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MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS.

GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156. FEBRUARY 3, 1997
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong
Berhad. MPHs bid was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of
the Manila Hotel bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH
matches RBs bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution**, but GSIS
refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB.
RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that:
1.

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is merely a statement of principle and
policy (not self-executing);

2.

Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as the legit buyer of shares.
HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino First Policy.

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used
the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.
Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our
people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood.

Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to individuals but to corporations as well and other
juridical entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make
a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the
pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an
indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a
qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
**Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates,
reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that
will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its
national goals and priorities.

FREEDOM CONSTITUION
[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.
SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986

In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972, People's Crusade
for Supremacy of the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino,
et al., the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that her government is illegal because it was
not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated below. On April 17, 1986,
Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they would pursue
the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.
The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of
action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people
of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de
jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO (G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)
FACTS: 1.On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power.2.On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of
the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people are the judge. The Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; It is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and law a de jure government The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA
G.R. No. 78059, August 31 1987, 153 SCRA 602
FACTS:

In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners
as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the
Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M. de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent
OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The other petitioners were also replaced. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the
Minister of Local Government."
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6)
years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or
up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the
authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Memorandum issued by the OIC Governor designating the respondents to replace the petitioners from their
respective positions was valid.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held it was not valid. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore,
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could
no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure especially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares
it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities. Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the
barangays form a part, and limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local governments. Relevantly, Section 8, Article X
of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
Sec 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years...
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

AMENDMENT AND REVISION distinguished


STEPS IN AMENDATORY PROCESS
(Article 17 Sections 1-4)

Imbong vs. Comelec [35 SCRA 28]


Petitioner: Imbong
Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)
Petitioner: Gonzales
Respondent: Comelec Ponente: Makasiar
RELATED LAWS: Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each
representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970.RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2
Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of 320delegates a proportioned among
existing representative districts according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates
.RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.
Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy
Sec 2: apportionment of delegates
Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from assuming any appointive
office/position until the final adjournment of the ConCon.
Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a delegate to the convention.
FACTS: This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to
the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law
Imbong:
ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call is
constitutional.
HOLDING: The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific
provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.
RATIO: Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution-Constitutionality of enactment of RA
6132:Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by
votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough
that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted
more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other

provinces with more population.- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof.
Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and
to allow them to devote more time to the Constitutional Convention.- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and
also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of
political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.

Occena v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Fernando, C.J.
Facts: Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions
is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.
Issue: What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how may it be exercised? More specifically
as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal,
and the standard required for a proper submission?
Held: The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: The Interim Batasang
Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof. One of such powers is
precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with
the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and
Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose
the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is
concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. Considering that the
proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and

judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935
Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass
media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.
Issue: Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the
Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather than amendment?
Held: Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present
Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment;
because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about
the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one is no argument
against the validity of the law because amendment includes the revision or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate,
whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is
ratified by the sovereign people.
Issue: What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission?
Held: The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is
needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as
well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a
constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises
its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies,
such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote
of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of
147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2
with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed
not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such
amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly
informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no
ambiguity to the applicable provision: Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of

the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision. The
three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In
the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)


MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as
founding members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.

FACTS: Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for
an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of said
Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
(3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct

of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners
contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 is void.
ISSUE: Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system
of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .
HELD: NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the
Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution are declared void.
RATIO: Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading.
Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel
before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics
Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in
the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry
list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be
entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not
fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which
reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the

Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PUNO, concurring and dissenting
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss
the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally
defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to
the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
VITUG, concurring and dissenting
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe
the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional amendments.
[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under the ponencia should be held to cover only
the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the
Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.
FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia.
Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)

PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting


Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the initiatory Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the people through initiative, there is no implementing
law for the purpose. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void.
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of signatures in this case,
12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no public funds may be spent and
no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any
petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majoritys two other rulings.

PRIMA VS COMELEC (GR NO 129745)


On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the
Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was supported by around five (5) million signatures
in compliance with R.A.6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC, among
others: (1) cause the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of
general and local circulation; (2) order all election officers to verify the signatures collected in support of
the petition and submit these to the Commission; and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite where the following
proposition would be submitted to the people for ratification: Do you approve amendments to the 1987

