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Shell....................................................................................

5
Security K 1NC Generic............................................................................6
Link General Security.............................................................................11
Link Security Rhetoric............................................................................ 12
Link Security Ideology............................................................................15
Link Environment................................................................................... 16
Link Environment -- AT: Environmental Security Good...........................24
Link Global Warming.............................................................................. 30
Link -- Water Wars.................................................................................... 39
LinkResource Wars................................................................................41
Link Energy Security.............................................................................. 46
Link -- OCS................................................................................................ 48
Link -- Arctic Link...................................................................................... 52
Link -- Energy Security.............................................................................54
Link -- Disease.......................................................................................... 55
Link -- Disease.......................................................................................... 58
LinkFood Security.................................................................................. 68
Link Hegemony...................................................................................... 70
Link -- Hegemony [Rule].........................................................................102
Link -- Hegemony [Rule].........................................................................104
Link -- Hegemony [Burke].......................................................................106
Link -- Hegemony [Burke].......................................................................107
Link Global Governance.......................................................................109
LinkGlobal Coop..................................................................................111
Link Soft Power.................................................................................... 113
Link Multilateralism.............................................................................123
Link --Accidents...................................................................................... 124
Link -- Democracy................................................................................... 126
Link -- Economy...................................................................................... 129
Link -- Economy Poverty......................................................................132
Link -- Economy Economic Analysis Fails.............................................135
Link -- Economy AT Econ =/= Realism.................................................137
Link -- Competitiveness..........................................................................138
LinkHuman Rights............................................................................... 144
Link --I-Law............................................................................................. 147
Link -- Failed States................................................................................149
Link -- Prolif............................................................................................. 155
Link -- Prolif AT Perm............................................................................164
Link -- Prolif Spread Link....................................................................167
Link -- Prolif NPT Link........................................................................... 169
Link -- Prolif AT Cant Deter Third World...............................................170
Link -- Prolif AT Crazy Third World........................................................172
Link -- Terrorism...................................................................................... 173
Link -- Terrorism Alt Solves..................................................................190
Link --Terrorism AT Perm/Flawed Epistemology....................................191
Link -- Terrorism Biological Terrorism Link............................................192
Link -- Terrorism Nuclear Terrorism Link...............................................193
Link -- Terrorism Cyberterrorism Link...................................................195
Link -- Terrorism AT Elshtain.................................................................196

Link Islamic/Middle East Threat.........................................................199


Link-- Afghanistan..................................................................................201
Link -- Afghanistan Counterterrorism...................................................204
Link -- Afghanistan Counterterrrorism Reps Key................................205
Link -- Afghanistan Stability.................................................................207
Link - China............................................................................................. 208
Link -- China - Method Debate...............................................................221
Link -- China - Threats False....................................................................225
Link -- China - AT: Perm...........................................................................227
Link -- China - AT: Realism......................................................................228
Link -- Indo-Pak War................................................................................230
Link -- Latin America...............................................................................232
Link North Korea.................................................................................. 233
Link -- Korea War.................................................................................... 240
Link -- Korea War Alt Solves/AT Perm...................................................246
Link -- Korean Prolif.................................................................................247
Link -- Japan Relations............................................................................249
Link -- Japan Alliance.............................................................................. 250
Link -- Israel/Iran Strikes........................................................................251
Link -- Iran................................................................................................ 253
Link -- Iran Prolif..................................................................................... 257
Link -- Middle East..................................................................................277
Link -- Middle East Representations First..............................................285
Link -- Middle East Impact Calc............................................................287
Link -- Middle East FW card..................................................................288
Link -- Middle East AT Said Indicts........................................................291
Link -- Middle East Alternative.............................................................292
Link -- Middle East Iraq........................................................................293
Link -- Russia.......................................................................................... 295
Link -- Turkey.......................................................................................... 298
Link --- Ikenberry Liberal Hegemony.......................................................299
Link -- Catastrophe.................................................................................301
Link -- Survival........................................................................................ 303
Link- Realism............................................................................................. 307
Link -- Schmitt....................................................................................... 308

Impacts............................................................................313
General................................................................................................... 314
Threat Construction................................................................................ 318
Turns Case.............................................................................................. 319
Turns Environment.................................................................................. 326
Endless Violence..................................................................................... 327
SFFP (Turns Case)................................................................................... 332
Genocide................................................................................................ 335
Bare Life................................................................................................. 340
Biopower Bad......................................................................................... 342
Value to Life............................................................................................ 343
Environmental Destruction.....................................................................350

A2: Hegemony Good Impact Turns....................................352


2NC Hegemony No !............................................................................ 353

2NC Hegemony AT War Decreasing (Pinker)........................................360


2NC Hegemony AT Statistics................................................................361
2NC Hegemony AT Deterrence.............................................................362
2NC Hegemony AT Kagan....................................................................363
2NC Hegemony AT Ferguson................................................................364
2NC Hegemony AT Thayer (Card)........................................................365
2NC Hegemony AT Thayer (Analytic)...................................................366
2NC Hegemony Credibility...................................................................367
2NC Hegemony- Power Vacuum.............................................................369
Alternative..............................................................................370
General................................................................................................... 371
Discourse Impact.................................................................................... 372
Reps First................................................................................................ 373
Ethical Obligation to Vote Neg................................................................376
Rejection................................................................................................. 379
Embrace Insecurity................................................................................. 385
A2: Policymaking Good...........................................................................395
A2: Intellectualism Bad...........................................................................401
A2: Cede the Political.............................................................................. 404
A2: Perm................................................................................................. 407
A2- Perm: Must Disengage First..............................................................416
A2: Perm- Realism Coopts......................................................................418
Alternative Solves Warming Better.........................................................420

Answers to (A2) Common Affirmative Arguments................................423


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Our Harms Are Objective..................................................................424


Realism Reflexive...........................................................................425
Realism Evolutionary.....................................................................426
Realism General............................................................................. 429
Realism Inevitable............................................................................439
Realism Inevitable [Empiricism].......................................................446
Realism Inevitable [K Solves Realism]..............................................447
Realism Good................................................................................... 451
Realism Inevitable............................................................................452
Murray/Guzini................................................................................... 453
Guzinni............................................................................................. 458
OTuathail......................................................................................... 462
Jarvis................................................................................................ 465
Kurasawa.......................................................................................... 467
Gunning............................................................................................ 469
Jones................................................................................................ 470
Lockman (Middle East Studies Reflexive).........................................471
Heydemann Role of the Ballot.......................................................472
Zarnett (Reverse Essentialism)........................................................473
Mueller (Democracy Discourse Doesnt Cause War).........................475
Rychlak (Should Represent Islamic Terrorism)..................................476
Valbjorn (Shouldnt Focus on Representations)................................478
Kaufman (Discourse Doesnt Cause Violence)..................................479
Pinker (Violence Declining Because of the West)..............................480
Pinker............................................................................................... 482
Schmitt/Emnity................................................................................. 484

A2: Human Nature is Self-Interested/Violence Inevitable.......................489


A2: Security Inevitable...........................................................................501
A2: War Inevitable.................................................................................. 503
A2: Threats Real..................................................................................... 505
A2: Action Key........................................................................................ 513
A2: Case Outweighs...............................................................................515
A2: We Have a Specific Impact...............................................................520
A2: Scenario Planning Good...................................................................522
A2: Transitions........................................................................................ 523
A2: Benign Hegemon..............................................................................525
A2: Good forms of security.....................................................................527
A2: We just respond to existing threats..................................................531
A2: Security K2 Freedom........................................................................532
A2 Critical Security Bad.......................................................................533
A2: Liberal Democracy Solves War.........................................................536
A2: Threat Con Solves War.....................................................................537
A2: We Solve.......................................................................................... 540
A2: Nuke War Outweighs........................................................................542
A2: Predictions Good.............................................................................. 545
AT: Democracy Prevents Genocide.........................................................547

Useful Overview Evidence..................................................556


2NC/1NREpistemology........................................................................557
Aff Ev. Suspect........................................................................................ 561

1NC Shell

Security K 1NC Generic


The 1AC calls into existence a world replete with dangerous flaws in need of
correction at all costs. The image of catastrophe is not a neutral depiction of the
way things are, but a rallying cry to a violent project of eliminating otherness.
Campbell, Professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle,
1998 [David, Writing Security, p. 47-48]
To talk of the endangered nature of the modern world and the enemies and threats that abound in it is thus
not to offer a simple ethnographic description of our condition; it is to invoke a discourse of danger through
which the incipient ambiguity of our world can be grounded in accordance with the insistences of identity.
Danger (death, in its ultimate form) might therefore be thought of as the new god for the modern world of
states, not because it is peculiar to our time, but because it replicates the logic of Christendom's evangelism
of fear. Indeed, in a world in which state identity is secured through dis courses of danger, some low tactics
are employed to serve these high ideals. These tactics are not inherent to the logic of identity, which only
requires the definition of difference. But securing an ordered self and an ordered worldparticularly when
the field upon which this process operates is as extensive as a stateinvolves defining elements that stand
in the way of order as forms of "otherness." 50 Such obstructions to order "become dirt, matter out of place,
irrationality, abnormality, waste, sickness, perversity, incapacity, disorder, madness, unfreedom. They
become material in need of rationalization, normalization, moralization, correction, punishment, discipline,
disposal, realization, etc."51 In this way, the state project of security replicates the church project of
salvation. The state grounds its legitimacy by offering the promise of security to its citizens who, it says,
would otherwise face manifold dangers. The church justifies its role by guaranteeing salvation to its
followers who, it says, would otherwise be destined to an unredeemed death. Both the state and the church
require considerable effort to maintain order within and around themselves, and thereby engage in an
evangelism of fear to ward off internal and external threats, succumbing in the process to the temptation to
treat difference as otherness. In contrast to the statist discourse of international relations, this understanding
proffers an entirely different orientation to the question of foreign policy. In addition to the historical
discussion above, which suggested that it was possible to argue that the state was not prior to the interstate
system, this interpretation means that instead of regarding foreign policy as the external view and
rationalist orientation of a preestablished state, the identity of which is secure before it enters into relations
with others, we can consider foreign policy as an integral part of the discourses of danger that serve to
discipline the state. The state, and the identity of "man" located in the state, can therefore be regarded as the
effects of discourses of danger that more often than not employ strategies of otherness. Foreign policy thus
needs to be understood as giving rise to a boundary rather than acting as a bridge. (47-48)

