You are on page 1of 83

Carbon Tax CP

Carbon Tax CP.............................................................................................................................. 1


Overview................................................................................................................................... 3
FYI............................................................................................................................................ 4
Top-Shelf...................................................................................................................................... 5
1nc text fee + dividend..........................................................................................................6
1nc text sin tax.......................................................................................................................7
1nc warming.......................................................................................................................... 9
2nc warming........................................................................................................................ 10
1nc oil................................................................................................................................... 13
1nc laundry list (longer*).....................................................................................................14
1nc laundry list (short).........................................................................................................17
2nc other countries/economists..........................................................................................18
Solvency Extensions...................................................................................................................19
Solves Warming..................................................................................................................20
Solves Warming/Oil Consumption.....................................................................................25
Solves Modeling**...............................................................................................................26
Solves International Coop...................................................................................................29
Solves Oil Dependence........................................................................................................30
Solves Oil Prices/Dependence............................................................................................32
Solves Coal/Natural Gas/Nuke Power................................................................................33
Solves Agriculture...............................................................................................................34
Solves Disease/Invasive Species.........................................................................................35
Solves Energy Extraction....................................................................................................36
Solves Renewables/Efficiency.............................................................................................37
Solves Econ.......................................................................................................................... 41
Solves Econ (Jobs)..............................................................................................................42
Solves Competitiveness/Heg..............................................................................................43
Solves Soft Power/Heg***..................................................................................................44
Revenue-Neutral Solvency.....................................................................................................45
Phased Solvency.....................................................................................................................46
Politics Shields........................................................................................................................... 47
Avoids Politics........................................................................................................................ 48
Avoids Politics Fee + Dividend EXTN................................................................................54

Avoids Politics Obama No Push EXTN...............................................................................55


Avoids Politics Internal Change EXTN...............................................................................57
Avoids Politics Consensus/No PC EXTN............................................................................58
Avoids Politics (Public Supports)..........................................................................................60
2NC NB Coercion................................................................................................................61
Neg 2NC AT:...........................................................................................................................63
AT: Carbon Leakage...............................................................................................................64
AT: Border Tax X WTO..........................................................................................................67
AT: Trade Deficit/Competitiveness........................................................................................71
AT: Implementation Issues/Delay.........................................................................................72
AT: Ineffective/No Solve Consumption.................................................................................74
AT: Consistency/Politics........................................................................................................75
AT: Transition Bad.................................................................................................................76
AT: Econ Turns.......................................................................................................................77
AT: Manufacturing.................................................................................................................79
AT: Consumers.......................................................................................................................80
AT: Low Income/Poor People................................................................................................82
AT: Oil Shocks Turn...............................................................................................................83
AT: Oil Markets......................................................................................................................84
AT: Hurts Energy-Intensive Consumers/Industries.............................................................85

Overview
This file is an advantage CP to solve global warming advantages and any affs that claim to
bolster the renewable energy market. I cut this originally for the college energy topic
(undefeated when we went for it) and have updated it with 2014 evidence.
Given that global warming is almost certain to be one of the biggest advantages on next years
Oceans topic, this file is a must-have. The solvency cards are fantastic, seriously a silver-bullet
against any warming advs. Included are a variety of versions of the CP that have never been
read (to account for potential DAs/to bolster politics shields) and extensive 2NC blocks to
answer every possible arg you will hear in response.
In terms of the net benefit, you can go for any DA specific to oceans exploration/development.
Additionally, the politics shields are very solid.
FYI section includes a general overview of how a carbon tax would be implemented.

FYI
Carbon Tax Center 11 (FAQs, Jan 31, retrieved July 27, http://www.carbontax.org/faq/,
CMR)

15. How will carbon taxes be administered?


The tax will be levied in the wholesale branch of the fuel supply chain, as far upstream as
practicable. For example, electric generators will pay the mandated carbon tax to their coal, oil
or natural gas suppliers, who will forward the payment to the government; the generators will
pass along the tax to the retail electric utility which in turn will charge it to customers to the
extent that market conditions allow. Similarly for petroleum products (e.g., gasoline, jet fuel,
heating oil), with government collecting the tax from refiners or importers of refined petroleum
products, and the taxes passed on to oil wholesalers and eventually to retail customers. This
approach will maximize accuracy and incentives and minimize paperwork and leakage.

Carbon Tax Center 11 (FAQs, Jan 31, retrieved July 27, http://www.carbontax.org/faq/,
CMR)

17. Will a carbon tax apply to nuclear power?


A carbon tax will only be imposed on the use or combustion of carbon and the resulting
emission of carbon dioxide. A carbon tax would not be imposed directly on the generation of
nuclear power, but it would apply to any CO2 released in mining, enriching and transporting
uranium, in other uses ancillary to the generation of nuclear power (such as fuel used for backup generation), and in storing radioactive wastes.

Top-Shelf

1nc text fee + dividend


The United States federal government should implement a phased,
revenue-neutral carbon fee and dividend on all domestic production
and importation of coal, petroleum, and natural gas.
[Politics shields for this mechanism are in the avoids politics block below]

1nc text sin tax


The United States federal government should implement a phased,
revenue-neutral carbon sin tax on all domestic production and
importation of coal, petroleum, and natural gas.
Sin taxes avoid political backlash
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)
Alternatively, casting

the carbon tax as a "sin" tax may be an option . Sin taxes in the past have been
politically palatable in the United States. People seem to agree with the idea of shifting revenue
from a "public bad" (tobacco) and to a "public good" (cancer research and health care). n141 As public [*89]
consciousness around climate change develops, it is conceivable that citizens could impose a form of sin tax on carbon use.

ZERO opposition to sin taxes


Trinko 10 (Katrina, freelance writer in Washington, D.C., and former editorial page intern at
USA TODAY, Political cowards love the sin tax, 9/20,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-09-21-column21_ST_N.htm,
CMR)
That's because during this recession, politicians

are increasingly resorting to sin taxes to help close budget gaps.


Aware that Americans, facing high unemployment and underemployment, won't rush to support (or re-elect)
those who raise income taxes, politicians are devising less obvious ways to boost revenue. Raising fees on
government services is one such way; increasing or instituting sin taxes is another. And so, politicians have rushed to
raise these new levies as if they're the policy equivalent of rescuing kittens. In the past fiscal
year, 11 states have increased cigarette taxes, while five states upped their gas taxes. (Yes, even driving is seen as a sin in some
quarters today.) Earlier this year, Colorado stopped exempting sugary drinks and fatty snacks from a 2.9% sales tax, while
Washington state hiked taxes on beer and soda. And the proposals keep coming: Californians will vote in November whether to
legalize and tax marijuana, more than 130 Maryland General Assembly candidates have signed a pledge to vote for a 10-cent tax on
all alcoholic drinks, and in Oregon, the Public Health Division is pushing for a soda tax. Hurting the poor Washington is also
jumping on the bandwagon: Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., has introduced a bill to legalize and tax Internet gambling. The intended
jackpot: up to $42 billion over 10 years. While the legislation still has several hurdles, it has attracted 70 co-sponsors in the House
a significant number considering that a bill that included an Internet gambling ban passed almost unanimously in 2006. With

the nation's economic wheels still spinning in the mud, expect sin taxes to be in for the
foreseeable future. Though politicians will still argue that they're still being chaste when it comes to keeping hands off the
middle class and economically impoverished, the sin tax says otherwise. Low-income Americans, who are already the hardest hit by
the recession, will lug the load of any sin tax. Unlike income taxes, which exempt the poorest and have lower rates for those making
less, there's nothing progressive about sin taxes.

1nc warming
Carbon tax could be implemented immediately solves warming and
restores US negotiating credibility ensuring international action
Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann9 (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law
and the Director of the International Tax LLM Program at the University of Michigan Law
School; David M. Uhlmann is the Jeffrey F. Liss Professor from Practice and the Director of the
Environmental Law and Policy Program at the University of Michigan Law School, Combating
Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap
and Trade, Feb, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, lexis, CMR)

A more efficient and effective market-based approach to reduce carbon dioxide emissions would
be a carbon tax imposed on [*7] all coal, natural gas, and oil produced domestically or imported
into the United States. A carbon tax would enable the market to account for the societal costs of carbon dioxide emissions and thereby
promote emission reductions, just like a cap and trade system. A carbon tax would be easier to implement
and enforce, however, and simpler to adjust if the resulting market-based changes were either too
weak or too strong. A carbon tax also would produce revenue that could be used to fund research and development of alternative energy and
tax credits to offset any regressive effects of the carbon tax. Because a carbon tax could be implemented and become
effective almost immediately , it would be a much quicker method of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions than a cap and trade system. In addition, because a carbon tax could be effective in advance of
any international treaty regarding greenhouse gas emissions, a carbon tax would provide the
United States much needed credibility in the negotiations over international carbon dioxide
limits. A carbon tax could then supplement an international cap and trade system, combine with emission caps in an international hybrid
"cap and tax" approach, or become the focal point for the next international treaty to address global
climate change.

2nc warming
CP solves warming best our Avi-Yonah evidence says a carbon tax
could be implemented immediately results in huge emissions
reductions by creating a disincentive to use fossil fuels also accesses
their credibility arguments gives the US leverage to pursue an
international treaty
Necessary vs sufficient the CP solves just as well as the aff err
negative since they cant quantify the impact to a solvency deficit
huge risk of the disad outweighs
Best way to reduce emissions spurs renewable transition and
energy efficiency other countries will model
Komanoff 12/10/12 economist and directs the New York City-based Carbon Tax Center

(Charles, The Time Has Never Been More Right for a Carbon Tax,
http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-a-carbon-tax-a-good-idea/the-time-has-never-beenmore-right-for-a-carbon-tax, CMR)
to leave carbon-based energy behind.
no modern economy can do that unless prices of fuels tell the truth about the climate damage
they cause. This is best done by aggressively taxing the carbon content of coal, oil, and natural
gas, with the levies placed "upstream" where the fuels are taken from the ground. That's a
carbon tax: straightforward, transparent, no gimmicks, no loopholes. Unlike cap-and-trade, a carbon tax creates no new markets; rather, it
embeds price signals in existing fuel markets that will spur innovation and reward the rapid
Recurring and worsening climate disasters make painfully clear that the world has just a few decades, if that,
But

uptake of clean energy. Moreover, making the tax revenue-neutral will prevent it from adding to
the size of government . With the anti-science far right losing traction in Washington, and with the nation reeling from "extreme weather" events
Americans appear ready for climate action.

like the 2011-2012 droughts and the recent Superstorm Sandy,


Fortuitously, a carbon tax is
perfectly suited to handle an overlooked but key piece of the "fiscal cliff"the impending expiration of the two-year payroll tax "holiday." The Carbon Tax Center estimates that
a carbon tax pegged at just $18 per ton of carbon dioxide would generate $95 billion a yearenough to pay to extend the payroll tax holiday beyond its December 31 expiration
and thereby help keep the fragile economic recovery from imploding. That tax is relatively small (equivalent to 17 cents on a gallon of gas and just under a penny per kilowatt-

the reductions in carbon emissions will cascade if the tax is


ramped up, year by year; indeed, the mere expectation of rising prices for coal, oil, and gas will go far
to drive an across-the-board transition to renewable and efficient energy. To protect
energy-intensive industries, carbon tax legislation should include "border tax adjustments" on
imports, pegged to their untaxed carbon contents. These tariffs will incentivize our trading partners to impose
hour of electricity), so its climate impact would be modest. But

their own carbon taxes so that the tax revenues flow to them, not the U.S. Treasury. A carbon tax is so necessary and
manageable that its adoption isn't a matter of "if" but of "when."

The time has never been more right.

It's up to Congress and the

president to seize it.

CP solves warming and climate leadership best no disads


- Revenue neutrality S econ risks
- Border tax checks carbon leakage w/o violating WTO
Clark 14 (Jon, Mid-Atlantic regional coordinator for Citizens Climate Lobby, Here's why a
carbon tax is key to fighting global warming, 1-8,
http://www.pennlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/01/heres_why_a_carbon_tax_is_key_to_fi
ghting_global_warming.html, CMR)

The solution that economists recommend is taxing carbon pollution to make up for the hidden costs to society
by burning fossil fuels. Taxing the bad stuff we want less of -like carbon pollution- makes much more sense than taxing the
stuff we want more of like income. A tax swap would make the carbon tax revenue-neutral by returning
equally to taxpayers 100 percent of the revenue collected and ensure that poor and middle-class families are not
negatively affected. This market signal would shift investment money away from fossil fuels
and towards clean, carbon-free forms of energy and manufacturing, making clean energy cheaper
than fossil fuels. Where investment dollars flow, jobs will follow. Here is the best part about a carbon tax. To protect
American businesses from being undercut by foreign corporations (much like what happened to American solar
manufacturer Solyndra when China dumped a large amount of heavily-subsidized solar panels on our market), we can tax
imports from countries that do not a have a price on carbon emissions . These countries would be
forced to pay border penalties to the United States to retain access to lucrative American markets. The only way
for the countries to avoid these penalties would be for those countries to also put a price on
carbon. Experts say this would not violate any current trade agreements provided that policymakers carefully
design a [carbon] tax, keeping in mind the basic requirements of the World Trade Organization not to discriminate in favor of
domestic producers or to favor imports from certain countries over others the threat of World Trade Organization challenges
should not present a barrier to policymakers wishing to adopt a carbon tax system now. This is according to Jennifer

Hillman, who was approved in December 2007 by the members of the World Trade
Organization to serve as one of the seven members of the World Trade Organization's appellate
body, the final adjudicator of international trade disputes. The China excuse doesnt hold up under scrutiny and is actually a good
reason for us to enact a revenue-neutral carbon tax with border tax adjustments on countries without a price on carbon. With carbon
dioxide levels going in the wrong direction, Congress

can take a leadership role in addressing climate


change by passing a revenue-neutral carbon tax. If we do this smartly, we can put the power of the free-market
to work to grow our economy while cleaning up our air and water and preserving a relatively
stable climate for future generations.

Solves warming and leadership consensus and empirics prove


Hallahan 14 (Bob, retired Navy Commander with an MA in national security and strategic
studies from the U.S. Naval War College, Its time to tackle climate change with carbon tax,
Feb 9, http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20140209/OPINION03/140209222, CMR)
Fortunately, we

have a solution to the pollution. Economists tell us that to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions, we have only to tax them. Our economy spews emissions because its free to pollute! The money we
pay for gasoline covers the cost to make and transport it, plus profit. Nobody pays the cost of cleaning up the carbon pollution
produced when we burn fossil fuels, although we certainly suffer consequences. In economic terms, its a classic market failure.
Gradually instituting a revenue-neutral carbon tax will correct this distortion, reorienting

our creative economy toward getting the carbon out. Such a tax need not increase net revenue to
governments; it could reduce state sales taxes and replace the B&O tax. Our friends in British Columbia already
implemented such a system. According to The Economist, its proved effective at reducing carbon
emissions without holding back their economy . A carbon tax is a simple, fair, and (among
economists) widely agreed-upon solution. Its senseless that we have an effective, market-based solution to two
gigantic problems but arent implementing it. The states Climate Legislative and Executive Workgroup (CLEW) failed to agree last
month on recommendations to meet our states already-too-tepid pollution limit targets. CLEW members Sen. Doug Ericksen (R42nd district) and Rep. Shelly Short (R-7th district) seemed to object to the very goal of state emission targets, writing that meeting
them would do nothing to mitigate global climate variability. This shockingly inaccurate statement demonstrates zero
acknowledgement of our ability to make a difference through leadership in reducing climate change and ocean acidification. It
abrogates a responsibility to leave the world at least as habitable as we found it, and as such, constitutes legislative malpractice. Our
state is an international leader in technology and innovation. A carbon tax would make us an

international leader in smart, ethical government policies as well.

1nc oil
Avoids politics and solves oil dependence and economy
Houser 11 visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Trevor, is

partner at the Rhodium Group (RHG) and director of its Energy and Climate Practice. He is also
an adjunct lecturer at the City College of New York and a visiting fellow at the school's Colin
Powell Center for Policy Studies. During 2009 he served as senior advisor to the US Special
Envoy on Climate Change, American Eyes on Australia's Carbon Tax, Australian Financial
Review, 7/12/2011, accessed 7/23/2011, http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?
ResearchID=1873, CMR)
Australias proposed carbon

tax is attracting interest in some unlikely quarters of the American political


landscape. Conventional wisdom in Washington is that the economic crisis coupled with the Republican takeover of the House of Representatives
has killed the prospect of serious US climate change policy. Yet while American politicians dont seem too concerned about rising global temperatures,
they are definitely concerned about rising fiscal deficits. And the revenue raising potential of a

carbon tax may become


increasingly attractive in Washington in the years ahead. A carbon tax has long been the favorite tool among

economists for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Imposing a tax on something that reduces welfare (like pollution) can allow policymakers to reduce
taxes on things that increase welfare (like employment, investment or innovation). And its not just liberal economists that find a carbon tax attractive.
Gregory Mankiw,

Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under George W. Bush and Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, senior economic advisor to Senator John McCain during the 2008 Presidential Campaign, have both
argued the merits of taxing carbon and using the revenue to cut economically distorting
corporate and payroll taxes. This economic logic has elicited support from some leading
Republican politicians as well. Most notable is Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska (the highest
ranking Senate Republican on energy policy issues) who, while opposing efforts by the Environmental Protection
Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, has publically supported a carbon tax. She is joined by

ExxonMobil chief executive Rex Tillerson, who argues the economic certainty that comes with a
carbon tax is more important than the environmental certainty you get with cap-and-trade. And for
Americans increasingly concerned with the security of the countrys energy supply, a carbon tax
could yield some unexpected benefits. A colleague and I recently analyzed all leading energy security proposals currently bouncing around
Washingtonfrom vehicle efficiency standards to expanded offshore oil drilling. And we threw a carbon tax in just for fun. To our surprise the
carbon tax did more to reduce US dependence on foreign oil than almost any other
proposal because it both reduced oil demand and increased domestic supply. The latter occurs thanks to
a) an increase in natural gas liquids production, an oil substitute pumped alongside the natural gas used to replace coal-fired power plants, and b) CO2
captured from remaining coal-fired power plants used to coax more oil out of older domestic wells. Yet the economic or energy security merits alone
arent enough to win most American politicians over, and in the current political environment the global climate benefits dont help much either. Its
the deficit reduction potential of a

carbon tax that could give US climate policy a new lease on life . For a recent

fiscal solutions summit in Washington, six leading American think tanks put forward plans for cutting the US budget deficit. Four of the six suggested
pricing carbon as a way to raise government revenue, including the

conservative American Enterprise Institute (AEI), which


recommended a carbon tax starting at $20 per ton and growing by over 5 percent per year after that. The AEI proposal would raise $161
billion per year by 2020, enough to reduce the federal budget deficit by 22 percent that year. Thats greater than the savings Washington would get
from raising the national retirement age to 70 and equivalent to eliminating all foreign aid and federal funding for education.

1nc laundry list (longer*)


Solves the economy, trade deficit, warming, oil dependence, and
investment in clean tech
Blinder 11 professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton University and vice

chairman of the Promontory Interfinancial Network, is a former vice chairman of the Federal
Reserve (Alan, The Carbon Tax Miracle Cure,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703893104576108610681576914.html, CMR)
Under this

policy approach, decision-making is left in private hands and the jobs created will be in the private sector.

Furthermore, the policy would not cost taxpayers a dime. In fact, it would eventually reduce the federal budget deficit
significantly. Plus, there are a few nice side effects, like reducing

our trade deficit, making our economy more

efficient, ameliorating global warming, and showing the world that American capitalism has not lost its edge.
What is this miraculous policy? It's called a carbon taxreally, a carbon dioxide taxbut one that starts at zero and
ramps up gradually over time.
The timing is critical. With the recovery just startingwe hopeto gather steam, this is a terrible time to hit it with some big new
tax. Hence, while the CO2 tax should be enacted now, it should be set at zero for 2011 and 2012. After that, it would ramp up
gradually. Adapting some calculations from a recent paper by Prof. William Nordhaus of Yale, the tax might start at something like
$8 per ton of CO2 in 2013 (that's roughly eight cents per gallon of gasoline), reach $25 a ton by 2015 (still just 26 cents per gallon),
$40 by 2020, and keep on rising. I'd like to see it top out at more than $200 a ton in, say, 2040which is higher than in Mr.
Nordhaus's example.
But the time pattern is more important than the exact dates and numbers. What's critical is that we lock in higher

future costs of carbon today. The key thing, as the president said, is that "businesses know there will be a market for what
they're selling."
Think about what would happen. Once

America's entrepreneurs and corporate executives see lucrative


opportunities from carbon-saving devices and technologies, they will start investing right
away and in ways that make the most economic sense. I don't know whether all this innovation will lead to 80% of our
electricity being generated by clean energy sources in 2035, which is the president's goal. But I can hardly wait to witness the
outpouring of ideas it would unleash. The next Steve Jobs, Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg are waiting in the wings to make
themselves rich by helping the environment.
Jobs follow investment , and we need jobs now. Even if our economy manages 4% growth for several years in a row,
unemployment is destined to remain high for years. We have become accustomed to grading stimulus programs on their "bang for
the buck." The 2009 Recovery Act, for example, was expected to cost $90,000-$100,000 for each job created. The "bang for
the buck" from a phased-in carbon tax would be infinite at first: lots of jobs at zero cost to the
federal budget.
Furthermore, many of the new jobs will be good jobs with good wages, just what America needs right now. It is probably
true, as some critics say, that much of the resulting manufacturing activity will move offshoreeventually. But not necessarily right
away. And besides, many of the best jobsin design, sales, marketing and executive positionswill remain in the U.S.
Another salutary effect would be that no one would pay higher taxes for the first two years or so. Using Mr. Nordhaus's tax rates as
an illustration, the tax would begin to bring in revenue starting in 2013a trickle at first but building. Mr. Nordhaus estimates $123
billion in annual tax revenue in 2015 and $282 billion by 2025. If we eventually hit a $200 per ton tax rate, the tax yield would be
close to 2% of GDP.
No one likes to pay higher taxes. But every realistic observer knows that closing our humongous federal budget deficit will require a
mix of higher taxes and lower spending as shares of GDP. Forget about value-added taxes and other new levies you may have heard
about. A CO2 tax trumps them all.
Among the major benefits is that a carbon tax would reduce oil imports . Everyone knows that we import too
much oileven if we ignore the fact that much of what we pay for it goes to countries that are not exactly friendly to us. In recent
years, our imports of energy-related petroleum products have accounted for nearly two-thirds of our overall trade deficit in goods
and services.
Everyone also knows that CO2 emissions are the major cause of global climate change, that climate change poses a clear and
present danger to our planet, and that the U.S. contributes a huge share of global emissions. Up to now, our country has done
approximately nothing to curb CO2 emissions. A stiff tax would make a world of difference . Let's remember that
even a tax of $200 per ton 30 years from now won't turn us into France. ( A

carbon tax would have very large effects


on the cost of energy generated by burning coal, but essentially none on the costs of nuclear, solar, or wind-generated
energy.)

