Kristineconfesor

LAUREL V. DESIERTO
FACTS:
Pursuant to President Fidel V. Ramos issuance of Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting
the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, the
National Centennial Commission was created with Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel as
Chair. Characterized as an ad-hoc body, the existence of the Commission shall terminate
upon the completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations. Like its
predecessor Committee, the Commission was tasked to take charge of the nationwide
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of
Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation
(Expocorp) was created. On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng
delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction
and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon
motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege speech was referred to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee recommended for the prosecution by the
Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Laurel, chair for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the
award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting
manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR
(Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to
government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds
infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the
anti-graft law. . Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground
that he is not a public officer because:
1)
EXPOCORP, the corporation chaired by petitioner laurel which undertook the
freedom ring project in connection with which violations of the anti-graft and
corrupt practices were allegedly committed, was a private corporation, not a
government-owned or controlled corporation.
2)
the national centennial commission (ncc) was not a public office.
3)
petitioner, both as chairman of the ncc and of expocorp was not a public officer as
defined under the anti-graft & corrupt practices act.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is holding a public office? YES
HELD:
A PUBLIC OFFICE is the RIGHT, AUTHORITY and DUTY,
created and conferred by law, by which,
for a given period,
either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer.
The CHARACTERISTICS OF A PUBLIC OFFICE, according to Mechem, include the (D, L,
OSC, SD)
1)
delegation of sovereign functions,
2)
its creation by law and not by contract,
3)
an oath, salary, continuance of the position,

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4)
5)

scope of duties, and the

designation of the position as an office.

Mechem describes the DELEGATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL OF SOME OF THE

SOVEREIGN FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AS [T]HE MOST IMPORTANT
CHARACTERISTIC IN DETERMINING WHETHER A POSITION IS A PUBLIC OFFICE OR
NOT. The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment
or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the
individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit.
Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. The E.O.
128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government.
A SALARY IS A USUAL BUT NOT A NECESSARY CRITERION FOR DETERMINING THE
NATURE OF THE POSITION. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no
part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or
honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the
office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to
a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are
attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless.
NEITHER IS THE FACT THAT THE NCC WAS CHARACTERIZED BY E.O. NO. 128 AS AN
AD-HOC BODY MAKE SAID COMMISSION LESS OF A PUBLIC OFFICE. The term office, it
is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is merely
temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. But, says Chief Justice
Marshall, if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the
government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to
perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining
them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult to
distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the
duties from an officer.
AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THIS ELEMENT OF CONTINUANCE CAN NOT BE
CONSIDERED AS INDISPENSABLE, for, if the other elements are present it can make no
difference, says Pearson, C.J., whether there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -whether the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during
good behavior.

ABAKADA V. PURISIMA
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335[2] (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the (BIR) and the (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing
a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.

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Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a
system of rewards and incentives, the law transform[s] the officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption
and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to
serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

HELD: Accountability of Public Officers

Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest lives.
PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST. IT MUST BE DISCHARGED BY ITS HOLDER NOT
FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL GAIN BUT FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PUBLIC FOR WHOM
HE HOLDS IT IN TRUST. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees
have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
PUBLIC OFFICERS ENJOY THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR
and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their
revenue-generation capability and collection.
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be
overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court
do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public
policy.
Petitioners claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and
employees into bounty hunters and mercenaries is not only without any factual and legal
basis; it is also purely speculative.
PUBLIC SERVICE IS ITS OWN REWARD. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be
rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A SYSTEM OF INCENTIVES FOR
EXCEEDING THE SET EXPECTATIONS OF A PUBLIC OFFICE IS NOT ANATHEMA TO
THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces
dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government
personnel.

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TONY N. FIGUEROA and ROGELIO J. FLAVIANO V. PEOPLE
August 9, 2006
FACTS: On March 24, 1992, in the RTC of Davao City, the city prosecutor of Davao, at the
instance of one Aproniano Rivera, filed an Information for libel under Article 355 in relation
to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code against the herein petitioners, Tony N. Figueroa and
Rogelio J. Flaviano.
Tony Figueroa and Rogelio Flaviano, columnist and publisher-editor, respectively of the
People's Daily
From the trial courts judgment of conviction, petitioners went to the CA which affirmed the
TCs decision.
ISSUE: Is the private complainant is not a public officer, hence the published article cannot
be considered to be within the purview of privileged communication? NO

HELD:
It is next contended by the petitioners that Rivera is a public officer. On this premise, they
invoke in their favor the application of one of the exceptions to the legal presumption of the
malicious nature of every defamatory imputation, as provided for under paragraph (2),
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it
is shown, except in the following cases:
2 fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature,
or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
RIVERA IS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE BUT A PRIVATE CITIZEN. Hence,
the published article cannot be considered as falling within the ambit of privileged
communication within the context of the above-quoted provision of the Penal Code.
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or
contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involve a delegation to the individual
of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive
or judicial, attaches, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are
of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.
BEING A MEMBER OF THE MARKET COMMITTEE DID NOT VEST UPON HIM ANY
SOVEREIGN FUNCTION OF THE GOVERNMENT, BE IT LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE OR
JUDICIAL. As reasoned out by the CA, the operation of a public market is not a
governmental function but merely an activity undertaken by the city in its private
proprietary capacity. Furthermore, Rivera's membership in the market committee was in

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representation of the association of market vendors, a non-governmental organization
belonging to the private sector.
CAROLINA JAVIER V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
On June 7, 1995, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047, or otherwise known as the Book
Publishing Industry Development Act, was enacted into law. Foremost in its policy is the
State's goal in promoting the continuing development of the book publishing industry,
through the active participation of the private sector, to ensure an adequate supply of
affordable, quality-produced books for the domestic and export market.
To achieve this purpose, the law provided for the creation of the National Book
Development Board (NBDB or the Governing Board, for brevity), which shall be under the
administration and supervision of the Office of the President. Petitioner was appointed to the
Governing Board as a private sector representative for a term of one (1) year. Part of her
functions as a member of the Governing Board is to attend book fairs to establish linkages
with international book publishing bodies. She was issued by the Office of the President a
travel authority to attend the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain. For her failure to
attend with said bookfair, Resident Auditor Martin advised petitioner to immediately
return/refund her cash advance considering that her trip was canceled. Petitioner,
however, failed to do so.
The Executive Director of the NBDB, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against
petitioner for MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS AND PROPERTIES. She averred that
despite the cancellation of the foreign trip, petitioner failed to liquidate or return to the
NBDB her cash advance within sixty (60) days from date of arrival, or in this case from the
date of cancellation of the trip, in accordance with government accounting and auditing
rules and regulations. Dr. Apolonio further charged petitioner with violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6713[13] for failure to file her Statement of Assets and Liabilities.
Petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only a private sector representative,
stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic purposes and objectives
provided for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for the book publishing
industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she was the President of the
BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she could not be held liable for the crimes
imputed against her, and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Is she correct? NO
HELD:
THE NBDB IS THE GOVERNMENT AGENCY MANDATED TO DEVELOP AND SUPPORT
THE PHILIPPINE BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY. It is a statutory government agency
created by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure the full development of the
book publishing industry as well as for the creation of organization structures to implement
the said policy. To achieve this end, the Governing Board of the NBDB was created to
supervise the implementation. The Governing Board was vested with powers and functions,
to wit:
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT PETITIONER CAME FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO SIT AS
A MEMBER OF THE NBDB, THE LAW INVESTED HER WITH SOME PORTION OF THE
SOVEREIGN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, so that the purpose of the government
is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as
it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed

