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It has sometimes been suggested that Construction Grammar is nothing more than the
study of idioms. There are two possible reasons for this, one being that it's true - true
in the sense that from our point of view, idioms are the irreducible units of description
for the way a language works, and these are precisely the individual morphemes of
the language (together with their combinatorics), and the constructions which license
combinations of linguistic units into larger units, including, of course, those which
require reference to one or more lexical items. In that sense, of course, almost every
grammatical model is a theory of idioms, since the job is to isolate those principles
which are in themselve irreducible, that is, which are not explained by other principles
in the same language.

But if the charge is framed with the phrase "nothing but", it is intended to be
trivializing. We might be thought of as interested in the careful study of idiomatic
runs like "trip the light fantastic" or "kick the bucket", ignoring such global
organizing principles as complementation patterns, long-distance dependencies, voice
alternations, and the like. But in that sense, the charge is false.

Such an opinion might be based on the fact that in my own career, there was a period,
especially in the early seventies, when I was convinced that almost everything that
people produced in everyday talk consisted of assemblies of pre-fabricated sentence-
structuring or discourse-structuring phrases, and that the role played by extremely
general processes had been hugely exaggerated. [references] But actually studying
what is idiomatic in a given language is the other side of the coin of studying what is
general in that language. The right way to study a so-called idiom is to discover
exactly what there is about the expressions that exemplify it that needs to be learned
by linguistic convention, and in order to discover that, one needs a theory of what is
regular or general in the language. What to the lay person is usually thought of as an
"idiom" can be understood by considering the organization of information in a
constructicon [glossary entry] [reference to Jurafsky], the inventory of all of the
constructions in the language, together with a specification of the inheritance links
connecting them.

In this constructicon, one will find a number of very simple constructions which are
only bound [glossary entry], that is, which are inherited by lots of other constructions,
but which do not themselves inherit any higher-level constructions. One of these
might be a very general construction for English that requires that a lexical head
precedes all of its complements. Thus, in English, verbs precede their complements in
a phrasal VP ("showed the pictures to the sheriff"), prepositions precede their objects
("among the stars"), nouns precede their complements ("top of the hill"), adjectives
precede their complements ("afraid of cats"), etc. Such highest-level constructions can
be thought of as characterizing the typological nature of the language in question.
Other constructions are not at that highest level, but are broadly necessary for
accomplishing such things as providing specifiers, modifiers or complements for their
heads, combining two constructs [glossary entry] of the same level and type into a
larger construct of the same type, establishing coinstantiation [glossary entry],
licensing [glossary entry] the grammatical realization of semantic arguments, etc., and
these will correspond more or less to what people are thinking of when they speak of
the core [glossary entry] properties of the language.

A very large number of constructions identify single lexical items, together with their
semantic features and their combinatorial requirements. These include, of course, the
ordinary lexical constructions. But some are more complicated than that, perhaps
specifying one or more lexical constituents, contributing meanings that go beyond
simple modification and complementation and argument realization, and so on. These
could be referred to as the peripheral [glossary entry] constructions, if they are mainly
syntactic in nature; and if they contain more than one lexical specification, they would
correspond more or less to the kinds of expressions typically known as idioms - the
kinds of expressions collected in idiom dictionaries.

It is probably obvious that these four or five categories of constructions can't

meaningfully be sorted into separate boxes, because no matter where we put the
boundaries, there are going to be unclear cases.

Negative definition of idioms.

We need to distinguish what it is that speakers of a language have to know outright

from what it is that they have to be able to figure out on the basis of the other things
that they know. Given such a distinction, we can give a kind of backwards definition
of idiom. An expression is an idiom, if there are things that speakers know about its
form, its meaning, or its use, which they wouldn't be able to figure out by simply
knowing everything else about the language. By this definition, of course, we include
the typical examples for which it is clearly possible to speak of the "arbitrariness" of
the linguistic sign. [reference] We don't understand what the word "cat" means by
computing its meaning from information about its shape or parts: that's something we
just have to know, by linguistic convention. (A cooperative interpretation of this
"backwards definition" will have to allow that for these purposes I don't include in
knowing "everything else" about English the knowledge of the meaning of "cat food",
"cat fur", "cat's claws" and the like.)

