2010

ASEAN ROLE IN
MYANMAR
By: David Raja
Marpaung S.IP
M.Def 1

1 David Raja Marpaung. Associate Lecture University of Indonesia, also Indonesia Politic and Defense Consultant. Email:
davidrajamarpaung@gmail.com phone: +62 81219588360
 CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

I. BACKGROUND

Burma has the largest number of armed ethnic insurgencies of all the member states in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as a well-established civil opposition to the ruling military regime. The
ethnic insurgencies began in 1948 while civil opposition has grown more open during the last decade. There are
seven officially recognised ethnic groups in Burma apart from the Burman majority: the Chin, Kachin, Karen,
Karenni (Kayah), Mon, Rakhine (Arakanese) and Shan. This, however, fails to take into account a bewildering
number of subgroups speaking over 100 languages. This ethnic diversity and these ethno-nationalist aspirations,
combined with the communist movement, composed alarming problems.
Independence on 4 January 1948, named the Union of Burma, with Sao Shwe Thaik as its first President
and U Nu as its first Prime Minister. Democratic rule ended in 1962 when General Ne Win led a military coup
d'état. He ruled for nearly 26 years and pursued policies under the rubric of the Burmese Way to Socialism.
Between 1962 and 1974, Burma was ruled by a revolutionary council headed by the general, and almost all
aspects of society (business, media, production) were nationalized or brought under government control (including
the Boy Scouts). In an effort to consolidate power, General Ne Win and many top generals resigned from the
military and took civilian posts and, from 1974, instituted elections in a one party system. Between 1974 and 1988,
Burma was effectively ruled by General Ne Win through the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP).
In 1988, unrest over economic mismanagement and political oppression by the government led to
widespread pro-democracy demonstrations throughout the country known as the 8888 Uprising. Security forces
killed thousands of demonstrators, and General Saw Maung staged a coup d'état and formed the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC). In 1989, SLORC declared martial law after widespread protests. The military
government finalized plans for People's Assembly elections on 31 May 1989. SLORC changed the country's
official English name from the "Union of Burma" to the "Union of Myanmar" in 1989.
In May 1990, the government held free elections for the first time in almost 30 years. The National League
for Democracy (NLD), the party of Aung San Suu Kyi, won 392 out of a total 489 seats, but the election results
were annulled by SLORC, which refused to step down. Led by Than Shwe since 1992, the military regime has
made cease-fire agreements with most ethnic guerilla groups. In 1992, SLORC unveiled plans to create a new
constitution through the National Convention, which began 9 January 1993. In 1997, the State Law and Order
Restoration Council was renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). On 23 June 1997,
Myanmar was admitted into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

PESTEL Analysis of Myanmar SItuation

To describe the current situation in the Myanmar, this analysis is using PESTEL analysis, consists of
politic, economy, social, technology, environment, and legal aspect of the country, as follow:
• Politic and Legal
2
 ◦ Governed by military junta (1962-now), with full of coercion and no democracy
◦ Many pro-democracy activists, civil societies, and opposition elements have been suppressed,
detained, and jailed without fair judiciary process (including monks), and some of them were killed
◦ Criticised and pressed by Western countries, as well as UN (and ASEAN for some extends), but
relatively close with India, China, and Russia (in 2007, the SC draft resolution about human rights
violation was vetoed by Russia and China)
◦ Extremely corrupt state (rank 178 of 180 countries in 2008 Transparency Internationals CPI)
◦ Junta using anti-subversive and internal security constitution to destruct the democratisation process
◦ 2008 constitution referendum promised to held Election in 2010 and perform “democracy” in the
future2
• Economy
◦ Until 1960’s, Myanmar was the wealthiest country in Southeast Asia and the world’s largest exporter
of rice
◦ Since governed by junta regime, average rate of annual GDP growth only 2,9%, GDP per capita USD
233 and inflation rate reach 30-60%
◦ Banned investment and trading from US and other Western countries
◦ Foreign investment comes primarily from China, Singapore, South Korea, India, and Thailand (India is
the biggest investor in natural resources and industry).
◦ Lack of infrastructures, except in Thai border, trough which the main illegal drugs are exported
◦ World’s 2nd largest producer of opium, and gaining national income through illegal drugs (some
banks received 40% commission from money laundry)—some of them collaborated with MOGE
(national oil company)3
• Social
◦ 55 million population, with over 295,800 refugees exist along Indian, Bangladeshi and Thai borders
while several thousand are in Malaysia.
◦ 135 distinct ethnic groups, with 108 languages. Bamar is the biggest ethnic, with 68% of population
and Buddhist is the biggest religion.
◦ Human Development Index 0,583 (rank 132)
◦ Minority ethnic and religious persecution to join the army or get government jobs, the main route to
success in the country.
◦ UN identified large human rights violation, including massive rape and killing of Karen minority ethnic
by military .
◦ Military junta restrict the international humanitarian assistances to keep the people’s dependence
from government.
◦ There are 101 universities, 12 institutes, 9 degree colleges and 24 colleges in Burma, a total of 146