 Kristineconfesor
from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does
not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the
Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was enacted are
achieved. The Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one body.
The purpose of the law for appointing members from the private sector is to ensure that
they are also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to
cultivate the book publishing industry.
Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the
Anti-Graft Law, which provides that A PUBLIC OFFICER INCLUDES ELECTIVE AND
APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY, WHETHER
IN THE CLASSIFIED OR UNCLASSIFIED OR EXEMPT SERVICE RECEIVING
COMPENSATION, EVEN NOMINAL, FROM THE GOVERNMENT.[33]
The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment. Section 7, R.A. No.
8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive per diem and such
allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually attended and subject to
pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Also, UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT LAW, THE NATURE
OF ONE'S APPOINTMENT, AND WHETHER THE COMPENSATION ONE RECEIVES FROM
THE GOVERNMENT IS ONLY NOMINAL, IS IMMATERIAL BECAUSE THE PERSON SO
ELECTED OR APPOINTED IS STILL CONSIDERED A PUBLIC OFFICER.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by
direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties
as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be
a public officer.[34]
As in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No.
8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in
the government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any rank or classes.
In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation of several
rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the
country in the canceled book fair in Spain.
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 162059
January 22, 2008
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of
swindling government funds?
FACTS:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP Cebu. A student of a
state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President
Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000
and ending on December 31, 2000. In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with
President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4,
2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of
the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed

 Kristineconfesor
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the
President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent,
Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently
filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No.
27819 of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not
have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP
student regent. Petitioner posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her
person not being a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the
other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a
simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer? YES
HELD:
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will
be called upon to define a public officer. In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1).
The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It
exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly
creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested
interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer."42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary
grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, it is well established
that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an
individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48 The administration of the UP is

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a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the
sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created
for profit.50
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them.

LAGMAN V. OCHOA
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially
assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled
Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed
by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando
B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May
2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch
condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap.
The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble
objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special
body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30,
2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court
to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal
of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially the same.
The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress
to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which
was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
ISSUES:

 Kristineconfesor
1) Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers
by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public
offices, agencies and commissions?
2) Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ;

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office
lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They
maintain that the delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code:
1) does not permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission;
2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the
President;
3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President
Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and
4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
5) Such continuing authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by
issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this delegated
authority.

The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the
President of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. OSG concludes that the power
of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG, the President may
create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and
corruption in the government.
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the
ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative
Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from
one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to
- reduction of personnel,
- consolidation of offices, or a
- bolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much
less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under
Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term
restructure an alteration of an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the
structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As
held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,[46]

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But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department
or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the
very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section
31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v.
Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It
falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing
authority to reorganize.=
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control.
Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter.[47] Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the
power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds
basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute
the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the
President to create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above
provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.[48] The said
law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government,
including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer
appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section
20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive
Secretary.[49]
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President
to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No.
1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices
and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its
last Whereas clause:
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is
well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article
VII, Section 17 thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his

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department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive
department.[57]
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of
graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no
quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of
persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide
in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law.[58] In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasijudicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly
authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was
delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe

into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study
closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official
probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by
application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into
with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,

decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle
finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x
to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or
rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially
in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations
Omitted]

 Kristineconfesor
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered
as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.[60] Even respondents
themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.[61]

Pichay v. Ochoa
(7/24/12)
The abolition of PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created w/in
ODESLA (IAD-ODESLA) under EO 13 is within the prerogative of Pres. under his continuing
delegated legislative authority to reorganize his office pursuant to Sec. 31(1) of EO 292.
The abolition of PAGC did not require creation of a new, separate & distinct office as the
PAGC functions were simply transferred to ODESLA w/c is an existing office w/in the Office of
the President Proper. Thus, there is no usurpation of legislative power to create a public
office (Pichay vs. Ochoa, 7/24/12)
The Pres.s power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper [Sec. 31(1)] should be
distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the Pres. under Sec. 31(2) & (3) of
EO 292.
In Sec. 31(1), he can reorganize the OP Proper by
1) abolishing,
2) consolidating or
3) merging units, or
4) by transferring functions from one unit to another.
In Sec. 31(2) & (3), his power to reorganize offices outside OP Proper but still within OP is
limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from OP to Departments or Agencies or
vice versa. The PAGC & ODESLA both belong to OP Proper. (Pichay vs. Ochoa)
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 13, entitled,
"Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring Its Investigative,
Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Office Of The Deputy Executive
Secretary For Legal Affairs, Office of the President",1 and to permanently prohibit
respondents from administratively proceeding against petitioner on the strength of the
assailed executive order.
FACTS:
On April 16, 2001, PGMA issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against
presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President.
Pertinent portions of E.O. 12 provide:
Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions.
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate
or hear administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the
government and any of its agencies or instrumentalities xxx
Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. After completing its
investigation or hearing, the Commission en banc shall submit its report and

 Kristineconfesor
recommendations to the President. The report and recommendations shall state,
among others, the factual findings and legal conclusions, as well as the penalty
recommend (sic) to be imposed or such other action that may be taken."
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13
(E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IADODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees which arose from
the purchase by the LWUA of (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written
explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge
of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed
as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the
ordinary course of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition
ISSUE: Is the E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to create
a public office?
HELD:
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not
authorized under any existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division,
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating
a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has
not only usurped the powers of congress to create a public office, appropriate funds and
delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon
the powers of the Ombudsman. Petitioner avers that the unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also
evident when weighed against the due process requirement and equal protection clause
under the 1987 Constitution.
THE PRESIDENT HAS CONTINUING AUTHORITY TO REORGANIZE THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT UNDER E.O. 292. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292),
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing
authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve (S-E-E) simplicity, economy
and efficiency.
E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose:
1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including
the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof
or transferring functions from one unit to another;
2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and

 Kristineconfesor
3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies.4
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office
and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this
purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the
President. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies.
After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President.
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially
created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his
continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.
292. Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring
either an office or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or
Agency, and the other way around.Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand
in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to
take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less
drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another
THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO REORGANIZE THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT UNDER
SECTION 31 (2) AND (3) OF EO 292 SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM HIS POWER
TO REORGANIZE THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT PROPER.
Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one
unit to another.
In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize
offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is
limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one
hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees'
tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is,
whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O.
292.
When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two
(2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9
and was placed directly "under the Office of the President."10 On the other hand, the
ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office
within the Office of the President Proper.11 SINCE BOTH OF THESE OFFICES
BELONG TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT PROPER, THE REORGANIZATION
BY WAY OF ABOLISHING THE PAGC AND TRANSFERRING ITS FUNCTIONS TO
THE ODESLA IS ALLOWABLE UNDER SECTION 31 (1) OF E.O. 292.
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.

 Kristineconfesor

A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also
be pursued in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done
for purposes of economy and efficiency.13 It appears in this case that the streamlining of
functions within the Office of the President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind.
In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of
eradicating corruption in the government and promoting economy and efficiency in the
bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is shown by the fact that
while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the 2010
annual budget,14 no separate or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever
required after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.

 Kristineconfesor

PUBLIC

OFFICE IS NOT PROPERTY SO THEREFORE NO PERSON HAS VESTED RIGHT.

