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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HILARIO MACASLING, JR.

y COLOCADO
Facts: Macasling was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 6425. On or about the 20th day of
August 1988, in the City of Baguio, Macasling, not authorized by law, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sold, delivered, distributed and dispatched in transit or transport 50 of shabu, knowing
fully well that said shabu is a prohibited drug, in violation of the above-mentioned provision of law.
Evidence of record discloses that on 19 August 1988, at about 3:00 PM, Lt. Manuel Obrera, Chief of
the Narcotics and Intelligence Division, received a telephone call from the Chief of the Narcotics
Command. The latter sought the assistance of Lt. Obrera in the apprehension of appellant, who
according to the Narcom Chief, would be delivering shabu at Room No. 77 of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel
in Baguio City, on that same afternoon. Lt. Obrera quickly formed a team. There they were met by the
Narcom Chief who informed them that Macasling had previously agreed with a Chinese businessman
in Las Pinas, Metro Manila, that he would deliver about 250 grams of shabu at Room 77 of the Hyatt
Terraces Hotel.
Lt. Obrera and his companions waited inside Room No. 77, for appellant to show up. Appellant,
however, did not arrive that afternoon. He arrived at the Hyatt Terraces Hotel at about 1:00 o'clock in
the early morning of the following day, together with Editha Gagarin and a third person who was an
undercover Narcom agent. Lt. Obrera opened the door of Room No. 77 to let appellant and his party
in, upon noticing that the Narcom agent was combing his hair, which was pre-arranged signal
meaning that appellant had the shabu in his possession. When appellant and his party were inside
Room No. 77, Lt. Obrera and his companions identified themselves to appellant and asked him about
the shabu. Appellant handed over a small package with a wrapper marked "Happy Days" which, upon
being opened by arresting officers, was found to contain about 50 grams of crystalline
granules. Appellant and Editha Gagarin were brought to Camp Bado, Dangwa, where the fact of their
arrest was officially recorded. They were later transferred to the Baguio City Jail as detention
prisoners. The crystalline granules were forwarded to the INP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, for examination. The Forensic Chemist in charge of the examination subjected the
granules to 4 different tests, namely, the color test, the melting point test, the thin layer
chromatography test, and the spectro-infra red test. Tests showed the presence of metamphetamine
hydrochloride, the scientific name of the substance popularly called shabu.
Issue: 1) Whether or not the lower court erred in not holding that since the arresting officers were not
armed with a search warrant of arrest, the arrest and consequent confiscation of the package with a
wrapper marked 'Happy Days' containing 50 grams of shabu are illegal and unlawful, hence are
inadmissible in evidence.
2) Whether or not the lower court erred in not acquitting the accused on the ground that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him.
Ruling: RTC - sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment, to pay a fine and costs of litigation.
SC - Decision of the Regional Trial Court Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 5936-R is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto
Ration: 1) No. Arresting officers had been informed by the Chief of the Narcom Regional Office that a
transaction had been agreed upon by appellant in Las Pinas, Metro Manila, involving delivery
of shabu, which delivery was, to take place in Room No. 77 at the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio City.
Only appellant with Editha Gagarin and the undercover Narcom agent showed up at Room No. 77 at
the Hyatt Terraces Hotel and the Narcom undercover agent had signalled that appellant had with him
the shabu. The reception prepared by the arresting officers for appellant inside Room No. 77 was in
fact an entrapment operation. The sale of the shabu (understood as the meeting of the minds of
seller and buyer) did not, of course, take place in the presence of the arresting officers. The delivery
or attempted delivery of the subject matter did, however, take place in their presence.
The situation at hand is no different from a buy bust operation and is in fact part of a buy bust
operation. It must be stressed that the sale was transacted and closed in Las Pinas, Metro Manila by a
Chinese businessman but the delivery was directed to be made in Room 77, Hyatt Terraces, Baguio.
And instead of the Chinese businessman being inside Room 77 to receive the delivery, the Narcom
elements took his place to entrap the party that will deliver. The fact that the Narcom got to know
beforehand the delivery to be made thru their intelligence sources must be given credence by the
Court. Like any other organization fighting the crime on drugs, the Narcom must have intelligence
sources or it cannot perform its functions well and fulfill its mission.
To wait for the delivery, the Narcom elements deployed themselves inside Room 77 in place of the
Chinese businessman to entrap the party who will appear to deliver the shabu which they would be in

