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IX.

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
A. The President
1. Qualifications: “No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write,
at
least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding such election” [Sec. 2, Art. VII].
2. Election [Sec. 4, Art. VII].
a) Regular Election: Second Monday of May.
b) Congress as canvassing board. Returns of every election for
President and Vice President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to Congress, directed to the Senate President
who, upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, shall, not later than 30 days after
the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and
the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided
by law, canvass the votes. Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing
of the certificates. In case two or more candidates shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall be chosen by a majority vote of all the members
of Congress.
i) Sec. 18.5 of R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003),
insofar as it grants sweeping authority to the Comelec to proclaim all winning
candidates, is unconstitutional as it is repugnant to Sec. 4, Art. VII of the
Constitution vesting in Congress the authority to proclaim the winning candidates
for the positions of President and Vice-President [Makalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No.
157013, July 10, 2003].
ii) In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the
initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee, composed of members of the House
of Representatives and of the Senate. The creation of the Joint Committee does
not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the
other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under
the very Rules under attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee
shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of both Houses of Congress,
voting separately [Ruy Elias Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163556,
June 8, 2004]
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282 Constitutional Law
iii) Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may
continue to perform this constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential and
vicepresidential
election results without need of any call for a special session by the

President. The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by
express directive of Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and
to proclaim the newly-elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot,
adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For
only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus
officio [Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the votes
cast for President and Vice President, G R No 163783 June 22, 2004], ’
iv) There is no constitutional or statutory basis for Comelec to
undertake a separate and an “unofficial” tabulation of, results, whether
manually
or electronically. By conducting such “unofficial” tabulation, the Comelec
descends
to the level of a private organization, spending public funds for the purpose. This
not only violates the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an
“unofficial”
count, but also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing the election returns
and the election returns themselves. Thus, if the Comelec is proscribed from
conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and VicePresident, the Comelec is, with more reason, prohibited from making an
“unofficial”
canvass of said votes [Brillantes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004].
c) Supreme Court as Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The Supreme
Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose.
3. Term of Office: six [6] years.
a) No re-election: and no person who has succeeded as President and
has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the
same office at any time.
b) The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, extended to noon of June 30, 1992 [Sec. 5, Art. XVIII], See Osmena v.
Comelec, 199 SCRA 750.
4. Oath of Office [Sec. 5, Art. VII], 5. Privileges [Sec. 6, Art. VII],
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Constitutional Law 283
a) Official residence.
b) Salary. Determined by law; shall not be decreased during tenure. No
increase shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent
during which such increase was approved.
c) Immunity from suit. In Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393, it was
held that while the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from
instituting suit. See also In Re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160. In Forbes v. Chuoco
Tiaco, 16 Phil 534, the Supreme Court said that the President is immune from civil

Under our Constitution. by order of the President) the power to invoke the privilege [Senate v. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of the inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President. he cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely those of a department Secretary [Gloria v. like the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts. appointing. Court of Appeals. such as in the area of military and foreign relations. G. i) After his tenure. ii) In Neri.R. the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief. or executive sessions of either House of Congress. the Court finds it essential to limit to the President (and to the Executive Secretary. by definition. he is covered by executive privilege. Senate Committees. 2006]. April 20. through the Executive Secretary. the courts. . 2008]. pardoning and diplomatic powers. the communications were received by a close advisor of the President. 146710-15. the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” (the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries) of the President. Thus. supra. the necessity for withholding the information must be of such a high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. second. 2000]. Ermita. there was no adequate showing by . a majority of the members of the Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the petitioner to answer the three questions asked during the Senate inquiry because the information sought by the three questions are properly covered by the presidential communications privilege. ii) Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the President.R. 180843. correspondences. an exemption from the obligation to disclose information (in this case to Congress). the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties [Estrada v. G. No. It has been defined as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from Congress. the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others [Neri v. G. are recognized as confidential. March 02. March 25. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. August 15. the public”. 169777. Secretary Neri being a member of the Cabinet and by virtue of the “proximity test”. No. and ultimately.R. Desierto. presidential conversations. and third. d) Executive Privilege. or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings. the privilege being. 2001]. Nos. First. Ermita. G. i) i) However. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege. 119903.R.as validly claimed by the President.liability. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government [Senate v. and executive privilege w. No.].