In what instance may a public office be considered a property? in so far as the tenure is
concern
Segovia vs Noel
The question to be decided on this is whether that portion of Act No. 3107 which provides,
that justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until
they have reached the age of sixty- five years, should be given retroactive or prospective
effect.
Prospective
The same rule is followed by the courts with reference to public offices. A well-known New
York decision held that "though there is no vested right in an office, which may not be
disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right
is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated."
FACTS: Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of Dumanjug, Cebu, on January
21, 1907. He continuously occupied this position until having passed sixty-five mile- stones,
he was ordered by the Secretary of Justice on July 1, 1924, to vacate the office. Since that
date, Pedro Noel, the auxiliary justice of the peace has acted as justice of the peace for the
municipality of Dumanjug.
Mr. Segovia instituted friendly quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu to inquire into the right of Pedro Noel to occupy the office of justice of the peace , to
oust the latter therefrom, and to procure reinstatement as justice of the peace of Dumanjug.
To this complaint, Pedro Noel interposed a demurrer on the ground that it did not allege facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because Act No. 3107 was constitutional and
because Mr. Segovia being sixty-five years old had automatically ceased to be justice of the
peace. On the issue thus framed and on stipulated facts, judgment was rendered by
Honorable Adolph Wislizenus, Judge of First Instance, overruling the demurrer, and in favor
of petitioner and against respondent.
ISSUE: whether that portion of Act No. 3107 which provides, that justices of the peace and
auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of
sixty- five years, should be given retroactive or prospective effect.
HELD:
1. section 67 of Act No. 136, provided that justices of the peace shall hold office during
the pleasure of the Commission. Act No. 1450, in force when Vicente Segovia was
originally appointed justice of the peace, amended section 67 of the Judiciary Law by
making the term of office of justices and auxiliary justices of the peace two years
from the first Monday in January nearest the date of appointment. Shortly after
Segovia's appointment, however, the law was again amended by Act No. 1627 by
providing that "all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall hold
office during good behavior and those now in office shall so continue." Later
amended by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2617, the law was ultimately codified in sections
203 and 206 of the Administrative Code.

 Kristineconfesor
Codal section 203 in its first paragraph provides that "one justice of the peace and
one auxiliary justice of the peace shall be appointed by the Governor-General for the
City of Manila, the City of Baguio, and for each municipality, township, and municipal
district in the Philippine Islands, and if the public interests shall so require, for any
other minor political division or unorganized territory in said Islands." It was this
section which section 1 of Act No. 3107 amended by adding at the end thereof the
following proviso: "Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years ."
But section 206 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tenure of office," and reading "a
justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during
good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of
some other justice," was left unchanged by Act No. 3107.
A STATUTE OUGHT NOT TO RECEIVE A CONSTRUCTION MAKING IT ACT
RETROACTIVELY, UNLESS THE WORDS USED ARE SO CLEAR, STRONG, AND
IMPERATIVE THAT NO OTHER MEANING CAN BE ANNEXED TO THEM, OR UNLESS
THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT BE OTHERWISE SATISFIED. No court
will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. As our Civil Code
has it in article 3, "Law shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided."
"THOUGH THERE IS NO VESTED RIGHT IN AN OFFICE, WHICH MAY NOT BE
DISTURBED BY LEGISLATION, YET THE INCUMBENT HAS, IN A SENSE, A RIGHT TO
HIS OFFICE. IF THAT RIGHT IS TO BE TAKEN AWAY BY STATUTE, THE TERMS
SHOULD BE CLEAR IN WHICH THE PURPOSE IS STATED." In another case, a new
constitutional provision as to the advanced age which should prevent the incumbents of
certain judicial offices from retaining them was held prospective; it did not apply to persons
in office at the time of its taking effect.
The case at bar is not the same as the case of Chanco vs. Imperial ( [1916], 34 Phil., 329). In
that case, the question was as to the validity of section 7 of Act No. 2347. The law under
consideration not only provided that Judges of First Instance shall serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years, but it further provided "that the present judges of Courts
of First Instance ... vacate their positions on the taking effect of this Act: and the GovernorGeneral, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission, shall make new
appointments of judges of Courts of First Instance ... ." There the intention of the Legislature
to vacate the office was clearly expressed. Here, it is not expressed at all.
The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section 203 of the Administrative Code, gives
no indication of retroactive effect. The law signifies no purpose of operating upon existing
rights. A proviso was merely tacked on to section 203 of the Administrative Code, while
leaving intact section 206 of the same Code which permits justices of the peace to hold
office during good behavior. In the absence of provisions expressly making the law
applicable to justices of the peace then in office, and in the absence of provisions impliedly
indicative of such legislative intent, the courts would not be justified in giving the law an
interpretation which would legislate faithful public servants out of office.

 Kristineconfesor
Answering the question with which we began our decision, we hold that the proviso added to
section 203 of the Administrative Code by section 1 of Act No. 3107, providing that justices
and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the
age of sixty-five years, should be given prospective effect only, and so is not applicable to
justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed before Act No. 3107 went
into force. Consequently, it results that the decision of the trial court is correct in its findings
of fact and law and in its disposition of the case.

Abeja vs Tanada
Public office is not a property which passes to heirs. Protestees heirs may no longer
prosecute the deceased protestees counterclaim for damages
In an election protest filed by Abeja to the mayor and the latter filed a counterprotest before
which, he dies. Since public office is a public trust the protestees heirs can no longer
continue the action filed by the decedent. The right to public office was extinguished
through his death.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner seeks the annulment of the orders dated September
21, 1992 and October 18, 1993 issued by respondent Judge Federico Taada which decreed,
among others, the revision of some 36 precincts contained in the counter-protest filed by
respondent Radovan. The said orders were issued by respondent judge in resolving
petitioner/protestant's "Motion to Determine Votes, to Proclaim Winner and to Allow
Assumption of Office" dated August 27, 1993.
FACTS:
Petitioner EVELYN ABEJA and private respondent ROSAURO RADOVAN (deceased) were
contenders for the office of municipal mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, in the May 11, 1992,
national elections. Based on the official returns of the MBC for the said municipality,
RADOVAN(D) was credited with 6,215 votes as against ABEJAs 5,951 votes.
Soon after the proclamation of RADOVAN, ABEJA filed an election contest. On June 5, 1992,
RADOVAN filed an Answer with a Counter-Protest of the results in thirty-six (36) precincts.
During the pre-trial, RADOVANs counsel filed a motion praying that the 36 counter-protested
precincts be revised only if it is shown after completion of the revision of the 22 protested
precincts that petitioner leads by a margin of at least one (1) vote. The trial court declared
discussion on the matter to be premature. The revision of the ballots covering 22 protested
precincts was completed in September 1992. Thereafter, ABEJA urged private respondent to
commence the revision of the 36 counter-protested precincts by praying the necessary fees
for the purpose. RADOVAN refused.
In an order dated April 15, 1993, Presiding Judge Lopez ruled that "(p)rotestant's offer of
evidence as well as the protestee's objections thereto are now submitted for the Court's
resolution" (Rollo, p. 61).On June 13, 1993, private respondent Rosauro Radovan died. He
was substituted by Vice-Mayor Conrado de Rama and, wife, Ediltrudes Radovan. On July 13,
1993, private respondents de Rama and Radovan filed a Manifestation seeking a prompt
resolution of all pending incidents.
ISSUE: to be resolved in this case is whether or not private respondents should be allowed
to proceed with the revision of the 36 precincts subject of the counter-protest.