Now when we say that something like "You're pulling my leg" is an idiomatic
construct, we have to recognize that there is much about such expressions that is not
idiomatic. It has the form of an ordinary transitive active sentence. But that's not a
separately "stored" property of the idiom;a passive form is equally possible. ("I think
my leg is being pulled.") The possessor of "leg" is "my", but that particular word is
not a part of the idiom: any possessive form is possible in this situation ("his leg", "the
man's leg"). We might end up saying that the construction is reducible to a valence
description involving the verb "pull", the requirement that the non-subject member of
its valence set be headed by the noun "leg", and that its specifier be a possessive NP.
Ordinarily the possessor will not be co-construed with the agent of the verb, but that
might be a simple consequence of the verb's meaning and perhaps does not need to be
stored as a property of the idiom. The idiom's meaning also has to be specified, and
that will involve something about an agent playfully trying to get somebody (the
individual associated with the "possessor" expression) to believe something that is not
true, or to act in a way that is not in his or her best interests.

Some Basic Concepts

Encoding versus Decoding. We speak of encoding as the process by which speakers

who have something to say choose the linguistic forms needed to express it; decoding
is the process by which interpreters make sense of linguistic expressions they are
exposed to. There can be both decoding and encoding idioms [Makkai reference]: an
idiom of encoding is an expression which a speaker would not realize is a
conventional way of saying what it means, without knowing that fact; an idiom of
decoding is an expression whose interpretation could not be figured out by someone
using only independently learned linguistic conventions. By these definitions, of
course, every idiom is an encoding idiom; but we may allow ourselves, when
speaking to people inclined to be cooperative, to use the termencoding idiom to refer
to idioms that are not decoding idioms, i.e., to idioms which have transparent
meanings. When speaking with people who demand more care, we will refer to these
as encoding idioms which are not decoding idioms.

(A qualification may be needed here. In saying that the hearer would not be able to
"figure out" what the expression means "by already known linguistic conventions" I
intend to exclude such cases as figuring out what something means by its being
situated in a meaningful context. Most of the vocabulary learning we accomplish
during our lives takes place by contexted abductive reasoning: if I drop something
that I haven't learned the name of and you say, "You dropped your comb", I will
instantly know what "comb" means. [necessary to say the usual thing about gavagai?]
Similarly, if you've been treating me in a certain unpleasant way for some time, and
then, when you see how upset I'm becoming, you say something like, "Don't take it so
seriously. We're just pulling your leg!", that might allow me to learn the idiom on one
trial as well. We can think of these as examples of the occasions in which we acquire
the linguistic conventions.)

"You're pulling my leg" is an example of a decoding idiom; something like "Let me

be the first to congratulate you" is an example of an encoding idiom. (More carefully:
an encoding idiom which is not a decoding idiom.) Interestingly, the adjective
"idiomatic" is ambiguous according to whether the encoding or the decoding
"direction" is intended. That is, if I say that Igor's English is not idiomatic, I might
mean that he does not express himself in ways that an ordinary English-speaking
native speaker would, that is, that he hasn't mastered the language community's most
common or popular encoding idioms, the usual ways of saying things. But if I say that
he doesn't understand much of what we say because he hasn't learned many idiomatic
expressions, I would mean that there are lots of decoding idioms that he doesn't know.

The alternatives to idiomaticity include such explanatory principles as

compositionality, pragmatic reasoning, and the anchoring of pragmatic indices. In
considering the "backwards" definition of idiomaticity, we notice that somebody
associates a meaning with a phrase that does not simply fall out from the meanings of
the words themselves. Before we can decide what part of this might be idiomatic, we
have to consider the alternatives.
Compositionality. Compositionality is the name given to the predictable relation
between (I) the meaning of an expression and (2) the meanings of its parts, together
with the ways in which those parts are grammatically organized. We can know by
compositional principles what "blue box" means, simply by knowing the meaning of
the adjective "blue" and the meaning of the noun "box" and by knowing the semantic
force of the adjective + noun modification construction which this phrase is a
construct of. [note about why this is an oversimplification?] In such cases we can say
that the meaning of the phrase is a function of the meanings of its parts. Nobody has
to "learn" separately the meaning of the phrase "blue box." The noun compound
"greenhouse" is different. Knowing the meaning of the adjective and the noun, and
knowing the familiar pattern by which adjectives can join nouns in a compounding
process, does not alone prepare one for the knowledge that this is the name given to
structures within which plant growth is facilitated or hastened.