the Court noted that the total accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple amounted to P2.319. iii) This prohibition must not. Art. paragraphs (b) to (d) also apply to Members of the Cabinet. from which their net worth could be determined. The prohibition on the President and his official family is all-embracing and covers both public and private office employment. G. in direct contravention of Sec. Paragraphs (a) to (d) apply to the Vice President. In fact. Ferdinand Marcos. VII. 284 which allowed Cabinet members to hold two other offices in government. This sum should be held as the only known lawful income of the respondents Marcos since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities. as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the said officials’ office. Sandiganbayan.R. Besides. ii) In Civil Liberties Union v. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 285 i) Note. 152154. like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds.33 which. Art. 6. shall not hold any other office or employment. July 15. nor was there a showing of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. and the Secretary of Justice is an ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.the respondents of the compelling need for the information as to justify the limitation of the privilege. and under the 1973 Constitution. Prohibitions/lnhibitions [Secs. 6 & 13. No.583. 2003. under the 1935 Constitution. as required by law. i) In Republic v.372. b) Unless otherwise provided in this Constitution. the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 194 SCRA 317. however that the Vice President may be appointed to the Cabinet. however. Executive Secretary. their deputies or assistants. V///. his management of businesses. without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity. not being qualified by the phrase “in the Government” x x x This is proof of the intent of the Constitution to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. could not receive “any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities”. 13. as President. when converted to dollars at the exchange rate then prevailing would have an equivalent value of $304. The reason is that these posts do not comprise “any other . was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution. could not “receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source”. During tenure: a) Shall not receive any other emoluments from the government or any other source.43.

is prohibited from receiving any compensation for this additional office. G. To illustrate. Under Secretaries. Rules on Succession. After all. or the Office of the Ombudsman. March 12. . and the fact that the petitioner’s position as Director IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices. No. the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority and the Light Rail Transit Authority. petitioner would not have been in the Board at all [Bitonio v. who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA).R. iii) President shall not have been chosen: Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified. CO A. or as Secretaries. it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in said position. or be financially interested in any contract with.R. because his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. including government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. . OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 286 Constitutional Law c) Shall not directly or indirectly practice any other profession. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office. ii) President-elect fails to qualify: Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect'shall have qualified. or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the government or any subdivision. 2004]. but properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. It follows that the petitioner. 147392. 7. ' The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to the principal office [National Amnesty Commission v. including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. agency. September 8. Commission on Audit. participate in any business. i) Death or permanent disability of the President-elect: Vice President-elect shall become President. or instrumentality thereof. e) May not appoint spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as Members of Constitutional Commissions. 156982. 2004]. Otherwise. No. a) Vacancy at the beginning of the term. the representative would have a better right than his principal. iv) The Secretary of Labor. the petitioner attended the PEZA Board meetings by authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor. who sits in the PEZA Board merely as representative of the Secretary of Labor. G. is likewise prohibited from receiving any compensation therefor. without such designation or authority. d) Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as President until a President or a Vice President shall have been chosen and qualified. ia) In Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. should a majority of the Members of the Cabinet transmit . G. or both shall have died or become permanently disabled: The President of the Senate or. permanent disability. No. by law. b) Vacancy during the term: i) Death. and [2] act of relinquishment. or resignation of the President: Vice President shall become the President. ii) Death. In the event of inability of the officials mentioned. [i] he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. [iii] he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity). [ii] he emphasized he was leaving the palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears). in case of his inability. the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. In the press release containing his final statement. c) Temporary Disability. Congress. permanent disability. provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice President shall have qualified. removal from office. shall act as President until a President or Vice President shall be elected and qualified. [iv] he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country. March 2. i) When President transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. shall provide for the manner in which one is to act as President in the event of inability of the officials mentioned above. in case of his inability. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.iv) No President and Vice President chosen nor shall have qualified. Meanwhile. or resignation of President and Vice President: Senate President or. 2001. the Supreme Court declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 287 leaving Malacanang. removal from office. and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary: such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. by law. the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Court declared that the elements of a valid resignation are: [1] intent to resign. ii) When a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the Senate President and the Speaker their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. 146738. x x x Thereafter. and [v] he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. R. when the President transmits to the Senate President and Speaker his written declaration that no inability exists. Congress shall.

1. Art. VII: “The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines”. Executive power. VII: “x x x He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.within 5 days to the Senate President and Speaker their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. The same as the President [Sec. G. Art. 2 & 3. 1. the Vice President shall act as President. that the President is unable to OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 288 Constitutional Law discharge the powers and duties of his office. Congress determines by a 2/3 vote of both Houses. Congress shall convene without need of a call. but no Vice President shall serve for more than 2 successive terms. For this purpose. 8. d) Constitutional duty of Congress in case of vacancy in the offices of President and Vice President: At 10 o’clock in the morning of the 3rd day after the vacancy occurs. XI]. The Vice President. 2002. a) The executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. Art. the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office. x x x The convening of Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. election. the President is vested with the power to execute. C. In National Electrification Administration v. 17. Art. TheAdministrative Code of 1987 (EO 292) expressly grants the President continuing authority to . The Executive Power [Secs. Vacancy in the office of the Vice President [Sec. 3. Congress shall decide the issue.R. Art. By impeachment [Secs. within 10 days from receipt of the last written declaration or. Qualifications. then. Removal of the President. Sec. within 12 days after it is required to assemble. and within 7 days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice President to be held not earlier than 45 nor later than 60 days from the time of such call. Court of Appeals. February 15. if not in session. The Vice President may be appointed as Member of the Cabinet. term of office and removal. The bill shall be deemed certified and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by Congress. No. 143481. And if. administer and carry out laws into practical operation. within 48 hours. Powers of the President 1. otherwise. 2. the Supreme Court said that as the administrative head of the government. VII]. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 289 b) Authority to reorganize the Officeofthe President. ’] . B. Such appointment requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. if not in session. is the power of carrying out the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. VII]: The President shall nominate a Vice president from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of Congress voting separately. x x x No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the date of the next presidential election. Congress shall convene. voting separately. 9.

