shown who (how?) they conspired and helped each other in the commission of the crime charged. the court a quo conducted trial. the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries (BNSHI) in Maramag. single-spaced judgment is quoted hereunder for careful scrutiny and better appreciation. 4264 acquitting accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion." Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop. The last three items were said to have been recovered by the police. of the crime of robbery with force upon things notwithstanding his plea of guilt.15. Eventually. which the prosecution could have proved to show that the possessors of the stolen things could have .: This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal (now Provincial Prosecutor) of Malaybalay. Thus — This is a case where three accused were allegedly responsible for forcibly taking things from the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries. Jakosalem. After an on-thespot investigation.298. Petronilo Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte Dahilan alias Ricky. As shown by the evidence of the prosecution. It was established by the prosecution that the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries at Maramag. Case No." The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was "not mentally well. Although Juan Magalop pleaded guilty. At the arraignment on 23 June 1987. consisting of two pliers and a saw. respondent Judge acquitted accused Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier pleaded guilty to the charge. After on the spot investigation. Bukidnon. as well as a clerk and a storekeeper of the BNSHI. Caracol.

insisting that with his voluntary plea of guilt. Bukidnon. be dismissed. 6 This rule is at most directory. the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. Parenthetically. that the case of the prosecution against the three (3) accused was virtually non-existent as the asported articles were found in the possession of a certain Babie Tan and yet. We have already ruled in a number of cases that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines once such actions are brought before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. It may be stressed that the petition is defective since it was filed by the Provincial Fiscal and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay. when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense. "without coursing it through the OSG. Babie Tan could have positively identified those who sold him the stolen articles if called to testify. as amended. petitioner is now before us contending that the decision of 8 October 1987 and the order of 4 November 1987 denying reconsideration are "purely capricious and arbitrary. The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt freely. had voluntarily. explaining that the petition was filed directly by the Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay. hence. petitioner interposed no objection to the acquittal of accused Fernandez. Here it is evident. let this case be held in abeyance until he is mentally well. Bukidnon. in his Manifestation filed with this Court on 8 June 1989. It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to persist in holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the evidence points to his acquittal." 2 Petitioner submits that the accused Magalop. 5 Thus. PREMISES CONSIDERED. voluntarily and with full knowledge and understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the information as well as the consequences of his plea. Thus." as a consequence of which it should be the fiscal who should submit the required pleadings.4 It is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. he could very well have been the perpetrator of the crime himself. 3 As a matter of fact. the petition should. just the same. In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into possession of stolen . the trial court had no other recourse but to pronounce judgment and impose the proper penalty. the prosecution utterly failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond doubt (emphasis supplied). Nonetheless. under the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure. Petitioner would have this Court set aside the acquittal of Magalop. the trial court had no alternative but to pronounce judgment and impose the proper penalty. the prosecution did not summon him to the witness stand.been identified as the thief or thieves. the accused Petronilo Fernandez and Juan Magalop are hereby ACQUITTED. who was assisted by counsel. spontaneously and intelligently pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery with force upon things. and curtailed the power of the state to punish criminals. made for no proper reason at all and rendered without legal authority whatsoever. quite inexplicably. 1 Its motion for reconsideration having been denied. There is no rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction automatically follows. the Solicitor General steered away from the case. Additional evidence independent of the plea may be considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently made. and not by the Solicitor General. thereby amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion. even from the start. even if we overlook this procedural lapse and treat the case on the merits. Or. With respect to Ricarte Dahilan.

habeas corpus. In that case.: This is a special civil action for certiorari. In Criminal Case No. in view of the foregoing. as amended) but true also is that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction on final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in "cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved. as the better procedure would have been that set forth in People v. Judiciary Act. tamen inique noceat. the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the acquittal of the accused-respondent JUAN MAGALOP Y SALVACION is sustained. Off-hand it can be said that the petition is frivolous. It is for this fundamental reason that. Interdum even it ut exceptio quae prima facie justa videtur. injunction. Applying the principle laid down in the Padernal case. however. his acquittal must be sustained. ELFREN PARTISALA and HON. 1982 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES & TRADERS ROYAL BANK. J.effects." (Sec. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the 2nd Branch of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.) This is such a case so that the Court of Appeals had to certify it to Us. there is absolutely no evidence against him — presented or forthcoming. and all other auxiliary writs and process in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" (Sec. Solicitor General for petitioner. in view of the exculpatory testimony of the accused who had earlier pleaded guilty to the charge of homicide. ADIL. prohibition. 10997 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. outside of his improvident plea of guilt.'original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. Enrique Arguelles and Eugenio Original for respondents. in the interest of substantial justice. It may sometime happen that a plea which on its face seem just. Antonio C. It is so in this instance. He pleaded guilty and was forthwith "sentenced To suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of from Four (4) Years. No. In fairness to Magalop. MIDPANTAO L. in its place. It was also filed in the wrong court -. For even after finding that the plea of Magalop was not intelligently made. independent of the acknowledgment of guilt. L-61997 November 15. it can fairly be concluded that there was no standing plea at the time the court rendered its judgment of acquittal hence said acquittal was a nullity. ordered a plea of not guilty entered. the possessor is presumed to be the author of the crime of robbery.the Court of Appeals. there is no way by which accused Magalop could have been implicated. G. certiorari. . SO ORDERED. the trial court correctly considered the plea as withdrawn and. As the trial court succinctly put it. which could link accused Magalop to the robbery. Singson for petitioner Traders Royal Bank. ABAD SANTOS. not even the testimonies and the mute exhibits introduced during the trial could breathe life into the moribund state of the case for the prosecution. we cannot allow such procedural error to prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. the procedure followed by respondent judge was not the normal course. Be that as it may. From the evidence of the prosecution." Admittedly. 17. Judge Mendoza proceeded to pass judgment without requiring Magalop to plead anew to the charge. 8 where the court sustained the exoneration of the accused notwithstanding his plea of guilt. petitioners. there was nothing. Elfren Partisala was accused of estafa upon complaint of his employer The Traders Royal Bank. True the Court of Appeals has . vs. nevertheless is injurious and inequitable. even pro hac vice. This was not done by respondent judge. 7 Indeed. Padernal. "the plea of Juan Magalop was not intelligently done. While the loss of articles in the storeroom of the BNSHI was established.R. respondents. 30. WHEREFORE. Id em.

so good. 8 months. namely: 1." He advanced the proposition that Partisala should have been sentenced to a penalty higher than six years which would then make him ineligible for probation. He sought to educate the trial judge by filing a "MOTION TO CORRECT ERROR IN COMPUTATION OF PENALTY AND TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE PETITION FOR PROBATION. denying the motion to reconsider the denial. (People vs. the trial judge granted Partisala's application for probation. There followed a reply to the opposition. People vs. 28.) But even the learned fiscal was not absolutely certain as to the correct penalty. The instant petition prays that the orders of the trial judge denying the motion to correct. and granting the application for probation be annulled. which has a range of from 8 years. But before the trial judge could act on the application which appears to have attracted attention because the Sangguniang Bayan of Calinog. as this Body do hereby manifest.Two (2) Months and One (1) Day. Section 1. if granted will place the accused in double jeopardy.D. maximum. (Sec." But alternatively he said that the imposable penalty can also "be in the medium period of prision mayor. the trial judge denied the motion. The motion. 968." He asked that the sentenced imposed on Partisala be "corrected. L-8229. I day and 1 0 years. He gave two reasons for the denial. Probation Law. a supplement to the opposition. A motion for reconsideration was filed but denied. the instant motion is filed out of time. It is elementary that a motion for reconsideration should be based on the same grounds as those for a new trial for the two remedies are the same. together with all the accessory penalties provided for t)y law and to pay the costs. Firstly. a memorandum to support the application. Iloilo. it is a valid sentence because the trial judge had jurisdiction to impose it. a. including this Court. So far.R. We do not have to decide whether or not the penalty which the trial judge imposed on Partisala is correct. a motion for new trial should be filed before the finality of a conviction. and that his application for probation be denied. We make it known that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. a convict who files a petition for probation automatically waives his right to appeal and therefore his conviction becomes final." He was also ordered to reimburse to the bank the amount malversed. They argued that Partisala can best be rehabilitated in prison and if he is set free he might commit other crimes. to Six (6) Years of prision correccional. So for the reasons given by him when he denied the motion to correct. No. that the correct penalty be imposed on Partisala. The one who signed the petition for the Republic is a mere second assistant provincial fiscal. an assistant provincial fiscal and tile private prosecutor opposed the application for probation. the Probation Law. he said the penalty "is between 6 years. minimum. immediately after he was sentenced. Nov. L-6697-6688). as amended. " Predictably. the alarm and vehement sentiment of the people of this Municipality over reprehensive conduct of Elfren Partisala for his abstraction and misappropriation of the peoples' savings and deposits and other funds of the Calinog Branch of the Traders Royal Bank. As such it should have been filed before the sentence of the accused became final." the Acting Provincial Fiscal no less intervened. For correct or not. par. No. Henceforth actions filed in the name of the Republic of the Philippines if not initiated by the . albeit he is the Officer-in-Charge of the Iloilo Provincial Fiscal's Office. a rejoinder to the reply. 2. Partisala filed an application for probation. Under Rule 121. 9. Under P. Three weeks later. Therefore. in special session passed a resolution wherein it "RESOLVED to manifest. the sentence was already beyond his reach. G. Ang Cho Kio. 21 days to 8 years. In the meantime. 1955. Taruc. The motion is in the nature of a motion for reconsideration. It is to be noted the Republic of the Philippines is one of the petitioners herein.

represented by the SolGen. as in this case. 1999] . Evidence. the case was filed after an alleged eyewitness. where the OSG takes a contrary position and recommends.R. • The complainant has an interest in the civil liability arising from the crime. • Three years after Reynaldo’s death. Ruling and Reasoning: • Rule 122. in their appeal. complainant filed a Memorandum for the Private Complainant (after filing a Manifestationand Motion to File Brief) which was noted by the Court. 127899. Thebody of Reynaldo was found by his wife on the landing of the stairs of their house. improbabilities and uncertainties which relate to material points.” It has been held that the word“party” in the provision includes not only the government and the accused but other persons who may be af-fected by the judgment. Hence. No. Villaseñor of the PNP Crime Laboratory yielded to the conclusion that the cause of deathis intracranial hemorrhage as a result of traumatic head injury. The preliminary injunction which was issued by the Court of Appeals is hereby dissolved. the complainant’s right to be heard as regards indemnity and damages arises. • The complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief separate from that which the OSG would file. An autopsy con-ducted by Dr. in the prosecutionof the offense. In view of the position takenby the OSG. the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. byway of an answer to the brief of accused-appellants. Based on the testimony of this witness. as the appellee. The OSG subsequentlyfiled a Manifestation recommending the acquittal of accused-appellants. the complainant’s role is that of a witness for the prosecution. must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself be credible [G.1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that “any party may appeal from a judgment or final order. This motion was denied.to be believed.Facts: • An appeal from the decision of the RTC Branch 81 of Romblon. andthe State. • The accused-appellants. SO ORDERED. Villaseñor. Peoplev. • Ordinarily.Solicitor General will be summarily dismissed. Mercy Villamor’s testimony is riddled with inconsistencies.Madali 16 January 2001Mendoza. J. Sec. WHEREFORE. as appellants. No costs. the appeal of the criminal cases involves as parties only the accused. the evidence is insufficient to sustain the accused-appellants’ conviction. the acquittal of the accused. The participation of the private offended partywould be a mere surplusage if the State were simply to seek affirmation of a judgment of conviction. alleged that the trial court erred in failing to resolve doubtsand discrepancies in its findings of fact in favor of the accused and that the court erred in finding credi-ble the testimonies of Mercy Villamor and Dr. Romblon finding accused-appellantsguilty of the murder of Reynaldo M. Mercy Villamor. December 2. Abrenica and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua.surfaced and implicated the accused-appellants. unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. • Nevertheless.However. the accused-appellants were found guilty in the aforementioned decision.

After trial. (attached as Annexes “A” and “B” in the Comment/Opposition to the Post Sentence Investigation Report). Attached thereto are the checks he allegedly paid for subject property.R. Mr.000. 1995.: At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision.989.00 a parcel of land in La Trinidad. which motion was granted by Judge Umali in an Order dated January 11. Inc.000.10 to the private respondent. T18721 (“TCT No. 3. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. On January 6. On the same day. Dijamco filed an “Affidavit of Third-Party-Claim” over the same Benguet property on the strength of the said previous sale but averring already a consideration of P3. before Branch 160 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. and she failed to pay her judgment debt to the private respondent. To the said accusations.989. Petitioner therefore. 1993. CASTRO. T-18721. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON T. Thus. 1995. 102009 to 102062. J. the sheriff annotated the Notice of Levy on Execution on the dorsal portion of TCT No. 1995. Private respondent opposed subject application for probation on the grounds that: the petitioner is not eligible for probation because she has been sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of fifty-four (54) years.570. contending that: “x x x 2. all of which checks were dishonored upon presentment to the drawee bank. petitioner. SP No.[1] Resolution. It must be stressed that the real estate mortgage was executed by the accused in . Benguet (“Benguet Property”). as evidenced by the Affidavit of Third Party Claim filed by Teodoro S. vs. Thereafter. 1995. DECISION PURISIMA. Dijamco and the Real Estate Mortgage executed by the accused in favor of the Rural Bank of Angono. The facts that matter are as follows: Petitioner issued fifty-four (54) checks in the total amount of Three Million Nine Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Five and 10/100 (P3. On March 29. which was referred by Presiding Judge Umali to the Probation Officer of Marikina.MARILYN C. On February 13. respectively. respondents. docketed as Criminal Case Nos. she was found guilty in a Decision promulgated on December 20. sentencing her to a total prison term of fifty-four (54) years and to pay P3. Dijamco (“Mr.175.00. the sheriff prepared and signed a Notice of Levy on Execution over several properties belonging to the petitioner. T-18721”). the petitioner was charged with fifty-four (54) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (“BP 22”) in fifty-four (54) separate Informations. Recent developments show that the accused had been disposing and/or mortgaging her properties in obvious attempt to negate the satisfaction of her civil liability to herein private complainant. filed an application for probation.175. the corresponding writ of execution issued for the implementation and satisfaction of the monetary aspect of the said Decision. On October 12.10) Pesos. private respondent interposed a “Supplemental Opposition” to the application for probation. report. 38522. and recommendation. 1995. petitioner and her husband executed a “Deed of Absolute Sale” deeding out in favor of Teodoro S. Dijamco”) for P264. petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.[2] and Supplemental Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CAG. SANTOS. On May 5. private respondent presented a “Motion for a Writ of Execution”. 1994. for investigation.

