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Transportation Law Digest Compilation

Chapter 2

Regional Container Lines of Singapore VS
Netherlands Insurance Co.
Facts:
On October 20, 1995, 405 cartons of Epoxy Molding Compound were consigned to be shipped from
Singapore to Manila for Temic Telefunken Microelectronics Philippines (Temic). U-Freight Singapore PTE
Ltd. (U-Freight Singapore), a forwarding agent based in Singapore, contracted the services of Pacific Eagle
Lines PTE. Ltd. (Pacific Eagle) to transport the subject cargo. The cargo was packed, stored, and sealed by
Pacific Eagle in its Refrigerated Container No. 6105660 with Seal No. 13223. As the cargo was highly
perishable, the inside of the container had to be kept at a temperature of 0º Celsius. Pacific Eagle then
loaded the refrigerated container on board the M/V Piya Bhum, a vessel owned by RCL, with which Pacific
Eagle had a slot charter agreement. RCL duly issued its own Bill of Lading in favor of Pacific Eagle.
To insure the cargo against loss and damage, Netherlands Insurance issued a Marine Open
Policy in favor of Temic, as shown by MPO-21-05081-94 and Marine Risk Note MRN-21 14022, to cover all
losses/damages to the shipment.
On October 25, 1995, the M/V Piya Bhum docked in Manila. After unloading the refrigerated
container, it was plugged to the power terminal of the pier to keep its temperature constant. Fidel Rocha
(Rocha), Vice-President for Operations of Marines Adjustment Corporation, accompanied by two surveyors,
conducted a protective survey of the cargo. They found that based on the temperature chart, the
temperature reading was constant from October 18, 1995 to October 25, 1995 at 0º Celsius. However, at
midnight of October 25, 1995 – when the cargo had already been unloaded from the ship – the temperature
fluctuated with a reading of 33º Celsius. Rocha believed the fluctuation was caused by the burnt condenser
fan motor of the refrigerated container.
On November 9, 1995, Temic received the shipment. It found the cargo completely damaged.
Temic filed a claim for cargo loss against Netherlands Insurance, with supporting claims documents. The
Netherlands Insurance paid Temic the sum of P1,036,497.00 under the terms of the Marine Open Policy.
Temic then executed a loss and subrogation receipt in favor of Netherlands Insurance.
Seven months from delivery of the cargo or on June 4, 1996, Netherlands Insurance filed a complaint
for subrogation of insurance settlement with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Manila, against “the
unknown owner of M/V Piya Bhum” and TMS Ship Agencies (TMS), the latter thought to be the local agent
of M/V Piya Bhum’s unknown owner.
Issue: whether the CA correctly held RCL and EDSA Shipping liable as common carriers under the theory of
presumption of negligence.
Held:
Petition is denied
We do not find the arguments of RCL and EDSA Shipping meritorious.
A common carrier is presumed to have been negligent if it fails to prove that it exercised
extraordinary vigilance over the goods it transported. When the goods shipped are either lost or arrived in
damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there
need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable.
To overcome the presumption of negligence, the common carrier must establish by
adequate proof that it exercised extraordinary diligence over the goods. It must do more than
merely show that some other party could be responsible for the damage.
In the present case, RCL and EDSA Shipping failed to prove that they did exercise that degree of
diligence required by law over the goods they transported. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence showing that
the fluctuation of the temperature in the refrigerated container van, as recorded in the temperature chart,
occurred after the cargo had been discharged from the vessel and was already under the custody of the
arrastre operator, ICTSI. This evidence, however, does not disprove that the condenser fan – which caused
the fluctuation of the temperature in the refrigerated container – was not damaged while the cargo was being
unloaded from the ship. It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded
generally remain under the custody of the carrier; RCL and EDSA Shipping failed to dispute this.
RCL and EDSA Shipping could have offered evidence before the trial court to show that the damage
to the condenser fan did not occur: (1) while the cargo was in transit; (2) while they were in the act of
discharging it from the vessel; or (3) while they were delivering it actually or constructively to the consignee.
They could have presented proof to show that they exercised extraordinary care and diligence in the
handling of the goods, but they opted to file a demurrer to evidence. As the order granting their demurrer

was reversed on appeal, the CA correctly ruled that they are deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence, and the presumption of negligence must stand.
It is for this reason as well that we find RCL and EDSA Shipping’s claim that the loss or damage to the
cargo was caused by a defect in the packing or in the containers. To exculpate itself from liability for the
loss/damage to the cargo under any of the causes, the common carrier is burdened to prove any of the
causes in Article 1734 of the Civil Code claimed by it by a preponderance of evidence. If the carrier
succeeds, the burden of evidence is shifted to the shipper to prove that the carrier is negligent. RCL and
EDSA Shipping, however, failed to satisfy this standard of evidence and in fact offered no evidence at all on
this point; a reversal of a dismissal based on a demurrer to evidence bars the defendant from presenting
evidence supporting its allegations.

2.2 Defense Exclusive
Natural Disaster or calamity
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
196 SCRA 570
Facts:
SS Eastern Comet, owned by defendant Eastern Shipping Lines was engaged in the business of
shipment from Japan to the Philippines. Through the SS Eastern Comet, two fiber drums of riboflavin were
shipped from Yokohama to Manila. The shipment was discharged upon arrival into the custody of defendant
Metro Port Service, Inc. However, the latter refused to one drum after claiming that such unwanted drum
was in bad order. Defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation received the shipment from Metro Port and
detected that one drum was opened and without seal. The goods were then delivered to the consignee’s
warehouse. The latter noted that one drum contained spillages, while the rest of the contents were
adulterated. As a consequence of the damage Mercantile Insurance Company paid the consignee under its
marine policy insurance and instituted civil action against defendants as subrogee. The Court of Appeals
affirmed judgment holding the common carrier, arrastre operator, and customs brokers jointly and severally
liable.
Issue:
Whether Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. can be held severally and jointly liable with Metro Port and
Allied brokerage.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that Esatern Shipping Lines, Inc can be held liable. As what was already
decided in Fireman’s Fund Isurance, Co. vs Metro Port Service, Inc, the legal relationship between the
consignee and the arrastre operator is analogous to that of a depositor and a warehouseman. Further
explained, the relationship between the consignee and the common carrier is comparable to that of the
consignee and the arrastre operator. Since it is the duty of the Arrastre to take good care of the goods that
are in its custody and to deliver them in good condition to the consignee, such responsibility also devolves
upon the carrier. The duty of the consignee to guard the goods and shelter it from destruction or impairment
is also shouldered by the common carrier. Both are therefore charged with the obligation to deliver the
goods in good condition to the consignee.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. IAC
150 scra 463
Facts:
In GR 69044, the M/S ASIATICA, a vessel operated by Eastern Shipping Lines loaded at
Kobe, Japan for Manila:
1.) 5,000 pieces of calorized lance pipes in 28 packages valued at P256,039.00 consigned to
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
2.) 7 cases of spare parts valued at P92,361.75, consigned to Central Textile Mills, Inc.
Both sets of goods were insured for their value with Development
Insurance and Surety Corporation.
1.
2.

In GR 71478, the same vessel took on board :
128 cartons of garment fabrics and accessories, in 2 containers, consigned to Mariveles
Apparel Corporation
two cases of surveying instruments consigned to Aman Enterprises and General Merchandise.

The 128 cartons were insured for their value by Nisshin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., for US$46,583.00.
The 2 cases by Dowa Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., for US$11,385.00. Enroute for Kobe, Japan, to
Manila, the vessel caught fire and sank, resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo. The respective Insurers
paid the corresponding marine insurance values to the consignees concerned and were thus subrogated
unto the rights of the latter as the insured.
Eastern Shipping denied liability mainly on the ground that the loss was due to an extraordinary
fortuitous event; hence, it is not liable under the law. The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of
Development Insurance in the amounts of P256,039.00 and P92,361.75, respectively, with legal interest,
plus P35,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs. Eastern Shipping took an appeal to the then Court of Appeals
which, on 14 August 1984, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Eastern Shipping filed a petition for review
on certiorari.

Nisshin, and Dowa, as subrogees of the insured, filed suit against Eastern Shipping for the
recovery of the insured value of the cargo lost imputing unseaworthiness of the ship and non-observance of
extraordinary diligence by Eastern Shipping. Eastern Shipping denied liability on the principal grounds that
the fire which caused the sinking of the ship is an exempting circumstance under Section 4(2) (b) of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA); and that when the loss of fire is established, the burden of proving
negligence of the vessel is shifted to the cargo shipper. Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Nisshin
and Dowa. CA affirmed decision. Hence this petition on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence.

Held:
Eastern Shipping shall pay the Development Insurance the amount of P256,039 for the 28
packages of calorized lance pipes, and P71,540 for the 7 cases of spare parts, with interest at the legal rate
from the date of the filing of the Complaint on 13 June 1978, plus P5,000 as attorney’s fees, and the costs.
The Court, on the other hand, in GR 71478, affirmed the judgment.
The evidence of the defendant did not show that extraordinary diligence was observed by
the vessel to prevent the occurrence of fire at hatches nos. 2 and 3. Defendant’s evidence did not likewise
show the amount of diligence made by the crew, on orders, in the care of the cargoes. What appears is that
after the cargoes were stored in the hatches, no regular inspection was made as to their condition during the
voyage. The complete defense afforded by the COGSA when loss results from fire is unavailing to Eastern
Shipping. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), a special law, is merely suppletory to the provisions
of the Civil Code The fire may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity, as it arises almost invariably
from some act of man or by human means. It does not fall within the category of an act of God unless
caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or calamity. It may even be caused by the actual fault or
privity of the carrier.
2.2.2: Acts of Public Enemy
Prize Cases
Brief Fact Summary. Union ships pursuant to President Lincoln’s April 1861 Order declared a blockade of
southern ports seized ships carrying goods to the Confederate States.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. It is the Congressional prerogative “to declare war” under Article , Section: 8,
Clause 11. However, the President has the ability to take action when attacked.
Facts. In April 1861 President Lincoln declared a blockade of southern ports. Pursuant to this blockade in
May and July 1861, Union ships seized Confederate merchant vessels and cargoes of foreign neutrals and
residents of the southern states. The ships were condemned by federal court order. The owners of the ships
and cargo appealed.
Issue. Did President Lincoln have the authority to institute a blockade of southern ports?
Held. Justice Grier. Yes.By the Acts of Congress of 1795 and 1807, the President is authorized to call out
the militia and use the military and naval forces of the United States in case of invasion by foreign nations
and to suppress insurrection against the government of a state or of the United States.Even if it was
necessary to get Congressional sanction for the existence of war Congress did approve of the President’s
actions by the Acts they passed in 1861, which allowed the government to prosecute the war with vigor and
efficiency. In 1861, Congress approved, legalized and made valid all acts, proclamations and orders of the
President as if they had been done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress.
Therefore even if he needed Congress to ratify his actions, they did so and therefore cured any defect.
Dissent. Justices Nelson, Catron, Clifford and Chief Justice Taney dissenting.The Acts of 1795 and 1807 did
not and could not confer on the President the power of declaring war against a state. When Congress
declares war, ordinary citizens convert into public enemies are treated accordingly. This great power over
the business and property of the citizen is preserved to Congress by the United States Constitution. It
cannot be delegated or surrendered to the Executive. Until Congress declares war, then no citizen of the
State can be punished in his person or property unless he has committed some offense against a law of
Congress passed before the act was committed which made his act a crime.The Congressional ratification
of the seizures was an ex post facto law and hence invalid.
Discussion. The majority opinion held that the President could resist an attack by a foreign nation. The fact
that the attack in this case came from an internal part of the Union rather than from a foreign power does not
eliminate the President’s power to take action.

2.2.3: Shippers Fault
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC, VS. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE
CORPORATION,

Facts:

Delsan is a domestic corporation which owns and operates the vessel MT Larusan. On the other
hand, respondent American Home Assurance Corporation (AHAC for brevity) is a foreign insurance
company duly licensed to do business in the Philippines through its agent, the American-International
Underwriters, Inc. (Phils.). It is engaged, among others, in insuring cargoes for transportation within the
Philippines.
On August 5, 1984, Delsan received on board MT Larusan a shipment consisting of 1,986.627 k/l
Automotive Diesel Oil (diesel oil) at the Bataan Refinery Corporation for transportation and delivery to the
bulk depot in Bacolod City of Caltex Phils., Inc. (Caltex), pursuant to a Contract of Afreightment. The
shipment was insured by respondent AHAC against all risks under Inland Floater Policy No. AH-IF641011549P and Marine Risk Note No. 34-5093-6.
On August 7, 1984, the shipment arrived in Bacolod City. Immediately thereafter, unloading operations
commenced. The discharging of the diesel oil started at about 1:30 PM of the same day. However, at about
10:30 PM, the discharging had to be stopped on account of the discovery that the port bow mooring of the
vessel was intentionally cut or stolen by unknown persons. Because there was nothing holding it, the vessel
drifted westward, dragged and stretched the flexible rubber hose attached to the riser, broke the elbow into
pieces, severed completely the rubber hose connected to the tanker from the main delivery line at sea bed
level and ultimately caused the diesel oil to spill into the sea. To avoid further spillage, the vessel’s crew
tried water flushing to clear the line of the diesel oil but to no avail. In the meantime, the shore tender, who
was waiting for the completion of the water flushing, was surprised when the tanker signaled a “red light”
which meant stop pumping. Unaware of what happened, the shore tender, thinking that the vessel would, at
any time, resume pumping, did not shut the storage tank gate valve. As all the gate valves remained open,
the diesel oil that was earlier discharged from the vessel into the shore tank backflowed. Due to nonavailability of a pump boat, the vessel could not send somebody ashore to inform the people at the depot
about what happened. After almost an hour, a gauger and an assistant surveyor from the Caltex’s Bulk
Depot Office boarded the vessel. It was only then that they found out what had happened. Thereafter, the
duo immediately went ashore to see to it that the shore tank gate valve was closed. The loss of diesel oil
due to spillage was placed at 113.788 k/l while some 435,081 k/l thereof backflowed from the shore tank.
As a result of spillage and backflow of diesel oil, Caltex sought recovery of the loss from Delsan, but
the latter refused to pay. As insurer, AHAC paid Caltex the sum of P479,262.57 for spillage, pursuant to
Marine Risk Note No. 34-5093-6, and P1,939,575.37 for backflow of the diesel oil pursuant to Inland Floater
Policy No. AH-1F64-1011549P.
Issue: Whether or not Delsan liable for the loss of the cargo for its negligence in its duty as a common
carrier?
Held:
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported
by them. They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of negligence in case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence. There
are, however, exceptions to this rule. Article 1734 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when the
presumption of negligence does not attach:
Both the trial court and the CA uniformly ruled that Delsan failed to prove its claim that there
was a contributory negligence on the part of the owner of the goods – Caltex. We see no reason to depart
therefrom. As aptly pointed out by the CA, it had been established that the proximate cause of the spillage
and backflow of the diesel oil was due to the severance of the port bow mooring line of the vessel and the
failure of the shore tender to close the storage tank gate valve even as a check on the drain cock showed
that there was still a product on the pipeline. To the two courts below, the actuation of the gauger and the
escort surveyor, both personnel from the Caltex Bulk Depot, negates the allegation that Caltex was remiss
in its duties. As we see it, the crew of the vessel should have promptly informed the shore tender that the
port mooring line was cut off. However, Delsan did not do so on the lame excuse that there was no available
banca. As it is, Delsan’s personnel signaled a “red light” which was not a sufficient warning because
such signal only meant that the pumping of diesel oil had been finished. Neither did the blowing of whistle
suffice considering the distance of more than 2 kilometers between the vessel and the Caltex Bulk Depot,
aside from the fact that it was not the agreed signal. Had the gauger and the escort surveyor from Caltex
Bulk Depot not gone aboard the vessel to make inquiries, the shore tender would have not known what
really happened. The crew of the vessel should have exerted utmost effort to immediately inform the shore
tender that the port bow mooring line was severed.
To be sure, Delsan, as the owner of the vessel, was obliged to prove that the loss was caused by one
of the excepted causes if it were to seek exemption from responsibility. Unfortunately, it miserably failed to
discharge this burden by the required quantum of proof.
To recapitulate, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.The mere proof of
delivery of goods in good order to the carrier, and their arrival in the place of destination in bad order,
make out a prima facie case against the carrier, so that if no explanation is given as to how the injury
occurred, the carrier must be held responsible. It is incumbent upon the carrier to prove that the loss was