The reason we need an understanding of compositionality in discussing idiomaticity is

that some arguments against the treatment of an idiom as an idiom take the position
that we are dealing merely with polysemy. Thus, if one of the meanings of "spill" is
'divulge', and one of the meanings of "beans" is 'secrets', then "spill the beans" is not
an idiom: it is the compositional product of special meanings of each of the words.

Pragmatic Reasoning. In the case of sentential idioms, it is important to distinguish

between the conventional meaning that a construct built on them might have and the
kind of reasoning that is involved in cooperative conversational interaction. If a
mother says, "I wonder who could have left their dirty socks on the middle of the
floor", she probably expects her intended addressee to take this as a sarcastic request
to pick the socks up and put them where they belong. A lot has been written about the
mechanisms for this kind of reasoning; one reasonable view is that the mother expects
what she says to be taken as the first part of a potentially continuable conversation
that, given the relationships that hold between speaker and hearer, is going to lead to a
specific conclusion; the cooperative child can anticipate this path and act on the
inference without requiring the whole conversation to be played out. [references]

But now consider certain negative "why" questions, in particular, questions such as
those exhibited here:

• "Why don't you try again tomorrow?"

• "Why don't you just memorize your Social Security Number?
• "Why don't you visit me some time?"
• "Why don't you be the leader?"

An attempted pragmatic reasoning explanation for these sentences might follow some
such train as train as this: if someone asks me to explain a state of affairs that I am
involved in, it might be that she thinks there's something wrong about that state of
affairs, and making that inference might lead me to doing something to change it.
Such reasoning will perform quite well with certain kinds of questions, but I will
claim that it doesn't work in the case of these sentences.

If I say to you, "Why aren't you wearing your shoes?", your natural inclination might
be to think that I find this situation questionable and I am suggesting you should put
your shoes on. Such an inference, however, does not depend on the question being
negative in form: it would be called on just as well if my question had been "Why are
you going barefoot?".

The argument that the first group of negative "why" questions make up a special
construction, even though constructs built on it closely resemble ordinary questions,
includes the following points:

(1) "Real" questions with "why" can generally be paraphrased as something like
"situation S exists; explain that". Thus, "You are not wearing shoes; explain yourself."
The "why" questions that are taken as suggestions cannot. "Why don't you be the
leader?", for example, cannot be paraphrased as "You don't be the leader; explain!".

(2) Instances of the construction can use "do" with "be", true also of imperatives
(obligatory, in the negative "don't be obtuse" and optional in the affirmative, as in the
gushy "do be careful"). Notice the difference in interpretation between "Why aren't
you the leader?" and "Why don't you be the leader?". The first of these does permit
the two-part paraphrase. ("you aren't the leader; tell me why").

(3) "Real"negative "why" questions are generally negative polarity contexts

[references]; negative-why-question suggestions are not. In the following two
sentences, notice the difference between the suggestion, with "something", and the
ordinary question, with "anything.

• "Why don't you try something new?"

• "Why don't you (ever) try anything new?".

Our conclusion, using the preceding observations and a few others, will have to be
that there exists in English a way of expressing suggestions that has the form of a
negative "why" question and has some of the internal trappings - the full story is a bit
complicated - of a positive suggestion.

Anchoring of Pragmatic Indices. Other contextual effects are tied to linguistic

conventions, but are separate and not tied to specific phrasal idioms. Here I refer to
the fact that deictic [references to deixis literature?] references, of time, place, and
person, generally need to be interpreted by appealing to such features of context as
who is talking, where the conversation is taking place, where the interlocutors are
located, what has become topical in the immediately preceding discourse, etc. In
general, the nature of this particular sort of appeals to context does not figure in
disputes about whether some expression is idiomatic or not, so nothing more will be
said about it here.

More Needed Concepts.

Productivity.. A grammatical process or pattern or rule (or "construction") can be

said to be productive if the conditions of its applicability do not require the listing of
exceptions. Actually, productivity is a notion of degree. All grammatical
constructions have some constraints on their applicability, but the extent to which
those constraints can themselves be formulated in general ways is the extent to which
we can say that the construction is productive. Some constructions only work with
monosyllabic words; some only with certain grammatical categories. But they are
general to the extent that such non-lexical constraints involve general (boolean)
conditions involving properties shared by classes of lexical items, rather than lists of
specific words.

