IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA
___________________________________________________________
CASE NO.: 3D15-2208
L.T. CASE NO.: 14-492)
____________________________________________________________
JACOB PFEFFER, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MIAMI, et al.,
Respondents.
___________________________________________________________
CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
__________________________________________________________

VICTORIA MNDEZ, City Attorney

JOHN A. GRECO, Deputy City Attorney
Attorneys for City of Miami
444 S.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite 945
Miami, FL 33130-1910
Tel.: (305) 416-1800
Fax: (305) 416-1801
Primary Email: jgreco@miamigov.com
Secondary Email: slstubbs@miamigov.com

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The City of Miami, by and through undersigned counsel, files its Response
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and states the following:
Introduction
This Second-Tier Certiorari Petition involves a challenge to a Class II
Special Permit issued to Wal-Mart for the construction of a store in Midtown
Miami. Previously, the Circuit Court Appellate Division quashed the City
Commissions Resolution and remanded to the City Commission. On remand, the
Commission approved the Permit with a change to the project that addressed the
solitary issued raised in the Circuit Court opinion. On appeal the second time, the
Circuit Court affirmed without an opinion. The Petitioners now seek Second-tier
certiorari raising procedural challenges that have by and large not been raised
below, and lack any merit. As explained herein, this Petition should be summarily
denied.
Factual and Procedural Background
Wal-Mart applied to build a store in Midtown Miami. The Applicant sought
a Class II Special Permit from the City of Miami for construction of the store.
Prior to consideration by the Planning Director, the application was
reviewed by the Neighborhood Enhancement Team (NET) Office and the Urban
Development Review Board (UDRB). After such review, the Planning Director
2

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

granted the Permit. The Petitioners appealed to the Planning Zoning and Appeals
Board (PZAB). On October 2, 2013, the PZAB approved the Permit and the
Petitioners appealed the Permit to the City Commission. On appeal to the City
Commission, the Commission conducts a de novo quasi-judicial hearing after
which the Commission is empowered to affirm, deny, or modify the Permit.
On November 21, 2013, the City Commission heard the appeal. After
hearing evidence from the Applicant, the attorney for the Petitioners, and the
public, the Commission approved the Permit.
The First Appeal
The Petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court Appellate Division.

On

appeal, the Petitioners raised a multiplicity of arguments, including the claim that
the Planning Director ignored the mandatory language under the City Code
concerning referrals to the Neighborhood Enhancement Team (NET) Office and
the Urban Development Review Board (UDRB); that the City Commission failed
to set forth specific written findings sufficient to satisfy the City Code
requirements under Section 1305 of the Citys Zoning Ordinance; and that the City
Commission improperly granted variances.
The Circuit Court Appellate Division rendered a written opinion which
rejected all but one of the Petitioners arguments. In particular, the Appellate
Division held that the City Commission complied with City Code requirements
3

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

regarding consideration of the reports of the NET Office and the UDRB; the
written findings of the City Commission were sufficient and satisfied Section 1305
of the Citys Zoning Ordinance; and that there was competent substantial evidence
to support the projects compliance with the City Code building continuity
requirements, liner uses, and garage set back requirements.
The only argument accepted by the Appellate Division was that the project
did not comply with the City Code loading berth requirements. The Circuit
Courts opinion on this point states as follows:
Nevertheless, Section 627.2.15 of the Code reads The offstreet loading requirements shall be as follows: 2. For nonresidential uses: (d) For non-residential floor area up to two
hundred and fifty thousand (250,000) square feet, three (3)
berths total. Such language does not appear to have been
subject to previous judicial scrutiny. At the hearing, Ms.
Gelabert testified that this provision has always been
interpreted as the minimum amount of berths permitted under
the Code. Consequently, she testified that since the Project
provides for five (5) loading berths, it was in compliance with
the required number of loading berths under the Code.
However, as case law shows, when the language of the statute
or rule is unambiguous and conveys a clear and ordinary
meaning, there is no need to resort to other rules of statutory
construction. [citation omitted.] Blacks Law Dictionary
defines total as [w]hole, not divided, lacking no part, entire,
full, complete, the whole amount. [citation omitted.] Thus,
when examining the plain language of paragraph 2(d) of this
provision, the phrase three (3) berths total does not appear to
be ambiguous. The plain meaning of the word total will not
permit it to be read as a minimum. As noted earlier,
[f]ailure of an agency to adhere to its own regulations
constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of the
4