On July 28.” Issues: 1. 2. defendants-appellees imputed that the damage and/or loss was due to pre-shipment damage. or to perils.50). shipped on board the MN ‘Anangel Sky’ at Hamburg. Consequently. or to insufficiency of packing thereof. should not exceed the limitations of liability provided for in the bill of lading and other pertinent laws. are bound to observe extraordinary diligence and vigilance with respect to the safety of the goods and the passengers they transport. if there be any.086. Delsan must bear the consequences. PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE CO. All told. defendants-appellees averred that.due to accident or some other circumstances inconsistent with its liability. Germany 242 coils of various Prime Cold Rolled Steel sheets for transportation to Manila consigned to the Philippine Steel Trading Corporation. Having failed to do so. within the subsequent days. Whether petitioners have overcome the presumption of negligence of a common carrier? Whether the notice of loss was timely filed? Held: First Issue: Proof of Negligence Well-settled is the rule that common carriers. plaintiff-appellant instituted this complaint for recovery of the amount paid by them. In addition thereto. danger and accidents of the sea. plaintiff-appellant paid the consignee five hundred six thousand eighty six & 50/100 pesos (P506.4: Inherent Vice BELGIAN OVERSEAS CHARTERING AND SHIPPING VS. Tally sheet No. discharged the subject cargo. or to the act or omission of the shipper of the goods or their representatives. 1990. CMC Trading A. common carriers are required to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and “to use all reason[a]ble means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of . Finding the four (4) coils in their damaged state to be unfit for the intended purpose. the consignee Philippine Steel Trading Corporation declared the same as total loss. being a common carrier. to the inherent nature. and was subrogated to the latter’s rights and causes of action against defendants-appellees. Consequently. MN Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and. 154974.2. defendants-appellees refused to submit to the consignee’s claim. “Impugning the propriety of the suit against them. vice or defect of the goods. defendants-appellees argued that their liability. it is obliged to prove that the damage to its cargo was caused by one of the excepted causes if it were to seek exemption from responsibility. “Despite receipt of a formal demand. Four (4) coils were found to be in bad order B. Finally. Delsan. 2. Thus. in any event.. to the consignee as insured. should have exercised extraordinary diligence in the performance of its duties.O. INC Facts: “On June 13.G. Subsequently. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. 1990. they exercised due diligence and foresight required by law to prevent any damage/loss to said shipment.

they have the burden of proving that they observed such diligence. This strict requirement is justified by the fact that. As stated earlier. 1990. This is a closed list. however.the goods tendered for shipment. (3) an act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods. If the cause of destruction. a failure to file a notice of claim within three days will not bar recovery if it is nonetheless filed within one year. Having failed to discharge the burden of proving that they have exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. including such methods as their nature requires. But none of these measures was taken. Corollary to the foregoing. or (5) an order or act of competent public authority. to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them. unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. Further. and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage. Second Issue: Notice of Loss Petitioners claim that pursuant to Section 3. loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances. the presumption of fault or negligence will not arise if the loss is due to any of the following causes: (1) flood. lightning. the master of the vessel and his crew should have undertaken precautionary measures to avoid possible deterioration of the cargo. as stated in the same provision. without a hand or a voice in the preparation of such contract. Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them. (4) the character of the goods or defects in the packing or the container. the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)--which provides for a one-year period of limitation . common carriers. Hence. but that respondent filed its Notice of Claim only on September 18. paragraph 6 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act[44] (COGSA). as a general rule. First. Even if it wants to. prior to unloading the cargo. an Inspection Report as to the condition of the goods was prepared and signed by representatives of both parties. the above-cited provision of COGSA provides that the notice of claim need not be given if the state of the goods.In order to avoid responsibility for any loss or damage. the words “metal envelopes rust stained and slightly dented” were noted on the Bill of Lading. there is no showing that petitioners exercised due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss.Thus. then the carrier is liable therefor. That is. storm. the consignee. the loss or the destruction of the goods happened. defects in packages in which they are shipped. The aforecited exception refers to cases when goods are lost or damaged while in transit as a result of the natural decay of perishable goods or the fermentation or evaporation of substances liable therefor. it cannot be reasonably concluded that the damage to the four coils was due to the condition noted on the Bill of Lading. True. has been the subject of a joint inspection or survey. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration. the riding public enters into a contract of transportation with common carriers. the transporter shall be held responsible. That petitioners failed to rebut the prima facie presumption of negligence is revealed in the case at bar by a review of the records and more so by the evidence adduced by respondent. or the natural propensities of animals.[45] We are not persuaded. 1990. the master of the vessel should have known at the outset that metal envelopes in the said state would eventually deteriorate when not properly stored while in transit. whether international or civil. mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the carrier. petitioners have not successfully proven the application of any of the aforecited exceptions in the present case. (2) an act of the public enemy in war.[36] Having been in the service for several years. to avoid damage to or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for safe carriage and delivery. therefore. petitioners failed to prove that they observed the extraordinary diligence and precaution which the law requires a common carrier to know and to follow. it cannot submit its own stipulations for their approval. earthquake. or other natural disaster or calamity. the necessary and natural wear of goods in transport. “Inasmuch as the neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Commerce states a specific prescriptive period on the matter. once it accepts the goods notwithstanding such condition. petitioners cannot escape liability for the damage to the four coils. at the time of their receipt. Equipped with the proper knowledge of the nature of steel sheets in coils and of the proper way of transporting them. This one-year prescriptive period also applies to the shipper. However. respondent should have filed its Notice of Loss within three days from delivery. Second. it is not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom. are presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. The .” The extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of and received for transportation by the carrier until they are delivered. They assert that the cargo was discharged on July 31. even if the fact of improper packing was known to the carrier or its crew or was apparent upon ordinary observation. From the evidence on record. None of these is present in the instant case. it merely adheres to the agreement prepared by them. the insurer of the goods or any legal holder of the bill of lading. actually or constructively.

for it was not able to establish that the subject shipment was weighed at the port of origin at Darrow. Contiquincybunge Export Company loaded 6. however. Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court holding petitioner ATI solidarily liable with its co-defendants for the shortage incurred in the shipment of the goods to respondent? Held: The CA misapprehended the following facts.S. Nor has the genuineness and due execution of these documents been established.A. This can only be done if the weight of the shipment at the port of origin and its subsequent weight at the port of arrival have been proven by a preponderance of evidence. 1996.100. as there was no competent evidence to prove that it actually weighed 3. U. petitioner ATI is correct in arguing that the respondent failed to prove that the subject shipment suffered actual shortage. 1995. Louisiana. 1995.00. within the one-year prescriptive period.300. convincing. before the burden is shifted to the defendant.415. quantity. quantity and quality unknown. South Harbor. while the Complaint was filed by respondent on July 25. the plaintiff must still. When the vessel arrived at the South Harbor in Manila. 1990. Louisiana.843. and that the actual weight of the said shipment was 3. for delivery to the Port of Manila to respondent Simon Enterprises.863 metric tons... and quality of the cargo. First. Inc Facts: On October 25.A.A. the carrier docked at the inner Anchorage. U.848.86 or P2. Inc.100.000 metric tons of shipment. and competent evidence to prove that the shipment indeed weighed 4.e.S. it cannot be determined whether there was a shortage of the shipment upon its arrival in Batangas.” meaning that it was transported with the carrier having been oblivious of the weight. (ATI). Manila. the cargo was discharged on July 31. and it can be seen that the former weight is considerably greater than the latter weight. The subject shipment was discharged to the receiving barges of petitioner ATI and received by respondent which.” In the present case. Though it is true that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods transported by them are lost. Soybean Meal in Bulk on board the vessel MN "Sea Dream" at the Port of Darrow. The Berth Term Grain Bill of Lading states that the subject shipment was carried with the qualification “Shipper’s weight.300. Inc. and that the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption. In this case. taking into consideration the exceptions provided in Article 1734 of the Civil Code. and the amount or quantity of goods in the container in a particular package is only prima facie evidence of the amount or quantity A shipment under this arrangement is not inspected or inventoried by the carrier whose duty is only to transport and deliver the containers in the same condition as when the carrier received and accepted the containers for transport Ms. transported in sealed containers or “containerized”] ordinarily would declare “Said to Contain”.on claims for loss of. or deteriorated.000 metric tons of U.S. 3. The carrier issued its clean Berth Term Grain Bill of Lading. the shipment was discharged to the receiving barges of petitioner Asian Terminals. . Asian Terminals Inc VS Simon Enterprises. Suarez’s testimony regarding the contents of the documents is thus hearsay.137 metric tons instead of the manifested 3. cargoes sustained during transit--may be applied suppletorily to the case at bar. prove that the subject shipment suffered actual shortage.. On November 25. based as it is on the knowledge of another person not presented on the witness stand.300 metric tons. Louisiana.300 metric tons at the port of origin. destroyed. or damage to. In the absence of clear.35 metric tons at the port of origin when it was loaded on the M/V Gao Yang. but its claim was denied.025. Soybean Meal in Bulk for delivery to respondent at the Port of Manila.700 metric tons of U. respondent failed to prove that the subject shipment suffered shortage.S.S. reported receiving only 3. 1991. Respondent filed against petitioner ATI and the carrier a claim for the shortage of 199. estimated to be worth US$79. “Full Container Load”. U. as consignee. Contiquincybunge Export Company made another shipment to respondent and allegedly loaded on board the vessel M/V “Tern” at the Port of Darrow. On January 25. “Shipper’s Load and Count”. The recital of the bill of lading for goods thus transported [i.

SH9410306[2] in the name of the shipper consigned to the order of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company with arrival notice in Manila to ultimate consignee Blue Mono International Company.863 metric tons that respondent alleges is a minimal 6. albeit the Bill of Lading qualified it by the phrase “said to weigh. may have been due to the inherent nature of the subject shipment or its packaging since the subject cargo was shipped in bulk and had a moisture content of 12.. National Shipping Corporation of the Philippines (NSCP). as correctly asserted by petitioner ATI. as it was wintertime when M/V “Tern” left the United States and the climate was warmer when it reached the Philippines. the respondent then has no cause of action to claim for shortages. Perez were requested by respondent. contents and valueunknown. Manila.5: Defense in Packing or in the container (Regional Container Lines Vs. the fact of loss or shortage in the cargo upon its arrival in Manila cannot be definitively established. assuming that the shipment lost weight in transit due to desorption. the weight of the cargo could not be gauged from the bill of lading. respondent cannot fairly claim damages against petitioner for the subject shipment's alleged shortage. NSCP.05% of the total quantity of 3. Evidently. Freight forwarder. as correctly argued by petitioner. Mr. by answering a question propounded by the RTC. the 199. Mr. Philippines. Del Pan. on board the vessel M/V “National Honor. as shipper. “D-1”. NSGPBSML512565[3] in the name of the freight forwarder. Fernando Perez. Incorporated (BMICI).” 6.. issued Bill of Lading No.5%. the shortage of 199. a Cargo Surveyor of L. for its part. and “D-2” would show that the methods used in determining whether there was a shortage are not accurate. Third. 1995. convincing and competent evidence to prove that the cargo indeed weighed. a reading of Exhibits “D”.05% of the weight of the entire Soy Bean Meal shipment. Makati. consigned to the order of Stamm International Inc.” represented in the Philippines by its agent.. Samhwa Inter-Trans Co. The alleged loss. The conclusion that the subject shipment lost weight in transit is bolstered by the testimony of Mr. Also. More importantly. that loss of weight of the subject cargo cannot be avoided because of the shift in temperature from the colder United States weather to the warmer Philippine climate.Moreover. a reading of the Survey Report of Del Pan Surveyors (Exhibits “D” to “D-4” of respondent) would not show any untoward incident or negligence on the part of petitioner ATI during the discharging operations. the shortage. the alleged percentage loss clearly does not exceed the allowable 10% allowance for loss.599. if any. issued Bill of Lading No. hence the moisture level of the Soybean Meal could have changed.J. Korea. The legal basis for attributing liability to either of the respondents is thus sorely wanting. Philippines . condition. The shipment was for delivery to Manila. not having exceeded the allowable percentage of shortage. Ltd.23 MT at the port of origin when it was loaded onto the MV Hoegh.The bill of lading carried an added clause – the shipment’s weight. loaded a shipment of four units of parts and accessories in the port of Pusan. Trading Co. if any. Taking into consideration the previously mentioned option of the shipper to ship 10% more or less than the contracted shipment. Korea.300 metric tons.2. quantity.300 metric tons at the port of loading. Singapore ) PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. and the fact that the alleged shortage is only 6. Perez testified that it was possible for the subject shipment to have lost weight during the 36-day voyage.” NATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES Facts: On November 5. Ltd. These discrepancies only lend credence to petitioner ATI's assertion that the weighing methods respondent used as bases are unreliable and should not be completely relied upon. Perez himself confirmed. and that it cannot therefore be concluded that there was a shortage for which petitioner should be responsible. The services of Mr.863 metric-ton shortage that respondent alleges is a minimal 6. Considering that respondent was not able to establish conclusively that the subject shipment weighed 3. J. bearing in mind that the subject shipment most likely lost weight in transit due to the inherent nature of Soya Bean Meal. 2. measure.05% of the weight of the entire shipment. UNKNOWN OWNER OF THE VESSEL M/V “NATIONAL HONOR. and noting that the respondent was not able to show negligence on the part ofthe petitioner and that the weighing methods which respondent relied upon to establish the shortage it alleges is inaccurate. of Seoul. Binondo. quality. Second. which is within the allowable 10% allowance for loss. we agree with the petitioner ATI that respondent has not proven any negligence on the part of the former. In the absence of clear. As petitioner ATI pointed out.