 Kristineconfesor

HELD: We also find as erroneous the substitution of the deceased Rosauro Radovan's
widow, Ediltrudes Radovan, on the ground that private respondent had a counter-claim for
damages. "Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to
his heirs" (Santos vs. Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA 848 [1968]; De la Victoria vs. Comelec,
199 SCRA 561 [1991]). The heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased protestee's counterclaim for damages against the protestant for that was extinguished when death terminated
his right to occupy the contested office (Dela Victoria, supra).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of respondent judge as
well as the results of the revision of the 11 ballot boxes subject of the counter-protest are
SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is further ordered to DISMISS the counter-protest in Election
Case No. 92-1 and to resolve the "Motion to Determine Votes, to Proclaim Winner and to
Allow Assumption of Office" filed by petitioner conformably with this decision within a nonextendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof. This decision is immediately
executory. Costs against respondent Ediltrudes Radovan.
SO ORDERED.
Mayor De Castro vs. Comelec & Jamilla
Effect of the contestants death in an election protest: Is said contest a personal action
extinguished upon the death of the real party in interest? If not, what is the mandatory
period within which to effectuate the substitution of parties?
It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property
transmissible to his heirs upon death. Thus, applying the doctrine of actio personalis moritur
cum persona, upon the death of the incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed to continue
holding his office in his place.
But while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an
election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee
such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings. An election contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting private aspirations
but is imbued with paramount public interests. The death of the protestant, as in this case,
neither constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor ousts the trial court of its
jurisdiction to decide the election contest.
JIMMY S. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AMANDO A. MEDRANO, respondents.

FACTS:
De Castro was proclaimed Mayor of Gloria, Oriental Mindoro during the May 8, 1995
elections. In the same elections, Medrano was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of the same
municipality. On May 19, 1995, petitioners rival candidate, the late Nicolas M. Jamilla, filed
an election protest. During the pendency of said contest, Jamilla died. Four days after such

 Kristineconfesor
death the trial court dismissed the election protest ruling as it did that [a]s this case is
personal, the death of the protestant extinguishes the case itself. The issue or issues
brought out in this protest have become moot and academic.

Medrano learned about the dismissal of the protest from one Atty. Gaudencio S. Sadicon,
who, as the late Jamillas counsel, was the one who informed the trial court of his clients
demise. He then filed his Omnibus Petition/Motion (For Intervention and/or Substitution with
Motion for Reconsideration).[5] Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner on January 30,
1996. The same was denied and the court stubbornly held that an election protest being
personal to the protestant, is ipso facto terminated by the latters death.

Hence, Medrano filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC); mainly assailing the trial court orders as having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. COMELEC granted the petition for certiorari and mandamus.[8] It
ruled that an election contest involves both the private interests of the rival candidates and
the public interest in the final determination of the real choice of the electorate, and for this
reason, an election contest necessarily survives the death of the protestant or the protestee.

ISSUE: Before us is a petition for certiorari raising twin issues as regards the effect of the
contestants death in an election protest: Is said contest a personal action extinguished upon
the death of the real party in interest? If not, what is the mandatory period within which to
effectuate the substitution of parties?

HELD:
ACTIO PERSONALIS MORITUR CUM PERSONA
It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property
transmissible to his heirs upon death. [9] Thus, applying the doctrine of actio personalis
moritur cum persona, upon the death of the incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed to
continue holding his office in his place.

BUT ELECTION PROTEST IS NOT PURELY PERSONAL

But while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an
election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee
such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings.

 Kristineconfesor

An election contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is
imbued with paramount public interests. As we have held in the case of Vda. de De
Mesa v. Mencias:[10]
x x x. It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the
adjudication and settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates but also the
paramount need of dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real
choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the
offices within their gift, is a proceeding imbued with public interest which raises it onto a
plane over and above ordinary civil actions. For this reason, broad perspectives of public
policy impose upon courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their
command who is the real candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as possible,
without being fettered by technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the will
of the people may not be frustrated xxx the voluntary cessation in office of the
protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him of the character of an adversary in the
contest inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep his political opponent out of the
office and maintain therein his successor, but also does not in any manner impair or
detract from the jurisdiction of the court to pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion.

The asseveration of petitioner that private respondent is not a real party in interest entitled
to be substituted in the election protest in place of the late Jamilla, is utterly without legal
basis. Categorical was our ruling in Vda. de Mesa and Lomugdang that:

x x x the Vice Mayor elect has the status of a real party in interest in the
continuation of the proceedings and is entitled to intervene therein. For if the protest
succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the Vice-Mayor succeeds to the office of
Mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected can not assume the post. [14]

The filing by private respondent of his Omnibus Petition/Motion on January 15, 1996, well
within a period of thirty days from December 19, 1995 when Jamillas counsel informed
the trial court of Jamillas death, was in compliance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Since the Rules of Court, though not generally applicable to election
cases, may however be applied by analogy or in a suppletory character, [15] private
respondent was correct to rely thereon.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

Oath of Office

 Kristineconfesor

Mendoza vs. Laxina

Is the taking of an oath of office anew by a duly proclaimed but subsequently unseated local
elective official a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office where
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) orders the relinquishment of the contested
position?
To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a
prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. It is only when the public
officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the
position becomes plenary and complete. However, once proclaimed and duly sworn in
office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise the functions thereof. The
pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming office or
from discharging his functions. Unless his election is annulled by a final and executory
decision, or a valid execution of an order unseating him pending appeal is issued, he has the
lawful right to assume and perform the duties of the office to which he has been elected.
In the case at bar, respondent was proclaimed as the winner in the 1997 Barangay Elections
in Batasan Hills, Quezon City; he took his oath on May 27, 1997 and thereafter assumed
office. He is therefore vested with all the rights to discharge the functions of his office.
Although in the interim, he was unseated by virtue of a decision in an election protest
decided against him, the execution of said decision was annulled by the COMELEC in its
September 16, 1999 Resolution which, incidentally, was sustained by this Court on March
13, 2000, in Fermo v. Commission on Elections. It was held therein that [w]hen the
COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal in favor of FERMO, the decision of
the MTC proclaiming FERMO as the winner of the election was stayed and the status quo or
the last actual peaceful uncontested situation preceding the controversy was restored
The status quo referred to the stage when respondent was occupying the office of Barangay
Captain and discharging its functions. For purposes of determining the continuity and
effectivity of the rights arising from respondents proclamation and oath taken on May 27,
1997, it is as if the said writ of execution pending appeal was not issued and he was not
ousted from office. The re-taking of his oath of office on November 16, 1999 was a mere
formality considering that his oath taken on May 27, 1997 operated as a full investiture on
him of the rights of the office. Hence, the taking anew of his oath of office as Barangay
Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City was not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his
re-assumption in office and to the exercise of the functions thereof.
Is the taking of an oath of office anew by a duly proclaimed but subsequently unseated local
elective official a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office where
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) orders the relinquishment of the contested
position?

FACTS:
Laxina took his oath and thereafter assumed office as the duly proclaimed and elected
barangay captain of Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, in the 1997 Barangay
Elections. Meanwhile, Roque Fermo, his rival candidate, filed an election protest and was
subsequently declared as the winner. Laxina filed a notice of appeal with the COMELEC
while Fermo filed a motion for execution pending appeal.The trial court granted the motion
for execution pending appeal.

