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United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit



October 23, 2008

Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court


No. 08-4027
(D.C. No. 2:02-CV-00975-TC)
(D. Utah)



Before OBRIEN, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and

McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Aaron Raiser appeals from the district courts dismissal

of this action under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a
sanction for his refusal to comply with court orders. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. 1291, we affirm.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

Raiser filed this lawsuit against Brigham Young University (BYU) in
2002, alleging BYUs campus police illegally detained him on several occasions
and the school newspaper published false information about him, depriving him
of various constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. After an initial
flurry of discovery and other non-substantive motions, the case sat idle for some
time until an initial pre-trial conference was set in December 2006.
Before the conference, the court issued a Notice Reminder to the parties,
which specifically ordered them to appear in person and stated telephonic
appearances would not be permitted. Nonetheless, three days before the
scheduled conference, Raiser filed a notice stating he would appear by phone.
When the conference convened, however, he appeared neither in person nor
telephonically, which prompted BYU to move for sanctions. On April 23, 2007,
the district court denied BYUs motion, holding Raisers failure to appear at one
pre-trial conference was not sufficient to justify dismissal. But the court warned
Raiser he was on thin ice and very close to having his case dismissed with
prejudice for failure to prosecute and failure to follow court orders and rules. R.
Vol. V., doc. 145 at 10. In the same order, the court specifically ordered Raiser
to personally appear in Utah for every deposition noticed in the case: FAILURE



NOTICE. Id. at 12.
In June 2007, after clearing the date with Raiser, BYU noticed his
deposition for August 24 at its attorneys offices in Salt Lake City. In response,
Raiser filed two motions for a protective order seeking to change the location of
his deposition to neutral territory. While he did not object to appearing in Utah
generally, he did object to appearing at the offices of BYUs counsel. In short, he
argued he simply could not bring himself to go onto the private property of
BYUs counsel because the Universitys past treatment of him was so
traumatizing. The district court found no foundation for Raisers alleged fear of
BYUs counsel. Accordingly, it denied his motion and ordered the deposition to
proceed as noticed.
On August 19, 2007, by email Raiser informed BYUs counsel he would
not appear for his deposition, but he would agree to dismiss the case provided he
be allowed to draft the dismissal documents. In its response the next day, BYU
agreed to a voluntary dismissal, but not to Raiser drafting the documents.
Accordingly, it drafted the dismissal documents and attached them to its email for
Raisers approval, specifying that if his approval was not received by 3:00 pm on
August 23, BYU would have no choice but to convene his deposition. Raiser did
not submit his approval so BYU convened his deposition on August 24, as
promised. When Raiser failed to appear, BYU filed its motion to dismiss and for

attorneys fees, which the district court granted on October 29, 2007. Raiser then
filed a Motion to Reconsider, which the court denied on January 15, 2008.
We review a district courts decision to dismiss an action as a sanction
under Rule 41(b) for abuse of discretion. Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC
Holding Co., 497 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2007). An abuse of discretion
occurs when a district court makes a clear error of judgment or exceeds the
bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. Id. (quotation omitted).
More specifically for purposes of this case, we have held a district court abuses
its discretion if it dismisses an action under Rule 41(b) without considering the
following factors: (1) the degree of actual prejudice to the other party; (2) the
amount of interference with the judicial process; (3) the litigants culpability; (4)
whether the court warned the party in advance dismissal would be a likely
sanction for noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions. Mobley v.
McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994).
There was no abuse of discretion here. To the contrary, the record reveals
a careful consideration of each of the above factors leading to the district courts
ultimate conclusion that Raisers repeated non-compliance warranted the harshest
of sanctions. Furthermore, we conclude the district court acted well within its
discretion in ordering Raiser to pay the modest amount in attorneys fees incurred
by BYU in convening his deposition and drafting the motion for sanctions. The

district courts judgment is therefore AFFIRMED. Raisers arguments concerning

the district courts tailoring of his complaint are mooted by this disposition, and
all pending motions are DENIED.

Entered for the Court

Terrence L. OBrien
Circuit Judge