2 Burma. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html (last accessed on 5:19 PM

7/28/2009)
3 Ibid.
3
 higher education institutions4.
• Technology
◦ Technological advanced is very low, as well as the economic growth
◦ Importing most of its weapons from Russia, Ukraine, China and India.
◦ Technological investment from India include oil and gas exploration, IT, hydropower, and construction
of ports and buildings.
◦ The country is building a research nuclear reactor near May Myo (Pyin Oo Lwin) with help from
Russia5.
• Environment
◦ Cyclone Nargis disaster in May 2008 was used by the regime to performed referendum (as barter of
the humanitarian aid) to support government’s constitution6.

I.2. PROBLEMS

What are the ASEAN’s roles in implementing political stability in Myanmar? And what are the obstacles for the
ASEAN to solve the problem in Myanmar?

I.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

International Organization
Before we analyze and discuss the ASEAN role in Myanmar regarding the human rights issue. The
international organization theory will be very relevant to help us to explain the issue. Clive Archer, quoted the
Maurice Duverger – a politics expert – and Philip Selznick – an American sociologist – in his book International
Organizations, mentioned that an international organization represents a form of institution that refers to a formal
system and rules and objectives, a rationalized administrative instrument and which has ‘a formal technical and
material organization: constitutions, local chapters, physical equipment, machines, emblems, letterhead
stationary, a staff, an administrative hierarchy and so forth’.7
International organization does not usually refer to an organization which has members from different
regions. This we give an example to help you to understand the meaning. United Nations (UN) is absolutely an
international organization. Beside it represents the definition as we mentioned before, it also has so many
members from any regions. But Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) can be called as an
international also even though it’s also a regional organization. The member of ASEAN is not from any regions,
it’s only from the South East Asian region, like the name.

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Archer, Clive. 2003. International Organizations. 3rd Edition. New York: Routledge, p. 2
4
 But the most important elements that any organizations must have are membership, aim, and structure.8
Those are the requirement to typifying the international organization. Wallace and Singer, the politics experts,
stated that an international organization should draw its membership from two or more sovereign states. It is
acceptable [the amount of member] in preference to the Yearbook of International Organizations. But Grigorii
Morozov – an author of the Soviet period – had his own choice and it’s three. The second element is aim. The
organization is established with the aim of pursuing the common interests of the members. And the last element is
structure. The organization should have its own formal structure of a continuous nature established by an
agreement such as a treaty or constituent document.
So, from the explanations of those elements, we can define an international organization as a formal,
continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non
governmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the
membership.9
Another important thing in the international organization theory is the role of it. There are three major roles
can be indentified. Instrument is the first one. Perhaps the most usual image of the role of international
organizations is that of an instrument being used by its members for particular ends. This is particularly the case
with Intergovernmental Organizations, where the members are sovereign states with power to limit independent
action by international organizations.10 This is absolutely the role that international organizations can play
depends on the interests of their member states. States establish and develop international organizations to
achieve objectives that they cannot achieve on their own. But on the other hand, states will not permit
international organizations to do things that constitute, in the eyes of these states, interference in their internal
affairs.11
A second image of the role of international organizations is that of their being arenas or forums within
which actions take place. In this case, the organizations provide meeting places for member to come together to
discuss, argue, cooperate or disagree. Arenas in themselves are neutral. They can be used for a play, a circus, or
even a fight.
The last role is as an actor. The crucial word here is independent. In this case, the organizations can act
on the world scene without significantly affected by outside forces. They [organizations] can make decisions, can
act contrary to the wishes of some members and can affect the action of other members.12 Usually, this role is
played by the international non-governmental organizations.

