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G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015 - GLENN VIAS, Petitioner, v. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIAS, Respondent.
FACTS: On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married in civil rites held in Lipa
City, Batangas. Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment.
Glenn alleged that the infants death was caused by Mary Graces heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.

Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary
Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.He alleged that Mary
Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. She
thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked heavily even whenshe was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to
perform even the most essential household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited the
foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship.

Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Graces personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo
(Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back in college.
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag
concluded that Mary Grace and Glenns relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each
other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couples marriage.

On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on
account of the latters psychological incapacity.

On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to
cite the root cause of Mary Graces disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayags
statements anent the gravity and incurability of Mary Graces condition. The RTC resorted to mere generalizations and conclusions
sansdetails. Besides, what psychological incapacity contemplates is downright incapacity to assume marital obligations. In the
instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown, but these do not
warrant the grant of Glenns petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this does not translate into a
psychological illness.

On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage between
Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting.
ISSUE: Whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTCs declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."

In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence
offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Graces condition.
The respondents stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be
rooted in some psychological illness.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance ofand to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.

Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more
convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the formers condition. Glenn, however, failed in
this respect. Glenns testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenns
statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary Graces traits and acts, which she exhibited
during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the antecedence of Mary Graces alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that,
six months before they got married, they saw each other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and well[-]educated
person" in Mary Grace.


We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayags conclusions about the respondents psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side the petitioner whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.

The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest to the
antecedence of a persons psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the
law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenns marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides
inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations
as Glenns spouse.


G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015 - VIRGINIA OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO, Respondent.
FACTS: On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage
with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological
The decision became final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the marriage.
On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties, and if they
failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to agree on a project of
partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand.
On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties declared by the parties belong to each
one of them on a 50-50 sharing.

ISSUE: Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and
psychological perversity.
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family Code provides:


In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other,
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for
Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term
"capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment
to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as
husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry should, therefore, be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts.
Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed
to prove that the properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.
We note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the subject properties during the subsistence of their
marriage. The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Article 116 of
the Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are
registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate
of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the
presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses." Thus, the failure of Virginia to
rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by
them in equal shares. Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership, as ordered by the
RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.