Miscellaneous Essays on the Roman Republic and Empire

David G. Terrell
December 23, 2009

On Constitutional and Social Constructs of the early Roman Republic

Rome’s early social structure was primarily based upon a complex network of

interlocking patron-client relationships. The basic network, the familia, consisted of a wealthy

male leader (the patron or paterfamilias); his extended family, linked by ties of blood and

intermarriage; and, those other families and persons of lower (plebian) status who owed

allegiance to the patron through ties of employment, manumission, favor and/or debt. The

patron’s privileges were balanced by obligations to the members of his familia; supporting their

interests and providing for their welfare. At the time of the Republic, there were about fifty of

these leading families; collectively called gentes, whose male members were termed patricians.

The interlocking responsibilities the system imposed—loyal deference to one’s patrons and loyal

patronage to one’s clients—bound Roman citizens into multi-dimensional, tightly-knit social

networks. The patres of the patrician families were themselves gathered into a consultative

Council of Elders (Senatus) which chose one of their number to be the chief patron to all—the

king. This original manifestation of the Roman monarchy was that of a sole father figure who was

invested with total religious, executive (including military), legislative and judicial authority by

this Senate. When the kings succumbed to the corrupting influence of power and failed to uphold

their responsibility as “arch-patron”, they were removed from office and the Republic declared.1

Another dimension to the Roman social structure was its division into classes. At this

time, military-aged plebian males were divided into five classes based upon an individual’s

economic net worth. The classes were used to assign a man’s general military responsibilities, as

1
M Cary, and H H Scullard, A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine (3rd Edition. New York:
Palgrave, 1975), 49 ff.
Henry C. Boren, Roman Society: A Social, Economic and Cultural History (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1977), 12 ff.
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individuals had to possess wealth sufficient to provide and maintain their own panoply. Members

of the wealthiest class were assigned to the cavalry, being able to provide and provision a horse.

Members of less-wealthy classes were assigned as legionnaires, light infantry, archers, etc. These

classes evolved into a representative assembly of citizens with real consultative political powers

called the Comitia Centuriata.2

Led by elected tribunes, the Comitia further shaped the Roman political process through

the use of general strikes in the face of discontent; forcing the patrician-dominated power

structure to consider plebian interests. However, the influence of property—landed wealth and

chattel slavery—continued to be the principle dynamic that defined the source of political power.3

After the Roman monarchy ended, the king’s powers of religious, executive, judicial and

legislative authority were constitutionally dispersed among several groups and individuals, to

preclude future abuses of the people. Religious authority was transferred to a pontifical college,

made up of patricians, serving for life and functioning as the officiators and arbiters of Rome’s

relationships with her gods. Executive authority, including command of the armies, was placed

into the hands of two co-rulers (consuls) who held joint power for a single-year term of service

that could only be repeated once every ten years. The consuls were elected by the Comitia

Centuriata; however, the patrician senators controlled the nominations for consul and, through

exercising various degrees of patronage over comitia members, limited choices to patrician

candidates and exercised indirect control over the voting. During their term, the consuls also

exercised supreme appellate magisterial (judicial) power, but delegated subordinate magistracies

2
Cary, 53-4.
3
Boren, Henry C. Roman Society: A Social, Economic and Cultural History. Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1977, 20-21.
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David G Terrell

to personally appointed quaestors. Legislative power was divided between the consuls and the

Senate, with the senators providing advice and consent to the consuls.4

4
Cary, 62 ff.
Christopher S. Mackay, Ancient Rome: A Military and Political History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 5-39.
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On Roman Warfare

Yes, there was a “Roman way in warfare”. Over the course of 2,000 years, from the 8th

century BC to the fall of Constantinople in 1453 AD, the Roman army sustained the Romano-

Grecian civilization. This author subscribes to Gabriel’s assertion that Rome’s success in warfare

is attributable to three capabilities that exemplify Rome’s way of war: her organizational skills;

the appreciation and application of proven best practices; and, her endurance.5

Organizational skills. From early in its history, Rome established systematic policies

that governed the raising, equipping, command, employment and training of her armies.

Adherence to these policies was bound up in Rome’s cultural emphasis on the need to fulfill

social and religious obligations to their Gods, tribes and their familia. These obligations, for

example, required Rome to ritually demonstrate the righteousness of grievances leading her to

war through a demand for restitution; formally calling the Gods to witness the justice of their

grievances; and, formally declaring war with the symbolic hurling of a spear into an enemy’s

territory.6 Rome’s attention to these details allowed her to repeatedly mobilize, train and field

substantial and capable armies against her enemies. The consistency in policy and procedure that

resulted from her insistence on organizational efficiency made Rome a predictable and usually

reliable diplomatic adversary, as well as a formidable enemy; all of which worked to Rome’s

advantage, often securing diplomatic gains without resort to arms.

