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CA 231 SCRA 30
BOI granted petitioners application to amend its BOI certificate of
registration by changing the scope of its registered product from glazed
floor tiles to ceramic tiles. Oppositor Mariwasa filed a petitioner for
review with the CA. CA granted the preliminary injunction. Petitioner says
that the CA has no jurisdiction as it is vested exclusively with the SC within
30 days from receipt of the decision pursuant to the Omnibus Investments
Code and therefore, Mariwasa has lost its right to appeal. Mariwasa
counters that whatever inconsistencies that the Omnibus Investment Code
and the Judiciary Reorganization Act have been resolved by SC Circular 191.
W/n Mariwasa correctly filed its appeal with the CA.
YES. B.P. 129s objective is providing a uniform procedure of
appeal from decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the
bench and the bar. The obvious lack of deliberation in the drafting of our
laws could perhaps explain the deviation of some of our laws from the goal
of uniform procedure which B.P. 129 sought to promote. Although a
circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect
of law according to settled jurisprudence
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly
repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right
which is prohibited under the Constitution. These simply deal with
procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of
its constitutional rule-making powers. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the
venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of
Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days
from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to

The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence of
Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision
of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeals from
final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words
"(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered
by the Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein.

Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O.

226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal
from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
This is a MR of the previous case. Petitioner's contention is that
Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed to have superseded art. 82 of the
No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino promulgated in the
exercise of legislative authority, is in the nature of a substantive act of
Congress defining the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII, 2 of the
Same issue as in the first FIRST LEPANTO case.
YES (as in previous case). Art. 78 of the Omnibus Investment
Code on Judicial Relief was thereafter amended by B.P. Blg. 129, 3 by
granting in 9 thereof exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the CA over the
decisions and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. When the Omnibus
Investments Code was promulgated on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal
from the decisions and final orders of the BOI to the Supreme Court was
again granted. By then, however, the present Constitution had taken
effect. 4 The Constitution now provides in Art. VI, 30 that "No law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence." This
provision is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can
unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential
function of expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.
Now, art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing
for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders
of the BOI, increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was
enacted without the advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision
never became effective, with the result that it can never be deemed to
have amended BPBlg. 129, 9.

Petitioner is a practicing lawyer who was assessed with P14,009.84
deficiency tax in 1980. His protest was denied by the CIR, which he filed a
NOTICE of appeal (instead of a petition for review) with the CA then two
days later filed for a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
which was denied3.
In G.R. No. 105368: Petitioner CIR rejected the argument of
private respondents4 that they were not liable for donors tax of
P263,032.66 each for their contributions to the campaign chest of Sen.
Edgardo J. Angara when the latter ran for the Senate in the 1987 elections,
on the ground that a political or electoral contribution is not a gift within the
contemplation of the National Internal Revenue Code. The CTA affirmed
the decision to which the CIR filed a motion for extension to file a petition
for review for 15 days. It was granted but its subsequent motions for
extension were denied as the first motion granted was non-extendible.
W/n a party can file a motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review on decisions from the CTA and other quasi-judicial agencies under
Circular 1-91.
YES.From the rules mentioned in a previous ruling 5, it is clear that the
prohibition against granting an extension of time applies only in a case
where ordinary appeal is perfected by a mere notice of appeal. The reason
is that only the filing of the notice of appeal is required to perfect an appeal
and nothing more. However, it is different in a petition for review where the
pleading is required to be verified. A petition for review, unlike an ordinary
appeal, requires careful preparation and operose research in order to put
up a persuasive and formidable position.

These are two cases. The other one involving CIR v. ACCRA partners (w/o Angara)
The court said that there is nothign in the SC circular permitting an extension of time to file a petition for review
Manuel G. Abello, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala and Avelino V. Cruz

Lacsamana v. CA states that The period for filing a petition for review is fifteen days. If a motion for
reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the movant has only the remaining period within
which to file a petition for review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for
extension of time to file such petition for review.
xxx xxx xxx
6) Period of Extension of Time to File Petition for Review. Beginning one month after the promulgation of this
Decision, an extension of only fifteen days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the Court of Appeals,
save in exceptionally meritorious cases . . . .

