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S 436 (1966)
In the case of Miranda v. Arizona, Ernesto Miranda, 23, was arrested for kidnapping and sexual assault in
Phoenix, Arizona on March 13, 1963 who was identified by the complaining witness. The police took him
to Interrogation Room No. 2 of the detective bureau. He was questioned by two police officers. After two
hours of interrogation, the officers went out of the room with a written confession which was signed by
Miranda. At the top of the statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made
voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and with full knowledge of my legal rights,
understanding any statement I make may be used against me.
At the trial, the officers admitted that Miranda was not advised that he had a right to have an attorney
present. At his trial before jury, the written confession was admitted into evidence over the objection of the
defense counsel and the officers testified to the prior oral confession made by the defendant during the
interrogation. Miranda was found guilty, convicted and sentenced to 20 30 years of imprisonment. On
appeal, Supreme Court of Arizona held that Mirandas constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining
the confession and affirmed the said decision.
Is the confession obtained from Miranda during the custodial investigation admissible as evidence?
The Court voted to overturn Mirandas conviction. Chief Justice Warren declared that the burden is upon
the State to demonstrate that procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination are followed.
The case was against the fundamental fairness standards which the Court established. According to Chief
Justice Warren, it is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney
and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself
affectively protected in any other manner. Without these warnings, statements were inadmissible. The mere
fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had full knowledge of his
legal rights does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional
Chief Justice Warren the spelled out the rights of the accused and the responsibilities of the police. Police
must warn a suspect prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Rule of the case:
Accused Ernesto Miranda, retracting his confession, was tried again by the State of Arizona, found guilty
and sent to prison for 20 to 30 years. The said retrial, based on prisoners successful appeal, did not
constitute double jeopardy.

After his wife left him, petitioner Anthony Douglas Elonis, under the pseudonym Tone Dougie,
used the social networking Web site Facebook to post self-styled rap lyrics containing graphically
violent language and imagery concerning his wife, co-workers, a kindergarten class, and state
and federal law enforcement. These posts were often interspersed with disclaimers that the lyrics
were fictitious and not intended to depict real persons, and with statements that Elonis was
exercising his First Amendment rights. Many who knew him saw his posts as threatening,
however, including his boss, who fired him for threatening co-workers, and his wife, who sought
and was granted a state court protection-from-abuse order against him. When Eloniss former
employer informed the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the posts, the agency began
monitoring Eloniss Facebook activity and eventually arrested him. He was charged with five
counts of violating 18 U. S. C. 875(c), which makes it a federal crime to transmit in interstate
commerce any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.
According to Elonis, every definition of threat or threaten conveys the notion of an intent to
inflict harm. For its part, the Government argues that Section 875(c) should be read in light of its
neighboring provisions, Sections 875(b) and 875(d). Those provisions also prohibit certain types
of threats, but expressly include a mental state requirement of an intent to extort. According
to the Government, the express intent to extort requirements in Sections 875(b) and (d) should
pre-clude courts from implying an unexpressed intent to threaten requirement in Section
875(c) (expressio unius est exclusio alterius).

A grand jury indicted Elonis for making threats. Elonis moved to dismiss the indictment for failing
to allege that he had intended to threaten anyone. The District Court denied the motion. In the
District Court, Elonis moved to dismiss the indictment for failing to allege that he had intended
to threaten anyone. The District Court denied the motion, holding that Third Circuit precedent
required only that Elonis intentionally made the communication, not that he intended to make
a threat. Elonis requested a jury instruction that the government must prove that he intended
to communicate a true threat. The District Court denied that request instead, the District Court
told the jury that Elonis could be found guilty if a reasonable person would foresee that his
statements would be interpreted as a threat. A jury convicted Elonis on four of the five counts
against him, acquitting only on the charge of threatening park patrons and employees. Elonis was
sentenced to three years, eight months imprisonment and three years supervised release.
Elonis renewed his challenge to the jury instructions in the Court of Appeals, contending that the