Adoption of competitors’ successful practices. Roman society’s conservative, if not

reactionary, emphasis on exemplifying traditional mores that prioritized one’s obligation to the

group, over the needs of the individual, often worked against the creation and adoption of

domestically-originated technical innovations and improved practices. However, this same

conservativism also made Romans attentive to adopting those foreign technologies and practices

5
Richard A. Gabriel, The Great Armies of Antiquity (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 243.
6
Cary, 49, 54.
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David G Terrell

that brought her to a military, social and economic disadvantage. This paradoxical social

characteristic—the rejection of local innovations and wholehearted adoption of proven foreign

innovations—led to a conservation of effort. Rome avoided the expense and pitfalls inherent in

the pursuit of incremental, experimental improvements and, once a proven innovation was seen,

was able to use it to improve Roman civil and military technologies and practices over time.

Examples include: adopting the phalanx, after seeing successful Etruscan employment of the

same; abandoning the phalanx in favor of the manipular legion after noting its limitations facing

massed infantry on broken ground; adopting the scutum and pilum, and the construction of

military roads based on experiences gained in the Samnite wars; adopting the gladius, the use

foreign auxiliaries (especially as cavalry), the employment of naval forces, and the development

of professional military staff work in support of legionary commanders during the Punic wars;

reorganizing the legions into cohorts and employing specialized auxiliary troops (i.e., Balearic

slingers and Cretan archers) in response to reverses experienced in the Gallic and Social wars;

improving Greco-Macedonian siegecraft techniques and machines, giving the legionary army

organic mobile artillery; adopting Celtic-inspired segmented body armor, oval shields and the

longer spatha to replace the scutum and gladius; and, adopting elastic defensive lines and smaller

legions after learning lessons from the infiltration of gothic tribes, and their cavalry-dense forces,

in and around Adrianople.7

Endurance. From the Republic’s earliest days, when Rome spent ten long, expensive

years (405-396 BC) besieging and finally reducing the Etruscan city of Veii in retaliation for

many years of raiding activity, Rome established a reputation of not allowing a diplomatic slight

or military reverse to go forever unrequited. The self-satisfaction (and profits) gained in the

victory at Veii were tempered about five years later when the Gallic sack of Rome illustrated the

weaknesses of their phalanx-based military system and gave the Romans an intensely personal

7
Gabriel, Great Armies, 225-275.
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David G Terrell

understanding of the potential cost of military failure.8 The two events left Rome with a lasting

determination to win wars once started, and to win them geographically distant from Rome, so as

to protect her citizens from violence.

8
Cary, 71-72.
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David G Terrell

On the Collapse of the Roman Republic

The Roman Republic collapsed after its constitutional authority lost its force upon its

citizens. The immediate cause of this loss was a series of defiant rejections of senatorial and

magisterial decisions by the commoners (plebs) that reduced the influence of the Senate. The

resulting rise in plebian authority, relative to the Senate, provided a venue for powerful and

wealthy individuals, both patrician and plebian, to achieve political power through demagogic

persuasion; outside the previously accepted channels that made up the cursus honorum. The first

major constitutional crisis occurred in 133 BC, when Tiberius Gracchus, a plebian Tribune,

successfully procured approval for a land reform law in the Comitia without first submitting the

proposed law to the Senate for debate, a significant deviation from constitutional practice that led

to significant political infighting. When support emerged for revisiting the law in the Comitia,

Tiberius succeeded in convincing the assembled plebs both to confirm the law (endorsing the

unconstitutional act) and to impeach another tribune opposing the action. Violent repercussions

followed this governmental usurpation leading to Tiberius’ assassination; the first deadly civil

strife within the city in 400 years. With the precedent set, it would not be the last.

Very soon after, Tiberius’ brother, Gaius Gracchus, also a tribune, continued to mobilize

the Comitia to enact a series of substantial, but unconstitutional laws. Though the reforms had

mostly beneficial results to the commoners, increasing Gaius’ popularity, they arbitrarily

increased the tax burden on the mostly-patrician wealthy. The slighted patricians, using their

patronage to counter plebian violation of the constitution eventually removed the Gracchi and

their followers from the political scene through violence. While having a patriotic spirit and good

intentions, the reformers diminished the stability of the Republic by excluding some stakeholders

from the political process; violating constitutional methods to achieve their ends. The example set

by these events—that of diminishing the Senate’s power when it was deemed expedient to

achieve a result deemed just and desirable by a single faction—created a dangerous precedent that
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David G Terrell

every future “reformer” would follow. In the end, the unwillingness to submit one’s deeply held

political positions to political discourse and possible rejection, and to support personally

unpopular decisions when enacted in accordance with the constitution, lead to the creation of

factions willing to gain their ends through violence against the constitution and their opponents.