She shall devote herself to a specific employment and shall not change said employment without prior notice to the supervising officer. and shall satisfy any other condition related to her rehabilitation and not unduly restrictive of her liberty or incompatible with her freedom of conscience. and/or shall pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training. 1995. and from the Court if such travel exceeds thirty (30) days. 11. Clearly. the private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. questioning the grant of probation. 10. In its Decision[4] dated August 16. Let the records of this case be remanded to the Court a quo. She shall meet her family responsibilities. 3. Marikina and shall not change her residence without approval of the supervising probation and parole officer or of the Court. Her motion for reconsideration was denied. 2. the Court of Appeals ruled thus: “IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING.” Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[5] of the above Decision but the same was denied in the Resolution[6]dated January 7. 5. Probationer shall report initially to the Chief parole and Probation Officer at Marikina Parole & Probation Off. 5. Marikina within seventy-two hours from receipt of the Order granting Probation. to wit: “1. 4. She shall participate in the Parole and Probationer’s Project as clean and green project in Marikina and attend the First Friday Mass at the Hall of Justice of Marikina. 4. and shall not commit any other offense. She shall allow the supervising probation officer. Judge Umali granted petitioner’s application for probation for a period of six (6) years. Hall of Justice. 6. unless otherwise modified by the Chief Probation and Parole Officer. thereafter. Dissatisfied. holding: . The Respondent Judge is hereby directed to issue a warrant for the arrest of the Private Respondent. the Petition is GRANTED. 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and the accused may likewise be prosecuted criminally for the said acts. She shall cooperate with her program of supervision. 1997. subject to the following terms and conditions.anticipation of an unfavorable judgment and that the alleged sale the real property in favor of Teodoro Dijamco was made after this Honorable Court had rendered judgment convicting the accused of the crime charged and after notice of levy on execution had been annotated on the title. 9. it is crystal clear that the accused is not entitled to the benefits of the probation law and that the acts enumerated constitute indirect contempt. the accused is disqualified from the benefits of the aforecited Decree as she has been sentenced to a total of fifty four (54) years of imprisonment. the said mortgage and sale executed by the accused constitute indirect contempt under Sec. 7. 8.” In the Order he issued on June 30. She shall reside in #8 Jazmin. Concepcion. Annexes “A” and “B” of the Petition are SET ASIDE.” Private respondent moved for reconsideration but to no avail. From the foregoing. Twinsville Subd. Moreover. 1996. The Orders of the Respondent Judge. She shall refrain from associating with persons of questionable character. She shall. as the case may be. or an authorized Volunteer Aide to visit her place of work and home. She shall plant at least five (5) fruit bearing trees in his backyard or any government lot as part of her rehabilitation. She shall secure a written permit to travel outside the jurisdiction of the parole and probation office from the chief probation officer. report to her supervising probation and parole officer 2 times a month.

and declared that there were no procedural lapses in the granting of private respondent’s petition. “In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1. SO ORDERED. We find no valid justification for a reversal or reconsideration of our Decision. III THE COURT OF APPEALS IS MORE INTERESTED IN THE FULL SATISFACTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT CORAZON T. Being the person aggrieved by petitioner’s issuance of bouncing checks. VI THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A “HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER” TO PREVENT PETITIONER FROM LEAVING THE PHILIPPINES. Private Respondent’s claim that the Petitioner is not the proper party-in-interest to file the Petition is barren of merit. V THE GRANT OF PROBATION BY JUDGE UMALI TO PETITIONER UNDER THE FACTS OBTAINING DOES NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. the Private Respondent. private respondent has an interest in the civil aspect of the case. IV THE GRANT OF PROBATION TO PETITIONER MARILYN C.” In a Supplemental Resolution[7] dated January 29. Marikina City. the Solicitor General appearing for the Public Respondent has not filed any ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ of our Decision. married. until further orders of this Court. petitioner has come to this Court for relief. Santos. and a resident of No. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court . We find the said motion meritorious and hereby grants the same. Private respondent may bring such action in her own name to protect her interest in the case. on the Petition. the Commissioner & Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed not to allow the departure from the Philippines of the Private Respondent Marilyn C. It is not true that it is only the State or the People that can prosecute the special civil action before the Court of Appeals. in her Answer/Comment and the Public Respondent. Having lost the case before the Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals elucidated further its Resolution that the herein petitioner is the real party-in-interest. Anent the first issue. THIS IS HIGHLY IMPROPER. Anent Petitioner’s ‘Motion for the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order’. More. contending that: I PRIVATE RESPONDENT CORAZON T. II NON-PAYMENT OF THE CIVIL LIABILITY IMPOSED ON PETITIONER IN THE DECISION RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE REVOCATION OF PROBATION. Evidently. never claimed that the Petitioner was not the proper party-in-interest to file the Petition. 1997. the Court holds that the private respondent had the personality to bring a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. 8 Jasmin Street. in his Comment.“Anent Private Respondent’s ‘Motion for Reconsideration’. SANTOS IS FAIT ACCOMPLI AND SHE HAS COMPLIED WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE PROBATION GRANTED HER. CASTRO IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO QUESTION THE GRANT OF PROBATION TO HEREIN PETITIONER. Accordingly. the Solicitor General is in accord with our Decision. Twinville Subdivision. CASTRO RELATIVE TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CASE THAN IN THE REHABILITATION OF PETITIONER AS A PROBATIONER. In the first place.

erroneous is petitioner’s submission that the Court of Appeals unduly stressed petitioner’s non-satisfaction of her civil liability as the basis for reversing the grant of probation to her. subject to some conditions. Judge Umali ratiocinated: “Based on the report of the probation officer. an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state.[8] The primary objective in granting probation is the reformation of the probationer. which is at best only persuasive.[9] Probation is a just privilege the grant of which is discretionary upon the court. xxx” (De la Rosa v. 174 SCRA 143. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In such case.[11] In granting petitioner’s application for probation. That the said proceedings benefited the People is not a reversible error. offenses committed by accused/ petitioner is not so grave a crime that she can pose a great threat in the peace and order of the community where she resides. Stated otherwise. Foregoing considered that petition of accused for probation is hereby Granted.wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds. [10] The courts are not to limit the basis of their decision to the report or recommendation of the probation officer. Rollo. 1995. third. 508) Anent the second. Santiago. is whether the petitioner is entitled to probation. it can be presumed that she is still welcome to mingle with the community and participate in any community projects. June 30. accused may be granted probation (P.” (People v.D. 968. complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. and fifth issues. Before granting probation. despite her criminal record? Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege. the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The proper approach to the problem. Neither does it constitute grave abuse of discretion. 153) * * * “In the instant case. along with other relevant circumstances. as amended) The findings of the Parole and Probation Office shows that accused is not considered as a rescidivist [sic]. 99) . Court of Appeals. and accused/petitioner is not condemned by the community because of her cases. the court had earlier issued a writ of execution to satisfy the money judgment in an order dated January 11. and the Court considers the same as the pivotal issue in this case. which may be granted to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense for which he was convicted. the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. the recourse of the complainant to the respondent Court was therefore proper since it was brought in his own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. The point of conflict is whether the petitioner is qualified to be granted probation. accused petitioner is not in need of correctional treatment. 1995 and the sheriff of this court had issued a notice of levy on execution on the properties of accused. Courts must be meticulous enough to ensure that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the accused be served by the grant of probation.” (Order. p. has petitioner shown her qualifications entitling her to the grant of probation? Is society better off with petitioner in jail or should petitioner be allowed to co-mingle with the people. the court must consider the potentiality of the offender to reform. In so doing. Her failure to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability is not a ground for the denial of the application for probation of accused. Moreover. but more of an individualize treatment of rehabilitation. 253 SCRA 501. together with the demands of justice and public interest.

make amends for her criminal misdeeds.000. demonstrate remorse and concomitant determination to reform and turn a new leaf in her life.00. On the contrary. once again. 1995. The “Deed of Absolute Sale” executed in favor of Mr. 3. shy away from doing and abetting injustices to her fellowmen. the Private Respondent had violated. ruling thus: “As it was. On February 13. Dijamco and as evidenced by the checks issued to and encashed by petitioner.00 when in truth and in fact. would strive. Private Respondent resorted to devious chicanery and artifice to prevent Petitioner from recovering her losses and perpetrate reprehensible if not criminal acts of falsification of the “Deed of Absolute Sale” in favor of Dijamco over her Benguet property. petitioner disposed of her Benguet property by means of a “Deed of Absolute Sale” in favor of Mr. in his “Affidavit of Third Party Claim” dated February 21. 22 no less than fifty-four (54) times to the damage and prejudice of the Petitioner in the aggregate amount of close to P4.000. The documentary evidence presented in this case overwhelmingly proves that such claim is puerile and tenuous. There is no mention whatsoever of any sale to Mr. Dijamco stated a consideration of P264.When the aforesaid order was assailed before it. still claimed the property to be theirs. 24.Inc. Rollo.570. Annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’ of the Petition are null and void.) and “Deed of Absolute Sale” (in favor of Mr. p. Petitioner never remitted a single centavo of the proceeds of the “Real Estate Mortgage” (in favor of Rural Bank of Angono. thus flaunting. the “Deed of . 2. We find and so declare that the Respondent Judge abused his discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting probation to the Private Respondent. There is evidence to prove that the “Deed of Absolute Sale” may just have been a simulated sale because petitioner’s husband. with impunity. 5. from then on. on the grounds that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and petitioner was unworthy of probation. foul play and unabashedly making gross misrepresentations to the Probation Officer. the consideration was P3. By understating the price. then.” (Decision. We find and so declare that the Orders complained of. In fine.000. p. Dijamco and had the deed registered in Benguet to preempt the sheriff of the lower court from causing the “Notice of Levy on Execution” annotated at the back of the title of the Benguet property. after escaping from the specter of imprisonment and averting the tribulations and vicissitudes of a long prison term. Accordingly. the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of probation. she should have at least offered a portion of said proceeds to private respondent. Batas Pambansa Blg. as indicated by the following facts and circumstances.00. by applying for and securing probation from the Respondent Judge. Dijamco. If she really had the good intentions of settling and satisfying the judgment of the trial court. 1995.000. One would believe that the Private Respondent had learned her lesson. she exhibited a design to compeletely evade her civil obligation to private respondent. Petitioner’s claim that the Benguet property actually belongs to Corazon Leano is of no moment and could not be given credence. and reassume her role as a responsible and productive member of community. to reform. to wit: 1. 4. Worse. 51) The Court finds merit in the determination by the Court of Appeals that the herein petitioner is not entitled to probation because she had displayed a devious and reprehensible character in trying to evade the implementation of the execution against her thereby rendering the judgment against her ineffective. Primarily. her mockery and defiance of justice. Dijamco) to the private respondent. petitioner committed acts of falsification causing damage to the government as the latter was deprived of taxes that should have been paid from the sale. as stated in the uncontested “Affidavit of Third Party Claim” of Mr.

SO ORDERED. petitioner’s contention that her probation is fait accompli is equally untenable. appellant Allocod was apprehended only because he “came back” to the capitol grounds. CRIMINAL LAW. the instant appeal should thus be confined only to Allocod’s case. Worse. there is indeed the need to restrict the petitioner’s movements and activities so as not to render nugatory the multiple judgments rendered against her. To allow petitioner to be placed on probation would be to depreciate the seriousness of her malefactions. 2. according to Maj. April 26. Obeñita. The only evidence that could provide some indication on his possible involvement in the story of the prosecution would be a portion of the testimony of Dr. 38522 AFFIRMED. . Anent the last issue. CRIMINAL LIABILITY. it can be gleaned unerringly that petitioner has shown no remorse for the criminal acts she committed against the private respondent. TRANQUILINO O.During the pendency of his appeal. Her demeanor manifested that she is incapable to be reformed and will only be a menace to society should she be permitted to co-mingle with the public. as well as that of Maj. there is no probation to speak of. petitioner is not the penitent offender who is eligible for probation within legal contemplation. The review of this case yielded the distressing fact that both the prosecution and defense vigorously focused the evidence and argument on the culpability of Calo. SYLLABUS 1. Bayotas. No. accused-appellants. such lapse of the period of probation does not detract from the fact that the order granting probation was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. not one of the witnesses was able to definitively identify the driver of the get-away car. Brillantes. Regrettably. 1995. per the certificate of postmortem examination issued by the National Bureau of Investigation. From the foregoing. vs. PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. the Court rules that the issuance of a “hold departure order” against the petitioner is warranted under the premises. [G. . EVIDENCE. As a result. Verily. PABLO MACAPAS. Metro Manila. SP No.Appellant Allocod evidently was linked to the commission of the crime for being then the driver of Calo. CALO. The six (6) year period of probation which commenced on June 30. EXTINGUISHED BY DEATH OF ACCUSED. and BELARMINO ALLOCOD. Having displayed a criminal tendency and propensity to evade or disobey the lawful orders of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling in People vs. De los Santos. Probation having been improperly granted. as regards appellant Allocod. Calo died of myocardial infraction secondary to coronary insufficiency at the New Bilibid Prisons Hospital in Muntinlupa. JR. she even resorted to devious schemes to evade the execution of the judgment against her. With respect to the fourth issue. the indispensable requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict an accused had all but been missed in the .R. In fact. and BELARMINO ALLOCOD. in connection with the declaration of Dr. instead of complying with the orders of the trial court requiring her to pay her civil liability.Absolute Sale” and “Affidavit of Third Party Claim” (filed by petitioner’s husband) prove their ownership of the Benguet property. 1996] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. NOT MET IN CASE AT BAR WHERE NOT ONE OF THE WITNESSES WAS NOT ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE DRIVER OF THE GET-AWAY CAR. WHEREFORE. has not yet been completed. JR. the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG. TRANQUILINO O. accused. REMEDIAL LAW. plaintiff-appellee. Her issuing subject fifty-four (54) bouncing checks is a serious offense. 94210.R. Furthermore. even if the said period has expired. Obeñita. No pronouncement as to costs. CALO.