jury should have been required to find that he intended his posts to be threats. The Court of
Appeals disagreed, holding that the intent required by Section 875(c) is only the intent to
communicate words that the defendant understands, and that a reasonable person would view
as a threat. Hence, this certiorari
Whether the conviction of Elonis is proper?
NO. 18 U. S. C. 875(c), requires that a communication be transmitted and that the
communication contain a threat.
An individual who transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing
any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another is guilty of a felony
and faces up to five years imprisonment. This statute requires that a communication be
transmitted and that the communication contain a threat. Eloniss conviction, however, was
premised solely on how his posts would be understood by a reasonable person. Such a
reasonable person standard is a familiar feature of civil liability in tort law, but is inconsistent
with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct awareness of some wrongdoing.
Eloniss conviction cannot stand. The jury was instructed that the Government need prove only
that a reasonable person would regard Eloniss communications as threats, and that was error.
Federal criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act without considering
the defendants mental state. That understanding took deep and early root in American soil
and Congress left it intact here: Under Section 875(c), wrongdoing must be conscious to be
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.



Respondent Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. operates several lines of clothing stores,
which imposes a Look Policy that governs its employees dress. The Look Policy prohibits caps,
a term the Policy does not define, as too informal for Abercrombies desired image.
Petitioner Samantha Elauf is a practicing Muslim who, consistent with her understanding
of her religions requirements, wears a headscarf. She applied for a position in an Abercrombie
store, and was interviewed by Heather Cooke, the stores assistant manager. Using Abercrombies
ordinary system for evaluating applicants, Cooke gave Elauf a rating that qualified her to be hired.
Though the subject of her religion never arose during Elaufs interview, Cooke was concerned that
her headscarf would conflict with the stores Look Policy.
Cooke sought the store managers guidance to clarify whether the headscarf was a
forbidden cap. When this yielded no answer, Cooke turned to Randall Johnson, the district
manager, who told him that Elauf s headscarf would violate the Look Policy, as would all other
headwear, religious or otherwise, and directed Cooke not to hire Elauf.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Abercrombie on Elauf s
behalf, claiming that its refusal to hire Elauf violated the disparate-treatment provision, as
enshrined in the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, which prohibits two
categories of employment practices, thus:
It is unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individuals race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individuals race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
On the other hand, Abercrombies primary argument is that an applicant cannot show
disparate treatment without first showing that an employer has actual knowledge of the
applicants need for an accommodation.
The District Court granted summary judgment on the issue of liability, held a trial on
damages, and awarded $20,000 in favor of Elauf. When the case was elevated to the Tenth Circuit,
it reversed and awarded summary judgment in favor of Abercrombie. It concluded that ordinarily
an employer cannot be liable under Title VII for failing to accommodate a religious practice until
the applicant or employee provides the employer with actual knowledge of his need for an
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Whether Abercrombie violated the disparate-treatment provision under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964?
Yes, Abercrombie violated the disparate-treatment provision under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
To prevail in a disparate-treatment claim, an applicant only needs to show that his need for
an accommodation is a motivating factor in the employers decision, not that the employer has
knowledge of his need. Title VIIs disparate-treatment provision requires Elauf to show that
Abercrombie failed to hire her because of her religion (including a religious practice). Thus, rather
than imposing a knowledge standard, Title VII prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of
the actors knowledge.
Abercrombies primary argument that an applicant cannot show disparate treatment
without first showing that an employer has actual knowledge of the applicants need for an
accommodation does not hold water. Instead, an applicant need only show that his need for an
accommodation was a motivating factor in the employers decision. Hence, the rule for disparatetreatment claims based on a failure to accommodate a religious practice is straightforward: An
employer may not make an applicants religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in
employment decisions.
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuits judgment and remanded the case for
further consideration consistent with its opinion.