 Kristineconfesor

Hence, Laxina vacated the position and relinquished the same to Fermo. Thereafter, Laxina
filed a petition with the COMELEC questioning the order of the trial court. Thereafter, the
COMELEC issued a resolution annulling the order which granted the execution of the decision
pending appeal on the ground that there existed no good reasons to justify execution.

COMELEC issued a writ of execution directing Fermo to vacate the office. Fermo refused. This
did not, however, prevent Laxina and his staff from discharging their functions and from
holding office at the SK-Hall of Batasan Hills. COMELEC, acting on Laxina motion to cite
Fermo for contempt,[8] issued an alias writ of execution, [9] which was likewise returned
unsatisfied. Finally, on November 16, 1999, Laxina took his oath of office as Barangay
Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City before Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr.

O Barangay Council of Batasan Hills issued Resolution No. 001-S-1999 ratifying the
appointment of Godofredo L. Ramos as Barangay Secretary, effective November 1,
1999[12] and Resolution No. 002-S-1999 ratifying the appointment of Rodel G. Liquido, as
Barangay Treasurer, also effective November 1, 1999.[13]
However, the appointees of Roque Fermo to the same position registered objections to the
said Resolutions. In order to accommodate these appointees, respondent agreed to grant
them allowances and renumerations for the period of November 1- 7, 1999

petitioner barangay councilors filed with the Quezon City Council a complaint [18] for violation
of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act and falsification of legislative documents against
respondent and all other barangay officials who signed the questioned resolution and payroll
contending that defendants made it appear in the payroll that he and his appointees
rendered services starting November 8, 1999 when, in truth, they commenced to serve only
on November 17, 1999 after respondent took his oath and assumed the office of barangay
chairman. They further claimed that the effectivity date of the barangay secretary and
barangay treasurers appointment, as approved in Resolution No. 001-S-1999, was November
16, 1999, but respondent fraudulently antedated it to November 1, 1999. Petitioners also
contended that respondent connived with the other barangay officials in crossing out their
names in the payroll.

In their joint counter-affidavit,[19] defendants claimed that the taking anew of the oath of
office as barangay chairman was a mere formality and was not a requirement before
respondent can validly discharge the duties of his office. They contended that respondents
appointees are entitled to the remuneration for the period stated in the payroll as they

 Kristineconfesor
commenced to serve as early as October 28, 1999. They added that the names of the 3
petitioner barangay councilors who refused to sign the assailed resolution and daily wage
payroll were crossed out from the said payroll to prevent any further delay in the release of
the salaries of all barangay officials and employees listed therein. [20]

HELD:
To be sure, AN OATH OF OFFICE IS A QUALIFYING REQUIREMENT FOR A PUBLIC
OFFICE; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. It is only when the public officer
has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position becomes
plenary and complete.[33] However, once proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer
is entitled to assume office and to exercise the functions thereof. THE PENDENCY OF AN
ELECTION PROTEST IS NOT SUFFICIENT BASIS TO ENJOIN HIM FROM ASSUMING
OFFICE OR FROM DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS.[34] Unless his election is annulled by a
final and executory decision,[35] or a valid execution of an order unseating him pending
appeal is issued, he has the lawful right to assume and perform the duties of the office to
which he has been elected.

In the case at bar, respondent was proclaimed as the winner in the 1997 Barangay Elections
in Batasan Hills, Quezon City; he took his oath on May 27, 1997 and thereafter assumed
office. He is therefore vested with all the rights to discharge the functions of his
office. Although in the interim, he was unseated by virtue of a decision in an election protest
decided against him, the execution of said decision was annulled by the COMELEC in its
September 16, 1999 Resolution which, incidentally, was sustained by this Court on March
13, 2000, in Fermo v. Commission on Elections.[36] It was held therein that [w]hen the
COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal in favor of FERMO, the decision of
the MTC proclaiming FERMO as the winner of the election was stayed and the status quo or
the last actual peaceful uncontested situation preceding the controversy was restored [37] The
status quo referred to the stage when respondent was occupying the office of Barangay
Captain and discharging its functions. For purposes of determining the continuity and
effectivity of the rights arising from respondents proclamation and oath taken on May 27,
1997, it is as if the said writ of execution pending appeal was not issued and he was not
ousted from office. The re-taking of his oath of office on November 16, 1999 was a mere
formality considering that his oath taken on May 27, 1997 operated as a full investiture on
him of the rights of the office. Hence, the taking anew of his oath of office as Barangay
Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City was not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his
re-assumption in office and to the exercise of the functions thereof.

Having thus ruled out the necessity of respondents taking anew of the oath of office, the
next question to be resolved is: when is respondent considered to have validly re-assumed
office from October 28, 1999, the date of service of the writ of execution to Roque Fermo
and the date respondent actually commenced to discharge the functions of the office, or

 Kristineconfesor
from November 17, 1999, the date Roque Fermo turned over to respondent the assets and
properties of Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City?

The records show that the COMELEC served on October 28, 1999 a writ of execution ordering
Fermo to desist from performing the function of the Office of Barangay Captain, but the
latter refused to comply therewith. His supporters prevented respondent from occupying the
barangay hall, prompting the latter to move for the issuance of an alias wit of execution,
which was granted on November 12, 1999. It was only on November 17, 1999 that the turnover to respondent of the assets and properties of the barangay was effected. Undoubtedly,
it was Fermos defiance of the writ that prevented respondent from assuming office at the
barangay hall. To reckon, therefore, the effectivity of respondents assumption in office on
November 17, 1999, as petitioners insist, would be to sanction dilatory maneuvers and to
put a premium on disobedience of lawful orders which this Court will not countenance. It is
essential to the effective administration of justice that the processes of the courts and quasijudicial bodies be obeyed.[38]Moreover, it is worthy to note that although the physical
possession of the Office of the Barangay Captain was not immediately relinquished by Fermo
to respondent, the latter exercised the powers and functions thereof at the SK-Hall of
Batasan Hills, Quezon City starting October 28, 1999. His re-assumption in office effectively
enforced the decision of the COMELEC which reinstated him in office. It follows that all lawful
acts of the latter arising from his re-assumption in office on October 28, 1999 are
valid. Hence, no grave misconduct was committed by him in appointing Godofredo L. Ramos
and Rodel G. Liquido as Barangay Secretary and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, and in
granting them emoluments and renumerations for the period served.

Respondent was also charged of conniving with the other barangay officials in crossing out
the names of the petitioner barangay councilors in the payroll. The petition alleged that as a
consequence of the striking out of the names of the petitioner barangay officials, they were
not able to receive their salaries for the period November 8 to December 31, 1999. [39] A
reading of the payroll reveals that the names of said petitioners and their corresponding
salaries are written thereon. However, they refused to sign the payroll and to acknowledge
receipt of their salaries to manifest their protest. Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum
sentire. Indeed, he who suffered injury through his own fault is not considered to have
suffered any damage.[40] Hence, the investigative committee correctly brushed aside this
charge against respondent.
The trial court therefore did not err in exonerating respondent and pursuant to Article 68 of
the Local Government Code, he should be paid his salaries and emoluments for the period
during which he was suspended without pay.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
Summary Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No.
Q-00-42155, exonerating respondent Manuel D. Laxina, Sr., of the charge of grave
misconduct and ordering the payment of all benefits due him during the period of his
suspension, is AFFIRMED.