. Branch II. On 31 January 1989. Sr. the Court of Appeals[5] set aside the questioned order and directed the court a quo to resolve the matter only after conducting the requisite hearing to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt was strong. At the same time.[8] On 24 February 1989.00 and P60.. SP No.[6] On 08 February 1989. Jr. Jr. however. the Court of Appeals[12] ultimately dismissed the petition (CA-G.R. 87194. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Butuan City. hitting the latter on the different parts of the body resulting to his death.000. That it was committed in a place where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties. Calo.[10]Judge Adao thus directed the recommitment of Calo and Allocod at Camp Rodriquez. of Calo and Allocod. did then and there wilfully. Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant. upon petition of the prosecution in G. That it was committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities. against Macapas. the above-named accused.process. DECISION VITUG. [1] Mariano Corvera. “CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 16383) the legality of the grant of bail to Calo and Allocod. Corvera’s son. Judge Adao. confederating together. viz.000. In due time.00[4] was fixed for each of Calo and Allocod.00 for the provisional liberty. Belarmino Allocod.: Right after giving his testimony as the complainant-victim in a frustrated murder case. No. Dabalos. an order temporarily restraining the lower court from enforcing its order of 24 February 1989 while the case was pending disposition by the Court of Appeals to which the matter was referred.. conspiring. Appellant Belarmino Allocod is acquitted for the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Libertad. SP . Executive Judge Dabalos ordered the raffle of the case and the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Judge Adao. on 15 March 1989. and “2.. and mutually helping one another. 3464) that read: “That on or about morning of March 10. then Mayor Tranquilino O. assailed before the Court of Appeals (CA-G. respectively. Butuan City.R. in an information (docketed Criminal Case No. was gunned down in cold blood by Pablo Macapas. placed the accused in the custody of the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary at the detention center in Camp Rafael Rodriguez. noting that accused Calo and Allocod had voluntarily surrendered themselves. with treachery and evident premeditation. unlawfully and feloniously attack.R.: “1.[2] a new charge for murder was filed against Macapas. 1988 at Capitol Building. a bail of P50. fixed bail in the amounts of P100. and the latter’s driver.[7] stating that he had therefore requested authority from this Court for his inhibition on account of a previous lawyer-client relationship with one of the accused. inside the courtroom of the Regional Trial Court. after hearing. 248 of the Revised Penal Code)”[3] On 08 December 1988. in Butuan City.[11] On 16 May 1989. [9] This Court. The following day. issued. “That the commission of the crime is attended with the following aggravating circumstances. assault and shot one Mariano Corvera. then being presided over by Judge Rosarito F. with the use of a handgun. along with his counsel. J. Executive Judge Dabalos indorsed the case to Judge Jose Adao of Branch 1 of the same court. Mariano Corvera. Philippines. Sr. without bail. APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.000. a former mayor of Nasipit in Agusan del Norte. the accused. with intent to kill.

dated 29 February 1988. Mariano Corvera. In the afternoon. mas maayo pa tingale atong liquidahon si Anoy [Mariano Corvera] kay samokan (Ah. who. both pleaded not guilty to the charge. On the merits of the case. 2850. Jaramillo went to NIASSI to re-assume his position. Jr. being the offended party. considering her past professional relationship with one of the accused and the fact that the case was rather controversial in nature. Calo threatened to liquidate Corvera. Esparagoza (retired). Calo.. the Court ruled that. the Court ordered the cancellation of the bail in favor of Calo and Allocod and temporarily restrained the Court of Appeals from enforcing its resolution of 16 May 1989..R. Calo and Allocod were arraigned. 07 March 1988. set aside the 16th May 1989 decision of the Court of Appeals and made permanent the temporary restraining order it had previously issued. barged in and shouted at everyone else to get out of the room.. went to Jaramillo’ s office to congratulate him. Bidin. In her stead. another stockholder. later moved for her inhibition on the ground that Calo was the lawyer of Judge Placer’s family. together with Engr. court personnel Arturo Cinco and . The prosecution and complainant Mariano Corvera. “I will see you dead!”[20] In the morning of 10 March 1988. Placer to take over the case. Atty. No. Corvera. Jr. The Solicitor General prayed for the dismissal of the petition. Calo was heard to have remarked. On 20 July 1989. The following day. had sufficient personality and interest to file the special civil action. the Court designated Judge Alfredo Lagamon of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City to try the case. Tranquilino Calo. Calo told Jaramillo that there was no need to be concerned about Corvera’s complaint with the SEC.. sought this Court’s intervention through a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G. Judge Placer denied the motion on the strength of her having been designated by this Court. during the scheduled trial in Criminal Case No. Jaramillo received an injunction order. was a stockholder of the corporation. “Ah. the town Mayor of Nasipit. on 31 March 1989.No. like Corvera. however.[15] In the meanwhile.[14] On 18 June 1990. All were taken aback when Calo. with his bodyguards. acting on the request of Executive Judge Dabalos in Administrative Matter No. it is better to liquidate Anoy because he is troublesome).. 88531). Calo pointed his finger at Corvera and shouted. 17142) on the basis of its finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in granting bail to Calo and Allocod. received the order.. the Court granted the petition. which was Jaramillo’s birthday and the 11th anniversary of the founding of NIASSI. Corvera questioned the election of the corporate officers before the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) which thereupon issued a restraining order. Once again. stating that his Office had not authorized anyone to institute it.R. Executive Judge Dabalos. this Court.[19] On 06 March 1988.. through a resolution penned by Justice Abdulwahid A. 87932). Tiburcio Guno and Col. 3464 to another court. the late Mayor Pedrito Carmona of Nasipit and Calo met at Jaramillo’s office. Jr. Jr. the Court held that Mariano Corvera.[13] The prosecution and private complainant Mariano Corvera. Agusan del Norte. 88-12-3478-RTC for the assignment of Criminal Case No. Inc. issued a resolution requiring Judge Zenaida P. thereupon elevated the case to this Court via a petition for certiorari (G.[16] Finally. on 02 February 1989. No. among them Macapas and Ignacio Albarrigo. Atty. during the conversation. from the SEC.[17] The prosecution gave the following narration of its case. Later. Sr. Judge Placer should be disqualified from hearing it. Corvera. used to be the vicepresident and manager of the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre Stevedoring Services. Once again. Jr. On 06 July 1989. He was replaced on 13 June 1986 by Benjamin Jaramillo. banged the door. Berido. (“NIASSI”). the prosecution and Mariano Corvera.”[18] On 20 November 1986. Rosales.

Atty. After the woman had left. Fiscal Gallarde surfaced from under the lawyers’ table. Macapas drew closer to Corvera and fired again at his victim. Macapas left ahead of Calo but Calo overtook Macapas. don’t. his hands and feet shaking. including Dr. Soon four or five other persons came in to help. Outside the courtroom. Stating that Corvera was booked for the ten o’clock. Rosales unsuccessfully trying to lift him up. Macapas took aim and pressed the trigger. and smoked. a physician of the Nasipit Lumber Company. ayaw. Nelson Obeñita. the parties finally agreed to the resetting of the hearing to 22 April 1988. Larbonita heard a gunshot. followed by two more gunshots.[26] Shortly before ten o’clock.m. Macapas came out of the courtroom and Calo handed a gun over to him. a 63-year-old “alalay” of Corvera. Just as the lady was departing. He was . As soon as the judge banged his gavel to adjourn the proceedings. pale and scared. Rosales moved for the re-setting of the hearing. ayaw”[23] (Don’t. squatted a meter away from the door. saying “Ayaw. Corvera tripped while retreating. A woman who had ascended the eastern stairs conversed with Calo for a few seconds. Visibly shaken. Moments later. and they brought Corvera down the building and from there to the hospital.m. Casinao saw Corvera lying flat on his back near the western door with his feet towards the podium.”[24] Unmoved. Casinao rushed downstairs and summoned for help to get Corvera fast to the Santos Hospital.[21] At about 9:30 a. With them were Raul Abao. Casinao dashed in to the courtroom and. Seeing that Corvera was still alive and Atty. Calo’s security guards were near the stairs while Larbonita was about a foot away to the left of Casinao. Corvera raised his hands. ayaw.[22] At about ten o’clock. Abruptly. Atty. on the way.[32] After the court had adjourned. a. then two more gunshots rang out.[29] Pacifico Larbonita. Macapas then turned away as calmly as when he entered the room. Dr. Dr. flight for Cebu. Larbonita was unable to see where Calo got the gun. After receiving the firearm. Corvera fell. all of a sudden.[31] Dr..[27] He later saw Calo leave the courtroom through the eastern door. Fiscal Ambrosio Gallarde. were in attendance. Nelson Obeñita. Calo. Macapas went back to the courtroom. Macapas walked towards Calo. so much unlike his usual calm way in court. At that moment. opposed the motion saying that he himself was scheduled to take the same flight that morning. He went near the eastern door. there was a burst of gunfire.[25] Fernando Casinao was with the group of Corvera that morning. still pleading “Ayaw. counsel for accused Macapas. Obeñita promptly signed the certificate of attendance and exited through the gallery entrance. Then. Casinao saw security men of Calo in the vicinity of the western door. he appeared agitated and tense. Obeñita went down the capitol building through the main entrance. was in the courtroom to attend the hearing. Pacifico Larbonita and driver Oligario Barcelona. He hastily stood up and grabbed a chair to shield himself. [30] Macapas went back to the courtroom.Calixtro Berol. Corvera tried to open the western door of the room but it would not budge. Corvera took the witness stand. Atty. Rosales noticed that while Calo was conducting the cross-examination. Calo stood up and walked towards the eastern door. Rosales tried to lift Corvera but found him too heavy. A lady approached Calo and conversed with him for around five seconds. bumped on Macapas at the eastern door. Larbonita stood up. Atty. don’t). When Calo left the courtroom. Corvera. Abao and Larbonita entered the courtroom while Casinao remained at the lobby near the eastern door.. Calo remained around two feet away from the eastern door. left the courtroom at around ten o’clock that morning. and four or five spectators.[28] Casinao tried to follow Macapas but a person who was standing by the door pushed Casinao back sending him to the railing. Rosales himself was about to leave when he saw Macapas return to the courtroom holding a revolver and walking in calmly. Unable to exit. he saw Casinao. he pointed the gun at Corvera. Calo handed over a revolver to Macapas.

While Major de los Santos was being briefed by the two PC officers. he saw a man rushing down the stairs of the capitol building. Then. blood vessels and right lobe of the lung with the bullet lodged at the sorratus anterior muscle. At the police station. “On the civil liability. Rolando T. There. JR. with the bullet lodged at the tissue above the latissimus dorsi muscle.[42] On 16 March 1990.000.. subclavia vein. and for a time headed the “mayors’ league” of the province.000. was in the office of the provincial governor at between 9:00 and 9:30.000. (and) multiple gunshot wound(s). Brillantes went out to the balcony where he saw “the car of Mayor Calo (was) speeding away. the small intestines and the abdominal aorta. Allocod. He denied having given a gun to Macapas[41] or as having had him as a bodyguard.000.[40] He was an undefeated candidate for mayoralty in Carmen. remained to be a respected practicing lawyer. and hereby sentences both accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Macapas boarded the vehicle.00 representing unrealized net income for eight (8) years. A commotion outside the building was heard. De los Santos directed his men to apprehend the driver and to bring him to the police station. He turned to look back.00 by way of moral damages. costal muscle. In his defense. The man proceeded to a vehicle parked by the side of the provincial treasurer’s office. a. Evacueto de los Santos.[38] Although he was removed as a municipal judge for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.00 as death compensation. Dr. moments later. the Court finds accused TRANQUILINO O. and BELARMINO ALLOCOD guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code qualified by treachery and with the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. internal hemorrhage. Calo pictured himself to be incapable of the dastardly act. the two accused are hereby jointly and severally sentenced to pay to the heirs of the late Mariano Corvera. of 10 March 1989. Brillantes.in the garden barely twenty meters away when he heard gunshots.”[37] Police authorities were never able to apprehend Macapas. to discuss with the governor the laborers’ strike in Nasipit. the “armored car” of Calo returned to the capitol grounds. Maj.00 as reimbursement of litigation expenses and attorney’s fee. taking the seat to the right of the driver. and “f) P 100. “d) P800. then assistant provincial commander for operations of the PCINP in Agusan del Norte.00 as reimbursement of burial expenses.000. [36] Dr. CALO.one on the right arm which hit and fractured the scapula with the bullet lodged at the trapereus muscle of the back. the trial court promulgated the herein questioned decision disposing of the case. Maj. someone shouted that Mayor Corvera had been shot. learned of the shooting incident from the radio operator. “c) P100. the deputy station commander and operations officer of the Butuan Police Station.000. viz: “WHEREFORE. “b) P20. nevertheless.m. denied involvement in the incident. . “e) P500. the following: “a) P30. another on the chest which pierced the skin.00 as exemplary damages. he boarded the police car and proceeded to the capitol building with some of his men. Sr. and the third on the abdomen below the umbilicus piercing the abdominal muscle. Agusan del Norte. [39] he. Immediately. the driver.[35] Sixty seven-year old Corvera sustained three gunshot wounds . Elsie Caballero concluded that Corvera died of “shock. Obeñita recognized the man to be Macapas. he was met by PC Major Rolando Brillantes and PC Captain Godofredo de los Santos.[33] Maj.”[34] Maj.

”[49] For his part. who was that person? “A. Who is the owner of that vehicle which was parked and which was boarded by Pablo Macapas? “A. Calo. I called the Central Police Station from my hand set radio. Appellant Allocod evidently was linked to the commission of the crime for being then the driver of Calo. What did you do? “A. in connection with the declaration of Dr. When you went out to the balcony of the Provincial Governor’s Office.[46] During the pendency of his appeal. When I heard two shots. “Q. I presume it was owned by Atty. You said he went to that vehicle which was parked on that right side. “Q. I called the attention of the Central Police Station. Bayotas. “Q. what happened after he went to that vehicle? “A. “Q. The only evidence that could provide some indication on his possible involvement in the story of the prosecution would be a portion of the testimony of Dr. Metro Manila. It was very unusual and very suspicious. as well as that of Maj. through counsel.[48] the instant appeal should thus be confined only to Allocod’s case. Brillantes stated: “Q. “Q. Brillantes. I was able to contact Major Evacueto delos Santos and I told him to please intercept the car of Mayor Calo which left the Capitol Building just a few minutes. Later on I saw a man coming down from the stairs of the capitol. When I went out I saw the car of Mayor Calo speeding away. You said you saw that person. Calo died of myocardial infraction secondary to coronary insufficiency at the New Bilid Prisons Hospital in Muntinlupa. .”[43] When their motion for the reconsideration[44] of the decision was denied. He went to the vehicle and boarded the vehicle on the right side of the driver. What made you call the attention of the Central Police Station? “A.“SO ORDERED. sir. Yes. filed a notice of appeal to this Court. “Q. what did you see? “A. what was on my mind was that it might be that the car was used by the assailant. Obeñita. So. Towards the highway. He was able to apprehend the driver. that side of the provincial treasurer’s office.[45] Calo and Allocod. What happened after that? “A. because I saw that the car was running very fast. He took a seat and made a motion to hide in the vehicle and they left. From the Capitol towards the direction of the DBP. Maj. Dr. Were you able to contact the Central Police Station? “A. “Q. Macapas. Calo since I often saw that vehicle being used by Atty. “Q. Obeñita testified: “Q. and Major delos Santos reacted to my request. And what did you do after you saw the vehicle of Atty. To what direction? “A. he reached the capitol grounds. Calo speeding towards the DBP? “A. left and right and proceeded to the parked vehicle on that side of the capitol. per the certificate of postmortem examination issued by the National Bureau of Investigation. Right then and there. I turned my back and tried to observe what would happen next. Obeñita. [47] Pursuant to the ruling in Peoplevs. he brought the driver to the police station. he made a few glances.