Carbon tax solves warming, the economy, and leads to a renewable


transition
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)

One way or another, the era of cheap carbon energy is ending. The question before us is how to best navigate the transition from
carbon energy to clean technology. Since the industrial revolution, carbon has been a key facilitator in the most explosive growth in
human history. Fossil fuels, however, are finite, and numerous analyses suggest that we have already hit peak consumption. n1 In
addition to their inevitable depletion, several factors compel a transition away from fossil fuels and toward clean-energy sources
such as solar, wind, and biofuels (collectively referred to as "clean tech"). This Article argues that a

carbon tax is the best

policy to facilitate the unavoidable transition to new energy sources. The move away from human reliance on fossil
fuels is both pushed by the need to avoid negative environmental and geopolitical consequences and pulled by the opportunity for economic growth. Under the current system
for redistributing the world's fossil fuel reserves, both importing and exporting nations face great political and economic costs. For supplying nations - especially those with weak
democracies or dictatorships - the presence of oil frequently corrupts the political culture and leads to violent struggles for control. n2 For oil consuming nations, the payment of
trillions of dollars annually to oil producing countries is causing one of the biggest transfers of wealth in human history. n3 The United States steadily pays billions annually to
producing countries such as Venezuela, Iran, and Russia. n4 In sheer economic terms, the rising bill for imported petroleum lowers the United States savings rate, adds to
inflation, worsens the trade deficit, and undermines the dollar. n5 Profound redistributions of wealth also impact relationships between nations. Nations ideologically opposed
to the United States gain financial independence, confidence, and capabilities. n6 Moreover, fossil fuel resource depletion could "potentially destabilize the geo-political
environment, leading to skirmishes, battles, and even war due to resource constraints." n7 Environmental concerns present another host of reasons that compel the [*71]
transition away from fossil fuel consumption. Governments and a growing public majority are joining the near uniform scientific consensus that global warming is a reality and
that a century of industrial development has acutely impacted the ecosystem. n8 Scientists believe that most of the warming in the last fifty years is human-induced n9 and has
led to melting glaciers, rising sea levels, the unbalancing of ecosystems, and intensified droughts and wildfires. n10 Scientists also believe that rising temperatures will increase
the frequency of catastrophic, Katrina-like events, such as the submergence of low-lying coastal areas and violent storms. n11 The possible environmental and geopolitical
consequences alone raise reason enough to discontinue the current "business as usual" path. But this Article does not intend to join the increasingly cacophonous chorus of
doomsayers. Rather, it argues that the inevitable move away from fossil fuels presents an opportunity for an unprecedented economic and technological shift. If governments,
individuals, and organizations choose to develop renewable energies, we can address pressing global issues, build new high-growth economies, improve collective security, and
ensure brighter prospects for future generations. n12 In a unique moment in modern history, renewable energy offers a simultaneous promise of economic growth and
environmental sustainability. Indeed, a clean tech revolution will depend on financial growth, built around current and future business opportunities, driving us toward a more
sustainable world. Technology markets, supported by capital and the right governmental policies, can provide the engine that generates new high-paying jobs, competitive

A carbon tax - to be
imposed on coal, natural gas, and oil produced in or imported to the United States - would create a price signal for
businesses, vast infrastructure investment, and long-term sustainability. n13 Ultimately, this Article embraces a market-based solution.

private markets to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and invest in the development
of fossil fuel alternatives . Such a signal would utilize the undeniable force and meritocratic
nature of capitalist markets to transition to a new, wealth-generating economy . In relying on
our [*72] capitalistic nature, we can meet the world's rising energy needs while transitioning away from
the exploitive dependence on carbon energy.

Carbon tax is easy to implement and effective solves warming and


the economy while protecting low-income individuals and industries
Litman 10 (Todd Litman, executive director of the Victoria Transport Policy Institute,

author of Online TDM Encyclopedia, chairperson of the TRB Sustainable Transportation


Indicators Subcommittee, the VTPI, Tax What You Burn, Not What You Earn, June 4, page 4,
http://www.vtpi.org/carbontax.pdf, CMR)
Climate change, uncertain future energy prices, and other problems caused by high fossil fuel consumption rates justify bold actions
to encourage energy conservation and emission reductions. Of these, carbon taxes are among the most effective and

efficient. Such taxes should be broad, gradual, predictable, and structured to benefit low-income
households. British Columbias new carbon tax reflects these principles. It begins small and increases gradually, allowing
consumers and industry to respond with many energy saving strategies. Revenues are returned to residents and
businesses in ways that protect low income households. Although its impacts are initially modest, the tax
provides a foundation for large future emission reductions . It sends an important
message: fossil fuels are costly and should be used efficiently . Carbon taxes encourage
consumers and businesses to implement various energy conservation strategies , including choosing
more fuel efficient vehicles, reduced vehicle travel, shifts to alternative modes, more accessible land use, building weatherization and
renewable energy development. This is more effective, efficient and beneficial than strategies that only

encourage a single solution, and by reducing total vehicle travel it provides additional co-benefits including congestion
reduction, road and parking cost savings, increased safety and health, and reduced sprawl. Like most new taxes, the carbon tax has
been criticized, but much of this criticism is technically incorrect or exaggerated. Critics portray households and businesses as

powerless victims with inflexible energy demands, virtually everybody have ways to conserve energy and therefore can reduce their
tax burden, particularly over the long-run as higher future fuel prices affect long-term decisions such as vehicle purchases and home
location. Since lower-income households tend to consume less than average amounts of fuel and

receive targeted rebates, most lower-income households benefit overall. A revenue-neutral


carbon tax tends to support economic development by encouraging efficiency and keeping
money circulating within the regional economy. Energy intensive groups (heavy industries, rural
residents, taxi drivers) argue they should be exempt due to the excessive burden the tax imposes on
them, but the carbon tax is actually modest as a portion of total fuel costs and because such
groups are large energy users their participation is critical: 20% fuel conservation by heavy energy users
provides greater benefits than the same reduction by less fuel intensive households and businesses. This is not to suggest that carbon
taxes are the only strategy needed to achieve emission reduction targets, or that BCs carbon tax cannot be improved (Litman
2008b). It is important to develop better technologies and efficient transport options, overcome market barriers, educate
consumers, and help lower-income households finance energy conservation investments. These all complement carbon taxes. British
Columbias carbon tax shows true leadership in recognizing a problem and providing a real solution. If other North American
jurisdictions follow, its impacts

and benefits will be huge.

1nc laundry list (short)


Solves oil prices and dependence, warming, and the economy
Rosenblum 7 (Daniel, A Carbon Tax When Oil Approaches $100/Barrel?, 11/9,

http://www.carbontax.org/blogarchives/2007/11/09/a-carbon-tax-when-oil-approaches100barrel/, CMR)
Finally, right now the high oil prices are enriching oil producing countries and oil companies
and causing severe damage to the United States economy. A revenue-neutral carbon tax will
reduce demand and lead to reduced prices for the oil itself . The results? Reduced carbon
dioxide emissions, less money going overseas and to big oil companies, carbon tax revenues
returned to all Americans and strengthening our economy, and increased national security as we
reduce our dependence on foreign oil. Win-win-win-win!

2nc other countries/economists


Carbon tax is effective other countries and economic models prove
Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann9 (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law

and the Director of the International Tax LLM Program at the University of Michigan Law
School; David M. Uhlmann is the Jeffrey F. Liss Professor from Practice and the Director of the
Environmental Law and Policy Program at the University of Michigan Law School, Combating
Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap
and Trade, Feb, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, lexis, CMR)
In contrast to the limited experience in the U.S. with cap and trade, carbon

taxes have been successfully

implemented in a growing number of countries. Carbon taxes have been implemented in


Quebec and British Columbia as part of Canadian efforts to meet the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. In addition,
Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden have introduced carbon taxes in
combination with energy taxes. n119 The existing carbon taxes are too new to draw meaningful conclusions about their long-term
benefits, but many

economists believe that a carbon tax would be the most effective method of
reducing carbon dioxide emissions. n120 Cap and trade systems for carbon dioxide emissions have been implemented
by the European Union n121 and on a regional basis in New England; n122 in addition, seven Western [*35] states and four
Canadian provinces have taken steps to develop a cap and trade system. n123 As discussed in Part III, the European Union system
has not been particularly successful to date, but that has not diminished enthusiasm in the United States and abroad for relying on
cap and trade systems as the principal method of reducing carbon dioxide emissions.

Solvency Extensions

Solves Warming
A carbon-tax is the only way to reduce emissions corrects incentives
and creates spill-over effects
Carbon Tax Center 12 (Why a Carbon Tax?, Carbon Tax Center: Pricing Carbon Efficiently
and Equitably, updated June 29 and retrieved on July 27, ,
http://www.carbontax.org/introduction/#no-tax-increase, CMR)

The rationale for a carbon tax is simple: the levels of CO2 already in the Earths atmosphere and being added daily are destabilizing
established climate patterns and threatening the ecosystems on which we and other living beings depend. Very large and

rapid reductions in the United States and other nations carbon emissions are essential to avoid runaway
climate change and avert resulting severe weather events, inundation of coastal areas, spread of diseases, failure of agriculture
and water supply, infrastructure destruction, forced migrations, political upheavals and international conflict. A carbon tax
must be the central mechanism for reducing carbon emissions. Currently, the prices of gasoline,
electricity and fuels in general include none of the costs associated with devastating climate change.
This omission suppresses incentives to develop and deploy carbon-reducing measures such as
energy efficiency (e.g., high-mileage cars and high-efficiency heaters and air conditioners), renewable energy (e.g., wind
turbines, solar panels), low-carbon fuels (e.g., biofuels from high-cellulose plants), and conservation-based
behavior such as bicycling, recycling and overall mindfulness toward energy consumption. Conversely, taxing
fuels according to their carbon content will infuse these incentives at every link in the chain of
decision and action from individuals choices and uses of vehicles, appliances, and housing, to businesses choices of new
product design, capital investment and facilities location, and governments choices in regulatory policy, land use and taxation. A
carbon tax wont stop global climate change by itself other, synergistic actions are required as well. But without a carbon

tax, even the most aggressive regulatory regime (e.g., high-mileage cars) and enlightened subsidies
(e.g., tax credits for efficiency and renewables) will fall woefully short of the necessary reductions in carbon burning
and emissions.

Solves *every internal link* , *faster*


Gardner 8, Timothy Gardner, Energy and Environment Correspondent for Reuters, Carbon
tax seen as best way to slow global warming, Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/09/us-climate-finance-sachsidUSTRE4988X020081009, CMR
(Reuters) - Climate

taxes, not cap and trade markets alone, will lead to the vast technological changes the
world's energy system needs to fight global warming , a top U.S. economist said on Thursday. Cap and trade
has emerged as the dominant attempt to slow global warming. Global deals in permits to emit greenhouse gas emissions have hit
nearly $65 billion a year. The European Union, under the Kyoto Protocol, has embraced cap and trade since 2005 and voluntary
markets have developed in the United States, the developed world's top carbon polluter. But a straight carbon tax on

energy production -- at an oil wellhead or refinery for instance -- would be simpler and cheaper than putting
a cap on tens of thousands of polluters, Jeffrey Sachs, a special advisor to the U.N. secretary
general and director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University told a panel on Thursday. As the world
prepares to form a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol by the end of next year, focus is sharpening on how well cap and trade
markets are fighting emissions. Carbon

taxes would quickly cut emissions across all sectors of

the economy , including vehicles and manufacturing, said Sachs. It could also be more efficient than spreading the trade of
permits across the financial system.

Most effective strategy to solve warming ensures emissions


reductions in all sectors
Litman 10 (Todd Litman, executive director of the Victoria Transport Policy Institute,

author of Online TDM Encyclopedia, chairperson of the TRB Sustainable Transportation


Indicators Subcommittee, the VTPI, Tax What You Burn, Not What You Earn, June 4, page 4,
http://www.vtpi.org/carbontax.pdf, CMR)
Such taxes are particularly beneficial because they have greater effectiveness and scope than most
other energy conservation and emission reduction strategies, as illustrated in Figure 3. Capand-trade programs generally only reduce large industry emissions. LEED standards only reduce buildings-related emissions.
Incentives to purchase more efficient and alternative fuel vehicles, such as CAFE standards and feebates, reduce emissions per
vehicle-mile but by reducing per-mile vehicle operating costs they tend to increase total vehicle traffic (a rebound effect) which
increases problems such as congestion, facility costs, accidents and sprawl (Litman 2005). Although improving mobility options,
such as nonmotorized travel and public transit, individually provide relatively modest energy savings, such strategies provide
additional benefits such as congestion reductions, facility cost savings and reduced accidents. Carbon taxes support
almost all

types of emission reductions (excepting reductions in non-fossil-fuel emissions, such as cement


production and landfill methane), and by reducing total vehicle traffic, provide greater total
benefits than most other strategies. Carbon taxes are efficient and flexible because
they support many energy conservation and emission reduction strategies,
allowing households and businesses to choose the combination that works best for
them, including more fuel efficient vehicles, more accessible locations and
destinations, more efficient modes, more resource-efficient goods (such as recycled
products), building weatherization, and shifts to alternative fuels (Toman, Griffin, Lempert 2008).
Most households and businesses can implement some of these strategies, depending on their abilities and preferences. Carbon
taxes help achieve various economic, social and environmental objectives (congestion reductions, facility cost savings,
accident reductions, reduced sprawl, improved mobility for non-drivers, etc.), rather than just energy conservation and emission
reductions, and so help achieve true sustainable development (Litman and Burwell 2006).

Solves warming best British Columbia proves


Bauman & Hsu 7/4/12 environmental economist, fellow @ Sightline Institute in Seattle,
AND law professor at Florida State (Yoram and Shi-Ling, The Most Sensible Tax of All,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/05/opinion/a-carbon-tax-sensible-for-all.html?
_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss, CMR)
Of course, carbon

taxes also lower carbon emissions. Economic theory suggests that putting a price on
pollution reduces emissions more affordably and more effectively than any other measure .
This conclusion is supported by empirical evidence from previous market-based policies, like those
in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act that targeted sulfur dioxide emissions. British Columbias carbon tax is
only four years old, but preliminary data show that greenhouse gas emissions are down 4.5
percent even as population and gross domestic product have been growing. Sales of motor gasoline have fallen by 2 percent
since 2007, compared with a 5 percent increase for Canada as a whole.

Solves warming and facilitates international action


Schueneman 7/26/12 (Tom, A Carbon Tax is More Viable than Cap and Trade,

http://theenergycollective.com/globalwarmingisreal/97071/carbon-tax-more-viable-cap-andtrade, CMR)
According to a new report released in June, the Canadian province of British

Columbia introduced a carbon tax


that has successfully reduced fossil fuel consumption to the lowest in Canada with little
economic damage.

The study titled British Columbias Carbon Tax Shift, produced by the Ottawa-based think-tank

Sustainable Prosperity, offers clear

evidence that the tax has helped reduce emissions while


producing tangible economic benefits.
Economist and Sustainable Prosperity senior director Alex Wood said as a consequence of the carbon tax, youre starting to see in
B.C. a separation between economic growth and fossil fuel use. That decoupling, he added, would lead to a more resilient
economy insulated from oil price shocks.
The B.C. model is simple , its elegant; its a lot of different things, said Wood. You reduce taxes on income, on
corporate income, and you promise to be revenue neutral and you make sure that happens.
Despite controversy, British Columbians are increasingly on board. Wood says the report demonstrates that dire predictions are
unfounded and he further claims that B.C.s carbon tax policy could be easily exported.
Reasons to Support a US Carbon Tax
A solid rational for a carbon tax in the US comes from a recent book titled, The Case for a Carbon Tax, written by Shi-Ling Hsu, a
professor at the University of British Columbia. According to Hsu, a carbon tax is the most effective mechanism to combat climate
change and motivate the private sector while raising much-needed revenue for governments. As reviewed by the Energy Collective,
here are 10 reasons to support a U.S. carbon tax from Hsus book.

It is economically efficient. An accurate disincentive for using carbon-based fuels could mimic
the increment of damage the marginal damage caused by each ton of carbon dioxide released into
the atmosphere. The simple genius of a carbon tax is that it aggregates disparate pieces of information,
transmitting a price signal at every stage in which there is fossil fuel usage . . . no data collection
is required and no model is required.
It avoids creating physical capital that could actually harm the environment e.g. coal-fired power
plants. The problem with capital is that once we have it, its high cost makes it difficult to dispose of.
It doesnt interfere with other regulatory instruments or jurisdictions. A carbon tax would have the
advantage, because of its simplicity, of forming the strongest foundation upon which other policies can stand.
Government is better at reducing bad actions than increasing good actions. Taxes work better than subsidies.
Incentives for innovation price effects. It would impact emissions not only from the largest carbon sources such as
power plants and industrial facilities but all carbon sources .
Incentives for innovation price breadth. It focuses new products and services no matter how much money can be saved by using
less electricity or electricity from a different source, e.g. renewables.

It is easy to administer. There are no offsets as would be needed with a cap-and-trade


program. Awarding an offset for a project that purports to avoid emissions increases rather than actually reducing them is a
tricky proposition.

International coordination is doable. An international accord based on a carbon tax


scheme would avoid the unfortunate appearance of China being allocated some cap amount by
an external bureaucracy. It would not represent . . . a binding limit to economic growth.
It raises badly needed revenue. There is a lot of money that could be raised from discouraging carbon emissions. However, the less
carbon emitted, the lower revenues would be.

It avoids the risk of catastrophe . In the long-run, this is the ultimate measure of efficiency from a public welfare
perspective.
A carbon tax may succeed where emissions trading schemes have failed because a tax sends a clear and consistent
message to the markets with little opportunity for speculative manipulation .

Reduces emissions broad consensus agrees


Stone 12 (Chad, chief economist at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, A Carbon

Tax Is Smart Energy and Budget Policy, March 29,


http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/03/29/carbon-tax-smartenergy-and-budget-policy, CMR)
Policymakers who are serious about addressing the nations long-term fiscal problems should look closely
at the merits of putting a price on carbon. A carbon tax or similar policy is a two-fer that would give
businesses and households a better price signal to guide their decisions about energy use, and that
would raise revenue to reduce the budget deficit.
This is not a radical left-wing idea. As Harvard professor N. Gregory Mankiw, former chairman of President George W. Bushs
Council of Economic Advisers and current adviser to presidential candidate Mitt Romney, wrote in a 2007 New York Times op-ed:
In the debate over global climate change, there is a yawning gap that needs to be bridged. The gap is not between
environmentalists and industrialists, or between Democrats and Republicans. It is between policy wonks and political consultants.

there is a broad consensus . The scientists tell us that world temperatures are rising
economics tells us that when you tax
something, you normally get less of it. So if we want to reduce global emissions of carbon ,
we need a global carbon tax. Q.E.D.
Among policy wonks like me,

because humans are emitting carbon into the atmosphere. Basic

Mankiw is not alone among prominent economists who advise Republican politicians to recognize the merits of a carbon tax. (See
Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Kevin Hassett.)
To be sure, these economists do not endorse the use of a carbon tax to reduce the budget deficit. Party orthodoxy requires opposition
to any tax increases, so maybe we should call it a carbon fee. These supporters typically call for using carbon fee

revenues (which could be $100 billion a year or more) to finance cuts in corporate or individual income tax
rates, based on standard tax reform arguments about how, all other things equal, a broader tax base and lower rates are preferable
to higher rates and a narrower base.

Only way to solve warming its easy to implement


Pierce 11 (Richard J. Pierce. Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington

University, SYMPOSIUM: THE FUTURE OF ENERGY LAW: The Past, Present, and Future of
Energy Regulation, 31 Utah Envtl. L. Rev. 291, lexis, CMR)
There has long been a broad consensus that the massive reductions in CO<2> emissions needed to mitigate global warming can be
attained through only one of two means - a global cap and trade system or a large global carbon tax. n53 The failure of the

Copenhagen meeting has left even many of the strongest proponents of a cap and trade system in despair. n54 It seems highly
unlikely that an effective global cap and trade system can be designed and implemented. That leaves a large carbon tax as
the only potentially viable means of mitigating global warming. Given the present political climate, it is
hard to imagine the U.S. adopting a large carbon tax. Democrats are unwilling to increase taxes on people who earn less than $
250,000 per year, while Republicans are unwilling to increase taxes on anyone. n55 That aspect of the political environment must
change in the near future, however, if the U.S. is to avoid the fate of Greece. Unless we make major changes in fiscal policy, we will
experience large deficits for the indefinite future. n56 Deficits of that magnitude are unsustainable. n57 At some point in the near
future, we must reduce spending and increase taxes. A carbon tax is superior to an increase in income taxes or a value-added tax the only alternatives to a carbon tax that offer the prospect of increasing revenues [*300] to the point at which our budget deficit will
be tolerable. Taxes discourage the taxed activity. Thus, income taxes discourage work, while a value added tax discourages purchases
of all types of goods and services. By contrast, a carbon tax discourages only what we need to discourage to

mitigate global warming - emissions of CO<2>. A carbon tax is superior to subsidies for carbon-free energy sources
in two important respects. First, it has the opposite effect on the budget deficit. While subsidies increase the deficit, a carbon tax
would decrease the deficit. Second, it is much easier to design and to implement. To be effective, a carbon

tax need only deter consumption of hydrocarbons. Consumers are left with complete discretion
with respect to the ways in which they reduce their consumption of hydrocarbons. For example, by increasing the
efficiency of their use of energy or by substituting for hydrocarbons some mix of carbon-free
fuels like wind power, solar power, or nuclear power. It is important to give consumers that flexibility, both because the
alternatives will be more or less attractive to different consumers in a variety of different situations, and because we cannot predict
which of the alternatives to hydrocarbons will become more attractive in the future as a result of technological breakthroughs. By
contrast, subsidies must be set at levels that are adequate to encourage optimal substitution of each subsidized alternative. By
definition, they are always too high or too low, both because of the varying circumstances of consumers and because of the dynamic
and unpredictable pace of technological progress.