his possession thru a pre-arranged signal of their undercover agent. And ultimately their waiting paid
off as accused Hilario Macasling, Jr. appeared in Room 77 to deliver the shabu and from whom it was
taken by the Narcom. The lack of warrant of arrest is not fatal as this would be covered by the
situation provided for warrantless arrests under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court where an
offender is arrested while actually committing and offense or attempting to commit the offense in the
presence of a peace officer.
In the case at bar, accused Hilario Macasling, Jr., at the time of his arrest, was actually in the act of
committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the peace officers as he
appeared there in Room 77 to deliver 50 grams of shabu, a regulated drug, which was previously
bought but directed to be delivered thereat. We consider that under the total circumstances of this
case, the warrantless arrest of appellant inside Room No. 77 was merely the culmination of an
entrapment operation and that the taking of shabu from appellant was either done immediately
before, or was an incident of, a lawful arrest.
2) No. The acts with which he was charged are quite plainly set out in the operative portion of the
criminal information: that appellant "did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, distributed,
dispatch in transit or transport 50 grams of shabu, knowing fully well that said shabu [is] a prohibited
drug . . .". We agree with the trial court that the use of the term "prohibited drug" was merely a
conclusion of law, something which is for the Court to determine; in the circumstances of this case,
the inaccurate use of the term "prohibited drug" was also merely a falsa descriptio.
It can readily be seen that the subject matter of the offense, as recited in the body of the Information,
is the transport or sale or delivery of the 50 grams of shabu. This is the allegation of fact in respect to
the acts constituting the offense. This is the offense that would need to be proved. However, the
allegation that shabu is a prohibited drug is a conclusion of law. The prosecutor, who filed the
Inforamtion considered shabu a prohibited drug. Thus, the prosecutor designated the offense as a
violation of Section 21 (b) in relation to Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The
Court pointed this out as should shabu, which really is the street name of metamphetamine
hydrochloride be, in fact, a regulated drug, the the designation of the offense should have been
Violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 15, Article III of Republic Act 6425, as
amended. But note, despite the mistaken designation of the offense for as recited in the body of the
Information, what is charged is still the sale, transport or delivery of 50 grams of shabu. That is the
one important. Only the designation of the offense was a mistake from regulated drug to prohibited
drug which is a conclusion of law.
This would not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accuasation against him. As in fact, the accused is still informed of the offense charged, that is,
the unlawful, transport, sale or delivery of 50 grams of shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.REY FRANCIS YAP TONGSON @
REY, accused-appellant.
Facts: In the evening of May 21,1987, while the offended party was on her way home from the house
of Emerenciana Aberasturi at Malitbog, Southern Leyte, she was held by the accused and forcibly
dragged towards the sea. She shouted for help but to no avail.
Upon reaching the seashore, the accused held her hair and immersed her in the sea. The place of
immersion was knee-deep. Her whole body wet, she was dragged ashore by him. He then pushed her
and she fell down. While she was lying down, he gagged her with his T-shirt and then boxed her thrice
on her abdomen.
Thereafter, the accused removed her panty, inserted his fingers into her vagina, and after pulling
them out, had sexual intercourse with her. She tenaciously resisted the lustful designs of the accused
by moving her body, pushing him and even boxing him while he was sexually abusing her. Her efforts
at resistance, however, proved futile as he was much stronger than she.
After he had performed the act, he warned her not to divulge it or else he would kill her. The accused
then brought her towards the house of Tiu Tiam Su where he was then working.
When they reached near the house of Tiu Tiam Su alias Onjo, the accused told her to wait because he
would get a pump boat. She did not, however, wait for him. As soon as he was at a distance from the
house of Tiu Tiam Su, she ran towards the house of her aunt, Estela.
Upon arriving at Estela's house she called for the people upstairs. Estela responded to her call. They
met at the stairway. Estela asked her why she was wet and crying. She told Estela she (victim) was
raped by the laborer of Tiu Tiam Su. She then went up the house after telling Estela about the
incident.

