6. People of the Philippines vs.

Sonny Gatarin y Caballero @ "Jay-R" and Eduardo Quisayas

The facts:
This is an appeal of Eduardo Quisayas who was accused of Robbery with Homicide
together with Sonny Gatarin y Caballero who remained at -large.
Umali, one of the witnesses of the prosecution claimed that the two accused mauled
Januario. SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel saw Januario dying on the street and brought him
to the hospital. While on board the patrol car, SPO3 Mendoza asked the victim who hurt him
and Januario answered that it was "Jay-R and his uncle". Maria Castillo, his wife, testified on
how she learned of what happened to her husband. The doctor who attended Januario reported
in the medical certificate that three fatal wounds caused by a bladed weapon were found in
Januario's body which eventually caused his death.
On June 20, 2008, the RegionalnTrial court rendered a Decision against the apellant
guilty of Robbery with Homicide. The court of appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court
decision.
Issue (s):
Whether or not the accused Eduardo Quisayas and Sonny Gatarin y Caballero @
"Jay-R" guilty of Robbery with Homicide.
Ruling:
No. in order for the crime of robbery with homicide to exist, it must be established
that a robbery has actually taken place and that as a consequence or on the occasion of
robbery, a homicide be committed. Which the prosecution failed to prove. Maria Castillo's
testimony is not sufficient in proving such took place because she was not at the scene of the
crime as she was only inform by his niece. No evidence was presented to show that Januario
indeed had that amount of P20,000 and at that the same was in his possession.
The Court modified the Court of appeals and Regional Trial Court Decision. Eduardo
Quisayas is charged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

7. Emmanuel M. Olores vs. Manila Doctors College and / or Teresita O. Turla

The facts:
The petitioner, signed as a full-time instructor on a fixed term employment contract
wih the respondent. Mr. Jacinto Bernardo, Jr. charged the petitioner with gross misconduct
and gross ineffeciency in the performance of duty for employing a grading system not in
acordance with the system.
On May 31, 2010, the Manila Doctors Tribunal submitted its recommendation to the
president of the respondent. The culpability of the petetioner was established. On June 7,
2010, respondent terminated the service of the petitioner for grave minsconduct and grosss

inefficiency and incompetence.

Petitioner filed a case against the respondent. In a Decision dated Decmeber 8, 2010, the
Labor Arbiter found merit in th petitioner's charge for illegal dismissal. However, dismissed
petitioner's claim for regularization, and other claims for lack of merit.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the NLRC resolution and n September 30, 2011
granted respondent's appeal and reversed its earlier resolution.
The petitioner filed a certiorari petition with the Court of Appeals but since petitioner
failed to file a motion for reconsideration against the NLRC decision before seeking recourse
o it via a certiorari petition, the CA dismissed petitioner's special civil action for certiorari.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not respondent's appeal with the NLRC was perfected despite its failure to
post a bond.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appesls erred in dismissing petitioner's Rule 65 petition.
Ruling:
1. No. Section 223 of the Labor Code and Section 6, Rule VI of th 2005 RevisedRules of
Procedure of the NLRC are consistent in saying that in case of judgment involving a
monretary amount, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting s cash or
surety bond. athe posting of bond i indispensable to th perfection of an appeal in asrs
involving monetary awards from the decisions of the LaborArbiter. The filing of the bond is
not only mandatory, but a jurisdictional requirement as well, that must be complied with in
order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non -compliance thererpwith rendersnthe
decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.
2. Yes. In the instant case, the NLRC had allthe olportunity to review its ruling and correct
itself. And the instant case falls under (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon the lower court; of the recognized exceptions to the general rule
of motion for reconsideration before resorting to the special civil action for certiorari.
8. People of the Philippines vs. Henry T. Go
The Facts:
An Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before th
Sandiganbayan that the respondent conspired with the late DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile in
committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of th same. Respondent
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreemeny
which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quah the information filed against him
on th ground that he is a private person therefore does not constitute an offense under Section
3(g) of Republic Act 3019. Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary
Enrile, there is n public officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution
against respondent may not prosper.
On June 2, 2005, the Sandiganbayan grants the Motion to Quash and the Information is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over thebperson of the accused.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Henry T. Go may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Sec. 3(g) of
R.A. 3019 even if th ouboic officer withbwhom he was alleged to have conspired, has died

prior to the filing of th Information.

2. Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person of Henry T. Go.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The death of the Secretary did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the bases
of the charge of conspiracy, only the criminal liability of the deceased, between him and
private respondent. The Court held it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of
conspiracy, so long as the acquittap or death of a co - conspirator does not remove the bases
of a charge for consoirac,, one defenant may be found guilty of the offense. The act of one is
the act of all.
2. Yes. The Court agrees with the petitioner's contntion that Henry T. Go's act of posying
bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
his person.
The Court reversed and set aside the Resolution of th Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005,
granting respondent's Motion to Quash and directed the Sandiganbayan to proceed with the
criminal case.
9. Mariano Lim vs. Security Bank Corporation
The Facts:
Petitioner, Mariano Lim, executed a Continuine Suretyship with a stipulation, if any of the
Guaranteed Obligations is not paid or performed on due date, the surety shall, without need
for any notice, demand or any act or deed, immediately become liable therefor and the Surety
shall pay and perform the same; in favor of the resoondent to secure "any and all types of
credit accomodation that may be granted by the bank herein and hereinafter" in favor of Raul
Arroyo.
The debtor, Raul Arroyo, defaulted on his loan obligation. Mariano Lim, therafter, became
liable to pay the loan obtained by Raul and Edwina Arroyo. The respondent filed a complaint
forthe collection of money against th petitioner and Arroyo spouses. The latter can no longer
be located, only the petitioner participated on the case.
The Regional Trial Court ordered the petitioner to pay the total amount due, attorney's fees
and litigation expenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed with the RTC Decidion with
modification to the computation of the interest and penalty fees, lowered the attorney's fees
and increased the litigation expenses.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Mariano Lim may validly held liable for the principal debtor's loan.
2. Whether or not the recovery of attorney's fees is allowed by the law.
Ruling:
1. Yes. A contract of suretyship is an agreement whereby a party, called the surety,
guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of an obligation
or undertaking in favor of another party, called the obligee. A surety is considered in law as
being the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation
of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. The terms of the
Continuing Suretyship executed by petitioner, quoted earlier are very clear. It states that
petitioner, as surety, without need for any notice demand or any other act or deed,

immediately become liable and shall pay "all credit accommodations".

2. Yes. It should be noted that Article 2208 of the Civil Code does not prohibit recovery
of attorney's fees if there is stipulation in the contract for the payment of the same. However,
the courts still have the power to reduce the same if it is unreasonable.
The Court affirmed to the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification, reducing the
attorney's fees to 10% of the principal debt only.

10. Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutor's Office Tacloban vs. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas;
Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao vs. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas
The Facts:
This consolidated complaints stemmed from Criminal Case Nos. 2009-11-537; 2009-11538 and 2009-11-539 for Qualified Trafficking and Violation of Article VI, Section 10 od
Republic Act No. 7610 against Danilo Miralles.
Complainant, Prosecutor Leo Tabao, lamented that the respondent judge disregarded his
dutie and violated mandatory provisions of te Rules of Courtbwhen he did not issue a warrant
of arrest againts the accused Miralles, who was charged wi two (2) non - bailable criminal
offenses. Respondent Judge summarily granted reduced bail in the absence of a motion to fix
bail and thr prosecution was not given te opportunity to interpose its objections.
The complainant, Prosecutor Liza M. Jorda, has alleged substantially the same facts
involving accused Danilo Miralles. That during the hearing on the petition for Involuntary
Commitment of the minor victim Margie Baldoza, to DSWD, the respondent propunded a
series of questions that went beyond judicial authority and discretion. The complainant
alleged that the respondent humiliated her in an open court and exhibited anger and animosity
towards her for filing the motion of inhibition.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the
law.
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent's act of fixing the accused's bail and rducing the same motu proprio
without allowing prosecution to present its evidence, the respondent judge denied the
prosectution of due process, is not mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on
the part of the respondent judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is
so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law. The respondent judge's actuations in th court pmises during th
hearing of the petition for commitment to the DSWD constitute abuse of authority.