the President has a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts on its validity. the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department. 272 U. Gil. See Marcos v. and in Planas v. and vice versa [Domingo v. Zamora. and that all executive authority is thus vested in him. 97 Phil 143. economy and efficiency”. Thus. e. or by transferring functions from one unit to another. the Supreme Court declared that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines and no other. No. 31 (2) and (3). 2007. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. Secs. G.] However. Inc.(MEWAP) v. and it is also an exercise of his “residual powers”. the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office “to achieve simplicity. February 6. July 31.g. To remain effective and efficient. Roque. G. 52. Secretary of the Interior. 31 (2) and (3) of the Administrative Code should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. . the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing. 31 (1) of EO 292. 2003].reorganize the Office of the President. under Sec. it was held that the President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutes. Romulo. 142283. A contrary opinion would allow him to negate the will of the legislature and to encroach upon the prerogatives of the Judiciary. d) In Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines. c) In Villena v. 1 and 17. on certain “residual powers” of the President of the Philippines. [This is in keeping with the rule announced in Myers v. In contrast. United States. Manglapus. Silvosa.R. 160093. the Supreme Court opted for a stricter interpretation of executive power. in Lacson v.S. 67 Phil 451. that the specific grant of executive powers is not inclusive but is merely a limitation upon the general grant of executive power.R. Under Sec. 67 Phil 62.. 177 SCRA 668. But the power to reorganize the Office of the President under Sec. consolidating or merging units. This authority is an adjunct of the President’s power of control under Art. and in Mondano v. However. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 290 CcmstiunUmul LLT A e) It is not for the President to determine the validity of a law since this is a question addressed to the judiciary. until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional. No. 92 Phil 456. the President’s power of general supervision over local governments could be exercised by him only as may be provided by law. VII.

takes effect immediately. by the authority vested with the power. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. by law. on a person already in the public service. continues until the end of the term of the appointee.”]. The ad interim appointment is intended to prevent interruptions . ii) Regular or ad interm. usually by law. b) Appointments. It is also different from the commission in that the latter is the written evidence of the appointment. classified. Art. 8 SCRA 692]. An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in session. a) Appointment is the selection. takes effect only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or upon the next adjournment of Congress. agencies. it was held that where a person is merely designated and not appointed. Permanent appointments are those extended to persons possessing the qualifications and the requisite eligibility and are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. ambassadors. in the courts. Peralta. 188 SCRA 154. A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session. vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone. revocable at will and without the necessity of just cause or a valid investigation. Such confirmation. ia) A temporary appointment and a designation are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. VII: “The President shall nominate and. Garrucho. commissions or boards. i) Permanent or temporary. other public ministers and consuls. and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. It is distinguished from designation in that the latter simply means the imposition of additional duties.2. the ad interim appointment is deemed “bypassed” through inaction. appoint the heads of the executive departments. a designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 291 at will by the appointing authority. or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. The Power of Appointment [Sec. or in the heads of departments. Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility. and once approved. with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. will not make the incumbent a permanent appointee [Valencia v. In this sense. In the latter case. if given erroneously. The Congress may. ib) In Binamira v. 16. made on the understanding that the appointing power has not yet decided on a permanent appointee and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a permanent choice is made.

Benipayo. [c] Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. Thus. iia) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment [Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. April 2. But when an ad interim appointment is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize. Intermediate Appellate Court. Benipayo. G. [b] Ambassadors. Such disapproval is final and binding on both the appointee and the appointing power. ia) In Sarmiento v. In this case. 7. VII. 177 SCRA 259. 2002]. No. the Supreme Court declared that the foregoing are the only categories of appointments which require confirmation by the Commission on Elections. it was held that the appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Customs needs no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. 16. the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment [Matibag v. ib) In Soriano v.in vital government services that would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in government offices. a civilian agency. No. i) The first sentence of Sec. Absent such decision. supra. 153881. because the Commissioner of the Customs is not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence. inasmuch as the disapproval is a final decision of the Commission in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. On the other hand. in Quintos-Deles v. the Supreme Court said that because the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines. There is no dispute that when the Commission on Appointments disapproves an ad interim appointment. Sec. It is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office.R. c) Officials who are to be appointed bv the President. 2003. or adjournment by Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on the appointment. 16. Art. and [dj Those other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution. there is no final decision by the Commission to give or withhold its consent to the appointment. Art. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 292 Constitutional Law other public ministers and consuls. March 24. and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Art. 156 SCRA 549. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character [Matibag v. . but is now under the Department of Transporation and Communications (DOTC). the appointment of a sectoral representative falls under category [d] above. 140 SCRA 22]. the appointment of a sectoral representative by the President of the Philippines is specifically provided for in Sec. Commission on Appointments. Committee on Constitutional Commissions. says that the President shall nominate. VII. G. iib) An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution: disapproval of the appointment by the Commission on Appointments.R.]. appoint the following: {a] Heads of executive departments. the appointee can no longer be extended a new appointment. Mison. 149036. Lista. XVIII of the Constitution.