De los Santos who testified: “Q. Castor Raval for petitioner. what did you do after being informed that ex-mayor Corvera was shot? “A. is hereby dismissed. GONONG. WHEREFORE. When you went back to the police station. The review of this case yielded the distressing fact that both the prosecution and defense vigorously focused the evidence and argument on the culpability of Calo.”[51] Regrettably. Jr. if any? “A. No. Calo. J. now deceased. Bonifacio G. SO ORDERED. what happened? “A. As a result. Sir. Yes. petitioner. ANTONIO. 1972.”[50] What might have been expected to be the clincher had come from Maj. I looked for Allocod. ARSENIO M. In effect did you carry out the order of this officer? “A. “Q. not one of the witnesses was able to definitively identify the driver of the getaway car. Tranquilino Calo came back to the Capitol ground.. convicting . I ordered my men to bring the car and the driver of Mayor Calo to the police station for proper investigation. “Q. respondents. with prayer for the execution of the judgment. SECOND DIVISION G. xxx xxx xxx. De los Santos. What did you do next? “A. Costs de oficio. “Q.. L-42010 August 31. While I was informed. and MARIANO NALUPTA. In effect did you meet Allocod there? “A. with respondent Judge presiding. Sir. SR.“Q. I do not know the name of the driver. appellant Allocod was apprehended only because he “came back” to the capitol grounds. Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte Branch IV. Judge.: This petition for certiorari challenges the validity of an amendment of a judgment of conviction after the accused had manifested in writing to the trial court the withdrawal of his appeal. Agdigos for private respondent. The antecedent facts are as follows: On September 21. what did you do there. When that armored car of Atty. In fact. vs. 1976 ODELON RAMOS. petitioner Odelon Ramos was charged with the crime of Damage to Property with Multiple Physical Injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence before Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. and I even asked him some questions but he denied everything. the case against Tranquilino T. What was the name of the driver? “A. Appellant Belarmino Allocod is acquitted for the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. the armored car of Mayor Tranquilino Calo came back to the Capitol ground.R. as regards appellant Allocod. Then. the driver of the armored car of Mayor Calo. HON. Yes. “Q. the indispensable requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict an accused had all but been missed in the process. 1 On October 3. after trial. according to Maj. a decision was rendered in said criminal case. 1975. “Q. I was directed by Major Brillantes to apprehend the driver of the car because they saw that that was the gate away vehicle used by the assailant.

to promote the ends of Justice. to pay the statutory costs.95. On October 21. 3. which the court a quo thereupon set at P16. We grant the certiorari. 1975. 1975. to pay the statutory costs. sentencing him to a 'fine' of double the amount of P7. 365. 26 and 48. 66 and 75 of the same code. 26 & 48.95 as damages and to suffer a subsidiary personal imprisonment of not more than six (6) months in case of insolvency (Art. par. 6 In the case at bar. notwithstanding opposition thereto filed by herein petitioner. par. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE. 2. or motu propio. The applicable provision is section 1. Hence the instance petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. in relation to Art. having also in mind Art.00 as moral damages. having also in mind Art. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for. withdrawing his appeal.P. such amendments or alterations as it may deem best. October 21.500. 1915. 2.95 or a total of P14. 2. either on motion of one of the parties. or on October 23. 3. the Court finds the accused Odelon Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Damages with Multiple Slight Physical injuries thru Reckless Imprudence as defined and penalized in Art. within the frame of law. 1975. 1975. 39.000.425. It is manifest from the foregoing that. except to correct clerical errors. in view of the foregoing. WHEREFORE.00 as moral damages and finally. R. 7. thus: "Finding the manifestation reasonable. it is clear that the judgment in Criminal Case No." 4 Two (2) days after the withdrawal of the appeal. coupled with the approval by the . par.95 or a total of P14. the Court finds the accused Odelon Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Damages with Multiple Slight Physical Injuries as defined and penalized in Art. the trial Fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. — A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been perfected. 'to pay Mariano Nalupta Sr. petitioner filed a written manifestation "withdrawing his intention to appeal the decision" and praying that the decision be executed. After the reading thereof. and finally. sentencing him to double the amount of P7. that the bail bond for his provisional liberty be fixed. 365.). Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court. and the amendment of the dispositive portion sought by the trial Fiscal was accordingly adopted by the court. On the following day. upon its finality. to pay P2. and Art.95. and Art. the trial court has "plenary power to make. granted the motion for reconsideration. 266. 66 and 75 of the same code. in view of the foregoing. (Emphasis supplied). Penal Code. Penal Code. the said amount of P14. Rev. 1975 was denied by respondent court "for want of merit" on November 19.861. the through counsel. to pay P2. 5 Thereafter. at the same time.C. 3 This was granted by Order of the court on the same date.petitioner of the crime charged. thus: SEC. with prayer that the judgment in said case be executed. with a prayer that the dispositive portion thereof be amended to read as follows. par. A motion for reconsideration of the above Order seasonably filed by petitioner on November 5.. before a judgment of conviction becomes final. 2 The afore-mentioned decision was promulgated on October 20.425. perfecting an appeal. Rev.00. 266. par.000. manifested in open court his intention to appeal and prayed. asserting its power to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice before the judgment becomes final and executory. or when the sentence has been partially or totality satisfied or served or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. the notice of appeal is hereby withdrawn and let the decision as Promulgated be executed. respondent court. the trial court is divested of all authority to amend or alter the aforesaid judgment.851.851. in relation to Art. Modification of judgement. 98-IV became final and executory upon the filing of the written manifestation by the accused.

on October 21. As stated in People v. it is not necessary for the accused to go through the whole process of perfecting an appeal before he may expressly waive in writing his right to appeal. be made by the trial court. appears to be inapposite Respondent court loses sight of the fact that a judgment of conviction may become final in a number of ways. notwithstanding that . prior to the Order of October 21. an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries — the first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty. From the conclusion that the decision in question has become final as to its criminal aspect because the accused had waived his right to appeal on October 21. 5465. (2) indemnification of the consequential damages. the court may allow the appellant to withdraw his appeal. and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime. as amended by Republic Act No. section 12. to reinstate defendant's right to appeal. Contrary to the position taken by respondents. Rodillas.8 the judgment of conviction in a criminal case may become final even before the expiration of the period to appeal if the accused demonstrates his conformity in a clear and express manner to the sentence by renouncing or waiving in writing his right to appeal therefrom. 10 It has been said that as a general rule. As we declared in a previous case. no subsidiary penalty is imposed for non-payment of (1) the reparation of the damage caused. In the case at bar. a judgment becomes final in any of the following instances: (1) when the period for perfecting an appeal has lapsed or (2) when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served. notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal. accompanied by a voluntary petition to be immediately committed to prison. provided the records of the case have not yet been transmitted to the appellate court. after the decision has become final. and the Supreme Court cannot order said judge. which injury is sought to be compensated thru indemnity. 1975. the waives of the right to appeal by the defendant. 11 Thus. 1975. together with the clear and express withdrawal of "his intention to appeal the decision" demonstrates the conformity of the accused to the sentence of conviction within the intendment of the aforequoted section 7 of the Rules and. Thus. therefore. it does not necessarily follow that the trial court. 7 The reliance placed by respondent court upon Rule 122. section 12 of Rule 122 expressly covers a case where. and the order of the court accepting such waiver and ordering defendant's confinement therein. act on the motion for withdrawal of appeal. in which case. of course. 9Consequently.court of such withdrawal. Upon the other hand. the trial court can order the defendant to indemnify the offended party. only the latter court may. upon the grant of such withdrawal. If the records have already been forwarded to the appellate court. by mandamus. Civil liability is not part of the penalty for the crime committed. it has been held that before the expiration of the fifteen-day period provided for appeal. could not order the defendant to indemnify the offended party. It should be noted that under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. which is civil in nature. bring the trial court's jurisdiction to an end. The full import of the prayer for the execution of the judgment. or (3) when the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. the judgment shall become final. There is no question that an accused cannot be made to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine imposed upon him when the subsidiary imprisonment is not imposed in the judgment of conviction. after he has been notified of the judgment of conviction. It was. should have the legal effect of rendering the decision final. 1975. the judgment had already become final. therefore. the inclusion in the amended decision of the penalty imposed which cannot. and (3) the costs of the proceedings. after its approval by the Court. beyond the authority of the trial court to amend the penalty imposed in the aforesaid judgment.

this Court. Article 266 penalizes the offense of slight physical injuries with arresto menor (sub-par. such an additional penalty can no longer be imposed. in relation to 6. As the judgment in the criminal aspect is final. 1).. refused to enter judgment with respect to the civil liability of the defendant for the reason that the appeal taken by him divested the trial court of jurisdiction to pass upon the question of indemnity to the heirs of deceased.00 before the expiration of the 15-day period provided for appeal. General Orders No. 1 of paragraph 6 thereof provides that if the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of the article. had it been intentional. no error was committed by it in ordering him to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P1. In explaining why the trial court did not lose jurisdiction over the civil phase of the case. 2 and 3). necessarily implies that such right is protected in the same manner as the right of the to his defense. in the proper period. or arresto menor to or fine (subpars.000. Article 48. If the has the right within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of conviction. contrary to the holding of respondent court. 60 Phil. is unfounded. in People v. We observe that the court a quo was inaccurate in the imposition of the penalty. 13 On the other hand. As the trial court did not lose jurisdiction over the civil phase of the case even if the defendant had commenced the service of his sentence.) and reminded the can to the lower court for determination of the civil liability. the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed. and his appeal should not be made dependent on that of the accused. the latter is only entitled to the actual or compensatory damages proven at the trial. 252. (p. should likewise have been imposed. if the independently of the appeal of the accused. 14 With respect to the damages to be paid to the offended party. 13 Article 365. which deals with complex crime where one or both of the two crimes resulting from the single act is a light felony. 58). should therefore have been imposed. 12 said: In People vs. the penalty next lower in degree. 2W255. If the multiple slight physical injuries which resulted from the accused's negligent act fall within that class punishable by arrests menor. we held: The trial court's resolution that. would have constituted a light felony. the offended party would be deprived of his right to appeal. The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution and to appeal for purposes of the civil liability of the accused (section 101. It imposed only a fine of double the amount of the damage to property. or fine. to allow the appeal of the offended party. if the accused files his will before the expiration of said period. Rodriguez. upon motion of the prosecution. It is likewise noted that. depending upon the kind thereof. Therefore. because the cause had been appealed by the accused it had lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution nine days after the date of the judgment. If upon appeal by the accused the court altogether losses its jurisdiction over the cause. paragraph 1 provides that if the reckless imprudence resulted in an act which. It appears that the respondent court should not have doubled the amount of damages because the value of the damages . although fifteen days have not yet elapsed from the date of the judgment. it also has jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution in connection with the civil liability of the accused. No. has jurisdiction within fifteen days from the date of the judgment. the offended party should have the right within the same period to appeal from so much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him. the multiple slight physical injuries likewise resulting from the negligent Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. (Pp. No. where the defendant was found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence and the trial court. 351).the judgment has become final because the accused has commenced the service of his sentence. Ursua. 1. the penalty of arrests in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC August 1. 1975. WHEREFORE. requested the chief of police to load it. Shortly after the accused had taken the revolver in his hands. Ocampo & Cea and Rosendo R. The private prosecution excepted to this ruling and appealed therefrom. an information was filed against Benedicto Ursua. In the course of the trial. When Alejandro Quiro delivered the revolver to the accused. the only question left to be decided is the appeal of the private prosecution with regard to the civil liability of the accused. Luntok for the offended party as appellee. 1934. The chief of police loaded it with four cartridges and delivered it to the accused. The trial court's resolution that. however. it had already lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion of the private prosecution. plaintiff-appellee. denied the said motion. AVANCEÑA. BENEDICTO URSUA. the writ of certiorari is granted. resulting in his death. believing that. the latter. failed to enter judgment with respect to the civil liability of the accused in favor of the heirs of the deceased. modifying its questioned Order of October 27.90. 40198 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. in accordance with the observation of this Court as herein above indicated. On the 18th of the same month. this court. The respondent Judge is hereby directed to issue an Order. The court. the accused.: In the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. Province of Camarines Sur. because the accused had been appealed by the accused and said appeal had been allowed. declared the appeal of the accused abandoned. in its resolution dated November 28. a discharge was heard which hit Alejandro Quiro in the abdomen. is unfounded. it had lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution nine days after the date of the judgment. Tible and Valer for appellant. In this instance. the trial court found the following facts to be proven. The judgment of the trial court was rendered on July 8. 1933. who was acting as municipal president. 1934 G. C. the private prosecution filed with the court a motion for reconsideration of its judgment on the ground that it failed to make any finding relative to the civil liability of the accused and to sentence him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution and to appeal for . or P7.R. Upon these facts.425. and the accused was noticed thereof on July 13th. as charged in the information. We hereby order its reduction to the actual amount of the damage. As the amount is now questioned by petitioner (Annex "F"). on which date accused filed notice of appeal. with the cylinder in proper place and trigger locked. Villafuerte. The trial court. vs. 1933.425.90. and sentenced him to one year and one day of prision correcional.sustained is limited to the amount of P7.J. charging him with the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. noticing that it was not loaded. defendant-appellant. the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. and after the evidence had been taken. Costs against private respondent. On November 17. ordered the policemen Alejandro Quiro to ask the municipal president for the latter's revolver. in which the private prosecution intervened. in the municipality of Libmanan. Therefore. because the cause had been appealed by the accused. No.

. 1965. J. S. petitioner. MERCEDES L. G. convey. within fifteen days from the date of the judgment. No. JAVELLANA. 1. may appeal with respect to the civil aspect of the case. did then and there. October 11. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. unlawfully. 0-105 A parcel of land (Lot 1. The criminal action in this case was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet. on the SW. by property of Honor Kingdoms. it also has jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution in connection with the civil liability of the accused. General Orders.... L-34666 October 30. if no reservation has been made to ventilate it in a separate action. "J".: The legal question raised in this petition for certiorari is whether from a decision of acquittal.R. DE CASTRO.purposes of the civil liability of the accused (section 107. No.. Sec. if the court. 58). ITONG AMISTAD respondent. vs.) So ordered. the abovenamed accused. has jurisdiction. situated in the Res. and December 23. . in the City of Baguio. As to the rest. If the accused has the right within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of conviction. Odlin. Section 407 of General Orders.. transfer and deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of Ben Palispis an unsegregated portion of 42. to allow the appeal of the offended party. Civil Reservation Case No. on the W and NW. Philippines. 3 Phil.. Therefore.. the complainant in a criminal action for estafa. Bounded on the NE. although fifteen days have not yet elapsed from the date of the judgment. Wherefore. 1981 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. of the Revised Penal Code. by Public land. 211). plan Psu-203086-Amd. committed as follows: That on or about January 30. 1965. if the accused files his appeal before the expiration of said period. it is hereby ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for the purpose of determining the civil liability of the accused (U. the offended party should have the right within the same period to appeal from so much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him. it was an error for the court not to have entered judgment with respect to the civil liability of the accused (Springer vs. 58 expressly imposes upon the courts the duty of entering judgment with respect to the civil liability arising from the offense.326 square meters of that parcel of land described in ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No.R. independently of the appeal of the accused. Civil Reservation Record No. No. by Lot 2. 1965. willfully. If upon appeal by the accused the court altogether loses its jurisdiction over the cause. containing an area of EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY THREE . 602. 344). 600. 1965) sell. L. City of Baguio. necessarily implies that such right is protected in the same manner as the right of the accused to his defense. Heery. 25 Phil.C. and feloniously — (1) (January 30. plaintiff-appellee. and his appeal should not be made dependent on that of the accused. vs. under an information which reads: I N F O R MATI O N The undersigned Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal accuses ITONG AMISTAD of the crime of Estafa penalized under Article 316 Paragraph 2. the offended party would be deprived of his right to appeal.