11. Philippine Commercial International Bank (now BDO Unibank ,Inc.)

vs. Arturo P. Franco, substituted by his heirs,namely:
Maurica P. Franco, Floribel P. Franco and Alexander P. Franco
The Facts:
Arturo P. Franco invested in a trust fund to Philippine Commercial International Bank
(PCIB) that automatically roll-over if there is no withdrawal made upon maturity. In 1992,
the Trust Indenture Certificate (TIC) was converted into Common Trust Fund. Respondent
tried to encash his TIC, but on June 22,2000, he received a letter , signed by the counsel of the
petitioner of the bank, saying that due to the conversion , all the TIC have been rendered
null and avoid . But one of the employees of PCIB declared that TIC and Common Trust
Funds have the same features , the change is only in the name.
On October 21,2003,the Regional Trial Court Rendered a decision in favor of Arturo
P. Franco.
PCIB filed a motion for reconsideration to the Court of Appeals alleging that there
was a payment already made to the respondent. The CA denied the motion for failure to show
evidence.
Hence, this petition.
Issue (s):
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming to the RTC Decision dated
October 21,2013.
Ruling:
No. The Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in sustaining the RTC
Decision. Both courts have applied the law in accordance with the facts of the case. In Civil
cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. The TICS in the hands of the
respondent is a proof a non-payment and a prima facie evidence that they have not been paid.
Petitioner bank could have easily presented documentary evidence to dispute the claim but it
did not.

12.

Corazon Macapagal vs. People of the Philippines

The Facts:
The petitioner, Corazon Macapagal, was convicted guilty of the Crime Estafa.
The Petitioner received the decision on January 13, 2009, then she timely moved for
reconsideration, but was denied in an order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner
allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She filed a Notice of appeal on August 3, 2009,
but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.
Aggrieved, Corazon Macapagal comes directly before the Court in this
petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue(s):
Whether or not the petition for Certioran under Rule 45 be granted by this
Court.
Ruling:
No. The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken
from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can
elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. In availing the wrong
mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 Instead of the appropriate remedy of
Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal. Direct resort to this Court is
allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and
specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case. A petition
for review on certiorari an under Rule 45 of the Rule of Court must contain a certified
true Copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment.
Failure to comply with the requirements is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition. This petition is bound to fail because of the petitioners repeated disregard of
the Rules and the Courts lawful orders.

13. Luis R. Villafuerte vs. Commission on Election ad Miguel R. Villafuerte

The Facts:
The petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the gubernatorial positions of
the province of Camarines Sur in the May 13, 2013 local and nation elections. On October
25, 2012 the petitioner filed a petition to deny course to or cancel the COC of the respondent,
alleging that respondent intentionally and materially misrepresented a false and deceptive
name / nickname that would mislead the voters when the respondents name that he intended
to appear on the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L RAY JR. MIGZ instead of his
baptismal first name MIGUEL. On January 15 , 2013, the COMELECs First Division
denied the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc which
affirmed the Resolution dated January 15, 2013 of its First Division.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for Certiorari.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the respondent committed a material misrepresentation under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of his COC.
Ruling:
No. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states: A verified petition seeking to

deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty five days from the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. Section 74 enumerates the contents of
COC and failed to prove that respondent violated any of the provisions of Section 74.
Moreover, the false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. As we
said, respondents nickname is not considered a material fact, and there is no substantial
evidence showing that in writing the nickname L RAY JR. MIGZ in his COC, respondent
had the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on his eligibility
or qualification for the office he seeks to assume.

14. Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. and Pablo B. Roman, Jr. vs. Manuel O. Sanchez
The Facts:
On August 12, 2002, Manuel O. Sanchez, a stockholder of the petitioner filed a
Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents, which the court granted in an Order
dated September 10, 2002. The petitioner is ordered to produce and make available for
inspection and photocopying by the respondent.
During the January 11, 2007 inspection, the only document produced by the Acting
Corporate Secretary of the Petitioner, and one of the staff was the Stock and Transfer Book of
the Corporation. They alleged that they could not find from the corporate records the copies
of the proxies submitted by the stockholders, including the tape recordings taken during the
stockholders meetings, and that they needed more time to locate and find the list of
stockholders as of March 2002. On September 3, 2007 the trial court issued a Resolution to
produce the documents ordered in the September 10, 2002 Resolution and ordered the
petitioners solidarily to pay a fine of P10, 000 for every day of delay to comply with the order
of September 10, 2002 until the defendants shall have fully and completely complied with the
said order.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court dated September 3, 2007
imposing penalty in case of delay of compliance with the orders is allowed by law.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules state that, in addition to a possible
treatment of a party as non suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for
failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of discovery shall apply. Under
Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to
obey an order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying , or
photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such orders as are just. In this
case, the threatened sanction of possibly ordering petitioners to solidarily pay a fine of P10,
000.00 for every day of delay in complying with the September 10, 2002 Order is well within
the allowable range of penalty.

15. Antonio E. Unica vs. ANSCOR Swire Ship Management Corporation

The Facts:
In the last employment contract of Antonio E. Unica, petitioner, with the ANSCOR
Swire Ship Management Corporation, he was deployed for a period of nine months from
January 29, 2000 to October 25, 2000. The petitioner was only repatriated on November 14,
2000, or twenty (20) days after the expiration of his contract because the vessel was still at the
sea. Petitioner averred that since he was allowed to stay in the vessel for another twenty (20)
days, there was an implied renewal of his contract of employment.
On May 31, 2004, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner for
illegal dismissal against the respondent, directing the latter to pay the petitioner his salary for
the unexpired portion of his impliedly renewed contract. The NLRC affirmed the LAs
decision.
Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. A
decision date August 15, 2006, the CA ruled that there was no implied renewal of contract and
the twenty(20) days extension was due to the fact that the ship was still at sea.
Issue(s):
Whether or not there was an implied renewal of petitioners contract of employment
with the respondent.
Ruling:
There was no implied renewal of contract of employment. The petitioners contract of
employment with the respondent ended on October 25, 2000 thus, his employment is deemed
automatically terminated, there being no mutually agreed renewal or extension of the expired
contracts. However, in Section 19 of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean Going Vessels is clear that the
continuance service on board of the seafarer shall be entitled to earned wages and benefits as
provided in his contract. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to be paid his wages from October
26, 2000 until November 14, 2000.

16. Republic of the Philippines vs. Merlinda L. Olaybar

The facts:
Merlinda L. Olaybar and her boyfriend plans to get married. One of the requirements
for marriage is Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR), so the respondent requested it from
the National Statistics Office (NSO) only to find out that she is already married to a certain
Yen Son Sune. The respondent filed a petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage
Contract, especially in the entries of the wife portion which was granted by the Regional Trial
Court based on the evidences and testimonies that support the respondents claims. The
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds that there was no clerical
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within
the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and granting the cancellation of all the
entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage
void ab initio.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule of 109 proceedings.
Ruling:
No. The respondent claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who
contacted marriage with Yen Son Sune, although admittedly the entries made in the wife
portion of the certificate of marriage are the personal circumstance of respondent. Her claims
were proven by evidences and testimonies. The Court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and therefore, forged. It was
established that no such marriage was celebrated. In allowing the correction of the subject
certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the Trial Court did not, in any
way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

17. The City Of Manila, represented by Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., and Ms. Liberty M.
Toledo vs. Hon. Caridad H. Grecia - Cuerdo; Pasay City; SM Mart, Inc.; SM Prime Holdings,
Inc.; Star Appliances Center; Supervalue Inc.; ACE Hardware Philippines Inc.; Watson
Personal Cares Store, Phils., Inc.; Jollimart Phils., Corp.; Surplus Marketing Corporation and
Signature Lines
The Facts:
On January 24, 20004 private respondents file a complaint with the regional trial
court of Pasay city for refund or recovery of illegally and/or erroneously collected local
business tax, prohibition with prayer to issue TRO and Writ of preliminary injunction. The
private respondents alleged that in relation to Section 21, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and