iia) In Mary Concepcion Bautista v. VII. it is the President who shall appoint the trustees. VII. as amended by R.R. which can be commenced only by the Solicitor General or by “a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another”. 113956. Obviously.August 11. the Court denied the petition for prohibition filed by the petitioner as a “taxpayer” questioning the appointment of Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments as provided in RA 7653. Endriga. however. Infact. 84 Phil 740.1999. In Lacson v. iii) Issuance of the commission. Art. ii) The second sentence of Sec.. d) Steps in the appointing process: i) Nomination by the President. and [b] Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.A. No. is unconstitutional.Art. . 16. 16. calling attention to its ruling in Calderon v. the clause “officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain” refers to military officers alone. 208 SCRA 254.R. the Supreme Court declared that a statute cannot circumvent the constitutional provisions on the power of appointment by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the co-workers in that office. July 21. No. G. VII. Romero. insofar as it requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the NLRC Chairman and commissioners. This manner of filling vacancies in public office has no constitutional basis. Article 215 of the Labor Code. by virtue of Sec. In Calderon v. 2006. Salonga. because it violates Sec. the Supreme Court held that the appointment of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not otherwise provided for in the Constitution or in the law. 172 SCRA 16. 6715. the Supreme Court said that Congress cannot. G. 16.. Singson. The petition was dismissed. ii) Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. there is no necessity for such appointment to be passed upon by the Commission on Appointments. Thus. OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 293 iib) In Tarrosa v. require the confirmation of appointments of government officials other than those enumerated in the first sentence of Sec. supra. iv) Acceptance by the appointee. Sistoza. Thus. Art. 16. Carale. VII of the Constitution which provides that the President has the power to appoint officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. states that he shall also appoint [a] All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. 107369. by law. primarily on the ground that it was in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding. Carale.the promotion and appointment of respondent officers of the PCG will not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. inManalov. because the challenged section of the law is unconstitutional. iic) In Rufino v.

VII]. i) The President may not appoint his spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as Members of the Constitutional Commissions. way before the lapse of one year. In denying the petition. Appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights. Pending such acceptance. Mendieta. the Supreme Court said that the essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. we find no abuse in the present case. whether the appointment is temporary or permanent. if abused. e) Discretion of Appointing Authority. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress. 2005. However. Pobre v. 164978. 13. including the Civil Service eligibility prescribed by law for the position. October 13. II. Lapinid v.e. Art. 14. Civil Service Commission. such as the office of Department Secretary. Ermita. Undersecretaries. cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. iii) Two months immediately before the next presidential elections . which is optional to the appointee. or as Secretaries. and to prohibit them from performing the duties of Department Secretaries. Civil Service Commission.the Supreme Court declared that an appointment is deemed complete only upon its acceptance. See Luego v. the only condition being that the appointee. several Senators. Appointment to a public office cannot be forced upon any citizen except for purposes of defense of the State under Sec. the President must necessarily appoint the alter ego of her choice as Acting Secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. 4. should possess the minimum qualification requirements. 224 SCRA 738. No.. chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices. VII]. including governmentowned or -controlled corporations [Sec. ii) Appointments extended by an acting President shall remain effective unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption of office [Sec. holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but.R. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 294 Constitutional Law i) In Pimentel v. questioned the constitutionality of the appointments issued by the President to respondents as Acting Secretaries of their respective departments. In case of a vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President. This discretion also includes the determination of the nature or character of the appointment. they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. including members of the Commission on Appointments. if issued a permanent appointment. An alter ego. the appointment may still be validly withdrawn. 197 SCRA 106. 143 SCRA 327. as an exception to the rule against involuntary servitude. Art. f) Special Constitutional Limitations on the President’s appointing power: . Art. through a law. whether temporary or permanent. i. as Ombudsman. G.