Security rhetoric furthers the perpetual threat of destruction and justifies unending,
state-sanctioned violence.
Coviello 2000 (Peter Coviello, assistant professor of English at Bowdoin College, Apocalypse From Now
On, 2000)
Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the
world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed it did
not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear,
apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derridas
suitably menacing phrase) remainderless and a-symbolic destruction, then in the postnuclear
world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance,
apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an other people
whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety
and prosperity of a cherished general population. This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan
Sontags incisive observation, from 1989, that, Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not
Apocalypse Now but Apocalypse from Now On. The decisive point here in the perpetuation of

the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever
present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the
perpetual threat of destruction through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse
the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular
population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter
of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addressess himself to the problem of a power that is
less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, life-administering. Power,
he contends, exerts a positive influence on life [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and
multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. In his brief comments
on what he calls the atomic situation, however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of
modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For
as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, agencies of modern power presume to act
on the behalf of the existence of everyone. Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and
survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed,
potentially annihilating. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power, Foucault writes, this
is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill it is because power is situated and
exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.
For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more
comprehensive power over the patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an
apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

C THE IMPACT:THE LOGIC OF SECURITY MAKES ANNIHILATION


INEVITABLE
The inability to accept the inherent disorder of existence and the arena of
international relations in particular results in a violent struggle to overcome
uncertainty in the name of an unattainable securitythis futile quest has brought
into existence the technology to eradicate life on earth and the political context that
makes such an apocalypse both possible and necessary.
Campbell and Dillon, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle and professor of politics at Lancaster University, 1993 [David
and Michael, The Political Subject of Violence, p. 163-165]
This interpretation of violence as constitutive of identity might, paradoxically, offer the only hope of some amelioration of the worst
excesses of violence exhibited by the formation of (political) identity. The orthodox rendering of such violence as premodern abdicates its responsibility to a predetermined historical fatalism. For if these ethnic and nationalist

conflicts are understood as no more than settled history rearing its ugly head, then there is nothing that can
be done in the present to resolve the tension except to repress them again. In this view, the historical drama
has to be enacted according to its script, with human agency in suspension while nature violently plays
itself out. The only alternative is for nature to be overcome as the result of an idealistic transformation at the hands
of reason. Either way, this fatalistic interpretation of the relationship between violence and the political is rooted in a hypostatised
conception of man/nature as determinative of the social/political: the latter is made possible only once the former runs its course, or if
it is overturned. It might have once been the case that the prospect of a transformation of nature by reason seemed
both likely and hopefulindeed, many of the most venerable of the debates in the political theory of international relations
revolved around this very point. But, having reached what Foucault has called societys threshold of modernity, we now face a
prospect that radically re-figures the parameters of politics: the real prospect of extinction. As Foucault argues,
we have reached this threshold because
the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for
Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity of a political existence: modern man is an animal whose
politics place his existence as a living being in question.

How the prospect of extinction might materialise itself is an open question. That increasingly it can be
materialised, militarily, ecologically and politically, is not. The double bind of this prospect is that modernitys
alternative of transformation through reason is not only untenable, it is deeply complicit in the form of
(inter)national life that has been responsible for bringing about the real prospect of extinction in the first
place. The capacity of violence to eradicate being was engendered by reasons success; not merely, or perhaps
even most importantly, by furnishing the technological means, but more insidiously in setting the parameters
of the political (Ia politique, to use the useful terms of debate in which Simon Critchley engages) while fuelling the violent
practices of politics (la politique). The reliance on reason as that which could contain violence and reduce the real
prospect of extinction may prove nothing less than a fatal misapprehension. In support of this proposition,
consider the interpretive bases of the Holocaust. For all that politics in the last fifty years has sought to exceptionalise the
Nazis genocide as an aberrant moment induced by evil personalities, there is no escaping the recognition that modern political
life lies heavily implicated in the instigation and conduct of this horror. In so far as modernity can be
characterised as the promotion of rationality and efficiency to the exclusion of alternative criteria for action,
the Holocaust is one outcome of the civilising process . With its plan rationally to order Europe through the elimination
of an internal other, its bureaucratised administration of death, and its employment of the technology of a modern state, the
Holocaust was not an irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully-eradicated residence of pre-modern barbarity. It was a
legitimate resident in the house of modernity; indeed, one who would not be at home in any other house. The
paradoxical nature of modernity is suggested by the emergence of a Holocaust from within its bosom. And there can be no better
indication in contradistinction to those modernists who would like to brand so-called postmodernists with the responsibility for all
and future Holocausts that a reliance on established traditions of reason for ethical succour and the progressive amelioration of the
global human condition may be seriously misplaced. The comfort we have derived from the etiological myth of

modern politics has occluded the way in which the civilising process of which that myth speaks has
disengaged ethics from politics. As Bauman concludes:

the civilizing process is, among other things, a process of


divesting the use and deployment of violence from moral calculus, and of emancipating
the desiderata of rationality from interference of ethical norms and moral inhibitions.
We need to take stock of the evidence that

D -- Our alternative is to reject the affirmative in favor of a critical approach to


security. This is crucial to open space for emancipatory perspectivesour critique is
mutually exclusive with the affirmative.

Bilgin 5Pinar Bilgin, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University (Turkey)
[Conclusion, Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective, Published by Routledge,
ISBN 0415325498, p. 205-207]

Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social


movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for intellectuals to make a
change is to get directly involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a
critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future outcomes may result if
necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent
in regional politics. Students of security could help create the political space for alternative
agents of security to take action by presenting appropriate critiques . It should be emphasised
however that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. The hope is that
non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute
themselves as agents of security when presented with an alternative reading of their situation.
Thinking about the future becomes even more crucial once theory is [end page 205]
conceptualised as constitutive of the reality it seeks to respond to . In other words, our ideas
about the futureour conjectures and prognoseshave a self-constitutive potential . What
the students of Cold War Security Studies consider as a more realistic picture of the future becomes real
through practice, albeit under circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about what a desired future
would look like is significant for the very same reason; that is, in order to be able to turn it into a reality
through adopting emancipatory practices. For, having a vision of a desired future empowers
people(s) in the present.
Presenting pictures of what a desired future might look like, and pointing to the security community
approach as the start of a path that could take us from an insecure past to a more secure future is not to
suggest that the creation of a security community is the most likely outcome. On the contrary, the dynamics
pointed to throughout the book indicate that there exists a potential for descent into chaos if no action is
taken to prevent militarisation and fragmentation of societies, and the marginalisation of peoples as well as
economies in an increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics exist as threats to the future to
use Becks terminology; and only by thinking and writing about them that can one mobilise preventive
action to be taken in the present. Viewed as such, critical approaches present not an optimistic,
but a more realistic picture of the future. Considering how the realism of Cold War Security
Studies failed not only when judged by its own standards, by failing to provide an adequate
explanation of the world out there, but also when judged by the standards of critical
approaches, as it was argued, it could be concluded that there is a need for more realistic approaches to
regional security in theory and practice.
The foregoing suggests three broad conclusions. First, Cold War Security Studies did not present the
realistic picture it purported to provide. On the contrary, the pro-status quo leanings of the Cold War
security discourse failed to allow for (let alone foresee) changes such as the end of the Cold War,
dissolution of some states and integration of some others. Second, notwithstanding the important inroads
critical approaches to security made in the post-Cold War era, much traditionalist thinking remains and
maintains its grip over the security practices of many actors. Third, critical approaches offer a fuller
or more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world (including the Middle East).
Cold War Security Studies is limited not only because of its narrow (military-focused), prostatus quo and state-centric (if not statist) approach to security in theory and practice, but

also because of its objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship that
obscured the mutually constitutive relationship between them. Students of critical approaches
have sought to challenge Cold War Security Studies, its claim to knowledge and its hold over security
practices by pointing to the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice and revealing
[end page 206] how the Cold War security discourse has been complicit in constituting (in)security in
different parts of the world. The ways in which the Cold War security discourse helped constitute the
Middle East by way of representing it as a region, and contributed to regional insecurity in the Middle
East by shaping security practices, is exemplary of the argument that theories do not leave the world
untouched.
The implication of these conclusions for practice is that becoming aware of the politics behind the
geographical specification of politics and exploring the relationship between (inventing)
regions and (conceptions and practices of) security helps reveal the role human agency has
played in the past and could play in the future. An alternative approach to security , that of
critical approaches to security, could inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby helping
constitute a new region in the form of a security community. It should be noted, however, that to