It opined that three to four pieces of cable or wire rope slings. or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale. Crate No. this was a normal procedure. The crane was operated by Olegario Balsa. The Lathe Machine was stuffed in the crate. The Mariners’ Adjustment Corporation hired by PCIC conducted a survey and declared that the packing of the shipment was considered insufficient.While it is true that the crate contained machineries and spare parts. As the crate was being hoisted from the vessel’s hatch. that the crates were sealed and that the contents thereof could not be seen from the outside. or that it was not strong enough to bear the weight of the shipment. WON THE COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT COMMON CARRIER IS LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THE SHIPMENT IN THE POSSESSION OF THE ARRASTRE OPERATOR. Family Insurance and Investment Corporation. covered by Commercial Invoice No. BMICI’s customs broker.” We agree with the trial and appellate courts. along with the crew and the surveyor of the ICTSI.There were no markings on the outer portion of the crates except the name of the consignee. carriage and delivery. It was insured for P2. mediocre. Denasto Dauz..620 kgs. II. resulting in extensive damage to the shipment. 1. measured 10 cubic meters and weighed 2. Claudio Cansino. the checker-inspector of the NSCP. checked the cargo and found it in apparent good condition. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. The shipment had a total invoice value of US$90.00 with the Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation (PCIC) thru its general agent. Incorporated (ICTSI) was furnished with a copy of the crate cargo list and bill of lading. On the flooring of the wooden crates were three wooden battens placed side by side to support the weight of the cargo. BMICI found that the same could no longer be used for the intended purpose. the vessel started discharging its cargoes using its winch crane. complete and in good order condition. JRM Incorporated. In Dauz’s experience.060 kgs. and one (1) unit Milling Machine complete with parts and accessories. including such methods as their nature requires. The following day. The Court has defined extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods as follows: The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to. considering that the crate contained heavy machinery. inferior means of poor quality. NSGPBSML512565 .547. a winchman from the ICTSI. The M/V “National Honor” arrived at the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) on November 14. 2. the mid-portion of the wooden flooring suddenly snapped in the air. one (1) unit Surface Grinder complete with parts and accessories. No sling cable was fastened on the mid-portion of the crate. There is no showing in the Bill of Lading that the shipment was in good order or condition when the carrier received the cargo. “defectiveness” is not synonymous with “inferiority. In other words. The International Container Terminal Services.[Crate No. A thing may be of inferior quality but not necessarily defective.270.The shipment was contained in two wooden crates. Jr. and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage. should have been used. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that common carriers. or second rate. namely. 68043 dated October 24.On the other hand. sending all its contents crashing down hard. Upon receipt of the damaged shipment. 1 and Crate No.” “Defect” is the want or absence of something necessary for completeness or perfection. conducted an inspection of the cargo. a lack or absence of something essential to completeness. The petitioner failed to rebut the testimony of Dauz. held in all equal setting. 1994. WON THE CA GROSSLY MISCOMPREHENDED THE FACTS IN FINDING THAT THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THE [SHIPMENT] WAS DUE TO ITS DEFECTIVE PACKING AND NOT TO THE FAULT AND NEGLIGENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS? Held: The petition has no merit. about five feet high from the vessel’s twin deck. took delivery of the cargo in such damaged condition. according to all the circumstances of each case. 1 measured 24 cubic meters and weighed 3. never bypassing the center of the crate. the exclusive arrastre operator of MICT. It contained the following articles: one (1) unit Lathe Machine complete with parts and accessories. it cannot thereby be concluded that the respondents knew or should have known that the middle wooden batten had a hole. It ruled out the possibility of taxes due to insufficiency of packing. a deficiency in something essential to the proper use for the purpose for which a thing is to be used. and it knew the contents of the crate. on the other hand. under Marine Risk Note No. 2. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and “to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment. the stevedore of the ICTSI. under Bill of Lading No. Issue: I. The petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to counter that of respondent ICTSI.00 C&F Manila.000. or that the three wooden battens under the flooring of the cargo were not defective or insufficient or inadequate. 1995. placed two sling cables on each end of Crate No. On the other hand. They inspected the hatches. Crate No. YJ-73564 DTD and a Packing List. are mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them.

the acting Mayor this time went to the port where the Batman was docked.2. Case law has it that such statement will create a prima facie presumption only as to the external condition and not to that not open to inspection. is sufficient to sustain a finding of absence of defects in the merchandise. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Ganzon. However.6: Acts of Public Authority Ganzon v. The contract was for the petitioner to transport the scrap iron to Manila from Bataan. Issue: Whether or not Ganzon is liable for the loss that Tumambing sustained. therefore he shall be liable for its loss. and when they were about halfway through. that the shipment was in apparent good condition. the latter represented and warranted that the goods were properly packed. the loading of the scrap metal was resumed. 2. to board it on the same.8: Fortuitous Event (De Guzman Vs. the respondent ICTSI was not obliged to do so. CA) .895 as actual damages. The latter resisted and a heated argument started. Mayor Advincula arrived and demanded P5. the contract of carriage was perfected. the exercise of extraordinary diligence in caring for the goods shall also commence to begin. The scraps of iron were already under the custody and control of the carrier. The defense that the scraps of iron were not unconditionally placed in his custody and control is untenable. injury or detriment to the goods. therefore the scraps of metal were placed in his custody and control. Upon perfection of the contract. 2. Petitioner herein admits that the scraps of iron were delivered to Captain Niza by Tumambing in order to load the same on the lighter Batman. The crew of the Batman started to load the iron. What was left or the iron was confiscated by the Acting Mayor and brought to NASSCO.issued by the respondent NSCP and accepted by the petitioner. However.” Absent any signs on the shipment requiring the placement of a sling cable in the mid-portion of the crate.2. and disclosed in writing the “condition. Hence this petition by Ganzon.000 from Tumambing. The employees of Ganzon received the scraps of iron on his behalf. lucky for him the wound was not fatal. The statement in the Bill of Lading. Mayor Advincula drew his gun and fired at Tumambing. Article 1738 of the NCC provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence shall cease only upon delivery to the consignee or to the person who has the right to receive the same. petitioner herein.2. P5. A receipt was issued showing that the municipality had taken custody of the scraps or iron. It is irrelevant that the scraps of iron were only partially loaded on the lighter. He was accompanied by 3 policemen and he ordered Captain Niza to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked. was hired by Tumambing to haul 305 tons of scrap iron. He was brought to the hospital for treatment. CA) 2. captain of the lighter LCT “Batman”. nature. Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to Niza. Held: The Court held that Ganzon is liable for the loss of Tumambing. A few days after this incident. on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the decision ordering Ganzon to pay Tumambing P5. quality or characteristic that may cause damage. therefore the carrier should have exercised extraordinary diligence in taking care of the scraps of iron. In this case.000 for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees as well. Tumambing filed a case in order to recover damages for the loss that he sustained. Upon the receipt of the scraps by the carrier in order transport the same. Court of Appeals 161 SCRA 646 Facts: Ganzon.7: Extraordinary Diligence (De Guzman vs. there was no delivery made to the consignee.

It is not denied by the insurance companies that the vessel was indeed inspected before actual loading and that North Front 777 was issued a Permit to Sail. There were days when unloading had to be stopped due to variable weather conditions and sometimes for no apparent reason at all.433.234 sacks of corn grains valued at P3.. The proofs presented by North Front Shipping Services. In fact the mold growth could still be arrested by drying.. They did not encounter big waves hence it was not possible for water to seep in. The demands however were unheeded. In addition. were insufficient to rebut the prima facie presumption of private respondent's negligence.9: Partial Defense: Shippers Contributory Fault or Negligence TABACALERA INSURANCE CO vs. Republic Flour Mills Corporation was advised of its arrival but it did not immediately commence the unloading operations. as there were already several patches on them. they lodged a complaint for damages against North Front Shipping Services. the carrier failed to volunteer any explanation why there was spoilage and how it occurred. The vessel left Cagayan de Oro City on 2 August 1990 and arrived Manila on 16 August 1990. The cargo was covered with tarpaulins and wooden boards. The tarpaulins were not brand new as there were patches on them. Inc. NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES.189. rancid and deteriorating. They proved the fact of shipment and its consequent loss or damage while in the actual possession of the carrier. 001[1] and insured with the herein mentioned insurance companies. The tarpaulins were doubled and brand new and the hatches were properly sealed. averred in refutation that it could not be made culpable for the loss and deterioration of the cargo as it was never negligent. Thusly. they were issued a permit to sail by the Coast Guard. He further averred that the corn grains were farm wet and not properly dried when loaded. contrary to the claim of North Front Shipping Services. it was shown during the trial that the vessel had rusty bulkheads and the wooden boards and tarpaulins bore heavy concentration of molds.. a vessel owned by North Front Shipping Services.. The remaining merchandise was already moldy. On the other hand. Precision Analytical Services. Inc. A Certificate of Analysis was issued indicating that the corn grains had 18.333 metric tons. . They did not notice any seals in the hatches. North Front Shipping Services. was hired to examine the corn grains and determine the cause of deterioration. The insurance companies were perforce obliged to pay Republic Flour Mills Corporation P2. Inc. thus making it possible for water to seep in. They also discovered that the bulkhead of the barge was rusty. contrary to the claim of North Front Shipping Services.2.500. Captain Solomon Villanueva. reiterated that the barge was inspected prior to the actual loading and was found adequate and seaworthy. Inc. The vessel was inspected prior to actual loading by representatives of the shipper and was found fit to carry the merchandise. hence. making it highly probable for water to enter. claiming that the loss was exclusively attributable to the fault and negligence of the carrier.00 were shipped on board North Front 777. The cargo was consigned to Republic Flour Mills Corporation in Manila under Bill of Lading No. The unloading operations were completed on 5 September 1990 or twenty (20) days after the arrival of the barge at the wharf of Republic Flour Mills Corporation in Pasig City.. The tarpaulins used were not new.2.56% moisture content and the wetting was due to contact with salt water. Inc.. The Marine Cargo Adjusters hired by the insurance companies conducted a survey and found cracks in the bodega of the barge and heavy concentration of molds on the tarpaulins and wooden boards.. more so if we consider the evidence adduced by petitioners. INC Facts: On 2 August 1990. 20. By virtue of the payment made by the insurance companies they were subrogated to the rights of Republic Flour Mills Corporation.640. Inc.40. Issue: WON Republic Flour Mills Corporation liable for contributory negligence? Held: In fine. Inc. Notably. we find that the carrier failed to observe the required extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods placed in its care. When the cargo was eventually unloaded there was a shortage of 26. Inc. master of the vessel. Republic Flour Mills Corporation rejected the entire cargo and formally demanded from North Front Shipping Services. The mold growth was only incipient and not sufficient to make the corn grains toxic and unfit for consumption. payment for the damages suffered by it. The hatches were sealed and could only be opened by representatives of Republic Flour Mills Corporation.

it discharged her cargo placing it in the custody of the arrastre operator appointed by the Bureau of Customs. Issue: Whether or not the common carrier is liable for the lost cargo. Issue: Whether or not there was a contract and whether or not there was a fortuitous event. The corn grains were not yet toxic or unfit for consumption. Two lighters of the petitioners loaded the said cargo from Macleod’s wharf at Davao awaiting the arrival of another vessel of the petitioner for reloading. . As to the issuance of the bill of lading. Republic Flour Mills Corporation should share at least 40% of the loss 3.1: Temporary Unloading and Storage 3. the services of the petitioner Comapania Maritima for the shipment of bales of lamp from Davao to Manila. Held: There was complete contract of carriage the consummation of which has already begun when the shipper delivered the cargo to the carrier and the latter took possession of the same by placing it on a lighter manned by its two authorized employers under which Macleod become entitled to the privilege of law. Commencement. No explanation was proffered by the consignee as to why there was a delay of six (6) days. Petitioner denied liability on the grounds that there was no bill of lading issued thereby resulting to be nonexistence of the contract. Lu Do v. we cannot attribute the destruction. of North America 12 SCRA 213 Facts: Macleod & Co. Binamara demanded from the carrier indemnity for the loss it sustained. It was seasonably notified of the arrival of the barge but did not immediately start the unloading operations. contracted. One of the lighters sunk of which Macleod suffered a total of P64. Later on the goods were delivered to Binamara. it is not required or essential to the contract. and being subrogated to Macleod’s right.However..3: Actual or Constructive Delivery Compania Maritima v. The barges or lighters were merely employed as the first step of the voyage.2: Effects of Stoppage in Transitu 3. Duration and Termination of Carriers Responsibility over the Goods 3. Having arrived at the Cebu port. However. The responsibility of the carrier commenced on the actual delivery and receipt by. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Binamara. the carrier denied liability relying on the stipulation in the contract of carriage. We find the consignee Republic Flour Mills Corporation guilty of contributory negligence.018. Binamara 101 PHIL 120 Facts: Delta Company of New York shipped 6 cases of film and photographic supplies to respondent herein. After inspection it was found out that some cargo were missing. loss or deterioration of the cargo solely to the carrier. The cargo was checked and found to be in good order. For its contributory negligence. Respondent insurers of said cargo paid Macleod. As testified to by the chemist who analyzed the corn samples. It provides that the carrier is no longer liable for the cargo after delivery of the same to the customs authorities. that the sinking was due to a fortuitous event and the respondent has no personality. Had the unloading been commenced immediately the loss could have been completely avoided or at least minimized.. Insurance Co. the carrier or its authorized agent of the goods. the mold growth was only at its incipient stage and could still be arrested by drying. first by telephone and later confirmed by a formal written booking issued by Macleod & Co. although it may become obligatory by reason of regulations or as a condition injured in the contract by the agreement of the parties themselves. Hence this petition. filed a claim to collect from the petitioner the amount it paid to Macleod.

(Ganzon Vs CA) Macam v.000 bags of sodium sulphate anhydrous 99 PCT Min. while 58. The general rule is that delivery must be made to the consignee or the person authorized to receive the goods. Inc. without such delivery the carrier shall be liable for the loss or destruction of goods while in their custody. However. Court of Appeals 313 SCRA 77 Facts: Petitioner Macam exported watermelons and mangoes to Hong Kong. Both are foreign firms doing business in the Philippines. Inc. Facts: On or about 2 October 1995. the shipment arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel M/S Offshore Master from which it was subsequently discharged. there was a valid delivery. Anhui Chemicals Import & Export Corporation loaded on board M/S Offshore Master a shipment consisting of 10. Inc. SHIPPING. . thru its local ship agent. in the export invoice. (shipment). complete and in good order for transportation to and delivery at the port of Manila for consignee.00 kilograms had been exposed and contaminated. The Bill of Lading reflects the gross weight of the total cargo at 500. Upon arrival in Hong Kong.[10] while the final inspection was conducted jointly by the consignee’s representative and the cargo surveyor. The bad state of the bags is also evinced by the arrastre operator’s Request for Bad Order Survey. respondent Wallem Philippines Shipping. covered by a Clean Bill of Lading. morals. parties may agree to limit the liability of the carrier considering that the goods have to go through the inspection of the customs authorities before they are actually turned over to the authorities. resulting in losses due to depreciation and downgrading. Inc. (consignee). Upon inspection.426 poly bags (bags) were in bad order and condition.065.00 kilograms of the shipment had sustained unrecovered spillages. (Regional container lines of Singapore vs Netherlands insurance) PHILIPPINES FIRST INSURANCE VS.G. On or about 16 October 1995. This is evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes of the arrastre operator. The stipulation in this case is binding upon the parties it being not contrary to law. During the unloading.Held: The Court held that the carrier is no longer liable for the loss of the goods. or public policy. 1736 of the Civil Code. However. it was discovered that 63. The Owner and/or Charterer of M/V Offshore Master is unknown while the shipper of the shipment is Shanghai Fareast Ship Business Company. the shipment was delivered by the carrier directly to GPC and not to Pakistan Bank and without surrendering the bill of lading. Great Prospect Company is the consignee. It was disclosed during the discharge of the shipment from the carrier that 2. The bill of lading stated that one of the bill must be presented by the Pakistan Bank as consignee and GPC as the notify party. This premise brings into conclusion that the deliveries of the cargo to GPC as buyer or importer is in conformity with Art. Asia Star Freight Services. Held: The extraordinary responsibility of common carriers last until actual or constructive delivery of the cargo to the consignee or his agent. L.200 kilograms. Petitioner referred to GPC as such in his demand letter to respondent and his complaint before the court.235. it was found and noted that the bags had been discharged in damaged and bad order condition. Therefore. Asian Terminals. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid delivery. Atkimson Import-Export. GPC was clearly named as buyer or importer. Pakistan was indicted as consignee and GPC was the notify party. undertook the delivery of the subject shipment from the pier to the consignee’s warehouse in Quezon City. having sustained various degrees of spillages and losses. WALLEM PHILS.