Court of Appeals. No. provided that the same is for cause and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. iiia) In De Rama v. ii) Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose continuity in office depends upon the pleasure of the President may be replaced at any time. but legally speaking. i) Members of the career service of the Civil Service who are appointed by the President may be directly disciplined by him [Villaluz v.R. Silvosa. No. the President cannot remove officials appointed by him where the Constitution prescribes certain methods for separation of such officers from public service. bureaus. the same may be exercised only for cause as may be provided by law. In the cases where the power of removal is lodged in the Presfdent. or . the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so. their separation is effected not by removal but by expiration of their term. unless prohibited by Sec. 98-5-01-SC. February 28. 15 SCRA 710].] g) The Power of Removal. There is no law that prohibits local executive officials from making appointments during the last days of their tenure. 15.]. a President or acting President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety [Sec. It is distinguished from supervision in that the latter means overseeing. the power of removal may be implied from the power of appointment.g. Art. 17. As a general rule. 100 Phil 683. Zaldivar. November 9. [Note: The presidential power of appointment may also be limited by Congress through its power to prescribe qualifications for public office. A. there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban [In Re: Mateo Valenzuela. and in accordance with the prescribed administrative procedure. G. VII: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments. and the judiciary may annul an appointment made by the President if the appointee is not qualified or has not been validly confirmed. However. VII]. or judges who are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.. Alba. 131136. the Supreme Court ruled that this provision applies only to presidential appointments. While the filling up of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest.and up to the end of his term. See Alajar v. The Power of Control [Sec. 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required by law to fill up vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein. 2001. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 295 iiib) During this period. x x x’]. 3. Secs. 1998]. 127 SCRA 231. Aparri v.M. e. Art. and offices. a) Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter [Mondano v. Court of Appeals. Chairmen and Commissioners of Constitutional Commissions who can be removed only by impeachment. supra. 15 of Article VII.

the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive. b) The alter ego principle. and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally. Romulo. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Art.D. Executive Order No. then the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.]. No. Presidential Decree No. 2007].the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 296 Constitutional Law officers perform their duties. G. which grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures. Book II. R. (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment.]. the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Romulo. to transfer functions. While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged in the legislature. 1772. is permissible under present laws [Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines (MEWAP) v. supra. Sections 1 and 17. 1416. the authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch. grants the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government which includes the power to group. July 31. 292 (Administrative Code of the Philippines). of the Constitution. Title I. performance and merit. which amended P. and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them. i) The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutes. ii) The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20. services and activities. all executives and administrative organizations are adjuncts OUTLINE ' REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 297 of the Executive Department. the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the . which may incidentally include such abolition. Also known as the “doctrine of qualified political agency”. 160093. consolidate bureaus and agencies. supra. VII. Under this doctrine which recognizes the establishment of a single executive. Further. to create and classify functions.R. (b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created. and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation [MEWAP v. to abolish offices. 6656 enumerates the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees as a result of reorganization: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned. iii) Be that as it may. (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices. and to standardize salaries and materials [MEWAP v.A. Romulo.

the same may. and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are. on appeal to the President. in which case the decision of the Cabinet Secretary carries the presumptive approval of the OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 298 Constitutional Law President. 119903. inasmuch as the questioned acts are not those of the President [Gloria v. Director of Forestry. 178 SCRA 582.R. Court of Appeals. in this case. 2000] . 205 SCRA 92]. Gatmaitan. and there is no need to appeal the decision to the President in order to complete exhaustion of administrative remedies [Kilusang Bayan. V. All projects undertaken by SBMA involving P2. Pano. South Cotabato. 125 SCRA 302]. Araneta v. ii) Applying this doctrine. the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his Cabinet Members exercising control over a particular executive department. 2003]. unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive [DENR v. except in the instances when the doctrine of qualified political agency applies. Castillo. it was held that the Executive Secretary had the authority to enter into the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with ABS-CBN. 158 SCRA 158. . supra. completes exhaustion of administrative remedies [Tan v. 101 Phil 328]. i) The President may exercise powers conferred by law upon Cabinet members or other subordinate executive officers [City of lligan v. Thus. 21 SCRA 895]. G. Ltd. G. Dominguez. the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal.. DENR Region XII Employees. Even where the law provides that the decision of the Director of Lands on questions of fact shall be conclusive when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. including Cabinet members. DENR Region XII Employees. SBMA. August 19. No.R.million or above require the approval of the President of the Philippines under LOI 620 [Hutchinson Ports Phils. No. as an alter ego of the President. No. Accordingly. is presumed to be the act of the President because the latter had not expressly repudiated the same [DENR v. be reviewed and reversed by the Executive Secretary [Lacson-Magallanes v. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary. v. G. 9 SCRA 619]. d) But the power of control may be exercised by the President only over the acts. August 31. not over the actor [Angangco v.executive departments. 2000]. the DECS Secretary cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him.]. Director of Lands. since he was acting on behalf of the President who had the power to negotiate such agreement. Arroyo. c) Appeal to the President from decisions of subordinate executive officers. e) The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) is under the control of the Office of the President. etc. 131367.R. iii) But even if he is an alter-ego of the President. 149724. in Gascon v. August 15.

