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623 F.2d 139
Theodore L. MULARZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
 No. 78-1969.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
 Argued May 9, 1980. Decided June 12, 1980.
Arnold Alperstein, Lakewood, Colo. (Donald W. Alperstein, Lakewood,Colo., with him, on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.F. S. Prince, Jr., of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, Salt Lake City, Utah(Donald J. Winder, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him, on brief), for defendant-appellee.Before BARRETT, DOYLE and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge.1This appeal is on behalf of Mularz, the plaintiff in the court below, seekingreview and reversal of a judgment in favor of the defendant, Greater Park CityCo. The cause was tried and appealed previously. On that occasion the plaintiff  prevailed on summary judgment. Our decision was that the court had erred inso disposing of it. The case was remanded for trial. Although the facts aresuccinctly set forth in our prior opinion, Mularz v. Greater Park City Co., No.77-1040 (10th Cir., June 19, 1978), we here briefly recount them in the light of  present issues.2The object of the suit is recovery of the unpaid portion of an architect's fee.Mularz, the architect, had entered into a contract with Park City, a Utahcorporation, which contract required rendition of architectural services to Park City in connection with a proposed 160-unit condominium development.Mularz prepared the employment contract. He followed a standard formagreement of the American Institute of Architects. He modified that form bystriking out several parts.
 
3Under the contract, Park City agreed to pay Mularz a total of $125,000.00. Inreturn he was to render basic services. The contract contained a definition of theterm "basic services." It recognized and defined five stages or phases:schematic design, design development, construction documents, bidding or negotiation, and construction supervision. Park City paid a total of $100,000.00and hence the action is for the $25,000.00 balance.4The contract set up a schedule for the payment of the fee. Upon the completionof the third construction documents phase, the total payments were to be 80% of the total; at the completion of the bidding and negotiations phase, the total payments were to be completed. Park City abandoned the project beforecompletion of the contract, and this factor is the source of the controversy.5The problem before us arises by reason of the fact that the project was never completed; financing was not obtained by Park City. In October 1973, Park City gave notice to Mularz that the project was on the shelf.6The ultimate question is whether Mularz completely fulfilled his obligationsunder the contract. In the original action, the trial court in effect ruled thatMularz had fully performed and was entitled to the $25,000.00. An alternative basis for the court's decision was that Park City had violated the contract by not providing written notice of suspension or abandonment and that even if Mularzhad not fulfilled his obligations, his failure to do so was excused by Park City's breach. Park City appealed, and the essence of this court's prior ruling was thatPark City had effectively terminated the contract by a letter which was writtenon March 6, 1975. This in effect notified Mularz that continuation of the projecthad to await improvement in the economic climate; that if the circumstanceschanged, the project would be able to go ahead.7In the prior appeal we recognized that there was an unresolved factual questionand that was to what extent Mularz had fully performed the fourth, bidding andnegotiation, phase. To determine that issue the cause was remanded.8In the pretrial order that was filed following remand, the issues of fact were:91. Whether the agreement of the parties was that the plaintiff was to receive$125,000 for the work which he had actually performed.102. Whether there was some bidding and negotiation phase activity which wasrequired in order to get the full fee.
 
In my judgment, considering all of the evidence including the later correspondence,which I don't find to be inconsistent with this determination as to what is the113. If any bidding and negotiation activity was required, how much did he perform?12A contested issue of law was whether parol evidence was admissible.13The trial court's ruling this time around was that the contract was ambiguousconsidering the broad range of possibilities of what could be required of thearchitect under the bidding and negotiation phase, and therefore as aconsequence of the ambiguousness of the contract, parol evidence wasnecessary. This consisted of written correspondence between the parties as wellas the contract and other documents, together with the testimony of twowitnesses: Mularz and, on behalf of Park City, another architect, Ted Warr of Park City, Utah.14Mularz testified that he understood that the $125,000 was a fixed fee and thatsince Park City had its own architects, no service was required of him duringthe last two phases. He said that he intended to make himself available for the project at the bidding and negotiation phase so as to handle questions that mightarise from bidding contractors by telephone. Mularz gave special, reproduciblecopies of his plans to Park City's staff whereby they could reproduce as manysets of blueprints for bidding and negotiation purposes without the need for contacting him. At no time was Mularz ever called by Park City's staff to perform any services connected with bidding and negotiation. Mularz alsotestified, and Warr as well, that a wide variety of services could be requiredduring the period in question and that there was no established practice as towhat the specific services would be; that this varied with the particular client,the architect, and the size and complexity of the project.15Warr's testimony was that the final phase would require about 5% of the totalarchitect's services; that it could be less if the bidding and negotiation work wascompleted mostly by the project owner.16Mularz testified that it was his understanding that the final 20% of his fee, theamount disputed in the action, would be deferred until the making of thefinancing arrangements.
1
 A letter of Mularz, dated March 14, 1973, expressedthis.17In the trial court's ruling from the bench, it was said:18

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