Article 619 of the Code of Commerce provides that the ship captain is liable for the cargo from the time it is turned over to him at the dock or afloat alongside the vessel at the port of loading.2 4. unless agreed otherwise.R. in this case the appellate court is correct insofar as it ruled that an arrastre operator and a carrier may not be held solidarily liable at all times. and the consignee. It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded generally remain under the custody of the carrier.[30] Section 3 (2) thereof then states that among the carriers’ responsibilities are to properly and carefully load. After evaluating the invoices. Respondents were to board M/S “Sweet Hope”. carry. it is disputed who should be liable for the damage incurred at that point of transport? Held: For marine vessels. However. Petitioner.3 Void Stipulations Sweet Lines Inc.[14] petitioner found the claim to be in order and compensable under the marine insurance policy. The Carrier shall not be liable of loss of or damage to the goods before loading and after discharging from the vessel. As the cost of the actual damage to the subject shipment has long been settled. the carrier is liable for the damage or losses caused to the shipment. Section 2 of the COGSA provides that under every contract of carriage of goods by sea. howsoever such loss or damage arises. custody.470. In the instant case. at the Cagayan de Oro City. Wallem did not settle nor even send a response to petitioner’s claim.213. PERIOD OF RESPONSIBILITY.[31] Thus. The bill of lading covering the subject shipment likewise stipulates that the carrier’s liability for loss or damage to the goods ceases after its discharge from the vessel. L-37750 Facts: Private respondents Atty.however upon learning that it will not be proceeding to . care for and discharge the goods carried. and discharge the goods carried. against all risks in the amount of P2. the bad order certificate and other documents. stowage. to wit: 4. No. Inc.879. until he delivers it on the shore or on the discharging wharf at the port of unloading. to no avail.On 29 April 1996. But the precise question is which entity had custody of the shipment during its unloading from the vessel? The aforementioned Section 3(2) of the COGSA states that among the carriers’ responsibilities are to properly and carefully load. Teves G. care. and discharge of such goods. The responsibility of the carrier shall commence from the time when the goods are loaded on board the vessel and shall cease when they are discharged from the vessel. a shipping company transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes. handle. Lastly. carriage. sent a demand letter to Wallem for the recovery of the amount paid by petitioner to the consignee. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tirog bought tickets at the branch office of the petitioner. despite receipt of the letter.69 has to be sustained.. 4.[12] the consignee filed a formal claim[13] with petitioner for the damage and losses sustained by the shipment. petitioner paid the consignee the sum of P397. Stipulations Limiting Carrier’s Liability 4. the damage or losses were incurred during the discharge of the shipment while under the supervision of the carrier. v.. in the exercise of its right of subrogation. care for.50. Article 619 of the Code of Commerce holds a ship captain liable for the cargo from the time it is turned over to him until its delivery at the port of unloading.69 and the latter signed a subrogation receipt. the trial court’s finding of actual damages in the amount of P397.879. the consignee filed a formal claim with Wallem for the value of the damaged shipment. stow. the carrier in relation to the loading. The records are replete with evidence which show that the damage to the bags happened before and after their discharge and it was caused by the stevedores of the arrastre operator who were then under the supervision of Wallem. Consequently. Issue: Whether or not the damage or losses were incurred by the shipment during the unloading. shall be subject to the responsibilities and liabilities and entitled to the rights and immunities set forth in the Act. The above doctrines are in fact expressly incorporated in the bill of lading between the shipper Shanghai Fareast Business Co. Consequently. the turn-over survey. keep. handling. Since the shipment was insured with petitioner Philippines First Insurance Co.

” Clearly.”. such as the private respondents herein.” Condition No. as was done in the instant case. since it will frustrate in meritorious cases. will not cause inconvience to. thus placing petitioner company at a decided advantage over said persons. Condition No. 14 is valid and enforceable.14 not being agreed to by the respondents is not valid and enforceable. After suffering the inconviences in the cargo section and paying other tickets because those that are in their possession were no honored. Petioner contend that condition No.” and “shall” leave no doubt that the intention of Condition No.00. For. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu. freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the good of the public. Issue: Whether or not condition No. . much less prejudice. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents after denying the motion for dismissal. of the Rules of Court. . . The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. if enforced. Upon the other hand.Bohol they decided to board M/S “Sweet Town. 14 is subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions. That condition No. since it is printed in bold and capital letters and not in fine print and merely assigns the place where the action arising from the contract is instituted. Section 3. therefore exclude the filing of the action in Misamis Oriental. will be subversive of the public good or interest. “irrespective of where it is issued. 14 is not a part of the contract of carriage and that it is an independent contract requiring the mutual consent of the parties. valid and binding as such. petitioner has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. In the case at bar the consent of the respondents was not sought it was imposed on them unilaterally. The said condition should. 14. who may have perfectly legitimate claims against it. to the exclusion of all other places. as contrary to public policy — to make the courts accessible to all who may have need of their services. instead of enhance. The respondents sued the petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental for breach of contract of carriage in the alleged sum of P110. Public policy is “.000. actions of passenger claimants outside of Cebu City. 14 is valid and enforceable because private respondents acceded to it when they purchased passage tickets and it is an effective waiver of venue. such an agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the claimants. Supposing that it is otherwise. .4 Reasonable time in the Delivery of Goods Maerskline v. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue for Conditon No. the words and phrases “any and all”. Respondents contend that condition No. it is not exclusive and does not. therefore. 4. 14 printed on the ticket essentially provides that any actions arising out of the ticket will be filed at the competent court of Cebu. the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental. that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good .” On such vessel the respondents agreed to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coast guard. Having exhausted all the remedies available and still failed to obtain a ruling in their favor. be declared void and unenforceable. Held: Condition No. . Under this principle “. petitioner. Court of Appeals 222 SCRA 108 Facts: . . although venue may be changed or transferred from one province to another by agreement of the parties in writing pursuant to Rule 4. The Supreme Court gave due course to their petition and required them to submit their memoranda in support of their respective contention. The condition will thus defeat. 14 is to fix the venue in the City of Cebu. the ends of justice. he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. 14 is unequivocal and mandatory. Venue of actions can only be waived if there is a “written agreement of the parties. the petitioner filed this instant petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction. Hence.

1 Ad Valorem B/L Juan Ysmael & Co. Hence this appeal. of Puerto Rico empty gelatin capsules. However the capsules were shipped to Virginia.5. and held Maersk to be liable for breach of the contract of common carriage. In this case. 1922. so as to determine whether or not defendants were liable for its loss. Inc. it appears in the bill of lading that the goods will arrive on April 3. and Maersk together with a claim for damages. There was no contract between the parties in this case. It was due to the negligence of the petitioner why the cargo arrived so late. Held: The action was brought within a reasonable time as those words are specified and defined in the authorities sited. Issue: Whether or not Maersk is liable for breach of contract of common carriage. 51 PHIL 90 Facts: Plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant the alleged value of the four cases of merchandise which it delivered to the steamship ANDRES on October 23. Therefore. Clause 12 places a limit of P300 for “any single package of silk. The drums were placed on board the M/V Anders Maeerskline.Respondent herein is a firm engaged in the manufacture of pharmaceutical products. or less than 1/8 of its actual value. and respondent herein refused to accept the goods due to its late arrival. The goods in question were shipped from Manila on October 25. The court finds that the delay of the delivery was unreasonable. Petitioner did not even explain the reason for such delay. Inc. In the very nature of things.500. Said capsules were placed in 6 drums containing 100 capsules each. The lower court dismissed the complaint against Eli Lily. Said shipment was never delivered to the consignee.” The evidence of each case very near P2. such delivery should be made within a reasonable time. but it is also true that Surigao where the goods in question were to be delivered is one of the most distant places from Manila in the Philippine Islands. v. Barreto & Co. If that rule of law should be sustained. On appeal. It ordered from Eli Lily. the court affirmed the lower court’s decision. plaintiff would not want to commence its action until such time as it had made a full and careful investigation of all of the material facts and even the law of the case. at Manila. however the petitioner was aware of the date of the expected arrival of the goods. .5 Limitation on the Amount of Liability 4. USA instead of the Philippines. Held: The Court held that Maersk is liable for the breach of contract of common carriage. Such a limitation in value is valid as against public policy. Inc. to be shipped to Surogao. In this situation. It is true that both the plaintiff and the defendants are residents of the City of Manila. petitioner herein is held liable for the breach of contract. An action was filed by respondent to rescind the contract with Eli Lily. would put it in the power of the defendant to have taken the whole cargo of 64 cases of silk at a valuation of P300 of each case. and on clause 12 which provided that the defendants are not liable for any package in excess of P300 unless the value and contracts of such package are correctly stated in the bill of lading at the time of the shipment. or a little less that 6 months after the shipment was made. The defendants rely only on clause 7 of the bill of lading whereby it was provided that action not brought within 610 days from the time the cause of action accrued still be barred. no silk would ever be shipped from one island to another in the Philippines. Common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and deliver merchandise promptly unless the common carrier previously assumes to deliver the goods at a given date or time. The goods arrived in the Philippines 2 months after the original date of arrival. 1922. the limit of defendant’s liability for each package of silk for loss or damage from any cause of for any reason. Issue: Whether or not the action was brought within a reasonable time. 4. However.

The latter offered to pay P100 for his loss but Shewaram. He checked in 3 pieces of baggage. Held: The Court held that PAL is liable for the loss of the petitioner herein. Held: . it was only after reacting indignantly to the loss that the matter was attended by the porter clerk which however. aside from the two gift items for his parents-in-law. is a Hindu from Davao. however.Shewaram v. be limited to a fixed amount. He demanded indemnity for his loss from PAL. As a passenger. When the luggage was delivered to the petitioner with the information that the lock was open. He was scheduled to attend the trial in the Court of First instance .00. he checked in one piece of luggage. Among his things in the suitcase was a Rollflex camera and Transistor Radio 7.00 is stated. The plane left Mactan Airport. Philippine Airlines 17 SCRA 606 Facts: Shewaram. a suitcase 2 other pieces. a bull maleta. Br. and the baggage is lost." In this case. Upon arrival.00 for the amount of the things he lost. he found out that the folder containing documents and transcripts were missing. His baggage was later on returned but the camera and radio were missing. According to petitioner. He boarded a PAL plane for a trip to Manila. Article 1750 of the NCC provides that Article 1750 the pecuniary liability of a common carrier may. PAL will charge extra because PAL is being held liable for an amount exceeding P100. Cebu City at about 1pm and arrived at Bacasi Airport. the court believes that the requirements of said article have not been met. that the contract must be "reasonable and just under the circumstances and has been fairly and freely agreed upon. Shewaram rejected the offer and demanded full payment of P800. Augusto Ong Yiu v. The fact that those conditions are printed at the back of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant the presumption that the petitioner was aware of those conditions such that he had "fairly and freely agreed" to those conditions. Petitioner refused to accept the luggage. He was shown a similar bag. The stipulation in at the back of the ticket shall not be binding against the petitioner. petitioner claimed his luggage but it could not be found. the later denied. One of the suitcases were mistagged by the defendant and as a result the said suitcase did not arrive with him in Manila. Butuan City at past 2pm of the same day. Issue: Whether the stipulation limiting the liability of PAL shall apply in the case at bar. petitioner herein. by contract. II thereat. embodying the conditions as printed at the back of the ticket stub that was to the petitioner. stated in fine print that if the value of baggage is not stated. PAL refused to do so. It cannot be said that the petitioner had actually entered into a contract with the PAL. It is required. on the reverse side. Court of Appeals 91 SCRA 223 Facts: Petitioner was paying passenger of respondent Philippine Airlines on board flight No. the maximum liability of PAL is P100. Issue: Whether or not PAL acted with gross negligence so as to entitle petitioner to an award of moral and exemplary damages. but the contents did not belong to him. If value in excess of P100. 946-R from Mactan Cebu bound for Butuan City. Defendant herein claimed that the PAL ticket.00.

Wherefore. Inc. 814 for unrealized profit and P25. no value was indicated in the bill of lading. the business name used by Cue. in accordance with the stipulation written at the back of the ticket is limited to P100 per luggage plaintiff not having declared a greater value and not having called the attention of the defendant on its value ad paid the tariff thereon. One of these supplementary special laws is the Carriage of goods by Sea Act (COGSA). Since the liability of a common carrier for loss of or damage to goods transported by it under a contract of carriage os governed by the laws of the country of destination and the goods in question were shipped from the United States to the Philippines. (Consignee) is the importer of the subject shipment of Dunhill cigarettes from England. Issue: Whether or not Sea-Land is liable to pay Cue. Act. Exemplary damages can only be granted if the defendant asked in a wanton. P55. and judgment sought to be reviewed is hereby affirmed. 65. which loss. The justices of such stipulation is implicit in its giving the owner or shipper the option of avoiding accrual of liability limitation by the simple expedient of declaring the value of the shipment in the bill of lading. PAL exerted diligent efforts to locate the plaintiff’s baggage. and while awaiting transshipment to Cebu. in all matters not cluttered thereby. The trial court sentenced Sea-Land to pay Cue P186.000 for attorney’s fees. Petitioner is neither entitled to exemplary damages. The shipper not having declared the value of the shipment . v. Manila Wine Merchants. Inc. or damage to. reckless. supplementary. although that document may have been drawn up only by the consignor and the carrier without the intervention of the consignee. Held: There is no question of the right of a consignee in a bill of lading to recover from the carrier or shipper for loss of. fraudulent. Intermediate Appellate Court 153 SCRA 552 Facts: Sea-Land. goods being transported under said bill. the instant petition is hereby denied. Court of Appeals 184 SCRA 544 Facts: Citadel Lines. Inc.. made applicable to all contracts for the carriage by sea to and from the Philippines Ports in Foreign Trade by Comm. received from Sea-borne Trading Company in California. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Even if Section 4(5) of COGSA did not list the validity and binding effect of the liability limitation clause in the bill of lading here are fully substantial on the basis alone of Article 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code. for lack of merit.048 representing the Philippine currency value of the lost cargo. The stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of Sea-Land for loss or damages to the shipment covered by said rule to US$500 per package unless the shipper declares the value of the shipment and pays additional charges is valid and binding on Cue. the cargo was stolen and never recovered. The shipment was discharged in Manila. the liability of Sea-Land has Cue is governed primarily by the Civil Code. oppressive or malevolent manner. v.PAL did not act in bad faith. and as ordained by the said Code. The said vessel loaded on board Filbrite cartons of manufactured cigarettes called . Sea-Land Service. a foreign shipping and forwarding company licensed to do business in the Philippines. by the Code of Commerce and special laws. It was the duty of PAL to look for petitioner’s luggage which had been miscarried. Inc. a shipment consigned to Sen Hiap Hing. petitioner herein is the general agent of the vessel "Cardigan Bay/Strait Enterprise" . Citadel Lines.

petitioner offered to pay only One Hundred Thousand (Y100.000. Hence this petition. and held the petitioner liable for the amount representing the market value of the lost shipment. When the Consignee found out that 90 cases were missing it filed a claim demanding the payment of the market value of the missing cargo. It has been held in previous cases that a stipulation appearing in the bill of lading limiting the liability of the carrier is binding. This was confirmed and admitted by petitioner in its letter of January 13. unless the owner or shipper declares a higher value. the award of damages should be reduced and computed with regard to the bill of lading. Court of Appeals 297 SCRA 496 Facts: Hernandez Trading Co. petitioners headchecker discovered that the container van of the cigarettes had a different padlock and the seal was tampered with. The said container was received by Metro Port Service."Dunhill International Filter" and "Dunhill International Menthol". Inc. respondent herein. respondent herein. The vessel arrived in Manila and it was discovered that the one crate was missing. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the actual value and not the maximum value recoverable under the bill of lading. Respondent rejected the offer and filed a case to collect payment for the loss against the petitioner. NGO53MN. The next day. a foreign corporation based in Japan." a vessel owned by the principal of the petitioner herein. 1991. with the arrastre and demanded payment of the value of the goods but said claim was denied. in its reply letter.00) Yen.500.. The said crates were covered by Bill of Lading No. One shipment was delivered and the other shipment containing cigarettes was palletized. Due to lack of space at the Special Cargo Coral. Therefore.00) Yen. This was reported to the Pier Superintendent it was found that 90 cases of imported British manufactured cigarettes were missing. Issue: Whether the stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier contained in the bill of lading is binding on the consignee. The lower court rendered a decision exonerating the arrastre of any liability on the ground that the subject container van was not formally turned over to its custody. Petitioner.. 1992 addressed to private respondent. Everett Steamship Corporation v. the amount shown in an Invoice No. The crates were shipped from Japan to Manila on board "ADELFAEVERETTE. However. The consignee in this case did not declare a higher value and admits that the value of the goods does not appear in the bill of lading. Maruman Trading Company.. imported 3 crates of bus spare parts from its supplier. MTM-941. the maximum amount stipulated under Clause 18 of the covering bill of lading which limits the liability of petitioner. Ltd. It was expressly stipulated in the bill of lading that the carrier’s liability is limited to $2.00 per kilo. On appeal the court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court but deleted the award of attorney's fees and costs of suit. Subsequently the container van. which thereafter made a formal claim upon petitioner for the value of the lost cargo amounting to One Million Five Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Five Hundred (Y1. Held: The Court held that the stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier is valid and binding upon the consignee. admitted the loss but alleged that the same occurred at Pier 13.552. the aforesaid cigarettes were placed in two containers with two pallets with both containers duly padlocked and sealed by the representative of the petitioner. an area absolutely under the control of the arrastre (Metro Port Service. Everett Orient Lines. which contained two shipments was stripped. Held: . The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila in a container. Inc). The contract had been freely agreed upon and the stipulation appears to be just and reasonable. Therefore the stipulation in the bill of lading should be applied. Manila Wine Merchants filed a formal claim. dated November 14.

Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation.00 (Yen). Macondray & Co. Maktani had to take a connecting flight to Bombay on board British Airways. v. confident that upon reaching Hong Kong. BA finally advised him to file a claim accomplishing the property. Plaintiff claimed P420. he was told that the same might have been diverted to London. Conditions of contacts was one of continuous air transportation from Manila to Bombay. he discovered that his luggage was missing and that upon inquiry from the BA representatives. when Maktani arrived in Bombay. Mahtani decided to visit his relative in Bombay. the market value of the clocks. The latter merely endorsing the Manila to Hong Kong log of the former’s journey to PAL.00. The clocks were not delivered despite demands. 121824 Facts: On April 6. In the bill of lading. Issue: Whether or not defendant BA is liable for compulsory damages and attorney’s fee. the carrier made it clear that its liability would only be up to Y100. The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff freight ton value. 1989. The trial value plus freight and insurance. unless the value be expressly stated in the bill and freight [aid. Heacock Co. It was also agreed that in the event of claims for shortage or damages the carrier shall not be liable for than the net invoice price plus freight and insurances loss charges. No. Maktani checked in the PAL counter in Manila his two pieces of luggage containing his clothing and personal effects. it had itself to blame for not complying with the stipulations. In anticipation of his visit. The trial court’s decision that private respondent could not have fairly agreed to the limited liability clause in the bill of lading because the said condition were printed in small letters does not make the bill of lading invalid.R. the same would be transferred to the BA flight bound for Bombay. as well as the dismissal of its third party complaint against PAL Held: The contract of transportation was exclusively between Maktani and BA. The Court of Appeals should have been cognizant of the well-settled rule that an agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act. The stipulations in the bill of lading are reasonable and just. unless the shipper declares or a higher value is sanctioned by law. the proportionate freight for value. Maktani can only sue BA and not PAL. particularly Articles 1749 and 1780 of the Civil Code. the shipper. Prior to his departure. Unfortunately. Since british Airways had no ticket flights from Manila to Bombay.000.E. while defendant tendered only P76. 42 PHIL 205 Facts: The plaintiff shipped Edmonton clocks from New York to Manila on board a vessel of the defendant.A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of the common carrier for the loss. . British Airways v. India. It was agreed in the bill of lading that the value of the goods received does not exceed $500 per freight or on in proportion for any part of a ton. since the latter was not a party in the contract. However. H. Since the instant petition was based on breach of contract of carriage. and any loss or damage for which the carrier may be liable shall be adjusted pro rata on said basis. damages of cargo to a certain sum.36. Court of Appeals G. Gemar to prepare his travel plan. he obtained the services of a certain Mr. Maruman Trading. as its subcontractor or agent. After plaintiff waiting for his luggage for one week. had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the carrier.

The petitioners contended that PAL is liable for breach of contract of carriage. Where the defendants has faithfully complied with the requirements of government agencies and adhered to the established procedures and precautions of the airline industry and particular time. The mandatory use of the most sophisticated electronic devices may have minimized hijackings but all these have proved ineffective against truly determined highjackers. for not transporting them and their belongings at the point of destination without loss or damage. First. PAL interposed that the incident was force majeure. gunshots ensued between Zaldy’s group and Villarin. Hand-carried Quisumbing Sr. Third. Passenger’s Baggages 5. saw a certain “Zaldy” boarded on the same flight. Such incident which occurred was indeed force majeure. A senior NBI agent. However. It was proven that PAL cannot be faulted with negligence. vs. Florencio O. one limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper declares a higher value and pay of authority. As a defense. if the shipper makes the choice understandingly and freely. Villarin advised the Captain of the danger having Zaldy and his companions onboard. Issue: Whether PAL can be held liable for the loss of petitioners’ belongings due to the hi-jacking? Held: The Supreme Court held that PAL cannot be held liable for the loss of property. Zaldy was a suspect for the killing of a Judge Valdez. there was no breach of contract of carriage because there was no clear evidence that PAL acted in bad faith in their obligation to transport the passengers and their properties at the point of destination. a senior NBI agent and also one of the passengers of the said plane. 5. Zaldy announced a hold-up and obtained the belongings of the passengers. Hence. Court of Appeals 189 SCRA 605 Facts: Norberto Quisumbing and Gunther Loeffler were passengers of PAL’s Fokker “Friendship” plane flying from Macatan City bound to Manila. Held: Three kinds of stipulation have after been made in a bill of lading. Consequently. . its failure to take certain steps that a passenger in hindsight believes should have been done is not the negligence or misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an active and cooperative cause. Captain Luis Bonnevie came out of the cockpit and informed Villarin the he could not send the message because it would be heard by all ground aircraft stations. Villarin sent a note to the Captain of the plane requesting that they contact the NBI director to send agents on their point of destination because of the presence of Zaldy.1 Checked-in Vs.Issue: Whether or not the stipulation in the bil og lading in the case at bar be followed. Second. one providing for an agreed valuation. Villarin. Zaldy and his companions successfully escaped upon landing in Manila. one exempting the carrier from any and all liability for ton and damage occasioned by its own negligence. if a carrier gives to a shipper the choice of two takes. but the third is valid and enforceable. he cannot thereafter recover move than the value which he puts on this places upon his property. the lower of them cautioned upon his agreeing to a stipulated valuation of his property in case of loss even by carrier’s negligence. the first and second kinds of stipulations are involved as being contrary to public policy. Thus. Petitioners now demand from PAL indemnity for their lost belongings. and names his valuation. The stipulation in a bill of lading which limits the liability of the carrier to a specified amount unless the shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher freight valid and enforceable.

When she got back to Manila she demanded that Alitalia compensate her for the damages that she suffered. shall apply in case of loss. the court found sufficient basis under the particular facts of the case for the availment of the liability limitations under the Warsaw Convention. She was to read a paper regarding foreign substances in food and the agriculture environment which she had specialized knowledge of. However. any registered luggage or goods. 22(4) of the Warsaw Convention does not preclude an award of attorney’s fees. the same man in charge of had carry control did not fail to notice him and ordered him again to register his baggage. Petitioner herein offered free airline tickets in order to compensate for the alleged damages. . She received her luggage 11 months after and after she had already instituted a case against Alitalia. The airline informed her that her luggage was delayed because it was placed in one of the succeeding flights to Italy. That provision states that the limits of liability prescribed in the instrument shall not prevent the court from awarding in accordance with its own law. Rapadas claimed and was given all his checked in baggage except the attaché case. Issue: Whether or not Alitalia is liable for damages incurred by Dr. Pablo were not placed in the succeeding flights. 841 with the route from Guam to Manila. Rapadas protested pointing to the fact that other co-pasengers were permitted to hand carry baggage. if the occurrence causing it took place during the carriage by air". petitioner herein. the whole or part of the court costs and other expenses of litigation incurred by the plaintiff.Pan American World Airways vs. Pablo for nominal damages. She never got her luggage. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and even increased the amount of damages to be awarded to Dr. No. However. damage or destructionto a passenger’s luggage. wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger if the accident causing it took place on board the aircraft or in the course of its operations of embarking or disembarking. or damage to. CA) Alitalia v. There is no dispute and the courts below admit that there was such a notice appearing on page 2 of the airline ticket stating that the Warsaw Convention governs in case of death or injury of passengers or of loss. Upon arriving in Manila on the same day. Pablo and ordered plaintiff to pay damages. She booked a flight to Italy with Alitalia airlines. Pablo.R. Rapadas G. Held: The Court held that Alitalia is liable to pay Dr. He stepped out of the line only to go back again at the end of it to try of he can get through without having to register his attaché case. The Warsaw Convention provides that an air carrier is made liable for damages when: (1) the death. On appeal. She had arrived in Milan the day before the meeting however her luggage did not arrive with her. Pablo. Issue: Whether or not a passenger is bound by the terms of a passenger under the Warsaw convention. Italy. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Dr. however she rejected this offer and instead filed a case. While standing inline to board the flight at the Guam Airport. luggage or goods. Rapadas was ordered by petitioner’s hand carry control agent to check-in his samsonite attaché case. Hence this petition for certiorari. Intermediate Appellate Court 192 SCRA 9 Facts: Dr. Felipa Pablo. Held: After a review of the various arguments of the appointing parties. 60673 Facts: Private respondent Jose Rapadas held passenger ticket and baggage claim check for petitioner’s flight No. and (3) delay in the transportation by air of passengers. (2) the destruction or loss of. the claim for damages may be brought subject to limitations provided in the said convention. (British Airways VS. a professor from UP was invited to attend a meeting by the United Nations in Ispra. in addition. Art. Subsequently it was found out that the luggages of Dr. damage or destruction to a registered luggage of a passenger.

In this case. Pablo did not suffer any other injury other than not being able to read her paper in Italy. There was no bad faith or malice on the part of Alitalia in the said delay in the arrival of her luggage. Pablo received all her things which Chapter 3: Safety of Passengers . Dr. Dr. This was due to the fact that Alitalia misplaced her luggage.

On appeal. The petitioner then filed a case against the respondent for breach of the contract of carriage.R. the carrier is not liable Mecenas v. In addition. the captain was playing mahjong at the time of the collision and the captain stated that he was on break during the emergency when he should take charge of the ship. Utmost Diligence Required of Common Carriers 1. The respondent can not also raise the defense that it followed the International Rules of the Road when it had the chance to prevent the collision with proper care and skill.1 Common Carriers Doctrine Nocum v. Court of Appeals 281 SCRA 534 Facts: Ramon Miranda purchased tickets for his wife.. owned by Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) collided with M/T Don Juan. CA 180 SCRA 83 Facts: M/T Tacloban City. with due regard to all circumstances.. petitioner herein. third. Issue: Whether or not the respondent should be held liable. Unfortunately. Such instances are first. there was no ample number of life saving devices such as rafts due to the overloading of passengers. The doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied in the case as well because the doctrine is only applicable between two drivers that are negligent against each other and not to a passenger claiming for damages to the carrier. Inc.1. Held: The Court held that the respondent should be held liable and the respondent court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court. daughter. Issue: Whether or not the respondent committed a breach in the contract of carriage. Subsequently. the ship was overloaded with passengers than that prescribed number of passengers and lastly. a box containing fireworks inside the bus exploded which cause the petitioner to be thrown out of the bus and obtained injuries. v. . The petitioners in this case are the heirs of two passengers who boarded the M/T Don Juan and perished due to the collision. Therefore. the bodies of his family members were never found. The Court emphasized that there was utmost diligence on the part of the carrier when it asked the person who bought the box what its contents are. The Court found the respondent to be gross negligent based on certain instances. The trial court held the respondents liable for damages. The said vessel is operated by the Negros Navigation Co. second. using the utmost diligence of very cautious person. G. Negros Navigation Co. the crew of the vessel failed to delay the sinking of the vessel because the ship sank around ten to fifteen minutes. The carrier had regard to all the circumstances in the case because allowances should be given to the passengers and their property bought for it is presumed that passengers will not bring anything that will cause damage to him or to others. Held: The Court held that the respondent did not commit a breach in the contract of carriage. the M/T Tacloban City was the one who is negligent and failed to follow the International Rules of the Road when it did not turn starboard (right) to prevent the collision. Petitioners then appealed. son and niece for a trip to Bacolod on board the M/V Don Juan.. Many perished in this accident and some of the bodies of the victims were washed to the shore. the Court stressed the constitutional right to privacy which is always present. It is not duly bound to open the box and inspect the contents. 1755 of the Civil Code stating that the common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. The petitioner claims that the respondent was careless and did not exercised the diligence required of it when the latter’s employees did not inspect the box which contained the fireworks and allowed such dangerous objects inside the bus. Unfortunately. No. The Court applied Art. The respondent court reversed the decision applying the doctrine of last clear chance raised by the respondent. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. was owned by respondents Negros Navigation Co. Inc. the M/V Don Juan collided with the M/T Tacloban City which resulted to the sinking of the former. L-23733 Facts: Petitioner boarded the respondent’s bus. The respondent in its defense claimed that it only relied on the statement of the person who carried the box that such item is safe to be transported inside the bus. the respondents denied the liability by stating that between the two vessels.

Petitioner herein alleges that since the bodies of his family cannot be found there is no proof that his family was in fact on board the vessel. Pursuant to the legal maxim of "stare decisis et non quieta movere". his ticket was canceled by KAL. Damages may not be awarded on the basis of speculation or conjecture (Gatchalian vs.00 which is 1/5 of P300. Ltd.000. hence. for a period of one year through Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services. Thus. This was further proven when the numbers of the purchased tickets appeared on the passenger’s manifest of the vessel. Negros Navigation is liable to pay for the damages incurred by Miranda for the loss of his family. when he was the third or fourth rung of the stairs. Defendant appellant’s liability is limited to the one year contract only. Saudi Arabia . 1980. hence they cannot be held liable for the loss of his family. Consequently. renewable every year for five years. Therefore. he was wait listed. and held that Negros Navigation was negligent and that it is liable for the loss of the family of Miranda. The legal interest of 6% on the damages awarded to private respondent should commence from the date of the decision of the trial court on November 14. He rode on the shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of the KAL aircraft for boarding. When he later asked for another booking. Court of Appeals 305 SCRA 14 Facts: .e. such renewal will still be subject to his foreign employer. Juanito C. Although plaintiff-appellant intends to renew his contract. Court of Appeals. he was unable to report for his work in Saudi Arabia within the stipulated 2 week period and so lost his employment. an automotive electrician. Initially. Court of Appeals 234 SCRA 717 Facts: In 1980. Whether or not the family members of Miranda were on the M/V Don Juan therefore making them liable for the said loss. Held: The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Miranda’s family was in fact on board the M/V Don Juan. Held: A perusal of the plaintiff-appellant’s contract of employment shows that the effectivity of the contract is for only one year. When two of such passengers did not appear. However. representing lost earnings for five years prayed for in the complaint. the damages representing the loss of earnings of plaintiff-appellant in the renewal of the contract of the employment is at most speculative. The legal maxim of stare decisis et non quieta movere (Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) was properly applied in this case. 1990. Lopez. Issue: 1. The lower court rendered a judgment in favor of Miranda. Miranda testified that he personally brought his family to the vessel and watched the departure of the same.. he was allowed to check in with one suitcase and one shoulder bag at the check-in counter of KAL. Whether or not the legal maxim of stare decisis et non quieta movere is applicable in this case.. According to Lapuz. V. the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. “DOWN! DOWN!”and was barred from taking the flight. Fortune Express vs. employer. He passed through the customs and immigration section for routine check-up and was cleared by departure. Plaintiff appellant had not yet started working with his foreign. There is no reason for Miranda to claim that he had lost his whole family in the tragedy and even went through the anguish of looking for their bodies. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be liable for damages. 203 SCRA 126).Miranda filed a case in order to recover damages from Negros Navigation for the loss of his family. Hence this petition. Delim. was contracted for employment in Jeddah . i. When the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Lapuz and another person by the name of Perico were given two unclaimed seats. via Korean Airlines. On appeal the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. a KAL officer pointed to him and shouted. P60. In the Mecenas case the bodies of the victims were likewise never recovered. Plaintiff appellant is therefore entitled only to his lost earning for one year. 2.00 the total amount of actual damages . Korean Airlines Co.000. the court applied the ruling in the case of Mecenas v. there can be no basis as to whether his contract will be renewed by his foreign employer or not. Inc. Lapuz was supposed to leave on November 8.