Solves warming best and avoids politics


Waggoner 8 Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Colorado. A.B., European
History, Stanford University; LL.B. Harvard Law School (Michael, Why and How to Tax
Carbon, Fall, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, lexis, CMR)
Copyright (c) 2008 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law, Inc.

To address the challenge of global warming more effectively, and to improve its tax base, the United States should
impose a revenue-neutral carbon tax on all domestic production and importation of coal,
petroleum, and natural gas. The United States should seek to persuade other nations that carbon
taxation is a critical tool in confronting the dangers of global warming. This Article first argues that a carbon
tax is a necessary and politically feasible tool to resist the rise in global temperatures attributable to increased

carbon dioxide ("CO2") that human activities have injected into the atmosphere. The Article then explores how a carbon tax
might be designed and implemented.
This carbon tax would have two major purposes. First, imposing

a tax on carbon production would create an

incentive to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. This reduction is desirable because carbon dioxide emissions
appear to be contributing significantly to global warming and climate change, developments that may cause serious environmental
damage. n2 The

carbon tax may be a better tool for carbon reduction than [*3] alternatives such
as subsidies, regulation, or cap-and-trade. n3 However, the solution for reducing carbon emissions may include all four of these
and other approaches, as a matter of both practical politics and administrative feasibility.

A carbon tax can successfully reduce emissions


Revelle 9 (Eleanor Revelle, LWVIL and LWVUS Climate Change Task Force Member, Cap-AndTrade Versus Carbon Tax: Two Approaches to Curbing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, League of Women
Voters, http://www.lwv.org/files/CCTF_BP_CapTrade-CarbonTax.pdf, CMR)
As typically envisioned, a

carbon tax would be imposed on fossil fuel suppliers at a rate that reflects the
amount of carbon that will be emitted when the fuel is burned. The tax would be included in the price
of the coal, oil and natural gas supplied to wholesale users and ultimately passed on to consumers in the price of
electricity, gasoline and other energy-intensive products. Coal, which generates the greatest amount of carbon per unit of energy
(BTU), would be taxed at a higher rate per BTU than oil or natural gas. 11 By raising the price of
carbon-based energy, the tax would create incentives to reduce energy use, stimulate demand
for more energy-efficient products, and promote a shift to cleaner fuels and renewable energy.

Solves Warming/Oil Consumption


Solves warming and fuel consumption British Columbia studies
prove
Hussain 7/5/12 (Yadullah, 4 key reasons why BCs carbon tax is working,

http://business.financialpost.com/2012/07/05/4-key-reasons-why-bcs-carbon-tax-is-working/,
CMR)
British Columbias carbon tax shift was raised by $5 on July 1, four years after it was first initiated by the government.
Has the plan worked and how will the new increases impact the economy?
Sustainable Prosperity, a University of Ottawa-based research network, thinks the first four years

have had a positive environmental impact without harming the [BC] economy.
In a report, Sustainable Prosperity outlines the key reasons why it thinks the initiative has been a success, although it admits its still
early days:
1.DROP IN FUEL CONSUMPTION: The carbon tax has contributed substantial environmental

benefits to British Columbia (BC). Since the tax took effect in 2008, British Columbians use of petroleum
fuels (subject to the tax) has dropped by 15.1% and by 16.4% compared to the rest of Canada. BCs greenhouse
gas emissions have shown a similarly substantial decline (although that analysis is based on one years less
data).
2.GROWTH UNAFFECTED: BCs

GDP growth has outpaced the rest of Canadas (by a small amount) since
the carbon tax came into effect suggesting that it has not adversely affected the provinces
economy, as some had predicted. This finding fits with evidence from seven other countries that have had similar carbon tax
shifts in place for over a decade, resulting in neutral or slightly positive effects on GDP.
3.REVENUE NEUTRAL: The BC government has kept its promise to make the tax shift revenue neutral, meaning no net increase
in taxes. In fact, to date it has returned far more in tax cuts (by over $300 million) than it has received in carbon tax revenue
resulting in a net benefit for taxpayers. BCs personal and corporate income tax rates are now the lowest in Canada, due to the
carbon tax shift.
4.GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS DECLINING: From 2008 to 2010, BCs per capita GHG

emissions declined by 9.9% a substantial reduction. During this period, BCs reductions outpaced those in the
rest of Canada by more than 5%.

Solves Modeling**
CP will be modeled globally solves warming
Handley 9 (James Handley, chemical engineer and attorney who previously worked in the

private sector and for the Environmental Protection Agency, March 11, Imagine: A
Harmonized, Global CO2 Tax, Carbon Tax Center,
http://www.carbontax.org/blogarchives/2009/03/11/imagine-a-harmonized-global-co2-tax/,
CMR)
For more than 20 years, I have supported a CO2 tax, offset by an equal reduction in taxes elsewhere. However, a cap-and-trade
system is also essential and actually offers a better prospect for a global agreement, in part because it is difficult to imagine a
harmonized global CO2 tax. Moreover, I have long recognized that our political system has special difficulty in considering a CO2 tax
even if it is revenue neutral. Al Gore, quoted in New York Times, House Bill for a Carbon Tax to Cut Emissions Faces a Steep
Climb, March 7.
Lets examine Mr. Gores points:
Harmonization: Mr. Gore has raised a crucial concern: Any

carbon-reduction policies the U.S. enacts must

quickly go global . Acting alone or counter to other nations efforts will not suffice.
containership_pbo31_1.jpgIn their seminal report last February, Policy Options for Reduction of CO2 Emissions, Peter Orszag
(now Budget Director) and Terry Dinan of the Congressional Budget Office meticulously compared cap-and-trade with carbon tax
options. They concluded that a carbon tax
because of price volatility under a fixed cap.

would reduce emissions five times more efficiently, primarily

CBO had no difficulty imagining a harmonized global carbon tax . Chapter 3 of the Orszag-Dinan
report, International Consistency Considerations, describes straightforward ways to harmonize carbon taxes. If nations choose
different carbon tax rates, border tax adjustments permitted under World Trade Organization rules authorize higher-taxing nations
to enact tariffs to equalize tax rates on imported products to the same levels applied to similar domestically-produced products.
Indeed, Rep. John Larsons new carbon tax bill employs precisely this strategy. In effect, the U.S. would collect and

retain the revenue generated by equalizing carbon taxes on products imported from countries
that havent enacted their own or whose carbon tax rate is lower than ours. That will provide a
powerful incentive for our trading partners to follow our lead.

Even if other countries dont establish a carbon tax, the innovation


fueled by the CP leads to a worldwide clean tech transition****
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)
Lastly, carbon

taxes may benefit the global effort in preventing climate change without

requiring participation from all countries. Carbon taxes that fuel innovation in the
leading industrialized countries like the United States, Denmark, Germany, Japan, and Canada can spur clean
technologies to the point of economic scale when distribution to less industrialized countries
becomes cost effective . Just as Chinese automakers are aiming to skip the current technology of gas-powered vehicles by
jumping to newer electric technologies, n177 many countries that lag technologically can make a virtue of a liability. Emerging
market powers like India, Brazil, and China may have the option of implementing new solar and wind
technologies without ever investing in conventional grid infrastructure . Furthermore, given the size
of these markets, even modest adoption rates of solar, wind, and other renewables could result
in significant global reductions in clean tech costs. n178 China, for example, despite its poor environmental track
record and reputation for polluting, just overtook the United States as the world's third largest producer of solar panels, after
Germany and Japan. n179
The United States and other clean tech leaders have a significant role to play in providing funding,

technology, and knowledge in the diffusion of clean tech. A carbon tax, regardless of whether

countries like China and India are among the first to adopt it, feeds the dynamic of the
innovation-based environmental [*97] protection model. Spillover from industrialized to
industrializing markets contributes to the creation of a worldwide clean tech market.
Both types of markets benefit from competition and collaboration, and a worldwide market creates greater scale
and diversity in technology developments. The United States has already experienced the benefit of Chinese interest in
clean tech and can expect more to come. "Companies from China are already tapping American equity markets, creating [a] frenzy
over Chinese solar stocks, reflecting the confluence of two major trends: [China's] growing interest in clean technology stocks and
demand from investors for more plays on China's booming economy." n180 A worldwide clean tech market invites new
opportunities for entrepreneurial companies across the globe. Including India and China in the market-based solution to climate
change is critical to the international negotiation dynamic. These countries, as an inescapable part of the global problem, must be
part of the global solution.

Solves warming and renewables best spills over globally


Handley 12 (James, Book Review: The Case for a Carbon Tax, by Shi-Ling Hsu, 7/6,

http://www.carbontax.org/blogarchives/2012/07/06/book-review-the-case-for-a-carbon-taxby-shi-ling-hsu/, CMR)
The Case For A Carbon Tax (Island Press, 2011, 233 pp) brings to mind Hans Christian Andersens ugly duckling story. The word
tax screams cost to most people, and so the beauty of a carbon pollution tax isnt apparent on first glance. Prof. Hsu reveals the
beauty as he shows why a gradually-rising carbon tax is the least costly and most effective

policy for curbing the pollution driving global warming , and how enacting such a tax
can usher in a new era of clean energy and efficiency .
Trained in engineering, law and economics, Shi-Ling Hsu, a law professor who is moving from the University of British Columbia to
Florida State University, deftly marshals a multi-disciplinary case for a carbon tax. He opens by describing and comparing the four
main climate policy tools: subsidies, regulations, cap-and-trade, and carbon taxes. Then he briskly articulates ten arguments for a
carbon tax, emphasizing economic efficiency and the advantages of basing a coordinated international system on a simple,
transparent tax.
Hsu is especially strong in rebuttal, answering the arguments against carbon taxes,

including the oft-repeated assertion that a carbon tax is politically impossible . He


dissects psychological hang-ups that have kept the public and elected officials from embracing carbon taxes. Hsu points to British
Columbias enactment and implementation of North Americas first carbon pollution tax, arguing that it is broadly supported
because its revenue is used to reduce taxes for individuals and businesses. As Hsu and Yoram Bauman wrote this week in their New
York Times op-ed, The Most Sensible Tax of All:
On Sunday, the best climate policy in the world got even better: British Columbias carbon tax a tax on the carbon content of all
fossil fuels burned in the province increased from $25 to $30 per metric ton of carbon dioxide, making it more expensive to
pollute. This was good news not only for the environment but for nearly everyone who pays taxes in British Columbia, because the
carbon tax is used to reduce taxes for individuals and businesses. Thanks to this tax swap, British Columbia has lowered its
corporate income tax rate to 10 percent from 12 percent, a rate that is among the lowest in the Group of 8 wealthy nations. Personal
income taxes for people earning less than $119,000 per year are now the lowest in Canada, and there are targeted rebates for lowincome and rural households.
Hsu crisply articulates the theory of Pigouvian taxes the idea of taxing pollution rather than productive activity. But he sidesteps
the thorny question of how high to set a carbon tax and how rapidly to increase it. And he does not mention the potential efficiency
advantages of using carbon tax revenues to reduce other taxes such as taxes on work and thereby use climate policy to improve
overall economic well-being. (Economists call that a double dividend.) He notes that while British Columbias carbon tax is
revenue-neutral, the regressive effects of carbon taxes can be addressed by a wide variety of other mechanisms, leaving substantial
revenue for cash-strapped governments, as recent reports and a new book by the International Monetary Fund have stressed.
Hsu delves into the limitations of EPA regulations, which he shows cannot create the broad incentives

for innovation and planning needed to drive carbon eminssions way down :
A [carbon] tax, by imposing a cost on every single ton of pollutant, constantly
engages the polluter with the task of reducing her pollution tax bill . By contrast, a command
and control scheme that mandates a one shot, irrevocable installation of pollution control equipment allows for the polluter to stop
thinking about pollution reduction. Why, if compliance is achieved, should the polluter look for other ways to reduce?
There are further problems, too: EPA can too easily be persuaded or intimidated by industry into granting exemptions and relaxing
standards. Hsu also glosses over the enormous effort that would be required to write and enforce permits for each of the thousands
of point sources of CO2. One has to wonder where and how the already-stretched EPA (and state environmental agencies) would
find funding for such a massive undertaking.
Hsu neatly unveils the hidden high cost of taxpayer-funded subsidies of renewables and supposed low-carbon fuels. Subsidies, along
with regulations and cap-and-trade with offsets, are attractive to the public and Congress despite serious limitations on their
effectiveness, because their costs are largely hidden. Not only is Congress notoriously ineffective at

picking technology winners, but subsidies create lock-in to incumbent


technologies and businesses, foreclosing opportunities to spur innovation . In contrast,

as Hsu shows, a

carbon pollution taxs laser focus on CO2 pollution creates incentives


for all low-carbon alternatives, leaving specific technology decisions to engineers rather than politicians.
Cap-and-trade with offsets seems to be Hsus choice for second-best policy; it allows flexibility and could result in a price on
carbon pollution, albeit one that is indirect and subject to price volatility. Happily, Hsu debunks the notion of emissions certainty
that was used to sell cap-and-trade, by pointing out that for a stock pollutant such as CO2 that persists in the atmosphere for a
century, the objective must be cumulative rather than annual reductions. Even year-to-year emissions certainty is vitiated in the
European Emissions Trading System by provisions allowing borrowing and banking of allowances as well as by voluminous offsets.
Carbon prices there have remained so low that recent analyses have concluded that industrial facilities will have little incentive to
reduce their emissions through at least 2020.
Hsu points out the hidden costs that cap-and-trade would impose on consumers, profiting the financial sector and purveyors of
offsets. His most egregious example: Chinese refrigerant manufacturers who garnered far more revenue from offsets awarded for
destroying their greenhouse gas byproducts than from the sale of their underlying products. As documented by UN and GAO
reports, the carbon market paid about 100 times more for the installation of emissions reducing equipment (an HCFC 23
incinerator) than the price of the equipment. The Chinese refrigerant manufacturer and the investors in the offset project reaped
those windfalls, contradicting claims about the efficiency of cap-and-trade.
As Hsu illustrates, evaluating and verifying offset projects is staggeringly difficult. Applications for hundreds of different project
types are submitted to a single U.N. panel with little capacity to evaluate additionality to determine whether projects would have
occurred in the absence of offset funding. Stanford University law professor and offset expert Michael Wara estimates that 30-50%
of offset projects in the U.N. systems should not have been awarded credit, a fraction so large as to overwhelm any claim of
emissions certainty under a cap with offsets.
Hsu concludes that linking cap-and-trade internationally would offer constant opportunities for mischief and arbitrage. In contrast,

under a tax every country would have an incentive to scrupulously monitor


emissions in order to collect the revenue. Moreover, the transparency of a carbon tax
offers potential for international linkage via World Trade Organization sanctioned Border Tax

Adjustments. WTO rules were built around a consumption tax the European Unions Value Added Tax; Hsu suggests that a
carbon tax should similarly be supportable under WTO rules. But he seems to understate the capacity of Border Tax Adjustments to
protect domestic energy-intensive industry while offering a growing monetary incentive to trading partners to enact their own
carbon taxes.

Carbon tax will have international support ensures modeling


Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)

Finally, because the solution to the climate change crisis must succeed on a global scale, a discussion of the relative values of a tax
versus cap-and-trade systems must address international implications. The difficulties in enacting a price on carbon are multiplied
on the world scale but so too are the advantages. For the same reasons that a carbon tax appeals domestically, it is

attractive at the world level . A carbon tax, for one, presents a more practical approach to the
major collective action problem facing the international community . n172 The inherent simplicity
of a tax and the institutional familiarity with taxing make a carbon tax more replicable
across numerous countries. A leading cap-and-trade proposal in the United States, the Leiberman-Warner Climate
Security Act of 2008, n173 is an "exceedingly long and complicated bill of over three hundred pages." n174 Other cap-and-trade
proposals are similarly complex, dwarfing their carbon tax counterparts, which are on the order of ten to twenty pages. n175 The
specter of creating and regulating a cap-and-trade system in the United States alone raises considerable practical limitations. Less
industrialized countries with less sophisticated regulatory control would face seemingly insurmountable challenges in imposing an
economy-wide regulation. A carbon tax, in contrast, has the potential to focus on the multinational

extraction industries at the wellhead, which resource-poor countries could administratively


manage as a revenue-generating resource.

Solves International Coop


Best mechanism for international action
Bloomberg 11 (Free Markets, Carbon Tax Best Way to Fight Climate Change: View, Dec
11, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-12/free-markets-carbon-tax-best-way-to-fightclimate-change-view.html, CMR)

The best instrument for coordinating climate-change efforts is the price of carbon . The impact of
any carbon-abatement plan -- emission quotas, cap and trade, carbon taxes -- can be measured by its effect on this price. The aim
should be to equalize worldwide a gradually rising price of carbon.

flexibility is essential . It would allow governments to more easily


tailor their climate-change policies to political and economic circumstances, altering them on
the run if need be. The price of carbon would provide an international gauge of their abatement
efforts, so that peer pressure could be brought to bear.
For most countries, the simplest and clearest way to hit the price target would be with an outright carbon tax. The economic
benefits are well known: By letting markets work, a tax achieves a given amount of emissions
abatement at the lowest cost. The world needs to cap its greenhouse gas emissions, but theres no obligation to do this in
As a matter of practical politics, this

the most expensive, painful or disruptive way.

Solves Oil Dependence


Solves oil dependence by reducing consumption
Stelzer 11 - Senior Fellow and Director of Hudson Institute's economic policy studies group.

Prior to joining Hudson Institute in 1998, Stelzer was resident scholar and director of regulatory
policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He also is the U.S. economic and political
columnist for The Sunday Times (London) and The Courier Mail (Australia), a contributing
editor of The Weekly Standard, a member of the Advisory Board of The American Antitrust
Institute and a member of the Visiting Committee of the Harris School of Public Policy Studies
at the University of Chicago. (Irwin, Carbon Taxes: An Opportunity for Conservatives, Hudson
Institute, March 2011, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Stelzer%20Carbon%20Tax
%20web.pdf, CMR)
A tax on carbon, whether it takes the form of a levy on emissions, or a second-best substitute, a tax on gasoline, would
accomplish a host of conservative goals. First, by reducing oil consumption it would reduce the
security threat posed by the increasing possibility that crude oil reserves will fall under the
control of those who would do us harm, either by cutting off supplies, as happened when American policy towards
Israel displeased the Arab world, or by using the proceeds of their oil sales to fund the spread of radical Islam and attacks by
jihadists. No one doubts that the execrable Hugo Chvez survives only because we pay millions for Venezuelan oil, or that Saudi
funding of radical Islam is made possible in good part by our payments for the Kingdoms oil. If we curtail our use of oil

we reduce our overall imports and, thereby, the flow of funds that end up in hostile hands. Needing
less oil, we can concentrate the reduction in our demand on supply sources we consider the greatest danger to our security and/or
have the highest externalities associated with their use.

A tax on carbon would make all of that possible . And need not swell the governments coffers if we
pursue a second, long-held conservative objective: reducing the tax on work. It would be a relatively simple matter to arrange a
dollar-for-dollar, simultaneous reduction in payroll taxes as taxes on, say, gasoline, increased. Anyone interested in jobs, jobs, jobs
should find this an attractive proposition, with growth-minded conservatives leading the applause.

Solves oil dependence causes heavy cuts


Carbon Tax Center 11 (FAQs, Jan 31, retrieved July 27, http://www.carbontax.org/faq/,
CMR)

11. Will

a carbon tax lessen U.S. oil dependence? You bet it will. Petroleum products account for
42% of U.S. CO2 emissions from burning fuels (coal and natural gas are responsible for 36% and 22%,
respectively), so a carbon tax stiff enough to cut down heavily on CO2 will necessarily put a big
dent in oil consumption .