. December 18. the records of the case were elevated to this Court.C. People vs. The decision was promulgated on March 18. convey. Javellana in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5. Rule 122. he had previously entered into an agreement with one MERCEDES L. Now.326 square meters of the above-described parcel of land. 1957. indeed. cannot appeal if the accused is acquitted as matters are (People vs. Velez. while the right of the offended party to intervene in the criminal action (Section 15. 0-105 in favor of vendees Ben Palispis and Teodoro Mat-an which effected the issuance of two separate titles in favor of said vendees — knowing fully well and purposely withholding the information that on or about February 10. wherein the accused Itong Amistad who was prosecuted for the crime of estafa paragraph 2.R. 1026. 4205.P. filed a Notice of Appeal from said judgment." From the judgment of acquittal. 1965) sell. 1971. the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal merely on the legal proposition that an appeal by the complainant from a judgment of acquittal should be disallowed. All contrary to law. the complainant. the case of the prosecution is civil in nature. (2) (October 11. Besides. and this Court required the completion of the same. citing People vs. In fact.00) PESOS. Flores. in the names of spouses I tong Amistad and Luisa Tengdan.00) PESOS and had already received from her the sum of FIVE THOUSAND ( P5.). in Criminal Case No. Rules) is recognized. appealed to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. 1971. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1. thereby causing damage and prejudice to said Mercedes L. the trial court in acquitting the herein defendant stated: In the mind of the court. is set forth in full as follows: This refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.000. L-7523. respondent herein. An appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance would perforce require a new determination of defendant's criminal liability. 1962. more or less. Indeed.. and promulgated on March 18.000. It has already been so ruled by the Supreme Court in several cases (People vs. October 31. 77 Phil.000. Herrera 74 Phil. 1971 acquitting the accused. 8224. JAVELLANA to convey to her an area of 10." Apparently the appeal was approved by the trial court. the supervening acts of the parties after the execution of Exhibit A until the execution of Exhibit D are clear and unequivocal which ineluctably lead this court to believe that the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.. transfer and deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of Teodoro Mat-an the remaining 42. the Court holding that "the case of the prosecution is civil in nature" and that "the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Without awaiting the completion of the transcript of the stenographic notes in the case. Rule 110. the petitioner herein. decision was rendered dated February 8. After trial. G. Benjamin Liggayu et al. the offended party however. People vs. Article 316 R.653) Square meters.000 square meters from the above-described parcel of land for the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10. 21).. was acquitted. "insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.(84. the complainant. and (3) (December 23. Philippine Currency. 1971 and on that same day. through counsel. 1955. this question is not new. No. 1965) execute a supplemental deed of sale over the entire area covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Rules) as well as to appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant (Section 2.00) PESOS. the offended party has the remedy of bringing a civil action independently of the criminal action. This cannot be done. . No.

From the aforequoted provisions. 12.28. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt. In all other cases either party may appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant. from which she quotes the following: SEC. only insofar as the latter's civil liability is concerned. 572). 679 [decided under the new Rules of Court]. Other civil actions arising from offenses. the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. she cites Article 29 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which reads: ART.—In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: xxx xxx xxx (c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil. she cites Section 3 of Rule 111. The stenographers who were required to submit their respective transcripts of stenographic notes in this case are hereby excused therefrom. In the absence of any declaration to that effect. 78. Brief for the Petitioner. id). the court shall so declare. (b) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner the expenses of litigation actually incurred by the latter. Florendo. In support of her affirmative position on the issue above stated. it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. is whether an appeal by the complainant for estafa. 13-14. p. From both aforesaid Resolutions dismissing the appeal and the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 60. and (c) Ordering respondent to pay the costs of suit.) (pp. Upon motion of the defendant. Additionally. Rollo). 29. A motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals was filed but was denied on January 4. Fernan. p. and that judgment be rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent insofar as the latter's hability is concerned — (a) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner such sum as this Court shall adjudge to rightfully represent the value of the one hectare portion of the land involved agreed to be conveyed to petitioner by respondent in accordance with the Agreement to Convey Real Property (Exhibit "A"). (p. p. unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. the petitioner came to this Court on a petition for certiorari with prayer that the Resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed.—The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. Ricafort vs. petitioners contend that the remedy of appeal is expressly . her appeal should be disallowed. The sole legal question for determination as stated at the outset. 101 Phil. Considering that the complainant is appealing from a judgment acquitting the accused in a criminal case. Brief for the Respondent. (p. Who may appeal. Rollo). a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. 2. (Rule 111. the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. petitioner cites Section 2. (pp. 166. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. (p. 3. the appeal is hereby ordered dismissed. 575. may be allowed from a decision acquitting the accused of the crime charged. Rules of Court in the Philippines. Brief for the Petitioner. In other cases.Joaquin Lipana 72 Phil. Id) Finally. WHEREFORE. Rollo). 60. Rules 122 of the Rules of Court which provides: SEC. 6-7. 1972. 14. People vs. 73 Phil.

can appeal from the judgment acquitting the accused. It is this omission. The obvious reason is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction. all the defenses available. Criminal Case No. among her three assigned errors. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and as held in People vs. at least not fully or completely. such as prescription.granted to her inasmuch as the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain admission as to the commission thereof. as alleged by petitioner herein. nor even to the Court of Appeals. that con constitutes the thrust of her first assignment of error. This is the kind of civil liability involved in the civil action deemed filed simultaneously with the filing of criminal action. 4205 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet. if not reserved or waived. We find no ground to reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals on the purely legal question of whether the petitioner. despite which. may file the appropriate responsive pleading. in exactly the same manner that the Court . unless it is reserved or waived. In the case of People vs. to the first assigned error. Upon these considerations. Herrera. set-off. because said liability arises from the offense. which. the only one We feel called upon to rule on. notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted therewith. Lipana 72 Phil. et al. the evidence presented during the trial not having been elevated to this Court. In the Resolution of the Court of Appeals several cases have been cited which held that an appeal from the dismissal of the criminal case on motion by the fiscal may not be taken by the offended party (People vs. because the trial court failed to declare the latter's civil liability to the complainant. its enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil action. complete with pre-trial after issues have been joined. 168. Confining ourselves. 21. lack of jurisdiction. such as from law or contract or quasi-delict. except on the occasion of arraignment. it becomes clear that the argument of petitioner invoking the rule against multiplicity of action may not forcefully or convincingly be put forth. and the extent of damages petitioner alleges to be entitled to under such evidence. the accused was acquitted without the court making any pronouncement as to his civil liability. which may be an answer or a motion to dismiss. The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner clearly requires the institution of a separate action by the filing of the proper complaint. 74 Phil. Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil actions. 73 Phil. therefore. People vs. as expressly provided in Article 29 of the Civil Code may be disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence would warrant. which evidently may not be passed upon in the instant proceedings. Herrera. for estafa. To such complaint. there having been no reservation to file a separate civil action or a waiver of the right to file one. Then. She had in fact hired a private prosecutor to handle. the other two having relation to how the trial court evaluated the evidence.. the trial court failed to rule on the latter's civil liability to the complainant. The private prosecutor presented evidence bearing on the civil liability of the accused. 679). 4025 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet. 21. he also discussed extensively the civil liability of the accused. the accused is not afforded the same remedy. 74 Phil. the prosecution of the crime remaining under the direction and control of the prosecuting Fiscal. In a memorandum he filed. as so expressly provided in Section 1. as complainant in Criminal Case No. the accused as the defendant therein. as may be proper under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Florendo. If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the offense. primarily the civil aspect of the case. which was allegedly proven by the evidence. and the other grounds for a motion to dismiss may be availed of. In a criminal action.

was charged with a similar omission in the case at bar. No. section l (a) of the new Rules of Court. after the verdict of acquittal has been handed down by the trial court. The futility of petitioner's instant recourse becomes all too evident upon consideration of the principles enunciated. as she does of being denied due process for disallowing her appeal. It is but fair to require petitioner to take this course of action. Hence. the complainant alleging a cause of action independent of. . and not based on. FILOMENO GALDONES. For all the foregoing. petitioner tries to show that the cases cited by the Court of Appeals are not in point. G. the two actions may rise or fall together. in view of his previous acquittal in the justice of the peace court. Only preponderance of evidence would then be required. So the appeal from the decision of the justice of the peace court is not authorized by law. Again. not only because she would have to pay for the lawful expenses for instituting the action to obtain the relief she seeks from respondent. the Resolution appealed from is affirmed. but certainly not anymore from the offense of which petitioner had already been acquitted. An appeal from that decision to the Court of First Instance. but also for the respondent or defendant to avail of all defenses and remedies as are open to him in a separate civil action not otherwise available in a criminal action that carries with it the civil action when deemed simultaneously filed with it. accordingly. She can institute a separate civil action if her cause of action could come under the category of quasi-delict or one arising from law. petitioner may not complaint. ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA. and the instant petition is. vs. no longer may the respondent be found criminally liable upon a review of the evidence. a separate civil action may be filed. But she has not cited one single case faintly supporting her position as she has tried to maintain in the instant case. But another trial upon defendant's criminal responsibility cannot be held. However. Revised Penal Code). would reopen the question of defendant's civil liability arising from the alleged crime. And considering that such civil liability must be based on the criminal responsibility of the defendant (art.of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in Criminal Case No. from which she is spared in the prosecution of a criminal case. petitioners. any review or re-examination of the question of civil liability would perforce require a new determination of defendant's criminal liability. The Supreme Court did not permit an appeal by the offended party. the aforesaid decision of acquittal covered both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case under Rule 107. or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.R. without pronouncement as to costs. 4025. contract or any other known source of civil liability. particularly in the Herrera case. not only by freeing the defendant from criminal responsibility but also by rejecting all liability for damages arising from the alleged crime of malicious mischief. as intended by the offended parties. the commission of an offense. SO ORDERED. dismissed. if the civil action is reserved. 1984 ROY PADILLA. to recover civil liability arising from the crime charged. The offended parties not having reserved their right to bring a separate civil action. Nevertheless. L-39999 May 31. 100. the Court saying: The decision of the justice of the peace court which acquitted the defendant of the charge and did not make any pronouncement holding the defendant civilly liable put an end to the case. since if the civil liability recoverable in a criminal action is one arising from the crime charged. Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly brought simultaneously with the criminal action is the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense.

and the rest of the accused being policemen. Philippines. Ricardo Celestino. by confederating and mutually helping one another. Jose Panganiban. Villanoac. ROMEO GARRIDO. the above. Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega. province of Camarines Norte. Christopher Villanoac.000. by means of threats.named accused. being the incumbent municipal mayor.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9. and another P10. ROBERTO ROSALES. Realingo alias Kamlon. RICARDO CELESTINO. VILLANIA. all of Jose Panganiban. the dispositive portion of which states that: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. PEPITO BEDENIA. unlawfully. and Fourteen Richard Does. The Solicitor General for respondent. YOLLY RICO. JOHN DOE alias TATO.00 to the complainants as actual damages. Camarines Norte. committed as follows: That on or about February 8. and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings. GUTIERREZ. The petitioners were charged under the following information: The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA. That in committing the offense. Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion. wares and merchandise. Roy Padilla. John Doe alias Tato. David Bermundo. Filomeno Galdonez. Romeo Garrido. Sisenando Villaluz. force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market. Villania. Pepito Bedenia.COURT OF APPEALS.00. According to . DAVID BERMUNDO.00 each. Building No. and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments. Roberto Rosales. JR. They contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. and that it was committed with evident premeditation. except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian.000.000. did then and there wilfully. the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla. 3. 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning. and carrying away the goods.00 for exemplary damages.000.000. JR.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages. Camarines Norte. to pay a fine of P500. Godofredo Villania. Jr.. FILOMENO GALDONES. The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte. Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision. Filomeno Galdones. and acting without any authority of law. Jose Ortega. jointly and severally. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. for petitioners.00 as exemplary damages. Romeo Garrido. the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla. David Bermundo.000.. The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon'. JOSE ORTEGA. and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day. and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION. to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30. and all the accessory penalties provided for by law. REALINGO alias "KAMLON". and further the sum of P20. J. respondent. Sr. moral damages in the amount of P30. Roberto Rosales. in the municipality of Jose Panganiban. VILLANOAC. are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged. Yolly Rico. to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10. and feloniously.00..

P10. the petitioners filed this special civil action.. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9. IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN.00 actual and compensatory damages. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises. DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES'.R. IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR. 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT. THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.00 exemplary damages. III THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY. IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT. and. APPELLANTS IN CA-G. . II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26. THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS. JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY. P30..00.600. NO. destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful. and the costs of the suit.00 moral damages.000. Consequently. The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge. as evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual damages. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se.the petitioners.600. the imposition of actual damages is correct. contending that: I THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE. 13456CR.000. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that: xxx xxx xxx . NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES. as their taking the law into their hands. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. P10. TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9. AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6. not on facts that no unlawful act was committed.1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.00 each. as actual damages.000. appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was committed. The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states: WHEREFORE. They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500. we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.

and the carting away of the merchandize. While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. Rules of Court). Rev. unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111. (Rule 111. Sec. (Morte Sr. 49 O. And since there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action. 44 OG. Maniago 69 Phil. v. the violence must be employed against the person. its demolition with axes and other instruments. Pueblo contra Abellera. it does not allege the particular threat made. The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx xxx xxx Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted..Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act. xxx xxx xxx The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion? From all appearances. Ochoa. Pantig. (Elcano v. . Sec. following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. 101 SCRA 221). We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law. 457). the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime. Virata v. they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious mischief. People v. the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. In the case before us. v. . Elepafio 116 Phil. the fact from which the civil might arise. exists. the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein. and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case. 51 OG. (no civil liability arising from the criminal case). Hill. Laperal v. Rules of Court.. 1. namely. 748. the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. these offenses. the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. Aldaba v. In other words. Rev. Alvizo. People v. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil. 3874. the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. not against property as what happened in the case at bar. 77 SCRA 98. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for.R. Aliza. 81 SCRA 472)..G. The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision: For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision. Miranda. Velez. 623. 3 (c). There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall. 69 Phil. In the instant case. The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was by means of threats'. 496. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar. As easily as 1942. 1811). 1311. 97 Phil. People v. Jr. and this is not denied by the accused. 5 SCRA 1067. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief. no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him.

Catipon. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged.. in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence. supra) as.. unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that: When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides: Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. Rule III. Remedial Law Compendium. et at.Garcia. Rules of Court. where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused. 623). the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. Revised Penal Code). Other civil actions arising from offenses. However. 1983 ed. where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Pantig. 4 SCRA 1093. p. 98 Phil.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the . the court shall so declare. for instance. in the felonies of estafa. Upon motion of the defendant. Collector of Internal Revenue. where provided by law. and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and. 96 Phil. Thus.. The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. More recently. 558. a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. V-3339 is based does not exist. we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution: . 332. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that: Sec. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. his employer. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt. Alvia. theft. See Regalado. For instance. (Section 1. and. the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. In other cases. 3. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil. 73 Phil. In the absence of any declaration to that effect.

000. The petitioners.300. they had them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were: Cost of stall construction P1. then Chief Galdones. This finds no support in law and in fact. therefore.00 It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. Bello. he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his possession. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. 120 SCRA 203) There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. as in the case at bar. the latter refused to do so. The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that: On the morning of February 8th. It is. themselves. piled them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope. complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No. forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable. the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made known. but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended. The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the defense: xxx xxx xxx (9) In the morning of February 8. and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question. a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury. using ax. effort. and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein. ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. He was. Due process has been accorded the accused. crowbars and hammers. in fact. do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the . The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time.00 Value of goods and equipment taken 8. the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force.00 P9. demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around.00 Value of furniture and equipment judgment destroyed 300. A person may be acquitted of malversation where. at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out. 32 of the Mayor. and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents.commission of the offense charged.600. went to the market and. 1964. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away. and money on the part of all concerned. and after all the goods were taken out from the store. with the aid of his policemen. because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied with the order to vacate. farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated. exonerated of the criminal charged. and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. Since then up to the trial of this case. (Republic v.

but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions. a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action. 3. may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action.. or other independent civil actions. pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives. Philippine Law on Torts and Damages. . Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions. if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal action. the Vergaras were still in the premises. that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. so the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban. But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested. They state: On February 8.. would likewise render. There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal . made an inventory of the goods found in said store. may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action. 288-289). it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. 1964. .complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away.. and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict. despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the passageways of Market Building No. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. As stated by retired Judge J. and therefore. and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco... and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action. or quasi-delict. the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance. the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages. pp. and brought these goods to the municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer. and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal. We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate. Art. the vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action. In the light of the foregoing exposition. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action." According to some scholars. earlier cited.. unjustifiably. The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code. this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense. demolished the store of the Vergaras. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. Cezar Sangco: .