132988. No. Such deferment. Villegas v. supra. iii) In Pimentel v. is unconstitutional. In Ledesma v. because jurisdiction. David v. Judge How. 4.R. Court of Appeals. modify or reverse the resolutions of his subordinates. he cannot substitute his own judgment for that of the local government unit [Drilon v. G. 187. The Crespo ruling did not foreclose the Justice Secretary’s power of review. finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. g) The President exercises only the power of general supervision over local governments [Sec. and does not confer the power of control over local government units in the Secretary of Justice. once acquired by the trial court. Aguirre. Any directive. the Supreme Court held that Sec. it was reiterated that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who exercises the power of direct control and supervision over prosecutors. This power may still be availed of despite the filing of a criminal information in Court. 2000.R.R. to revoke it on either or both grounds — is valid. 81 SCRA 842. where the Secretary of Justice exercises his power of review only after an information is filed. 235 SCRA 135]. cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. if warranted. because it violates the principle of local OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 299 autonomy. X]. however. Villegas.f) Power of control of Justice Secretary over prosecutors. however. the Secretary may affirm. as an act of supervision and control by the Justice Secretary. as well as the doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and the legislative departments in governing municipal corporations [Judge Dadole v. ii) Sec. G. i) i) On the President’s power of general supervision. Salas. which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance — and. See also Solar Team Entertainment v. Commission on Audit. 4. trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and other proceedings until the appeal is resolved. No. 125350. Lim. 2000. and in his discretion. G. because the President’s power over local governments is only .. 327. as even if the latter can set aside a tax ordinance. Administrative Order No. Enrile. which withholds 5% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of local government units. The President or any of his alter egos. 67 SCRA 47. No. Review. by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity. therefore. is not lost despite the resolution of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.A. 140863. 7160. Art. does not mean that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the Secretary of Justice. the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter had acted contrary to law. 50 SCRA 11. August 22. July 19. R. December 3. Thus. Noblejas v. 2002].

ia) The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority — the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. Balutan attended and both testified atthe hearing. on conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline. asking that the order of PGMA preventing petitioners from testifying be declared unconstitutional. individual rights may be curtailed. on will fully disobeying a superior officer. Balutan were charged with violation of Articles of War 65. In cases of invasion or rebellion. and the respondents be permanently enjoined from proceeding against the petitioners. General Gudani and Col. On recommendation of the Office of the Provost Marshal General. to civil supremacy over the military. 4. in relation to Articles of War 97. This notwithstanding. and to the general stability of our representative system of government. Senga. Art. 2006. August 15. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service. 170165. to a certain degree. De Villa: “The Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. when the public safety requires it.inchief powers are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control. The Military Powers [Sec. 18. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.R. Gudani and Col. By tradition and jurisprudence. AFP Chief of Staff General Senga wrote Senator Biazon. these commander. The Court quoted Kapunan v. Thus. x x x”] a) The Commander-in-Chief clause. chairman of the Senate Committee. VII: “The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary. he may.. for a period not exceeding sixty days.. because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of . may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Gen. of the tenet that the President is the commanderinchief of the AFP is most crucial to the democratic way of life. G. Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.” In Gudaniv. that “no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear” at the Senate hearing.one of general supervision. and not one of control. the Senate Committee on National Defense invited several senior AFP officers to testify on matters related to the conduct of the 2004 elections. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of LGU shares in the national internal revenue. i) “The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines. suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. invasion or rebellion. No. ib) The vitality. including the freedom of speech. the charges for violation of the OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 300 Constitutional Law Articles of War be quashed.

invasion or rebellion. Sec. acting as commander. 181 SCRA 623. it provides a valid standard — that the military and the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence”. the inclusion in PP 1017 of Sec. She cannot invoke a greater power when she wishes to act under a lesser power. with supporting reports forming part of the record. judging from the seriousness of the incidents.” ii) To call out (such) armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. Significantly. Art. is valid. The Court noted the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum showing a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017. must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. calling for military aid. is totally bereft of factual basis. supra. de Villa. the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017. and thus. invasion or rebellion.. the President may summon the armed forces to aid her in suppressing lawless violence. irrespective of a soldier’s personal view on the matter. Hence. addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. 17. absent any contrary allegations. should be deemed deleted from the GO. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. Macapagal-Arroyo. iia1) Under the calling-out power. It is an order issued by the President. iib) In Guanzort v. Thus. requires a delegation from Congress. invasion or rebellion. 5. issued to implement PP 1017. because legislative power is peculiarly within the province of Congress. But the words “acts of terrorism” found in the GO. by issuing Presidential Proclamation No.in-chief. the Supreme Court recognized. lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with. 17. had not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress. XII. Art. PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the President the authority to promulgate “decrees”. and thus. Likewise. the conduct of . President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence.discipline within its ranks. this involves ordinary police action. Indeed. iia2) General Order No. iia3) However. as part of the military powers of the President. a President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. the Supreme Court said that the petitioners failed to prove that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power. 1017. iia) In David v. For this OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 301 reason. XII of the Constitution is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers.