539 U.S. 558 (2003) Argued March 26, 2003Decided June 26, 2003
In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County Police Department were dispatched to a private
residence in response to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered an apartment where
one of the petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence, resided. The right of the police to enter does not
seem to have been questioned. The officers observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner,
engaging in a sexual act. The two petitioners were arrested, held in custody over night, and
charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace.
The complaints described their crime as "deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a
member of the same sex (man)." The applicable state law is Tex. Penal Code Ann. 21.06(a). It
provides: "A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex." The statute defines "[d]eviate sexual intercourse" as follows:
"(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus
of another person; or
"(B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object."
The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They
challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Those contentions were rejected.
The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fined $200 and assessed
court costs of $141.25.
The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners' federal
constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected
the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. In affirming, the State Court of
Appeals held, inter alia, that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Then, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme

1. Whether the petitioners' criminal convictions under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct"
lawwhich criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior
by different-sex couplesviolate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal
protection of the laws?
2. Whether the petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in their
home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
3. Whether Bowers v. Hardwick should be overruled?

The main question before the Court is the validity of a Texas statute making it a crime for two
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. On June 26, 2003, the
Supreme Court released its 63 decision striking down the questioned Texas statute. Five justices
held it violated due process guarantees, and a sixth, Sandra Day O'Connor, held it violated equal
protection guarantees. The five-member majority opinion overruled Bowers v. Hardwick and
implicitly invalidated similar sodomy statutes in 13 other states.
Resolution of this case depends on whether petitioners were free as adults to engage in private
conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. For this inquiry the US
Supreme Court deems it necessary to reconsider its Bowers holding. The Bowers Court's initial
substantive statement-"The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy ... ," To say that the issue
in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the
individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it said that marriage is just
about the right to have sexual intercourse. Although the laws involved in Bowers and here
purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act, their penalties and purposes have
more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. They seek to control a personal
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals. The liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.
Having misapprehended the liberty claim presented to it, the Bowers Court stated that
proscriptions against sodomy have ancient roots. It should be noted, however, that there is no
longstanding history in U.S. of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter. Early
American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit

nonprocreative sexual activity more generally, whether between men and women or men and
men. Moreover, early sodomy laws seem not to have been enforced against consenting adults
acting in private. Instead, sodomy prosecutions often involved predatory acts against those who
could not or did not consent: relations between men and minor girls or boys, between adults
involving force, between adults implicating disparity in status, or between men and animals. The
longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon whichBowers placed such
reliance is as consistent with a general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an
established tradition of prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character.
The Bowers Court was, of course, making the broader point that for centuries there have been
powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral, but the US Supreme Court's
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate its own moral code. The Nation's laws
and traditions in the past half century are most relevant here. They show an emerging awareness
that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex.
Bowers' deficiencies became even more apparent in the years following its announcement. The
25 States with laws prohibiting the conduct referenced in Bowers are reduced now to 13, of
which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct. In those States, including Texas,
that still proscribe sodomy (whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct), there is a pattern of
nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private. Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) confirmed that the Due Process Clause
protects personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education-and Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 624-which struck
down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals-cast Bowers' holding into even more
doubt. The stigma the Texas criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial. Although the
offense is but a minor misdemeanor, it remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the
dignity of the persons charged, including notation of convictions on their records and on job
application forms, and registration as sex offenders under state law. Where a case's foundations
have sustained serious erosion, criticism from other sources is of greater significance. In the
United States, criticism of Bowers has been substantial and continuing, disapproving of its
reasoning in all respects, not just as to its historical assumptions. And, to the extent Bowers relied
on values shared with a wider civilization, the case's reasoning and holding have been rejected
by the European Court of Human Rights, and that other nations have taken action consistent
with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual
conduct. There has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent. Stare decisis is not an
inexorable command. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828. Bowers' holding has not induced
detrimental reliance of the sort that could counsel against overturning it once there are
compelling reasons to do so. Bowers causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and after it
contradict its central holding.