Nos. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial. September 24. v. act may be accorded the justice which he seeks. Petitioner. It does not. WHEREFORE. when the latter is not proved. L-47994-97. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive: The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. 1986. of course. for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused. choose to file a separate action. it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed. we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.] LIDELIA MAXIMO. pp.. appellate. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice. These do not exist in this case. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility. SO ORDERED. however... a provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable. . 45-46). the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. yet non-criminal. We further note the rationale behind Art.R. why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission. One affects the social order and the other. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. civil liability cannot be demanded. and review stages. The two can stand side by side. we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit. Respondents. EN BANC [G. it is just and proper that. extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. The offended party may. Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court. and to determine the logical result of the distinction. private rights. 12th Judicial District.and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. With this in mind. JR. where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. Bacolod City and CONCHITA PANGHILASON. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party. HONORABLE JUDGE NICOLAS GEROCHI. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the criminal offense. A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case.

00 drawn against the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in favor of the petitioner. REMEDIAL LAW. The informations alleged that Panghilason willfully issued four (4) checks amounting to P35. the City Fiscal of Bacolod filed with the Circuit Criminal Court. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel. CCC-XII-1067..SYLLABUS 1.com. Jalandoni (131 SCRA 454) where the accused formally admitted the amount of civil damages. to include in his judgment of acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. JR. On June 28. judgment:jgc:chanrobles.586. the civil liability which the private respondent Conchita Panghilason admitted in court. four (4) informations for estafa against respondent Conchita Panghilason. the Court strongly believes that in the case at bar.. ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED IN THE DENIAL ACTION DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACTS COMPLAINED OF.. Bacolod City. and that she refused to make the necessary deposit within three (3) days from receipt of notice to redeem the said checks. ID.ph the respondent judge rendered the following "Verily. 1976. herein. ID. 1977. 1073. Court of Appeals. J. it . for all said. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time. and money on the part of all concerned. 1074 and 1129. Due process has been accorded the accused. the prosecution. This ruling was reiterated in the case of People v. RATIONALE. and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. That. He was. to say the least. (129 SCRA 558) is that the Court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages already proved in the same case without need for a separate civil action. The petitioner intervened in the case through her private prosecutor on July 10. a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury. On December 5. ID. effort.: This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioner Lidelia Maximo to compel the public respondent Judge Nicolas Gerochi. it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment. Jr. The prevailing rule as enunciated by this Court en banc in the case of Padilla v. DECISION GUTIERREZ. failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. that the checks were dishonored for lack of funds or that her account with said bank had been closed.. — If an accused is acquitted. exonerated of the criminal charge. in fact. 12th Judicial District. 1976. — The rationale behind the rule is stated in the Padilla case as follows: "There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. 2.

in fact.586. WHEREFORE." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary This motion was denied by the court in an order dated February 20. wrong. and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel. for then. The aforementioned case further declared that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or . The prevailing rule as enunciated by this Court en banc in the case of Padilla v. Jalandoni (131 SCRA 454) where the accused formally admitted the amount of civil damages. This ruling was reiterated in the case of People v. it is simply civil in nature that could be properly ventilated within the context of civil law. a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury.00 plus 12% interest from the filing of the information. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant less of time. exonerated of the criminal charge. this recovery of civil liability is deemed included in the offense proved. Due process has been accorded the accused. and money on the part of all concerned. came lower to this court Court with the present is petition."cralaw virtua1aw library The The petitioner. He was. and considering that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of accused Conchita Panghilason beyond a reasonable doubt. The rationale behind the rule is stated in the Padilla case as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library There appears to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. 1978. therefore. effort. in view of all the foregoing. but the question is not indubitable because the accused was acquitted in all the four (4) informations she was charged of. Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 558) is that the Court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages already proved in the same case without need for a separate civil action.appears that if accused had any obligation. the Court finds accused Conchita Panghilason NOT GUILTY of all the above-entitled four (4) criminal information and ACQUITS her therefrom."cralaw virtua1aw library The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration praying "that the portion of the decision regarding the civil liability of the accused be reconsidered and thereafter the accused who had admitted her civil liability be ordered to pay the sum of P33. with costs de oficio. it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment. The order stated that the award of civil liability "would not have been a problem if the accused was convicted. If an accused is acquitted.

Oh to whom she indorsed it.00." the return slip. The offended party may. PCIB Check No." all for Crim. and in payment for which accused issued a check dated the same day. Case No.500." signature of accused." the signature of the accused. Accused again bought rice from her in the amount of P11." remark "account closed. Accused purchased rice from her in the amount of P5. 161478.300.00. again on February 6. Exhibit "B-1.00 in a form of a check which she accepted after the accused assured her that the check was covered by sufficient funds which check when presented encashment to the bank was dishonored for reason of "account closed. Exhibit "B". the return slip. "account closed. and that all these checks were signed in the presence of complainant Mrs. which she accepted after the accused assured her that the same was likewise supported by sufficient funds. and Exhibit "B-1. it was similarly dishonored for reason of "account closed." Exhibit "A" the check.more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. signature of accused. the same was also dishonored for reason of "account closed. she accepted a check which when deposited by Mr." reason of return. 1976." return ship.000. and Exhibit "B-1. appellate. and review stages. choose to file a separate action.00 and with the same assurance given her as the previous checks." remark "account closed. 1976. 161490.775. that she (accused) issued PCIB Check No.000. and in payment of which was made in check dated the same day February 6. retain the services of counsel to which she covenanted to pay as attorney’s fee for P3. "closed account." all for Crim." Exhibit "A" PCIB Check No. 1976." Exhibit "A. CCC-XII-1073. February 1.000. Again on February 7. PCIB Check No. 1976. Exhibit "A-1". Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial." the return slip. 1976." Exhibit "A". 1976. Accused again purchased rice from her in the amount of P7." All for Crim." all for Crim. 161479. hence. of course. Case No.500. despite repeated demands failed to settle the matter with her hence she was compelled to bring the matter to the Court. Case No." reason for return." the signature of the accused. Case No. and Exhibit "B-1. Oh to whom she indorsed the same. That on February 6. Exhibit "A-1. 1976. The evidence taken in this case is summarized by the lower court as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Prosecution evidence tends to show that on January 31. 165511." the check: Exhibit "A-1. in the process. Exhibit "B. Exhibit "B. Exhibit "A-1. That on February 1. CCC-XII-1129.00. Exhibit "B. which she accepted after the accused assured her that it was supported by sufficient funds hence accused again was able to secure the rice in the amount of P7. CCC-XII-1067. Maximo. that the actual total damage . Accused purchased rice from Mrs. that accused. That all these sale transactions of rice occurred at the Capitol Shopping Center. These do not exist in this case. CCC-XII-1074.00. that when the check was deposited by a certain Enrique Oh to whom she indorsed the check. Bacolod City. Maximo and paid her the amount of P11. that the said check when deposit (sic) by Mr.Accused was able to secure rice from her in the amount of P11. and.00. it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed. Exhibit "A" in CCC-XII-1073. the same was dishonored for reason of "account closed.

and on December 17.00 was in payment of a rice transaction that took place on January 15.000. that first she refused but later on she consented after the assurance of Sgt. Maximo refused unless she would pay P5. that the check dated February 7. Maximo allowed her to purchase rice on a 15-day credit basis. not that the obligation is non-existent or paid in full.00 involved a transaction that actually transpired on January 21. in the amount of P7. and in fact. he later died on December 3. Exhibit "1. and postdated February 6. 1975.000. Jalandoni rulings earlier cited which are applicable to the facts of this case. that the check dated January 31. Maximo. Maximo was not there. 1975. that at the time she was not able to make the necessary deposits because her husband was then hospitalized and she pleaded to Mrs. Villanueva that no case will be filed against her. Maximo tried to collect thru the Silay Police. that all the checks in question involved in the above-entitled criminal cases were all issued on January 15 and 21.00 but Mrs.incurred by Mrs. and the check was issued on January 21. Villanueva asked her to initial all the questioned checks to be dated 1976. The foregoing argument is erroneous in view of the Padilla v. 1975." Defense evidence. 1975. in the amount of P5. Her defense was directed only towards proving the fact that the checks were issued in payment of a preexisting obligation. In his answer. 1975. tends to show that accused came to know complaining witness sometime in 1973. Accused merely made partial payment of P500. that after she got the rice. and then Sgt. and they agreed before the PC that she would pay in installment. that consequently. Maximo not to encash the checks.000. Court of Appeals and People v.00 which she went to the PC again in the accompany (sic) of her eight-year old girl but Mrs. she would issue a check for the previous purchases she made. as evidenced by the checks she had issued to Mrs. she purchased rice from Mrs. CCC-XII-1129 involved a transaction that transpired on January 15. and not on the dates they appeared therein. He stated in his denial of the motion for reconsideration that the action for civil liability must be filed in a "civil court." that later. that out of these four transactions. 1975.000. and again later thru the PC.000. that she took over the business of buying and selling rice when her husband got sick. Case No. Maximo weekly. We further note that the private respondent failed to submit her answer to this petition despite several notices from this Court. The private respondent never denied her debts or obligations to the petitioner. 1976. that likewise Mrs.00 on December 17. 1975. was also in payment of a rice transaction that occurred on January 21. 1975. that it was her late husband who used to have transactions with the latter who allowed her husband to purchase rice on credit. 1975. 1976. 1975. Maximo brought the matter to the PC at the PC Headquarters at Bacolod City. that she was allowed to issue postdated checks dated 15 days after the actual purchase. Exhibit "2" up to Exhibit "21. that consequently Mrs. Mrs. that the check dated February 6. covered in Crim. 1976. 1976. and actually postdated January 31. and the latter consented thereto as Mrs. Maximo know that her husband was really sick.00 with her. and she offered to pay up to P1. as shown by Exhibit "1.500. 1975. and actually postdated February 1. She has waived her defenses to the petition. on the other hand. 1975. and a check was issued in payment for it on January 31. and also postdated February 7. Maximo as a result of the dishonor of the checks in question summed up to P35." although all these checks did not represent all the transactions she had with her amounted approximately to P480.00. she deposited the amount of P500. 1975. the trial judge justified his refusal to award civil liability with a statement that the civil liability did not arise from any criminal act but only from a civil contract connected to the crime. 1976. . that the check dated February 1.00.

for preliminary investigation (Rollo. pp. On October 31. FIDEL CALALANG and DRA. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (FOURTH CIVIL CASES DIVISION). was employed as househelper in the household of petitioners spouses Dr. mother of the deceased. MARIA GENER CALALANG. and HEIRS OF ERLINDA GRUTA. 15 years old. presented the sworn statement of Dolores Ayuste. 394). 393). 1976 until fully paid. 164). 393). Bulacan. After clarificatory questioning.: This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse. Malolos. . Complainant Juanita Gruta did not file a motion for reconsideration nor appeal to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice.respondents. SO ORDERED. 357. and (b) the resolution dated April 28. 83-18019 (for damages) between the same parties. No. p. The case was investigated by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).. Erlinda Gruta died of malathion poisoning.R. Fidel Calalang and Dra.R. Ferdinand Calalang. pp." setting aside the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. Respondent Ferdinand Calalang never appeared nor presented his counter affidavit. who brought Erlinda first to the Calalang's Clinic and then to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where she died. 393). the facts of the case are as follows: Erlinda Gruta. the petition is hereby granted. As gathered from the records. the parties submitted their memoranda and later the Investigating Fiscal Liberato Reyes dismissed the complaint on the ground of failure to prove a prima facie case of the offense charged (Rollo. 74613 February 27. When the parents of the deceased arrived from Samar and after obtaining the Necropsy Report from the NBI. PARAS. a complaint for Murder was filed against Ferdinand Calalang with the Provincial Fiscal of Malolos. the aunt of the deceased maid who was summoned during the incident and who was able to see her before she died. p. son of the spouses Calalang. Francisco A. was charged with murder for allegedly poisoning her (Rollo. 1991 SPOUSES DR. instead his mother Maria Gener Calalang presented a counter affidavit and two affidavits of her maids who saw the deceased take a lethal dose of malathion and the report of Pat. and FERDINAND CALALANG. 1985 decision1 of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in ACG. vs. 74-80). Bulacan. Annex "F" of request. in Bulacan (Rollo. J. from the province of Samar. Then the case was referred to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. No.petitioners.586. Bernabe ( Rollo. Complainant Juanita Gruta. p. G. Ferdinand Calalang. The trial court had dismissed the case on the ground of lack of cause of action but the Court of Appeals ordered the case to be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Jose L. 1981. Lava.00 with 12% interest from July 10.WHEREFORE. pp. Maria Gener Calalang and their son Ferdinand Calalang. The private respondent Conchita Panghilason is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P33. Jr. for petitioners. the death certificate and the necropsy report (Rollo. 164. et al. The order of the lower court denying the motion for reconsideration is set aside. Aguilar for private respondents. CV 04384 entitled "Heirs of Erlinda Gruta vs. 1986 denying the motion for reconsideration. nullify and set aside: (a) the June 28.

receiving a salary wage of P200. Subsequently later. resulting in her death on October 31. Erlinda Gruta at that time of her death was a domestic helper or servant of Dra. Plaintiffs.00 as Moral Damages. The parents of the late Erlinda Gruta. The case was investigated by the NBI. dismissing the murder charge. 5.00 as actual or compensatory damages. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the sum of P50. she was poisoned by defendant Ferdinand Calalang. 1983. writs and other court processes. anxiety and shock and for which plaintiff demand P50. after hearing.00 more or less. lost such earning as a direct result of her untimely death. after which the case was referred to the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation. the parents and relatives suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P50. 1981. which was however dismissed on the alleged ground of failure to prove a prima faciecase of the offense charged. the parents would be deprived of at least P72.00 a month.00 for attorney's fee and consequential expenses and costs. are all with capacity to sue and be sued and are residents of 617 Carbajal Street. plaintiffs obligated themselves to pay their lawyer the sum of P 30. Manila.00 a month. of Marulas. WHEREFORE. (pp. and finally P30. Erlinda Gruta is a 15 year old girl and one of the children of Rogelio Gruta and Juanita Gruta. Binondo.00 as loss of earnings to the plaintiffs. Annex "A".000.000.000. Fernando St. Praying for such other reliefs which are just and equitable under the premises. 1983.000.00 for moral damages. 83-18019 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila on the claim that they are jointly and severally liable (Rollo. 4245. On October 30. Valenzuela.000. p. Maria G. son of the other defendants Spouses Calalang. 4. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay P72.00 more or less.00 in earnings.00 contingent attorney's fee and will probably incur consequential expenses and costs to the tune of P10. nearly two (2) years after the death of Erlinda Gruta and over a year after the resolution of the Assistant Fiscal dated May 27. Calalang.000. Metro Manila. per necropsy report of the NBI. 1982. Erlinda Gruta is now demise. 1981 at Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital of poisoning.On June 8.00 (Rollo. resulting from burial expenses and others.00 for loss of earnings.00 for attorney's fees aside from incidental expenses of P10. judgment issue: 1. 3. wounded feelings. P72. Also as a result of the death of Erlinda Gruta.000. pp. while defendants are likewise with capacity to sue and be sued and are residents of 41 A. who received the meager salary of P200. Rogelio Gruta and Juanita Gruta in their own rights and co-heirs of the late Erlinda Gruta. a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against Ferdinand Calalang impleading the spouses Calalang docketed as Civil Case No.. In prosecuting this case. Metro Manila.000. petitioners filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim . the parents and relatives suffered mental anguish.000. Annex "A". 44).000.000. the heirs of Erlinda Gruta. Ordering defendants to jointly and several pay plaintiff the sum of P40.000.000. where they all may be served with summons. 4245. she died on October 31.00 in Moral Damages from defendants jointly and solidarily. a case of Murder by poisoning was filed against defendant Ferdinand Calalang with the fiscal's office of Bulacan. Valenzuela. 163) for actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P50. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the sum of P 50. Rollo) On August 2. 1981. As a resulting consequences of the death of Erlinda Gruta. which if computed to the age of 30 years old. 2.