Ends dependence on foreign oil


Sullivan 9 (Bartholomew, FedEx CEO: Tax carbon, end our dependence on foreign
oil , Sept 23, http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2009/sep/23/fedex-ceo-smith-saysus-needs-end-dependence-forei/, CMR)
WASHINGTON -- FedEx CEO Frederick W. Smith made his case Wednesday for a tax on carbon, a reduction in the
payroll tax and expensing of capital equipment, speaking at a panel discussion with other CEOs at the Council on Competitiveness
National Energy Summit. Saying that ending the nation's dependence on foreign oil is more "enlightened self-interest" than a
crusade, Smith noted that the Memphis-based logistic giant consumes 1.5 billion gallons of fuel a year. He called it a matter

of both national and economic security. Smith said his work with the Energy Security Leadership Council with retired
generals and admirals made him realize that "we're spending 600 and some odd billion dollars on national defense -- 50 to 60 cents
of every dollar is directed to protect the oil trade." George A. David, chairman of United Technologies Corp., argued that more
efficient building codes and standards and more investment in research and development are high priorities. He noted that the
elevators his company makes use 25 percent of the energy they used to because they now recapture the energy of descent. Jonathan

Lash, president of the World Resources Institute, made the case for pricing carbon and agreed with David that the free allowances in
current cap and trade proposals are a mistake. John Krenicki Jr., CEO of GE Energy Infrastructure, said the U.S. came late to
renewable energy compared to Europe. Smith took the opportunity in a question by moderator Richard M. Smith of Newsweek to
argue that the tax code is prejudiced against capital investment. "If you want to make a blue-collar worker more productive and
allow them to make more money, you have to invest in training, infrastructure and capital," Fred Smith said. "The reality is our tax
code in the U.S. promotes financial speculation, leverage and private equity, and penalizes capital investment. With a stroke of a
pen, the Congress could change the dynamics, and that would be to allow for the expensing of capital equipment." On the carbon

tax, Smith said he prefers it to cap and trade because he suspects "an army of lobbyists" will be employed making exceptions to it so
it becomes something like the 170,000-page tax code. A predictable, graduated tax would have an impact on the role
of the military overseas, improve the environment and be good for the economy , Smith argued. When
Richard Smith asked him how he could escape being called a socialist with his plan, Fred Smith recalled spending two years on one
of the country's overseas "adventures" in Indochina. "If people want to call me a socialist for recognizing these huge costs -externalities -- of our national defense, not to mention the 5,000 young men and women who have lost their lives in this thing and
the thousands who have been maimed and wounded, we need to solve this problem," he said. "The failure to do it is not only

going to create serious consequences in terms of our economy, but we're going to make a big mistake and get into
a big conflagration over this thing," he predicted.

Solves Oil Prices/Dependence


Solves oil shocks and dependence
Rosenblum 7 (Daniel, A Carbon Tax When Oil Approaches $100/Barrel?, 11/9,

http://www.carbontax.org/blogarchives/2007/11/09/a-carbon-tax-when-oil-approaches100barrel/, CMR)
Finally, right now the high oil prices are enriching oil producing countries and oil companies
and causing severe damage to the United States economy. A revenue-neutral carbon tax will
reduce demand and lead to reduced prices for the oil itself . The results? Reduced carbon
dioxide emissions, less money going overseas and to big oil companies, carbon tax revenues
returned to all Americans and strengthening our economy, and increased national security as we
reduce our dependence on foreign oil. Win-win-win-win!

Solves Coal/Natural Gas/Nuke Power


Solves misc f faffs?
Stelzer 11 - Senior Fellow and Director of Hudson Institute's economic policy studies group.

Prior to joining Hudson Institute in 1998, Stelzer was resident scholar and director of regulatory
policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He also is the U.S. economic and political
columnist for The Sunday Times (London) and The Courier Mail (Australia), a contributing
editor of The Weekly Standard, a member of the Advisory Board of The American Antitrust
Institute and a member of the Visiting Committee of the Harris School of Public Policy Studies
at the University of Chicago. (Irwin, Carbon Taxes: An Opportunity for Conservatives, Hudson
Institute, March 2011, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Stelzer%20Carbon%20Tax
%20web.pdf, CMR)
Get the prices right and let competition rip. The

likely result will be an energy economy less dependent on


imported oil, increased incentives to clean up coal or reduce its use , lower consumption of
gasoline, greater reliance on nuclear if it can be competitive with properly priced coal, more use of natural gas,
and increased reliance on conservation. This process of sorting out winners and losers is surely superior to having the
government substitute its judgment.* Because carbon is not priced into the cost of energy consumption indeed, such consumption
is enhanced by the variety of net subsidies accorded the oil industry we cannot know just how competitive solar, wind and other
renewable sources of energy would be in a non-distorted market, or whether they are a drag on the efficiency of the energy economy.
Advocates of wind and solar energy at least those whose preference for these sources is not quasi-theological justify taxpayerfunded subsidies on the grounds that the costs of carbon emissions are not priced into fossil fuels. They are right about that, but
wrong about their solution. If any environmental and security costs of fossil-fuel use are not internalized in the prices of these fuels,
get the prices right, instead of subsidizing energy sources that are less carbon intensive.

Solves Agriculture
Makes agriculture more environmentally sustainable
Waggoner 8 Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Colorado. A.B., European
History, Stanford University; LL.B. Harvard Law School (Michael, Why and How to Tax
Carbon, Fall, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, lexis, CMR)

Agriculture now is very carbon intensive because fertilizers and pesticides are made from petroleum and substantial amounts of
diesel fuel are needed to move tractors repeatedly across the field to plow, plant, apply fertilizer or pesticides, and harvest. But with

less carbon available at higher costs, less carbon-intensive methods will be necessary . n64
Increased costs of transportation will result in more agricultural products being consumed
closer to where they are produced.

Solves Disease/Invasive Species


Solves disease and invasive species
Waggoner 8 Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Colorado. A.B., European
History, Stanford University; LL.B. Harvard Law School (Michael, Why and How to Tax
Carbon, Fall, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, lexis, CMR)

World trade, travel, and globalization will be reduced as energy prices rise and carbon taxes are imposed. n65 In some regards, that
reduction is truly a loss, not just of trade in goods, but also of trade in ideas, such as health care, science, literature, and ultimately,
understanding. That loss may be a necessary one, however, dictated by energy scarcity and the need to reduce carbon emissions.
Fortunately, much trade and exchange of ideas can be digital, which does not require physical transportation. Further,

reductions in physical transportation may be in the public interest. Less transport of people
should reduce the risk of epidemics, or at least slow their spread and thus allow more time to
develop countermeasures. n66 Less transportation should reduce the problems caused by
invasive species. n67 Finally, less transportation of components and products should reduce the risk that a few large factories
will provide all of the world's needs for particular items, such that a fire, [*31] flood, war, or earthquake at such a factory might
devastate the world economy. n68

Solves Energy Extraction


Reduces energy extraction/environmental harms
Waggoner 8 Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Colorado. A.B., European
History, Stanford University; LL.B. Harvard Law School (Michael, Why and How to Tax
Carbon, Fall, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, lexis, CMR)

[*30] The energy extractive industries will likely shrink because the carbon tax will reduce
demand. There will likely be a similar decrease in other extractive industries, such as metals and
stone, because there will be less energy to extract, smelt, manufacture, and transport them. This
will reduce the strain that humans impose on the environment .

Solves Renewables/Efficiency
The CP is the best way to promote alternative energy and solve
warming independently, the aff alone is insufficient and wont solve
for DECADES***
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)

An indirect pull approach - like a comprehensive tax - makes the most sense because it simultaneously encourages a variety of
innovations. Instead of pushing for particular technologies, where the government must act as an arbiter to favor one kind of
technology, the pull approach casts a long shadow and allows the market to reward a variety of

innovations that find competitive advantages in particular settings . n42 For example, instead of the
government putting all of its eggs in the solar basket, a price on carbon would allow solar energy
to take hold in a sunny place like Arizona and wind energy to develop on the less sunny, windy
Eastern coasts. A pull approach maximizes the capabilities of markets by providing for incremental innovations and allowing
for adaptability in regional markets. Many different technologies can be rewarded and implemented at
once, which is exactly what the climate change situation calls for .
Currently, energy provided by clean tech barely registers on the overall energy pie .
Transitioning from carbon-based energy to clean technology is a daunting project that will take decades .
n43 Some reports estimate that it will take thirty years for renewables to supply 25% of our global energy. n44 A carbon tax,
then, properly frames the technological shift in long-term thinking. In retooling our energy
supply, there will be no silver bullet but thousands of solutions and [*76] millions of variations that will
take decades for robust implementation. "Rather than a swift series of eureka moments, progress [in the clean tech space takes]
shape in setting goals, testing, tweaking, and then setting more goals." n45 The solutions, moreover, will come from multiple sectors,
such as wind, solar, biofuel, and energy conservation. Each technology, if developed and deployed

simultaneously , will play a specific role in meeting future energy needs. n46 This "wedge approach,"
which Al Gore endorsed in his documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, proposes that replacing carbon use will require the utilization
of numerous renewable sources at once. n47
A broad, multi-variant approach presents an ideal situation for government underwriting. Government is at its best when it does not
directly act, but puts its thumb on the scale to move society in a responsible direction. In applying diffuse pressure, a
carbon tax would create a larger framework for creating and distributing new technologies. Private
enterprises across the board would be invited to enter the clean tech space with the promise of
making profits. Developed technologies, then, could reach the level of cost competitiveness for
widespread adoption and gradual diffusion to other parts of the world.

Carbon tax makes renewables competitive eventually results in


wind/solar without subsidies
Randazzo 12 (Ryan, INCENTIVES AT EVERY TURN, 5/6,
http://www.usatoday.com/USCP/PNI/Business/2012-05-06-PNI0506bizsubsidiesPNIBrd_ST_U.htm, CMR)
Gautam

Gowrisankaran, an economics professor at the University of Arizona Eller

College of Management , said the hodgepodge of U.S. incentives is a result of not having a clear energy policy. Without
political consensus on energy and global warming, interest groups win support for their individual causes.
"I believe in free markets and would rather the government just tax carbon rather than get into the
politics of which energy sources to subsidize," he said. "If there is a harmful element to the environment from
carbon-dioxide emissions (from coal, natural gas and oil), that is the policy to implement. But politically we are not there yet. So to
substitute for that, we like to subsidize renewable energy rather than tax traditional fossil fuels."

With a carbon tax, solar, wind and other alternative energy would not need subsidies
because they would be economically competitive with fossil fuels, he said.
And tax breaks for domestic drilling and other fossil fuels could probably go away, too , he said.

Makes renewables more attractive and increases investment


Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)

B. Capital To understand how a carbon tax would drive a clean tech revolution, we must [*83] first understand the process of
business development and the problems facing capital investment. The private sector, while capable of profit and success without
any changes to public policy, must overcome numerous obstacles in bringing a business to market. A carbon tax has the

potential to harness innovation and ease distribution bottlenecks, making clean tech a more
attractive industry . The overall process of business development often begins with new ideas and new technologies. Or,
in the case of many clean technologies, the ideas have existed for years but were unappealing to investors until the price of oil spiked
and climate change became a concern. Now, places like the Silicon Valley are abuzz with private investment , as
numerous firms vie to create the next clean tech Google. Many investment firms, like Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers (KPCB) - the
company behind Google - have made a trade of finding the next big thing, often developing their projects in secret. Most of the
Kleiner's green-tech investments are not publicly discussed... . The firm has acknowledged 15 of its 40 investments. The rest are in
what [Venture Capitalists or] V.C.'s call "stealth" mode, hidden from the press (and copycat V.C.'s) until they are on sounder footing.
Last summer, the growing number of stealth companies involved with clean energy formed a kind of dark matter in the Silicon
Valley universe, businesses that could not be seen yet nevertheless exerted a discernible gravitational pull. Executives would
suddenly leave jobs at established companies to join ventures with no official name. Manufacturing facilities would set up shop in
cheap, anonymous buildings in towns like Santa Clara, Calif., then begin round-the-clock operations. n100 Already, without
major policy incentives, many investors are betting their portfolios on the promise of clean
technology. The amount of money changing hands is staggering. Al Gore, a partner of KPCB, who increasingly devotes his energy
to the private arena, recently stated that "more money is allocated in the private markets in one hour than in all of the budgets of all
of the governments of the world in a year's time." n101 Even great ideas with successful proofs of concept have a high probability of
failure. Entrepreneurs refer to the phase between a project's origins and its commercial deployment as "the valley of death." n102
Ideas must overcome numerous obstacles to make it to the market. Among the main risks are: (1) technological
scalability - can the idea be reproduced and can others easily learn the process; (2) personnel - are the people behind the idea
capable in their sales pitches and executions of the idea; (3) market receptiveness - even if the product is offered, will people buy it;
and (4) financing - have all the stages thus [*84] far proven promising enough to earn continued investment? n103 Financing
typically comes is several rounds, and businesses that have problems with their technology, management, or marketing have
difficulty attracting more financing. n104 Another inescapable challenge associated with the above risks is the innovator's paradox.
Many clean-tech companies are developing products that require new industrial processes. At the beginning, developers face a
challenge in reaching mass production "because not enough buyers are willing to pay for the costly products.[ n105] On the other
hand, the products cost so much because they are not being mass-produced." n106 The historical pattern of innovation indicates
that novel products can overcome this paradox and succeed in the marketplace by exploiting a niche market. As sales expand and
performance improves, the costs drop to a level that allows widespread affordability. n107 Cell phones are an example of this
phenomenon. Initially balky and expensive, only a niche market of business people in the developed world appreciated cell phones.
As the market gradually expanded, costs decreased, reliability improved, and eventually, governments and entrepreneurs in
developing countries found it cheaper to build cellular networks than landlines. n108 Many clean tech entrepreneurs have similar
ambitions. They envision that fuel cell and solar technologies will gradually disseminate from cutting edge centers like Silicon Valley
to places around the world that have never had access to a grid. The dissemination of clean technology from

cutting edge centers into the mainstream poses a unique challenge because of the energy
market's vast scale. Unlike personal computers or software, which have traditionally moved into the mainstream relatively
quickly, the dissemination of energy technology may take much longer. Google, for example, took $ 25 million and five years to
reach its initial public offering. n109 A medical venture can take $ 100 million in investment and ten years to mature. n110 A clean
tech company that requires a new industrial process like solar panels could take $ 500 million and fifteen years to reach market.
n111 Energy, in other words, operates on a different scale than other industries and requires its own treatment. Projects like
commercializing fuel cells or equipping gas stations with ethanol pose an investment risk too great to invite numerous business
models. A

price on carbon is needed to tip the scales of risk to attract [*85] investors to the
higher stakes.

Stimulates economic growth and sends a signal that spurs renewable


development

Handley 12 (James Handley, chemical engineer and attorney who previously worked in the

private sector and for the Environmental Protection Agency, May 21, A Carbon Tax Beats
Automatic Austerity, Carbon Tax Center,
http://www.carbontax.org/blogarchives/2012/05/21/a-carbon-tax-beats-automatic-austerity/,
CMR)
So what will austeritys demise do to the case for a U.S. carbon tax, given that new taxes, or tax hikes in any form, are one of the two
pillars of austerity? (The other, of course, is governmental spending cuts.) The answer to that question depends on the alternatives
and the uses of the carbon tax revenues, but the key points are these: first, a carbon tax is almost certain to be

better for economic growth than draconian spending cuts or higher taxes on incomes or wages; second, if its
revenues are used to reduce other taxes or are spent in ways that spur
employment, the net effect of a carbon tax can be stimulative . Ironically, while there is now,
finally, broad consensus that austerity in Europe has stunted its economic growth, the fragile U.S. recovery faces a ticking time bomb
of automatic austerity, set to go off on January 1. Unless Congress acts, the deficit ceiling legislation enacted in 2011 will sequester
$1.2 trillion of automatic across-the-board cuts on military and domestic spending. At exactly the same time, the Bush tax cuts are
set to expire, which will raise the effective federal tax rate from about 16% of GDP to the Clinton-era 20% level. Last but not least, the
payroll tax holiday is set to expire on Jan. 1 as well. The alternatives to letting those time bombs explode are (i) repeal the
sequester and extend the Bush tax cuts and the payroll tax holiday (leading to even larger deficits), or (ii) increase revenue by
broadening the tax base. In 2010, two bipartisan deficit commissions, Simpson-Bowles (officially the National Commission on
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform) and Rivlin-Domenici, recommended sweeping tax and entitlement reform. Rivlin-Domenici went
further, urging broadening of the tax base by imposing a European style Value Added Tax. A VAT, of course, is a regressive sales tax
(levied on virtually all consumer purchases) that can suck up revenue like almost nothing else. But it is so broadly based that it offers
little environmental benefit. Other revenue options include worthy but politically-loaded proposals like repealing or limiting the
home mortgage deduction. Where does this leave a carbon tax? In our view, a tax on carbon emissions that starts low
or even at zero, with

a built-in ramp up over time (as recommended by former Fed Vice-Chair Alan Blinder), is
an attractive alternative to pretty much everything on the standard menu a VAT, higher income taxes or draconian
spending cuts. A gradually-rising carbon tax would also yield gradually increasing revenues, helping to close the deficit while
working better (at lower cost and more broadly) than any other policy to reduce global warming pollution. One particularly
stimulative way to use carbon tax revenue would be to fund and expand the payroll tax holiday, a stimulus measure enacted in 2010
that increased employee paychecks by up to $2,000, but which is set to expire at the end of this year. Economic analysts of virtually
every stripe agree that unparalleled uncertainty about the strength of the recovery is helping to hold back investment and growth.
Beyond the general lack of confidence, the energy sector faces additional regulatory and price uncertainty. A clear, upward

price trajectory on carbon pollution would give entrepreneurs and investors in


efficiency and renewables something to bank on . Without that predictable price
signal , renewables will continue to face the prospect of feast or famine
depending on Congressionally-enacted subsidies or the even more volatile price instability of cap-andtrade systems. And if a carbon tax helps avert an automatic sequester triggering draconian cuts in social programs, the result will
be enormously better for low and moderate-income households that depend on the safety net.

Causes a switch to energy efficiency and alternatives


Baltimore Sun 7/30/12 (Our view: A carbon tax is just the sort of solution to the

mounting threat of climate change that conservatives ought to embrace,


http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-07-30/news/bs-ed-climate-20120730_1_carbon-taxclimate-change-fossil-fuels, CMR)
When political conservatives start talking about raising taxes, it's wise to pay attention. Such is the case with a recently-announced
campaign by a former South Carolina congressman who believes solving the nation's energy and climate change

challenges requires a tax on carbon. The goal of the Energy and Enterprise Initiative, according to Robert "Bob" Inglis
Sr., a six-term congressman who lost reelection in a 2010 GOP primary (his support for the 2008 federal bank bailout having hurt
him with the tea party movement), is to explore and promote conservative solutions to U.S. energy needs and to climate change.
That he even accepts the need to address man-made global warming sets him apart from many of his peers. But Mr. Inglis is above
all else pragmatic. He believes the free market can address both those issues far better than government regulators. As GOP
economists have often pointed out, government should tax those things it wants less of and reduce taxes on those
things it considers desirable. A

carbon tax, translated into higher fees paid on the acquisition or use of
coal, oil and other fossil fuels, would seem a natural . Not merely because it would be preferable for Americans to
switch to alternative fuels but because the tax would reflect the true cost of various forms of energy. Here's another way to look at it.
One of the shortcomings of the current price structure is that the "true" cost of coal and oil is underwritten by taxpayers who are
saddled with such hidden costs as the health effects of pollution and, in the case of foreign oil, the high cost of military preparedness

and intervention overseas. If

oil sold at its genuine cost to society, motorists would be inclined to switch
to more energy-efficient transportation . Same for coal-fired electricity and the need to
promote alternatives such as wind and solar power. A carbon tax would make both approaches
possible .

Spurs clean-tech investment and innovation


Bauman & Hsu 7/4/12 environmental economist, fellow @ Sightline Institute in Seattle,
AND law professor at Florida State (Yoram and Shi-Ling, The Most Sensible Tax of All,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/05/opinion/a-carbon-tax-sensible-for-all.html?
_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss, CMR)
Revenue from a

carbon tax would most likely decline over time as Americans reduce their carbon emissions, but for many years
energy conservation and steer
investment into clean technology and other productive economic activities. Lastly, the carbon tax would
to come it could pay for big reductions in existing taxes. It would also promote

actually give Americans more control over how much they pay in taxes. Households and businesses could reduce their carbon tax
payments simply by reducing their use of fossil fuels. Americans would trim their carbon footprints and their tax
burdens by

investing in energy efficiency at home and at work, switching to less-polluting


vehicles and pursuing countless other innovations. All of this would be driven not by government mandates but
by Adam Smiths invisible hand.

Solves Econ
CP boosts growth improves the tax system
Bauman & Hsu 7/4/12 environmental economist, fellow @ Sightline Institute in Seattle,
AND law professor at Florida State (Yoram and Shi-Ling, The Most Sensible Tax of All,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/05/opinion/a-carbon-tax-sensible-for-all.html?
_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss, CMR)
Lets start with the economics. Substituting

a carbon tax for some of our current taxes on payroll, on


a no-brainer. Why tax good things when you can tax bad things, like emissions?
The idea has support from economists across the political spectrum , from Arthur B. Laffer and N. Gregory
Mankiw on the right to Peter Orszag and Joseph E. Stiglitz on the left. Thats because economists know that a carbon
tax swap can reduce the economic drag created by our current tax system and increase
investment, on businesses and on workers is

long-run growth by nudging the economy away from consumption and borrowing and
toward saving and investment.

CP solves growth and clean tech transition best aff takes several
decades
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)

[*74] Piecemeal incentives like tax credits for hybrids or the PTC can create cost competitiveness and bolster
investments in particular markets. The scale of transformation at hand, however, requires a
greater , more uniform level of government incentive and regulation. The United States alone
spends over a trillion dollars annually on energy. n32 Currently, clean tech energy occupies a tiny
percentage of that space. Even optimistic estimates of retooling the energy infrastructure talk in
twenty to fifty year blocks . n33 Placing a cost on carbon would apply a relatively hands-off market
pressure and would raise

the tide to lift numerous clean tech enterprises . A carbon tax could

ignite innovation , spur economic growth , and steer the economy in a direction
that we thoughtfully choose.

Solves Econ (Jobs)


Creates tons of jobs
Drape 6/28/12 Australian associated press writer (Julian, Carbon tax will create green

jobs: Milne, Australian News, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-news/carbontax-will-create-green-jobs-milne/story-fn3dxiwe-1226411123997, CMR)


pricing
pollution will actually help create new industries and jobs. Greens leader Christine Milne says growth in the
THE federal opposition argues Labor's carbon tax will squeeze the life out of the economy but the Australian Greens insist

United States and Europe is being driven by the need to move away from oil to renewable energy and the carbon tax will ensure
Australia isn't left behind. The "zero-carbon economy" will provide "big opportunities ", she told AAP.
Renewable energy includes wind, solar, thermal and wave power. The Climate Institute estimates the

carbon tax could


create up to 32,000 clean-energy jobs by 2030. Senator Milne said the carbon price wouldn't have become a reality
without the minor party. "The Greens made it a key component of an agreement with the Gillard government in order to give it
confidence and supply," she said. The most influential people in Sport The Greens sank Kevin Rudd's carbon pollution reduction
scheme in the Senate in 2009. Later they extracted an additional $10 billion "green bank" for renewable and low-emissions
technologies under the 2011 clean energy future package and a much tougher 80 per cent reduction target by 2050. Senator Milne
insist serious action is needed because the International Energy Agency has warned the world is on track for a six-degree increase in
global temperatures. "That's planetary wipe-out," the Tasmania senator said ahead of the carbon tax starting on July 1. "So the

sooner we can get going on this the cheaper it will be, the more innovative it will be and the more
exciting it will be."

