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Lenie R.

Dela Cruz Law 1-Set a

G.R. NO. 163193

JUNE 15, 2004

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results
of the national and local elections. It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs),
computer equipment, devices and materials and adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. The COMELEC
initially intended to implement the said automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections, particularly in
counting the votes collected from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the failure of the
machines to correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued its implementation.
Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 172 on January 24, 2003, allocating the sum of P2, 500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in
time for the May 10, 2004 elections. On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing the release of a further supplemental P500 million
budget for the AES project of the COMELEC.
The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual voting and counting system for the May
10, 2004 elections after contract negations with companies Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the
computerized voting/counting machines) were discontinued. Despite this impediment, the COMELEC nevertheless
continued the electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and
municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of Jurisdiction in the issuance of Resolution No. 6712. Respondent COMELEC contends that its advancement in
tabulation procedures is allowed within the statutory confines of section 52 (i) of the Omnibus Election Code that
prescribes the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, taking into account the situation
prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose. Provided, That the Commission shall notify the
authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of
technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.
Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC in authorizing the use of
election funds in consolidating the election results for the May 10, 2004 elections should be declared VOID, as it is
YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said Resolution No. 6712 preempts the sole authority of the
Congress to canvass the votes of the election returns for the President and the Vice-President.
Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive authority vested in the Congress to
canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. It is a grave error on the part of the respondent to
have ignored the misapprehensions addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to COMELEC Chairman
Benjamin Abalos during the 2004 saying that such act would be in violation of the Constitution (section 4 of Article
"any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the
votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but
would also be lacking of any constitutional authority."
The existence of an accredited Citizens arm: Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the accredited citizens arm - in this case, NAMFREL
- is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of the votes,
whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized
to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an "unofficial" count.
In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC
under the said laws, are not intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The said copies are archived and unsealed
only when needed by to verify election results in connection with resolving election disputes that may be established.
Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code: The Court contends that Section 52(i) of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not
cover the use of the latest technological and election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the
COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in areas
affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity

of the use of such devices, after failing to submit any document proving that it had notified all political parties of the
intended adoption of Resolution No. 6712. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the
law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional
or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the
limitations respected, is justiciable the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. In the present
petition, the Court must pass upon the petitioners contention that Resolution No. 6712 does not have adequate
statutory or constitutional basis.

G.R. NO. L-14639

March 25, 1919

The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, situated in
Gardenia street, in the district Sampaloc, Manila, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of
Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the
district by the police.
At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton
Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170
inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were
given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being
taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in
Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor
indirectly given their consent to the deportation. Just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting
in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an
application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to
sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not
proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department
of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control,
and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit
attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the
haciendas of Yigo and Governor Sales.
On the Supreme Courts first order, it awarded the writ that directed Mayor Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Feliciano
Yigo, and Gov. Francisco Sales to bring before the court the persons therin named, alleged to be deprived of their
liberty. None of the respondent in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents.
The Fiscal offerred certain affidavits showing that the women were certained with their life in Davao and did not
wish to return to Manila brought before the court unless: (a) the women should, in written statements voluntarily
made before the judge of first instance of Davao or (b) the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the
respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible.
Whether or not the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set
up in the Philippine Islands.
By what authority of law did the mayor of Manila presume to act in deporting by duress these persons
from Manila to other distant locality within the Philippine Islands.
Government of laws and not government of men should be set up in the Philippines. Law defines power.
Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his
freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass
upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man,
we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." No official no matter how high is above the law. "The
law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme
power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the
more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the
exercise of the authority which it gives."
There is no law permitting or authorizing Mayor Lukban in deporting the women. These women, despite
their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless chattels but Filipino citizens protected by the same
constitutional guarantees as are other citizens. Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who,
not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence. Mayor Lukban
was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same who made
arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor,
and who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the
unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the
social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the
court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the
administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his

conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive such an amount is

G.R. NO. 104732

JUNE 22, 1993

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for
prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power to
appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be
appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the
constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The
petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
The proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts. In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides: No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. In the case at bar, the subject
Proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the
constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, there is no doubt to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first
par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if
allowed bylaw or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2)
paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices
by an Appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to
be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official
to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself.


421 U.S. 491

MAY 27, 1975


The Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, pursuant to its authority under a Senate resolution to make a
complete study of the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950, began an
inquiry into the various activities of respondent organization, to determine whether they were potentially harmful to the
morale of United States Armed Forces. In connection with such inquiry, it issued a subpoena duces tecum to the bank
where the organization had an account, ordering the bank to produce all records involving the account. The
organization and two of its members then brought an action against the Chairman, Senator Members, and Chief
Counsel of the Subcommittee, and the bank to enjoin implementation of the subpoena on First Amendment grounds.
The District Court dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, although courts should hesitate
to interfere with congressional actions even where First Amendment rights are implicated, such restraint should not
preclude judicial review where no alternative avenue of relief is available, and that, if the subpoena was obeyed,
respondents' First Amendment rights would be violated.

Whether or not, the actions of petitioners fall within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.

The activities of the Senate Subcommittee, the individual Senators, and the Chief Counsel fall within the
"legitimate legislative sphere," and since it is determined that such is the case, those activities are protected by the
absolute prohibition of the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution against being "questioned in any other Place,"
and hence are immune from judicial interference.
(a) The applicability of the Clause to private civil actions is supported by the absoluteness of the term "shall not be
questioned" and the sweep of the term "in any other Place."
(b) Issuance of subpoenas such as the one in question is a legitimate use by Congress of its power to investigate, and
the subpoena power may be exercised by a committee acting, as here, on behalf of one of the Houses.
(c) Inquiry into the sources of the funds used to carry on activities suspected by a subcommittee of Congress to have
a potential for undermining the morale of the Armed Forces is within the legitimate legislative sphere.
(d) There is no distinction between the Subcommittee's Members and its Chief Counsel insofar as complete immunity
from the issuance of the subpoena under the Speech or Debate Clause is concerned, and since the Members are
immune because the issuance of the subpoena is "essential to legislating," their aides share that immunity.
(e) The subpoena cannot be held subject to judicial questioning on the alleged ground that it works an invasion of
respondents' privacy, since it is "essential to legislating."
(f) Nor can the subpoena be held outside the protection of speech or debate immunity on the alleged ground that the
motive of the investigation was improper, since, in determining the legitimacy of a congressional action, the motives
alleged to have prompted it are not to be considered.
(g) In view of the absolute terms of the speech or debate protection, a mere allegation that First Amendment rights
may be infringed by the subpoena does not warrant judicial interference.