20 of the RRCM were violative of limitations and guidelines under Section 143(h) of
Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) on double taxation and petitioner citys
ordinance no. 8011 which amended portion of the RRCM had already been declared to be
illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice. The RTC granted private
respondents application for writ of preliminary injunction. The petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the RTC denied it. Petitioners then filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the CA assailing the assailing the orders of the RTC. Which was dismissed by
the CA holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition that since appellate jurisdiction
over private respondents complaint for tax refund is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals,
likewise, be filed with the CTA. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA
denied it for being moot and academic. The petitioners did not inform the Court that the RTC
issued a Writ of Execution already. It clearly appears that the issues raised in the present
petition, which merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC,
have already become moot and academic considering that the trial court, in its decision on the
merits in the main case, has already ruled in favor of respondents and that the same decision
is now final and executor. The rule that where the issues have become moot and academic,
there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical
use or value.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over a special civil action
for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the Regional Trial Court in a
local tax case.
Ruling:
Yes. On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282
expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the
level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction in Section 7 (b) which provides exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or order of the Regional
Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.
Therefore, the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders
issued by the RTC in local taxes cases filed before it.
18. Iglesia Filipina Independiente vs. Heirs of Bernardino Taeza
The Facts:
On February 5, 1970, Rev. Macario Ga, sold Lot Nos. 3653 A and 3653 B which
was owned by the IFI; to the defendant Bernardino Taeza. The defendant registered the
parcels of land, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T 77995 and T 77994 were issued in his
name. The respondent then occupied a portion of the land. IFI allegedly demanded the
respondent to vacate the said land which he failed to do. In January 1990, a complaint for
annulment of sale was filed by the IFI this time through Supreme Bishop Most Rev. Tito
Pasco with the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3.
On November 6, 2001, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. It
held that the deed of sale executed by and between Rev. Ga and the respondent is null and
void. The respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. On a Decision dated June
30, 2006, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and ruled that petitioner being a
corporation sole, validly transferred ownership over the land through its Supreme Bishop,
who was at the time the administration of all properties and the official representative of the
Church.
Issue(s):

1. Whether or not then Supreme Bishop Rev. Ga is authorized to enter into a

contract of sale in behalf of petitioner.
2. Whether or not the February 5, 1976 deed of sale with mortgage is enforceable.
3. Whether or not Bernardo Taeza is a buyer in bad faith.
Ruling:
1. No. Article IV (a) of their Canons provides that all real properties of the Church
located or situated in such parish can be disposed of only with the approval and
conformity of the laymens committee, the parish priest, the Diocesan Bishop,
with sanction of the Supreme Council, and finally with the approval of the
Supreme Bishop, as administrator of all the temporalities of the Church. The
trial court found that the laymens committee indeed made its objection to the
sale known to the Supreme Bishop thus, when the Supreme Bisip executed the
contract of sale, he acted beyond his powers.
2. The February 5, 1976 Deed of Sale is unenforceable. This case clearly falls under
the category of unenforceable contracts mentioned in Article 1403, paragraph (1)
of the Civil Code, which provides The following contracts are unenforceable,
unless they are ratified:
(1) These entered into in the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation or who has acted beyond his
powers;
3. Bernardo Taeza is a buyer who acted in bad faith. Here, the present action was
filed on January 19, 1990, while the transfer certificates of title over the subject
lots were issued to respondents predecessor in interest, Bernardo Taeza only
on Febraury 7, 1990.
19. Ralph P. Tua vs. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang and Rossana Honrado Tua
The Facts:
On May 23, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) against Ralph Tua for Rossana Honrado Tua and her minor children. The petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion to Lift TPO, he contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23,
2005 is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause of the constitution.
Without awaiting for the resolution of his comment on the petition and motion to lift TPO,
petitioner filed with Court of Appeals for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injection and
hold departure order assailing the May 23, 2005 TPO issued by the Regional Trial Court
which was denied for lack of merit on October 28, 2005.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not the issuance of the Temporary Protection order against Ralph Tua
is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion
when The RTC issued the TPO.
Ruling:
1. No. In respect to Section 15 of R.A. 9262, to issue a TPO on the date of the filing
of the application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance
thereof. The alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e. he cocked the gun and
pointed the same to his head in order to convince respondent not to proceed with
legal separation case and others; while not conclusive, are enough bases for the
issuance of TPO.
2. No. It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as in equivalent of lack of
jurisdiction such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary personal hostility

