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Framework Answers 1NC

1. Policy making framework makes a commodity of violence ensures its

continuance and is unethical
Makau 96 (Josina., Ph.D. in Rhetoric at the University of California-Berkeley, Responsible
Communication, Argumentation Instruction in the Face of Global Perils)
Weisel's critique of German education prior to world war II points to another danger of traditional argumentation instruction . Like the Nazi
doctors, students in traditional argumentation courses are taught "how to reduce life and the mystery
of life to abstraction." Weisel urges educators to teach students what the Nazi doctors never learned that people are not
abstractions. Weisel urges educators to learn from the Nazi experience the importance of humanizing their charges,
of teaching students to view life as special, 'with its own secrets, its own treasures , its own sources of
anguish and with some measure of triumph.' Trained as technocrats with powerful suasory skills but little
understanding , students participating in traditional argumentation courses would have difficulty either grasping or appreciating the
importance of Weisel's critique. Similarly, they would have difficulty grasping or appreciating Christian's framework for an ethic of technology an
approach that requires above all, openness, trust and care. The notion of conviviality would be particularly alien to these trained technocrats.
Traditionally trained debaters are also likely to fail to grasp the complexity of issues. Trained to view problems in black and white terms and
conditioned to turn to "expertise" for solutions, students, and traditional courses become subject to ethical blindness. As Benhabib noted, 'Moral
blindness implies not necessarily an evil or unprincipaled person, but one who can not see the moral texture of the situation confronting him or
her.' These traditional debaters, deprived of true dialogic encounter , fail to develop 'the capacity to represent' to themselves the 'multiplicity of
viewpoints, the variety of perspectives, the layers of meaning, etc. which constitute a situation'. They are thus inclined to lack 'the kind of
sensitivity to particulars, which most agree is essential for good and perspicacious judgment.' Encouraging student to embrace the will to control
and to gain mastery, to accept uncritically a sovereign view of power, and to maintain distance from their own and others 'situatedness,' the
traditional argumentation course provides an unlikely site for nurturing guardians of our world's precious resources. It would appear, in fact,
that the argumentation course foster precisely the 'aggressive and manipulative intellect bred by

modern science and discharged into the administration of things' associated with most of the
world's human made perils. And is therefore understandable that feminist and others critics would write so harshly of traditional
argumentation of debate.

2. We must incorporate alternative perspectives in order to stop violence.

Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, 30(3), p. 519)JM

Hope for a better world will, indeed, remain slim if we put all our efforts into searching for a
mimetic understanding of the international. Issues of global war and Third World poverty are far too
serious and urgent to be left to only one form of inquiry, especially if this mode of thought
suppresses important faculties and fails to understand and engage the crucial problem of
representation. We need to employ the full register of human perception and intelligence to
understand the phenomena of world politics and to address the dilemmas that emanate from them. One of the key
challenges, thus, consists of legitimising a greater variety of approaches and insights to world politics. Aesthetics is an
important and necessary addition to our interpretative repertoire. It helps us understand why the emergence,
meaning and significance of a political event can be appreciated only once we scrutinise the
representational practices that have constituted the very nature of this event.

3. Realism is not the result of the inherent nature of human or states, but instead is the result of
secularisms rise to absolute sovereignty
Milbank 1997 (John, Professor of theology at Cambridge, The Word Made Strange: Theology,
Language, Culture pg 240-241)
All Niebuhr is doing here is giving an ideological picture based on the constant American story in which successive waves of immigrant groups, organized
organically within, meet in competition with each other, and also confront the enlightenment authority of the state with its neutral commitment to a
regulation of individual and group competition. Niebuhr increasingly interprets this incoherent mlange as (at least potentially) an ideal synthesis of the
irrationally organic with the rationally individualist.
Thus Niebuhrs finding of a place for organic groups does not alter the fact that he grounds political collectivities on the contract model, which

imagines social life as a coming together of individuals who already in isolation possess intelligence,
imagination and morality. To acquire these, they must have started to struggle free of their original organic
context. It is this model, plus the Stoic ethics, which permits the classic antithesis of moral man and immoral
society. Of course Niebuhr is right to point to the collective selfishness of the political nation. But Niebuhr fails
to note that this arises not just from atavism, but also from the moral character of the political entity- namely
that it is a whole which purports to serve the benefit of its human parts. Jacques Maritain, Niebuhrs French
contemporary, exhibits a much more genuine spirit of realism when he says that politics is not a sphere set over
against ethics, but a special sphere of ethics, with its own specific and particular virtues and goals .
Moreover, it is not enough to relate the especially dangerous selfishness of modern nation-states simply to the
inherent nature of groups. It is clear that it has to do rather with the contingent, historical growth of absolute
sovereignty. Likewise the selfishness of corporations and trade unions is to be related to the market economy. In older

societies where there was an organic hierarchy of interlocking groupings, group selfishness simply could not
have made the same kind of sense.

4. We meet and turn- The negatives view that the acceptance of one definition requires the negation
of all others is based on the capitalist narrative of scarcity. This denies Gods original plenitude and
leads to an embrace of death and the reduction of difference to sameness that is impact by our
Cavanaugh 98 card
Long 2000 (D. Stephen, assistant professor of theology at Garret-Evangelical Seminary, Divine Economy: Theology and
the Market pp 146-147)
The suggestion that these three philosophical positions share a common theme will certainly be a surprise to many
readers. Even if this argument is accepted, what does it demonstrate? That such different voices all speak and act from an
assumed scarcity could demonstrate merely that capitalist economics is philosophically sound. Can we deny the reality of
this scarcity, this lack, at the heart of economics, morality, and theological language? Is it not the case that in choosing
this commodity, I sacrifice an infinite number of other commodities? In caring for my wife, I sacrifice an infinite care for
all other wives? Is it not the case that in calling God Father, Son and Holy Spirit, I sacrifice an infinite number of other
names for God? No, it is not. And to assume that it is shows how intrusive capitalisms critical culture is in both
philosophy and theology.
Theologians must deny this narrative of scarcity for it forces our language and actions into the inevitable embrace of
death. The moment my will and intellect are bound to some particular good entails a sacrifice of all other objects only if
that good itself implies lack. But God is not defined by lack: God is an original plenitude never able to be exhausted.
While we do not have an immediate access to God based on our being alone, we can recognize that our being participates
in that fullness that makes our being possible, while at the same time that fullness is never exhausted nor diminished in
our being. Gods goodness in history cannot be exhausted by that history, but neither does the fact that it is in history
mitigate against it being fully Gods goodness. This makes possible my caring for my children, spouse, and neighbors, and
my naming of God, without assuming that in so doing I shirk my duty toward all others. In fact, I do not know that by my
living in a house I thereby make necessary homelessness for others. There may very well be no lack of shelter, food,
clothing and above all charity and friendship. All these things may exist in plenitude. My love for my children, spouse,
neighbors, and even enemies is not borne out of an inevitable scarcity, but participates in a plenitude which discloses to
me the possibility that all others can also enjoy these same goods and thus participate in Gods inexhaustible goodness.
While some goods may indeed be scarce, this does not require that all goods- economic, ethical, and theological- must of
necessity be scarce. That I argue for the specificity of Christian theological language as true does not imply a lack whereby
I must deny any truthfulness to all other specific theological languages. In fact, the fullness of Christian theological
language requires just the opposite. What I cannot do is expect to inhabit some neutral, Olympian space whence I can
view all religions as legitimate expressions of some unnamable a priori religious experience. Only because I can speak a
language that always contains more can I recognize truths in other religions. But such truths will of necessity be narrated
within, and never from without, the truths of some specific theological language.