Regionalism
Regionalism itself can be simply defined as the formation of interstate groupings on the basis of regions.
There are so many definitions of regionalism, but related to the ASEAN, the definition from Joseph Nye which said
8 Ibid, p.33
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid, p.68
11 W.R. Bohning. The Role and Functions of International Organizations in the Field of Migrant Workers. In the Regional
Workshop on the International Labour Organization (ILO) and International Labour Migration by the Canadian Human Rights
Foundation, the Ateneo Human Rights Centre, and the Lawasia Human Rights Committee. January 1999.
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/mdtmanila/speeches/miworker.htm. Accessed at July 27, 2009. 8.25 pm.
12 Op Cit, p.73-80
5
that a limited number of states that linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual
interdependence13 is more understandable. Furthermore, there are so many varieties in terms of regionalism, and
focusing on ASEAN as believed as successful regionalism in Southeast Asia, we only concern on one appropriate
theory which is constructivism. The key concern of constructivist is the relationship between ideas, identities and
material interests, which change through interaction of agents (states) and structure. Identities and interests are
socially and politically constructed14.

National Interest
To analyze the international behavior or state’s and an organization’s behavior, a national interest concept
will be very helpful. Every state will produce and do their policies to achieve their national interests. It can be said
that national interest is the aim of every state’s and organization’s actions. As Professor Banyu Perwita said in his
book, Pengantar Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, national interest also can be explained as a fundamental aim and
determining factor which guides the decision makers in a state to formulate the foreign policy.
A state usually has more than one national interest. Its national interest includes military realm, economic
realm, political realm, and also cultural realm. But the primary (generally) is state’s survival and its national
security. In this globalization era, not only states survival and national security, economic growth is also another
national interest which can be included to the primary of national interest/
National interests are not static. They can change depending on time, place and circumstances. The
national interest of almost any country in this world may be learned from their foreign policy. So, the national
interest and foreign policy influence each other.

13 Fawcett, Louise and Andrew Hurrell ( 1995). Regionalism in World Politics. New York : Oxford University Press. Page
11
14 Rulan, Jurgen ( 2000). ASEAN and the Asian crisis: theoretical implications and practical consequences for Southeast
Asian regionalism. The Pacific Review, Vol. 13 No. 3 2000: 421–451
6
 CHAPTER II
ANALYSIS