Later that evening she was brought to the office of the Chief of Police, Guerillito Lura. There were
policemen and civilians (among them being the accused) in that office. When the Chief of Police
asked her who among those men raped her, she pointed to the accused. After identifying the accused
she went to the hospital for examination.
Issue: whether or not the court erred in giving much weight to the evidence of the prosecution
without considering that of the defense.
Held: the Supreme Court in the following cases took judicial notice that The alleged "public setting" of
the rape is not an indication of consent. For, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, rape may be
committed at a place where people congregate such as parks (People vs. Vidal, 127 SCRA 171), by
the roadside (People vs. Aragona, 138 SCRA 569), or on a passageway at noontime (People vs. Lopez,
141 SCRA 385). In the case of People vs. Barcelona, G.R. No. 82589, October 31, 1990, we took
judicial notice of the fact that a man overcome by perversity and beastly passion chooses neither
time, place, occasion, nor victim.
That no spermatozoa was present in the specimen that was taken from the vagina of the victim did
not disprove the rape. Presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial since it is penetration,
however slight, and not ejaculation that constitutes rape (People vs. Paringit, G.R. No. 83947,
September 13, 1990; People vs. Barro, Jr., G.R. No. 86385, August 2, 1990).
When a woman testifies that she was raped, she says all that is necessary to show its commission, for
no young and decent Filipino in this case only thirteen (13) years old would publicly admit
having been ravished unless it is the truth, for her natural instinct is to protect her honor (People vs.
Manago, G.R. No. 90669, November 21, 1990; People vs. Barcelona, G.R. No. 82589, October 31,
1990). The testimony of a rape victim is credible where no motive to testify against the accused is
shown except the desire to vindicate her honor (People vs. Lutanez, G.R. No. 78854, December 21,
1990; People vs. Fabro, G.R. No. 79673, November 15, 1990).
In any case, whether or not carnal knowledge is voluntary and free is a question of credibility (People
vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 72726, October 15, 1990). Since the witnesses to rape are often only the victim
and the offender, the trial judge's evaluation of the witnesses' credibility deserves utmost respect in
the absence of arbitrariness, considering the trial judge's advantage of observing the witnesses'
demeanor in court (People vs. Felipe, G.R. No. 90390, October 31, 1990.
Furthermore, the complainant was raped was established by the medical findings, to wit: "blood in
the vaginal orifice, first degree laceration of one inch or more at 6:00 o'clock position of the vaginal
orifice" (p. 61, Rollo). Dr. Leonardo Gimeno, the physician who examined the victim after the incident,
declared that the injury to her vaginal orifice was "caused by the forced entry into the vagina of a
man's penis" (p. 62, Rollo). The doctor's other findings support complainant's testimony that she was
raped on the seashore. Sand and grass were found in her vagina. The multiple abrasions and
contusions on the victim's lips, right face, lower back including both buttocks, left elbow, left thigh,
both knees, legs and feet, are mute testimonies giving credence to her claim that the appellant
dragged her on the shore and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her.
G.R. No. 82589 October 31, 1990
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.GIDEON
DEQUITO, defendant-appellant.