A waiver must not be contrary to law. The injured passengers were brought to the hospital for treatment of their injuries. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision that there was a valid waiver but denied petitioner’s claim for damages. Therefore the petitioner in this case is entitled to receive actual or compensatory damages which include 15. Four days after the accident. Fortune Express knew that Maranaos were planning to burn some of its passenger buses and yet petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Hence this petition. Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver and that Gatchalian is entitled to the award of damages. morals. Gatchalian v. Delim 203 SCRA 126 Facts: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded a minibus owned and operated by respondent herein.A bus of petitioner Fortune Express. Delim. The reply of the driver when asked about the snapping sound is sufficient proof to indicate that such sound had been there for a while and that the common carrier did not look after the roadworthiness of the vehicle to assure the safety of the passengers. Before leaving the hospital. the minibus hit a flower pot on the side of the road which caused the bus to turn turtle and it fell into a ditch. in order to be valid. Subsequently. Petitioner contends that the seizure by the armed assailants was a fortuitous event thus it cannot be held liable. A Constabulary agent investigated that the jeepney was owned by a Maranao and certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on petitioner by burning some of its buses. Talib Caorong went back to retrieve something. There was gross negligence on the part of the driver because there was wanton disregard for the passengers safety when he did not stop the minibus after hearing the snapping sound and the remark of one of the passengers. 1763 of the New Civil Code provides that the common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of willful acts of other passengers. if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through proper diligence. Held: The Supreme Court held that the seizure of the bus by the armed Maranaos cannot be assailed as a fortuitous event. one of the passengers noticed a snapping sound. Several passengers were injured in the accident. Jaymalin 112 SCRA 629 Facts: .000 pesos for the cost of plastic surgery to remove the scar on Gatchalian’s face. but one passenger. Inc. figured an accident with a jeepney in Lanao del Norte which resulted to the death of several passengers of the jeepney including two Maranaos. Del Castillo v. She was alarmed and asked the driver about it. The lower court dismissed the complaint of Gatchalian and held that there was a valid waiver of the right to file a complaint. Also. It was established through evidence that the common carrier is guilty of negligence. arm and face specifically the forehead. petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Gatchalian suffered injuries on her leg. Caorong. the seizure of the bus by the armed Maranaos was made possible. Issue: Whether or not Fortune Express is liable for the death of Atty. such waiver is against public policy because it would weaken the standard of utmost diligence required of common carriers in bringing their passengers safely to their destination. Atty. Petitioner’s employees failed to prevent the attack on one of its passengers because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. The words “no longer interested” do not manifestly show such intention. While the bus was running. Because of Fortune Express’s negligence. The requisite of unforseeability to be considered forced majeure is lacking. She boarded the bus at La Union and it was bound for Bauang. A waiver. wife of the respondent visited them and paid for the medical expenses of the victims. must be couched in clear and equivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of relinquishing a right that is legally his or hers. The waiver in this case is not valid because the terms in the affidavit did not clearly state the intention of giving up the right to file a complaint. Subsequently. Art. Caorong. He was shot and killed during the incident. Delim. he then replied that it was normal. While the passengers were confined in the hospital. They seized such bus and set it on fire. she made the injured passengers sign a prepared affidavit which stated that they were no longer interested in filing a complaint whether criminal or civil against the driver and owner of the minibus. Mrs. Gatchalian also signed the said document. three armed Maranaos pretended to be passengers of a bus of petitioner. Subsequently. public policy or good customs. Hence. Gatchalian filed a complaint for damages even though she had already signed the affidavit prepared by Mrs. Issue: Whether or not Gatchalian is entitled to the award of damages in lieu of the injuries that she suffered. the Operations Manager of Fortune Express was advised to take precautionary measures. The passengers of the bus were asked to get off.

1997.L Ammen Transportation. Facts On or about July 21. California to Newark. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES.000 attorney. In the case at bar. Mager informed him that flights to Newark via Continental Airlines were already fully booked and offered the alternative of a round trip flight via Frontier Air. Fernando went to Continental’s ticketing office at Ayala Avenue. However. The court rendered a judgment in favor of the respondent. Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their flight to Newark to an earlier date or August 6. They are paying passengers of defendant Bicol Transportation operated by A. Texas. Spouses Viloria were scheduled to leave for Newark on August 13. An action for damages was filed against the driver.00 per passenger and would mean traveling by night. Per the tickets. Fernando opted to request for a refund. however. As he was having second thoughts on traveling via Frontier Air.4 In a letter dated March 24.s fees. 1998. Held: Common carriers are responsible for the death of their passengers as provided in Articles 1964 and 2206 of the Civil Code. Fernando purchased for himself and his wife. The conductor was told and knowledgeable of passenger Mario being deaf and dumb. 1997 and while in the United States. INC. The court held that the conductor should have taken extraordinary care for the safety of the said deaf passenger. Fernando decided to reserve two (2) seats with Frontier Air. the court considered the pendency of the case being on roll for 13 years. Continental Micronesia informed Fernando that the subject tickets may be used as a form of payment for the purchase of another Continental ticket.5 On June 17. Makati City . telling her that she had misled them into buying the Continental Airlines tickets by misrepresenting that Amtrak was already fully booked. albeit with a re-issuance fee.. two (2) round trip airline tickets from San Diego. 1999. The Supreme Court determined the damages at Php12. Upon returning to the Philippines. Continental Micronesia informed Fernando that his complaint had been referred to the Customer Refund Services of Continental Airlines at Houston. Fernando went to the Greyhound Station where he saw an Amtrak station nearby. Fernando sent a letter to CAI on February 11. Issue: Whether or not the bus employees are liable for damages. Fernando reiterated his demand for a refund but Mager was firm in her position that the subject tickets are non-refundable. Subsequently. Court procedure demands that the case be remanded to the lower court for determination of the amount of damages to be awarded. 1997 and return to San Diego on August 21.C. Since flying with Frontier Air called for a higher fare of US$526. Fernando made inquiries and was told that there are seats available and he can travel on Amtrak anytime and any day he pleased. an intercity passenger train service provider in the United States. denied his request as the subject tickets are non-refundable and the only option that Continental Airlines can offer is the re-issuance of new tickets within one (1) year from the date the subject tickets were issued. Continental Micronesia denied Fernando’s request for a refund and advised him that he may take the subject tickets to any Continental ticketing location for the re-issuance of new tickets within two (2) years from the date they were issued.3 In a letter dated February 24.Mario a deaf mute is a son of Petitioner Del Castillo. 1998. Fernando agreed to buy the said tickets after Mager informed them that there were no available seats at Amtrak. D. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (Labor Case)) SPOUSES VILORIA VS. It includes the loss of the deceased earning capacity.00 each from a travel agency called “Holiday Travel” and was attended to by a certain Margaret Mager (Mager). demanding a refund and alleging that Mager had deluded them into purchasing the subject tickets. 1997. The loss of earning capacity is not awarded since the vivtim is deaf-mute. the court considered there is no loss of earning capacity considering the victim was deaf-mute. conductor and bus companies. Mario fell upon aligting from the bus and died. Trial court dismissed the petition based solely that damages and liability of the carrier is based on the earning capacity of the victim. Mager. (YRASUEGUI vs. Fernando then purchased two (2) tickets for Washington. 1998. Fernando purchased the tickets at US$400. From Amtrak. Lourdes. New Jersey on board Continental Airlines. According to Spouses Viloria.000 as indemnity for the victims death without interest and Php2. Fernando went to Holiday Travel and confronted Mager with the Amtrak tickets.

praying that CAI be ordered to refund the money they used in the purchase of the subject tickets with legal interest from July 21. and refusal to allow him to use Lourdes’ ticket. In a letter dated June 21. hence. there must be an independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the employee of its agent. if the passenger’s cause of action for damages against the airline company is based on contractual breach or culpa contractual.00 as attorney’s fees. On the other hand. In addition to the dubious circumstances under which the subject tickets were issued. the need to prove the principal’s own fault or negligence.867. Apart from their claim that CAI must be held liable for Mager’s supposed fraud because Holiday Travel is CAI’s agent. As this Court previously stated in China Air Lines and reiterated in Air France vs. (d) CAI.6 On September 8. He was also informed that a round trip ticket to Los Angeles was US$1. (ii) applicable tariffs. A prior determination of the nature of the passenger’s cause of action is necessary.000. Therefore. it was incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI was equally at fault.000. 1997 and to pay P1. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not make the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agent’s employees and the principal-agency relationship per se does not make the principal a party to such tort.24 “in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage. Spouses Viloria did not present evidence that CAI was a party or had contributed to Mager’s complained act either by instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel and Mager to issue the said misrepresentation. thus. Spouses Viloria filed a complaint against CAI.000. (iii) carrier’s conditions of carriage and related regulations which are made part hereof (and are available on application at the offices of carrier). P500. (c) as Mager is not a CAI employee. There is no vinculum juris between the airline company and its agent’s employees and the contractual relationship between the airline company and its agent does not operate to create a juridical tie between the airline company and its agent’s employees. Fernando was informed that Lourdes’ ticket was non-transferable.000. Therein.00 as exemplary damages and P250. 1999.40 for a round trip ticket to Los Angeles. cannot be used for the purchase of a ticket in his favor. CAI is not liable for any of her acts. 2000. All that he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier. which were performed in compliance with Holiday Travel’s obligations as CAI’s agent. It may likewise be argued that CAI cannot deny liability as it benefited from Mager’s acts.40 so he would have to pay what will not be covered by the value of his San Diego to Newark round trip ticket. which Mager entered into with them on CAI’s behalf. Gillego.00 as moral damages. except in transportation between a place in the United States or Canada and any place outside thereof to which tariffs in force in those countries apply. Fernando claimed that CAI’s act of charging him with US$1.7 CAI interposed the following defenses: (a) Spouses Viloria have no right to ask for a refund as the subject tickets are non-refundable. However.to have the subject tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket to Los Angeles. its employees and agents did not act in bad faith as to entitle Spouses Viloria to moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. It may seem unjust at first glance that CAI would consider Spouses Viloria bound by the terms and conditions of the subject contracts.00. (b) Fernando cannot insist on using the ticket in Lourdes’ name for the purchase of a round trip ticket to Los Angeles since the same is non-transferable. Fernando demanded for the refund of the subject tickets as he no longer wished to have them replaced. The mere fact that the employee of the airline company’s agent has committed a tort is not sufficient to hold the airline company liable. 1998 letter. To the extent not in conflict with the foregoing carriage and other services performed by each carrier are subject to: (i) provisions contained in this ticket. there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between them. the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. the records are devoid of any evidence by which CAI’s alleged liability can be substantiated. California under his name. it is not necessary that there be evidence of the airline company’s fault or negligence. breached its undertaking under its March 24.8 Issue: Whether or not CAI is bound by the acts of Holiday Travel’s agents and employees such as Mager? Held: An examination of this Court’s pronouncements in China Air Lines will reveal that an airline company is not completely exonerated from any liability for the tort committed by its agent’s employees.” Spouses Viloria’s cause of action on the basis of Mager’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is clearly one of tort or quasi-delict. in order to deny Spouses Viloria’s request for a refund or Fernando’s use of Lourdes’ ticket for the re-issuance of a new one.867. which other airlines priced at US$856. . CAI also invoked the following clause printed on the subject tickets: 3. and simultaneously claim that they are not bound by Mager’s supposed misrepresentation for purposes of avoiding Spouses Viloria’s claim for damages and maintaining the validity of the subject contracts. If the passenger’s cause of action against the airline company is premised on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline company’s agent.

no liability can be imposed on CAI for Mager’s supposed misrepresentation. The heirs of the passengers filed a case to claim for damages. Reports show that the bus was at moderate speed while the pick up was at a full speed and on the wrong lane. Held: The Court held that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable in this case. Inc. the driver of the jeep. 3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of. There is a breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of each case. was negligent. The Supreme Court likewise held that there was indeed contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Ammen Trans. CA) 2. But before reaching his destination. he contended that the defendant incurred liability in culpa contractual arising from its non-compliance with its obligation to transport plaintiff to his destination. Whether or not Manalo is solely liable for the death and physical injuries of the victims.. The collision caused the amputation of the left arm of the plaintiff. The injuries caused by the accident worsen. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the decision with regard to the payment of damages to Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. . the bus collided with a pick up type vehicle. Said jeepney was driven by Manalo and was travelling to Pampanga to Pangasinan. The lower court held that Manalo. The case at bar is a case where the passengers are demanding indemnity from the carrier due to the contract of common carriage. Co. Issue: Whether or not the common carrier liable for the injury caused. The existence of control or supervision cannot be presumed and CAI is under no obligation to prove its denial or nugatory assertion Therefore. Due to the incident. In addition. Emergency Rule Isaac v. Inc. Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case.L. Ammen Trans. Inc. Inc. Hence this petition. Thus. Defendant on its part set up the defense that the injury caused was due entirely to the fault or negligence of the pick up car and a contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Co. As a result of the collision.It is incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI exercised control or supervision over Mager by preponderant evidence. Issue: 1. the plaintiff went through several treatments causing many expenses. Co. It was proven in the case at bar. having due regard for all circumstances.L. Intermediate Appellate Court 189 SCRA 158 Facts: Several people boarded a jeepney owned by the spouses Isidro Mangue and Guillermo Carreon. Ammen Trans. and 4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risk of travel. 2. 1046 SCRA 101 Facts: Cesar Isaac boarded one of the buses operated by defendant A. (Delsan Transport Lines Inc Vs. The Supreme Court held that the following governs the liability of a common carrier: 1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. Subsequent to the unexpected u-turn a Philippine Rabbit bus bumped the jeepney from behind. or injury to. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Applicability Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. as he placed his elbow outside the window knowing that such was dangerous. plaintiff filed a case for damages alleging that the collision which resulted in the loss of his left arm was mainly due to the gross incompetence and recklessness of the driver of the bus operated by the defendant. it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence. L. one of the rear tires of the jeepney was detached and it prompted the driver to step on the brakes. The passengers wre on their way home to spend Christmas together with their families. 2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passengers with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. Held: The Supreme Court held that the defendant A. This doctrine shall only apply to suits between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. exercised the diligence required from it and is absolved from liability for the injury caused to its passengers. Upon applying the brakes the jeepney made a sudden u-turn and it stopped on the opposite lane of the highway. that the driver of the pick up car was the sole responsible for the accident.. passengers. A. On its way to Pangasinan. three passengers died and the others sustained physical injuries. without a modicum of evidence that CAI exercised control over Holiday Travel’s employees or that CAI was equally at fault... v.