II.1. ASEAN & Myanmar

As we know from the earliest time, Myanmar’s joining of ASEAN was not a smooth process. Many
judgments against the admission Myanmar into ASEAN came not only from the external but also from internal
ASEAN itself regarding the undemocratic system by the military junta and human rights violations issue. Despite
that situation, Myanmar realized that in the age of regionalism and globalization, it’s not possible to Myanmar to
isolate itself. Therefore seeking to become a member of regional group which won’t exploit Myanmar’s weak
situation through The ASEAN way and non interference principal become a priority for Myanmar at that time.
Indeed, become a member of ASEAN still not able to deal with political change and peaceful democratic transition
in Myanmar. ASEAN has been obliged for years of its regional and international implications regarding Myanmar’s
Junta refusal to work in a peaceful way democratic transition and also several human violations that done by the
repressive Junta, but up until now, there’s no much actions that have been done by ASEAN in order to resolve
this problem.
The traditional respect for the principle of non-interference in the affairs of states, have come to the fore in
Southeast Asia's politics15. Moreover, despite the legal character of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in
Southeast Asia, ASEAN prefers an informal approach to resolve conflicts, placing an emphasis on relationships
rather than formal structures, and these soft approaches called the ASEAN way. Related to the Myanmar’s issue,
ASEAN still avoid sanction mechanism towards Myanmar. According to the 42 nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in
Thailand, Abhisit, Prime Minister of Thailand said that soft way (ASEAN Way) approach is more productive rather
than sanction mechanism that will make Myanmar become more isolated 16. Also noted in the media, the Junta
said that Myanmar condemns any interventions in the domestic politics in Myanmar and that’s not appropriate with
the ASEAN values17. Unfortunately, the human rights abuses in Myanmar has made this kind of principles needs
to be looked up since it has not produce any results so far. Non interference principle limits the ASEAN’s
actions; meanwhile to solve Myanmar’s problem through Summit Diplomacy and consensus building is
not enough realizing that Myanmar itself refused to discuss its problems with ASEAN.
Expressing full support and urged Myanmar’s Government to give Ibrahim Gambari full access18, is not
the only way to solve this problem. Furthermore, this mechanism needs continuity in terms of what actions that
ASEAN could take. However, in this point, non-interference principle limits the actions and the collective actions
are hard to be done since there’s still lack of common vision in the members itself. So, it’s sadly to say that, since
the admission of Myanmar as a part of ASEAN members, there’s not much that ASEAN can do. It’s not only
because the non interference principle but also there’s lack of commitment from the members regarding concern
15 Forty Years of ASEAN -- What To Do With Myanmar? http://www.mysinchew.com/node/3194
16 http://www.republika.co.id/berita/63553/ASEAN_Tak_Ada_Sanksi_untuk_Myanmar
17 http://beritasore.com/2007/11/23/menanti-ratifikasi-asean-charter/
18 Haacke, Jurgen (2008) ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards A Regional Initiative. Contemporary Southeast
Asia Vol 30, No 3 (2008)
7
on human rights issue and democracy. The key of change in Myanmar is ASEAN; because United Nations, US,
and European Union have shown strong impose towards Myanmar. ASEAN should move beyond its traditional
non-intervention policy, as we can see in the making of ASEAN charter which has reconsidered the ASEAN way
and the formation of Human Rights body should be put as a prominent concern of ASEAN members. If ASEAN is
unable to prove any relevance action related to the efforts to reconsider the non interference principle in Myanmar
case, then the only hope is to wait for the appearance of changing from Myanmar itself.
The role that ASEAN plays in Myanmar is clearly not as an actor. It’s proved by no resolution or any other
concrete actions ASEAN did. In this issue, we can conclude that ASEAN is playing the arena / forum role. There
are many meetings and many forums that ASEAN did to discuss the problem. The ASEAN meeting in Hua Hin,
Thailand, last February is an example. There were two main agendas, human right issue and the impact of global
financial crisis. From the ASEAN Secreatry General Surin Pitsuwan to ASEAN head person, Thailand Prime
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, from Indonesia Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda to Malaysia Foreign Minister were
talking about Myanmar issue and its human rights violation.19
In 1998, the grouping agreed to use “enhanced interaction,” which calls for countries to comment on
domestic issues that portrayed the ASEAN grouping in a negative light 20. Again in 1998, the ASEAN Vision 2020
paper confirmed that the group sought an equilibrium between national sovereignty and regional resilience. Where
regional resilience is undermined by a rigid interpretation of national sovereignty, compromise in the interests of
regional stability should be taken under consideration 21. In 2000, ASEAN established the “ASEAN troika” as a
mechanism to implement “enhanced interaction” and address issues “…likely to disturb regional peace and
harmony, with the potential to affect ASEAN in political or security terms.” Then, in 2003, ASEAN proposed the
ASEAN Security Community, which directly stated that “ASEAN Member Countries shall promote political
development…to achieve peace, stability, democracy and prosperity in the region.22” Thus, those who express
caution over engaging critically on Myanmar, citing the “ASEAN norm of non-interference prohibits it” are
overlooking fundamental ASEAN documents, as well as changes that have taken place in the region since 1967.
Last year, Singapore Foreign Affair Minister, George Yeo also suggested keeping Myanmar within
ASEAN’s table.23 It’s definitely a strong evidence that ASEAN is playing its role as an arena / forum to discuss the
problem in Myanmar. But not only as a forum, is ASEAN playing its role as an instrument. The question is whose
instrument? It’s Myanmar’s. Myanmar can use the ASEAN’s basic principle, non-interference principle, to avoid
ASEAN’s participation. It clearly shows us that Myanmar doesn’t like if its domestic problem is interfered by any
other parties, ASEAN in particular. So, here is the example of Myanmar’s rejection on ASEAN’s participation. Last
May, there was 17th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Pnom Penh, Cambodia. U Maung Myint, the Deputy
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Myanmar stated, “Each and every nation has its own internal problems. Taking