and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty

or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.

20. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Toledo Power, Inc.

The facts:
Toledo Power, Inc. is a general partnership duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws. On June 20, 2002, Toledo Power, Inc. filed an application with the Energy
Regulatory Commission for the issuance of Certificate of Compliance pursuant to the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9136, known as the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2007 (EPIRA). On September 30, 2003, pursuant to the procedure prescribed
in Revenue Regulation No. 7 95, petitioner filed with the BIR RDO No. 83, an
administrative claim for refund or unutilized input VAT for the third and fourth quarter of
2001 the aggregate amount of P9, 129, 370.27. Commissioner of Internal Revenue has not
ruled upon respondents claim. On January 30, 2004, petititioner filed a Motion fo
Consolidation CTA Case nos. 6805 and 6851 which was partially granted bu the CTA First
Division after presenting its testimonial and documentary evidence, ordering the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund or to issue a tax credit certificate in favor of
Toledo Power, Inc. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed a Motion for
Reconsideration against the Decisions and was denied by the CTA En Banc for lack of merit
yet, modified the Decision dated May 17, 2007 and Resolution dated October 15, 2007. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue seeks recourse to this Court.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not Toledo Power, Inc. complied with the 120 + 30 day rule under Section
112 (C) of the Tax Code.
2. Whether or not Toledo Power, Inc. complied with the invoicing requirements under
the Tax Code.
Ruling:
1. TPI filed its third and fourth quarterly VAT returns for 2001 on October 25, 2001 and
January 25, 20012 respectively. It then filed an administrative claim for refund of its
unutilized input VAT for the third and fourth quarters of 2001 on September 30, 2003.
It appears that TPIs judicial claims for refund of its unutilized input VAT covering
the third and fourth quarters of 2001 were prematurely filed on October 24, 2003 and
January 22, 2004, respectively. Therefore, TPIs refund claim of unutilized input VAT
for the third quarter of 2001 was denied for being prematurely filed with the CTA,
while its refund claim of unutilized input VAT for the fourth quarter of 2001 may be
entertained since it falls within the exception.
2. Yes. Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations provides the invoicing requirements
which states the all VAT registered persons shall, for every sale or lease of goods or

properties or services, issue duly registered receipts or sales or commercial invoices

which must show the name, TIN and address of seller; date of transaction; quantity,
unit cost and description of merchandise or nature or service; the name, Tin, business
style, if any, and address of the VAT registered purchase, customer or client; the
word zero rated imprinted on the invoice covering zero rated sales; and the
invoice value or consideration. The words zero-rated appeared on the VAT
invoices/official receipts presented by the TPI in support of its refund claim.

21. Philippine National Bank vs. San Miguel Corporation

The Facts:
On July 1, 1996, San Miguel Corporation entered into an Exclusive Dealership
Agreement with Rodolfo R. Goraza. Goroza applied for and was granted a letter of credit by
the Philippine National Bank. Sometime in January 1998, Goroza started to become