Solves Competitiveness/Heg
Carbon tax solidifies US competitiveness and global leadership
Daniels 9 (Scott, leads the global chemicals-energy and sustainability practices at Monitor
Group, Why Carbon Caps are Good for U.S. Competitiveness and the Economy,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-daniels/why-carbon-caps-are-good_b_400830.html,
CMR)
This conviction would certainly be true if the world were never to embrace carbon limitation as a matter of multinational
environmental policy. If, however, you believe that timing, the form of policy regime and international alignment are quite
uncertain, but the ultimate end-state is not - that public opinion supported by a shift in youth culture toward environmental
protectionism, and the beliefs of most scientists will continue to drive the politics of sustainability toward a carbon constrained
future - then carbon management leadership, U.S. competitiveness and job growth become

mutually reinforcing objectives . If the U.S. wants to create sustainable job growth that is not
dependent on perpetual taxpayer stimulus, subsidy or protectionism (all of which would mortgage America's future for the sake of
its present) it must invest in a new basis for comparative advantage and growth. As it lacks a wealth
of cheap raw materials and labor, has seen much of its manufacturing base rendered
uncompetitive, and has had to borrow heavily to support its current standard of living, the
solution will require a fundamental return to innovation. A clear opportunity for the U.S. to
claim the future is through leadership in carbon (and environmental) productivity just as it did in
the industrial revolution through innovation in labor and lifestyle productivity. Putting in place policies such as
stringent carbon caps and efficiency standards that create the demand for carbon management
solutions sets the table for a feast of innovation . The U.S. should be pressing the rest of the
world to be as aggressive as possible in setting carbon limits (to create a vast, level playing field of demand),
and then investing heavily (through private capital encouraged by public incentives) in the race to provide the
best technologies to achieve these desired outcomes. Think of this effort as a new kind of
Marshall Plan for rebuilding the U.S. economy , sustained by a first generation of carbon management
solutions, with the same goal-oriented urgency the nation pursued in its race to the Moon. However, policies alone are not enough. It
is the high cost of carbon abatement that stands firmly in the way of new policies - as policymakers fear the implications for prices
and their impact on both businesses and consumers. Because there is not yet a commercial imperative, businesses are not working to
constantly improve carbon management methods through experience and innovation (like we see with automobile fuel efficiency
and sulfur dioxide abatement). That is, it is not an element of competition - yet. The result is the vicious circle of inaction we face
and that Copenhagen will likely only reinforce. The U.S. has the opportunity to create the conditions for a
new industrialization which would substantially contribute to economic growth and
prosperity for decades to come. However, this requires brave policy-making that establishes the economic conditions
for capital investment. Further, it must be accompanied by commitment of public support - a fraction of the initial $787 billion
stimulus package would be more than sufficient - such as public financing mechanisms (loans, guarantees, price floors and
technology grants) and physical investments in infrastructure (rights of way, pipelines, transmission facilities and site
characterizations). These investments will accelerate the development of commercial innovations that
not only improve the U.S.' competitive position in an inevitably carbon constrained world, but
also establish it as a global leader in exportable carbon management technologies and systems .
The U.S. doesn't just need jobs. It needs a new basis for competitiveness and growth in global markets .
Carbon management isn't the opposite of growth; it is a perfect platform on which to achieve it. Forget about
Copenhagen. Investing in U.S. carbon policy, infrastructure and innovation is a path back to prosperity.

Solves Soft Power/Heg***


CP solves quickly immediately restores US global credibility
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)
Other major

benefits of a carbon tax include quicker implementation

and the ability to raise revenue.

In terms of speed, the government could implement a carbon tax to take immediate effect ,
making it a much quicker method of reducing greenhouse gas emissions than a cap-and-trade system.
n165 A quick response is critical, as numerous commentators warn that the planet sits at a pivotal moment where immediate action
may be necessary to prevent abrupt [*94] climate change. n166 A cap-and-trade system would cause undue delay because it
requires time-consuming efforts in scientific inquiry and policy making. Furthermore, because cap-and-trade lacks transparency, it
would not provide a clear, stable price signal to influence investment decision-making until years down the road, possibly 2020.
n167 A

quick restoration of United States' credibility in the global environmental discussions


is another benefit of a speedy response to climate change . Because a carbon tax could be effective
before the next international treaty on greenhouse gas emissions, the U nited States could come to
the table with a seriousness that is tantamount to the task at hand. n168 Additionally, an in-place tax
would bring practical experience and a focal point to the next round of international talks.

Revenue-Neutral Solvency
Revenue-neutral carbon taxes solve
Litman 10 (Todd Litman, executive director of the Victoria Transport Policy Institute,

author of Online TDM Encyclopedia, chairperson of the TRB Sustainable Transportation


Indicators Subcommittee, the VTPI, Tax What You Burn, Not What You Earn, June 4, page 4,
http://www.vtpi.org/carbontax.pdf, CMR)
Many critics

claim that this tax harms low income households. They are wrong. Although fuel
price increases may seem regressive (a dollar tax imposes a greater burden on poor rather than wealthy people),
lower-income people purchase much less fuel than higher income people, as illustrated in Figure 5. Lowincome households will benefit overall from a tax shift that returns revenues as per capita
rebates, progressive tax reductions, or new services that benefit lower-income people (Boyce and
Riddle, 2007). Described differently, although fuel taxes by themselves are regressive with respect to income,
targeted tax reductions, cash rebates and improved services for poor people are extremely
progressive, so revenue-neutral carbon taxes can be extremely progressive overall .

Phased Solvency
A phased carbon tax is key
CTC 11 (Carbon Tax Center,

Charles Komanoff and Daniel Rosenblum launched the Carbon Tax Center (CTC) in January
2007 to give voice to Americans who believe that taxing emissions of carbon dioxide the primary greenhouse gas is imperative
to reduce global warming. The two of us brought to CTC a combined six decades of experience in economics, law, public policy and
social change. Though Dan has moved on, Charles remains as CTC director, while James Handley, a chemical engineer and attorney
who previously worked in the private sector and for U.S. EPA, serves as our Washington D.C. rep, FAQs January 31 st,
http://www.carbontax.org/faq/) CMR

While carbon taxes will need to be very high to create the required price incentives, they will
need to be phased in to give individuals and businesses the opportunity to adjust. There is no
magic formula or right number, but a tax that grows at an annual rate equivalent to 5-10% of the
baseline cost of fossil fuels probably offers a viable combination of meaningful incentive and
opportunity for adaptation. The $37 per ton of carbon starter tax mentioned earlier, equating
to around 10 cents a gallon of gasoline, fits the lower end of that range. At least as important as the tax
level is the commitment to keep raising the tax, so that energy-critical decisions, from car-buying (Hummer or Prius?) to homebuying (exurb or transit-oriented community?) to factory locating (highway interchange or rail line?), are made with carbonappropriate price signals.

Politics Shields

Avoids Politics
CP avoids politics
a) Obama doesnt push even oil lobbyists and leading republicans have
called for a carbon tax proves he wont have to spend PC thats Houser [only
use this extension if read in 1nc]
Ehley 11/20 (Brianna, Carbon Tax: Two Problems Solved for the Price of One,
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/11/20/Carbon-Tax-Two-Problems-Solved-forthe-Price-of-One.aspx#page1, CMR)

Environmental advocates including former Vice President Al Gore have also been pushing a carbon tax
as a way to bring in new revenue to narrow the deficit, while attempting to reduce carbon dioxide emissions which many scientists
have linked to extreme weather, like Hurricane Sandy. "We can back away from the fiscal cliff and the climate cliff at the same time,"
Gore told The Guardian. For his part, President Obama

does not intend to propose a carbon tax , but

indicated at his White House news conference last Thursday he

would not stand in the way of one if Congress

were to take the lead and approve it. "I am a firm believer that climate change is real, that it is impacted by human
behavior and carbon emissions," he said. "As a consequence, I think we've got an obligation to future generations to do something
about it." ENERGY PRODUCERS PUSH BACK Not surprisingly, the coal mining and oil and gas industry and many utilities
strongly oppose any form of a carbon tax, saying it would seriously damage the economy and cost many jobs. Major producers of gas
and oil have also warned that a tax on carbon emissions would make their companies less competitive in the global market.
However, some companies including Exxon Mobil that have previously resisted a carbon tax now say they may be open to one if its
revenue neutral meaning that revenues raised by it would either be returned to consumers or used to offset the effects of a
different tax. Alan Jeffers, a spokesman for Exxon Mobil, the nations leading natural gas producer, told The Fiscal Times that the
company is waiting to see a proposal before taking a position. He stressed, however, that Congress "shouldnt target a particular
sector" while generating revenue to reduce the deficit; rather, it should be "neutral across the economy." For the time being, there
is one piece of revenue-neutral carbon tax legislation floating around Washington. Last August, Rep. Jim
McDermott, a Washington state Democrat and senior member of the Ways and Means Committee, introduced the Managed
Carbon Price Act (MCP). McDermotts bill would require coal, oil and natural gas producers to purchase permits from the
Secretary of the Treasury to emit carbon dioxide a major contributor to climate change. The permit prices set by the government
would increase every five years. The MCP aims to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 80 percent within 42 years based on 2005
levels. Of the revenue generated from the permits, 75 percent would be rebated to the public to compensate them for price increases,
while 25 percent would go toward deficit reduction. "We can no longer ignore the climate and revenue problems we have in this
country, and a well-crafted carbon tax can help address both issues in a way that helps the economy and ensures meaningful
emissions reductions," McDermott told The Fiscal Times. He added that he put the proposal forward right before
August recess as a way to "spark discussion and awareness of a carbon tax, so that we have the best policy ready when Congress
finally takes up tax reform."

b) Framing You missed the CP text Fee and dividend labeling


avoids all their link arguments
Hurst 12 (Timothy, Goodbye, Cap and Trade. Hello, Fee and Dividend?, March 2,

http://ecopolitology.org/2012/03/02/goodbye-cap-and-trade-hello-fee-and-dividend/, CMR)
could a carbon tax fee and dividend fly in
the U.S.? Maybe, given the right political context and the right framing . The U.S. only need look to our counterparts
in the Southern Hemisphere for guidance. Australia's carbon tax , which passed in a similar political climate that
exists in the U.S. and will go into effect in mid-2012, is not called a carbon tax at all. They prefer to call it a
"carbon price." Substituting fees for taxes may seem like a simplistic approach to finding
politically viable ways to fund programs. But over the last decade or so, the Republican Party
However, the carbon tax, as an idea, has yet to be vilified to the same degree as cap and trade. But

has made the tactic their policy prescription of choice.


Republicans a taste of their own medicine.

And I have a feeling Democrats are on the cusp of giving

c) Revenue-neutrality shields the link


Carbon Tax Center 12 (No Tax Increase? How?, June 29, retrieved July 27, Carbon Tax
Center: Pricing Carbon Efficiently and Equitably, March 3,
http://www.carbontax.org/introduction/#no-tax-increase, CMR)

A carbon tax should be revenue-neutral. Revenue-neutral means that little if any of the tax revenues
raised by taxing carbon emissions would be retained by government. The vast majority of the revenues
would be returned to the public, with, perhaps, a very small amount utilized to mitigate the otherwise
negative impacts of carbon taxes on low-income energy users . Two primary return approaches are being
discussed. One would rebate the revenues directly through regular (e.g., monthly) equal dividends to
all U.S. residents. In effect, every resident would receive equal, identical slices of the total revenue
pie. Just such a program has operated in Alaska for three decades, providing residents with annual dividends from the states
North Slope oil revenues. In the other method, each dollar of carbon tax revenue would trigger a dollars worth of reduction in
existing taxes such as the federal payroll tax or state sales taxes. As carbon-tax revenues are phased in (with the tax
rates rising gradually but steadily, to allow a smooth transition), existing

taxes will be phased out and, in some cases,


eliminated. This tax-shift approach, while less direct than the dividend method, would also ensure that the carbon tax is
revenue-neutral and could offer other benefits. For example, reducing payroll taxes could stimulate employment. Each individuals
receipt of dividends or tax-shifts would be independent of the taxes he or she pays. That is, no persons benefits would be tied to his
or her energy consumption and carbon tax bill. This separation of benefits from payments preserves the incentives created by a
carbon tax to reduce use of fossil fuels and emit less CO2 into the atmosphere. Of course, it would be extraordinarily cumbersome to
calculate an individuals full carbon tax bill since to some extent the carbon tax would be passed through as part of the costs of
various goods and services. Revenue-neutrality not only protects the poor (see next section), its also

politically

savvy since it blunts the No New Taxes demand that has held sway in American politics for
over a generation. Returning the carbon tax revenues to the public would also make it easier to raise
the tax level over time, a point made nicely by McGill University professor Christopher Ragan in a 2008 Montreal Gazette
op-ed.

d.) Doesnt require legislation its an internal change


Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)
A carbon tax poses few of the problems associated with a cap-and-trade system and offers many more benefits. Unlike

a capand-trade system, a carbon [*93] tax is fundamentally simple . Numerous characteristics


beneficial to many tax systems are also at work in a carbon tax. For one, a carbon tax can be easily
implemented, administered, and overseen. The administrative infrastructure already exists to
levy taxes on fossil fuels, and the United States has extensive experience with economy-wide excise
taxes on a wide variety of products, including gasoline. n160 The government could conceivably
implement a carbon tax with minor additions to the I nternal R evenue C ode. n161 In fact, a
carbon tax bill proposed by Representative John Larson, Connecticut, proposes adding three relatively short sections to the existing
excise portion of the Code. n162
extensive

Unlike cap-and-trade

implementation -

which would require new

and

legislation - a carbon tax could apply broadly to all sectors in the economy with

relative ease . Additionally, the administrative advantages could be heightened if the tax occurred
at the source, such as the wellhead, mine, or port of entry . Taxing fewer entities that expect strong supervision
could pass the costs downstream and would limit leakage. Lastly, the existing staff of the Internal Revenue Service, which
has expertise in enforcing excise taxes, could oversee tax collection.

That saves capital


Schoenbrod 93 (David,- professor of law at NYU Power Without Responsibility pg. 9596, CMR)

Second, presidents must take personal responsibility for laws embodied in statues that they sign, but they can

shift

some of the

blame for agency laws to the agency. Shifting blame is easy when as independent agency has made the
law, because the leaders of such agencies do not serve at the presidents pleasure. Presidents also often avoid
substantial political losses they might sustain for the unpopular action of appointees who do serve at the
presidents please by taking no position on what the agency has done or even by expressing some disagreement.
Indeed, even incumbent presidents try to run against the government. President George Bush tried to distance
himself from agency laws promulgated during his administration by declaring a ninety-day moratorium on new agency laws before the
1992 elections. Third, delegation enhances the presidents ability to use his staff to do casework. It thereby allows
the president as well as legislators to particularize constituents perceptions of costs and benefits. President Reagan
and Bush made much of separation of powers --- but usually to defend executive powers from congressional encroachment and never to prevent
Congress from delegating its legislative power to the executive branch. Delegation does not change the cast of officials who

participate in lawmaking: legislators, agency heads, the president, and their staffs. But delegation does allow legislators and
the president to shift to the agency blame for the costs of complying with the laws, blame for the failure to deliver promised
regulatory benefits, and blame for the delay, complexity, and confusion that the process causes. Delegation also
increases the opportunity for legislators and the president to do politically valuable casework.

And avoids congressional fights


Frieden 92 (Jeffry, Economic Integration and the Politics of Monetary Policy in the United
States, Occasional Paper Series, 93-2, October 1992,
http://www.cappp.ucla.edu/papers/cappp932.txt, CMR)

For all intents and purposes, Congress virtually neglected monetary and exchange rate policy for nearly forty years after the New
Deal reforms.[50] A number of reasons for this might be adduced. One possibility--often mentioned in the analogous literature on
trade policy as well as in discussions of central bank autonomy--is that Congress recognized the efficiency gains to

be made by delegating responsibility to an independent agency. Not only could the agency
pursue welfare-improving policies without having to pay attention to political pressures, but
Congress was provided with an ideal scapegoat to avoid direct blame . In this view the
Fed was in fact implementing true Congressional preferences, just in a way that protected
Congress from responsibility for unpopular monetary policies.[51

***
Avoids partisan backlash recent trend proves
Volcovici 11/8 (Valerie, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/08/us-carbon-taxfiscal-cliff-idUSBRE8A71IU20121108, CMR)
"One major fiscal possibility is a new carbon

tax, which is likely to garner far more support

this time around

than at any time in the past and could become an appealing part of an emerging consensus
on how to avoid the fiscal cliff," said a note from Citigroup's investment research group. Paul Bledsoe, an independent policy
consultant, said a carbon tax on polluters would be "better for the economy than our current taxes on work." The measure would
garner more support if its economic benefits are touted rather than its ability to help the administration achieve its green goals, said
Bledsoe, who served as staff on the Senate finance committee during the 1993 budget negotiations. NUMBER CRUNCHING The
U.S. Treasury has funded a major carbon tax analysis that will explore how the country's tax code can be used to cut greenhouse gas
emissions. The report is being drafted by the National Academies of Science (NAS), which has commissioned a panel of economic
specialists to analyze how to reform the way the government raises revenue to encourage cuts in emissions of gases that are blamed
for climate change. The committee, which has met five times since April 2011, is reviewing how direct taxes, such as fuel-related
provisions, and indirect measures, such as home mortgage deductions, will increase or decrease emissions rates. The paper was
commissioned by legislation enacted during the George W. Bush administration in 2008, but not funded until 2009. It will be
submitted to Congress next spring. UNLIKELY SUPPORTERS In recent months, a number of moderate Republicans,
including a few economists that advised Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, have

declared their support for

a carbon tax, leading some to believe there is a chance for bipartisan support in Congress. Harvard
professor Gregory Mankiw, economic adviser to Romney, wrote in a 2007 column that "if we want to reduce global emissions of
carbon, we need a global carbon tax." Former Republican Congressmen Sherwood Boehlert and Wayne Gilchrest joined Democrats
Henry Waxman and Ed Markey to support a carbon tax in February. In July, former Republican Congressman Bob Inglis launched
a think tank to promote a plan to raise taxes on fossil fuels while cutting income tax, a concept previously supported by former
Democratic Vice President Al Gore. Even George Shultz, Ronald Reagan's former Secretary of State and a fellow at the Hoover
Institution, entered the fray, saying that a carbon tax that returns revenue to taxpayers could garner the support of his party. "The

fact that you are seeing more voices come into the conversation and talk about it is a welcome
one," said Nat Keohane, vice president at the Environmental Defense Fund and former special assistant to Obama on energy and
environmental issues. "Hurricane Sandy has helped reboot this conversation," he said, by becoming just the
latest in a year of extreme weather events in the United States, including major droughts and historic wildfires.

Revenue-neutrality prevents GOP backlash


Volcovici 11/13 (Valerie, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/14/us-usa-carbontax-idUSBRE8AD00820121114, CMR)

The ball is now in the court of Republicans if the Obama administration is to consider including a carbon tax as part of fiscal
reform efforts, a U.S. Treasury official said on Tuesday. Gilbert Metcalf, deputy assistant secretary for environment and energy, said
the White House has no specific plans in the works to introduce a charge on carbon dioxide emissions from the burning fossil fuels.
The idea of charging industries a fee for each ton of carbon dioxide emitted as a way to lower the deficit or cut tax rates has

attracted renewed attention

since President Barack Obama's re-election. Metcalf said the White House would be
open to the idea, which could also curb emissions of greenhouse gases blamed for climate change, should there be a bipartisan
solution. "We will need to address the fiscal concerns. We will need a bipartisan approach on all issues," Metcalf said in a speech at
a carbon tax event co-hosted by the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank. "If this is going to be an issue that is
part of the discussions there is going to have to be some interest shown by Republicans." In his second term, Obama faces the
challenges of lowering the deficit, fostering growth in oil and gas production and making good on his promise to act on climate
change. A carbon tax could raise significant revenue for the debt-ridden federal government and please those who blame climate
change for weather events like Superstorm Sandy. Many Republicans, however, reject anything resembling a new tax on industries
using or producing fossil fuels. Also co-hosting Tuesday's event, devoted to the economics of a carbon tax, was the Brookings
Institution and the International Monetary Fund. Experts at both ends of the political spectrum weighed various proposals.

number of academics and policymakers have recently advocated a revenue-neutral carbon


"tax swap". Supporters, including former Republican Congressman Bob Inglis, have touted it as a way to reduce carbon emissions
while raising much-needed revenue. Metcalf said if Republicans would view a carbon tax as a viable piece of the fiscal reform
discussion, the administration would support it as "part of the mix". "We have consistently been a supporter of market-based
approaches (to greenhouse gas emissions)," he said, referring to the administration's support for cap and trade - a system that
requires emitters to buy and trade permits for each ton of carbon they pump out. A bill that would have established a mandatory
cap-and-trade system for the United States passed in the House in 2009 but died after facing a divided Senate the following year.
NEW OPPORTUNITY? After Obama's latest win and Democratic pickups in Congress, some analysts expect less of the

vocal opposition from Republicans on hot-button issues seen over the past two years. William Gale, chair of the
Economic Studies Program at Brookings, told reporters the tone in Congress is different, and may signal a chance for progress. "It
feels like they (Republicans) are more willing to compromise now. I believe the real stuff will happen
behind closed doors. Public statements are mostly posturing," he said.