In his dissenting opinion in Bowers, JUSTICE STEVENS concluded that (1) the fact a State's
governing majority has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice, and (2) individual decisions concerning the
intimacies of physical relationships, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of
liberty protected by due process. That analysis should have controlled Bowers, and it controls
here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not correct today, and is hereby overruled.
This case does not involve minors, persons who might be injured or coerced, those who might
not easily refuse consent, or public conduct or prostitution. It does involve two adults who, with
full and mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.
Petitioners' right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in
private conduct without government intervention. Casey, supra, at 847. The Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the individual's personal
and private life.
Rule of the case
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District was reversed, and the
case was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this (US Supreme Courts)

Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of
the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse. The supreme penalty of death was to be imposed
upon him. He then filed motion for recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress
changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed
Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal injection. Echegaray filed a Petition for prohibition
from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted 1. cruel,
degrading, or unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due process, 3. a violation of the Philippines
obligations under international covenants, 4. an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an
unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of
delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal
protection as a ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the
Death Penalty Law, and has declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules,
is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and
easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); in addition to that, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court
dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
1. Is the lethal injection a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment? 2. Is it a violation of our
international treaty obligations?
No. lethal injection a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment it does not also violate international
treaty obligation.
1. Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture
or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by

lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons
discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the
competence and expertise of administrative officials.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for
the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime
and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgment rendered by a competent court." The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be
imposed for the "most serious crimes". Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty
was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified
said document.

People vs. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971

Jose was charged for violating Act 65 in 1944. Act 65 was an act of the Natl Assembly of RP while the
Japanese were still occupying the country. After serving 6 months or in April 1944, Jose was granted a
conditional pardon the simple condition was for him not to violate any other Penal Laws of RP. Later
he committed a crime of qualified theft. The Fiscal then went on to file an additional charge against Jose
for violating the conditions of the pardon granted him. Jose argued that he did not violate the pardon
conditions at all because there is no pardon at all. The pardon granted him is inoperative because the
law he violated before was a political law which was abrogated when the US army took over the country
as proclaimed by MacArthur in Oct 1944.
This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and
Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio Caal. However, for practical purposes all of
them shall hereafter be referred to as appellants.
Whether the defendant can now be prosecuted for having allegedly violated the conditional pardon
granted by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines.
No. Jose cannot be prosecuted criminally for a violation of the conditional pardon granted by the
President of the so-called RP (during the Jap Occupation)

Because, without necessity of discussing and determining the intrinsic validity of the conditional pardon,
as an act done by the President of the so-called RP, after the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government, no elaborate argument is required to show that the effectivity of a conditional pardon
depends on that of the sentence which inflicts upon a defendant the punishment inflicted by the
sentence ceases to be of any effect in so far as the individual upon whom it is bestowed is concerned,
for the latter cannot be required to serve a void sentence of penalty imposed on him, even without such


Romulo Neri, director of National Economic Development Authority was summoned to appear before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2007 to clarify matters regarding the ZTE-NBN deal
(project) of the government. Its a National Broadband Network project by the Department of
Transportation and Communication awarded to the Chinese owned Ziong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE). On the same hearing, Neri disclosed before the members of the committee that there
was an attempt to bribe him for P200 million just for him to approve the project. He further said that the
person who tried to bribe him was COMELEC chairman Abalos. After the attempt bribery, Neri told
President Arroyo about the incident and the later said to no accept the bribe but continue with the project.
After the said disclosures, Neri was asked regarding several details of the conversation between him and
President Arroyo which pertains to the said project. Neri tried to avoid answering said questions, thus
invoked Executive Privilege. Neri once again was asked to appear before the same committee on
November 20, 2007 but failed to appear following the orders of President Arroyo and still invoking
Executive Privilege. On January 30, 2008, Neri was cited in contempt for non-appearance.
January 30, 2008
January 30, 2008
February 1, 2008
February 4, 2008
March 25, 2008