et al. pp. CA. Annex "D". 1987.(Annex "B"). may be pleaded as an affirmative defense. Genato. Thus the trial court. The finding of IAC that there was no preliminary hearing (tsn. SO ORDERED. (Rollo. Dimayuga.. Private respondents. . 1984 as per Order dated February 3. 1984: and the records bear "minutes" of the preliminary hearing conducted on February 27. is hereby SET ASIDE and the original records are ordered remanded to the court below for further proceedings. Rule 16 "that the complaint states no cause of action. 175-201) and a resolution was rendered on April 28. 95 Phil. RTC-Manila. As the issues were joined. With costs against the defendants-appellees. Branch 20. (Rollo. this complaint should be. 1984) has no basis that can be verified from the records. Section 1. They are subject to some established exceptions. 123. The rule that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals (formerly IAC) are entitled to great respect is not inflexible. p. Annex "M". It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. except when the affirmative defense is based on par." This is to save the expense involved in the preparation and trial when the case can be otherwise disposed of. 1984. denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo. 1984. Leonosa. g. SO ORDERED. petitioners submitted a Request for Admission (Annex "C").. February 27. 1984. Martinez. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. 241-245). p. The preliminary hearing should be conducted as ordinary hearings: the parties should be allowed to present evidence and the evidence recorded (Asejo vs. 167 SCRA 363). reversing the order of the lower court. on appeal. Hence. issued an Order dismissing the case. Rule 16 "Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule. did not commit any error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of herein petitioners. and preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been Med. Annex "G". a preliminary hearing was conducted by the trial court on the affirmative defenses of the defendants. 96 Phil. 1985 (Rollo.. Hon. under Rule 26. Dimayuga vs. this petition. And one of these exceptions is when judgment is based on misapprehension of facts (Castillo vs. the order of the trial court dismissing this case. however. (Clavano vs. Annex "H".. This rule applies when the only affirmative defense is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. 84) However. No. Under Section 5. et al. the question submitted for determination is sufficiency of allegation in the complaint itself. the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered its decision dated June 28. only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered. 78 Phil. DISMISSED. on March 30. filed an Opposition to the Motion for Admission (p. finding merit to the prayer for dismissal of the case at bar on the ground of lack of cause of action. 365. G. IAC. (De Jesus. as it is hereby. CA's Original Record) which was not resolved by the trial court. No pronouncement as to cost. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. 80 SCRA 217).R. pp. On February 27. 859). 174) A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners on August 1. 467).. The sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint itself in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground. Thereafter. (Layugan vs." In determining sufficiency of cause of action. vs. Judge Antonio M. It does not apply when the grounds relied upon by way of affirmative defenses state other matters. based on the affirmative defenses in the answer. except improper venue. The trial court set the case for preliminary hearing on February 27. 1986. 1986. dated March 30. in the case at bar. Belarmino.

if any. . . and. Annex "G". statutory basis as to why and under what law are they being included as defendants since the complaint admits that Ferdinand Calalang has the capacity to sue. 12-13) Since the only cause of action of the case is based on the criminal act. p. and then on par. Thus. August 21. . motion for . A perusal of the preliminary hearing indicates that the cause of action of respondents (plaintiffs in the Civil Case) is based on the crime of murder allegedly committed by Ferdinand Calalang. 1989). 135) Thus. her parents and relatives suffered actual and compensatory damages to the tune of P50. 82) A close scrutiny of the Order of Dismissal of the Regional Trial Court indicates that the present case was not dismissed solely on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. It is further observed that the complaint alleges that all of the defendants (Ferdinand Calalang and spouses Calalang) are said to have the "capacity to sue and be sued.000 and in the total amount more or less P220. p. We find merit in the finding of the trial court that: . . IAC relied solely on the statement of the Clerk of Court that "this case was decided on the basis of pleadings. There being no legal ground to implead the defendants-spouses Calalang. . upon considering the "pleadings. based on par. p. (Order. Rollo. . the trial court concluded: Court So you are basing this case on the murder case. Court So you are basing your claim on the murder case? Atty. loss of income in the amount of P72. memorandum. Rollo. later. No oral or documentary evidence was presented" (Decision of IAC. Aguilar Yes. that is whether or not it is a murder case which lead to the filing of civil case for damages. a case of murder by poisoning was filed against defendant Ferdinand Calalang with the fiscal's office of Bulacan. that the other defendant Ferdinand Calalang is their son.000 more or less. p. There is no valid legal ground for impleading the spouses Dr. p. 3. but also on the ground that there is no valid cause of action against Ferdinand Calalang. Maria Calalang. states that as a resulting consequence of the death of Erlinda Gruta. . motion for reconsideration and opposition. The complaint shows that except for the fact that the spouses Calalang are said to be the employer of the deceased Erlinda Gruta. . resulting from burial expenses and others.. . and I wanted to have all the facts clear because your complaint. 8. February 27. . p. Rollo. p. and Mrs. . In their Memorandum in Support of Affirmative Defenses. 1. pp. the case against them should be dismissed.000. 12) The alleged ambiguity of the cause of action in the complaint was clarified by the admission of the respondents' counsel.48541. . (tsn. February 27. ." then the spouses Calalang can no longer be held civilly liable for any of his misdeeds. which was however dismissed on the alleged ground of failure to prove a prima facie case of the offense charged. states: subsequently. 2.1984. there is no reason to implead the Calalang spouses. there is nothing in the complaint which would connect them to the untimely death of Erlinda Gruta. (tsn.1984. Annex "D". (Emphasis supplied) (Memorandum in Support of Affirmative Defenses. the Calalang spouses reiterated that: . memorandum. the complaint does not show any legal. your Honor." Therefore. if Ferdinand Calalang has the "capacity to sue and be sued. 7.. So we may now have a clear case. the truth is he Ferdinand Calalang) is of age . That is what I want to make clear (in) this case. 163) without going to the records of the case.

. 24 SCRA 582. 1026. thereto. par. the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable" (Art. 672)." (De Mesa vs. the plaintiffs should be given their day in court to vindicate their claim to the fullest. Sec. that the dismissal of the information or the criminal action (upon motion of the fiscal) does not affect the right of the offended party to institute or continue the civil action already instituted arising from the offense." (People vs. This is not a ground for dismissal of action under Rule 16. Rule 111. however. As long as there is a cause of action in the complaint itself.1âwphi1 Finally. Therefore. Jenkins. 100. . In other words. but the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings are not between the same parties. Jr. the court is not allowed by law to dismiss the case motu proprio. because such dismissal or extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. 14 Phil. 158 SCRA 111). so that said case may be refiled anytime without the effect of double jeopardy. Standard Vacuum Oil Co. Tadeo. Similarly. it is a fundamental rule that the facts upon which the civil liability might arise must exist to warrant the filing of a civil action. Thus. "the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unlessthe Court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.. the trial court dismissed the case against Ferdinand Calalang motu proprio based on the ground that there is no valid cause of action against him. while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only (Ocampo vs. (Rollo.. 681). Fidel Calalang is hereby DISMISSED. Different rules as to the competency of witnesses and weight of evidence necessary to the findings in the two proceedings also exist. et al." (Tan vs. the appealed decision remanding this case to the court a quo for further proceedings is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the case against Dr. procedural due process demands that there must be a hearing on the merits with the complaint as "prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. WHEREFORE. Stress must be made. 173). Revised Penal Code). We held as early as the case of People v. the dismissal of this criminal case as found by IAC is only by resolution of the provincial fiscal and does not proceed from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Rules of Court) Verily. 97 Phil. Priela. criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof (Banal vs. Dy. 77 Phil. p.reconsideration and opposition" therein. It is highly speculative to conclude that the plaintiffs' cause of action would stand or fall on the strength of the testimony of Dolores Ayuste who was convicted of perjury on such alleged testimony. the insufficiency of evidence to support a murder charge does not imply that there is no sufficient evidence to support the civil case based on the same alleged act. might show that there is no valid cause of action against Ferdinand Calalang. and Mrs. 156 SCRA 325) In the case at bar. memorandum and motion for reconsideration and opposition. Velez. still. "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. counsel for private respondents admitted that his complaint for damages is based on the commission of the crime. (b). 2. Therefore. In a criminal action the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt. Generally. that under circumstances. The pleadings. A decision should be based on facts not on mere speculations or beliefs.

1991 motion met the same fate. 1990. Martinez. On complaint of then Vice-President Salvador H. In the meantime. The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. and SALVADOR H. NARVASA. Martinez actually seeks is the dismissal of the information for libel filed against him in the Trial Court. that he . Martinez filed a petition with the Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking review of the resolution of the City Prosecutor finding a prima facie case of libel against him.SO ORDERED. complainant Laurel filed a motion to set the case for arraignment and pre-trial. Yuzon in an Order dated June 21. 1990. On October 8. but this setting was cancelled in view of Judge Yuzon's retirement. vs. 1990. 1990. Martinez with libel arising from the allegedly derogatory and scurrilous imputations and insinuations against Laurel contained in Martinez' article entitled "The Sorrows of Laurel" published on January 8. At the hearing." What petitioner Manuel P. Bello III declared inter alia that while the language used in the article may be unsavory and unpleasant to complainant. Tabanag filed before the trial court on October 26. 90-82891 and assigned to Branch XI. On February 6. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL. 1991. No. 1994 MANUEL P. LAUREL. Private Complainant and Appellant. charging Manuel F. Action on the motion was held in abeyance by the pairing judge. complainant Laurel attempted once more to have the case set for arraignment and trial. a motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. Ballena. was denied by Judge Manuel E.J. as private prosecutor. 1990 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Manila by Assistant Prosecutor Antonio J. 1993 in CA-G.: This petition for review prays for the reversal of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 16. Gerardo Pepito. COURT OF APPEALS. No. Consequently. 90-82891 was filed on August 26. Accordingly. L-112387 October 13. as if embodied merely an opinion protected as a privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. MARTINEZ. By letter dated August 16. 13429.R. Plaintiff-Appellee. versus Manuel P. Laurel. City Prosecutor Lourdes C. 1991 addressed to the City Prosecutor of Manila. 1990 in his Manila Times column Narrow Gate. a motion to suspend proceedings pending resolution by the DOJ of Martinez' petition for review. No action was taken on his said motion. 1991 and set for hearing on December 17. respondent. Laurel Law Offices for private respondent. G. 1991 praying for the resolution of the February 6. C. 5 then Acting Justice Secretary Silvestre H. upon manifestation of complainant's counsel. 3rd Asst. pending assumption of duty of Judge Yuzon's successor.R. the same was not actionable as libel. petitioner. On the basis of the facts hereunder set forth. which was granted by Judge Pepito on November 6. Accused-Appellee. The appealed resolution was therefore set aside and the City Prosecutor was directed to cause the dismissal of the information filed against Manuel F. Martinez filed a "Motion for Reinvestigation" 3 which. 1 an Information dated March 23. Eriberto Ignacio for petitioner. entitled "The People of the Philippines. Martinez. and Salvador H. and a subsequent motion dated July 16. 1990. 1991. 1993 and October 25. 4 The case was set for arraignment and pre-trial conference on July 31. Laurel. Hon. the Court denies his plea.

had received no copy of the motion to dismiss, the trial court directed the case prosecutor to
furnish said counsel the desired copy, giving the latter ten (10) days to respond thereto.
It does not appear that the case prosecutor complied with the trial court's order; this
notwithstanding, said court, through Presiding Judge Roberto A. Barrios, issued on February
18, 1992 and Order 6 reading:
Before arraignment was had, the Department of Justice conducted & since concluded review
and reinvestigation of the charges, the Resolution of which is Annex "A" of the prosecution's
motion to dismiss. The prosecution's fresh stand is that "there is no sufficient evidence
against the said accused to sustain the allegation in the information." Coming as it does from
the officials having control of the prosecution and at this stage of the proceedings, and there
being no objection, the motion to dismiss is granted.
WHEREFORE, the case is dismissed. The office/officer having custody of it is directed to
forthwith release to the accused his cash bond submitted under O.R. NO. 46865.
SO ORDERED.
Complainant Laurel having sought and been denied a reconsideration of said Order, he went
to the Court of Appeals, ascribing error to the lower court in (a) recognizing the regularity and
validity of the petition for review filed by Martinez with the DOJ and the DOJ's giving due
course thereto, and (b) granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of notice thereof to
complainant Laurel, and basing said dismissal not on evidence on record but on the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice, to whom the judge completely subordinated his judgment and
whose opinion, on its face, was clearly puerile and flimsy and violated or disregarded
numerous Supreme Court decisions.
Martinez, on his part, moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no appeal lies from the
dismissal of a criminal case, and certainly not by the private complainant, particularly where
dismissal was at the instance of the City Prosecutor upon orders of the Department of Justice.
He contended that if any remedy was available to private complainant, it was a petition
for certiorari, not an appeal. Said motion notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals ordered
complainant to file his brief. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee's Brief recommending that the Order dated February 18,
1992 of the lower court granting the prosecution's motion to dismiss, be set aside and the
case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
On July 16, 1993, the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division, issued a Resolution 7 granting the
appeal and remanding the case for arraignment of the accused and trial on the merits. The
Appellate Court ruled that private complainant had "sufficient personality and a valid
grievance against the order of dismissal before arraignment" and that the remedy of appeal
was properly available because the order of dismissal was a final order which terminated all
proceedings in the case. Quoting extensively from the People's Manifestation, the Court
found the review by then Acting Justice Secretary Bello to run counter to prevailing
jurisprudence and DOJ Circulars. It further ruled that the trial court completely abdicated its
jurisdiction in favor of the Justice Department when it dismissed the case on the mere say-so
of the prosecutor, without requiring the latter to present evidence to enable the court to arrive
at its own judgment.
Martinez sought, but failed to obtain, a reconsideration of the above Resolution. 8 Hence, the
present recourse. His arguments in support thereof do no warrant reversal of the challenged
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Appeal against the order of dismissal of February 18, 1992 was not foreclosed by the rule of
double jeopardy, said order having issued before arraignment. Legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid
plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without