The petitioners then filed a suit against the owner and driver of the truck and the owner and driver of the bus. Lara sat at the back of the vehicle on a bag.R.It is clear from the evidence that it is Manalo and the owners of the jeepney who are negligent in this case. Valencia 104 PHIL 65 Facts: The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry in Davao who went to classify logs with defendant in his Cotabato concession. was a Mazada passenger bus. The driver of the bus noticed that the truck was wiggling however. Lara fell off and later died. Distinguish Gratuitous Passengers and Discounted Passengers 4. the same obligation of care is imposed upon the driver as in case of one expressing invitation to ride. Held: As accommodation passenger or invited guests. Issue: Whether or not the respondents are liable. Several passengers were thrown and caused death and injury to them. This act of the bus led to the two vehicles side swiping each other. No. Court of Appeals G. There was no proper explanation as to why the rear wheel of the vehicle suddenly became detached. Exception . In the case at bar. The trial court held that both drivers should be solidarily liable to the petitioners. 89880 Facts: A sand and gravel truck was descending on a road. the vehicle which is going down or descending is more liable to get out of control because it has added momentum as provided by the Court. there is no showing that the defendant failed to take the precautions necessary to conduct his passengers safely to this place of destination. The petitioners now filed this petition. Held: The Court held that the respondents should be liable to the petitioners. Issue: Whether or not defendant. defendant as owner and driver of the pick-up truck owes them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their destination. The petitioners raised the doctrine of last clear chance which the Court disregarded because such doctrine apply only to two drivers against each other in a case and not in a case where the passenger is claiming for damages against the carrier. on the opposite direction. the rule is established by the weight of authority that the owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care and injury by increasing the hazards of travels. only the owner and driver of the truck appealed. From the decision. The rule is that n owner of an automobile owes a guest the duty to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuring him. The reason is that the owner of the truck is negligent in hiring the driver and using the old truck in his business which is detrimental to other due to its poor condition. On the other hand. Furthermore. The respondent court reversed the decision as to the two who appealed. Therefore the Court affirms the decision of the lower court and holds Manalo and the owners liable to pay damages. the driver is liable for he was driving the old truck in a descending road and in a fast rate. the driver still increased its speed in order to overtake a tractor in front of it. He asked defendant if he could take him in pick-up back to Davao. Accommodation Passenger Lara v. The extraordinary diligence required of common carriers is not required. The driver also noticed the wiggling of the tires and did not give regard to it. Lara got sick of malaria. Thus. Defendant therefore is not liable for damages. Maritime Collision 3. liable to the death of Lara when the later fell off his vehicle. Since one riding in an automobile is no less a guest because he asked for the privilege of doing so. declared himself chose the place where he would sit and he was half-asleep when the accident took place so that the incident is attributed to his lack of care considering that the pick-up was open and he was then in a crouching position. Carrier not Insurer Against All risk of travel. CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant to pay damages. Bustamante v. as owner of the truck. On the other hand.

and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. We find that the defect could be detected. ASUNCION Facts: On March 27. the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. it should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of its equipment it such defects were discoverable. due to the eruption of Mt. The flights were to make an overnight stopover at Nairita. 1991. hence he has no remedy against him. Held: While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passenger. Held: The Supreme Court held that JAL cannot be held liable.Japan Airlines v. The rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment. while the carrier has. In this connection. 1991. Airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. JAL is not completely absolved from liability. 1992. Paras 104 PHIL 75 Facts: A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Line. Pinatubo which rendered the NAIA inaccessible. Such occurrence of the eruption of Mt. Japan. private respondent were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21. No. Hence. However. usual inspection of the steering knuckle did not measure up to the utmost diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide and therefore the knuckle’s failure can not be JAPAN AIRLINES. Common carriers are not insurer of all risks. Court of Appeals GR. However. 118864 Facts: Private respondents were passengers of Japan Airlines from California bound for Manila. When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure. there was absence of bad faith and negligence on the part of Japan Airlines. It has the obligation to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on its first available flight to Manila Necesito v. the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier. The periodical. Pinatubo amounts to a force majeure. Noriko Etou-Higuchi of JAL endorsed their applications for . holding that the accident was a fortuitous event. 1991. However. respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion left Manila on board Japan Airlines’ (JAL) Flight 742 bound for Los Angeles. Lower Court dismissed the actions. respondent’s flight from Japan to Manila was indefinitely. JAL assumed the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15. vs. Japan as an incentive for traveling. they commenced an action for damages against JAL for failing to provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to June 21. the driver lost control and the truck fell into a breast-deep creek. its front wheels swerved to the right. Upon arrival at Narita. While entering a wooden bridge. The mother drowned and the son sustained injuries. JAL no longer settled their hotel and accommodation expenses during stay at Nauta. In the case at bar. Since NAIA was only reopened for airline’s traffic on June 22. Their itinerary included a stop-over in Narita and an overnight stay at Hotel Nikko Narita. Issue: Whether or not the accident was considered a fortuitous event. Issue: Whether or not JAL was liable for the hotel and meal expenses defrayed by private respondents while pending destination. Mrs. These cases involve action ex contractu against the owner of PRBL filed by the son and heirs of the mother. 1991.

A shore pass is required of a foreigner aboard a vessel or aircraft who desires to stay in the neighborhood of the port of call for not more than 72 hours. Respondents were charged US$400. Atsushi Takemoto of the International Service Center (ISC). While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage. although stopping the bus. 5.shore pass and directed them to the Japanese immigration official. a common carrier such as JAL is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. It may be true that JAL has the duty to inspect whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents. security service and meals. JAL denied the allegations of respondents. it cannot impose upon the immigration authorities that respondents be billeted at Hotel Nikko instead of the airport resthouse. We find that JAL did not breach its contract of carriage with respondents. Consequently. she was no longer a passenger and therefore the contract of carriage terminated. The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by JAL. confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date. a contract of carriage arises. as to the child who was already led a place 5 meters from the bus under the contract of carrier. plaintiffs and their children alighted from the bus and the father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters from the vehicle. HELD: Under Article 1755 of the Civil Code.00 each for their accommodation. Secondly. we rule in the affirmative. Raquel. La Mallorco contended that when the child was killed. JAL could not vouch for the authenticity of a passport and the correctness of the entries therein. there was no utmost diligence. the agency tasked by Japan’s Immigration Department to handle passengers who were denied shore pass entries. the driver. the bus started to run so that the father had to jump. boarded a La Mallorca bus. however. the carrier may be held liable for a breach of contract of carriage. Duration and Termination of Carriers Responsibility La Mallorca v. During their interview. holding La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay P6. Averment of quasi-delict is permissible under the Rules of Court. the Japanese immigration official noted that Michael appeared shorter than his height as indicated in his passport. On December 12. He was followed by her daughter Raquel. Issue: Whether or not the contractual obligation between the parties ceases the moment the passenger alighted form the vehicle. Issue: whether or not JAL is guilty of breach of contract. It maintained that the refusal of the Japanese immigration authorities to issue shore passes to respondents is an act of state which JAL cannot interfere with or prevail upon. Upon arrival at their destination. respondents were denied shore pass entries and were brought instead to the Narita Airport Rest House where they were billeted overnight. JAL should not be faulted for the denial of respondents’ shore pass applications.[10] If the passenger is not so transported or if in the process of transporting he dies or is injured. Commencement. It is a recognized rules that the relation between carrier and passengers does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s premises. together with their minor children. Mr. Here. As such. he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Higuchi a Notice where it was stated that respondents were to be “watched so as not to escape”. Held: On the question whether the liability of the carrier. although incompatible with the . to be determined from the circumstances. the presence of said passenger near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still exists. did not put off the engine. respondents filed a complaint for damages claiming that JAL did not fully apprise them of their travel requirements and that they were rudely and forcibly detained at Narita Airport. Firstly. still persists. The immigration official also handed Mrs. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger. such duty does not extend to checking the veracity of every entry in these documents. Court of Appeals 17 SCRA 739 Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife. The passenger has every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that date and it becomes the carrier’s obligation to carry him and his luggage safely to the agreed destination. brought respondents to the Narita Airport Rest House where they stayed overnight until their departure the following day for Los Angeles. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. In this case. with due regard for all the circumstances. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage which was not unloaded. Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by CA. 1992. Because of this inconsistency. was run over and killed. This is not within the ambit of the contract of carriage entered into by JAL and herein respondents. who was near the bus.000 plus P400.

The 2 right wheels of the delivery van were on the right shoulder of the road and pieces of debris from the accident were found scattered along the shoulder of the road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the passenger jeepney. Article 2185 of the NCC. Held: The Supreme Court held that the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers makes Aboitiz liable. v. there is a presumption of negligence on the part of a person driving a motor vehicle if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. be they compatible with each other or not (Sec. pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane which resulted to his death. but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. Issue: Whether or not Aboitiz is liable for the death of Viana. considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney. The widow of Reyes filed a complaint to recover damages from Mallari. Viana’s wife filed a complaint for damages against Aboitiz for breach of contract f carriage. such justifiable cause exists because he had to come back for his cargo. thus he has already ceased to be a passenger. and Bulletin as well. Viana who had already disembarked remembered that some of his cargoes were still inside the vessel. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the driver of the Bulletin delivery van.00 cannot be sustained. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that Mallari Jr. 2180 of NCC. co-petitioner herein. Sr. 2.000. the crane hit him. Aboitiz has failed to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence in requiring or seeing to it that precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into a forbidden area. Court of Appeals 188 SCRA 387 Facts: Anacleto Viana was a passenger of M/V Antonia bound for Manila which was owned by defendant Aboitiz. Court of Appeals 324 SCRA 147 Facts: Mallari Jr. and Sr. Petitioners herein failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption. who are responsible for the death of Reyes. and Sr. . however filed a third party complaint against Pioneer since it had control completely over the vessel during the incident. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. Only question raised in the briefs can be passed upon. he overtook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. On appeal. who was negligent. The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. The points of collision were the and the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van. herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Art. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner’s vessel. who admitted that immediately before the collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway. the court reversed the decision of the lower court and held that it was Mallari Jr. While pointing to the crew of the vessel the place where his cargoes were.000. the Pioneer Stevedoring Corp. was the driving a passenger jeepney owned by his father. Jr. One hour after the passengers had disembarked. pars. In the case at bar. As he passed the vehicle he saw the delivery van of Bulletin and the vehicles collided. otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code.contract of carriage. Mallari. A reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated.. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of the carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle. Pioneer Stevedoring started operation by unloading the cargoes using its crane. Issue: Whether or not petitioners herein should be held liable for the death of Reyes. Furthermore. Aboitiz. petitioner contends that one hour has already elapsed from the time Viana disembarked. 41. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries. proceeded to overtake a fiera which had stopped in front of him. The jeep collided with the delivery van of Bulletin Publishing Corp. After the said vessel has landed. (a) and (b). The Rules of Court allows the plaintiffs to allege causes of action in the alternative. Decision MODIFIED. and as plaintiffs did not appeals the award of P3. The collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on it. Mallari Jr.00 the increase by the CA of the award to P6. while travelling on the National Nighway in Bataan. Rule 1). Hence this petition. of RA 4136 as amended. He negotiated the curve and moved in the opposite lane in order to overtake the fiera. Therefore they shall be liable for the loss of Reyes’ life. as the arrastre operator.

At the exact moment that Navidad fell. a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. JR. Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence. along with her children. Needless to say. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers. the Metro Transit Organization. Court of Appeals G. Regrettably for LRT. Prudent. the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. Navidad was struck by the moving train. went to barrio Ambasing to visit a patient. (Metro Transit). the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. and he was killed instantaneously. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. which petitioners. In either case. Two nurses from the Saint Theodore’s Hospital in Sagada. an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved. the Rural Health Physician in Sagada. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the fare). the widow of Nicanor. no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission. Junelito Escartin.” This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case. as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad. an LRT train. Facts: On 14 October 1993. 6. While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks. Presumption of Negligence Liability of Carriers for the Death or Injury to Passengers: Exceptions Bayasen v. have failed to show. filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin. the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman. thus. and Prudent for the death of her husband. operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. NAVIDAD. the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that “there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad). No. in its answer. the LRTA. delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening. for the reason that the negligence of its employee. Nicanor Navidad. herein respondent Marjorie Navidad. Elena Awichen . was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who. In case of such death or injury. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. between the two. L-25785 Facts: Petitioner Saturnino Bayasen. Mountain Province. has not been duly proven x x x.? HELD: The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. according to the appellate court. then drunk. Rodolfo Roman. and by simple proof of injury. a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent. was coming in. Issue: WON THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD. There being. On 08 December 1994. similarly. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred.R. however. denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards. Inc. he must also be absolved from liability.LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY VS. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. the presumption would be that it has been at fault. No evidence. Escartin.

so that Bayasen had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course. as in the instant case. . Issue: Whether or not there was a breach of contract of carriage. In case of death or injuries to passengers. 3490). Elena was found lying in a creek further below. Herein. failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.886. not in actions involving breach of contract. and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. The three.00. the obligation is created by law itself. Held: The proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of the jeep and not the unreasonable speed of the petitioner because there was no evidence on record to prove or support the finding that the petitioner was driving at “an unreasonable speed”. rode with him in the jeep assigned for the use of the Rural Health Unit. it was blocked by a pine tree. Held: Iin quasi-delict.for quasi-delict. testified that Saturnino Bayasen was driving his jeep moderately just before the accident and categorically stated that she did not know what caused the jeep to fall into the precipice. P1. not quasi-deplict. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. Issue: Whether or not the reckless driving of accused-petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. the girls. the petition for review on certiorari. and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. in which branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney The CA reversed the lower courts ruling on the ground the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of carriage. Saturnino Bayasen was charged by with Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed. at Ambasing. Court of Appeals 332 SCRA 356 Facts: Private respondent Eliza Sunga. Dolores Balcita who was one of the passengers in the jeep. therefore. his guilt of the crime charged has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. and acquitted Bayasen of the crime charged in the information in Criminal Case 1056 of the CFI of Mountain Province. She suffered a skull fracture which caused her death. on the other hand. The star witness of the prosecution. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva and absolved Calalas of liability. But. entitled to acquittal. Sunga sustained multiple injuries and remained on a cast for three months. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. Dr. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court with the modifications that the indemnity was increased to P6. for breach of contract of carriage. to 1 Year. It took cognizance of other case (Civil Case No. The negligence of Bayasen has not having been sufficiently established. As the jeepney was filled to capacity. and 17 Days of prision correccional. 7 Months. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. an Izuzu truck driven by Verena and owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena . When the jeepney stopped to a let passenger off and Sunga was about to give way to the outgoing passenger. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in action for quasi-delict. Bayasen again allowed them to ride. the owner of the truck. the skidding being an unforeseen event. Calalas. again asked if they could ride with him up to a certain place on the way to barrio Suyo which he intended to visit anyway. the award of attorney’s fees was set aside. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between parties. It is a well-known physical fact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads. It may occur without fault. whereas in breach of contract. indemnify the heirs Elena Awichen P3.filed a third party complaint against Francisco Salva. in this case the common carrier. took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. then freshman at Siliman University . and that the maximum of the prison term was raised to 1 Year.00 for burial expenses of the deceased. He is. About 8 feet below the road. Elena sitting herself between him and Dolores. with costs de oficio. who wanted to gather flowers. In such a case. the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action. On Appeal. Later.00 as attorney’s fees and P1. under the particular circumstances. were thrown out of the jeep. the jeep went over a precipice. a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.000. Sunga was given by the conductor an extension seat. Hence. 7 Months and 10 Days of prision correccional. and to pay the costs.and Dolores Balcita. Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or have acted negligently unless they proved that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. Bayasen who skidded could not be regarded as negligent. it is the parties themselves who create the obligation. without fault on account of the manner of handling the car.000. The motion for reconsideration of Bayasen was denied. On the way. the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor. as maximum.00 as compensatory damages. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas. Calalas v. Trial Court found Bayasen sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 4 Months and 1 Day of arresto mayor as minimum.000.