 Kristineconfesor
SO ORDERED.

Ombudsman vs Jurado
It is undisputed that respondent was the Chief of the Warehousing Inspection Division (WID)
of the Bureau of Customs. The WID is the inspection and audit arm of the District Collector of
Customs.
On March 16, 1992, CBW Inspector Baliwag submitted a report to respondent showing the
result of the ocular inspection of the proposed warehouse of applicant Maglei. The report
stated: "approval respectfully recommended subject to re-inspection before transfer of
imported goods is allowed."
On March 16, 1992, respondent, as Chief of the WID, issued a 1st Indorsement concurring
with the recommendation of CBW Inspector Baliwag that the application of Maglei be
approved.
Respondents indorsement was then submitted to the Chief of the MMBWD for comment and
recommendation. The Chief of the MMBWD eventually recommended that Magleis
application be approved since it has complied with all the necessary physical and
documentary requirements. Following the indorsements of the different divisions of the
Bureau of Customs, Maglei was eventually granted the authority to operate a CBW despite
the fact that the records disclose that there was no actual warehouse to speak of.
Respondent posits that since he was not the approving officer for application for CBWs nor
was it his duty or obligation to conduct re-inspection of the subject warehouse premises, he
cannot be held liable for neglect of duty.
As adverted to earlier, the Warehousing Inspection Division is the inspection and audit arm
of the Bureau of Customs. Respondent Jurado, as chief of the said division, was duty-bound
to verify the accuracy of the reports furnished by his subordinates. We agree with the
Ombudsman that respondent failed to validate the report of Baliwag and initiate, institute or
recommend the conduct of appropriate investigation immediately upon discovery of the
irregularity. As a supervisor, respondent was clearly negligent in the performance of his
duties.
When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the
duties of his office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act
primarily for the benefit of the public.
It bears stressing that public office is a public trust. When a public officer takes his oath of
office, he binds himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully and to use reasonable
skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of
his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution and attention which careful men use in the
management of their affairs. Public officials and employees are therefore expected to act
with utmost diligence and care in discharging the duties and functions of their office.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to measure up to this standard. Clearly, respondent should
be held administratively liable for neglect of duty.
Neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a task
expected of him, signifying "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference." By merely acquiescing to the report and recommendation of his subordinate
without verifying its accuracy, respondent was negligent in overseeing that the duties and
responsibilities of the WID were performed with utmost responsibility. Respondent was

 Kristineconfesor

likewise negligent when he failed, as supervisor, to initiate, institute, or recommend

investigation and disciplinary proceedings against his subordinate Baliwag after the anomaly
was discovered. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence
which the circumstances warrant.
FACTS
Sometime in 1992, Maglei Enterprises Co., (Maglei), a partnership owned by Rose Cuyos and
John Elvin C. Medina, filed an application before the Bureau of Customs for the operation of a
Customs Bonded Warehouse (CBW)-Manufacturing Warehouse. As part of the evaluation of
Magleis application, CBW Supervisor Juanito A. Baliwag conducted an inspection of Magleis
compliance with structural requirements. Baliwag submitted a report4 recommending
approval of the application.
On March 16, 1992, respondent Jurado, who was then the Chief of the Warehouse Inspection
Division, adopted the recommendation of Baliwag. Then he indorsed the papers of Maglei to
the Chief of the Miscellaneous Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse Division (MMBWD).
Magleis application was submitted to Rolando A. Mendoza, Chief of the MMBWD for his
comment and recommendation. In a Memorandum (for the District Collector of Customs)
dated March 20, 1992, Mendoza reported that Maglei has substantially complied with the
physical and documentary requirements relative to their application for the operation of a
Customs Bonded Warehouse. Mendoza further recommended that Magleis application be
approved. Following the indorsements of the different divisions of the Bureau of Customs
Emma M. Rosqueta (District Collector of Customs); Titus B. Villanueva (Deputy Commissioner
for Assessment and Operations); and Atty. Alex Gaticales (Executive Director of the Customs
SGS Import Valuation and Classification Committee) Magleis application was
recommended for approval.
On June 25, 1992, Maglei was finally granted the authority to establish and operate CBW No.
M-1467 located at 129 J. Bautista, Caloocan City. By virtue of such authority, Maglei
imported various textile materials which were then transferred to the said warehouse. The
textiles were to be manufactured into car covers for exportation.
Subsequently, on July 8 and 22, 1992, MMBWD Senior Storekeeper Account Officer George O.
Dizon was tasked by MMBWD Chief Mendoza to check and verify the status of Magleis CBW.
Dizon reported that the subject CBW was existing and operating. However, upon further
verification by the Bureau of Customs, it was discovered that the purported CBW of Maglei
did not exist at the alleged site in Caloocan City. Rather, what was reported located at the
site was a School of the Divine Mercy. Only a small signboard bearing the name "Maglei
Enterprises Company" was posted inconspicuously in the corner of the lot. Further
investigation revealed that Magleis shipment of textile materials disappeared, without proof
of the materials being exported or the corresponding taxes being paid.
Ombudsman Disposition
On August 11, 1992, the Bureau of Customs initiated a complaint against George P. Dizon,
Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C. Medina for prosecution under the Tariff and Customs Code.
After receiving a copy of the resolution, the Ombudsman conducted the investigation on the
complaint.
On February 13, 1996, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) recommended that the Resolution of the Bureau of
Customs be reversed. The EPIB further recommended that the complaint against George P.
Dizon be dismissed and another one be filed against Emma Rosqueta and Atty. Rolando

 Kristineconfesor
Mendoza, subject to further fact-finding investigation by the Fact Finding Bureau (FFB) of the
OMB. With regard to the case against Rose Cuyos and John Medina, the EPIB recommended
that the charges be taken up together with those of Rosqueta and Atty. Mendoza. The case
was then forwarded to the FFB.
On October 17, 1997, the OMB approved the above recommendation.
On August 2, 1999, the OMB dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and Section 3601 of
the Tariff and Customs Code filed against respondent. The complaint was dismissed on the
ground of lack of prima facie evidence to charge respondent of the crime.
On the other hand, on August 16, 1999, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the
OMB rendered judgment finding respondent administratively liable, penalizing him with
suspension for six (6) months without pay. Respondents motion for reconsideration of his
suspension was likewise denied by the Ombudsman.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA. In his appeal, respondent argued, among others,
that his right to a speedy disposition of his case had been violated; that the administrative
case against him should have been dismissed following the dismissal of the criminal charges
against him; and that there is no substantial evidence on record to make him
administratively liable.
CA Disposition
In a Decision dated July 3, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the questioned decision and
resolution of the OMB. The dispositive part of the CA decision runs in this wise:
Foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. Resultantly, the
challenged Decision/Resolution of the Ombudsman is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.7
In ruling in favor of respondent, the appellate court ratiocinated:
Indeed, we are in accord with Petitioners arguments that his right to speedy disposition of
cases had been violated. To be sure, Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides
thus:
"All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative bodies."
xxxx
In the case at bench, the incident which gave rise to the complaint against Petitioner
happened on March 16, 1992. And yet it was only on November 20, 1997 or a lapse of more
than five (5) years that the case relative to the said incident was filed against him. Records
disclose that on August 11, 1992, the complaint only charged George O. Dizon and 2 others.
Then on February 13, 1996 or after almost 4 years, the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau of the OMB made another recommendation which ultimately included
Petitioner as among those to be charged. From February 13, 1996 to November 20, 1997 or
a period of more than one (1) year, what took them so long to decide that Petitioner be
included in the charges?