argue that everything is socially constructed or that all approaches have normative
concerns embedded in them is a significant first step that does not by itself help one adopt
emancipatory practices. As long as people rely on traditional practices shaped by the Cold War security
discourse - which remains prevalent in the post-Cold War era - they help constitute a reality in line with
the tenets of realist Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to address evolving crises through
traditional practices whilst leaving a critical security perspective to be adopted for the long-term will not
work. For, traditionalist thinking and practices, by helping shape the reality out there,

foreclose the political space necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple
actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a critical perspective that
emphasises the roles human agency has played in the past and could play in the future in
shaping what human beings choose to call reality. Generating such an awareness of the
potentialities of human agency could enable one to begin thinking differently about regional
security in different parts of the world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors
multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s) and how they
think security should be sought in different parts of the world.
After decades of statist, military-focused and zero-sum thinking and practices that
privileged the security of some whilst marginalising the security of others, the time has
come for all those interested in security in the Middle East to decide whether they want to be
agents of a world view that produces more of the same, thereby contributing towards a
threat to the future, or of alternative futures that try to address the multiple dimensions of
regional insecurity. The choice is not one between presenting a more optimistic or
pessimistic vision of the future, but between stumbling into the future expecting more of
the same, or stepping into a future equipped with a perspective that not only has a
conception of a desired future but is also cognisant of threats to the future .

Link General Security


The AFFs imagination of war and catastrophe is part and
parcel of a cultural politics of fear and anxiety which
writes trauma into every aspect of life. The 1AC security
frame ensures a mania surrounding the coming trauma,
ensuring the perpetuation of a constant state of warfare
and closing off all epistemologies which do not obsess
about looming threats to life.
Neocleous 2012
/Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy, Politics and History @ Brunel University, London,
Dont Be Scared, Be Prepared: Trauma-Anxiety-Resilience, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 2012
37: 188 originally published online 13 June 2012, DOI: 10.1177/0304375412449789, SAGEOnline/
The idea of trauma is now deeply engrained in our political, cultural, and intellectual
universe. What in the seventeenth century was a surgeons term to describe a physical wound,
transformed in the nineteenth century to include psychic ailments comparable to shock, morphed into
shell shock and nervous trauma by the end of World War I (WWI) and from there eventually

became a psychiatric category now used to describe experience of war, genocide, and
catastrophe. The history of the category could be described as moving from the idea of physical damage
to the mental health system and on to the social management of major disasters.1 This is most
obviously true in the discourse surrounding war and conflict at some point in the future, note
the editors of one collection of essays on the trauma of war, historians looking back at the wars of the
1980s, 1990s, and early twentieth century will notice trauma projects appearing alongside food, health,
and shelter interventions.2 Yet the historians will also see a highly traumatized society in general, as

trauma has become the discourse through which not only catastrophic events are
articulated, but through which virtually all sufferings are expressed: That was really
traumatic! is now thought to be an appropriate response to any event that would once
have been described as rather unpleasant or quite difficult. It is this everydayness, or
naturalness, of trauma talk that I want to engage here. When categories and concepts take on an
increasing appearance of being the natural categories through which we are encouraged to think, critical
theory needs to be on the alert. Such is the case with trauma. My main purpose is to explore what all
this trauma talk might be doing, ideologically and politically. Such a task places us on the
terrain of the relationship between security and anxiety. A glance at any security text, from the
most mundane government pronouncement to the most sophisticated literature within academic security
studies, reveals that through the politics of security runs a political imagination of fear and
anxiety. I want to first explore this relation before connecting it with the question of trauma. In so doing I
suggest that the management of trauma and anxiety has become a way of mediating the

demands of an endless security war: a war of security, awar for security, awar through
security; a war whose permanence and universality has been established to match the
permanence and universality of our supposed desire for security . The article therefore has
nothing to say about governing traumatic events. Rather, it seeks to understand the emergence of a
hypertrophied concept of trauma and the proliferation of discourses of anxiety as
ideological mechanisms deployed for the security crisis of endless war; deployed , I will argue,
as a training in resilience. As such, I want to suggest that the language of trauma and anxiety,
and the training in resilience that is associated with these terms, weds us to a deeply conservative
mode of thinking, with the superficial humanitarianism supposedly captured in the
discourse of trauma in fact functioning as a means of cutting off political alternatives.

Link Security Rhetoric


Security rhetoric presumes a conception of peace that leads to inevitable violence
and undermines human security
Sandy & Perkins 1 (Leo R.,

co-founder of Peace Studies at Plymouth State College and Ray,

teacher of philosophy at Plymouth State College, The Nature of Peace and Its Implications for Peace Education
Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolutions, 4.2)

Also, versions of this name appear on entrances to some military bases. Keeping "peace" in this
manner evokes the theme in Peggy Lee's old song, "Is That All There is?" What this really comes
down to is the idea of massive and indiscriminate killing for peace, which represents a morally
dubious notion if not a fault of logic. The point here is that a "peace" that depends upon the
threat and intention to kill vast numbers of human beings is hardly a stable or justifiable
peace worthy of the name. Those in charge of waging war know that killing is a questionable
activity. Otherwise, they would not use such euphemisms as "collateral damage" and "smart bombs"
to obfuscate it.

Security rhetoric props up the legitimization of the state to a point where


elimination of all that is foreign to maintain the safety of the inside is justified
Steans 98 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations Theory , Department of Political Science and International Studies,
University of Birmingham, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction, 108-109)

Critical approaches to International Relations criticize the state centrism of realism, not only
because it is inherently reductionist, but also because it presents a view of the state as a concrete entity with
interests and agency. Not only does the state act, but the state acts in the national interest. Those who adopt critical approaches 15
view the state in dynamic rather than static terms, as a process rather than a thing. The state does not exist in any concrete sense; rather it is
made. The

state is made by the processes and practices involved in constructing boundaries and
identities, differentiating between the inside and the outside. Andrew Linklater has recently argued that
critical approaches to the study of International Relations centre around understanding the processes of inclusion and exclusion, which have
in a sense always been the central concerns of the discipline.16 However, as Linklater contends, critical theorists understand that these processes have also worked to include and exclude people on the basis of race, class and gender.7 In

the making of the state


the construction of the hostile other which is threatening and dangerous is central to the
making of identities and the securing of boundaries. Indeed, David Campbell argues that the legitimation of
state power demands the construction of danger outside. The state requires this discourse of
danger to secure its identity and for the legitimation of state power. The consequence of this is
that threats to security in realist and neo-realist thinking are all seen to be in the external realm and citizenship becomes synonymous with
loyalty to the nation-state and the elimination of all that is foreign.8 Jean Elshtain has argued that the problems of war and
the difficulties of achieving security in the so-called anarchy of the international realm, should not be seen as problems which are not rooted
in the compulsions of interstate relations as such.9 Rather, they arise from the ordering of modern, technological society in which political
elites have sought to control the masses by the implementation of the mechanism of the perfect army.20 Elshtain argues that to see war as a
continuation of politics by other means, is to see a continuation of the military model as a means of preventing civil disorder.2 In critiquing
dominant conceptions of security in International Relations, feminists have, to some extent, echoed the arguments of non-feminist critical
thinkers, but have been concerned to show what is lost from our understanding of security when gender is omitted. As was noted in chapter 4,
feminist political theorists have demonstrated that in much Western political thought the conception of politics and the public realm is a
barracks community, a realm defined in opposition to the disorderly forces which threaten its existence.22 This

same conception
of politics is constructed out of masculine hostility towards the female Other. One sees in the
development of this political discourse a deeply gendered subtext in which the citizen role is in
all cases identified with the male.23 Hartsock believes that this sets a hostile and combative dualism at the heart of the
community men construct and by which they come to understand their lives.

Framing the foreign as unstable portrays them inferior and perpetuates our
relationship with the Other in terms of domination and subordination
Tickner 92 (J. Ann, Professor of International Relations at University of South California, Gender in
International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, 8-9)

Extending Scott s challenge to the field of international relations, we can immediately detect a
similar set of hierarchical binary oppositions. But in spite of the seemingly obvious association of
international politics with the masculine characteristics described above, the field of international
relations is one of the last of the social sciences to be touched by gender analysis and feminist
perspectives. 1 The reason for this, I believe, is not that the field is gender neutral, meaning that the
introduction of gender is irrelevant to its subject matter as many scholars believe, but that it is so
thoroughly masculinized that the workings of these hierarchical gender relations are hidden.
Framed in its own set of binary distinctions, the discipline of international relations assumes
similarly hierarchical relationships when it posits an anarchic world outside to be defended
against through the accumulation and rational use of power. In political discourse, this becomes
translated into stereotypical notions about those who inhabit the outside. Like women, foreigners
are frequently portrayed as the other: nonwhites and tropical countries are often depicted
as irrational, emotional, and unstable, characteristics that are also attributed to women. The
construction of this discourse and the way in which we are taught to think about international
politics closely parallel the way in which we are socialized into understanding gender differences.
To ignore these hierarchical constructions and their relevance to power is therefore to risk
perpetuating these relationships of domination and subordination . But before beginning to
describe what the field of international relations might look like if gender were included as a central
category of analysis, I shall give a brief historical overview of the field as it has traditionally been
constructed.