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

law. [citation omitted.] Since the Project provides for five (5)
berths and the Code provides three (3) berths total, this Court
finds that the Commissions Resolution finding that the Project
complied with the requirements under the Code is a departure
from the essential requirements of the law.
For the above-stated reason, we hereby QUASH the
Commissions decision as set forth in Resolution R-13-0471
(File No. 13-0101ii), and REMAND this cause for proceedings
consistent herein.
[App. Tab 1].1
Upon remand, on November 20, 2014, the City Commission heard this
matter. Rather than maintain the five loading berths, Wal-Mart modified its plans
to include only three loading berths.
During the hearing, the Director stated with respect to the plans that were
being considered on remand that [t]hey have presented to us . . . documents that
show that where there were once five loading berths, there are now three loading
berths. [App. Tab 12, page 8]. Mr. Lydecker explained that Wal-Mart was
Asking now that the resolution be passed approving our Class
II permit. We have done all the hearings in this case. That we
pass our Class II permit. And its like any other condition, its
justand include the condition as part of the resolution that we
comply with the appellate order specifically requiring three
loading berths. And to back that up, weve actually provided
plans, . . . we will just have three loading berths.

Record Citations are to the Petitioners Appendix.

5

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

[App. Tab 12, page 18]. The Director later added that Planning and Zoning
Department had reviewed the amended plans and made findings. [App. Tab 12,
page 27; App. Tab 11]. The Director testified that [t]he modifications made to
the plans render the three remaining loading berths fully functional. There are
maneuvering studies that prove that. [T]his particular establishment will
function just fine. It will function properly with these loading berths provided.
[App. Tab 12, page 28].
With respect to the proper procedures on remand, Vice Chair Hardemon
noted that had the applicant come to us today and said, well, they wanted five not
three [loading berths], then there would be a question of a variance. And then . . .
the application process would be different. [App. Tab 12, pages 46-47]. Vice
Chair Hardemon went on to ask whether the prior decision of this court that had
remanded for proceedings consistent with the decision, referred to was the de
novo review of the City Commission that they were undertaking. [App. Tab 12,
page 68]. The City Attorney confirmed that the hearing before the Commission on
remand was all that was required by the decision:
For the above-stated reasons, we hereby quash the
Commissions decision as set forth in Resolution R13. It
doesnt say quash everybodys decision. It doesnt say all
decisions. It doesnt say start over.
[App. Tab 12, page 70].
6

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

Following the hearing, the Commission adopted Resolution R-14-0440,

which approved the decision of the Director to issue the Class II Special Permit at
issue. The Commission found that
WHEREAS, on October 15, 2014, the Court issued an
opinion quashing the City Commissions decision as set forth
in Resolution No. 13-0471, and remanded the matter back to
the City Commission for proceedings consistent with the
Courts opinion; and
WHEREAS, the Court found that since the Project
provides for five (5) berths and the Code of the City of Miami,
Florida as amended (City Code), requires three (3) berths
total that the Commissions resolution finding that the Project
complied with the requirements under the City Code is a
departure from the essential requirements of the law on that
issue only; and
....
WHEREAS, the City Commission after careful
consideration of the evidence admitted into the record at this
hearing and including the decision of the Court in the above
referenced case, finds the application for the Class II Special
Permit meets the applicable requirements of Zoning Ordinance
No. 11000 and deems it advisable and in the best interest of the
general welfare of the City of Miami and its inhabitants to
affirm the decision of the PZAB and deny the appeal of Class II
...
[App. Tab 14].
The Second Appeal
The Petitioners again appealed to the Circuit Court Appellate Division. The
Circuit Court Appellate Division denied the Petition without a written opinion.
7