4. and the declaration was deemed harmless and without legal significance. In the exercise of the power. “The Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. The Court may only look into the sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of the power. 141284. G. the President may call out the armed forces. Perez. G. because of the declaration. the decision to call out the armed forces must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. iie) In Sanlakas v. May 10. For all legal intents. Reyes.. 147780. While the authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates from her powers as Chief Executive (the statutory authority being Sec. Zamora. it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Art. As held in Lacson v. 2001. the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion as provided under Sec. Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. the Supreme Court said that when the President calls out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence. No. There is also no basis for the apprehensions that.R. Perez. No.R. 2000. the declaration is deemed not written.. on-the-spot decisions may be necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. at the same time. The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary”. Administrative Code of 1997). The Court cannot overrule the President’s discretion or substitute its own. the Supreme Court said that the President has discretionary authority to declare a “state of rebellion”. draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. 18. the Court said that. in calling out the armed forces. At most. supra. iid) In Lacson v. . Book II.” iie1) It is pertinent to state that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. in declaring a state of national emergency in PP1017. he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. rebellion or invasion. August 15. iic) In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. 5. Chapter 2. it was held that the President’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” springs in the main from OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 302 Constitutional Law her powers as chief executive and.“saturation drives” or “areal target zoning” by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests. Be that as it may. Indeed. supra. a mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. However. a declaration of a state of rebellion is an “utter superfluity”. President Arroyo did not only rely on Sec.

206 SCRA 821. the lawmakers merely intended to return to the civilian courts jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within their jurisdiction. where it was held that military tribunals cannot try civilians when civil courts are open and functioning. R. Garcia. 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Articles) of the Articles of War. . the RTC cannot divest the General Court Martial of jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Art.A. 18. etc. General Court Martial. XII of the Constitution. supra. G. voting jointly. the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof. when public safety requires it.4282. it continues until his case is terminated. and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing [Sec. 150 SCRA 144. Military Commission No. v) The Supreme Court may review. the Supreme Court held that pursuant to R. members of the Philippine National Police are not within the jurisdiction of a military court. Thus. Macapagal-Arroyo. 2004. Kuroda v.VII of the Constitution. Art. in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.R. 162318. on the issue of whether the court martial could still assume jurisdiction over General Gudani who had been compulsorily retired from the service. iiic) In Gudani v. General Abaya. iiia) But see Olaguer v. iii) Duty of President to report action to Congress: within 48 hours. but did not divest the military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated by the Articles of War. Ramos. 75 Phil 875. iv) Congress may revoke [or extend on request of the President] the effectivity of proclamation byy a majority vote of all its members. 17. iii) The power to organize courts martial for the discipline of the members of the armed forces. create military commissions for the punishment of war criminals. where the Supreme Court said that in enacting R. ii) Duration: Not to exceed sixty days. 42 SCRA 448. i) Grounds: Invasion or rebellion. See Ruffy v. b) Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer. personally or in writing.]. 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior Officer). the Court quoted from Abadilla v. following which it shall be lifted. as these are specifically included as “service-connected offenses or crimes” under Sec. October 25. Art. Jalandoni 42 0.. VII]. where it was held that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. See Lartsang v. 6975. In Quilona v. unless extended by Congress.). Chief of Staff. iiib) This is made clear in Navales v. 67 (Mutiny or Sedition). supra. 63 (Disrespect Toward the President. vi) The suspension of the privilege of the writ does not impair the .G. calling for the exercise of awesome powers which cannot be deemed as harmless or without legal significance [David v. No.A. 7055. but also on Sec.A. 34. 1. Senga. 7055.

]. In People v. The Pardoning Power [Sec. Art. whether full or conditional. Reduction or mitigation of the penalty. Revised Penal Code.right to bail [Sec. nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies. commutations. An act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment that the law inflicts for the crime he has committed. Thus. v) Amnesty. which puts into oblivion the offense itself. after conviction by final judgment. 13.] a) Definitions: i) Pardon. c) Limitations on exercise: i) Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment [Sec. Release from imprisonment. c) Martial Law. VII: “Except in cases of impeachment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress”. ii) Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without the favorable recommendation of the Commission on Elections [Sec. usually extended to groups of persons who committed political offenses. vii) The suspension applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. considering that this was a prosecution under a special law. reiterated in People v. or as otherwise provided in the Constitution. Discretionary. 250 SCRA 581. iii) Reprieve. 19. Act of grace. ii) Commutation. 5. IX-C]. VII]. i) The constitutional limitations for the suspension of the privilege of the writ are likewise imposed on the proclamation of martial law. Salle. 18. concurred in by the legislature. Art. nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ” [Sec. 260 SCRA 44. the President may grant reprieves. Art. iii) Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment. Postponement of a sentence or stay of execution. may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the courts. Bacang. it was a legal malapropism for the trial court to interject par. Art. 2. iv) Parole. . de Gracia. otherwise he shall be released. the Court declared that the 1987 Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon. recommending the grant of pardon after the convict shall have served a jail term of 5 years. to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction by the trial court. nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function. Art. and pardons. but without full restoration of liberty. unless there is a constitutional violation. and remit fines and forfeitures. III]. 19. as parolee is still in the custody of the law although not in confinement. b) Exercise bv the President. any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days. 5. “A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution. 135. and that the matter of a pardon is within the President’s exclusive prerogative [People v. supra. Art. viii) During the suspension of the privilege of the writ. VII]. Any application for a pardon should not be acted upon.