delinquent with his account. Upon respondents Motion to Declare Defendant in default,
Goroza was declared in default. On May 10, 2005, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
Decision ordering Goroza to pay SMC the principal amount of the credit, interest incurred,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. On October 14, 2005, the RTC issued a Supplemental
Judgment that the Court omitted by inadvertence to insert in its decision date May 10, 2005
the phrase without prejudice to the decision that will be made against the other co
defendant, Philippine National Bank, which was not declared in default.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court did not erred in rendering a Supplemental
Judgment and amended order against the bank despite the perfection of appeal of one
of the defendants.
2. Whether or not the proceedings continue against Philippine National Bank despite the
complete adjudication of relief in favor of San Miguel Corporation.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The appeal of Goroza, assailing the judgment of the RTC finding him liable, will
not prevent the continuation of the ongoing trial between San Miguel Corporation and
Philippine National Bank. The Regional Trial Court retains jurisdiction insofar as
PNB is concerned, because the appeal made by Goroza was only with respect to his
own liability. As to separate judgment, PNB has a counterclaim against SMC which is
yet to be resolved by the RTC. In fact, contrary to PNBs claim, there is nothing in the
RTC judgments which ruled that Goroza is solely liable to pay the amount which
SMC seeks to recover. PNBs liability, if any, under the letter of credit is yet to be
determined.
2. Yes. It is clear from the proceeding held before and the orders issued by the RTC that
the intention of the trial court is to conduct separate proceedings to determine the
respective liabilities of Goroza and PNB, and thereafter, to render several and
separate judgments for or against them. While ideally, it would have been more
prudent for the trial court to render a single decision with respect to Goroza and PNB,
the procedure adopted the RTC is allowed under Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that in an action against several defendants, the court may,
when a several judgments is proper, render judgments against one or more of them,
eaving the action to proceed against the others. Section 5 of the same rule provides
that the judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of
and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims.

22. Republic of the Philippines, represented by The Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Highways vs. Tetro Enterprises, Incorporated
The Facts:
On February 10, 1992, Tetro Enterprises, Inc. filed with Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga a Complaint for recovery of possession and damages against the
Republic of the Philippines represented by the DPWH, alleging that sometime in 1974,
petitioner, without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale,
constructed a road on the subject lot depriving the respondent of possession without due
process of law; and, despite its repeated demands, petitioner refuse to return the subject and to
pay the rent for the use of the same since 1974. Since it is impossible to return the subject lot
to the respondent, the RTC converted the action for recovery of possession to eminent domain
and expropriation. On March 29, 1996, the RTC rendered a decision fixing the price of the
subject lot which totals to the amount of P75, 858,000.00. The petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied in October 3, 1996. On December 13, 1996, petitioner filed a
Notice of Appeal, which was denied in January 7, 1997, since the decision had become final

and executory. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was
dismissed in June 9, 1997. A motion for reconsideration of the CA was also denied in a
Resolution dated August 6, 1997. The case was then remanded to the RTC for the
computation of damages for the loss of the use and enjoyment of the subject lot which totals
to P57, 631, 680.00 from the report of a professional licensed appraiser on the fair rental
value of the subject lot. Petitioner filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
urgent prayer for temporary restraining order alleging grave abuse of discretion committed by
the RTC in allowing substantial amendments of the complaint at the very late stage of the
proceedings. In finding no grave abuse of discretion in the part of the RTC, the CA denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration in the Resolution dated May 8, 2008.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Regional Trial Court
committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the
amended complaint.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent alleged that the subject property used to be a sugar land earmarked
for a subdivision, but no evidence was adduced before the trial court. Any attempt on the
Courts part to award damages in the present appeal would then be purely speculative. Thus,
there is a need to remand this case to the court of origin to determine the amount of damages
the respondent suffered since 1974. The only thing the RTC was asked to do when the case
was remanded to it by the CA was to determine the damages the respondent is entitled to, the
case was not considered a new case where an amendment of the complaint may still be
allowed. The Court finds that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it admitted respondents amended complaint which increased the
amount claimed as back rentals. The factors which do not exist at the time of the taking could
not be considered. The CA then could not award damages since no evidence yet was
introduced at the RTC at that time. The petition for review is granted, the Court reversed the
decision dated November 29, 2007 and the Resolution dated May 8, 2008 which was issued
by the Court of Appeals and the RTC Orders are nullified and set aside.
23. Atty. Marcos R. Sundiang vs. Erlito DS. Bacho
The Facts:
On Novermber 12, 2004, the Regional Trial Court issued a Writ of Demolition against
Pedro and Rosie Galacan, Vicente Quesada, Pablo Quesada, Antonio and Norma Bagares for
denying the legal owner of the use and possession of a parcel of residential lot. The
complainant averred that prior to the issuance of the Writ of Demolition, respondent sheriff
demanded and received One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos for the implementation of the
writ. Despite the receipt of the amount, respondent failed to place the plaintiffs in possessions
of the property because he failed to remove the structures inside and in front of the property.
Issue(s):
Whether or not Erlito DS. Bacho can be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
Ruling:
Yes. Sheriffs are mandated to comply with Sec. 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
which provides, to prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ; to ask
for the courts approval of his estimates; to render an accounting and to issue and official
receipt for the total amount he received from the judgment error; of which the sheriff failed to
observe, making him administratively liable. Any amount received by sheriffs in excess of the
lawful fees allowed in Section 10 is an unlawful exaction. It constitutes unauthorized fees.
This renders them liable for grace misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.