A common test of productivity is that if a new word is added to the language which
meets whatever semantic of formal conditions might be imposed on the construction,
speakers have no trouble using the construction with the new word. In English the
deadjectival nominalization construction that provides a "-th" suffix is not productive
("truth", "width"): the one that adds "-ness" is ("kindness", "friendliness"). Or at least
relatively so. The theoretical point of the use of the notions blocking and pre-emption
[see below] can be seen as a way of preserving (the appearance of) productivity, since
having a theory of blocking reduces the need to mention exceptions in the description
of individual constructions.

"Coining". We can distinguish two kinds of "creativity" in language. In one case

there is the ability of speakers, using existing resources in the language, to produce
and understand novel expressions. In the other case, the one for which we use the
term coining, a speaker uses existing patterns in the language for creating new

In many cases there are clearly unproductive patterns which can nevertheless be
exploited in the creation of new words. We distinguish coining from productivity in
word formation by saying that coining requires the recognition of a historical act in
which someone created the new word and assigned it a meaning. The two words
"benign" and "malignant" form a simple contrast set within a semantic frame having
to do with types of tumors. Not *benignant or *malign. But I recently heard
somebody introduce (I've forgotten the context) the word "benignant". If this word
catches on, that won't be evidence that the particular word-formational process was,
after all, productive, but will just show that the creator of the word made use of an
existing pattern for creating a new word. The special meaning assigned to that new
word was not predictable from its pieces. The word was "coined" and not "generated".

There is a view of grammar according to which the grammar proper will identify only
the productive processes. Since the ability to create new words, using non-productive
processes, is clearly a linguistic ability, it is my opinion that a grammar of a language
needs to identify constructions that exist for "coining" purposes as well. Technically,
the coining constructions will simply be thought of as bound constructions,
constructions that are "bound" to - inherited by - particular complex words. They will
serve to motivated and represent the substructure of morphologically complex words
and some idiomatic phrases. But they are also available for the coining of new words.

Motivation. We very frequently find that words and phrases that are idiomatic, by our
definition, nevertheless have components that are related, sometimes in quite explicit
and easily statable ways, to the meanings of their parts. This is true perhaps for most
morphologically complex words, and most conventional nominal compounds. Thus,
there are good reasons why a device used for certain purposes in the classroom is
called a pointer, and good reasons why a hunting dog that has been bred for certain
behavioral characteristics might also be called a pointer; but those reasons are not
sufficient to enable a speaker of the language to know that the word has just those
Some words are motivated by the semantics of one or more of their constituents; we
can speak of semantic motivation. Some words are motivated by certain features of
their sound: clap, slap, rap, tap, flap, for example; here we can speak of phonological
motivation. Many idiomatic phrases appeal to our recognition of underlying
symbolisms. "My hat's off to you" alludes to a gesture which has a particular social
meaning, even in a time when nobody wears hats. Here we are dealing with a special
kind of symbolic motivation.

Pre-emption a.k.a. Blocking. Pre-emption is the name given to a state of affairs in

which a ready- made expression fills a semantic gap which might have been filled by
a productive process, but where the productive competitor is ungrammatical.
Curiosity is said to block or pre-empt "curiousness", "suspicion" to block
"suspiciousness". [References to blocking: Ted Briscoe, etc.] (We might notice that it
would not be quite true to say that the morphological combinations "curiousness" and
"suspiciousness" are simply prevented from occurring. Here one needs to pay
attention to subtle matters of meaning. The adjective "curious" can refer to a property
of a person (or other sentient being), or it can refer to a property of something
observed by a person. Thus, I can say either "I was curious about the details of that
situation" or "That situation is quite curious". Similarly, "suspicious" can refer to a
property of an experiencer or to a property of some phenomenon or behavior. Thus, I
can say either, "I was suspicious about your behavior" or "I found your behavior quite
suspicious". The productive formation in "-ness" is in fact possible with the latter of
these two senses, allowing such phrases as "the curiousness of my situation" or "the
suspiciousness of his behavior".)