BARCELONA

(RULE 129)
FACTS:
Around 6:30 p.m. of November 7, 1985, Sylina Rodriguez, a sixteen-year old high scholl student of the
Roxas National Comprehensive High School in Roxas, Palawan, was walking on her way home. Upon
reaching a point in the diversion road near the Medicare Hospital of the new townsite, she looked
back and say a male person jogging. She continued walking The jogger overtook her and, upon doing
so, suddenly turned back and took hold of her hands and started pulling her towards the bushes. She
resisted and hit him with fist blows on his chest. As he was pulling her, he threatened to kill her by
making a motion to pull something from his back. He was finally able to pull her to the bushes.
In the bushes, he forcibly undressed her, removing both her skirt and panty. He also undressed and
forced her to lay down on her back. He then lay on top of her and began to kiss her cheeks and lips.
At this point, she was in tears. Then he inserted his organ into her private part. She immediately felt a
stab of pain. When he was finished he allowed her to dress up but warned her not to report the

incident to the police authorities. The victim then went home.


The following day, November 8, 1985, accompanied by her uncle and auntie, she reported the matter
to the police authoritie. Thereafter, she was brought to the Medicare Community Hospital where she
was examined.
Upon information from Hernando Cayaon that he saw accused-appellant, Gideon Barcelona jogging
near the diversion road in the late afternoon of November 7, 1985, the police authorities invited the
latter on November 9, 1985 for questioning (November 18, 1986, tsn, p. 3). Upon confrontation, the
victim positively Identified accused-appellant as the person who raped her (July 2, 1986, tsn, p. 14).
Thereafter, accused-appellant was placed under arrest. 4
The accused Gideon Barcelona, however, denied that he committed the crime imputed to him and
interposed the defense of alibi. The trial court summarized the evidence for the defense as follows:
The accused in his defense testified that he is presently 19 years old having been born on November
7, 1968. He was employed since October 1985 in the finishing outfit of Paning Paner and has their
base at Cabugan Island, Roxas, Palawan. Normally, they go to the Poblacion of Roxas every Saturday
to haul water and supplies. Sometime in the afternoon of November 9, 1985, he was fetched by P/Sgt.
Eriberto Castillo of Roxas Police Station and taken to the Municipal Building. In the said place he saw
Melchor Cayaon as well as his brothers and sisters. He alleged since complainant saw him, she did
not positively Identified him but entertained doubts as the person who raped her.
Supporting in part his testimony was the statement of Roger a detainee at the municipal jail of Roxas,
Palawan at the time who alleged that he saw suspect Melchor Cayaon in the early morning of 8
November, 1985. He stated that at about 8:00 A.M. of the same day when victim saw Melchor
Cayaon, the former identified the latter as the one who raped her. He further heard the complainant
describe that the person who raped her had curly hair. Suspect Melchor Cayaon had curly hair while
accused Gideon Barcelona had no curly hair.
In addition to this, witness Jose Lagrada testified that he was the companion of the accused at the
fishing outfit of Paning Paner. In brief, said witness testified that he knew accused Gideon Barcelona.
Both of them were employed in said fishing outfit about the latter part of October, 1985 and
continued uninterruptedly until his arrest on November 9, 1985. He stated that their schedule of
fishing is from 7:00 o'clock a.m. up to 1:00 o'clock p.m. He claimed that from the last week of October
1985 up to his arrest on November 9, 1985, accused Barcelona never went to the Poblacion of Roxas,
Palawan and continuously stayed at Cabugan Island. Despite prior knowledge that the latter was
arrested for rape, he never informed the Police Force of Roxas, Palawan or any person for that matter
about the stay of Barcelona in their place of work nor did he visited (sic) accused in jail despite his
close friendship with him.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the trial court erred in giving weight to the testimony of the complainant which is
allegedly materially inconsistent, contradictory and incredible
HELD:
There is no doubt that the complainant had been raped on 7 November 1985, in the manner testified
to by her and affirmed by the trial court. When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed, for no young and decent Filipino woman
would publicly admit that she has been criminally ravished unless that is the truth, for her natural
instinct is to protect her honor.
Besides, complainant's testimony is confirmed by the surrounding physical facts. Medical examination
of her genitalia in the morning following the attack showed that (1) there was a slight mucosal
inflammation of the labia majora; (2) hymenal laceration at 2:00 o'clock, 5:00 o'clock, and 9:00
o'clock; and (3) whitish mucosal vaginal discharge, scanty in amount noted. Dr. Feliciano Velasco,
medical officer of the Roxas Palawan Medicare Community Hospital, who examined the complainant,
opined that this was the first time she had sexual intercourse because the lacerations on the hymen
were fresh.
Moreover, the outrage was immediately reported to the police authorities after its commission,
removing any doubt that the complainant may have concocted her charge against the appellant.
The appellant contends, however, that the crime of Rape was not committed because no force or
intimidation was employed, i.e., no external injuries or bruises or scratches were found on the
complainant's body, despite her testimony that she was dragged to the bushes, and that the
complainant did not offer tenacious and spirited resistance to the assault on her.
The absence of physical injuries on the complainant's body does not, of itself, negate the