April 8, 2008
September 4, 2008

Romulo Neri was cited in contempt by Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

Neri moved for Reconsideration of contempt order
Neri filed Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with urgent application for
TRO/Preliminary Injunction)
Court issued a Resolution requiring parties to observe status quo prevailing prior
to the Order on January 30, 2008
The Court granted Neris petition for Certiorari on two grounds (Neris covered by
Executive Privilege and Grave Abuse of Discretion on part of Senate Blue Ribbon
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed Motion for Reconsideration
The Court denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration

Whether the communications between Romulo Neri and President Arroyo about the NBN-ZTE deal were
covered by the Executive Privilege?
The Supreme Court issued a resolution penned by Justice Leonardo-De Castro denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on April 8, 2008.
The Supreme Court sided with the petitioner saying that the would-be-answers to the questions of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee pertaining to ZTE-NBN project are covered by Executive Privilege. The
Court further explained that claiming such is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates
to a power given by the Constitution to the President in situation where communications, documents or
other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes
should remain confidential.
Wherefore, respondent Committee Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is hereby denied.

Disini v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 180564
22 June 2010
In 1989, the Philippine Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) wanted Jesus Disini to testify against the
Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United States District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration
case filed against the Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini
worked as an executive assistant for the various companies of Herminio Disini, his second cousin, from 19711984. The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan Power Plant,
brokered by one of Herminios companies, had been tended with anomalies.
On 18 February 1989, the PCGG and Disini entered into an Immunity Agreement under which Disini agreed to
testify for the government. The PCGG guaranteed Disini that apart from the two cases, it shall not compel Disini
to testify in any foreign or local proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio.
Disini complied with his undertaking, but 27 February 2007, Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum and
ad testificandum against Disini. The same commanded him to testify and produce documents before the Court
on 6 and 30 March 2007 in an action by the Republic against Herminio.
Disini filed a motion to quash citing the Immunity Agreement, but the Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and
issued another subpoena.
On 19 July 2007, the PCGG issued Resolution 2007-031, revoking and nullifying the Immunity Agreement as
it prohibited the latter from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio.
On 16 August 2007, Sandiganbayan denied Disinis motion to quash.
Whether the PCGG may revoke or terminate the Immunity Agreement.
No, the PCGG may not revoke the Immunity Agreement.
Section 5 of Executive Order 14 vests the PCGG to grant immunity to witnesses. Here, the PCGG offered Disini,
not only criminal and civil immunity, but also immunity against being compelled to testify in any domestic or
foreign proceeding other than the two cases identified in the Immunity Agreement. The case against the
Westinghouse had so huge a financial impact on the Republic that it was willing to waive its power and right to
compel Disinis testimony in other cases.
Though the government cannot be barred by estoppel based on unauthorized acts of public officers, such
principle cannot apply in this case since the PCGG acted within its authority when it procided Disini with a
guarantee against having to testify in other cases.
Rule of the Case:

The petition is granted and Resolution 2007-031 of the PCGG and Resolution of Sandiganbayan in Republic of
the Philippines v. Herminio T. Disini et al., is annulled.

GR 213197 Remegio A. Ching vs San Pedro College of Business Administration


Remegio Ching, one of the original incorporators and members of San Pedro College of
Business Administration, filed an irrevocable resignation by virtue of a letter dated September
19, 2001. Petitioner was paid the amount of P 20,000,000.00 representing the buy out price of
his interest in SPCBA.

On June 10, 2010, petitioner filed an intra-corporate case docketed as SEC Case No. 862010-C before the Regional Trial Court for the inspection of corporate books under Rule I, Section
1(a)(5) of A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC. He sought the recognition of his right to inspect the corporate
books of respondent as its member claiming that his letter only covered his trusteeship and
treasurership positions only and not his membership. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in
February 14, 2011 ordering the respondent to open the following books for inspection. Respondent
filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which was dismissed. The Supreme Court likewise denied
the petition filed by respondent and attained its finality on April 4, 2012. Meanwhile, on February
16, 2012 the SPCBA Board of Trustees issued a resolution confirming the removal of petitioner
due to the payment unto petitioner.