Thus the conditions existed under which strong, dictatorial leaders like Sulla, Cinna, Pompey, and

Julius Caesar could emerge; gain civic and military support; and, seize power with the promise of

restoring the traditional constitution.9

Octavian (Augustus), assuming power after the death of Caesar, did indeed respect the

historical constitution and its implicit social contract between the oligarchs and the governed,

based on the traditional patron-client relationship. Faced with a Republic in chaos, whose citizens

had lost all respect for that constitution, and having experienced the Triumvirate’s failed despotic

response, Augustus decided to break the cycle by assuming the role of patron-father-physician to

the country and imposing, by fiat, a return to an earlier conservative model of responsible

government. He then maintained these overall conditions by force for over four decades, hoping

to hold the institutions intact until a new generation of citizens could arise who were schooled in,

and accustomed to, two traditional principles of Roman governance debased in the Civil Wars:

that political power is a ethical trust one should exercise for the benefit of those ruled; and, that

political power should be shared among all those having demonstrated the commitment and

ability to wield it thusly.10

Once Augustus had control of the armed forces and, therefore, foreign policy, he used

them to stabilize the Empire while he retrained those who were to govern after him. For example,

Augustus made appointments to the senatorius ordo based more on a candidate’s good integrity,

exemplary military service, and sufficient financial means than familial or situational patronage;

9
Cary, 203-282.
10
Cary, 315-330.
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hoping to fill the Senate with men having a renewed sense of civic responsibility—who could be

trusted to place security of Rome above that of their own.11

These actions restored stability for a time by revitalizing the familial and social contract

between the people and their rulers; and, by directing Rome’s ideological, judicial and coercive

powers against the self-serving attitudes that had plunged Rome into chaos.

11
Cary 317-8.
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David G Terrell

On the Contributions of Rome to Western Civilization

“Civilization” has at least two meanings, according to Braudel. One encompasses the

material manifestations of an identifiable people; while the other describes their “normative

principles, values and ideals—in a word, the spirit”.12

Communications and Mobility. The most important features of Roman Civilization that

continue to influence Western Civilization are related to communications and mobility.13 The

ubiquitous knowledge of Latin and Greek in educated persons within the bounds of the Roman

world and its environs worked to standardize the cultural vocabulary of a large part of Eurasia

and provided those persons a media for the expansive dissemination and preservation of

knowledge.14 Rome’s language and literature communicated her historical precedents and

intellectual assessments—those both derived and original—regarding governance; civic

organization; natural and moral philosophy; and, physical science that provided priceless lessons

to later architects of Western Civilization.15 The roads and ships that provided an efficient land

and sea infrastructure allowed the evolution of sophisticated industrial and commercial concerns

that moved news, knowledge, technology, people, trade goods and food between these people2.16

Civitas. As Roman Civilization developed from its primitive, tribal roots, the formation

of cities promulgated a hierarchical society of mass populations consisting of persons whose

many classes—based on ethnicity, language, gender, wealth, blood and religion—learned to live

together. Though this urban life was fraught with continual tensions and conflicts between these

“orders”, urban existence worked. Its opportunity for numerous interactions between citizens

provided Rome with a venue for the accelerated evolution society. The successful Roman

12
Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilizations (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 5.
13
Braudel, 10.
14
Cary, 479-482.
15
Carl J. Richard, Greeks and Romans Bearing Gifts: How the Ancients Inspired the Founding Fathers
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 31-32.
16
Cary, 453.
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conquest of rural society and the creation of a viable model of urban infrastructure and

governance provided a proven design used by subsequent western societies arising in the domains

of the former empire.17

Mentality. In every historical period and place, people have a particular view of the

world. This “collective mentality” dominates a civilization in terms of its attitudes, choices,

prejudices and actions.18 There was a three-fold synthesis of Roman psycho-spiritual structures

that passed down into the mentality of modern Western Civilization. These structures were the

Roman concepts that 1) an individual owns a moral responsibility to give dignified attention to

familial and civic duties; 2) an individual should subdue the passions and manifest the rational,

intellectual strengths embodied in the idealistic Grecian philosophies, as filtered through Roman

pragmatism; and, 3) an individual should live in accordance with the ethical teachings of Jesus of

Nazareth.

This synthesis contributed to Western Civilization’s tendencies towards rationalism and

away from the supernatural; promoted stability in the social order through fleeting, vaguely-

realized ideals of social equality; and, imbued Western Civilization with an ideal of honest and

humane behavior which exemplified temperance, courage, prudence, justice, and charity. Its

concordant philosophy, that mankind could improve itself through conscious effort; provided the

basic underpinning of the idea of progress fundamental to Western Civilization’s identity.19

David G. Terrell
Herndon, VA

17
Braudel, 17-18
Cary, 458-9.
18
Braudel, 22.
19
Cary, 482-488.
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David G Terrell

Bibliography

Boren, Henry C. Roman Society: A Social, Economic and Cultural History. Lexington,
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1977.

Braudel, Fernand. A History of Civilizations. London: Penguin Books, 1993.

Cary, M, and H H Scullard. A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine. 3rd Edition.
New York: Palgrave, 1975.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Great Armies of Antiquity. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

Mackay, Christopher S. Ancient Rome: A Military and Political History. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004.

Richard, Carl J. Greeks and Romans Bearing Gifts: How the Ancients Inspired the Founding
Fathers. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008.

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