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

This Petition for Second-tier Certiorari follows.2

ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district courts role on second-tier certiorari is limited to a two-pronged

review of the circuit court decision, not a de novo review of the agency decision.
See Broward County v. G.B.V. Intl, Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 845 (Fla. 2001); City of
Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1982).

The district court

determines whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process; and applied
the correct law. Id. Moreover, second-tier certiorari should only be granted where
there is a departure from the essential requirements of law resulting in a
miscarriage of justice. Nader v. Fla. Dept of High. Saf. & Motor Veh., 87 So. 3d
712 (Fla. 2012).
In addition, the courts authority to exercise its discretion to review a circuit
court appellate division per curiam affirmance without an opinion is further
limited. See United Auto Ins. Co. v. A 1st Choice Healthcare Systems, Inc., 21 So.
3d 124 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). This court has suggested that such discretion to
review a per curiam affirmance may be limited to circumstances where failure to

The Petitioners suggest (in their facts section only) that the City did not timely
respond to a public records request. Such suggestion is not only unfounded but
has no place in an appellate brief where the issue had not been raised on appeal or
in an original action before the circuit court.
2

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

review would result in an unjustified approval of the obvious failure of the circuit
court to apply the correct law. Auerbach v. City of Miami, 929 So. 2d 693, 694
(Fla. 3d DCA 2006).
II.

THE CITY DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRET THE

MANDATE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT APPELLATE
DIVISION.

On remand from the first decision of the Circuit Court Appellate Division,
the Commission properly considered and approved the Project with three loading
berths pursuant to the modified plans. Post remand, the Project complied with the
City Code and did not contain a variance; thus, the Commissions decision
complied with the essential requirements of the law. Hence, the Circuit Court
applied the correct law in denying the Petition for Writ of Certiorari without a
written opinion; and there was no miscarriage of justice.
The essence of Petitioners argument is that the Circuit Court Appellate
Division somehow precluded a determination that the Project could be limited to
three loading berths thereby avoiding the variance procedure. There is no such
language in the opinion of the Circuit Court. Rather, the Circuit Court merely held
that five loading berths violated the City Code; quashed the Commissions
decision; and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
On remand, the Commission was authorized to approve the Project with
three loading berths. On review to both the PZAB and the Commission, the Code
9

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

grants those bodies the power to modify the pending application. The Code
explains the Commissions powers on review, as follows:
The city commission shall conduct a hearing de novo as a body
of original jurisdiction, upon any appeal and/or review from an
appealable decision under the terms of this zoning ordinance,
as amended. New evidence or materials may be received by the
city commission where such evidence or materials are pertinent
to a determination of the appeal. The city commission may hear
the testimony of witnesses and/or any other evidence offered by
any person aggrieved or by any officer, board or agency of the
city affected thereby or by any interested party having an
interest in the appeal under Florida law and may, in conformity
with this ordinance and other applicable laws, rules and
regulations, render its decision. The city commission on review
shall have full power to affirm, reverse, modify, in whole or in
part, with or without conditions, the action of the zoning board
or other appealable decision pursuant to this zoning ordinance.
Section 2004, City of Miami Zoning Code (11000) (emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing, the Commission was authorized to approve the
Permit with modifications.
Moreover, it was clear from the initial opinion of the Circuit Court that the
number of berths was the only noncompliant aspect of the Permit. The Appellate
Division directed the Commission to engage in proceedings on remand consistent
with its opinion. Parties are permitted to make stipulations on remand to address
the directions of the higher appellate court.