On April 26, 2012, respondent filed a complaint docketed as RTC-SEC Case No. 92-2012C against petitioner and asked that he be declared legally and/or validly removed as trustee,
treasurer and member pursuant to the resolution dated February 16, 2012. Petitioner countered
that res judicata had already set in following the decision rendered by the RTC in Case No. 862010-C. The lower court agreed with the petitioner that the respondent is already barred from
claiming that he is not a member of SPCBA. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Order and
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.


Whether or not the CA erred in not affirming the application by the RTC in SEC Case No.
92-2012-C on the principle of res judicata.


Yes, res judicata has settled in the present case that bar respondent from raising the question
of petitioner's membership.


Res judicata is commonly understood as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon
the same claim, demand or cause of action. In jurisprudence, it is referred to as bar by former
judgment. It requires that a former judgment or order must be final; that the judgment or order
must be on the merits; that it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and that there must be, between the first and the second action,
identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. Respondent's rejection of the claim that
res judicata exists is based on the lack of one of the aforementioned requisites, that is, the lack of
similarity between the causes of action of the first and second cases.

The Court agrees with petitioner that the issue on his membership was fully determined or
disposed of by the RTC in SEC Case No. 86-2010-C, in a decision which became final and
executory on April 4, 2012. The parties are the same and the issues are essentially the same. The
issue of petitioner's membership was indispensable in SEC Case No. 86-2010-C because his prayer
to be permitted to inspect the books of SPCBA depended on its resolution.

In sum, the confluence of all the elements of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness
of judgment or issue preclusion bars respondent from relitigating the same issue of petitioners


Petition is granted and the Omnibus Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Calamba

[G.R. No. 130003. October 20, 2004]

FACTS: Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Anonuevo traversing the
opposite lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc. (the employer of Anonuevo.)
Anonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to undergo four operations.
PROCEDURE: Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter &Gamble Inc. and Anonuevo
before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against Anonuevo before the MTC of Mandaluyong,
but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge. RTC rendered judgment against Procter
and Gamble and Anonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia the amount of P150, 000 for actual damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. It adjudged Anonuevo liable for the injuries sustained by
the cyclist, Jerome Villagracia. Anonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed
to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets. He also claim that Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by
analogy to all types of vehicles. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving
a motor vehicle has been negligent and at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.
1.) WON Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non-motorized vehicles?
2.) WON Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence for failure to comply with traffic regulations?
Article 2185 of the Civil Code does not apply by analogy to all types of vehicles and Villagracia is not guilty
of contributory negligence.
1.) There is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized and non-motorized vehicles. A motorized
vehicle is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time,
motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or
collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed
and its relative greater bulk of mass. Hence, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal
footing with other types of vehicles.
2.) The fact that Anonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn leads us to believe that even if
Villagracias bicycle had been equipped with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have had opportunity
to brake in time to avoid the speeding car. Even assuming that Anonuevo had failed to see Villagracia
because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclists part would not have
acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn. Moreover, it was
incumbent on Anonuevo to have established that Villagracias failure to have installed the proper brakes
contributed to his own injury. Hence there is no contributory negligence on the part of Villagracia.
Wherefore, the petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. As between Anonuevo
and Villagracia, the courts adjudged Anonuevo as solely responsible for the accident.

CASE: Syjuco vs. Abad

G.R. No. 209135, 01 July 2014

September 25, 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad
claimed that the money was taken from the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
Responding to Sen. Estradas revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public
statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration
Program, explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program
designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that
the funds had been released to the Senators based on their letters of request for funding; and
that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made because the DAP had
already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused
the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He explained that the funds under
the DAP were usually taken from the following;
(1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services;
(2) unprogrammed funds;
(3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and
(4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables
the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for
next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government
project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefore will
be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did
work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds
within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded.