Discussions of pre-emption are often limited to matters of word-formation; but there

are fixed phrases that are also involved in pre-emption. Consider, for example, the
(semi-)regular ways of describing calendric units of time that contain the moment of
speaking. With the units week, month, and year, we find such expressions as these:

(the) X before last, last X, this X, next X, (the) X after next

You will see that X can be replaced by any of the three words "week", "month", and
"year". But the word "day" cannot be fitted into these formulas. (There is, of course, a
kind of ceremonial use of the phrase "this day".) Instead, we use the following special

the day before yesterday, yesterday, today, tomorrow, the day after tomorrow

These are not merely alternative ways of saying what they say, but they pre-empt the
more regular means of expression. *"Last day" or *"day after next" are not English.

The layering of pre-emption in this semantic domain continues. The general ways of
identifying portions of a day follow three patterns:

(1) "the DAYPORTION of DAYNAME", if the DAYNAME is expressed as a date or

as a phrase with a definite article. Notice: "the morning of December 14th", "the
afternoon of the day the baby was born", etc. This pattern applies to the day-names
that are two away from "today": "the evening of the day before yesterday", "the
afternoon of the day after tomorrow".
(2) "DAYNAME DAYPORTION", if the DAYNAME is expressed as a single word:
"Christmas morning", "Thursday evening", but also "yesterday afternoon" and
"tomorrow morning".

But in the case of day-portions of the day containing the moment of speaking, there is
a new pattern: "this morning" (instead of *"today morning"), "this afternoon" (instead
of *"today afternoon"), and "this evening" (instead of *"today evening"). However,
this particular subregularity is itself pre-empted by "tonight" (in place of *"today
night") and "last night" (in place of *"yesterday night").

In short, there can be layerings of pre-emption, where a productive pattern A is pre-

empted by a semi-productive pattern B, but that pattern itself is pre-empted by a third
pattern, C.

Associations among Form, Meaning, and Use

For making certain observations about idioms, we can distinguish "form"

(morphosyntactic form) from "meaning" and both of these from "use", even though
the exact discrimination between the last two is not always straightforward. In this
section we distinguish the ways in which conventions of language can involve
different constellations of these three.

"Extragrammatical" Form. Sometimes even the form itself is not predictable from
the grammar. Phrasal idioms of this sort are what are called in the
Fillmore/Kay/O'Connor article extragrammatical idioms [reference]. Examples: "by
and large" "first off", "all of a sudden". The interpreter could not even know, without
learning them separately, that these expressions are sayable in English. The grammar
of English has no mechanism for conjoing a preposition ("by") with an adjective

Form-Meaning conventionalities. The meanings of monomorphemic words are the

clearest and most numerous examples of special conventions linking form with
meaning. Nothing will help you figure out what "butter" means from its form. The
word "butterfly" differs in that it is motivated in ways that mirror its morphological
structure; its head component makes it, perhaps, easy to remember: but one couldn't
know what kind of creature the word designates from the name alone.

Meaning-Use conventionalities. For idioms that directly map forms with uses, their
histories might be of the following sort. Let us suppose there was a time when it was
conventional to express to someone about to embark on a journey one's wish that God
accompany them. And let's suppose that this convention governed the relation
between the occasion and the meaning of the wish, so that the greeting could be
expressed in a number of ways. ("May God go with you", "Travel with God", "May
God be your travelling companion", "Take God with you", "Go with God", etc.). At
this stage what we have is a convention relating an occasion with a meaning.

Then let us suppose that after a number of decades there came to be a single preferred
expression that carried that function: "May God be with you". At this point (1) a given
form (2) expresses a given meaning, and (3) is used in a given social situation. The
convention connects a meaning, a form, and a use.
Then let us suppose that a period of phonetic erosion takes place and this automatic
expression comes to sound like "Goodbye". When this has happened, there is a
conventional pairing of the form with the use, but the form no longer has anything to
do with what the phrase is supposed to mean, and the users have no consciousness of
its history. In a sense, it doesn't, strictly speaking, mean anything. Here we could say
that the form is directly associated with the use, without any intervening semantics.
[Jerry Morgan reference]

Form-Use conventionalities. With this last example, we can see how there can be
conventions in which the form is associated with a use, even if nobody knows what
the form means. In most people's use, this is certainly true of certain politeness
formulas in English, such as "How do you do?", "You're welcome", and so on.