No opposition
Berezow 12 (Alex, Why Everyone Should Love a Carbon Tax, May 31,

http://www.realclearscience.com/articles/2012/05/31/why_everyone_should_love_a_carbon
_tax_106280.html, CMR)
A carbon tax prevents all of these problems. It is easy to explain , adds little to no extra
bureaucracy , and provides price stability. Those factors will make it more popular and hence, more effective than capand-trade.
Indeed, a Pigovian tax to reduce carbon emissions already has a wide base of Republican support.
For instance, former George W. Bush economic advisor N. Gregory Mankiw

supports it with an offsetting


reduction in payroll taxes. Conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer supports a similar policy in

regard to a gasoline tax. In todays political environment, thats about as close to unanimous
agreement as we can hope for.
Additionally, a carbon tax can be adjusted to reflect the relative desirability of energy sources . Coal and
oil, which are very dirty, would be taxed the greatest. Natural gas, which is cleaner, would be taxed less. Clean energy, including
nuclear, wouldnt be taxed at all.

Avoids backlash from both parties


Bauman & Hsu 7/4/12 environmental economist, fellow @ Sightline Institute in Seattle,
AND law professor at Florida State (Yoram and Shi-Ling, The Most Sensible Tax of All,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/05/opinion/a-carbon-tax-sensible-for-all.html?
_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss, CMR)

a British
Columbia-style $30 carbon tax would generate about $145 billion a year in the U nited States. That
could be used to reduce individual and corporate income taxes by 10 percent, and afterward
there would still be $35 billion left over. If recent budget deals are any guide, Congress might choose to set
aside half of that remainder to reduce estate taxes (to please Republicans) and the other half
to offset the impacts of higher fuel and electricity prices resulting from the carbon tax on lowincome households through refundable tax credits or a targeted reduction in payroll taxes (to
please Democrats).
What would a British Columbia-style carbon tax look like in the United States? According to our calculations,

Comparative ev least political risks


Schueneman 7/26/12 (Tom, A Carbon Tax is More Viable than Cap and Trade,

http://theenergycollective.com/globalwarmingisreal/97071/carbon-tax-more-viable-cap-andtrade, CMR)
Carbon Taxes
Historically, taxes have been a non-starter in U.S., particularly with Republicans. However,

with the failure of cap and


trade, many economists and a growing number of business leaders are looking towards a carbon
tax to reign in emissions.
The Breakthrough Institute estimates that a carbon tax of as little as $5 per ton could result in $30 billion a year in the U.S. This
could be used for R&D funding, project development, and other clean-tech supports, including a potential rebate for consumers
initially hit with higher energy costs in some regions.
Business leaders like Microsoft founder Bill Gates is among those who support a carbon tax. In 2010, Gates expressed his support for
a tax over cap-and-trade, stating its ideal to have a carbon tax, not just a price on carbon
It is clear that Republican opposition makes cap and trade a dead issue in the U.S. for the foreseeable future. However, one
prominent Republican claims that

it is still possible to introduce a carbon tax .

In July, George Shultz said that his party could eventually support a carbon tax. The former Secretary of
State for the Regan administration has called for a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and oil consumption. Shultz
is the head of the Hoover Institutions Task Force on Energy Policy, which calls for boosting energy efficiency, reducing dependence
on oil exports to improve national security, and putting a price on carbon.
We have to have a system where all forms of energy bear their full costs , Shultz said. For some, their
costs are the costs of producing the energy, but many other forms of energy produce side effects, like pollution, that are a cost to
society. The producers dont bear that cost, society does. There has to be a way to level the playing field and

cause those forms of energy to bear their true costs. That means putting a price on carbon.
Weve studied a variety of ways to do that, and to me the most appealing way is a revenue-neutral carbon
tax. That is, you distribute all the revenue from the carbon tax in some fashion back to
taxpayers, so there is no fiscal drag on the economy . British Columbia has a revenue-neutral carbon tax.
They started low and increased the tax over five years to a much higher level, so people could adjust. The revenue is
distributed mostly to individuals, so its popular.

Avoids Politics Fee + Dividend EXTN


Their ev is hype no opposition
Kirsch 9 (Steve Kirsch is a philanthropist and entrepreneur based in San Jose, CA. He has

founded five high technology companies. He is currently CEO of Abaca, an anti-spam company,
Why Hansen is Right: Cap-and-trade will Make the Climate Problem Worse, Not Better, Nov
9, http://bravenewclimate.com/2009/11/09/fee-and-dividend-better/, CMR)
Myth

#2: Fee-and-dividend

will never pass. It's a tax. There is no traction for this.


This is a self-perpetuating myth that is true only as long as people contine to believe it is true. A recent poll of American show they
overwhelmingly prefer fee-and-dividend.
The reality is that if properly positioned (see communication tools for making a carbon tax palatable to the public), a carbon fee and rebate
is not only politically viable , but it is political suicide to oppose it, as the lawmakers in British Columbia now know. Look what
happened in Finland. Finlands carbon tax has reduced emissions by 5% below the previous trend and stimulated renewable energy investment and
development. Energy taxes are now a major source of government revenue, and are curbing growth in energy use and promoting efficiency while
Finlands economy expands. Finlands climate policy has created jobs, including more jobs for women. See Carbon Tax is on the (Round) Table at the
Cosmos Club.

Fee and dividend labeling avoids political backlash


Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)

To successfully implement a carbon tax, the government must overcome the public's aversion to
taxes. The word tax triggers a knee-jerk reaction in much of the American public. For this reason, many tax-like programs seek to
manipulate public perception by avoiding the word tax. Seattle, for example, places what amounts to a twenty-cent tax on plastic
grocery bags and calls it an "advance disposal fee." n134 California and Oregon collect a "system benefit charge" as part of utility
bills. n135 In California, the fee is a small monthly surcharge that finances programs for energy efficiency, clean-tech R&D,
consumer rebates, and education. n136 Such efforts suggest that political strategists take the public distaste for

taxes seriously and create alternatives to sell their tax-like programs.


Continuing this trend, carbon tax advocates have proposed "fee and dividend" as an alternative label for
what amounts to a form of taxation. In a New York Times editorial, James Hansen, NASA climatologist and vocal cap-and-trade
opponent, laid out the fee and dividend proposal. n137 Hansen suggests imposing a gradually rising fee for each ton of carbon that
the United States extracts or imports. n138 The fee would raise the price of goods that utilize carbon energy in their production, but
it would also be redistributed as dividends to individuals in proportion to their reduction in carbon emissions. n139 The United
States Tax Code could pull these same policy levers, through taxing, offsets and grants, n140 but there would be no getting around
the word "tax."

No backlash
Reyna 10 (Shraddah, Fee and Dividend A Better Plan to Reduce CO2, March 9,

http://www.blueplanetgreenliving.com/2010/03/09/fee-and-dividend-%E2%80%93-a-betterplan-to-reduce-co2/, CMR)
The fee-and-dividend approach has bi-partisan appeal . Similar plans have been presented by Rep. John
Larson (D-CT) and by Rep. Bob Inglis (R-SC). But this legislation needs the support of citizens. If you like the idea of the fee-anddividend plan, contact your Members of Congress and tell them so. Let them know you support climate legislation that places a fee
on carbon and returns the revenue to all households. Its transparent, its simple, and it will be effective.

Avoids Politics Obama No Push EXTN


More evidence hell defer to others
Ehley 11/20 (Brianna, Carbon Tax: Two Problems Solved for the Price of One,

http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/11/20/Carbon-Tax-Two-Problems-Solved-forthe-Price-of-One.aspx#page1, CMR)
Environmental advocates including former Vice President Al Gore have also been pushing a carbon tax
as a way to bring in new revenue to narrow the deficit, while attempting to reduce carbon dioxide emissions which many scientists
have linked to extreme weather, like Hurricane Sandy. "We can back away from the fiscal cliff and the climate cliff at the same time,"
Gore told The Guardian. For his part, President Obama

does not intend to propose a carbon tax , but

indicated at his White House news conference last Thursday he

would not stand in the way of one if Congress

were to take the lead and approve it. "I am a firm believer that climate change is real, that it is impacted by human
behavior and carbon emissions," he said. "As a consequence, I think we've got an obligation to future generations to do something
about it." ENERGY PRODUCERS PUSH BACK Not surprisingly, the coal mining and oil and gas industry and many utilities
strongly oppose any form of a carbon tax, saying it would seriously damage the economy and cost many jobs. Major producers of gas
and oil have also warned that a tax on carbon emissions would make their companies less competitive in the global market.
However, some companies including Exxon Mobil that have previously resisted a carbon tax now say they may be open to one if its
revenue neutral meaning that revenues raised by it would either be returned to consumers or used to offset the effects of a
different tax. Alan Jeffers, a spokesman for Exxon Mobil, the nations leading natural gas producer, told The Fiscal Times that the
company is waiting to see a proposal before taking a position. He stressed, however, that Congress "shouldnt target a particular
sector" while generating revenue to reduce the deficit; rather, it should be "neutral across the economy." For the time being, there
is one piece of revenue-neutral carbon tax legislation floating around Washington. Last August, Rep. Jim
McDermott, a Washington state Democrat and senior member of the Ways and Means Committee, introduced the Managed
Carbon Price Act (MCP). McDermotts bill would require coal, oil and natural gas producers to purchase permits from the
Secretary of the Treasury to emit carbon dioxide a major contributor to climate change. The permit prices set by the government
would increase every five years. The MCP aims to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 80 percent within 42 years based on 2005
levels. Of the revenue generated from the permits, 75 percent would be rebated to the public to compensate them for price increases,
while 25 percent would go toward deficit reduction. "We can no longer ignore the climate and revenue problems we have in this
country, and a well-crafted carbon tax can help address both issues in a way that helps the economy and ensures meaningful
emissions reductions," McDermott told The Fiscal Times. He added that he put the proposal forward right before
August recess as a way to "spark discussion and awareness of a carbon tax, so that we have the best policy ready when Congress
finally takes up tax reform."

No chance Obama pushes


Snyder 11/12 (Tanya, became Streetsblog's Capitol Hill editor in September 2010 after

covering Congress for Pacifica and public radio, 2012, http://dc.streetsblog.org/2012/11/12/yeswe-have-no-carbon-tax/, CMR)
But then the

White House extinguished the flame of hope right quick. The Administration has not

proposed nor is planning to propose a carbon tax, a White House official told The Hill. After the failure
of cap-and-trade legislation during his first term, Obama seemingly doesnt want to wade back into those waters.
Though the President did at least acknowledge the threat of climate change in his acceptance speech, and in the post-Sandy political
environment, its fair to think there might be a little more openness to pricing carbon.

AND, Its pushed by McDermott avoids political fallout


Johnson 8/2/12 (Keith, Revisiting a U.S. Carbon Tax,

http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/08/02/revisiting-a-carbon-tax/, CMR)
Worries over the budget deficit and, to a lesser extent, over climate change are stirring new interest in an idea
that could tackle both: a carbon tax.

The concept is as simple as it is politically sensitive place a tax on carbon-dioxide emissions, which will help
drive them down. Use the proceeds to cut taxes elsewhere or reduce the deficit.

set to introduce a carbon bill in the House that sets a target for
reduction in emissions and instructs the executive branch to impose a tax sufficient to meet that target. The bill is designed to
On Thursday, Rep. Jim

McDermott

(D., Wash.) is

cut emissions of greenhouse gases and raise tens of billions of dollars that could help pay down the deficit.

Avoids Politics Internal Change EXTN


Its an administrative change no legislation required
Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann9 (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law

and the Director of the International Tax LLM Program at the University of Michigan Law
School; David M. Uhlmann is the Jeffrey F. Liss Professor from Practice and the Director of the
Environmental Law and Policy Program at the University of Michigan Law School, Combating
Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap
and Trade, Feb, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, lexis, CMR)
Cap and trade is also relatively untried: we have never had an economy-wide cap and trade system, while we have extensive
experience with economy-wide excise taxes on a wide variety of products, including gasoline. This is why Congressman Larson's
carbon tax bill can simply envisage adding three new relatively short sections to the existing excise tax

part of the Internal Revenue Code. n136 Cap and trade, on the other hand, is a major new and separate
piece of legislation. A new administration determined to implement cap and trade would probably have to take at least two
years to get the program passed in Congress and set up for implementation, even with swift Congressional action, because of the
inherent delays in the rulemaking process. A

carbon tax can be enacted and enforced practically

tomorrow . Given that we have already delayed action for decades, and that every year that passes makes the climate change
problem more difficult to solve, a carbon tax may be preferable to cap and trade - as well as traditional regulatory approaches - based
on timing concerns alone.
In addition to its inherent complexity, cap and trade also is more difficult to enforce. Under cap and trade, an elaborate mechanism
would need to be set up to distribute and collect allowances and to ensure that allowances are real (a difficult task, [*40] especially
if allowances from non-United States programs are permitted) and that polluters are penalized if they emit greenhouses gases
without an allowance. A new administrative body would need to be set up for this purpose, or at least a new office within EPA, and
new employees with the relevant expertise would need to be hired. A carbon tax, on the other hand, could be enforced by
the IRS with its existing staff,

which has the relevant expertise in enforcing other excise taxes.

Avoids Politics Consensus/No PC EXTN


Avoids political backlash, doesnt drain PC
Pethokoukis 10 - Money & Politics columnist-blogger for the American Enterprise
Institute (James, BP oil spill may fuel drive for carbon tax, June 3rd, 2010, Tax News,
http://www.taxrates.cc/html/1006-carbon-tax.html)

Enter the carbon tax. One advantage is the possibility of significant Republican
backing. It already has a smattering of support in Congress and from noted
conservative intellectuals such as economists Arthur Laffer and Gregory Mankiw. Then there's its double dividend.
First, a tax reduces emissions by creating a clear and certain price less subject to
potential gaming by business. The downside is that it, like cap-and-trade, could also lower economic growth and
employment by a "modest amount," according to the Congressional Budget Office. But a carbon tax can also be progrowth. A US$100-per-ton levy would boost gas prices by US$1 a gallon (while also
making coal and natural gas pricier) and eventually generate US$500-billion a
year in new government revenue. Payroll or corporate taxes could then be lowered by an equal amount. On
paper, this would be revenue neutral. But in reality it would amount to subbing a new tax on something Americans don't really want
(carbon pollution) for old taxes on something it does want (work and investment.) Even a starter tax of US$15 a ton could allow a
30% cut in corporate taxes or a 10% reduction in payroll taxes. The result could be higher economic growth, which also leads to
higher tax revenue. In 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama will likely face a far more Republican

Congress. Joint agreement on a carbon tax today would salvage some political -- if
not environmental and economic -- good from the catastrophe in the Gulf.

Its politically distinct avoids backlash


Carbon Tax Center 11 (Myths, last updated Jan 21, retrieved July 27,
http://www.carbontax.org/myths/, CMR)

Myth #8. Americans are too myopic, and our politics too broken, for even revenue-neutral carbon
taxation to ever take root here. Who says: Veterans of failed past efforts to take on entitlements; assorted skeptics and
cynics including, sometimes, ourselves. Rebuttal: This is the one myth even we at CTC cant dismiss out of hand. Witness the
failure of past fuel-tax efforts, the resistance to fossil-fuel-displacing wind farms in some rural areas, and the persistence of costly tax
entitlements like the deductibility of home mortgage interest payments from federal taxes each, in its own way, testament to the
dictum that losers cry louder than winners sing, in the words of University of Michigan tax policy expert Joel Slemrod.

were betting on a different outcome for carbon taxes . For one thing,
emphasizing revenue-neutral carbon taxing can help dispel the presumption that a carbon tax is
a tax hike. Second, because the non-climate benefits of carbon taxes are enormous , from reduced
dependence on foreign oil to less traffic gridlock, there are many opportunities to broaden support from
traditional environmentalists. Finally, unlike 1980 or 1993, when fuel-tax proposals went down to defeat, the stakes this
Nevertheless,

time are high frighteningly so. Stiff carbon taxes cant rescue the climate by themselves, but without them a rescue is virtually
inconceivable. Were confident the American people will rise to the challenge.

Its bipartisan
Handley 9 (James Handley, chemical engineer and attorney who previously worked in the

private sector and for the Environmental Protection Agency, March 11, Imagine: A
Harmonized, Global CO2 Tax, Carbon Tax Center,
http://www.carbontax.org/blogarchives/2009/03/11/imagine-a-harmonized-global-co2-tax/,
CMR)
Moreover, unlike cap-and-trade, a

national carbon tax is showing signs of bipartisan support . One


reason is that a carbon tax dispenses with the protracted drafting and wrangling inherent in capand-trade. British Columbia implemented its carbon tax in five months.

Avoids Politics (Public Supports)


Strong public support for a carbon tax
Handley 11 12/2/11, James Handley, chemical engineer and attorney who previously worked in the
private sector and for the Environmental Protection Agency, Majority in U.S. Support Revenue-Neutral
Carbon Tax, Carbon Tax Center: Pricing Carbon Efficiently and Equitably,
http://www.carbontax.org/blogarchives/2011/12/02/majority-in-u-s-support-revenue-neutral-carbontax/ CMR
Sixty-five percent of Americans now support a modest revenue-neutral carbon tax to reduce pollution and
create jobs, according to a survey of one thousand American adults conducted jointly last month by the
Yale Project on Climate Communication and the George Mason University Center for Climate Change
Communication. This is the first poll we have seen showing that a majority of Americans support a carbon
tax. Majority support for a carbon tax spanned the political spectrum in the Yale-George Mason poll, with
51% of self-identified Republicans, 69% of independents and 77% of Democrats supporting a carbon tax
with revenue returned as lower taxes. The survey found 60% support for a $10/ton CO2 tax if revenue is
returned by reducing income taxes. (The pollsters helpfully noted that $10/ton CO2 equates to around 10
cents per gallon of gasoline.) That support slipped to 49% if revenue is returned via annual checks to
families, with each family receiving the same amount. The apparent preference for an income tax shift
over a dividend runs counter to the view that voters are more likely to embrace direct checks than tax
shifts. The survey did not poll on monthly checks, nor on the payroll tax shift approach backed by many
economists and embodied in Rep. John Larsons carbon tax bill. In the poll, 70% of respondents rated
global warming as a high priority for the President and Congress, suggesting that reality in the form of
this years record-breaking 14 weather-related disasters in the U.S. may be affecting public opinion more
than the constant drumbeat of industry-funded climate science denial. Greater funding for research on
renewable energy was supported by an overwhelming 78% of respondents, with greenhouse gas regulation
supported by 63%, slightly less than the 65% support for a carbon tax. The survey also found that 70% of
respondents oppose fossil fuel subsidies, including a whopping 80% opposition among independent
voters. The Carbon Tax Center has long urged polling organizations to query voters on revenue-neutral
carbon taxes, in order to test opinions on carbon taxes apart from anti-government sentiments. The
strong public support for a revenue-neutral carbon tax evidenced by this groundbreaking survey suggests
we are on the right track.
More ev.
Pike, 11, Cara Pike, Founder and Director of the Social Capital Project,
http://www.climateaccess.org/blog/cap-not-trade-study-shows-support-carbon-tax, November 22nd,
2011, Cap not trade study shows support carbon tax CMR
According to Public Support for Climate & Energy Policies in November 2011, produced by the Yale
Project on Climate Change Communication and the George Mason University Center for Climate Change
Communication, there is strong majority public support (65%) in the United States for revenue-neural
carbon taxes, particularly when these taxes help create jobs and decrease pollution. As with most
climate-related issues, support is higher with Democrats; however, even a majority of Republications
(51%) can get behind revenue-neutral taxes.