This prompted Augusto Sy Juco and other several concerned citizens to file various petitions with
the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was: DAP is
unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President
to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).

October 17, 2013 SyJuco with Eight (8) other petitioners filed various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
The Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issues raised and

Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National
Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing
the DAP. Subsumed in this issue are whether there is a controversy ripe for judicial
determination, and the standing of petitioners.
The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies.
All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include applications for
the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction or temporary restraining orders.
The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication in
the absence of adverse claims between the parties; that the petitioners lacked legal
standing to sue because no allegations were made to the effect that they had suffered any
injury as a result of the adoption of the DAP and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their being
taxpayers did not immediately confer upon the petitioners the legal standing to sue
considering that the adoption and implementation of the DAP and the issuance of NBC
No. 541 were not in the exercise of the taxing or spending power of Congress; and that
even if the petitioners had suffered injury, there were plain, speedy and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law available to them, like assailing the regularity of the
DAP and related issuances before the Commission on Audit (COA) or in the trial courts.

Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the
following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget
Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a
certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets
for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.

G.R. No. 132390

May 21, 2004
CORPORATION, respondent.

INC., petitioner, vs.




First Metro Investment Corporation (FMIC), respondent, is an investment house organized under
Philippine laws. Petitioner, Bank of Philippine Islands Family Savings Bank, Inc. is a banking corporation
also organized under Philippine laws.
On August 25, 1989, FMIC, through its Executive Vice President Antonio Ong, opened current
account no. 8401-07473-0 and deposited METROBANK check no. 898679 of P100 million with BPI Family
Bank* (BPI FB) San Francisco del Monte Branch (Quezon City). Ong made the deposit upon request of his
friend, Ador de Asis, a close acquaintance of Jaime Sebastian, then Branch Manager of BPI FB San
Francisco del Monte Branch. Sebastians aim was to increase the deposit level in his Branch.
BPI FB, through Sebastian, guaranteed the payment of P14,667,687.01 representing 17% per
annum interest of P100 million deposited by FMIC. The latter, in turn, assured BPI FB that it will maintain
its deposit of P100 million for a period of one year on condition that the interest of 17% per annum is paid
in advance.
This agreement between the parties was reached through their communications in writing.
Subsequently, BPI FB paid FMIC 17% interest or P14,667,687.01 upon clearance of the latters
check deposit.
However, on August 29, 1989, on the basis of an Authority to Debit signed by Ong and Ma. Theresa
David, Senior Manager of FMIC, BPI FB transferred P80 million from FMICs current account to the savings
account of Tevesteco Arrastre Stevedoring, Inc. (Tevesteco).
FMIC denied having authorized the transfer of its funds to Tevesteco, claiming that the signatures
of Ong and David were falsified. Thereupon, to recover immediately its deposit, FMIC, on September 12,
1989, issued BPI FB check no. 129077 for P86,057,646.72 payable to itself and drawn on its deposit with
BPI FB SFDM branch. But upon presentation for payment on September 13, 1989, BPI FB dishonored the
check as it was "drawn against insufficient funds" (DAIF).
FMIC filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 146, Makati City Civil Case No. 89-5280 against
BPI FB. FMIC likewise caused the filing by the Office of the State Prosecutors of an Information for estafa
against Ong, de Asis, Sebastian and four others. However, the Information was dismissed on the basis of
a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused.
The facts as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
1) W/N in validating a clearly illegal and void agreement between FMIC and an overstepping branch
manager of BPI FB, the CA decided the appealed case in a manner not in accordance with law or the
applicable decisions of the Honorable Court.
2) W/N BPI FB clothed its branch manager with apparent authority to enter into such a patently
illegal arrangement.
The Supreme Court held that the parties did not intend the deposit to be treated as a demand
deposit but rather as an interest-earning time deposit not withdrawable any time. This is quite obvious from