10

It is inconceivable that the

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

Commission was not complying with the Courts mandate by addressing the only
error when it had the authority on remand to affirm with modifications. 3
The Circuit Court Appellate Division did not apply the incorrect law
resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, this Petition should be denied.
III.

PETITIONERS FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY OTHER

ARGUMENTS.

The Petitioners, for the first time before an appellate court, assert that the
City Commissions decision violated Section 1505.1, Section 2215.2, and Section
1305 of the Zoning Ordinance. First, and foremost, these arguments have not been
raised or preserved and therefore they are outside the discretionary jurisdiction of
this court to review. Thus, the Circuit Court Appellate Division did not apply the
incorrect law and certiorari review here should be denied.
It is elemental that Petitioners are required to preserve their arguments in
order to raise them on appeal. Preservation is required in administrative cases.
See, e.g., City of Miami v. Cortes, 995 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Clear
Channel Communications, Inc. v. City of North Bay Village, 911 So. 2d 188 (Fla.
3d DCA 2005).

At either de novo hearing, under Section 2004, the Commission had the
authority to modify the Permit to reflect three loading berths, particularly (but not
exclusively) if that was required by the Code. If effect, the Commission on
remand did just that and denied the appeal because the modification now complied
with the Code and thus there was no variance.
3

11

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

This preservation rule of appellate law applies in the context of second-tier

review.

In essence, Petitioners are arguing that the Circuit Court Appellate

Division misapplied the law; yet that law was never presented for consideration
below.
Two cases support denial of this Petition for failure to raise these issues
below. In Town of Jupiter v. Byrd Family Trust, 134 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA
2014), the Court of Appeal denied second-tier review. On appeal, the Fourth
District stated: For the purpose of second-tier certiorari, the circuit court cannot
be said to have departed from a clearly established principal of law when it failed
to consider or apply a point not raised in the briefs. Id. at 1102.
In Advanced Chiropractic & Rehab. Ctr., Corp. v. United Auto. Ins. Co.,
103 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), the Court of Appeal, on second-tier review,
granted a petition because the Appellate Division reversed on an issue not raised
in the briefs. The Fourth District stated:
An appellate court's reversal based on an unpreserved error, on
a ground not argued in a brief, amounts to a denial of due
process, which is a departure from a clearly established
principle of law. To properly preserve an issue for appellate
review, a litigant must make a timely, specific,
contemporaneous objection. See 90.104(1), Fla. Stat. (2010);
State v. Calvert, 15 So.3d 946, 948 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). As a
general rule, [a]n error not raised in the brief is waived.
Ramos v. Philip Morris Cos., 743 So.2d 24, 29 (Fla. 3d DCA
1999) (citing Chaachou v. Chaachou, 135 So.2d 206, 221
(Fla.1961); Lesperance v. Lesperance, 257 So.2d 66, 67 (Fla.
12

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

3d DCA 1971)). Here, United waived the evidentiary

deficiencies relied upon by the circuit court to reverse by not
raising objections at the hearing on the rule 1.540 motion. Also,
United did not rely on those purported errors as a basis for
reversal in its appellate brief in the circuit court. This is a case
of double waiver.
Id. at 868-869 (emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing, the Petitioners failed to raise or preserve any other
grounds for review. Hence, the Petition should be denied.
IV.

IN ANY EVENT, THE APPROVAL OF THE PROJECT DID

NOT VIOLATE ANY OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE MIAMI
ZONING ORDINANCE.