Constitution giving the President the chance to be reelected for another term, similarly with the VicePresident, so that both the highest officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of six
years each, and also to lift the term limits for all other elective government officials, thus giving Filipino
voters the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose, Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article
VI and Section 8 of Article X, respectively? The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of
the permanent restraining order issued by the Court in Santiago v. COMELEC.PIRMA filed with this Court a
Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to set aside the COMELEC Resolution dismissing its petition
for initiative. PIRMA argued that the Courts
decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling
was not definitive based on the deadlocked voting on the motions for reconsideration, and because there
was no identity of parties and subject matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court
to reexamine its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC. The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and
certiorari in its resolution dated September 23, 1997. It explained: The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous
vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June10,
1997.The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second issue posed
by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief
Justice and six (6)other members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres,
JJ., voted that there wasno need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said
second issue since the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court,
namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco,Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a need for such a re
examinationx x x x9In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice Bellosillo stated that
the PIRMA petition was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

SANIDAD VS COMELEC

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the
Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the
interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the
length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the
President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by
declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No.
1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD
No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October
16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there
is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to
the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the
court cannot take cognizance of it.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is
especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by
proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.
Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution
resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory
Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to
propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1,
pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than
calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru
Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the
regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought
to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031,
and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid,
thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this
Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme
Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without
the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all
other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that
the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged
within its limits.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and
he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD - petitioner; newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a
weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras
COMELEC - respondent; through its Solicitor- General
Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ISSUE: Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional or not.
FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a plebescite fo its
ratification (original schedule was reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990.
Allegations of Sanidad:
1.Unconsitutional as it it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press bause of its penal provsions in
case of violation
Responses of COMELEC
-Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press but only a valid
implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as
enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA 6646
-Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act.

He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime
(magazine/periodical in the province)

HELD: Petition is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and
unconstitutional . TRO made permanent due to the following reasons:
1. It has no statutory basis
2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason
3. Affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the
right to expression may be exercised.

Romualdez-Yap vs. Civil Service Commission


Petitioner: Estelito P. Mendoza
Respondents: The Solicitor General for the Civil Service Commission, Domingo A. Santiago, Jr. for Philippine
National Bank.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing Resolution No. 92-201 of the
respondent Civil Service Commission, which upheld the petitioner's separation from the Philippine National
Bank(PNB) as a result of the abolition of the Fund Transfer Department pursuant to a reorganization under
Executive Order No. 80, dated 3 December 1986.
Petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the Philippine National Bank on 20 September 1972 as
special assistant with the rank of Second Assistant Manager assigned to the office of the PNB President. After
several promotions, she was appointed in 1983 Senior Vice President assigned to the Fund Transfer Department.
Starting 1 April 1986 up to 20 February 1987, petitioner filed several applications for leave of absence (due to
medical reasons) which were duly approved. While she was on leave, Executive Order No. 80 (Revised Charter of
the PNB) was approved on 3 December 1986. Said executive order authorized the restructure/reorganization and

rehabilitation of PNB. Pursuant to the reorganization plan, the Fund Transfer Department was abolished and its
functions transferred to the International Department.
Consequently, petitioner was notified of her separation from the service in a letter dated 30 January 1987, thus:
Pursuant to the Transitory Provision of the 1986 Revised Charter of the Bank, please be informed that Management
has approved your separation from the service effective February 16, 1986. You shall be entitled to the regular
benefits allowed under existing law. (emphasis supplied)
Please be informed further that under Sec. 37 of the Bank's 1986 Revised Charter, any officer or employee who
feels aggrieved by any matter treated above may submit his case to the Civil Service Commission
In her motion for reconsideration with the Civil Service Commission, dated 5 March 1990, questioning Chairman
Barlongay's ruling, petitioner claimed:
1. The opinion/ruling was not fully supported by the evidence on record;
2. Errors of law prejudicial to the interest of the movant have been committed. She argued that her separation from
the service was illegal and was done in bad faith considering that her termination on February 16, 1986 was made
effective prior to the effectivity of Executive Order No. 80 on December 3, 1986, which law authorized the
reorganization of the PNB, and even before February 25, 1986, when President Corazon C. Aquino came into
power. She further claims that although the notice of termination was dated January 30, 1987 it was only served
upon her on February 16, 1987 when the new Constitution which guarantees security of tenure to public employees
was already in effect.
Overruling her imputation of bad faith, i.e. her separation was illegal because it took effect on 16 February
1986 or even before the promulgation of EO No. 80 on 3 December 1986, the CSC noted that the year "1986"
stated in the notice of her separation from the service was a typographical error. PNB submitted documents
(p. 6 of Resolution No. 92-201) supporting its stand that the separation actually took effect on 16
February 1987.
In the present petition before the Court, the following issues are raised:

1. Existence of bad faith in the reorganization of the Philippine National Bank resulting in the separation from the
service of petitioner.
2. Erroneous application of the Dario v. Mison doctrine vis-a-vis PNB's reorganization.
3. Erroneous application of the one (1) year prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings in petitioner's case.
Restoring petitioner to her previous position with backwages would be unjust enrichment to her, considering that she
had abandoned or showed lack of interest in reclaiming the same position when the bank was not yet fully
rehabilitated and she only insisted on reinstatement in August 1989 or two (2) years after her alleged unjustified
separation.
To those who feel that their unjustified separation from the service is for a cause beyond their control, the
aforecited Magno case teaches: while We fully recognize the special protection which the Constitution, labor laws,
and social legislation accord the workingman, We cannot, however, alter or amend the law on prescription to relieve
him of the consequences of his inaction. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt (Laws come to the
assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleeping). His explanation that he could not have filed the complaint earlier
because "he was prevented to do so beyond his control for the simple reason that private respondent have (sic)
tried to circumvent the law by merely floating" him is very flimsy and does not even evoke sympathetic
consideration, if at all it is proper and necessary. We note that petitioner herein is not an unlettered man; he seems
to be educated and assertive of his rights and appears to be familiar with judicial procedures. He filed a motion for
extension of time to file the petition and the petition itself without the assistance of counsel. We cannot believe that if
indeed he had a valid grievance against PNCC he would not have taken immediate positive steps for its redress.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed CSC resolution is AFFIRMED. The petition is DISMISSED for
failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of said CSC in rendering the questioned resolution. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

FONTANILIA VS. MALIAMAN

(194 SCRA 486) February 27, 1991


Facts: The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary
functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the
tortuous act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.
Issue: Whether NIA is performing governmental functions and is thus exempt form suit for damages caused by the
negligent act of its driver who is not its special agent
Held: No, The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or
ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes
merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. The functions of providing water supply
and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of government even though the service rendered
caters to the community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society.
The NIA was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a
service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make
the NIA essentially and purely a government-function corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of
constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including
all communal and pump irrigation projects. Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited
by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which
is the irrigation of lands.
The NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a
mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held
liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

PVTA VS. CIR (65 SCRA 416)


July 25, 1975
Facts: Private respondents filed a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services
in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid
to them and the amount allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration would predicate its
plea for the reversal of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of
respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue: whether PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions
Held: No. A reference to the enactments creating Petitioner Corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit of
petitioners plea that it performs governmental and not proprietary functions. As originally established by Republic
Act No. 2265, its purposes and objectives were set forth thus: (a) To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia
tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of
economic security; (b) To establish and maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its
manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to
cover the cost of production plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create,
establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise
the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return of
their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying, and inspecting of Virginia
tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry. The
amendatory statute, Republic Act No. 4155, renders even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first
section on the declaration of policy reads: It is declared to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia
tobacco industry, to encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities
marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and,
to create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public,
blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes. The
objectives are set forth thus: To attain this national policy the following objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financing;
2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia

Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and conditions in order that a reinvigorated Virginia
tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally manufactured
cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding
exportation at a ratio of one kilo of imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the importerexporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration.
Functions relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property
rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those
relating to national defense and foreign relations may not be strictly considered constituent. Under the traditional
constituent-ministrant classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these latter functions
being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. Nonetheless, the growing
complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government
quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which
the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only because it was better equipped to administer for the
public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals, continue to lose their well-defined boundaries
and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a
greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a
national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.

DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE GUARDIAN OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE

CABANAS VS PILAPIL
MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellate vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant
(58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974)
Facts: Florentino Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, Millian Pilapil, as the beneficiary and
authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughters minority. The lower court decided to
give the mother of the child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the
Civil Code and the consideration of the childs welfare. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention
of the amount in question by
invokingthe terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy.
Issue: Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an
insurance policy from the deceased.
Ruling: With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis, the decision is affirmed with costs
against the defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that the father, or in his absence the mother, is
the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance." And Article 321 state that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or
industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother
under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives.With the added condition that the child
stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the
test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration. It is reinforced by
its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is calledupon
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative
of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or
in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible

monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." There is a constitutional
provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the
Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that
even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to
aconstitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with
the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null andvoid. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor,
Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of
this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."
Parens Patriae
A doctrine that grants the inherent power and authority of the stateto protect persons who are legally
unable to act on their own behalf.