2NC NB Coercion
DA to the perm It violates revenue-neutrality government funded
programs are coercive and destroy individual free will
Smith 8 [Christina, freelance writer and recipient of the Amigas Peace Power Prize for her
works, So Welfare Is Now Patriotic?, Apr 20, http://www.christinesmith.us/id93.html]

Government handouts weaken this nation to its core economically, socially and morally.
Government handouts are financed by force, by coercion; taxation strips you of
money you deserve to keep and is then often wasted through bureaucracy and
corruption. But even if such a program were administered efficiently (and government does
little if anything efficiently), but even if it were so, it is fundamentally wrong to tax some people
in order to provide assistance to others. You don't take freedom from one by
eliminating their free will and taking the fruits of their labor to supposedly give
freedom/help/assistance to another. Freedom exist without coercion of any kind. And only in
freedom is compassion expressed.
It's not immoral to be in need, to be in a situation requiring the assistance of others - but it is immoral and
disgusting when the pain and suffering of those in need is exploited by the
government to justify its existence, its greed, its legalized stealing . Cloaked in the
guise of compassion, from birth to death, the government intrudes into every area of American's lives
making such important vital parts of life such as one's education, livelihood, health care, and
retirement all tied to government control.
Socialism (and socialist programs such as welfare) are the antithesis of a free society, just as they are
the antithesis of a compassionate society.
Moral side constraint
Petro, 74 Professor at Wake Forest (Sylvester, Spring 1974, Toledo Law Review, p. 480)
However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume's observation: "It is seldom

it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of


freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other
aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human
aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Dijas. In sum, if one believed in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to
maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified
and resisted with undying spirit.
that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." Thus,

CP avoids this
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)

Assuming that encouraging the clean tech revolution is needed to both avoid the negative consequences of depleting the fossil fuel
resource and to capitalize on an economic opportunity, the next point of discussion is why a carbon tax is better than

other policy proposals. A carbon tax is attractive because it pulls the policy lever only slightly. It nudges natural
consumption and development in a sensible direction, but does not require a dramatic
alteration people's behavior . n40 A carbon tax avoids mandates that people stop driving
their environmentally noncompliant diesel trucks, or that a city buy thirty percent of its
electricity from wind turbines. Rather, a small fee on carbon creates greater cost parity between
energy sources and operates at the margins of peoples' decision-making . Businesses may tip toward
greener ventures if the cost margins are slightly improved. At the consumer level, a difference of five cents on the dollar - not thirty -

between clean and carbon energy may allow people to opt for the more environmentally responsible choice. Such a

nudge does
not tell people what they must not do, but protects our freedom of choice in the
marketplace.

n41

Neg 2NC AT:

AT: Carbon Leakage


Border adjustment policy eliminates carbon leakage and protects US
companies from unfair competition
Carbon Tax Center 12 (Borders, May 14, retrieved July 27, 2012,
http://www.carbontax.org/issues/border-adjustments/, CMR)
Borders Border

Adjustments, also known as Border Tax Adjustments or Border Tax Assessments, are import fees
levied by carbon-taxing countries on goods manufactured in non-carbon-taxing countries . The
impetus behind border adjustments is the desire to ensure a level playing field in international trade while internalizing the costs of
climate damage into prices of goods and services. As Columbia University Economics Professor Joseph Stiglitz

has noted, Not paying the cost of damage to the environment is a subsidy , just as not paying the full
costs of workers would be. Stiglitz was formerly chair of president Clintons Council of Economic Advisers (1995-97) and Chief
Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank (1997-2000). He and others urge adoption of carbon

border adjustments to eliminate the artificial advantage

adhering to firms that manufacture goods or


provide services for world markets, from countries that fail to tax or otherwise price carbon emissions at prevailing world levels.
Stiglitz writes: In most of the developed countries of the world today, firms are paying the cost of pollution to the global
environment, in the form of taxes imposed on coal, oil, and gas. But American firms are being subsidizedand massively so. There is
a simple remedy: other countries should prohibit the importation of American goods produced using energy intensive technologies,
or, at the very least, impose a high tax on them, to offset the subsidy that those goods currently are receiving. Actually, the United

States itself has recognized this principle. It prohibited the importation of Thai shrimp that had
been caught in turtle unfriendly nets, nets that caused unnecessary deaths of large numbers of these endangered
species. Though the manner in which the United States had imposed the restriction was criticized, the WTO sustained the
important principle that global environmental concerns trump narrow commercial interests, as
well they should. But if one can justify restricting importation of shrimp in order to protect turtles, certainly one can justify
restricting importation of goods produced by technologies that unnecessarily pollute our
atmosphere, in order to protect the precious global atmosphere upon which we all depend for our very wellbeing. [A New Agenda For Global Warming, Economists' Voice, July 2006.] Stiglitzs Columbia University Web page has links to his
other articles and publications on border tax adjustments and other climate change issues. John Hontelez, secretary general of the
European Environmental Bureau (a federation of 140 environmental organizations based largely in European Union member
states), made similar points in a widely-circulated piece from April 2007, Time to tax the carbon dodgers. He wrote: Border Tax
Adjustments (BTAs) might be the answer which allows the EU to develop responsible climate

policies without having to wait for other countries. They would result in products imported from the US being
taxed to compensate for resulting differences in production costs. Thus EU firms would be protected against unfair, carbon-careless
competition from outside.

CP leads to domestic innovation and avoids offshoring also ensures


other countries model
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)

The benefits of a carbon tax, furthermore, do not necessarily depend on [*96] international cooperation.
While global cooperation is the ultimate goal, a well-designed carbon tax could benefit an individual country
by fostering domestic innovation without driving out industry. Observable benefits
may make a carbon tax attractive for self-adoption in numerous countries vying to be the next
growth centers for clean tech. A U.S. carbon tax, for example, could tax fossil fuels, both
domestically produced and imported, while rebating the tax on exports . Such a system would
provide a clear signal to domestic innovation while eliminating the incentive for
companies to outsource or relocate. Other countries , without being compelled by a supranational agency, may adopt their own carbon tax with similar protectionist measures to

capitalize on the upside of new technology market growth. n176 On the other hand, a more complicated capand-trade system may eventually provide similar market signals, but because it relies more heavily on international cooperation,
countries opting to not bind themselves present more opportunity for overall leakage and avoidance.

Carbon tax coupled with a border tax solves emissions


Helm 10 professor of energy policy at the University of Oxford (Dieter, A carbon border
tax can curb climate change, Sept 5, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a68bfc80-b915-11df99be-00144feabdc0.html#axzz22FxaNA4b, CMR)

As global growth picks up after the economic crisis, carbon emissions are going back up too. With China and India back on track to
double their gross domestic product every decade, and with coal providing nearly 30 per cent of global energy, the chances of
stabilising and reducing emissions are low. Indeed, little progress has been made in the last two decades. Only recessions lower
emissions and then only for a short time. This is partly due to the failed strategy for carbon reduction laid out at Kyoto. But behind
it lurks another troubling development: advanced nations fiddling their carbon reduction figures. As Robert Watson, the UK
governments chief environment scientist, has recently accepted, countries such as Britain that appear to have lowered their

greenhouse gases have done no such thing. Instead they have exported them, to the developing world. A new
approach is now needed to combat this evasion, beginning with plans for carbon border taxes .
The Kyoto agreement tried to get countries to set carbon production caps. These were to be translated into permits, and then traded.
Europe led the way with such a system with the US supposed to follow (as soon as President George W. Bush had gone). But the
strategy came unstuck at Copenhagen and there is now no prospect of a binding worldwide system any time soon. A US system now
looks impossible for years to come, while Australia has stalled, and China and India are not playing ball. In practice, however, even
Europes system has not worked. The scheme has proved volatile with a carbon price much too low to make a difference. Yes,
Europes trading system is politically popular mostly because it lets Europeans trumpet their leadership. It is profitable for traders
and incumbent polluters. But the system mostly gives the illusion of progress whilst heading off more effective policies such as
carbon taxes. Kyotos failed targets remain popular in part because they make Europe look good. But this is mostly because, under
the system, carbon consumption is ignored. As Europe continues to de-industrialise relative to emerging economies such as China
and India its production of carbon falls, displaced by carbon imports. All of this looks fine, until you admit that energy intensive
industries have been emigrating elsewhere. To give some idea of the scale of these effects, under Kyoto measurements the UKs
production of carbon fell around 15 per cent between 1990 and 2005. But once carbon imports, aviation and shipping are added it
actually went up, by around 19 per cent. The bottom line is that carbon consumption, not production, is what counts. Any

serious global climate policy would have those who cause the emissions paying for them. And
the obvious answer is to price carbon whatever its source . Sadly, the power of vested interests is so
strong, and the political fallout from abandoning it would be so shattering, that we are stuck with the European Union trading
scheme for now. But a carbon tax initially as a floor price to the trading scheme would be an improvement. The
tax could start low and rise over time. It could also begin upstream by taxing coal, gas and oil, instead of finished goods. A crossparty agreement never to lower it would be even better. Such a set of national carbon taxes would be a step

forward. But to bear down on global climate change, there would need to be taxes on imports too, making
western consumers pay for the carbon used to make the cars, electronics and clothes they
consume from abroad. And this, in turn, means a border carbon price would need to be established,
reflecting the carbon content of imports.

Border tax is wto legal and solves


Gutierrez 11 (Tom, Border tax could stop carbon leakage, not global competition, May 9,

http://sbbnews.wordpress.com/2011/05/09/border-tax-could-stop-carbon-leakage-not-globalcompetition, CMR)
In the absence of a binding international agrement on climate change regions are likely to continue developing their own regulations
separately. However, this means regions which pursue stricter regulations will also have to protect the

competetiveness of their industries.


SBB 11 April Border adjustments to compensate for the added costs to the European steel industry of the
Emissions Trading System (ETS) would be World Trade Organisation (WTO) compliant, argues Susanne Drge, head of
global issues at the German Institute for International & Security Affairs.
Speaking at Steel Business Briefings Green Steel Strategies conference in Brussels on 5-6 April, she warned steelmaking capacity
could still move to other geographies because of international competition.

A border adjustment on imports would be legal if applied to all regions and on a basis that refers
to a non-discriminating standard. For example, using a best available technology standard to ensure
regions and producers with lower emissions levels are treated fairly, according to Drge.

A border adjustment on imports and exports would be necessary to combat carbon leakage from
the EU. However, working out the exact details of these adjustments would be a long and complicated process, she suggests. Export
adjustments are also more difficult to handle under the WTO, she adds.

Border taxes check.


Elliott et al 12 research scientist and fellow at University of Chicago Computation Institute, Ian

Foster, Sam Kortum, Gita Khun Jush, Todd Munson, David Weisbach, February 27, The University of
Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory, Unilateral Carbon Taxes, Border Tax Adjustments and
Carbon Leakage, INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 600 (2D Series),
page 5 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2072696
We also simulate the effects of border tax adjustments, taxes on the emissions from the production of an
imported good and rebates of domestic carbon taxes on the export of goods. Border tax adjustments are
thought to reduce leakage because they reduce the incentive to shift production abroad. In our
simulations, border tax adjustments reduce leakage substantially. They result in an increase in emissions
in the taxing region and a reduction in the non-taxing region, relative to a production tax. This finding is
consistent with our understanding of the reasons why leakage occurs, which we discuss below.

AT: Border Tax X WTO


Doesnt violate WTO multiple justifications
Carbon Tax Center 12 (Borders, May 14, retrieved July 27, 2012,
http://www.carbontax.org/issues/border-adjustments/, CMR)

A Duke University law professor subsequently published a working paper, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and
Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law, which holds out strong hope that
border tax adjustments could pass muster under WTO and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs & Trades)
rules. Prof. Joost Pauwelyn writes:
First, a carbon tax or emission credits requirement

on imports could be framed as WTO permissible


border adjustment of a domestic, US tax or cap-and-trade system (Section V). Crucially, if such border
adjustment does not discriminate imports as against US products, and does not discriminate some imports as against others, this
type of competitiveness provision could pass WTO scrutiny without any reference to the environmental exceptions in Article XX of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Second, even if border adjustment would not be permitted for process-based measures such as a domestic, US carbon tax,
regulation or cap-and-trade system, and/or such border adjustment would be found to be discriminatory, the resulting

GATT violation may still be justified by the environmental exceptions in GATT Article XX (Section
VI). Such justification would then most likely center on whether, under the introductory phrase of GATT Article XX, a US carbon
duty, emission credit requirement or other regulation on imports is applied on a variable scale that takes account of local conditions
in foreign countries, including their own efforts to fight global warming and the level of economic development in developing
countries.

Its not protectionist


Helm 10 professor of energy policy at the University of Oxford (Dieter, A carbon border
tax can curb climate change, Sept 5, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a68bfc80-b915-11df99be-00144feabdc0.html#axzz22FxaNA4b, CMR)
There are two objections

to such a border tax: it would be protectionist; and it would be impractical. The


former is nonsense : at present trade is highly distorted by the fact that some countries price
in pollution and some do not. A border tax, however imperfect, reduces this trade distortion .
Trade conflicts and protectionism dont cause war or retaliation-no impact to the
economy or geopolitics
Fletcher 11 Ian Fletcher is Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, former Research Fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council M.A. and
B.A. from Columbia and U Chicago, "Avoid Trade War? We're Already In One!" August 29 2011 www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/avoid-trade-war-werealre_b_939967.html, CMR

trade war is that, unlike actual shooting war, it has no historical precedent.
In fact, there has never been a significant trade war, "significant" in the sense of having done serious
economic damage. All history records are minor skirmishes at best. Go ahead. Try and
name a trade war. The Great Trade War of 1834? Nope. The Great Trade War of 1921? Nope Again. There isn't one. The standard example
free traders give is that America's Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 either caused the Great Depression or made it spread around the world. But this canard does
not survive serious examination, and has actually been denied by almost every economist who
has actually researched the question in depth -- a group ranging from Paul Krugman on the left to Milton
Friedman on the right. The Depression's cause was monetary. The Fed allowed the money supply to
balloon during the late 1920s, piling up in the stock market as a bubble. It then panicked,
miscalculated, and let it collapse by a third by 1933, depriving the economy of the liquidity it
needed to breathe. Trade had nothing to do with it. As for the charge that Smoot caused the
Depression to spread worldwide: it was too small a change to have plausibly so large an effect. For
a start, it only applied to about one-third of America's trade: about 1.3 percent of our GDP. Our average tariff on dutiable goods went
from 44.6 to 53.2 percent -- not a terribly big jump. Tariffs were higher in almost every year from 1821 to 1914. Our
The curious thing about the concept of

tariff went up in 1861, 1864, 1890, and 1922 without producing global depressions, and the
recessions of 1873 and 1893 managed to spread worldwide without tariff increases.
As the economic historian (and free trader!) William Bernstein puts it in his book A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World,

Between 1929 and 1932, real GDP fell 17 percent worldwide, and by 26 percent in the United States, but most economic historians now believe
that only a miniscule part of that huge loss of both world GDP and the United States' GDP can be
ascribed to the tariff wars. .. At the time of Smoot-Hawley's passage, trade volume accounted for
only about 9 percent of world economic output . Had all international trade been eliminated, and had no domestic use for the previously
exported goods been found, world GDP would have fallen by the same amount -- 9 percent. Between 1930 and 1933, worldwide trade volume fell off by one-third to one-half.

the
damage done could not possibly have exceeded 1 or 2 percent of world GDP -- nowhere near the
17 percent falloff seen during the Great Depression... The inescapable conclusion: contrary to public perception,
Smoot-Hawley did not cause, or even significantly deepen, the Great Depression.
The oft-bandied idea that Smoot-Hawley started a global trade war of endless cycles of tit-for-tat
retaliation is also mythical. According to the official State Department report on this very question in 1931:
With the exception of discriminations in France, the extent of discrimination against American commerce is very
slight...By far the largest number of countries do not discriminate against the commerce of the
United States in any way.
That is to say, foreign nations did indeed raise their tariffs after the passage of Smoot, but this was a
broad-brush response to the Depression itself, aimed at all other foreign nations without distinction, not a
retaliation against the U.S. for its own tariff. The doom-loop of spiraling tit-for-tat
retaliation between trading partners that paralyzes free traders with fear today simply did not
happen. "Notorious" Smoot-Hawley is a deliberately fabricated myth, plain and simple. We should not allow this myth to
Depending on how the falloff is measured, this computes to 3 to 5 percent of world GDP, and these losses were partially made up by more expensive domestic goods. Thus,

paralyze our policy-making in the present day.

No trade warsprotectionism wont go nuclear and global trade is resilient


Bremmer 9 president of Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy (Ian, 3/24, The Political Risks From Washington,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/03/top_five_risks_and_a_red_herri.html, CMR)

There is one serious risk I think we can downplay--a global trade war. The past months have brought all sorts of fears of
growing US protectionism and the spiraling international reaction. And a wide array of localized protectionist measures have
been taken around the world-indeed, the world bank has counted about 50 trade restrictive
actions and only a dozen liberalizing ones since the G20 countries promised to forestall protectionism last November. To
list just a few examples--multiple countries have given low cost or no cost cash to their automakers; the United
States has restricted stimulus procurement to a subset of countries under a "Buy American" provision; in
response to US cancellation of a Mexican trucking program that country has put over $2 billion in tariffs in place on trade with the United States. But thinking about the
magnitude rather than the quantity of events uncovers that this is more conventional, rather narrow protectionism than the opening salvos of a trade war. Certainly in the
United States, the highest stakes for protectionism are around the automotive sector (after all, the millions of jobs potentially at stake would undo the Obama administration's

But there has been no serious suggestion of raising tariffs on foreign autos,
If the auto
sector-where unionized labor and management could easily point to foreign competition as a cause of its problems-is not enough to merit
nuclear protectionism, what is? Nothing, probably . The biggest silver lining to the economic and financial crisis in the
United States is that it has very little to do with globalization. To date, there has been no blaming foreigners; rather, the
recession has been a story of domestic greed and poor oversight. Certainly, as Americans feel poorer, the risk of redistribution from the
have-lots to the have-littles increases. But it's not a backlash against interconnectedness, trade, or global supply
chains.
job preservation goals in one swoop).

and congressional votes and nationwide polls have made clear that there is no public will to keep the industry alive through massive subsidy.

Free trade is stable - no risk of a 30s repeat


Ikenson 9 --- associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato
Institute
Daniel J, A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be ShortLived, March 12, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10651, CMR
Despite the global economic contraction and the occasional protectionist
indulgence, there is reason to be hopeful that retrogressive policies will be marginal , shortlived , and ultimately rejected . The absence of trade rules in the 1930s meant that

there were no proffered courses of action, no sources of adjudication or


remediation, and no generally accepted limits to the actions governments could
take in response to external economic policies. And there were far fewer domestic
constituencies of any political consequence advocating against protectionism in
the '30s. Consequently, there were no proven stopgaps to prevent the pandemic of
spiraling protectionism that erupted and exacerbated the global recession. Today
we have the benefit of understanding the consequences of the actions taken in the
1930s. Although that understanding does not guarantee avoidance of past mistakes, we also have solid institutions
and incentives to help steer policymakers away from the abyss . The rules
governing more than 60 years of trade liberalization have fostered greater
certainty and stability, and thus more investment, trade, and economic growth. And today, the commercial and
political appeal of protectionism is considerably diminished because most countries
have established domestic constituencies that depend on a trade and investment
environment that is open in both directions .
No worst-case scenario rules based system and self-interest check escalation of
protectionism
Ikenson 9 --- associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato
Institute
Daniel J, A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be ShortLived, March 12, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10651, CMR
A Little Perspective, Please Although

some governments will dabble in some degree of


protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the
economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will
limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy
Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate
of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years.8 That would be a substantial decline
relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9 But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical
perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a
period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the

potential downside today from what


protectionism" is actually not that "massive," even if all WTO members
raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates. If most developing countries raised their
Bergsten calls "legal

tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade
partners. But most developing countries that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact
on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import
value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to
be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events

that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist
measures in combating the current economic situation . In the United States, after President
Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war,
Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American
provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under
international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that
China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12 But even more promising than pledges to
avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract
and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and
services at competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent
of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all
Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate
in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13 And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government
suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other
capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January
decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15
Meanwhile, on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries

While
the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various
protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the
abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing
barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020.

knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or
location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when
governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.

AT: Trade Deficit/Competitiveness


Actually reduces the trade deficit and improves US trade
competitiveness
Carbon Tax Center 11 (Myths, last updated Jan 21, retrieved July 27,
http://www.carbontax.org/myths/, CMR)

Myth #6. Heavy fuel taxes will price U.S. goods out of the marketplace.
Who says? Some business groups, some labor unions.
Rebuttal: This argument assumes a static economy , sans adaptation and innovation. In

reality, increased
energy taxes will shrink the trade deficit (by cutting both volumes and pre-tax prices of foreign oil). Reduced
reliance on oil imports will also make it harder to justify military expenditures and
activities on grounds of protecting foreign supplies. The higher prices will also
spark innovation in clean, efficient technologies better suited for world markets than,
say, supersized automobiles. Finally, taxing energy will create parity with our
traditional competitors the EU and Japan while encouraging like-minded actions in
India, China and other emerging economies. In the interim, border tax adjustments can equalize
prices of imports from non-carbon-taxing nations.

Digital trade solves


Waggoner 8 Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Colorado. A.B., European
History, Stanford University; LL.B. Harvard Law School (Michael, Why and How to Tax
Carbon, Fall, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, lexis, CMR)

World trade, travel, and globalization will be reduced as energy prices rise and carbon taxes are imposed. n65 In some regards, that
reduction is truly a loss, not just of trade in goods, but also of trade in ideas, such as health care, science, literature, and ultimately,
understanding. That loss may be a necessary one, however, dictated by energy scarcity and the need to reduce carbon emissions.
Fortunately, much trade and exchange of ideas can be digital, which does not require physical

transportation. Further, reductions in physical transportation may be in the public interest. Less transport of people should
reduce the risk of epidemics, or at least slow their spread and thus allow more time to develop countermeasures. n66 Less
transportation should reduce the problems caused by invasive species . n67 Finally, less transportation of components and products
should reduce the risk that a few large factories will provide all of the world's needs for particular items, such that a fire, [*31] flood,
war, or earthquake at such a factory might devastate the world economy. n68

AT: Implementation Issues/Delay


Carbon tax can be implemented immediately
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)
Other major

benefits of a carbon tax include quicker implementation

and the ability to raise revenue.

In terms of speed, the government could implement a carbon tax to take immediate effect ,
making it a much quicker method of reducing greenhouse gas emissions than a cap-and-trade system.
n165 A quick response is critical, as numerous commentators warn that the planet sits at a pivotal moment where immediate action
may be necessary to prevent abrupt [*94] climate change. n166 A cap-and-trade system would cause undue delay because it
requires time-consuming efforts in scientific inquiry and policy making. Furthermore, because cap-and-trade lacks transparency, it
would not provide a clear, stable price signal to influence investment decision-making until years down the road, possibly 2020.
n167 A

quick restoration of United States' credibility in the global environmental discussions


is another benefit of a speedy response to climate change . Because a carbon tax could be effective
before the next international treaty on greenhouse gas emissions, the U nited States could come to
the table with a seriousness that is tantamount to the task at hand. n168 Additionally, an in-place tax
would bring practical experience and a focal point to the next round of international talks.

Carbon tax is easily implemented and requires minor administrative


changes
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)
A carbon tax poses few of the problems associated with a cap-and-trade system and offers many more benefits. Unlike

a capand-trade system, a carbon [*93] tax is fundamentally simple . Numerous characteristics


beneficial to many tax systems are also at work in a carbon tax. For one, a carbon tax can be easily
implemented, administered, and overseen. The administrative infrastructure already exists to
levy taxes on fossil fuels, and the United States has extensive experience with economy-wide excise
taxes on a wide variety of products, including gasoline. n160 The government could conceivably
implement a carbon tax with minor additions to the I nternal R evenue C ode. n161 In fact, a
carbon tax bill proposed by Representative John Larson, Connecticut, proposes adding three relatively short sections to the existing
excise portion of the Code. n162
extensive

Unlike cap-and-trade

implementation -

which would require new

and

legislation - a carbon tax could apply broadly to all sectors in the economy with

relative ease . Additionally, the administrative advantages could be heightened if the tax occurred
at the source, such as the wellhead, mine, or port of entry . Taxing fewer entities that expect strong supervision
could pass the costs downstream and would limit leakage. Lastly, the existing staff of the Internal Revenue Service, which
has expertise in enforcing excise taxes, could oversee tax collection.