In any event, although the Petitioners did not preserve any additional
arguments, the City did not violate any of the above Sections of the Zoning
Ordinance.
The Petitioners claim for the first time that the Commissions decision
violated Section 1505.1, Section 2215.2, and Section 1305 of the applicable
Zoning Ordinance. As explained below, there was no such violation of these or
any other Sections of the Zoning Ordinance.
Section 1505 states:
Sec. 1505. - Changes in original applications after final
approval.
1505.1. Requirements concerning
applications after final approval.
13

changes

in

original

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

Changes in an approved Class II Special Permit may be

permitted after application to the director of the department of
planning and zoning by the original applicant or successors in
interest. Upon receipt of such an application, the director of the
department of planning and zoning shall refer the application to
the zoning administrator, who shall determine whether such
changes are substantial changes, as defined in section 2215.1 of
this ordinance.
If the proposed changes are determined to be substantial,
the changes shall be treated as a proposed new application for
Class II Special Permit.
If the proposed changes are determined to be
nonsubstantial, the director of the department of planning and
zoning shall, upon receipt of a fee for "nonsubstantial
modification" of a Class II Special Permit, as specified in
chapter 62 of the Code of the City of Miami, be responsible for
review and approval, or denial, or approval with conditions of
the amendments.
Furthermore, Section 2215.1 states:
Sec. 2215. - Requirements concerning changes in original
applications after processing begins.
The following limitations and requirements apply where
changes are made in original applications for amendment after
processing begins:
2215.1. Substantial changes defined; changes prior to notice of
public hearing.
Substantial changes affect the essential part of the application,
not just the form of the application, as determined by the zoning
administrator and the Planning and Zoning Director. Such
determinations shall be made upon a request to review proposed
modifications to applications for variances, Special Exceptions,
14

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

Major Use Special Permits or zoning atlas amendments by persons

defined in Section 2202.1(e), using the following criteria:
(a) The requested change exceeds the zoning regulations;
(b) The footprint of the building is proposed to be moved by
more than ten (10) feet in any horizontal direction;
(c) The height of the building or any portion thereof is proposed
to be increased by more than five (5) feet or five (5) percent
of the height of the building, whichever is greater, in a
vertical direction; or
(d) The zoning administrator shall refer the proposed change to
the Director of the Planning and Zoning Department in order
to apply the applicable criteria as set forth in Section 1305,
where at such time the Planning and zoning Director shall
determine if the proposed changes result in substantially the
same project and are still in compliance with the findings in
the original application.
Once the criteria set forth in (a) through (d) above have been
applied, the Planning and Zoning Director shall make a written
determination as to whether the proposed modifications are
substantial or non-substantial. Based on this determination, the
application will be processed accordingly.
By mutual agreement between the director of the department
of planning, building and zoning and other affected parties,
substantial changes in original applications may be made prior to
publication of notice of hearing; provided that, where such
changes require major alteration of department of planning,
building and zoning reviews and recommendations already
prepared and based on the original application, a second
application fee shall be required.
Based upon the clear language of Section 1505, it applies only to changes after
final approval. There had not yet been a final approval as the appeals process
was still underway. Section 1801 states:

15

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

Sec. 1801. - Status of administrative decision; time limits on

appeal; filing of appeal.
Decisions of the zoning administrator or the director of the
department of planning, building and zoning shall be deemed
final, unless a notice of appeal is filed within not more than
fifteen (15) calendar days of the date such decision was rendered.
Such notice of appeal, specifying the grounds thereof, shall be
filed with an officer or agent designated by the city manager.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the application was not final; Section 1505 did not
apply.
Additionally, Sections 1505 and 2215.1 only apply where the change is
substantial. It certainly cannot be said that the change of the number of loading
berths from five to three was a substantial change; indeed the Planning Director
supported such changes at the hearing before the City Commission. The approval
of this singular change was supported by competent substantial evidence and as
such is outside the discretionary review of this Court.
Finally, Section 1305 states:
Sec. 1305. - Considerations generally; criteria; standards;
findings and determinations required.
The City agent, board, or commission that is charged with
decisions concerning each of the special permits shall review the
proposal before them and shall make, or cause to be made,
written findings and determinations in accordance with the
established applicable criteria set forth in this zoning ordinance
and the City Code. Such findings shall be used to approve,
approve with conditions, or deny the pending application.
16