By replicating the predominant image of a global space


teeming with dangers against which a national home must
be secured, the discourse of the 1AC contributes to the
emergence of destructive security-state that becomes
indistinguishable from the forms of violence it seeks to
prevent.
Agamben, Professor of Philosophy at the Collge International de Philosophie in Paris, 2002 [Giorgio, Theory & Event 5:4,
ProjectMuse]

Security as the basic principle of state politics dates back to the birth of the modern
state. Hobbes already mentions it as the opposite of the fear which compels human
beings to unite and form a society together. But not until the 18th century does the
paradigm of security reach its fullest development. In an unpublished lecture at the
Collge de France in 1978, Michel Foucault showed how in the political and economic
practice of the Physiocrats security opposes discipline and the law as instruments of
governance.
Neither Turgot and Quesnay nor the Physiocratic officials were primarily concerned
with the prevention of famine or the regulation of production, but rather wanted to
allow for their development in order to guide and "secure" their consequences. While
disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an
opening and globalisation; while the law wants to prevent and prescribe, security
wants to intervene in ongoing processes to direct them. In a word, discipline wants to
produce order, while security wants to guide disorder. Since measures of security can
only function within a context of freedom of traffic, trade, and individual initiative,
Foucault can show that the development of security coincides with the development
of liberal ideology.
Today we are facing extreme and most dangerous developments of this paradigm of
security. In the course of a gradual neutralisation of politics and the progressive
surrender of traditional tasks of the state, security imposes itself as the basic

principle of state activity. What used to be one among several decisive measures of
public administration until the first half of the twentieth century, now becomes the
sole criterion of political legitimation. Security reasoning entails an essential risk. A
state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile
organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic.
We should not forget that the first major organisation of terror after the war, the
Organisation de l'Arme Secrte (OAS) was established by a French General who
thought of himself as patriotic and who was convinced that terrorism was the only
answer to the guerilla phenomenon in Algeria and Indochina. When politics, the way
it was understood by theorists of the "Polizeiwissenschaft" in the eighteenth century,
reduces itself to police, the difference between state and terrorism threatens to
disappear. In the end it may lead to security and terrorism forming a single deadly
system in which they mutually justify and legitimate each others' actions.
The risk is not merely the development of a clandestine complicity of opponents but
that the hunt for security leads to a worldwide civil war which destroys all civil
coexistence. In the new situation -- created by the end of the classical form of war
between sovereign states -- security finds its end in globalisation: it implies the idea
of a new planetary order which is, in fact, the worst of all disorders. But there is yet
another danger. Because they require constant reference to a state of exception,
measures of security work towards a growing depoliticization of society. In the long
run, they are irreconcilable with democracy.
Nothing is therefore more important than a revision of the concept of security as the
basic principle of state politics. European and American politicians finally have to
consider the catastrophic consequences of uncritical use of this figure of thought. It is
not that democracies should cease to defend themselves, but the defense of
democracy demands today a change of political paradigms and not a world civil war
which is just the institutionalization of terror. Maybe the time has come to work
towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and not merely towards their
control. Today, there are plans for all kinds of emergencies (ecological, medical,
military), but there is no politics to prevent them. On the contrary, we can say that
politics secretly works towards the production of emergencies. It is the task of
democratic politics to prevent the development of conditions which lead to hatred,
terror, and destruction -- and not to reduce itself to attempts to control them once
they occur.

Security discourse results in ethical segregation of non-western others


Campbell 5 (David. Professor of cultural and political geography at Durham University Oil, Empire,
and the Sports Utility Vehicle: The Biopolitics of Security American Quarterly 57.3, 943-972 )
Over time, of course, ambiguity is disciplined, contingency is fixed, and dominant meanings are
established. In the history of U.S. foreign policyregardless of the radically different contexts
in which it has operatedthe formalized practices and ritualized acts of security discourse
have worked to produce a conception of the United States in which freedom, liberty, law,
democracy, individualism, faith, order, prosperity, and civilization are claimed to exist because of
the constant struggle with and often violent suppression of opponents said to embody tyranny,
oppression, anarchy, totalitarianism, collectivism, atheism, and barbarism.
This record demonstrates that the boundary-producing political performance of foreign policy does
more than inscribe a geopolitical marker on a map. This construction of social space also involves
an axiological dimension in which the delineation of an inside from an outside gives rise to a
moral hierarchy that renders the domestic superior and the foreign inferior. Foreign policy
thus incorporates an ethical power of segregation in its performance of identity/difference.
While this produces a geography of "foreign" (even "evil") others in conventional terms, it also

requires a disciplining of "domestic" elements on the inside that challenge this state identity. This is
achieved through exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the
"inside" are linked through a discourse of "danger" with threats identified and located on the
"outside." Though global in scope, these effects are national in their legitimation.12

Link Security Ideology


Security ideology paints the outside world as threatening and dangerous. Americas
identity becomes a suspicion of any threats from others within and outside our
borders and forces the elimination of all thats foreign
Tickner 95 (J. Ann, Professor of Policy at Holy Cross University, IR Theory Today)
When national security is defined negatively, as protection against outside military threats, the sense
of threat is reinforced by the doctrine of state sovereignty, which strengthens the boundary between a
secure community and a dangerous external environment. For this reason, many critics of realism

claim that, if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed.
While E. H. Carr argued for he retention of the nation-state to satisfy people's need for identity,
those who are critical of state-centric analysis point to the dangers of a political identity
constructed out of exclusionary practices. In the present international system, security is tied to a
nationalist political identity which depends on the construction of those outsides as 'other' and
therefore dangerous. (Walker 1990) David Campbell suggests that security the
boundaries of this statist identity demands the construction of 'danger' on the outside: Thus,
threats to security in conventional thinking are all in the external realm. Campbell claims that
the state requires this discourse of danger to secure its identity and legitimation which depend
on the promise of security for its citizens. Citizenship becomes synonymous with loyalty and the
elimination of all that is foreign. Underscoring this distinction between citizens and people
reinforced by these boundary distinctions, Walker argues that not until people, rather than any
citizens, are the primary subjects of security can a truly comprehensive security be achieved.

Link Environment
Environmental apocalypticism causes ecoauthoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed
environmental threats also causes political apathy which
turns case
Buell 3 Frederickcultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of
five books, From Apocalypse To Way of Life, pages 185-186

crisis discourse thus suffers from a number of


liabilities. First, it seems to have become a political liability almost
as much as an asset. It calls up a fierce and effective opposition
with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too
vulnerable to refutation by events. It also exposes
environmentalists to being called grim doomsters and antilife
Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often
tempted people to try to find a total solution to the problems
involved a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of
crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the
Third Reichs infamous final solution .55 A total crisis of
societyenvironmental crisis at its gravestthreatens to translate
despair into inhumanist authoritarianism ; more often, however, it helps
Looked at critically, then,

It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief


that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same
time it depoliticizes people, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals;
this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it
makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her
own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of
keep merely dysfunctional authority in place.

environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep
cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition:

the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is
tempted to turn ones back on the environment. This means,
preeminently, turning ones back on nature on traditions of nature

feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to
the different departments of ecological science),

and traditions of nature-based

activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, people need


to delink from nature and live in postnaturea conclusion that, as the next
chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how
deeply nature has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent
on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to further indifference to
nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with
them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis
discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with

one specific notion of environmental crisiswith 1960s- and 1970s-style


environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis
discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look
away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental
crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place.

The apocalyptic mode had a

number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into
walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that
promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and
with (often, though not always) the need for immediate total solution .
Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode; ecoauthoritarianism was a grave temptation; and as crisis was
elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation
increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly
terminal nature.

Catastrophic depictions of the environment embody the logic of security they


produce one-shot governmental solutions that utterly fail to resolve the underlying
harm
Roe, 12 (Paul Roe, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European
Studies at Central European University, Budapest, Is securitization a negative concept? Revisiting the
normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics, Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3, June 2012)
For the Copenhagen School, and particularly for Wver, desecuritization (politicization) might
be more effective than securitizing problems (Wver, 1995: 57; emphasis added). This is not
just a matter of the context within which problems are dealt with, but also has to do with the
long-term thinking that normal politics arguably brings with it. Although Wver is by no means
categorical in the claim that securitization is invariably worse than politicization, his thinking
nevertheless suggests that securitizing problems may not always result in better outcomes.5 For
example, Wver (1995: 65) restates Barry Buzans assertion that some environmental issues
might be tackled more effectively by the process-type remedies of economics, than by the statist
solutions of security logic. Similarly, Daniel Deudney (1990: 4657) has warned of the logic of
security being appropriated to create a sense of urgency in relation to the need to address
ecological problems: how some environmentalists endeavour to find a moral equivalence to
war. In particular, Deudney draws attention to how national securitys propensity for short-term
strategizing the desire that affairs are quickly returned to normal is not likely to make much
of a contribution to establishing patterns of environmentally sound behaviour. Because
conventional national security organizations have short-term horizons, the tendency not to
operate on the basis of long-term thinking represents a poor model for environmental problem
solving. Stefan Elbe has also raised questions over the efficacy of securitizing certain public
health concerns.6 In Elbes treatment of (the more specific) normative debate over the linking of
HIV/AIDS and security, he notes how framing the issue of HIV/AIDS as security pushes
responses to the disease away from civil society toward the much less transparent workings of
military and intelligence organizations, which also possess the power to override human rights
and civil liberties (Elbe, 2006: 128).7