the express consent of the accused. 9
Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a
final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to "any party", except when the accused
is placed thereby in double jeopardy. 10
In People vs. Guido, 11 this Court ruled that the word "party" must be understood to mean not
only the government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the
judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been
held to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right
to demand civil liability arising from the offense. 12 The right of the offended party to file a
special civil action of prohibition andcertiorari from an order rendered in a criminal case was
likewise recognized in the cases of Paredes vs. Gopengco 13 andPeople vs. Calo,
Jr., 14 which held that "offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and
personality as 'person(s) aggrieved' to file the special civil action of prohibition
and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal
construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object . . . ." 15
In People vs. Nano 16, the Court, while declaring the petition filed before it by the private
counsel for the offended parties to be defective in form, nevertheless took cognizance thereof
in view of the gravity of error allegedly committed by the respondent judge against the
prosecution — denial of due process — as well as the manifestation and motion filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General praying that the petition be treated as if filed by the said office.
The same exceptional circumstances obtaining in the Nano, case justified the Court of
Appeals' taking cognizance of the appeal filed by private complainant Laurel, i.e.: denial of
due process consisting in the failure of the prosecution to furnish counsel for private
complainant a copy of the motion to dismiss despite being ordered to do so, as well as of the
Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee's Brief 17 filed by the Solicitor General in the appellate
court, recommending the setting aside of the Order of the lower court dated February 18,
1992 and the remand of the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.
It is not unusual for the Solicitor General to take a position adverse to the People or the
prosecution. The reason, as explained by the Court in Orbos vs. Civil Service
Commission, 18 is that as the lawyer of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
the Solicitor General has the duty to "see to it that the best interest of the government is
upheld
within
the
limits
set
by
law. . . . It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally
uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position."
When that happens, as the Court observed in Orbos:
. . . the Solicitor General nevertheless manifests his opinion and recommendation to the Court
which is an invaluable aid in the disposition of the case. On some occasions he begs leave to
be excused from intervening in the case, more so, when the client had already filed its own
comment different from the stand of the Solicitor General or in a situation when he finds the
contention of a private party tenable as against that of the government or any of its agencies.
The Solicitor General has recommended the acquittal of the accused in appealed criminal
cases.
The procedural recourse of appeal taken by private complainant Laurel is correct because the
order
of
dismissal
was
a
final
order.
It
finally
disposed
of the pending action so that nothing more could be done with it in the lower court. 19 In Bell
Carpets International Trading Corp. vs. Court Appeals, 20 this Court held that "(t)he remedy
against such a judgment is an appeal, regardless of the questions sought to be raised on
appeal,
whether
of
fact,
or
of
law, whether involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the Trial Court. . . . (T)he

party aggrieved . . . did not have the option to substitute the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 for the remedy of appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the
existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special
civil action ofcertiorari."
The rule with respect to the disposition of motions to dismiss filed by the fiscal was laid down
by the Court in Crespo vs. Mogul, 21 where it was held that:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complainant or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal even cases while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
Petitioner maintains that it is precisely in recognition of the above-cited rule that the
prosecutor left the disposition of the case to the discretion of the lower court by filing the
appropriate motion to dismiss; and that it was neither the Justice Secretary nor the fiscal who
dismissed the information, but the trial judge himself, who exercised his discretion by
approving the stand taken by the prosecution.
The fault or error tainting the order of dismissal of the lower court consists in its failure to
observe procedural due process and to exercise its discretion properly and judiciously. Other
procedural lapses that must be pointed out are attributable to petitioner Martinez, who filed a
petition for review with the Department of Justice despite the denial by Judge Yuzon of his
motion for reinvestigation, and to the Justice Secretary, who took cognizance of the petition
for review despite the fact that an information had been filed in court. But that is water under
the bridge.
What now concerns the Court here with is how the trial judge acted in relation to the motion to
dismiss. First, he granted the same without the prosecution having furnished private
complainant a copy of the motion despite having been ordered to do so, thereby effectively
depriving private complainant of his day in court.
Secondly, the dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice
that no libel was committed. The trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the case. Reliance was placed solely on the conclusion of the
prosecution that "there is no sufficient evidence against the said accused to sustain the
allegation in the information" and on the supposed lack of objection to the motion to dismiss,
this last premise being, however, questionable, the prosecution having failed, as observed, to
give private complainant a copy of the motion to dismiss.
In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than
the judge's own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused.
Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of
discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was
indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only
after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was
imperatively required ws the trial judge's own assessment of such evidence, it not being
sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the
prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency.
As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent

finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of
the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In
effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do
and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling
in Crespo v. Mogul. 22
The dismissal order having been issued in violation of private complainant's right to due
process as well as upon an erroneous exercise of judicial discretion, the Court of Appeals did
not err in setting aside said dismissal order and remanding the case to the trial court for
arraignment of petitioner as accused therein and for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals are
affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18148
February 28, 1963
DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO
CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO,
ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES,
namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners.
Romerico F. Flores for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special
Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in question
and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958
and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist
Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his
properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all
surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena
Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the
estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and
intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and
Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in
accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the
testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her
collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to
the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own,
claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the
theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively,
set the two projects of partition for hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties,
followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the
memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the
properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively

matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding. the probate court. which prohibits donations between spouses during the marriage.and not to the conjugal partnership. reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based. issued an order declaring the donation void without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature. because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half share of such partnership. having limited and special jurisdiction. Amparo. et al. and considered under the second category. in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. the Honorable M. Ocampo. Manalac v. and (3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation. On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed. 80 Phil. 1960. the same must be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action. may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the power of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the . In the light of this doctrine.2 However. argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal character to the properties. and that since the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will. 1960. The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court." dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation.. Mejia presiding. had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule. and that with the consent of the parties. 1äwphï1. upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses. 661). on their part. On September 14. the executor filed a motion for new trial. this Court consistently held that as a general rule. that is. whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa. Pascual. 561." The motion for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3. 73 Phil. (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the donation. 1960. question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings. 73 Phil. there being no attestation clause. we have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased.ñët The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes. and when so submitted. Wherefore. it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code. it does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same Code. between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes. In the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file another. without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 229. 232). said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. for the reason that."1 except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property. the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court. aside from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code. petitioners filed this present petition for review by certiorari. In a line of decisions. it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property. considered under the first category." On September 27. Exhibit B.

3 Thereafter. The responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure. If appellants' contention is correct. for the jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate. then there can be no exception to the nojurisdiction theory. Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court. This is not borne by the admitted facts. extend or broaden it. but the widow is. it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow. On the contrary. the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. As the Court of . And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. To this end.4 In the case now before us. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings. it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person. so long as no interests of third parties are affected. as representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived". in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.testate proceedings. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband. the widow. the question as to whether the properties herein involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes. consequently. the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and. and that its decision on the subject is null and void and does not bind even those who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because. distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. not over the subject matter. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. which is distinct from jurisdiction. by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. including. But as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v. jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action can not vest. and as a necessary corollary. for the purpose of the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. has been recognized to be vested in probate courts. it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. of course. Therefore. let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. in the sense advanced by appellants that the trial court had completely no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute. the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. or to the deceased husband exclusively? At the outset. now represented because of her death. The respondents. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court. in which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition. and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator. Strictly speaking. it is contended. in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate.

Presiding Judge. on the approval of their project of partition and. after due hearing. as they do. thus. No. petitioner. the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel. L-54904 January 29. petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties — which is well within the competence of the probate court — and just because of an opposition thereto. did not agree. the deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal. . 1980. Branch IV. by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband). The trial court said the defendant could not be held liable for homicide because the wound inflicted on the victim was only superficial. 1 The heirs of the deceased. HON.00. 1988 HEIRS OF TITO RILLORTA. vs. entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". 2 This motion was sent by registered mail on February 2. and ANDREW COSTALES. have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character of the properties is correct. FIRME. adjudges question against them.6 Finally. J. as it has not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will. Certainly." they filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision notified to them on January 23. the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law. Court of First Instance of La Union. the same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. 1980. May the criminal aspect of the decision be modified as a basis for the increase in the civil award? Certainly not. during her lifetime. So ordered. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel. Bauang. Andrew Costales. 3 Heard on February 26. "In doing so all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. respondents. not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband. La Union. CRUZ. because silence without knowledge works no estoppel. the petitioners can not be heard to insist. 1980.Appeals said.7 In the present case. there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in motion. if inter-vivos. herein petitioners.R. but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. was held guilty only of less serious physical injuries and sentenced to twenty days of arresto menor and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500. Through their counsel acting "under the direct control and supervision of the provincial fiscal. G. and ineffectual if mortis-causa.5 They can not be permitted to complain if the court. In short. ROMEO N. and this was obviously induced by the exploratory surgery which was needlessly performed upon him. they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Is the case at bar covered by the rule on double jeopardy or by the exception? We shall come to that. petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself. in an order that was communicated to the private prosecutor on March 18. Certainly.: May the civil award in a criminal case be appealed by the heirs of the offended party? Of course. WHEREFORE. Accused of killing Tito Rillorta. it was denied on February 28. In other words. the victim had succumbed not to the skin-deep wound that did not affect any vital organ but as a result of the attending physician's gross incompetence. The certified cause of death was pneumonia.

. The offended party. we have held that — . declared the appeal of the accused abandoned. 6 Both the fiscal and the private prosecutor filed separate motions for reconsideration. 1980.An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. When appeal to be taken. the fiscal and the private prosecutor jointly filed a notice of appeal. dismissing the appeal. 58). 8 xxx xxx xxx In this instance. 9 . it had lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution rune days after the date of the judgment. Section 6. The adequacy of the award may be challenged on the ground that it is not commensurate with the gravity of the injuries sustained as a result of the offense committed by the accused. a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court under the signatures of the prosecuting fiscal and the private prosecutor. The pawnbrokers in this case are deemed to have been prejudiced by the commission of the crime. 1980. 1980. the respondent judge dismissed the appeal on April 14.. it could no longer issue the challenged orders of April 14. date of its posting by registered mail. Thus. The trial courts resolution that. 6. of the Rules of Court. Therefore. 7 The dismissal of the appeal is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. When two days later. It is clear that the notice of appeal was filed within the 15-day reglementary period. The motion for reconsideration of the decision rendered in open court on January 23. It is settled that this can be done by the private prosecutor on behalf of the offended party or his successors.5 After considering the opposition to the notice and the reply thereto. General Orders. 1980. The question of whether or not the civil award in a criminal case may be appealed is not new and has been resolved earlier by this Court. this court. The running of the period was suspended while the motion was under study and until a copy of the order denying the same was furnished the private prosecutor on March 18. the offended party should have the right within the same period to appeal from so much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him. 4 On March 20. necessarily implies that such right is protected in the same manner as the right of the accused to his defense. for tardiness. and his appeal should not be made dependent on that of the accused. The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution and to appeal for purpose of the civil liability of the accused (section 107. because by reason of the fact that the jewels pledged to them had been stolen they will now be deprived of their possession without first having a declaration of indemnity for the amount of the pledges. 1980. If the accused has the right within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of conviction. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney. and was obligated to elevate the records thereof to the appellate court. may appeal from the judgment of the trial court with reference to the payment of the indemnity resulting from the commission of the offense. reading as follows: SEC. . The appeal was thus perfected on time. the only question left to be decided is the appeal of the private prosecution with regard to the civil liability of the accused. is unfounded. in its resolution dated November 28. No. 1933. Only ten days had elapsed from the earlier date. only 12 days of the period of appeal had been consumed. be he the owner of the stolen or misappropriated property. on March 20. Having become functus officio. was filed on February 2. because the cause had been appealed by the accused. conformably to Rule 122. or the owner of the pawnshop. 1980. The trial court thus lost jurisdiction over the appealed case on March 20. 1980. and May 12.1980. 1980. but these were denied on May 12. 1980.

it was certainly not invalid. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision.S. The problem then is whether or not the sum of P500.00 be increased because the accused should not have been found guilty of only less serious physical injuries but of homicide.00 was sufficient indemnification for the wound which. Francisco. the civil indemnity may be increased only if it will not require an aggravation of the decision in the criminal case on which it is based. holding that the guilt of the accused had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. of which the accused in this case was convicted. In the present case. There is no doubt at all that the trial court had the requisite jurisdiction to pronounce the challenged sentence. This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be. their appeal involves "both the criminal aspect and the civil liabilities in the criminal cases. declared by a 5-4 vote that appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy. less serious physical injuries. of which the defendant has been absolved by the trial court. among them People v. This argument is flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction." We have made similar rulings in several other cases. It has been consistently applied since then in this jurisdiction. is necessarily included in the offense of homicide. the trial court has held. The Court disagreed. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. People v." This provision is based on the old case of Kepner v. The petitioners are urging that the civil award in the sum of only P500. and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order. a full trial was held and both the prosecution and the defense were accorded the right to be heard before the judgment was reached. Supreme Court. 12 where the U. Villarin. But the petitioners argue that double jeopardy will not attach because the judgment convicting the accused of less serious physical injuries is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore null and void. Nevertheless. In their own words. They are not confining themselves to the civil aspect of the challenged decision. who are mainly concerned only with the civil indemnity." 13 There is no question that the crime of less serious physical injuries. United States. it held through Justice Munoz-Palma that "however erroneous the order of the respondent court is. This rule is applicable in the present case. reviewing a decision of the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904. In People v. It need only be stressed that if the government itself cannot appeal. on appeal by the adverse party. . City Court of Silay. and People v. Even assuming it was incorrect." 10 This is not permitted under the rule on double jeopardy. The prohibition operates as a "bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. 11 Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. 108 SCRA 121. 14 the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dimiss a charge for falsification after the prosecution had rested. the accused may not. 128 SCRA 110. was not the proximate cause of the victim's death. The award cannot be related to the victim's death.However. to wit. much less then can the offended party or his heirs. 15 The prosecution in each of these cases was allowed to appeal because it had not been given its day in court. Hernando. The cases cited by the petitioners are not in point because they all involve not errors of judgment but denial of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction. It follows that the appeal should be limited to the civil award corresponding only to the offense found against the accused. be convicted of a more serious offense or sentenced to a higher penalty to justify the increase in the civil indemnity. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. such error cannot now be lighted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. In other words. 11 SCRA 550.

We can decide the appeal ourselves to expedite decision of this case. We have carefully studied the pros and cons of this problem and can rule on it directly on the basis of the record before us and in the interest of speedy justice. the orders of the respondent court dated April 14. But we do not believe that such delay is necessary. the appeal sought shall no longer be necessary because the questioned civil award in the amount of P500. 1980. If an error has been committed somewhere — and on this it is not necessary for us to rule — that error will nonetheless not relax the application of the salutary rule on double jeopardy. 1980. are SET ASIDE. No costs. While the Court sympathizes with the petitioners for their tragic loss. we hold that the sum awarded by the trial court to the petitioners. for the less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the victim — and not for his death — is sufficient recompense. Accordingly.00 is hereby directly AFFIRMED. However. SO ORDERED. It must be. upheld. This would require elevation of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the usual procedure and an exchange again of pleadings and arguments between the parties that will further prolong this case. . it is unable to accord them a more satisfactory material settlement because it is limited by the findings of the trial court and inhibitions of double jeopardy. Therefore.The determination of this question should normally be made by the appellate court after examining the factual issues as originally resolved by the trial court. WHEREFORE. as it is here. the increase sought is denied. and May 20.