24. Team Energy Corporation (Formerly Mirant Pagbilao Corporation) vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue G.R. No. 197760
The Facts:
On December 17, 2004, the petitioner filed with the BIR Audit Information, Tax
Exemption and Incentives Division an Application for VAT Zero Rate for the supply of
electricity to the NPC from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005 which was approved. On
December 20, 2006, petitioner filed an administrative claim for cash refund or issuance of tax
credit certificate corresponding to the input VAT reported in its Quarterly VAT Returns. Due
to respondents inaction on its claim, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review before the
Court on April 18, 2007. In a Decision dated July 13, 2010 the Court of Tax Appeals Special
First Division partially granted petitioners claim for refund or issuance of tax credit
certificate. The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision which
was granted by the CTA Special First Division and ordered that the July 13, 2010 Decision is
reversed and set aside for having been prematurely filed, the petitioners judicial claim for
refund should have been filed not earlier than April 19, 2007, however, the petitioner filed its
judicial claim on April 18, 2007 or only 199 days from December 20, 2006, thus, prematurely
filed. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc arguing that the
requirement to exhaust the 120 day period for respondent to act on its administrative claim
for input VAT refund/credit under Section 122 (C) of the NIRC is merely a species of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and, therefore, not jurisdictional which was
denied for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied
in a Resolution dated July 15, 2011.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
instant case.
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner filed its judicial claim on April 18, 2007 or after the issuance of BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 on December 10, 2003 but before October 6, 2010, the date when the
Aichi case was promulgated. Thus, even though petitioners judicial claim was prematurely
filed without waiting for the expiration of the 120-day mandatory period, the CTA make still
take cognizance of the instant case as it was filed within the period exempted from the 12-30day mandatory period.

25. Team Energy Corporation (formerly Mirant Pagbilao Corporation) vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (G.R. No. 190928)
The facts:
The petitioner filed with Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) its first to fourth quarterly
value added tax (VAT) returns for the calendar year 2002. On December 22, 2003, petitioner
filed an administrative claim for refund of unutilized input VAT for calendar year 2002. Due
to respondents inaction, petitioner elevated its claim before the Court of Tax Appeals First
Division on April 22, 2004. After trial on the merits, the CTA First Division ordered the
respondent to refund or issue a tax credit certificate to petitioner. Respondent filed his Motion
for Partial Reconsideration against said decision, which was denied by the CTA First Division
in a Resolution dated September 8, 2008. On October 10, 2007, respondent filed a Petition for
Review with the CTA En Banc. In a Decision dated August 14, 2009, the CTA En Banc
affirmed the CTA First Divisions decision but reduced the refundable amount. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration against said decision but was denied in a Resolution dated
January 5, 2010.
Issue(s):
Whether or not petitioner timely filed its judicial claim for refund of input VAT for
the first quarter of 2002.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no question that petitioner timely filed its administrative claim with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue within the required period. However, since its administrative
claim was filed within the two year prescriptive period and its judicial claim was filed on
the first day after the expiration of the 120 day period granted to respondent, to decide on its
claim, we rule that petitioners claim for refund for the first quarter of 2002 should be
granted.