Its seriously easy to implement


Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann9 (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law

and the Director of the International Tax LLM Program at the University of Michigan Law
School; David M. Uhlmann is the Jeffrey F. Liss Professor from Practice and the Director of the
Environmental Law and Policy Program at the University of Michigan Law School, Combating

Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap
and Trade, Feb, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, lexis, CMR)
[*38] Why is cap and trade so much more complicated than the carbon tax? A

carbon tax is inherently simple: a tax


is imposed at X dollars per ton of carbon content on the main sources of carbon dioxide
emissions in the economy, namely coal, oil, and natural gas. (Other greenhouse gas sources, such as methane, are not
included because energy accounts for nearly eighty-five percent of the 7147 million metric tons of greenhouse gases in the U.S.
economy. n132) The tax is imposed "upstream," i.e., at the point of extraction or importation, which
means than it can be imposed on only about 2000 taxpayers (500 coal miners and importers, 750 oil producers and importers, and
750 natural gas producers and importers). n133 Credits can be given to carbon sequestration projects and to other projects that
reduce greenhouse gas emissions (although this would need to be addressed in a way that does not dilute the price signal or create
undue complexity), and exports are exempted. Beyond that, the main question is what to do with the revenue, which will be
discussed below.

AT: Ineffective/No Solve Consumption


Drastically changes consumer habits their authors are wrong
Carbon Tax Center 11 (Myths, last updated Jan 21, retrieved July 27,
http://www.carbontax.org/myths/, CMR)

Myth #2. Carbon taxes wont change habits after all, high gas prices in 2008 didnt cut usage.
Who says? An odd collection of groups and individuals, including former Sierra Club CAFE (car fuel-economy) lobbyist Dan
Becker (Even as gas prices have doubled and trebled over the past several years, we see little change in driving behavior, Becker
told the New York Times in October, 2006.)
Rebuttal: Four points are key. First, the rise in gasoline prices did cut usage, and by more than a little.

Comparing 2008, the last pre-recession year, to 2003, U.S. gasoline usage was unchanged even
though economic activity was up 13%. What did the trick was the 73% higher price real (inflation-adjusted) price.
Second, much of the increase in energy prices in recent years has been masked by price volatility ; as
we show here, since 2002 gas prices have fallen almost as often on a month-to-month basis as they have risen, masking the upward
trend and convincing millions of Americans that prices would head south soon enough to make adjustments unnecessary. Third,
other sectors, especially electricity generation, which emits almost twice as much CO2 as cars, are even

more price-sensitive. Last, price-responsiveness will grow as households have opportunities to


buy more fuel-efficient vehicles and appliances, and as society transitions to a more fuelefficient infrastructure once we enact carbon taxes to send clear and strong price signals. (See
our Issues page, Carbon Tax Effectiveness, for more discussion.)

Critics are wrong CP solves energy consumption


Litman 10 (Todd Litman, executive director of the Victoria Transport Policy Institute,

author of Online TDM Encyclopedia, chairperson of the TRB Sustainable Transportation


Indicators Subcommittee, the VTPI, Tax What You Burn, Not What You Earn, June 4, page 4,
http://www.vtpi.org/carbontax.pdf, CMR)
Ineffective Critics claim that fuel taxes do little to reduce energy consumption. They are wrong. The price elasticity of

gasoline is typically about -0.3 in the short run and -0.7 in the long run, meaning
that a 10% price increase reduces fuel consumption 3% in a year or two, and 7% in
five to ten years (Lipow 2008; Litman 2008a). Some U.S. studies found lower price responses
during the 1990s (Hughes, Knittel and Sperling 2006), when real fuel prices declined and real
incomes increased, but more recent research indicates more normal elasticities
(CERA 2006; Komanoff 2008). While the current tax rate is modest, raising fuel prices only a few percent, it
provides a foundation for larger impacts if needed in the future, and so is suitable
for encouraging long-term conservation and emission reductions.

AT: Consistency/Politics
Carbon tax offers predictability, transparency, and consistency
avoids political adjustments
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)

Another characteristic that makes a carbon tax attractive is the predictability and transparency
it offers to private investors. Unlike a cap-and-trade market where carbon allowances could experience extreme volatility,
a tax provides long-term predictability for the price of emissions. Such a market constant would
provide a steady benchmark against which new technologies must compete. Companies could implement
more effective long-range plans for investing in the best technologies that reduce emissions. Furthermore, a carbon tax could
be more predictable if the tax was self-adjusting and could counteract fluctuations in the price of
carbon. n163 The tax could conceivably be held in trust to ensure consistency and avoid
politically motivated adjustments . n164 Despite offering a steady carbon price, a carbon tax would still allow
regulators to adjust the rate relatively easily if the price signal was understood to be too weak or too strong.

AT: Transition Bad


Itll be an efficient and smooth transition
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)

The government could employ numerous mechanisms to make the imposition of a carbon tax
more efficient and fair . The tax, for instance, could be phased-in gradually to ease the impact on
consumers and producers, creating a smooth transition to new sources of energy. n130 The tax
could also be phased-out gradually if it proves no longer effective. A carbon tax should contemplate exemptions
and credits to lower income consumers to combat regressive effects . n131 Incentives to promote carbon
sequestration should also be considered. n132 The tax, if it were to be added-on, would generate revenue that [*88] the political
process must allocate somewhere, such as paying off the national deficit, weaning producers and consumers away from oil, or
funding environmental friendly programs. Alternatively, if the tax were designed to be revenue-neutral, it

makes sense to introduce it along with a Value Added Tax, which would provide a convenient
counterbalancing mechanism to offset variations in the carbon tax while leaving other tax
systems unaffected. n133

AT: Econ Turns


Economic down-sides are exaggerated empirically proven
Carbon Tax Center 11 (Myths, last updated Jan 21, retrieved July 27,
http://www.carbontax.org/myths/, CMR)

Myth #4. Heavy fuel taxes will impede economic recovery.


Who says? Traditional growth champions, fossil fuel interests.
Rebuttal: Traditionally, energy

price volatility has wreaked more economic havoc than high or


even rising prices. Even fairly steep price increases can be manageable so long as theyre regular
and predictable, particularly now that the share of economic activity occupied by the fossil fuels
sector is at an historic low provided the revenues are distributed or tax-shifted back to Americans. And carbon taxes
need not be draconian to accomplish their mission. Our program of recurring annual increases of $10-15 per ton
of emitted carbon dioxide equates to 5-10% increases in energy prices per annum (with the percentages shrinking as the base rises
and as non-fossil energy assumes a larger share). By comparison, the average annual real increase in U.S. gasoline

prices in 2003-07 was 11%, and this didnt stop the economy from growing at 3% a year . Needless to
say, the true long-term threat to the economy (and everything else) is unchecked climate change, as the Stern Report has shown.

Phase-in ensures a smooth economic transition for both consumers


and producers
Waggoner 8 Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Colorado. A.B., European
History, Stanford University; LL.B. Harvard Law School (Michael, Why and How to Tax
Carbon, Fall, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, lexis, CMR)
C. Gradual Phase-In of the Carbon Tax The

carbon tax should be phased in over several years, with low


initial rates that slowly but substantially increase, to allow both consumers and producers to
adjust gradually to the new system. Old energy-intensive personal and business investments will lose their value
under a system of carbon reduction. However, allowing time for the change will permit the value of the old
investments to be recovered through depreciation because they will be used for a period not
much shorter than their normal useful life. That useful life, it may be noted, will already be shortened by the
increasing prices of energy, which will in many cases make old investments economically impractical well before their physical
useful lives are exhausted. As a matter of both politics and equity, it would be unwise to impose windfall losses unnecessarily. The

mirror image of phasing out the old is developing and implementing the new. It will take time to
develop and create the ability to mass produce new energy-efficient products and processes, and one would not want unnecessarily
large and sudden windfall gains to those who own such assets. A carbon tax enacted with low initial rates, but

with steady and eventually substantial rate increases, would allow a smooth and fair transition
from our current system to one much less carbon-intensive. n27

Carbon tax is comparatively a benefit to the economy


Litman 10 (Todd Litman, executive director of the Victoria Transport Policy Institute,

author of Online TDM Encyclopedia, chairperson of the TRB Sustainable Transportation


Indicators Subcommittee, the VTPI, Tax What You Burn, Not What You Earn, June 4, page 4,
http://www.vtpi.org/carbontax.pdf, CMR)
Economically Harmful Critics claim incorrectly that fuel taxes harm businesses and the economy (Pooley 2009). Although higher
fuel costs are economically harmful, revenue-neutral tax shifts are an economic transfer that

can help the economy by encouraging efficiency and retaining money in the
regional economy (Stephens 2008). If revenues are returned to consumers or invested efficiently
on improved services such as transport and education, high fuel taxes can benefit the economy overall
(Shapiro, Pham and Malik 2008). For example, a carbon tax increases regional economic activity if

it reduces traffic congestion and parking costs, and convinces households to


conserve fuel and spend the savings on local goods and services such as restaurants and home
improvements.

AT: Manufacturing
Nah---innovations and capital gains reform solve
Tucker 12 William, prominent published write on nuclear energy, "WILLIAM TUCKER:

Should Nuclear Support a Carbon Tax?" Sept 4 www.nucleartownhall.com/blog/william-tuckershould-nuclear-support-a-carbon-tax/


But Morgan doesnt stop there. He goes on to argue that a carbon tax would be a general tax on
manufacturing , spreading across the entire nuts-and-bolts economy and reducing our
international competitiveness.
The flaw in this argument is that it regards the current industrial situation as static. If a
carbon tax makes electricity more expensive then things will stay that way forever. But the
point of a carbon tax is to level the playing field for other forms of generation that
do not produce carbon dioxide . Most prominent among these, of course, is nuclear power .
If the increases costs of power can be temporarily offset by lower business and capital
gains taxes , the overall impact on the industrial economy could be muted.

AT: Consumers
Wont hurt consumers 3 reasons
Waggoner 8 Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Colorado. A.B., European
History, Stanford University; LL.B. Harvard Law School (Michael, Why and How to Tax
Carbon, Fall, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, lexis, CMR)

The first barrier to fair consideration of a carbon tax proposal is the recent high price of petroleum
products. To add a carbon tax of one dollar or more per gallon to the price of gasoline, recently selling for more than four dollars
per gallon, will create serious political pushback, jeopardizing the agendas, political careers, and perhaps even the physical [*5]
safety of such a proposal's advocates. The recent reduction in energy prices may soon be replaced by another increase. There are
three major reasons, however, why those high petroleum prices should not prevent enacting a carbon tax .
First, the

proposed carbon tax is a substitute for other taxes, not an addition to them. For example, an
individual's average income tax rate might be twenty percent, and that individual might use
seven percent of his or her income for carbon products. That individual would be no worse off
after taxes, if a carbon tax increased the cost of the carbon products by five percent of that
taxpayer's income (from seven percent to twelve percent of income), so long as the average rate of the income
tax were lowered by five percent (from twenty percent to fifteen percent). In this situation, the extra cost of the
carbon tax would be offset by the reduction in the income tax .
Second, it is not clear that the price of consumed carbon will rise by the amount of the carbon tax.
Some of the tax may be absorbed by the producers of carbon. The degree of price-shifting depends on the
relative elasticities of supply n5 and demand, n6 but it is unlikely that the tax will be borne entirely by consumers. One would
expect sales of carbon-based products to fall because of the price increase created by the carbon
tax. To mitigate that drop in sales, the producer of those carbon-based products might slightly
reduce the price to avoid an overly steep drop in sales, thus absorbing part of the tax.
This second point may have great potential. If only one nation imposes a carbon tax, it may be that much of that tax would be borne
by that nation's population. Under these conditions, world carbon prices will largely be set in carbon-tax-free markets, and the few
carbon-taxing nations' populations will have to pay much of the carbon tax. If most nations impose a carbon tax, however, it may be
that more of the tax will be borne by the producers of carbon; world carbon prices will be set in largely carbon-taxed markets, with
more of the tax absorbed by the producers. This shift of carbon taxes to carbon producers could help undo the recent shift in world
balances of power to the carbon-exporting nations such as Iran and Venezuela - with their arguably authoritarian regimes - and
return world power back to carbon-consuming nations.
Third, individuals can change their conduct to reduce their carbon tax liability . Although some users of
certain carbon products, such as gasoline, may have little ability to reduce their carbon-based purchases, [*6] other users may be
flexible even in the short run, and even more users should be flexible in the long run. In the short run, possibilities for

decreasing carbon use include: reducing recreational driving; planning accordingly to


accomplish several social, shopping, and business excursions in one trip; walking, bicycling,
carpooling, or using mass transit more often; and scheduling work for four days rather than five,
reducing commuting by twenty percent. Many persons may be able to choose to use their fuelefficient sedan more than their fuel-guzzling SUV, minivan, or pickup truck . Moreover, in the long
run, individuals can buy or rent more fuel-efficient cars, homes, and appliances; live closer to
work or to mass transit; invest in alternatives such as hybrid, plug-in, or perhaps hydrogen or fuel cell n7 vehicles;
and use energy collected from solar, wind, water, geothermal, biomass, or other sustainable
sources.
Note that these three mechanisms are cumulative. As discussed in the first point, other taxes will be reduced by the full
amount of the carbon tax. Additionally, it is likely that some of the tax will be borne by producers, so
that consumers' carbon tax burden will be less than the benefit of the income tax cut . Finally, as
explained in the third point, consumers can change their behavior to further reduce the impact of the
carbon tax, coming out still further ahead.

Temporary relief options prevent emergency-situations


Waggoner 8 Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Colorado. A.B., European
History, Stanford University; LL.B. Harvard Law School (Michael, Why and How to Tax
Carbon, Fall, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, lexis, CMR)
Finally, the

carbon tax could be reduced or suspended during an energy emergency, such as when
normal supplies of energy are cutoff by natural disasters, wars, or boycotts. The reduction or suspension
could be achieved by legislation, authority delegated to the executive, or automatic triggers.
However, one should remember that high prices discourage consumption, and reduced consumption is an appropriate response to
energy supply disruption. Moreover, reduction or suspension of the carbon tax will benefit both users and producers of carbon in
uncertain proportions. While one would hope that the suspension would benefit the users, the

suspension is also likely to benefit the producers to some extent. To increase the producers' profits at a time
when they are already swollen by an emergency energy price increase does not seem to be a wise policy.

AT: Low Income/Poor People


Effects on lower-income groups are overblown AND revenueneutrality programs solve
Litman 10 (Todd Litman, executive director of the Victoria Transport Policy Institute,

author of Online TDM Encyclopedia, chairperson of the TRB Sustainable Transportation


Indicators Subcommittee, the VTPI, Tax What You Burn, Not What You Earn, June 4, page 4,
http://www.vtpi.org/carbontax.pdf, CMR)
Regressive Many critics claim that this tax harms low income households. They are wrong. Although fuel price increases may seem
regressive (a dollar tax imposes a greater burden on poor rather than wealthy people), lower-income people

purchase much less fuel than higher income people, as illustrated in Figure 5. Low-income
households will benefit overall from a tax shift that returns revenues as per capita
rebates, progressive tax reductions, or new services that benefit lower-income
people (Boyce and Riddle, 2007). Described differently, although fuel taxes by themselves are regressive with respect to income,
targeted tax reductions, cash rebates and improved services for poor people are
extremely progressive, so revenue-neutral carbon taxes can be extremely
progressive overall. This tax is even more progressive if implemented with energy conservation policies and programs,
such as walking and cycling improvements, increased ridesharing and public transit services, smart growth land use policies, and
home insulating programs. Because alternative modes tend to experience economies of scale (for example, as rideshare demand
grows the chance of finding a favorable rideshare match increases exponentially, and as public transit demand grows, unit costs of
providing high quality service declines), their impacts and benefits increase if middle-class travelers have more incentive to walk,
bicycle and use public transit, and makes these modes more socially acceptable. In other words, people who are
economically or physically disadvantaged are particularly harmed by an
automobile-dependent transportation system and sprawled land use patterns. To
the degree that this tax and related policies help increase transport system
diversity and land use accessibility, it provides additional benefits to
disadvantaged people.

Wont impact the poor and progressive tax solves


Carbon Tax Center 11 (Myths, last updated Jan 21, retrieved July 27,
http://www.carbontax.org/myths/, CMR)

Myth #1. New taxes on carbon emissions or energy will hurt the poor and middle class.
Who says? Some low-income advocates, some left-of-center activists, some conservatives masking as populists.
Rebuttal: The

wealthy use more carbon-based energy than the rest of us, by far . For example, for
every gallon of gas used by the poorest quintile (20%) of households, the richest quintile uses
three to four. (See Slideshow, Slide #26.) The same holds for the other sources of carbon emissions: electricity, jet fuel, even
diesel fuel that powers the trucks that deliver goods. We can make carbon taxes progressive, i.e., beneficial to people
of below-average means, by redistributing the tax revenues equally to all as regular dividends what
climate scientist Jim Hansen calls a green check. A worthy alternative, which Al Gore advocates, is to tax-shift
carbon tax revenues by reducing regressive taxes such as sales taxes and payroll taxes. (See our
Issues page, Managing Impacts.) Energy-efficiency measures can be targeted to subsets of the population that stand to be harmed,
such as the rural poor who must drive long distances for work. Whats really regressive is the ongoing laissez-faire rises in fuel
prices, not a penny of which is rebated to the public. The Carbon Tax Center is committed to making carbon taxing revenue-neutral
and progressive.

AT: Oil Shocks Turn


CPs phased approach reduces consumption while allowing
consumers and the market to adjust avoids price shocks
Rosenblum 7 (Daniel, A Carbon Tax When Oil Approaches $100/Barrel?, 11/9,

http://www.carbontax.org/blogarchives/2007/11/09/a-carbon-tax-when-oil-approaches100barrel/, CMR)
One reason is that high

gasoline prices alone are not enough to reduce consumption of gas oline and the
resulting carbon dioxide emissions. Consumers, whether businesses or households, need a clear price
signal that future prices are going to remain high before they are motivated to make the
investment decisions necessary to reduce consumption . The volatile gas prices of the last few years just dont
provide that kind of signal. The rising global demand for oil headlined in the Times story is faster in developing countries, but as the
Times correctly noted, Americans appetite for big cars and large houses has pushed up oil demand steadily in this country, too.
The problem is that while it may be a rational economic decision to invest in a more efficient car, house, truck or airplane if gas
prices are expected to remain at or above current levels, the economic decision-making is very different if consumers believe prices
may plummet in two months. Europe has had considerably higher gasoline prices for many years and, not coincidentally, Europeans
generally drive much smaller and more efficient vehicles. While volatile prices do not encourage investment in

efficiency, a clear and certain trajectory of increasing carbon taxes would do so . The revenueneutral carbon tax proposed by the Carbon Tax Center provides that clear price signal . And, the gradual
trajectory of increased prices that we propose gives consumers time to adjust to the higher
prices by both investing in efficiency and making behavioral changes that will further reduce
energy use. For more on how consumer demand for gasoline responds to price, see our issue paper by clicking here.

AT: Oil Markets


CP will be responsive to oil markets ensures sustained innovation
Kerr 10 J.D. from the University of Colorado School of Law and B.A. from Amherst College
where he graduated magna cum laude (Alex Rice, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, Fall, 34
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 69, lexis, CMR)
IV. How? Little Picture. A

carbon tax can maximize the objectives discussed above because it fosters experimentation
and rewards numerous solutions simultaneously. The exact method of implementing a carbon tax is the subject of
a different article. n123 There are many possibilities, such as an add-on tax or a revenue neutral tax. One important idea in any
approach is the imposition of a variable tax rate that fluctuates to keep the price of oil stable. The tax should be higher

when oil prices drop and lower when prices rise. n124 Keeping the price of oil at a stable, high price creates
a consistent benchmark that new energy sources can aim for in achieving price parity . n125 Such a
system would dampen the boom and bust volatility of innovation that drives investors away . n126
For example, renewable energy exploded in the 1970s when oil prices skyrocketed. n127 Much of the solar and wind technology
being pursued today originated from the "70s energy crisis. That technology, however, was largely shelved until recent record oil
prices of $ 150 per barrel rekindled interest. n128 As if to prove the point, a 2008 plunge in oil prices swiftly dampened the
prospects of many renewable energy businesses. n129

AT: Hurts Energy-Intensive Consumers/Industries


Multiple options for consumers and price adjustments for industries
solve
Litman 10 (Todd Litman, executive director of the Victoria Transport Policy Institute,

author of Online TDM Encyclopedia, chairperson of the TRB Sustainable Transportation


Indicators Subcommittee, the VTPI, Tax What You Burn, Not What You Earn, June 4, page 4,
http://www.vtpi.org/carbontax.pdf, CMR)
Unfair Critics often claim that a carbon tax is unfair to people with energy intensive jobs, locations or lifestyles, such as truck drivers,
rural and northern community residents, and recreational motor boaters. However, all these consumers can

significantly increase their energy efficiency over the long term by weatherizing
homes, choosing more efficient vehicles and reducing mileage, and because they
are large energy consumers they can provide proportionately large energy savings.
Critics claim that rural residents cannot save energy because they lack high quality public transit service, but they can
achieve large fuel savings by choosing more efficient vehicles, ridesharing and
consolidating trips. The New Democratic Party (NDP), the official opposition criticized the
carbon tax claiming that it burdens consumers rather than industry. This is
inaccurate. Industries pay the tax when they consume energy, and taxes on
industry are ultimately borne by consumers as higher prices and by investors as
lower profits. A separate cap-and-trade system is being developed to encourage reductions in industrial climate change
emissions. Since industry represents a minority of British Columbia emissions effective energy conservation and emission
reductions require consumer behavior change.