 Kristineconfesor
From the foregoing unfolding of events, it is quite clear that it took the Ombudsman almost
six (6) years to decide that a case be filed against Petitioner. Under such circumstances, We
cannot fault Petitioner for invoking violation of his right to speedy disposition of his case.
More importantly, We do not agree that Petitioner, under attendant facts and circumstances
can be held liable for negligence. First of all, Petitioner as, Deputy Commissioner for
Assessment and Operation, did not have the duty to make inspection on the alleged
warehouse. Such duty belongs to other personnel/officers. Secondly, in Petitioners 1st
Indorsement dated March 22, 1992, he merely stated thus:
"Respectfully forwarded to the Chief, MMBWD, This Port, the within papers relative to the
request of MAGLEI ENTERPRISES CO., to establish and operate a Customs Manufacturing
Bonded Warehouse, pursuant to CMO 39-91, to be located at 129 Jose Bautista St., Caloocan
City, together with the attached report submitted by CBW Supervisor J.A. Baliwag of this
Office, inviting attention to the recommendation stated therein to which the undersigned
concurs." (p. 185, Rollo)
A careful reading of said 1st Indorsement undoubtedly shows that Petitioner invited
attention to the inspectors (Supervisor Baliwag) qualified recommendation, to wit:
"Approval respectfully recommended, subject to re-inspection, before transfer of imported
goods." (Underscoring for emphasis.)
After Petitioner made the indorsement, he no longer had any participation nor was he under
obligation or duty to make a re-inspection. If afterwards damage was suffered, Petitioner
cannot be faulted but rather only those who had the duty to make re-inspection. It is
precisely because of such fact that the criminal complaint filed against Petitioner did not
prosper. Where there is no duty or responsibility, one should not be held liable for neglect, as
what has been done to Petitioner.8
Issues
Petitioner Ombudsman now comes to this Court, raising twin issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL WAS VIOLATED;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY, AS
THE CHIEF OF THE WAREHOUSING INSPECTION DIVISION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE DID
NOT ENSURE THAT THE SUPPOSED WAREHOUSE WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE.9
Our Ruling
No violation of respondents right
to speedy disposition of cases.
Respondent administratively
liable for neglect of duty.
It is elementary that the dismissal of criminal charges will not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the administrative complaint based on the same set of facts.25 The quantum of
evidence in order to sustain a conviction for a criminal case is different from the proof

 Kristineconfesor
needed to find one administratively liable. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides
that for criminal cases, conviction is warranted only when the guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is defined as moral certainty, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.26 On the other hand,
the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable is substantial
evidence. Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a
fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
(Underscoring supplied)
Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary
civil cases, but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent
men in the conduct of their affairs.27
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez,28 the Court ruled:
x x x Be that as it may, its dismissal of the criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence was never meant, as respondent doggedly believed and arrogantly asserted, to
foreclose administrative action against him or to give him a clean bill of health in all
respects. The Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was simply saying that the
prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a
condition sine qua non for conviction because of the presumption of innocence which the
Constitution guarantees an accused. Lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of
evidence which, thought insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate
in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial
evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires in these cases such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.29
Verily, respondent can still be held administratively liable despite the dismissal of the
criminal charges against him.
We now discuss the administrative liability of respondent for neglect of duty. We opt to
reexamine the records considering the divergent findings of the Ombudsman and the CA.
It is undisputed that respondent was the Chief of the Warehousing Inspection Division (WID)
of the Bureau of Customs. The WID is the inspection and audit arm of the District Collector of
Customs.
On March 16, 1992, CBW Inspector Baliwag submitted a report to respondent showing the
result of the ocular inspection of the proposed warehouse of applicant Maglei. The report
stated: "approval respectfully recommended subject to re-inspection before transfer of
imported goods is allowed."30
On March 16, 1992, respondent, as Chief of the WID, issued a 1st Indorsement31 concurring
with the recommendation of CBW Inspector Baliwag that the application of Maglei be
approved.
Respondents indorsement was then submitted to the Chief of the MMBWD for comment and
recommendation. The Chief of the MMBWD eventually recommended that Magleis
application be approved since it has complied with all the necessary physical and

 Kristineconfesor
documentary requirements. Following the indorsements of the different divisions of the
Bureau of Customs, Maglei was eventually granted the authority to operate a CBW despite
the fact that the records disclose that there was no actual warehouse to speak of.
Respondent posits that since he was not the approving officer for application for CBWs nor
was it his duty or obligation to conduct re-inspection of the subject warehouse premises, he
cannot be held liable for neglect of duty.
The CA, in its decision, declared that respondent cannot be held liable for negligence for the
simple reason that it was not respondents duty to make the inspection and verification of
Magleis application.
We cannot agree.
The finding of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-97-0656 is more in accord with the evidence
on record:
Evidence on record shows that on 16 March 1992, respondent Juanito Baliwag (Customs
Bonded Warehouse Supervisor) submitted an Inspection Report of the same date showing
the result of an ocular inspection of the proposed warehouse of applicant Maglei Enterprises
with the recommendation: "approval respectfully recommended subject to re-inspection
before the transfer of imported goods is allowed" and with the observation that construction
is going on for compartments for raw materials, finished products and wastages by products.
On the same date, 16 March 1992, respondent Ben Jurado (Chief, Warehousing Inspection
Division) issued 1st Indorsement concurring with the recommendation of CBW Inspector and
co-respondent Juanito Baliwag for the approval of the application.
xxxx
On 08 July 1992, respondent Rolando Mendoza directed George Dizon (Documents
Processor) to verify the existence and operation of several bonded warehouses including the
warehouse of applicant Maglei Enterprises. On 23 July 1992, the same George Dizon was
again directed by respondent Rolando Mendoza to verify the transfer of shipment covered
Boat No. 13853454 in a container van with No. GSTV 824227 to the warehouse of Maglei
Enterprises (CBW No. M-1467). In those two occasions, respondent George Dizon reported
the existence of the applicants Warehouse located at No. 129 Jose Bautista Avenue,
Caloocan City.
xxxx
Evidence on records likewise revealed that No. 129 Jose Bautista Avenue, Caloocan City
which was given as the location address of CBW No. M-1467 is actually the address of a
school, that of the School of Divine Mercy.
xxxx
While respondent Dizon was authorized to verify the existence of Maglei Enterprises
Warehouse, it is admitted that he did not even look and see the premises of the alleged
warehouse. Likewise, CBW Supervisor and co-respondent Baliwag made a report on the
existence of the bonded warehouse earlier on 16 March 1992 in his Compliance with
Structural Requirements For Customs Bonded Warehouse Inspection Report. Both Dizon and
Baliwag reported the existence of the Warehouse in their respective and separate reports.
On the basis of the foregoing undisputed facts, it is apparent that the immediate cause of
the injury complained of was occasioned not only by the failure of the CBW Inspectors to