the communications between Jaime Sebastian, petitioners Branch Manager, and Antonio Ong,
respondents Executive Vice President. Both agreed that the deposit of P100 million was nonwithdrawable for one year upon payment in advance of the 17% per annum interest. Respondents
time deposit of P100 million was accepted by petitioner as shown by a deposit slip prepared and signed by
Ong himself who indicated therein the account number to which the deposit is to be credited, the name of
FMIC as depositor or account holder, the date of deposit, and the amount of P100 million as deposit in
check. Clearly, when respondent FMIC invested its money with petitioner BPI FB, they intended the P100
million as a time deposit, to earn 17% per annum interest and to remain intact until its maturity date one
year thereafter.

Ordinarily, a time deposit is defined as "one the payment of which cannot legally be required within
such a specified number of days."
In contrast, demand deposits are "all those liabilities of the Bangko Sentral and of other banks
which are denominated in Philippine currency and are subject to payment in legal tender upon demand
by the presentation of (depositors) checks."
While it may be true that barely one month and seven days from the date of deposit, respondent
FMIC demanded the withdrawal of P86,057,646.72 through the issuance of a check payable to itself, the
same was made as a result of the fraudulent and unauthorized transfer by petitioner BPI FB of its P80
million deposit to Tevestecos savings account. Certainly, such was a normal reaction of respondent as a
depositor to petitioners failure in its fiduciary duty to treat its account with the highest degree of care.
Under this circumstance, the withdrawal of deposit by respondent FMIC before the one-year
maturity date did not change the nature of its time deposit to one of demand deposit.
Going back to the unauthorized transfer of respondents funds to Tevesteco, in its attempt to evade
any liability therefor, petitioner now impugns the validity of the subject agreement on the ground that its
Branch Manager, Jaime Sebastian, overstepped the limits of his authority in accepting respondents deposit
with 17% interest per annum. We have held that if a corporation knowingly permits its officer, or any other
agent, to perform acts within the scope of an apparent authority, holding him out to the public as possessing
power to do those acts, the corporation will, as against any person who has dealt in good faith with the
corporation through such agent, be estopped from denying such authority. We reiterated this doctrine
in Prudential Bank vs. Court of Appeals, thus:
"A bank holding out its officers and agent as worthy of confidence will not be permitted to
profit by the frauds they may thus be enabled to perpetrate in the apparent scope of their
employment; nor will it be permitted to shirk its responsibility for such frauds, even though no benefit
may accrue to the bank therefrom. Accordingly, a banking corporation is liable to innocent third
persons where the representation is made in the course of its business by an agent acting within
the general scope of his authority even though the agent is secretly abusing his authority and
attempting to perpetrate a fraud upon his principal or some other person for his own ultimate
Petitioner maintains that respondent should have first inquired whether the deposit of P100 Million
and the fixing of the interest rate were pursuant to its (petitioners) internal procedures. Petitioners stance
is a futile attempt to evade an obligation clearly established by the intent of the parties. What transpires in
the corporate board room is entirely an internal matter. Hence, petitioner may not impute negligence on the
part of respondents representative in failing to find out the scope of authority of petitioners Branch
Manager. Indeed, the public has the right to rely on the trustworthiness of bank managers and their acts.
Obviously, confidence in the banking system, which necessarily includes reliance on bank managers, is
vital in the economic life of our society.

Significantly, the transaction was actually acknowledged and ratified by petitioner when it paid
respondent in advance the interest for one year. Thus, petitioner is estopped from denying that it authorized
its Branch Manager to enter into an agreement with respondents Executive Vice President concerning the
deposit with the corresponding 17% interest per annum.
At this point, we must emphasize that this Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, we uphold the finding
of both lower courts that petitioner failed to exercise that degree of diligence required by the nature of its
obligations to its depositors. A bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous
care, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of million of pesos. Here, petitioner
cannot claim it exercised such a degree of care required of it and must, therefore, bear the consequence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 4, 1997 and the
Resolution dated January 28, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44986 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.