Environmental issues become securitizing when extreme measures are taken to


conserve it- when the environment becomes an apriori issues to any others
Buzan et al, 1998 (Barry Bzzan, Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London
School of Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University, Ole
Waever, a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of
Copenhagen Jaap de Wilde, Professor of International Relations and World Politics at the University of
Groningen., 1998 Security: A New Framework for Analysis p.38)
Nor do system-level referent objects always lose out. Thus far they have done so in the military
and political sectors, where the security of humankind has generally had less appeal than that of
the state. But the story is different in other sectors. The environment is becoming an interesting
case, because groups are using a securitizing logic that exactly follows the format prescribed in
the previous section: the environment has to survive: therefore, this issue should take priority
over all others, because if the environment is degraded to the point of no return all other issues

will lose their meaning. If the normal system (politics according to the rules as they exist) is not
able to handle the situation, we (Greenpeace and especially the more extremist Eco terrorists)
will have to take extraordinary measures to save the environment. Sustainability might be the
environmentalists equivalent of the states sovereignty and the nations identity: it is the
essential constitutive principle that has to be protected. If the is idea catches on the environment
itself may be on the way to becoming a referent object- an object by reference to which security
action can be taken in a socially significant way. We discuss this more fully in Chapter 4. Once
this door is opened, one can see other plausible candidates for security referent objects at the
system level. Humankind as a whole achieved some status as a referent object in relation to
nuclear weapons and could do so again- perhaps more successfully- in relation to environmental
disasters, such as new ice ages or collisions between the earth and one or more of the many large
rocks that occupy near-earth space. The level of human civilization could also become the
referent object in relations to environmental threats.

Environment link
The extension of security logic to the environment reinforces current environmental
trends, and results in the destruction of human civilization and endangers our mere
existence
Dalby 2002 (Simon, professor of geography and political economy at Carleton University,
Environmental Security, 2002, pg. 144-6)
This observation makes the question of what is to be secured especially important. The
possibility that the ecological costs of globalizing omnivorous consumption might drastically
destabilize the biosphere is the rationale for many invocations to think about environmental
security, as well as the related appeals for global environmental management that so worry
"global ecology" thinkers like Wolfgang Sachs.2 While Peter Taylor calls such a program an
eco-fascist world order, the World Order Models Project has discussed these matters in terms of
eco-imperialism and made the argument that such practices are effectively already in action.3
Tim Luke's warning that environmentalists often, if sometimes inadvertently, support such
projects in their zeal to monitor and encourage managerial responses to political crises extends
these observations to once again emphasize the importance of the discursive politics of forms of
ecocritique.4 From this it is clear that a program of environmental management will have to
understand human ecology better than conventional international relations does if world politics
in the global city is going to seriously tackle environmental sustainability. Accelerating attempts
to manage planet Earth using technocratic, centralized modes of control, whether dressed up in
the language of environmental security or not, may simply exacerbate existing trends. The
frequent failures of resource management techniques premised on assumptions about stable
ecosystems are even more troubling in the case of claims about the necessity of managing the
whole planet. Given the inadequacy of many existing techniques, if these practices are to be
extended to the scale of the globe, the results are potentially disastrous. In the face of extreme
disruption, no comfort can be taken from biospheric thinking or the Gaia hypothesis. As James
Lovelock has pointed out, the question for humanity is not just the continued existence of
conditions fit for life on the planet. In the face of quite drastic structural change in the biosphere
in the past, the climatic conditions have remained within the limits that have assured the overall
survival of life-but not necessarily the conditions suitable for contemporary human civilization.
The political dilemma and the irony here is that the political alternative to global managerial
efforts, that of political decentralization and local control, which is often posited by green theory,
frequently remains in thrall to the same limited political imaginary of the domestic analogy and
avoids dealing with the hard questions of coordination by wishing them away in a series of
geographical sleights of hand coupled to the rearticulation of the discourses of political
idealism.5 Given that the ecological analyses of biospheric processes and the human ecology
discussions of biospheric people suggest both the global scope of processes of disruption and the
intrinsic instabilities of ecology, the importance of politics and the inadequacies of international
relations to grapple with its complexities is only emphasized in the face of these calls for either
global management or radical decentralization.6 The widespread failure of the omnivores to
acknowledge the consequences of their actions is a crucial part of these concerns, and this
responsibility is often obscured by the construction of security in terms of technological and
modernist managerial assertions of control within a geopolitical imaginary of states and
territorial entities, urbane civilization and primitive wilderness. But as the focus on human
ecology demonstrates, nature is not just there anymore; it is also unavoidably here, in part a
consequence of human activities, which, although often out of sight to urban residents, cannot
remain out of mind in considering matters of world politics and the radical endangerment of
human "being" as a result of the practices of securing modern modes of existence.

Environment link
Construction of environmental threats produces securitizing measures but no real
change- no solvency
Buzan et al, 1998 (Barry Buzan, Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London
School of Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University, Ole
Waever, a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of
Copenhagen Jaap de Wilde, Professor of International Relations and World Politics at the University of
Groningen., 1998 Security: A New Framework for Analysis p.73-74 )
It should be emphasized that the political agenda does not only address the more sensational,
emotion manifestations of environmental issues but has also become a part of ordinary politics.
Political parties, departments, and many firms must formulate environmental polities as a part of
their ordinary activities, regardless of whether they believe in them. This situation constitutes
politicization rather than securitization. As long as environmental concerns fall outside
established economic and political practices and routines, their advocates tend to- and probably
must- overemphasize the overwhelming importance of those values and issues. Many
securitizing moves can be found in the reports that bridge both agenda, ranging from the Club of
Rome reports to the work of the Brudtland Commission. These reports present Silent Springtype lessons (de Wilde 1994: Carson 1962): It is not the actual disasters but their predictions that
lead to securitization. Concepts such as resource scarcity and sustainability have successfully
mobilized public concern. when picked up by governments and firms, however, these concerns
are often merely politicized: they constituted a subagenda within the larger political context. The
environmental sector displays more clearly than any other the propensity for dramatic
securitizing moves but with comparatively little successful securitization effects (i.e. those that
lead to extraordinary measures). this finding points to the unsettled standing of the
environmental discourse as such within public debate.

The blending of environmental and national impacts supports a securitized logic of


geopolitics, upholding the US as the only true global savior
Gearid Tuathail, Professor of Government and International Affairs and Director of the Masters of
Public and International Affairs program Virginia Tech, Sept 1996. AT THE END OF
GEOPOLITICS?. http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/Website/Publish/papers/End.htm
Even within the much remarked upon emergence of "environmental security" and the sacred visions
of green governmentalists like Al Gore, geography is post-territorial in-flowmations of ozone gases,
acid rain, industrial pollution, topsoil erosion, smog emissions, rainforest depletions and toxic spills.
Yet, the discourse of unveiled and primordial geographical regions persists also. In the place of
Mackinder's natural seats of power, Gore presents the "great genetic treasure map" of the globe,
twelve areas around the globe that "hold the greatest concentration of germplasm important to
modern agriculture and world food production." Robert Kaplan's unsentimental journey to the "ends
of the earth" where cartographic geographies are unravelling and fading has him disclosing a "real
world" of themeless violence and chaos, a world where "[w]e are not in control." The specter of a
second Cold War -- "a protracted struggle between ourselves and the demons of crime, population
pressure, environmental degradation, disease and cultural conflict" -- haunt his thoughts. This
equivocal environmentalization of strategic discourse (and visa versa) -- and the environmental
strategic think tanks like the World Watch Institute which promote it -- deserve problematization as
clusters of postmodern geopolitics, in this case congealments of geographical knowledge and green
governmentality designed to re-charge the American polity with a circumscribed global
environmental mission to save planet earth from destruction.