 Kristineconfesor
conduct an ocular inspection of the premises in a manner and in accordance with the
existing Customs rules and regulations as well as the failure of their immediate supervisors
to verify the accuracy of the reports, but also by subverting the reports by making
misrepresentation as to the existence of the warehouse.
xxxx
Respondent, Ben Jurado, the Chief of the WID, cannot likewise escape liability for Neglect of
Duty since his Office is the inspection arm of the District Collector of Customs.32
As adverted to earlier, the Warehousing Inspection Division is the inspection and audit arm
of the Bureau of Customs. Respondent Jurado, as chief of the said division, was duty-bound
to verify the accuracy of the reports furnished by his subordinates. We agree with the
Ombudsman that respondent failed to validate the report of Baliwag and initiate, institute or
recommend the conduct of appropriate investigation immediately upon discovery of the
irregularity. As a supervisor, respondent was clearly negligent in the performance of his
duties.
In Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 defined the power of
supervision as "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that their
subordinate officials perform their duties."34 The Court added that in case the subordinate
fails or neglects to fulfill his or her duties, it is the supervisors responsibility to take such
action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.35 The doctrine was
reiterated in Deang v. Intermediate Appellate Court36 and Municipality of Malolos v.
Libangang Malolos, Inc.37
It bears stressing that public office is a public trust.38 When a public officer takes his oath of
office, he binds himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully and to use reasonable
skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of
his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution and attention which careful men use in the
management of their affairs.39 Public officials and employees are therefore expected to act
with utmost diligence and care in discharging the duties and functions of their office.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to measure up to this standard. Clearly, respondent should
be held administratively liable for neglect of duty.
Neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a task expected of
him, signifying "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference."40 By merely
acquiescing to the report and recommendation of his subordinate without verifying its
accuracy, respondent was negligent in overseeing that the duties and responsibilities of the
WID were performed with utmost responsibility. Respondent was likewise negligent when he
failed, as supervisor, to initiate, institute, or recommend investigation and disciplinary
proceedings against his subordinate Baliwag after the anomaly was discovered. Clearly,
respondent failed to exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence which the circumstances
warrant.
We are of course not unaware that as a general rule, superior officers cannot be held liable
for the acts of their subordinates. However, there are exceptions, viz.: (1) where, being
charged with the duty of employing or retaining his subordinates, he negligently or willfully
employs or retains unfit or improper persons; or (2) where, being charged with the duty to
see that they are appointed and qualified in a proper manner, he negligently or willfully fails
to require of them the due conformity to the prescribed regulations; or (3) where he so
carelessly or negligently oversees, conducts or carries on the business of his office as to
furnish the opportunity for the default; or (4) and a fortiori where he has directed, authorized
or cooperated in the wrong.41

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In Advincula v. Dicen,42 the Court found a provincial agriculturist liable for misconduct
despite his protestations anchored on reliance to a subordinate. In finding him liable, the
Court scored the said official for failing to scrutinize each and every document proffered to
him by subordinates. In Amane v. Mendoza-Arce,43 respondent clerk of court was held liable
for neglect of duty for failing to discipline her subordinates and make sure that they
regularly and promptly performed their duties. In the case under review, respondent was
careless or negligent in overseeing, conducting, or carrying on the business of his office as
to furnish the opportunity for the default of a subordinate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-97-0656 finding respondent guilty of
neglect of duty is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
General rule: Individual cannot be forced to accept public office ( Involuntary servitude)
Exceptions:

Office is essential to defense of State (Sec. 4, Art. ll, 1987 Constitution)

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or
civil service.

When one is elected by popular election, he cannot refuse (Art. 234, RPC)

Article 234. Refusal to discharge elective office. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who, having been
elected by popular election to a public office, shall refuse without legal motive to be sworn in
or to discharge the duties of said office.

Posse comitatus This is an exercise of police power by the state. For example, in an
area where there is a problem of peace and order, they will pass an ordinance requiring able
bodies to patrol the area.
Classifying Public Officers of GOCC under RA 3019 ( In re RA 7975 & RA 8249)
Now you should be familiar with the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman in relation to the
jurisdiction of the SandiganBayan
Under the Constitution, one important feature is the civil service system.
Under the Constitution, the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters.
So in the Constitution, there are 2 kinds of GOCCs
1. With original charter
2. Without original charter.
Take note that those officers and employees with original charter by express provision are
subject to the civil service rules and regulations. Those officers and employees of GOCCs
without original charter are not covered by Civil Service rules and regulations.

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This rule is not applicable in so far as the criminal liability of these officers of the GOCCs
without original charter because the SandiganBayan law does not make such distinction.
Who are the officers within the ambit of Sandiganbayans jurisdiction?
As a rule, they are high ranking officers with Salary Grade 27 and above. But this is not
exclusive because RA 3019 provides that even if they do not belong to this category but if
his position is among those enumerated in the law, he is still under the authority of SB.
RA 8249
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors engineers and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
-controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Even in those cases, the law recognizes that there may be positions not really under SG 27
but by express provision of law they should be considered as likewise high ranking by virtue

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of the nomenclature of their positions. Ex. City Gov. of Davao SG 26 but they are managers
so covered pa rin.
De Guzman vs People
Petitioner claims that SandiganBayan do not have authority to take cognizance because she
has only a SG of 26 but nonetheless she is a manager so this included in the enumeration.
It is possible for a GOCC with charter to have as one of its powers to create subsidiaries
which do not have their own charters but their existence is dependent upon the original
GOCC. Under Civil Service Law, they are not considered public officers but applying RA 7975
as amended by RA 8249, the officers and employees of these GOCCs even those created
under the general law (corporation code) are considered public officers so they can be
indicted before the SandiganBayan.
Examples

Philippine National Construction Commission no charter it is a GOCC created under

the Corporation Code so the Assistant Manager does not fall within SB it is the regular
courts. (Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452)
Take note that even low ranking officer may be indicted if there is conspiracy or collusion.
May a private individual be indicted before the SB? Yes on the basis of conspiracy.

President and COO of Phil. Postal Savings Bank PPA has a charter and it confers
authority to create subsidiaries, officers of such subsidiaries are not public officers under
Civil Service Law but for purposes of RA 7975 as amended by RA 8249 they are public
officers. (People vs. Sandiganbayan, 16 February 2005)

Philhealth Manager. Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional

director/manager of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and
incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act? It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified
as salary grade 26. While the first part of the abovequoted provision covers only officials of
the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
court. Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with
Farahmand, a private individual charged together with her. The position of manager in a
government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the
jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade,
that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. (Geduspan vs. People, 451 SCRA 187)

VPs and AVP of AFP RSBS has charter if a lower position is within the authority of
SandiganBayan with more reason a higher position is also covered. In the instant case,
petitioners Alzaga and Bello were Head of the Legal Department while petitioner Satuito was
Chief of the Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice Presidents and Assistant Vice
President. These positions are not specifically enumerated in RA. No. 8249; however, as
correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, their ranks as Vice Presidents and Assistant Vice
President are even higher than that of "managers" mentioned in RA. No. 8249. In sum, the
Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and controlled
corporation and that it has jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners who were Vice
Presidents and Assistant Vice President when the charges against them were allegedly
committed. (Alzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, 505 SCRA 849)

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De Facto Officer
De Facto Officer

One who in good faith has possession of the office & has discharged the duties under
color of authority, either derived from an election or appointment, however irregular.

One whose acts, though not those of lawful officer, the law will hold valid upon
principles of public policy & justice because of the need to protect the transacting public.

Requisites:
1. Regularly created office;
2. Color of title or general reputation;
3. Physical possession

What distinguishes it from a de jure is the fact that it has physical possession of the office
whereas a de jure may either be in possession or has never been in possession of the office
but he has the legal right to the office which is being occupied by another person.
A usurper has no right whatsoever. A usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without
any color of right.