DE JURE AND DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS

Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon


75 Phil 113
Facts: The respondent judge of the lower court refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceeding of civil
case No. 3012 of said court which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines. He argued that the proclamation issued by
Gen. Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the
courts of the said governments. He also argued that the said governments during the Japanese occupation were
noted facto governments.
Issue: Whether or not the governments established in the Philippines under the names of Philippines Executive
Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime was de
facto governments.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the Philippine Executive Commission which was organized border No. 1 by the
Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and
therefore a de facto government of the second kind. The source of its authority comes from the Japanese military, it
is a government imposed by the laws of war. The same is true with the Republic of the Philippines. Apparently
established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was,
in truth and reality, a government established by the Japanese forces of occupation.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES


NADECO VS. TOBIAS (7 SCRA 692)
G.R. No. L-17467, National Development Company and PNB v. Tobias
April 23, 1963 G.R. No. L-17467
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, represented by its Agents, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE YULO TOBIAS, defendant-appellee.
Ramon de los Reyes for plaintiff-appellant.
Vicente Hilado for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal taken by plaintiff, National Development Company, represented by its agent, The Philippine National Bank,
from an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissing plaintiff's complaint upon the ground of
prescription of action, without special pronouncement as to costs.
In said complaint, filed on March 22, 1960, plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant, Jose YULO TOBIAS, the sum
of P6,905.81, plus interest and attorney's fees, under a promissory note of said defendant, dated and issued on May
13, 1946, for the sum of P7,000.00, payable "on demand after date" to the order of said plaintiff. Upon being
summoned, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that "the action upon which the complaint is
based has prescribed long ago," more than ten (10) years having elapsed since May 13, 1946, when said
promissory note was issued and plaintiff's action accrued. Hence, the aforementioned order of dismissal, which
plaintiff assails as erroneous upon the theory that the statute of limitations does not run against the plaintiff because
the same is an instrumentality of the Government. In support of this view plaintiff cites the case of the Government
of the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad (35 Phil. 738).
Plaintiffs pretense is clearly devoid of merit. The case cited is not in point, it having been instituted by the
Government of the Philippine Islands. Plaintiff herein is neither the Government of the Republic nor a branch or
subdivision thereof. It is true that plaintiff is an instrumentality of such Government, but as this Court has held in the
case of Association Cooperative de Credito Agricola de Miagao vs. Monteclaro (74 Phil. 281), "even the Agricultural

and Industrial Bank, which is a government owned and controlled corporation and which has been created to
promote agriculture and industry on a larger scale than agriculture credit cooperative associations, cannot be said to
exercise a sovereign function. It is, like all other corporation capitalized by the Government, a business corporation,"
and, as such, its causes of action are subject to the statute of limitations. To the same effect are the cases
of Monteadora vs. Cebu Portland Cement Co. (54 O.G. 4289), Price Stabilization Corp. vs. CIR (54 O.G.
4472), GSIS vs. Castillo(52 O.G. 4269), and Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Co. (73 Phil.
374).
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts.
That plaintiff herein does not exercise sovereign powers and, hence, can not invoke the exemptions thereof
but is an agency for the performance of purely corporate, proprietary or business functions, is apparent from its
Organic Act (Commonwealth Act 182, as amended by Commonwealth Act 311) pursuant to section 3 of which it
"shall be subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as they are not inconsistent" with the provisions
of said Commonwealth Act "and shall have the general powers mentioned in said" Corporation Law, and, hence,
"may engage in commercial, industrial, mining, agricultural, and other enterprises which may be necessary or
contributory to the economic development of the country, or important in the public interest," as well as "acquire,
hold, mortgage, and alienate personal and real property in the Philippines or elsewhere . . .; make contracts of any
kind and description" and "perform any and all acts which a corporation or natural person is authorized to perform
under the laws now existing or which may be enacted hereafter."
In fact, plaintiff was sentenced to pay costs in Batongbacal v. National Development Co. (49 O.G. 229),
and National Development Co. vs. CIR, L-13209 (September 30, 1959), despite the fact that "no costs shall be
allowed against the Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by Law," pursuant to Rule 131, Section 1,
of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against plaintiff-appellant.

SOVERIENGTY
Ruffy vs Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-533


75 Phil 875
August 20, 1956
Petitioners: Ramon Ruffy, et al.
Respondents: The Chief of Staff, et al.
FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military
men were assigned at designated camps or military bases all over
the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner
and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit
and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and
fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the
new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of
command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his
fellow petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at


the time the offense was committed, which was at the time of war
and the Japanese occupancy.
HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to
military law since members of the Armed Forces were still covered by
the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during
an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman
is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners
liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating
officers, which make them even more eligible for the military court's
jurisdiction. In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no
merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Laurel vs. Misa
77 Phil. 856
FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to
the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of
sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the
Republic.
HELD: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or
sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government still had
the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced.

Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus,
there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the
sovereign the Filipino people is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government,
from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippine

LAUREL V. MISA
FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted
for the crime of treason for the reasons that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines
and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended; and that there
was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE GOVERNMENT BECOMES
SUSPENDED DURING OCCUPATION
HELD: No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of
their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains
vested in the legitimate government.
What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the

reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military
occupation.
DISSENT: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law adopted by
our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec. 3 ] as part of law of the nation.
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading
power whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced government, if it is
legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabit ants such obedience as may be
necessary for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of the law and order, and for the proper
administration of the country.

ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
GARCIA VS. CHIEF OF STAFF
16 SCRA 120
Facts: The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, an action to collect a sum of money against
the above defendants. He suffered injuries while undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca,
Pampanga. He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant Generals Office
which later disallow his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff, the same Adjutant Generals
Office denied the claim, alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610 which took

effect January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was deprived of his sight or vision
rendering him permanently disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim, plaintiff was
deprived of his disability pension from July 1948 totalling no less than P4,000 at the rate of P20/mo and suffered
moral damages and attorneys fees the amount of P2,000. The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of
Staff of AFP file separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court;
that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
Acting on the said Motion, the Court of First Instance, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint
on the ground that action has prescribed. Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the
plaintiff has interposed this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court is right in dismissing the complaint.
Held: The SC uphold the order of dismissal for the simple reason that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, it being a money claim against the government. It was already held in the case of New
Manila Lumber vs. Republic in L-14248, 4/28/60, that a claim for the recovery of money against the government
should be filed with the Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State can not be sued without its consent.
Commonwealth Act 327 provides:
Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the
Auditor General shall act and decide the same within 60 days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays after their
presentation.

Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim,
may within 30 days from receipt of decision, take an appeal in writing to (c) the Supreme Court, if the appellant is a
private person or entity.

The well established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative remedies had been exhausted
and that actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative officer could grant
relief is applicable to this case. The order dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

Case Digest: Sanders and Moreau, Jr. vs. Veridiano II


10 June 1988
G.R. No. L-56930
FACTS: Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably
to the pertinent rules and regulations of the US DoD. Moreau sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change
of employment status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a
complaint for damages against the herein petitioners claiming that the letters contained libelous imputations against the
two. Due to the failure to appear in the court, Moreau and Sanders were declared in default.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been
sued for damages.
RULING: It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department
of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their employment, work assignments,

discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The same can be said for Moreau. Given the official character of the
above-described letters, it can be concluded that the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States
government. There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to
be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.

TEST IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE SUIT IS AGAINST THE STATE OR


NOT

USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644 Case Digest


These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The
United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that
they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
FACTS:
1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with
the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The
respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not
included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.
2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at
Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine into the
soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and
thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty and recommended his
dismissal.
3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)
Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An information was filed against
Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from
his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it was because of the latters acts
that he lost his job.
4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)
A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US military officers) for injuries
allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on
them. The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus
incurring the injuries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by
them in the performance of their official duties.
RULING: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would
still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under
this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of

every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only
suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states
for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against
such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be
regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impeded. When the government enters into a
contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign
immunity from suit with its implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all
acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also
insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the
discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its nonsuability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is
only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no
such waiver may be implied.
In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US
government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have directly resolved
the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence
of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case
was remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a
business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for
profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity
because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against
petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as
the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genoves employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.
In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions
when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the complainant. For discharging
their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their
principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually
happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties
or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred.The needed inquiry must first be made by
the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.
NOTE:
1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE
DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS
CONTRACTS.
2. Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto)
Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent. (US v.
Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

WAIVER OF IMMUNITY -

A means authorized by statute by which a witness, before testifying or producing evidence, may relinquish the
right to refuse to testify against himself or herself, thereby making it possible for his or her testimony to be used against him or her in future
proceedings.

Waiver of Immunity refers to relinquishment of the right to refuse to testify against himself/herself by a witness. Thus s/he waives immunity
from self incrimination available to him/her under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Waiving of immunity is to be done before giving
testimony and will result in using his/her testimony against him/her in the legal proceedings before the court.