Circular 1-91 now provides that an appeal from the CTA or other
quasi-judicial agencies to the CA is only by petition for review and not
mere notice of appeal a corresponding motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review should likewise be granted. There is indeed no reason
why a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review pursuant to
Circular No. 1-91 may not be filed. Generally then, a non-extendible
period of 15 days may be granted unless there are compelling reasons
which may warrant the allowance of a longer period. Thus, ubi eadem
ratio, ibi eadem legis dispositio.
Considering however that the procedure enunciated herein may
work injustice to petitioners or those similarly situated if given retroactive
application, as procedural statutes are accorded, in view of the absence in
Circular No. 1-91 of an express provision regulating motions for extension
of time to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals from decisions
of the Court of Tax Appeals and other quasi-judicial agencies, this Court
resolves to give prospective application to the rule herein adopted.
Petitioners claim possession while petitioners claimed a sales
application over a bigger parcel of land including the 4 parcels of land
occupied by the former. The District Land Officer of Cotabato decided in
plaintiffs favor but the Dir. of Lands reversed. The appeal to the Sec. Of
Agri. & natural resources reversed the DoLs decision. An MR was denied
saying that it has become final and executory by the SANR and was
appealed to the Office of the Pres. The Office of the Pres. Reversed the
decision granting it again to the defendants. The petitioners instituted an
ordinary civil action to have the decision of the SANR declared final &
W/n the decision of the Office of the President was valid despite the finality
of the decision of the SANR.
In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some
statutes especially provide for such judicial review; others are silent. Mere
silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review is
unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes;
appeal, petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No general rule applies to
all the various administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute, the

accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are
still available. Therefore, the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy is certiorari, not
an ordinary civil action.
Although in injunctive or prohibitory writs, courts must have
jurisdiction over the Corporation, Board, Officer or person whose acts are
in question and not the jurisdiction over the SM of the case, the doctrines
invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction are inapplicable. Here
the sole point in issue is whether the decision of the respondent public
officers was legally correct or not, and, without going into the merits of the
case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be
confined to the courts of first instance of the locality where the offices of
respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the courts of first instance
in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned
decisions are being enforced."
The provisions of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 are thus
brought to the fore. Section 12 thereof provides:
12. Finality of decision promulgated by the Secretary.The decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce (now Agriculture and Natural Resources) or the Under
Secretary on an appealed case shall become final, unless otherwise specifically stated
therein, after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the date of its receipt by the interested

Section 13 following reads:

13. No reconsideration of final decision or order.After a decision or order of the
Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the Under Secretary or the Director of
Lands has become final, no motion or petition for reconsideration of such decision or
reinvestigation of the case shall be entertained by the Secretary of Agriculture and
[Natural Resources] the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands, as the case may be,
except as provided in Section 14 hereof.

And Section 14 is to this effect:

"Upon such terms as may be considered just, the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural
Resources], the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a decision, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default or excusable neglect: Provided, That application
therefor be made within a reasonable time but in no case exceeding one (1) year after
such decision, order or proceeding was taken."

Defendants did not move to reconsider or appeal from the

Secretary's decision of October 27, 1956 within 30 days from their
receipt thereof. Indeed, they attempted to appeal only on October 23,
1957. They merely contend that their appeal was but 9 days after October
14, 1957, the date defendants received the September 12, 1957 ruling of
the Secretary denying their second motion for reconsideration. That ruling,
it must be remembered, drew attention to the fact that the Secretary's

decision "had long become final and executory." By reason of which,

declaration was made that "this (Secretary's) Office had no more
jurisdiction to entertain the said motion."6
A meeting was held between petitioners (laborers) and the
respondent company where Mr. Eric Mentha, the company's general
manager, allegedly berated the petitioners for writing said letter and called
the letter and the person who prepared it as "stupid." The counsel for the
labor union filed a case (via affidavit) for grave slander against Mr. Mentha.
The company filed a complaint for perjury against petitioners alleging that
their affidavit contained false statements.
The respondent company suspended the petitioners based on
breach of trust and filed with the NLRC a petition for clearance to terminate
their employment. The arbitrator found that the petitioners' dismissal was
without justifiable cause, but that there was no unfair labor practice
committed and directed that petitioners be paid separation pay. NLRC
affirmed but ordered the reinstatement of the petitioners with two (2)
months salary as back wages. Both parties appealed to the Secretary of
Labor who set aside the decision of the NLRC and entered another one
ordering the payment of severance pay only. The petitioners appealed to
the Office of the President and found the company guilty of unfair labor
practice and directing the reinstatement of the petitioners with back wages
but reversed its decision after an MR. It ruled that, while the petitioners'
dismissal was not for just and valid cause, no unfair labor practice had
been committed. Consequently, it directed that petitioners be paid only
separation pay in an amount double those awarded by the compulsory
arbitrator and Secretary of Labor.
W/n the SC has jurisdiction to hear the case

In other words, public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step.
The rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what was already terminated should not be disturbed (Espiritu vs.
San Miguel Brewery, 63 Phil. 615). 10 We do not doubt that even the Office of the President subscribes to the above
rule. As aptly remarked by Justice Malcolm in Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O'Brien, 38 Phil. 527:
Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become
final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to
controversy. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up
to spur on the slothful. ...

YES. Although Art. 223 of the Labor Code. expressly provides that
decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the Office of the
president, does not provide for review of the decisions Of the Office of the
President by the Supreme Court. The Court, in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, may review decisions of the Office of the President on
questions of law and jurisdiction, when properly raised. This does not
mean judicial supremacy over the Office of the President but the
performance by this Court of a duty specifically enjoined upon it by the
Constitution, 12 as part of a system of checks and balances.