complainant's testimony that she was raped; nor does it make the complainant a willing partner in
the sex act. The victim need not kick, bite, hit, slap or scratch with her fingernails the offender to
successfully claim that she had been raped. It is enough that coition was undertaken against her will.
It is sufficient that the carnal knowledge was done after the woman yielded because of an authentic
apprehension of a real fear of immediate death or great bodily harm. In this case, there is evidence
that the offended girl yielded to the carnal desires of the appellant for fear that he might kill her
since, according to complainant, the appellant had threatened her with death and made menacing
gestures as if to draw a weapon. It is this same fear that must have prevented her from making an
outcry or reporting the outrage to her uncle.
As the Court had said in a case, "the force or violence required in rape cases is relative. When applied
it need not be too overpowering or irresistible. What is essential is that the force used is sufficient to
consummate the purpose which the offender had in mind, or to bring about the desired result. In
using force, it is not even necessary that the offender is armed with a weapon, as the use of a
weapon serves only to increase the penalty. Intimidation can be addressed to the mind as well. In
sum, the absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of the crime
of rape.
As to the identity of the perpetrator of the dastardly act, the complainant declared, and the trial court
agreed with her, that the appellant committed the crime. The complainant positively identified the
accused as the person who raped her and, as the trial court said, she had no doubt nor second
thought about her identification of the accused-appellant. Besides, it would appear that the
complainant had no ill motive to falsely against the appellant. In fact, the appellant was a complete
stranger to her and she did not know his name then; But, when they came face to face, the second
time, she readily pointed to the appellant as the person who ravished her. This court consistently held
that the testimony of a rape victim as to who abused her is credible where she has no motive to
testify falsely against the accused.
The appellant argues that the testimony of the complainant should not be given weight and credence
because it is allegedly inconsistent, contradictory and incredible in that: (1) on direct examination,
she declared that in trying to repel the advances of the appellant, she bit him on the left forearm,
whereas, on cross examination, she denied having stated that she bit the appellant; (2) on direct
examination, the complaint that she did not report the incident to her uncle because she was afraid
but, on cross examination, she stated that she reported the incident to her uncle who, in turn,
reported it to the police; and (3) on direct examination, the complainant testified that the sexual act
took about twenty (20) minutes and that she felt pain, but that she felt no ejaculation, while on cross
examination, she stated that there was ejaculation inside her vagina.
These alleged contradictory statements are not fatal as they refer to relatively minor details, and they
are to be expected from uncoached witnesses. They do not affect, nor can they prevail over
the positive identification of the appellant as the rapist. As repeatedly held by the Court, the
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses which refer to minor
details do not impair the probative value of their testimony.
The insinuation of the appellant that he could not have raped the complainant on 7 November 1985
because it was his birthday is, definitely, without basis for a man overcome by perversity and beastly
passion chooses neither time, place, occasion, nor victim.
There being no error committed in the judgment appealed from, the same should be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs.
SO ORDERED.
GENARO GOI, etc. Petitioners-Appellants, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR
VICENTE, Respondents-Appellees. [G.R. No. L-27434. September 23, 1986.]
FACTS OF THE CASE: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Court of Appeals. The three (3)
haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria were originally owned by the
Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas [TABACALERA]. Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T.
Villanueva negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. As he did not have
sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda
Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Private respondent
Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA.
Villanueva further contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda
Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00. Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit
from his account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the purchase price.