The affirmative harms expand the concept of security from


traditional issues like war to include the environment, this
framing of the environment spills over massively expanding
government power and justifying militarism

Waever 95 (Ole, Senior Researcher at the Center for Peace & Conflict
Research, On Security, p. 63-64) KSM
Central to the arguments for the conceptual innovation of
environmental or ecological security41 is its mobilization potential. As
Buzan points out, the concept of national security "has an enormous power
as an instrument of social and political mobilization" and, therefore, "the
obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is
the possible magnitude of the threats posed, and the need to mobilize
urgent and unprecedented responses to them. The security label is a useful
way both of signalling danger and setting priority, and for this reason alone it
is likely to persist in the environmental debates."42 Several analysts have,
however, warned against securitization of the environmental issue
for some of these very reasons, and some of the arguments I present
here fit into the principled issue of securitization/desecuritization as
discussed earlier in this chapter. A first argument against the environment as
a security issue, mentioned, for example, by Buzan, is that environmental
threats are generally unintentional.43 This, by itself, does not make
the threats any less serious, although it does take them out of the
realm of will. As I pointed out earlier, the field of security is constituted
around relationships between wills: It has been, conven tionally,
about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the sovereignty
of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in
defense of its sovereignty. The contest of concern, in other words, is
among strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the
logic around which the whole issue of security has been framed. In light of
my earlier discussion, in which I stressed that "security" is not a reflection of
our everyday sense of the word but, rather, a specific field with traditions,
the jump to environmental security becomes much larger than
might appear at first to be the case. I do not present this as an
argument against the concept but, rather, as a way of illuminating or even
explaining the debate over it. Second in his critique of the notion of

environmental security, Richard Moss points out that the concept of


"security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to
be provided by the state: The most serious consequence of
thinking of global change and other environmental problems as
threats to security is that the sorts of centralized gov ernmental
responses by powerful and autonomous state organizations
that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for
addressing most environmental problems. When one is
reacting to the threat of organized external violence,
military and intelligence institutions are empowered to take
the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic,
when responding to environmental threats, response by
centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical.
Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the
most efficient or effective way of addressing environmental
problems, particularly those that have a global character. 44
Moss goes on to warn that "the instinct for centralized state responses

to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding


effectively to global environmental problems."45 It might, he points
out, even lead to militarization of environmental problems .46 A third
warning, not unrelated to the previous two, is the tendency for the
concept of security to produce thinking in terms of us-them,
which could then be captured by the logic of nationalism. Dan
Deudney writes that "the 'nation' is not an empty vessel or blank slate
waiting to be filled or scripted, but is instead profoundly linked to
war and 'us vs. them' thinking ( . . . ) Of course, taking the war and 'us
vs. them' thinking out of nationalism is a noble goal. But this may be like
taking sex out of 'rock and roll,' a project whose feasibility declines when one
remembers that 'rock and roll' was originally coined as a euphemism for
sex."47 The tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general
tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own
borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away
from one's own contributions to environmental problems." Finally,
there is the more political warning that the concept of security is basically
defensive in nature, a status quo concept defending that which is,
even though it does not necessarily deserve to be protected. In a
paradoxical way, this politically conservative bias has also led to warnings by
some that the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous
tool of the "totalitarian left," which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis
of environmental collectivism." Certainly, there is some risk that the
logic of ecology, with its religious potentials and references to holistic
categories, survival and the linked significance of everything, might easily
lend itself to totalitarian projects, where also the science of ecology has
focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in
the name of the environment.50

Linking ecology to security misrepresents the nature and


significance of environmentalismenvironmental problems are
diffuse and long-term while wars are concentrated and violent
Dalby 2 (Simon, professor of geography and political economy at
Carleton University in Ottawa, Environmental Security, p. 16-17)
Discussions of the relationships between environment and security didn't start in 1989,
although at least in the United States it is fair to say that the topic emerged in its contemporary form
then." Against the backdrop of the long summer drought of 1988, alarmist reports of huge tropical
forest destruction, especially in Brazil, renewed concern about global climatic change and
stratospheric ozone depletion, the relaxation of the cold war, and the drastic rethinking of
Soviet security policy, policy discussions in Washington were ripe for some new topics and
thinking. Just as Francis Fukuyama was declaring the end of history and the triumph of liberalism,
the environment, too, became part of the foreign policy discussion and the focus for
discussions of endangerment.65 In 1989 Norman Meyers published an article linking environment
and security in Foreign Policy, and ,`Jessica Tuchman Mathews published one in Foreign Affairs
that suggested that resources and population issues mattered as foreign policy priorities and should
be incorporated in a reformulated understanding of security. Mike Renner's Worldwatch paper of
that same year also linked environment and security.66In Britain Neville Brown published a paper
on climate change and conflict in Survival, the journal of the influential Lute of Strategic Studies;
Peter Gleick reversed the process of introducing environment into security considerations by writing

about national security in the journal Climatic Change. Arthur Westing, the leading researcher on
questions of the environmental disruptions caused by warfare, contributed a discussion of a
comprehensive formulation of security. Josh Karliner suggested that the environmental difficulties
in Central America amounted to a different form of warfare there.67 National sovereignty and the
transboundary responsibilities for the global environment were also the topic for articles.68 Special
issues of the journals Millennium and the Fletcher Forum on International Affairs followed in 1990.
A little later Gwyn Prins introduced the discussion to wider British audiences in a book and television documentary with the memorably apt title of Top Guns and Toxic Whales.69 Daniel
Deudney was quick to pen a paper arguing that all this was not necessarily a good idea. In what has
probably become the most cited paper in this whole discussion, he argued that linking security
to ecology required a number of serious mismatches of means and ends as well as a
misconstrual of the nature and significance of environmentalism:70 He argued that
environmental problems are often diffuse and long-term while wars are concentrated and
violent. Polarizing discourses to mobilize populations against identifiedan tagonists is not
similar to the kinds of social changes needed to deal with environmental difficulties. With rapid
increases in international trade supplying raw materials from a diversity of sources, most re source conflicts were unlikely to lead to warfare. Before the debate had developed very far, one
of the arguments Deudney made, that military institutions' frequently dreadful record on
environmental matters in the past did not bode well for their handling matters of ecology in
the future, was powerfully reinforced by pictures of blazing oil wells in Kuwait in the latter
stages of the Gulf War in 1991.
The blending of environmental and national impacts supports a securitized logic of geopolitics,
upholding the US as the only true global savior
Gearid Tuathail, Professor of Government and International Affairs and Director of the Masters of Public and International
Affairs program Virginia Tech, Sept 1996. AT THE END OF GEOPOLITICS?.
http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/Website/Publish/papers/End.htm

Even within the much remarked upon emergence of "environmental security" and the sacred visions
of green governmentalists like Al Gore, geography is post-territorial in-flowmations of ozone gases,
acid rain, industrial pollution, topsoil erosion, smog emissions, rainforest depletions and toxic spills.
Yet, the discourse of unveiled and primordial geographical regions persists also. In the place of
Mackinder's natural seats of power, Gore presents the "great genetic treasure map" of the globe,
twelve areas around the globe that "hold the greatest concentration of germplasm important to
modern agriculture and world food production." Robert Kaplan's unsentimental journey to the "ends
of the earth" where cartographic geographies are unravelling and fading has him disclosing a "real
world" of themeless violence and chaos, a world where "[w]e are not in control." The specter of a
second Cold War -- "a protracted struggle between ourselves and the demons of crime, population
pressure, environmental degradation, disease and cultural conflict" -- haunt his thoughts. This
equivocal environmentalization of strategic discourse (and visa versa) -- and the environmental
strategic think tanks like the World Watch Institute which promote it -- deserve problematization as
clusters of postmodern geopolitics, in this case congealments of geographical knowledge and green
governmentality designed to re-charge the American polity with a circumscribed global
environmental mission to save planet earth from destruction.
The institutionalization of environmental fears expands securitization into the social realm,
constructing whole populations as threats to be eliminated while ignoring degradations true cause
Barry Buzan et al, prof Intl Studes, University of Westminster, 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. (Ole
Waever, senior research fellow, COPRI, and Jaap de Wilde, lecturer IR, University of Twente )
At first sight, there seems to be more room for natural hazards of the first type of threat: Nature
threatens civilization, and this is securitized. Many societies are structurally exposed to recurring
extreme natural events, such as earthquakes, volcanoes, cyclones, floods, droughts, and epidemics.
They are vulnerable these events, and much of heir history is about this continuous struggle with
nature. The risks involved are often explicitly securitized and institutionalized. In the Netherlands,

for example, protection against the sea and flooding rivers is a high-ranking national interest; the
same goes for protection against earthquakes in Japan.
As soon as some form of securitization or politization occurs, howeverthat is, when some
measure of human responsibilities replaces the role of fate of Godeven this group of conflicts
tends to develop a social character (the second type of threat). Following the river floods in the low
countries in 1995, the debate in the Netherlands was about political responsibility for he dikes: Who
was to blame, and what should be done? I Japan, following the Kobe earthquake in early 1995,
designers of seismological early warning systems and of construction techniques, as well as
governmental civil emergency plans, were under fire. Where the means to handle threats are
thought to exist, the security logic works less against nature than against the failure of the human
systems seen as responsible. Moreover, with links suspected between human activities and
natural catastrophes, the distinction between natural and manmade hazards is becoming blurred.
Therefore, except for cases in which people undergo natural hazards without any question, the logic
that environment security is about threats without enemies (Prins 1993) is often misleading.