The lack of a semantics that independently motivates the automatisms in our language
can be best understood by noticing occasions in which speakers of English have
mislearned idioms. Perhaps the speakers have mislearned the idioms by assigning
them some minimal sort of meaning, but it is at least clear that it is not its
conventional meaning that gives speakers a reason for using the expression. Such
mistakes as "for all intensive purposes" for "for all intents and purposes", "a nominal
egg" for "an arm and a leg" ("it'll cost you a nominal egg") [Morgan?], "by in large"
for "by and large", etc. [Kay's collection?]

Form-Meaning-Use conventionalities. A very large number of formulaic

expressions used in conversation, used in organizing a discourse, used in ceremonial
occasions, etc., are of the type where there are special conventions linking a form with
a meaning and these with occasions of use. There will probably be lots of occasions
for discussing these later on in the course.

Classifying Idioms

Idioms can be classified by a large number of criteria.

Category and Level. First, we might wish to group them according to their category
and level. Lexical idioms (ignoring monomorphemic lexical items) can be nouns
("pointer", "cranberry"), verbs ("subvent", "react"), adjectives ("uncanny", "holistic"),
for example. Phrasal idioms can be adjectival ("stark raving mad"). nominal ("notary
public"), verbal ("come a cropper"), prepositional ("in a brown study"), or sentential
("it takes one to know one").

Function. For the idioms that are not syntactically dependent on other elements, we
could classify them according to their function. Some formulaic expresses accompany
acts ("upsy daisy", "this hurts me more than it hurts you"), some accomplish acts ("I
declare the meeting adjourned"), some are comments on the ongoing discourse ("I
wouldn't touch that with a ten-foot pole"), some are parentheticals, qualifying what is
being said ("you might say"), and so on.

Sentence Type. Sentential idioms can be classified according to the sentence type.
Some are imperatives ("knock on wood", "shut up"), some are conditionals ("if the
shoe fits, wear it"), some are questions ("who knows?", "can the leopard change its
spots?"), and some use certain special constructions ("the more the merrier", "the
bigger they come, the harder they fall").

Gaps. Many idioms are not complete "runs" but have gaps in them. Some such gaps
are complete sentences ("it's (about) time [you brushed your teeth]", where the
sentence has to be in past tense form), some are verb phrases ("I wouldn't [marry
Louise] for all the tea in China"), some are noun phrases ("play second fiddle to
[Harry]"). Possessive gaps can be coreferential to the subject, in the case of verbal
idioms ("to blow [one's] nose"), or referentially distinct ("to pull [someone's] leg"),
and some can go either way ("to cook [(some)one's] goose").

Collocations. Collocations are phrase made up of two or more words, in some

grammatical relation to each other, where it appears that one or both of the words is
has some special conventional association with the other. In some cases, one of the
word only, or almost only, occurs in the phrase in question (the "blithering" of
"blithering idiot", the "aspersions" of "cast aspersions"), sometimes each word occurs
frequently elsewhere but the combination has a special sense or a special frequency of
occurrence ("spontaneous combustion", "manual labor", "consenting adult"), and so

In many cases a dependent or modifying word fulfills a necessary function in respect

to the other word, such as that of intensifying: "broad daylight", "dark red", "fancy
footwork", "vast majority", etc. [reference to Mel'cuk?]

The Ethnography of Formulaic Speech

Cultures differ greatly in respect to their attitudes toward ready-made speech. In

certain cultures - Japan or Turkey, say - knowing "the right thing to say" for a given
occasion is extremely important. Although in everyday small-talk, and in ceremonial
speech in American life, we depend a great deal on ready- made expressions, there is
a general attitude here that when it is important to say something, one should use
language that directly expresses what is on one's heart, rather than to recite well-worn
ready-made expressions.

It's as if the members of some cultures would say, "Why do you display your own
linguistic cleverness at a time like this? Everybody knows what you're supposed to
say, and by doing what you've just done, you've drawn attention to yourself!";
whereas other cultures would say, "How thoughtless of you just to recite phrases that
you've memorized; at a time like this you, as an individual, should say what's on your
heart!". In short, having lots of ready-made things to depend on can be thought of as a
"groove", making your conversational life easier, or as a "rut", blocking your freedom
of expression, getting you stuck in routines that don't fit your special occasion.

In any case, making use of ready-made expressions creates a sense of group

solidarity, since each member of a language community can depend on the others to
pick up allusions, to recognize familiar ways of thinking, and so on.

How does one study idioms?