September 7. see Garcia v. March 7. authorizes the President to order the arrest and reincarceration of such person who. the pardonee has placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the conditions of the pardon.or the process toward its grant should not begin. The ruling in Monsanto v. in his judgment. Sec. by the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in the contract. Gonzales. it was held that to avail of the benefits of an amnesty proclamation. 2000. i) Plenary or partial. Factoran. 11294. one must admit his guilt of the offense covered by the proclamation. Art. 116512. iia) On conditional pardon. 19. Sumulong. iii) Distinguished from pardon: A . Catido.addressed to political offenses. Art. the penalty and all its effects are thus extinguished. i) In People v. it was held that the person released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.R. G. iv) Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt (as it would violate separation of powers). The rule is reiterated in In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. No. was valid. Par. No. ii) Absolute or conditional. DECS. Revised Administrative Code. G.R. 347. Chairman. Commission on Audit. supra. 170 SCRA 190. unless the appeal is withdrawn. see Torres v. In People v. the grant of amnesty. Patriarca. provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty. September 29. is now changed by virtue of the explicit requirement under the 1987 Constitution. 180 SCRA 623. was deemed eligible for reinstatement to the same position of principal and not to the lower position of classroom teacher. 226 SCRA 356. 3. And the exercise of this Presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. v) Cannot absolve the convict of civil liability. which was laid down under the 1973 Constitution. d) Pardon Classified. No. But see Sabello v. See People v. where a pardoned elementary school principal. P . 89. VII. supra. or civil contempt (as the State is without interest in the same) . 152 SCRA 273. and therefore a violation of Sec. 64 (i). Nacional. on considerations of justice and equity. e) Amnesty. ii) In Vera v. Factoran. where the Court said that the grant of conditional pardon and the subsequent dismissal of the appeal did not relieve the accused of civil liability. Revised Penal Code. vi) Cannot restore public offices forfeited [Monsanto v. or before conviction by final judgment. 1997. that a conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal. shall fail to comply with the conditions of the pardon. 1995. 135457. G. it was held that while the pardon was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal. applied for by the accused-appellants under Proclamation No. 7 SCRA 152.. On executive clemency re: administrative decisions. People of the Philippines.R.].

looks backward and puts into oblivion the offense itself. Moreover. Other powers: . The Monetary Board shall. Art. The Diplomatic Power. He may also appear before it at any other time.acceptance necessary. Sec.a public act which the courts may take judicial notice of. ” .infractions of peace of the state.individuals. Art. A . P . Sec. thus: (i) international agreements which involve political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character take the form of a treaty. Executive Secretary. The Borrowing Power.-21. Sec. VII: “The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. under international law.” 10. ” a) In Commissioner of Customs v.requires concurrence of Congress. within 30 days from the end of every quarter.does not. P .looks forward and relieves the pardonee of the consequences of the offense. while international agreements involving adjustment of details carrying out well established national policies and traditions and involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements. A . 22. including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.classes of persons. b) But see Bayan v. 20. an executive agreement is just as binding as a treaty. The Informing Power. and (ii) in treaties. formal documents require ratification. a budget of expenditures and sources of financing. while executive agreements become binding through executive action.no need for distinct acts of acceptance. VII: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate. Art. VII: “The President shall submit to Congress within 30 days from the opening of every regular session. 2000. 23. The Republic of the Philippines cannot require the United States to submit the agreement to the US Senate for concurrence. as the basis of the general appropriations act. “recognized as a treaty”.private act which must be pleaded and proved.. Budgetary Power. Eastern Sea Trading. 21. No. See People v. for that would be giving a strict construction to the phrase. A . Art. G. 8. where the Supreme Court said that the Philippine government had complied with the Constitution in that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was concurred in by the Philippine Senate. ” 7. P . 3 SCRA 351. 9. and containing other matters as may be provided by law. P . October 10. supra. 6 6.R. thus complying with Sec. and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt. it is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA as merely an executive agreement because. Casido. VII: “The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. A . P . the Supreme Court distinguished treaties from executive agreements. Art.. VII. A . Sec. 138570.

15. December 2. G. VI]. Art. Art. 23(2). IX-C]. c) To consent to deputation of government personnel by the Commission on Elections [Sec. b) Power to approve or veto bills [Sec. and tariff powers [Sec. 28(2). 27. emergency powers [Sec. Art. f) General supervision over local governments and autonomous regional governments [Art. d) To discipline such deputies [Sec.R. VI: “x x x The President may call a special session at any time ]. e) By delegation from Congress. Art. . 2002. Art. X]. i) See Judge Dadole v. Art. 2(4). IX-C]. VI]. VI]. Commission on Audit. No. 125350. 2(8).a) Call Congress to a special session [Sec.