Link Environment -- AT: Environmental


Security Good
The aff is about environmental conflict, not environmental
security they privilege resource scarcity and national
security. Only our alternative recognizes the role of
consumption.
Detraz and Betsill 9Nicole Detraz Poli Sci @ Memphis and Michele Betsill Poli Sci @ Colorado
St. [Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts International Studies
Perspectives 10 p. 307-308]

From the environmental security perspective, policies should be targeted at both human
behavior and natural processes, as each of these contribute to environmental insecurity for
humans. Human behaviors that contribute to environmental insecurity include things such as
high consumption patterns (Barnett 2001; Princen, Maniates, and Conca 2002) and high
population levels9 (Pirages 1997; Worku 2007). Natural processes discussed in this discourse include
natural disasters or biophysical alterations such as changes in precipitation levels, the growth or decline of
species populations, or changes in levels of pathogenic microorganisms (Pirages and DeGeest 2004). It is
important to note that many of these natural processes can also be worsened by human behaviors such as
consumption and population growth. However, despite the potential contributions that humans make to
processes that lead to environmental insecurity, there is a different degree of intentionality in the
environmental security discourse when compared with the environmental conflict discourse. In the

environmental conflict discourse, humans have a high degree of intentionality. This means
that segments of society knowingly come into violent contact with each other because of the
presence or absence of a resource. From an environmental security perspective, humans are rarely
seen as intentionally contributing to the insecurity of others. Rather, they act in ways that are consistent
with the practices of their societies. Scholars working within the environmental security

discourse are likely to advocate policies that deal with not only the short-term instances of
environmental insecurity but also the longer-term strategies for combating processes of
environmental change. These policies must prioritize human security over national security,
meaning that the security of humans must be the main concern of security policy . This is in
contrast to policies advocated within the environmental conflict discourse, which tend to
have direct links to the security of states themselves either over or in conjunction with the
security of individuals. Environmental security policies will often involve direct action of states but will
also have a role for other actors. According to this storyline, states have a responsibility to protect the
security of their populations, but in some cases this will mean allocating authority to achieve this objective
to other actorseither above or below the state.10 The environmental security discourse focuses on a wide
variety of threats to humans due to environmental change. Policy making will be directed at vulnerable
populations where vulnerability is seen to stem from both human behaviors and natural processes. This may
require a portfolio of governance mechanisms at different scales, ranging from the local to the global, and
involving both state and nonstate actors. It may include policies aimed at minimizing human activities that
lead to environmental degradation as well as enhancing the ability of human populations to adapt to
environmental change. In sum, the environmental security and environmental conflict discourses represent
two distinct ways of conceptualizing the relationship between security and the environment. We contend
that the environmental conflict discourse is more than simply a part of the broader environmental security
discourse. As discussed above, each has its own storylines or narratives about these issues. Those who use
an environmental security discourse introduce a broad range of threats and vulnerabilities into their analysis
of environmental change, focus on the negative effects to human populations, and envision a broad array of
policy solutions. In contrast, the environmental conflict discourse uses a narrower set of
storylines to describe the link between security and the environment (emphasizing conflict),

privileges the security of the state over human populations, and proposes a more limited set
of policy solutions aimed at avoiding conflict over resources rather than eliminating the
sources of resource scarcity in the first place.

Climate conflict framing focuses on narrow adaptation


and militaristic preparation versus poor-states.
Detraz and Betsill 9Nicole Detraz Poli Sci @ Memphis and Michele Betsill Poli Sci @ Colorado
St. [Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts International Studies
Perspectives 10 p. 313-314]
A security dialog is an understandable choice for those who wish to raise the profile of climate change on
the global agenda. As mentioned earlier, the inclusion of environmental concerns into security debates was
designed to raise the environment into the area of high politics. Many scholars and policy makers view
climate change as an issue worth all of the attention that is typically bestowed on traditional security issues.
In fact, many are convinced of the security implications of climate changealthough how security is
defined varies. At the same time, there are others who question whether framing climate change as a
security issue is beneficial. In a field that is marked by complexity, adding security to the debate may only
serve to confuse matters. As discussed throughout this paper, discourses have implications for the way a
problem like climate change is defined and the range of policy options that are considered. Ultimately, we
believe that a discursive shift to the environmental conflict perspective, even if limited to the Security
Council, would be counterproductive in the development of a global response to climate change. Our
primary concern is that a shift to the environmental conflict discourse would result in a
narrowing of policy options focused on a particular form of adaptation avoiding

conflictand that other issues of human security as well as adaptation and mitigation
strategies for addressing those issues could fall off the agenda . One of the problems of
relying on the environmental conflict discourse to understand the security implications of climate change is
that the climate issue is different than most other issues discussed in the literature that links
conflict and the environment. Climate change is a more abstract phenomenon than many other
environmental issues and will be experienced in different ways. While there is some variation in the
time horizon expected for climate change, the pace will be relatively slow but the impacts will spread to a
variety of environmental arenas, including water availability, food availability, and so on. (IPCC 2007).
This means that climate change is more likely to act as a threat multiplier than as a primary source of
insecurity. This presents different issues than those often tackled by the existing environmental conflict
cases, which tend to be focused on only one resource at a time.17 According to Purvis and Busby
(2004:68), the connection between climate change and the outbreak of violence will unlikely be as strong
as when natural resources can be exploited for quick financial reward. None of this is to suggest that
environmental conflict is unlikely to occur as a result of climate change. On the contrary, there is a
possibility that groups in society will conflict over resources if climate change results in resource
scarcity.18 Our point is that this is only one concern in the climate change debate and quite probably not
the most pressing concern. Another issue with the environmental conflict discourse is the

tendency to locate the authority for solutions and action in the military apparatus of
states. Allenby (2000:13) claims that the national security community in most countries is
conservative, insular , heavily focused on military threats and challenges,
secretive , and powerful; it also tends to focus on short-term, obvious problems.
Culturally, such security communities are among the least likely to embrace environmental considerations,
and, when they do so, only in a mission-oriented context. Scholars have long questioned whether armed
forces are capable of meeting the challenges posed by environmental change (Barnett 2003). Liotta and
Shearer (2007:133) argue against the idea that climate change in particular should be met with a militarized
response: The problems are too broadly distributed and the consequences are too deeply
penetrating for such an approach to be successful. These positions point out the tendency of

militarized solutions to be narrowly defined and potentially top-down . If climate


change requires a behavioral shift to achieve lasting solutions, then narrowly defined militarized solutions
are unlikely to be sufficient responses. These problems are in addition to the fact that militaries around the
world are responsible for major environmental damage, both through wartime and peacetime activities
(Paterson 2001; Liotta and Shearer 2007). It may be counterproductive to depend on the military apparatus
of states as a potential solution to environmental problems when they are simultaneously contributing to
those same problems. Lastly, a shift to the environmental conflict discourse may lead to the
continuation of the status quomeaning that those who are currently advantaged in society
will suffer much less from the impacts of climate change as well as the strategies for
mitigating climate change and vice versa. Nordas and Gleditsch (2007:635) claim that the security
scenarios may well be constructed with the benign intention of arousing the world to greater attention to a
global issue. But they could also lead to greater emphasis on a national security response to whatever
degree of climate change is seen as unavoidable. This would not be helpful to the primary victims of
climate change. This is true both in terms of states and segments of society. IPCC reports have claimed that
the negative impacts of climate change are expected to fall disproportionately on poor countries in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America (Biermann and Dingwerth 2004; Park 2005). Additionally, there are different
levels of vulnerability to climate change. Those impacted most are likely to be those who depend on natural
resources and ecosystem services for their livelihoods (Barnett and Adger 2007). This includes agriculturalbased economies in particular. If climate change is understood as a security issue tied to potential for
conflict, then these poor states are likely to be seen as a military threat first and foremost. This may result in
military strategies, like ecological intervention, rather than more humanitarian strategies to help those
suffering from environmental insecurity. A related concern is the potential for disadvantaged populations
within states to be targeted differently for climate change solutions. Paterson (1996) suggests that as
countries are hit by the negative impacts of climate change, existing ethnic, religious, or other divides may
play a role in decision-making processes, and governments may favor dominant groups in decisions.

Nondominant groups could be classified as the aggressor in an environmental conflict


situation and therefore become targets of environmental conflict solutions implemented by
the state.

Climate security discourse authorizes technocratic topdown politics.


Methmann and Rothe 12Chris Methmann, Research Associate Poli Sci Inst. @ Hamburg and
Delf Rothe IR PhD Candidate @ Hamburg [Politics for the day after tomorrow: The logic of apocalypse in
global climate politics Security Dialogue 43 p. 334-337]

Security: The war of all against nothing The third case study involves the UN Security Council
debate on climate change in 2007. This represents an extreme case, since here securitization is most likely
to result in exceptional measures. At first sight, the discourse here follows the script of securitization in the
Copenhagen Schools sense, articulating climate change as a source of conflict among states. However, our
analysis, as illustrated in Figure 2, reveals a much more fine-grained picture. To be precise, it actually
presents two different versions of securitization, drawing on two different antagonisms. On the one hand,
there is an antagonism constructed between first-order threatsthat is, the direct impacts of a changing
climateand all vulnerable regions, countries or communities. The security framing here is one of
human security, as climate change threatens the livelihoods, food supplies, water security ,
etc. of the vulnerable. On the other hand, these hot spots or zones of crisis can become a source of danger
themselves. The human insecurity in vulnerable regions, then, is articulated with what could be called a
neo-Malthusian climate-conflict discourse (Trombetta, 2008; Detraz and Betsill, 2009). This states, on the
one hand, that vulnerable regions suffering from the impacts of climate change will be conflict-prone, as
they lack the knowledge, capacity and resources to deal with it (Heller in UN Security Council, 2007b:
19). Environmental degradation and the resulting scarcity of resources are understood as an additional and
novel driver for conflicts (see Appendix). Taken together, these ideas constitute a security discourse
in which the vulnerable are becoming dangerous (Oels, 2012)that is, a threat for national

security in the Western world or even for international securit y. The vulnerable thus
become the dangerous enemies in the sense of the logic of security. And this clearly implies
the adoption of a preemptive logic and the exceptional measures of interstate
conflict and military intervention . Yet, even in the security field, preemptive or other
security measures, which can be found for example in disaster management (see Figure 2), only play a
minor role. The reason for this is that the two articulations of climate change and security are heavily
permeated by a different storyline, one that follows the logic of apocalypse (the fantasmatic dimension
presented in Figure 2). Also in this case most articulations stress the universality of the threat,
resulting in an antagonistic frontier between humanity and dangerous climate change that is characteristic
for the apocalypse (see above). And this explains why an exceptional rhetoric in the case of climate change
is not linked with the adoption of exceptional measures. While the climate/humanity antagonism is still
most dominantly couched in metaphors of war (see Appendix), the unification of humanity implies that this
particular war is fought against an entirely spectral enemy: this is not a struggle against anyone (Weisleder
in UN Security Council, 2007b: 32). And this war of all against nothing is the crucial point for the

logic of apocalypse that connects security and risk in this particular case and thus excludes
exceptional measuresbecause our conflict is not being fought with guns and missiles but with
weapons from everyday lifechimney stacks and exhaust pipes (Pita in UN Security Council, 2007b: 8).