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

Approvals shall be issued when such application complies

with all applicable criteria.
Conditional approvals, shall be issued when such
applications require conditions in order to be found in
compliance with all applicable criteria.
Denials of applications shall be issued if after conditions and
safeguards have been considered, the application still fails to
comply with all applicable criteria.
The purpose of factual findings is to enable the reviewing court to conduct an
effective review. With this purpose in mind, it is obvious that the content of the
Resolution of the Commission on remand was sufficient to enable the Court to
review the case (if the issue had been raised below which it was not) and complied
with Section 1305. It is clear from the hearing before the Commission that the
reasons for approval set forth previously remained effective; indeed the Petitioners
challenged the findings in their first Petition and the Circuit Court Appellate
Division affirmed on that point with a written opinion. The findings by the
Commission on the only point considered at the hearing were plainly adequate to
demonstrate that there was competent substantial evidence which was accepted by
the Commission to support the Project with three berths rather than five.
The Florida Supreme Court has indicated that insufficiency of findings does
not amount to a grievous injury for purposes of exercising second-tier review. In

17

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

Florida Parole Commn v. Taylor, 132 So. 3d 780 (Fla. 2014), the First District
granted second-tier certiorari, but the Supreme Court quashed:
In Taylor's case, the FPC concluded that revocation was
for the best interest of society and the Conditional Releasee.
Revocation of Conditional Release Order at 1. This statement
was arguably sufficient to meet the requirement of section
120.57(1)(l) that the FPC stat[e] with particularity its reasons
for rejecting the penalty recommended by the parole examiner.
But even if this statement was insufficiently particular, Taylor
has not shown that he has suffered a grievous injury. Taylor
admitted that he violated his conditional release by using
marijuana. As a result of that evidence of a willful and
substantial violation, the FPC undeniably had an adequate basis
to exercise its discretion to revoke Taylor's conditional release.
If the FPC's order did violate section 120.57(1)(l), the error
could have been remedied by providing an opportunity for the
FPC to supplement its order. Accordingly, the circuit court's
denial of his habeas petition did not result in a miscarriage of
justice.
Id. at 785-786 (emphasis added). Here, the findings were sufficiently particular in
light of the fact that the record was replete with competent substantial evidence in
support of three loading berths.
Accordingly, the Project and the Commissions decision complied with the
essential requirements of the law; thus, the Circuit Court Appellate Divisions
decision applied the correct law, afforded due process, and there was no
miscarriage of justice.

18

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the City of Miami respectfully requests that this
Court deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted:
VICTORIA MNDEZ, City Attorney
JOHN A. GRECO, Deputy City Attorney
Attorneys for City of Miami
444 S.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite 945
Miami, FL 33130-1910
Tel.: (305) 416-1800
Fax: (305) 416-1801
Primary Email: jgreco@miamigov.com
Secondary Email: slstubbs@miamigov.com

By:/s/ John A. Greco

John A. Greco, Deputy City Attorney
Florida Bar No. 991236

19

CITY OF MIAMIS RESPONSE

CASE NO.: 3D15-2208

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished to
those individuals listed below by e-mail this 19th day of October, 2015.
Joan Carlos Wizel, Esq.
E-mail: jcw@lydeckerdiaz.com
Mark A. Emanuele, Esq.
E-mail: mae@lydeckerdiaz.com
Richard Lydecker, Esq.
E-mail: rl@lydeckerdiaz.com
Manuel A. Diaz, Esq.
E-mail: manny@lydeckerdiaz.com
Attorneys for Respondent
Samuel J. Dubbin, Esq.
E-Mail: sdubbin@dubbinkravetz.com
Attorney for Petitioner

By:/s/ John A. Greco

John A. Greco, Deputy City Attorney
Florida Bar No. 991236

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing brief complies with all the
requirements set forth in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100.
By:/s/ John A. Greco
John A. Greco, Deputy City Attorney
Florida Bar No. 991236

20