19 http://www.antara.co.id/view/?i=1235801759&c=ART&s=. Accessed at July 29, 2009. 1.34 pm

20 Royal Thai Embassy, Thailand and Human Rights, Washington, DC, available from
http://www.thaiembdc.org/socials/hr0200.html
21 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN Vision 2020, Hanoi, Vietnam, 16 Dec 1998
22 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action, Bali, Indonesia, 7 Oct 2003
23 http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/331796/1/.html. Accessed at July 29, 2009. 1.44 pm
8
action against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi……is a matter of internal legal proceedings. As Myanmar is a sovereign
nation, it is not fair and proper to interfere in its internal affairs”.24
We also get an evident of this role from a journal on Pasific review. Burma failed to respond to the
‘ASEAN way’ and rather instrumentalized the organization for its own purposes: to reduce dependency on China,
gain a more respectable stature in international relations, and win ASEAN over as an advocate for the resumption
of Western and multilateral development aid which was frozen after the bloody repression of the popular uprising
in August and September 1988.25

II.2. Regionalism in Southeast Asia

The states cooperation more or less based on the formation of collective identities shared principles,
values and traditions, and related to ASEAN case, we can see that The ASEAN Way as the norms of ASEAN has
become the core values of ASEAN political behavior. This is proven by the policy pursued by ASEAN called
‘constructive engagement ‘towards Myanmar which is a non conferential strategy to embrace a reclusive country
such Myanmar. ASEAN believed through that constructive approach such as a policy dialogue and persuasion
also without any threat or sanction, the political change could be stimulated. This non conferential strategy as
mentioned before proved that ASEAN is consistent with its shared principles, values and traditions, as the same
with constructivist way. Yet, the subsequent debate over ASEAN’s collective identity is the principle of non
interference. Moreover, the constructive approach through the ASEAN way failed to produce political change in
Myanmar. ASEAN expectations to induce gradual political change in Burma through ‘peer group pressure’ did not
materialize. Even after admission to ASEAN, Burma failed to respond to the ‘ASEAN way’ and rather instrumental
zed the organization for its own purposes26
The role that ASEAN plays in Myanmar is clearly not as an actor. It’s proved by no resolution or any other
concrete actions ASEAN did. In this issue, we can conclude that ASEAN is playing the arena / forum role. There
are many meetings and many forums that ASEAN did to discuss the problem. The ASEAN meeting in Hua Hin,
Thailand, last February is an example. There were 2 main agendas, human right issue and the impact of global
financial crisis. From the ASEAN Secreatry General Surin Pitsuwan to ASEAN head person, Thailand Prime
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, from Indonesia Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda to Malaysia Foreign Minister were
talking about Myanmar issue and its human rights violation.27

24 http://www.asiaobserver.com/component/option,com_fireboard/Itemid,453/func,view/catid,2/id,10024/. Accessed at July