FORMS OF CONSENT
43 SCRA 360 AMIGABLE VS CUENCA
Sense and Sensibility
SENSE
: (v) to become aware of, to grasp the meaning of; understand
SENSIBILITY
: (n) awareness, responsiveness, keen consciousness and appreciationIn any cruel environment, it is common for
actors to forget putting sense and sensibility in theirdecisions, actions and words.
reeseisreal
discusses, critiques, analyzes and puts sense and sensibility(understanding and consciousness) any of the issues
happening in this cruel environment we all live in.
Friday, November 2, 2012
Amigable vs Cuenca
G.R. No. L-26400
Petitioner:
Victoria Amigable
Respondent:
Nicolas Cuenca, as Commissioner of Public Highways and the Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-26400 - 43 SCRA 360

February 29, 1972


FACTS: Victoria Amigable rightfully owned a lot in Cebu City which was used by the government for Mango and
Gorordo Avenues without her permission and without proper negotiation of sales. Because of this, she filed a case
in CFI Cebu.
Defendants argue that 1) Action was premature; 2) Right of action has already been prescribed; 3) Government
cannot be sued without its consent and; 4) Cebu already agreed to use the land as such.
CFI rendered a decision which states that Amigable cannot restore and recover her ownership and possession of
the said land and thus dismissed the complaint on grounds that state may not be sued without its consent.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Amigable may rightfully sue the government without its consent.
HELD: In the case of Ministerio vs Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes
away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and
plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains as
the rightful owner of the lot.
She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other
purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation of the exact amount, price or value of
the lot at the time of the taking.
Petition is partly GRANTED.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. GUINTO (182 SCRA 644)


FACTS: These cases are consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity.
1) US VS GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the
bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base which was won by a certain Dizon. The
respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid
an area not included in the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding.
2} US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470
Genove, employed as a cook in the Main Club at John Hay Station, was dismissed after it had been ascertained in
an investigation that he poured urine in the soup stock. Genove filed a complaint for damages against the club
manager who was also an officer of USAF.
2)US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018
Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp ODonnel, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
petitioners who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. A trialensued where petitioners
testified against respondent Bautista. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He
then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that because of the latter s acts, he was removed from his job.
3)US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258)
Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against individual petitioners for injuries allegedly
sustained by handcuffing and unleashing dogs on them by the latter. The individual petitioners, US military
officers, deny this stressing that the private respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus
incurring the injuries.In all these cases, the individual petitioners claimed they were just exercising their
official functions. The USA was not impleaded in the complaints but has moved to dismiss on the ground
that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
ISSUE: Whether the defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them
in the performance of their official duties.
HOLDING: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still
be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this
doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every
civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign

equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state
although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
consent. In the case Of US, the customary law of international law on state immunity is expressed with more
specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. There is no question that the US, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietory or private capacity. It is only when
the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.It is clear from a
study of the records of GR No. 80018 that the petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official functions
when they conducted the buy-bust operations against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his
trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.As for GR No. 80018, the record is too
meager to indicate what really happened. The needed inquiry first be made by the lower court so it may assess and
resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial.
Ruling
1)US VS GUINTO (GR No 76607)The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US
government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The petitioners cannot plead any immunity
from the complaint, the contract in question being decidedly commercial. Thus, the petition is DISMISSED and the
lower court directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of the case.
2)US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470)The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Station operated for profit as a
commercial and not a government activity. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of self immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit filed by Genove. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by
entering into the employment contract with Geneove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested
itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. Still, the court holds that the complaint against petitioners in the lower court
be dismissed. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, the petitioner acted
quite properly in terminating the private respondents employment for his unbelievably nauseating act of polluting the
soup stock with urine.
3)US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018)It was clear that the individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise
of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the
complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts

imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. The conclusion of the trial court that the
answer filed by the special counsel of Clark Air Base was a submission of the US government to its jurisdiction is
rejected. Express waiver cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a dulyenacted statute. Neither does it come under the implied form of consent. Thus, the petition is granted and the civil
case filed in the lower court dismissed.
4)US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258)The contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study
of what actually happened. The record were too meager to indicate that the defendants were really discharging their
official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. Only after the lower court shall
have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting will the court determine, if still necessary, if the
doctrine of state immunity is applicable.
NOTE: 1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS
BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS
CONTRACTS.
NOTE: 2. implied consent
1. When the State enters into a private contract. The contract must be entered into by the proper officer and within
the scope of his authority. UNLESS: the contract is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental function.
2. When the State enters into a business contract. UNLESS: The operation is incidental to the performance of a
governmental function (e.g. arrastre services). Thus, when the State conduct business operations through GOCC,
the latter can be generally be sued, even if its charter contains no express sue or be sued clause.
Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto)
Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent
(US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)