The Old Civil Code did not impose upon the carrier absolute liability for assaults of their employees upon the passenger. was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company (MRC) from Calamba. and dismissed the complaint. Tomas Gillaco. Wife of deceased petitioner. husband of Cornelia A. where he was going to report for duty. Manila Railroad Co. Laguna to Manila. Tomas Gillaco died as a result of the wound sustained from the shot. Issue: Whether or not the carrier should be held liable Held: While the passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees. Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains. The resulting breach of Manila Railroad’s contract of safe carriage with the late Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby. Furthermore. The shooting was therefore. The CFI awarded her P3000 as damages against Perez dismissing the claim against the driver. . In the present case. or could it reasonably foresee every personal career that might exist between each of its may employee and any one of the thousands of passengers riding in its train. happened to be in said station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station. the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. Maranan v. L-8034 Facts: Lt. Perez 20 SCRA 412 Facts: Rogelio Carachea was a passenger in a taxicab operated by Pascual perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver. and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban. a caso fortuito. under the circumstances. And because of this personal grudge. a train guard of MRC assigned in the Manila-San Fernando. when the crime took place. de Gillaco. Rogelio’s mother. The carbine furnished by the MRC for his use as train guard. Thus this appeal. They had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet.000 damages to the petitioners. G.R. La Union Line. without costs. No. the act of Devesa is shooting the passenger was entirely unforeseeable by MRC. While an appeal at the CA. Devesa shot Gillaco upon seeing him inside the train. The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco. filed an action against the MRC at CFI Laguna. The trial court sentenced the respondents to pay P4. Antonia Maranan. When the train reached the Paco Railroad station. filed an action to recover damages for the death of her son.7. SC reversed the judgment appealed from. both being unforeseeable and inevitable. Negligence or Inntentional Assault by carriers Employee De Gillaco v. Emilio Devesa. Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas Gillaco dating back during the Japanese occupation. the responsibility of the carrier extends to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care or diligence required of it. Issue: Whether or not the carrier is liable for the assaults of its employee upon the passengers. who was found guilty of homicide in the CFI. Devesa was convicted of homicide by final judgment of the Court of Appeals.

that the driver of the pick up car was the sole responsible for the accident. PNR was created generally with all powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. their behavior and thus moral fiber. Passengers Duty to Observe Dillegence to avoid injury . The dismissal of the claim against the driver is correct. It was proven in the case at bar. Defendant on its part set up the defense that the injury caused was due entirely to the fault or negligence of the pick up car and a contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. A. Ammen Trans. PNR raised as a defense hat it was a mere agency of the Philippine government without distinct or separate personality of it own. Ammen Trans. the plaintiff went through several treatments causing many expenses. Due to the incident. 516 f the Philippine National Railways at Camarines Sur bound for Manila. Held: The Supreme Court held that PNR should be held liable. Thus. 1739 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the common carrier liable for the injury caused. Reports show that the bus was at moderate speed while the pick up was at a full speed and on the wrong lane. Philippine National Railways vs. upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena. Alarm was raised by the passengers that somebody fell but the train did not stop. Issue: Whether or not PNR could be held liable for damages for the death of Winifredo Tupang. or injury to. and 4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risk of travel.Held: Under Art. thus it cannot assail non-suability as a bar for damages. they contended that their funds are governmental in character. the characteristics and attributes of a corporation is fully applicable to PNR. Cotributory negligence Isaac v. plaintiff filed a case for damages alleging that the collision which resulted in the loss of his left arm was mainly due to the gross incompetence and recklessness of the driver of the bus operated by the defendant. Plaintiff’s action was predicated in breach of contract of carriage and the cab driver was not a part thereto. L. Likewise. Rosario Tupang. The Supreme Court held that PNR should be held liable for the death of Winifredo Tupang because it acted in . It is the carrier’s strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to technical competence but also to this total personality. Unfortunately. However. Co. 8. exercised the diligence required from it and is absolved from liability for the injury caused to its passengers.. Co.L. Inc. the deceased’s widow filed a cmplaint against PNR for breach of contract f carriage. the bus collided with a pick up type vehicle. having due regard for all circumstances. “a common carrier are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees. The Supreme Court likewise held that there was indeed contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Inc. Ammen Trans. he contended that the defendant incurred liability in culpa contractual arising from its non-compliance with its obligation to transport plaintiff to his destination. it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence. Inc. The injuries caused by the accident worsen. 1046 SCRA 101 Facts: Cesar Isaac boarded one of the buses operated by defendant A.. Held: The Supreme Court held that the defendant A. The Supreme Court held that the following governs the liability of a common carrier: 1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. passengers. His civil liability is covered on the criminal case. But before reaching his destination. Due to some mechanical defect.. CA 139 SCRA 87 Facts: Winifredo Tupang was a paying passenger who boarded Train No.. 2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passengers with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. The Philippine National Railways is not exempt from garnishment. 3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of. the train stopped which took two hours before the train could resume its trip to Manila. the train conductor called the station agent and requested for verification of the confirmation. thus they are not subject to garnishment or execution. PNR may sue and be sued and could be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation. Hence. although such employees may have ached beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common carrier. Co. The collision caused the amputation of the left arm of the plaintiff. Under PA 4156. There is a breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of each case. Tupang fell off the train resulting to his death. In addition.L. Instead. as he placed his elbow outside the window knowing that such was dangerous. It descends to a level of a citizen.

[5] He applied the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. of March 15. As the bus was approaching the bridge. 1987. Concurrent Causes of Action Distinctions Importance 2. The stabbing cause commotion and panic amount the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. Inc. petitioner also argued that it is not an insurer of its passengers. Issue: 1. v. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies. Cebu. Compostela. Daanbantayan. CA) Chapter IV. about three (3) or four (4) places from the front seat. and the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running. (Fortune Express Inc. Held: The sudden act o the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure.Passengers or Strangers Bachelor Express.[3] Pedrano left his helper. The common carrier must still proves that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away[4] behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. Cebu and left for Cebu City. The heirs of the deceased sued the bus company Evidence adduced showed that the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion.. 2. Jose Mitante.m.m. Inc. the bus was speeding from a full stop. it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The passenger bus was also bound for Cebu City. Injury to Passengers due to acts of Co. Compostela. It was about 12:00 a. ARRIESGADO Facts: At about 10:00 p. Petitioner denied liability on the ground that the death of its two passengers was caused by a force majeure as it was due to the act of a third person who was beyond its control and supervision. D’ Rough Riders passenger bus with plate number PBP-724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspiñas was cruising along the national highway of Sitio Aggies. Sergio Pedrano. But it was too late.bad faith as it did not stop despite the alarm raised by its passengers. Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. which was then about 25 meters away.m. Laspiñas saw the stalled truck. Poblacion. PNR has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destination and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. The argument that the petitioners are not insurers of their passengers deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destination as warranted by law. in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure. 9. Vs. and had come from Maya. Solidary Liability TIU VS. the bus rammed into the truck’s left rear. Cebu. just as the truck passed over a bridge. a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed another passenger. the cargo truck marked “Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise” bearing plate number GBP-675 was loaded with firewood in Bogo. who were seated at the right side of the bus. Considering the factual findings in this case. Whether or not the case at bar is within the context of force majeure. March 16. At about 4:45 a. Whether or not the petitioner should be absolved from liability for the death of its passengers. Poblacion. Jr. it is clear that petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common carriers. 85691 Facts: Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to petitioner Bachelor Express. one of its rear tires exploded. Arriesgado and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado. Pedro Arriesgado lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right . 1987. In line with this. Cebu. The truck’s tail lights were also left on. Actions and Damages in case of Breach 1. However. While the bus was on its way to Cagayan de Oro. No. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle. about 700 meters away. then parked along the right side of the national highway and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop.R.. The driver. The impact damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers injured. Court of Appeals G.

His wife. Felisa Pepito Arriesgado. wherein plaintiff and his wife were riding at the time of the accident.[32] 1755[33] and 1756. failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be proved. That due to the reckless and imprudent driving by defendant Virgilio Te Laspiñas of the said Rough Riders passenger bus. as owner and operator of D’ Rough Riders bus service. While evidence may be submitted to overcome such presumption of negligence.The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the defendant had the . Any injury suffered by the passengers in the course thereof is immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier.Upon the happening of the accident. for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.[34] In this case. plaintiff and his wife. thus.[35] It is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the destination agreed upon.colles. D’ Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu and his driver. in this case the common carrier. and which failure in his obligation to transport safely his passengers was due to and in consequence of his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. failed to safely reach their destination which was Cebu City. Daanbantayan. the presumption of negligence at once arises. only the existence of such contract.” per Medical Certificate. for transportation from Maya. particularly defendantdriver Virgilio Te Laspiñas. and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.[41] As correctly found by the trial court. Felisa.00. Thus: That the accident resulted to the death of the plaintiff’s wife. 1987. petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut such presumption. The negligence of petitioner Laspiñas as driver of the passenger bus is. Branch 20. a xerox copy of which is hereto attached as integral part hereof and marked as ANNEX – “A”.[36] This is because under the said contract of carriage. as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common carrier. which means that the carrier must show the utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care and foresight can provide. the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case. 8. was brought to the Danao City Hospital. it must be shown that the carrier observed the required extraordinary diligence. respondent Arriesgado and his deceased wife contracted with petitioner Tiu. Second issue: Contrary to the petitioner’s contention. Issue: First Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Tiu failed to overcome the presumption Of negligence against him as One engaged in the business Of common carriage? Second Issue: Whether or not The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Is Inapplicable? Held: First Issue: The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety of their passengers are set forth in the Civil Code. and physical injuries to several of its passengers. The respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at a fast and high speed along the national road. a xerox copy of which is hereto attached as integral part hereof and marked as ANNEX – “B” hereof. Felisa Pepito Arriesgado. to Cebu City for the price of P18. and that petitioner Laspiñas did not take precautionary measures to avoid the accident. the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. 7. being the owner and operator of the said Rough Riders passenger bus which figured in the said accident. the proximate cause of which was defendant-driver’s failure to observe utmost diligence required of a very cautious person under all circumstances. That defendant William Tiu. In actions for breach of contract. including plaintiff himself who suffered a “COLLES FRACTURE RIGHT. Respondent Pedro A. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. damages and attorney’s fees before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. as evidenced by a Certificate of Death. against the petitioners. binding against petitioner Tiu. Articles 1733. the petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances. She was later transferred to the Southern Island Medical Center where she died shortly thereafter. as it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. Virgilio Te Laspiñas on May 27. or that the accident was caused by fortuitous event. and the fact that the obligor. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage. is therefore directly liable for the breach of contract of carriage for his failure to transport plaintiff and his wife safely to their place of destination which was Cebu City. Cebu.[39] It must be stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them.

shed. injury or damage to the said cargo before or while the goods are being received or remained on the piers. the cargo fell from the chassis and hit one of the container vans of American President Lines. consignee. denied. it is difficult to see what role. the shipping line has its own cargo handling equipment. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT A QUO AND OTHER FACTORS SHOWING CLEAR JOINT LIABILITY OF DEFENDANTS IN SOLIDUM. U.METRO PORT SERVICE. sheds. its agent or employees in the performance of the undertaking by it to be performed under the terms of the contract. Emphasis supplied) To carry out its duties. Accordingly.. (Formerly E. p. and transhipped for Manila through the vessel S/S Maersk Tempo. the common law of last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff.00 which amount was paid by the petitioner insurance company to the consignee. . It was discovered that there were no twist lock at the rear end of the chassis where the cargo was loaded. There was heavy damage to the cargo as the parts of the machineries were broken. warehouse or facility if the loss. as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code.. INC.. 1 (40') container of 170 pieces steel tubings and 1 (40') container of 13 cases. 3 crates. In some cases. or other cause beyond the CONTRACTORS control or capacity to prevent or remedy. Inc. 1979. as well as all damage that may be suffered on account of loss. and hereby agrees to accept liability and to promptly pay to the ship company.A. (now Metro Port Service Inc. The cargo which was covered by a clean bill of lading issued by Maersk Line and Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (referred to as the CARRIER) consisted of the following: 1 piece truck mounted core drill. nor for any loss. or other designated place under the supervision of the BUREAU.) Facts: Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation imported from the United States several machineries and equipment which were loaded on board the SIS Albert Maersk at the port of Philadelphia. 1 piece trailer mounted core drill. facility. pp. damage. and referred to as the ARRASTRE).. 2 pallets and 26 mining machinery parts. 110-112. a tractor operator. 1979 and was turned over complete and in good order condition to the arrastre operator E. and the CONTRACTOR hereby agree to and hold the BUREAU at all times harmless therefrom and whole or any part thereof. FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE CO vs. . Razon Inc. (Rollo. the ARRASTRE is required to provide cargo handling equipment which includes among others trailers.00) for each package unless the value of the importation is otherwise specified or manifested or communicated in writing together with the invoice value and supported by a certified packing list to the CONTRACTOR by the interested party or parties before the discharge of the goods. named Danilo Librando and employed by the ARRASTRE. has itself been rejected. At about 10:20 in the morning of June 8. Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation. chassis for containers. (Original Records. warehouse. was ordered to transfer the shipment to the Equipment Yard at Pier 3.last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. however. cracked and no longer useful for their purposes. or non-delivery of cargoes to the extent of the actual invoice value of each package which in no case shall be more than Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3. 1 (40') container of 321 pieces steel tubings. but said CONTRACTOR shall not be responsible for the condition of the contents of any package received nor for the weight.500. consignor or other interested party or parties for the loss. 4) The shipment arrived at the port of Manila on June 3. The value of the damage was estimated at P187.S. damage. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN LIMITING LIABILITY SOLELY ON CO-DEFENDANT MAERSK LINES. at its own expense handle all merchandise in the piers and other designated places and at its own expense perform all work undertaken by it hereunder diligently and in skillful workmanlike and efficient manner. That the CONTRACTOR shall be solely responsible as an independent CONTRACTOR. injury or damage is caused by force majeure. — The CONTRACTOR shall.500. HELD: Claims. if any. Razon. or destruction of any merchandise while in custody or under the control of the CONTRACTOR in any pier. The CONTRACTOR shall be solely responsible for any and all injury or damage that may arise on account of the negligence or carelessness of the CONTRACTOR. While Librando was maneuvering the tractor (owned and provided by Maersk Line) to the left.

therefore. the records disclose that the value of the importation was relayed to the arrastre operator and in fact processed by its chief claims examiner based on the documents submitted. We. Since the ARRASTRE offered its drivers for the operation of tractors in the handling of cargo and equipment. inacurrate to state that Librando should be considered an employee of Maersk Line on that specific occasion. an efficient and diligent tractor operator must nevertheless check if the cargo is securely loaded on the chassis. With respect to the limited liability of the ARRASTRE. we gather that driver/operator Librando was remiss in his duty. VS Wallem Phils. or employees should observe the stand" and indispensable measures necessary to prevent losses and damage to shipments under its custody. find Metro Port Service Inc. It merely requested the ARRASTRE to dispatch a tractor operator to drive the tractor inasmuch as the foreign shipping line did not have any truck operator in its employ. It is. We agree with the petitioner that it is the ARRASTRE which had the sole discretion and prerogative to hire and assign Librando to operate the tractor. the records reveal that Maersk Line provided the chassis and the tractor which carried the carried the subject shipment. . "cargadors". solidarily liable in the instant case for the negligence of its employee. therefore. Benildez Cepeda. It was also the ARRASTRE's sole decision to detail and deploy Librando for the particular task from among its pool of tractor operators or drivers. Such arrangement is allowed between the ARRASTRE and the CARRIER pursuant to the Management Contract.In this particular instance. (Eastern Shipping Lines VS CA) (Philippines First Insurance Co. It was clearly one of the services offered by the ARRASTRE.. Shipping Inc. an arrastre-investigator of Metro Port admitted that Librando as tractor-operator should first have inspected the chassis and made sure that the cargo was securely loaded on the chassis Whether or not the twist lock can be seen by the naked eye when the cargo has been loaded on the chassis. From the testimonies of witnesses presented. then the ARRASTRE should see to it that the drivers under its employ must exercise due diligence in the performance of their work. Handling cargo is mainly the s principal work so its driver/operators.