29, 2009. 1.57 pm
25 Rulan, Jurgen (2000). ASEAN and the Asian crisis: theoretical implications and practical consequences for Southeast
Asian regionalism. The Pacific Review, Vol. 13 No. 3 2000: 421–451

26 Ibid.
27 http://www.antara.co.id/view/?i=1235801759&c=ART&s=. Accessed at July 29, 2009. 1.34 pm
9
 Last year, Singapore Foreign Affair Minister, George Yeo also suggested keeping Myanmar within
ASEAN’s table.28 It’s definitely a strong evidence that ASEAN is playing its role as an arena / forum to discuss the
problem in Myanmar.
But not only as a forum, is ASEAN playing its role as an instrument. The question is whose instrument?
It’s Myanmar’s. Myanmar can use the ASEAN’s basic principle, non-interference principle, to avoid ASEAN’s
participation. It clearly shows us that Myanmar doesn’t like if its domestic problem is interfered by any other
parties, ASEAN in particular. So, here is the example of Myanmar’s rejection on ASEAN’s participation. Last May,
there was 17th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Pnom Penh, Cambodia. U Maung Myint, the Deputy Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Myanmar stated, “Each and every nation has its own internal problems. Taking action against
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi……is a matter of internal legal proceedings. As Myanmar is a sovereign nation, it is not
fair and proper to interfere in its internal affairs”.29
We also get an evident of this role from a journal on Pasific review. Burma failed to respond to the
‘ASEAN way’ and rather instrumentalized the organization for its own purposes: to reduce dependency on China,
gain a more respectable stature in international relations, and win ASEAN over as an advocate for the resumption
of Western and multilateral development aid which was frozen after the bloody repression of the popular uprising
in August and September 1988.30

II.3. Myanmar National Interest

Foreign policy of Myanmar toward ASEAN become more communicative, but in the end Myanmar still
reject any political intervention in terms of Aung San Suu Kyi’case , human rights violation , and democratization
process. National interests of Myanmar take large part on economic side, as its country try to open cooperation
with ASEAN member countries and also China and India. But other national interests such community building
also took part in in its national interest.
The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is the most important actors in Myanmar’s political
economy. The SPDC has been trying to improve its popularity among the people, through enhanced publicity for
its state-building activities and an anti-corruption drive among civil servants. This latter initiative, however—
together with attempts to raise revenue by clamping down on tax evasion, the sudden move of the administrative
capital to Naypyitaw and a lack of transparent, predictable or sound economic policies—is currently further
slowing the nation’s economy. Besides that, these are some SPDC Policy to take interest from Myanmar people31.
1. Reconvening of the National Convention that has been adjourned since 1996

28 http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/331796/1/.html. Accessed at July 29, 2009. 1.44 pm

29 http://www.asiaobserver.com/component/option,com_fireboard/Itemid,453/func,view/catid,2/id,10024/. Accessed at July 29,
2009. 1.57 pm
30 Rulan, Jurgen (2000). ASEAN and the Asian crisis: theoretical implications and practical consequences for Southeast
Asian regionalism. The Pacific Review, Vol. 13 No. 3 2000: 421–451

31 Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson, Myanmar, The State, Community, and Environment. Canbera: Australia National
University, 2007
10
 2. After the successful holding of the National Convention, step-by-step implementation of the process
necessary for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system
3. Drafting of a new constitution in accordance with detailed basic principles laid down by the National
Convention
4. Adoption of the constitution through a national referendum.
5. Holding of free and fair elections for pyithu hluttaws [legislative bodies] according to the new constitution.
6. Convening of hluttaws [assemblies] attended by hluttaw members in accordance with the new
constitution.
7. Building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the hluttaw, and the
government and other central organs formed by the hluttaw

Stakeholder Analysis
A stakeholder analysis is a technique you can use to identify and assess the importance of key people, groups of
people, or institutions that may significantly influence the success of your activity or project32.