However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase price, only
the latter amount was debited from private respondents account. The difference was supposedly
paid by private respondent to Villanueva, but as no receipt evidencing such payment was
presented.On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three
haciendas in favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were
thereafter registered in the name of Villanueva. Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to
private respondent Vicente.On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were
instituted, among the properties included in the inventory submitted to the court were fields nos. 3, 4
and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. Private respondent Vicente instituted an action for
recovery of property and damages. He sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de
Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes
Villanueva in his favor on October 24, 1949.
the trial court rendered a decision ordering therein defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field
no 3, to execute a formal deed of sale covering fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente. CA affirmed
lower Court.ISSUE: May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of
Praxedes T. Villanueva, which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate, in violation of Rule 130,
sec. 20 par. (a) ?
RULING: YES. The object and purpose of Rule 130, Sec. 20 par. (a) (commonly known as the
SURVIVORSHIP DISQUALIFICATION RULE or DEAD MAN STATUTE) is to guard against the temptation to
give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and
further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving
testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the
party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the
possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.The case at bar, although instituted against the
heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to them, remains
within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the
"representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedents right by
descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they
are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the
deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been
interested to establish, if living.
HOWEVER, the protection under the Rules, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners crossexamined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiffs deposition is taken by the
representatives of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to
matters occurring during deceaseds lifetime." It must further be observed that petitioners presented
a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was
in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the
counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 13 and 14. Evidently, as defendant in the
counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death
of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate of
representatives of the estate/deceased person.Under the great majority of statutes, the adverse party
is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person
which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and
competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions
or communications which were had with the agent. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided
by Section 20 (a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either
confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the formers lips,
does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goni could and did not negate
the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said
contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goni testified that the same was subsequently novated into a
verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
[G.R. No. 30472. January 20, 1930. ]
MARIANO MARALIT AND EMETERIO LOTA, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. REYNALDO LARDIZABAL,
as judicial administrator of the estate of Germana Solis, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts:
On February 15, 1920, the deceased Germana Solis hired the plaintiffs to repair her house in Lipa,

Batangas, for the sum of P14,000. Plaintiffs alleged that they have performed the work, but have only
received P11,550 from Solis. They also allege that they performed additional work not included in the
contract. They pray that the defendant, who is the judicial administrator of the intestate estate of
Solis, be ordered to pay them the remainder of the price stipulated in the contract, the value of the
additional work done, and damages, which they allege they sustained by reason of the contract.
In turn, the defendant filed a cross-complaint for the foreclosure of the mortgage given by Maralit,
to secure the fulfillment of his obligations under the contract, and a counterclaim for the value of the
materials and labor engaged by defendant on account of the plaintiffs having abandoned the work,
and for damages caused by the delay in the completion thereof.
The lower court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the remaining balance plus the legal
interest. The court likewise absolved the defendant from all causes of action and the plaintiffs from
the counterclaim and the cross-claim. Both parties appealed the decision.

Issue: Whether the lower court erred in refusing to admit the testimony of plaintiff Mariano Maralit to
prove that the deceased Germana Solis, in the course of the work, ordered some additional repairs to
be made not included in the contract
Held:
The Court ruled that that the refusal of the lower court to admit the testimony of Maralit is with
merit.
This decision is based on section 383, paragraph 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides
that parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or
proceeding is prosecuted against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, cannot testify as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.
It was alleged that this provision is inapplicable because Solis died only after the complaint had
been filed against her. But the law does not state that it only refers to cases where the deceased died
before the action was instituted. Moreover, the purpose of the prohibition, which is to discourage
perjury may be applied where the deceased died either before or after the filing of the suit against
her, if, when the testimony is given, she is already dead and cannot disprove it.