Obviously the first thing to discover is just which part of the expressions you think of
as instances of an idiom belong to the idiom, as opposed to those that belong to the
"rest of the grammar". This topic is taken up in great detail in the Kay & Fillmore
paper, "What's X doing Y?".

Suppose you are thinking of the collocation "ripe old age". One question to ask is
where does this idiom end? In the initial set of examples you've seen, it always had
the indefinite article in it ("he lived to a ripe old age") so that might appear to be a
part of it; but then you find a new example "at the old age of 83" or the like. At first
you might notice that most of the expressions contain the word "live" ("live to a ripe
old age"), but then you find "attained a ripe old age" or "died at the ripe old age of
95". Should such information be brought in to the description, or will that fall out
from the meaning of the expression? All of these are issues that need to be taken up in
determining the nature of an idiomatic expression.

Or suppose you've been looking at the phrase "full well". Here you might end up
deciding that the full idiom is "know full well", since there doesn't seem to be much
variability in the use of this adverbial expression. Then you might think that "by
heart" is another of these, since "know by heart" is a common phrase; but then you'll
notice other expressions like "learn by heart", "recite by heart", "play by heart", etc.,
and you will think of "by heart" as the full extent of the idiom, while wanting to
describe its semantics in such a way that it will turn out to be a common companion
of the larger class of expressions in which it is found.

For expressions with gaps, it is important to study the degree of flexibility of the
expressions that can fill that gap. Sometimes this will result in a description of a
family of related idioms, rather than simply an idiom with a free gap. For the idiom
"cut a figure" there is a favorite expansion "cut a fine figure", but other possibilities
also exist, such as "not cut much of a figure".

It sometimes takes a lot of work to figure out just what the idiom means. In the case
of "spic and span", one might first propose that it means "very clean" or "completely
clean" or the like. But then you may notice that it seems to be applicable mainly to
shiny things in a kitchen. One would never say, "when we got the drapes back from
the dry cleaners, they were spic and span". Or "I want your hands spic and span when
you come to the dinner table". Should the final description identify "selectional
restrictions", specifying the kinds of nouns that can occur as the subject of "spic and
span" as a predicate, or should it be explained that this expression seems to be
dedicated to talk about certain kinds of smooth metal and glass surfaces of the sort
found in kitchens and bathrooms? These questions are sometimes difficult to answer.

Here are some idiomatic expressions to play with in carrying out such inquiries. In
some cases I have added comments on what is special about them.

lift a finger (requires negative polarity context)

deader than a doornail (fixed phrase with "doornail" also found in "as dead as a
doornail; but "deader" is an irregular comparative)

what, Jim get married? (incredulity response construction [references] )

now watch me drop it (tempting fate construction)

it's about time we did something about this (embedded sentence has to be in past

look what the cat dragged in (not "look at")

the thing is is (the "double IS construction" [references])

the bigger the better [references}

how big of a box (*how big boxes do you need? *how hot soup do you like?)

let alone [Fillmore, Kay & O'Connor reference]

number words (nine+ty seven; cf. Fr.quatre-ving dix-sept = four-twenty ten-seven)

time-telling formulas (quarter past seven; sechs Minuten vor dreiviertelsechs = six
minutes before three-quarters six [5:39])

cousin terminology (third cousin twice removed [Kay reference])

money value (UK: two pounds fifteen, US: *two dollars fifteen)

a philosopher's philosopher

coffee coffee ("instant coffee or coffee coffee?")

my every wish ("fulfills my every wish", "my every dream came true", *"my every
son became a doctor")

day in and day out ("week in and week out", *"week in and day out")

boys will be boys ("war is war" [Wierzbicka reference]

tag questions ("that was fun, wasn't it?" - polarity reversing; "you did your homework,
did you?" - polarity preserving)

snow is to white as blood is to red

what a fool I've been

hungry though we were

may he rest in peace

what did you go to the store and buy (extraction from first conjunct [Lakoff

what can you eat and not get cancer (extraction from second conjunct [reference])
what the heck did you see ("the hell", "the deuce", "on earth", "in heaven"

boy was I tired ("man, was he stupid" - *"girl ...," "*woman ...")

just because I live in Berkeley doesn't mean I'm a revolutionary [reference]

such that (the logician's relative clause)

with palm outstretched ("with hat in hand"; paraphrase with "have")

what's x doing y? [reference]

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