Recent Condition
Oversight Actors Government Military Civilian Impacts
1. No function of 1.Corruption 1.Using violence 1.Frustrated by 1.No law supremacy
parliament 2.Authoritarian 2. Dual-function law and politics 2.Social and security
2.No press freedom 3.Power supremacy 3.Running business 2. Under coercion unrest
3. Civil society are 4.Military as super and injustice 3.Destructing economic
in limited access power has dual 3.Race conflict development
and under- function
intimidated

Transformation The Stakeholders

Oversight Actors Government Military Civilian Impacts
1. Objective 1. Law enforcement 1. No violent 1. Obeying law 1. Law
2. Cover both 2. Controlling military 2. Obeying law 2. No anarchy supremacy
side 3. Security protection 3. Professional 3. Using legal 2. Social and
3. Pressure to 4. Give education and 4. Hand over and political political order
government guidelines the case to channel 3. Public trust
4. Research & 5. Eradicate corruption government 4. SSR
suggestion 6. Increase military 5. Human
5. Law welfare security
supremacy 6. Supporting

32 Stakeholder Analysis. http://erc.msh.org/quality/ittools/itstkan.cfm

11
 endorsement economic
development/
sustainability

Position, Interest, and Needs

This analysis is one of classical ideas in conflict resolution to distinguish between position held by parties and their
lying interest a needs33. Analyzing interest and needs can be a way to achieve consensus.
Interest Analysis

Needs Analysis

33 Oliver Ramsbotham, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Cambridge: Polity Press , 2005

12
Benefit Management
Benefits Management in is concerned with the beginning and end of project management and surrounds
each project. Every change project and program should at least end with a measurable contribution to a specific
benefit34. In Myanmar we offer 4 projects, that can be do with Military, Politic and Legal, Socio Cultural, and
economy approach.
The Projects are build democracy and good governance, Redesign vision also concept of military position
and function in government, Strengthening Regional and International Diplomacy Lobby in Myanmar, and
strengthening the social society.

34 Bozeman, B., and J. Melkers, eds. 1993. Evaluating R&D impacts: Methods and
practice. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
13
 CHAPTER III
CONCLUSION

The Southeast Asian leaders promise to step up the fight against terrorism, but they failed to denounce
the State-Sponsored Terrorism in the region. The region will never be secure while one of its members ( the
notorious Burmese military regime) is holding the 50 millions hostages , while a few live in the penthouse and do
as they please. The ASEAN should not harbor the terrorist regime in the region. The ASEAN should seek to
pressure and isolate state sponsors so they will renounce the use of terrorism, end support to terrorists, and bring
terrorists to justice for past crimes. Likewise, the ASEAN establishes an ASEAN community of "three pillars" – the
ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-cultural Community -- "for the
purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region. Without political stability in one of
its nations because of State-Sponsored Terrorism, the economic development in the region is impossible and so
do prosperity in the region. The ASEAN must reconsider their actions in the face of the mounting international
demands regarding on the Burma's issue. In retrospect of the past regime changes in the region ( ie Philippine,
Indonesia, East Timor, Cambodia ), the whole world has witnessed the ineffectual approaches of ASEAN and its
hypocritical policy. Despite that, building pressure on Burma must be indeed intense. We must continuously urge
international communities, governments and institutions to keep up the pressure and to use their power and
influence to stop the ongoing political oppression, violation of human rights inside Burma, and waging war against
the people. The political intervention from the
U.N Security Council is an urgent need to resolve the Burma's political impasse. The pressure is the only
language the regime's thugs understand and hear. The language may be too strong for Asian leaders who want to
sit on the fence in the Burma's issue, but we must push them to stand up for what is right and wrong in the
Burma's conflict. We must urge the ASEAN to continue pressing for democratic reforms in Burma.

14
 REFERENCE

. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html
Archer, Clive. 2003. International Organizations. 3rd Edition. New York: Routledge
W.R. Bohning. The Role and Functions of International Organizations in the Field of Migrant Workers. In the Regional
Workshop on the International Labour Organization (ILO) and International Labour Migration by the Canadian Human Rights
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