The antagonism created by a logic of apocalypse does not just replace or transform the
other security articulations: it also links them in crucial ways . As Figure 2 shows, the most
prominent demand articulated in the discourse is prevention. And as second-order threats like
uncontrollable migratory flows (see Figure 2) mainly evolve under conditions of an apocalyptic climate
change, mitigation becomes the best measure of conflict prevention. Again, there is a dichotomization
between a linear development (e.g. normal migratory patterns) and a state of chaos. Therefore, also the
climate-security discourse heavily promotes the political machinery of the UN Framework Convention and
its Kyoto Protocol (Churkin in UN Security Council, 2007b: 17)just as appropriate incentives, public
private partnerships, low-carbon emitting technologies and innovative solutions (Kryzhanivskyi in UN
Security Council, 2007b: 4). At the same time, also adaptation becomes a form of conflict prevention, as it
lessens the direct impacts of climate change on the vulnerable. The discourse thus articulates a riskmanagement approach similar to that in the field of adaptation, which revolves around the concepts of
vulnerability, resilience and community (see, for example, Hill in UN Security Council, 2007b: 6;
(Koenders in UN Security Council, 2007a: 22). The hegemonic discourse here takes up the calls for
supporting the vulnerable with adaptation and constructs a responsibility on the part of the West (see
Appendix and Figure 2). This responsibility is transformed into a pastoral relation, taking the
form of government at a distance through empowerment, stakeholder participation and self
responsibilization of local communities. Also in the field of global security governance we can see
the impacts of the banality of the apocalypse (De Goede and Randalls, 2009: 872).
Even though climate change is commonly seen as one of the major threats to international
peace and security, this does not result in the adoption of exceptional measures not in
preemptive geo-engineering, not in a global climate response force, not in military pre-warning systems,
etc. Rather, the (political) machine of mitigation governance and the preparedness of the
vulnerable become the cornerstones of a broadened security agenda . Conclusion The starting
point of this article was the paradoxical simultaneity of the logic of risk and the logic of security in global
discourses of climate change. Drawing on Laclau and Mouffes theory of hegemony, we have argued that
risk and security have been articulated in a way that may be termed the logic of apocalypse: creating a
universal threat for the entire planet, radically undermining the possibility of a future as such, mobilizing
religious apocalyptic imageries and emphasizing an antiepistemology. Our empirical analysis in three cases
those of mitigation, adaptation and the security sectorreveals that this logic is deeply ingrained in
global discourses of climate change. Yet, apocalypse is the hegemonic way of articulating climate change
as a security problem. And, following our theoretical argument, this logic of apocalypse results coherently
in practices of risk management: mitigation as precautionary risk management, adaptation as investing in
preparedness, and security not as preemption but as a combination of the former two. In the face of the
apocalypse, politicians seem to be too small and human to resolve the dawning crisishence,

responsibility is handed over to the arcane and obscure practices and rationalities of risk

management. To conclude, we suggest that our study be read as outlining a contribution to critical
security studies that might be termed the security paradox. It may indeed be a recurrent pattern that
securitization, as the Copenhagen School holds, results in exceptional measures. However, there are
definitely some cases in which securitization is so overwhelming that it prompts a counterintuitive result:

the greater and more apocalyptic the perceived threat, the greater the resulting distrust in
political actors and exceptional measures, and thus the smaller and technocratic the
political measures ; here, securitization is so exaggerated that it prompts the opposite: routine
and micropractices of risk management. By contrast, for those working in the Foucauldian tradition, this
piece could draw attention to the fact that even the most mundane practices of risk management are
politically supported and discursively sustained by images of an overwhelming apocalyptic threat. In other
words, our work supports the emerging insight that risk and security are two sides of the same coinrather
than two very different animals.

Link Global Warming


Even if warming is true, framing it as apocalypse is strategically even more dangerous.
Crist 7 Ass. Prof. Sci & Tech in Society @ VT (Eileen, Telos 141, Winter, Beyond the Climate Crisis)
While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as
the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two
reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the
needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planets ecological
predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying
climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the
proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio
thereof, will solve the problem. Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines,
using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering
technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the suns rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident:
confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them,
capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to
face climate change by changing our whole style of living.16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come
away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, the one lifeline we can use
immediately.17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with
implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to
that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. The Montreal protocol, he submits, marks a signal
moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.18 He hopes
for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in
the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the
planets predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated
climate crisis, so it would be nave not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hopedfor) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and
innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of
production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth,
would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer
civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the
entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest
for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisisamong
numerous other catastrophesclimate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes
over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive
and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate
change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other
facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued

old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development,
and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages
the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisisa crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite
decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other
academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global
warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades,
centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate
species and ecosystem lossesindeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate
change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to
will barely addressthe ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

Their framing of climate change causes a distraction for more pressing


environmental movements that solve extinction
Crist 7 Ass. Prof. Sci & Tech in Society @ VT (Eileen, Telos 141, Winter, Beyond the Climate Crisis)
The diminishment of life's richness began with the exodus of hunters and gatherers from Africa
thousands of years ago, and deepened with the [end page 36] invention of agriculture and cities, the
development of warfare, and the advent of the European voyages.24 But biodepletion accelerated

enormously after the emergence of industrial civilization, and particularly since the mid-

twentieth century, with billions of people not only doubling every few decades, but
incliningby force, choice, or delusiontoward a consumer culture founded on
overproduction and global trade. Overproduction and global trade, in turn, require the
ceaseless conversion of living beings and natural systems into dead objects, "resources,"
and humanized landscapes and seascapes.25 The significance of human-driven extinction
can never be overstated, because it means not only the death of species but the end of their
evolutionary destinies as wellof the life-forms they would or might have eventually originated.
Present-day extinction is not about species blinking out sporadically; it is a global and escalating
spasm of en masse losses that, the geological record reveals, is an infrequent event in Earth's natural
history. Notwithstanding circulating shallow sophistry that proclaims extinction to be "natural" or
"normal," anthropogenic extinction is neither natural (for countless species are disappearing from
targeted onslaught or pressures far exceeding their capacity to adapt) nor normal (for this level of
losses occurs rarely as a consequence of a catastrophic event). Yet, as tragic as extinction is, species
are also being devastated without being annihilated: losses of distinct populations and plunges in
population numbers are a blow to the vigor, ecological contributions and connectedness, and
evolutionary potential of species. Today, drops of 70, 80, 90 percent, or more, of wild plants and
animals, on land and in oceans, are common. Such declines mean that species hang on as relics, with
shortened lifespans or committed to extinction, no longer able to play significant ecological and
evolutionary roles. The nosedive of wild-animal and plant abundance foregrounds yet [end
page 37] another facet of biodepletion: the simplification of ecosystems. From a landscape
perspective, the decline of numbers and geographic races of wild organisms signifies constrictions
of their former ranges. As populations blink out from diverse places, their place-bound

contributions are lost; the losses cascade through the communities of organisms to which
the extinguished populations belonged, leaving behind degraded ecosystems. While the
simplification of ecosystems is often dramatically visible, it can also unfold as an
incremental, barely noticeable process. And it is not that ecosystems, here and there, are
occasionally suffering simplification by losing constituent locals. The biosphere is
experiencing gross decline or elimination of areas that are, in certain cases, centers of
diversificationmost notably, tropical forests, wetlands, mangrove forests, and coral reefs
everywhere. The whittling down of ecological complexity has been a global trend proceeding from
the conversion of ecosystems for intensive human uses, the aforementioned population depletions,
and the invasion of nonnative species. Nonnative species are the generalists hitching rides in the
bustle of globalizationfrom the climate-change-favored fungus that is killing frogs, to millions of
domestic cats preying on birds, to innumerable more.26 Human-facilitated invasions, coupled with
the disappearance of natives, lead to places losing the constellation of life-forms that once uniquely
constituted them. The inevitable outcome of extinction, plummeting populations, lost and simplified
ecosystems, and a bio-homogenized world is not only the global demolition of wild nature, but also
the halting of speciation of much complex life. The conditions for the birth of new species within a
wide band of life, especially of large-bodied species that reproduce slowly, are being suspended.27
[end page 38] All these interconnected dimensions constitute what conservation biologists call
the biodiversity crisisa term that to the postmodernist rings of rhetoric, while to the broad
public (insofar as it has heard anything about it) involves a largely illiterate and vague
understanding of "extinction."28 Academic frivolity and public ignorance aside, the biodiversity

crisis heralds a biospheric impoverishment that will be the condition and experience of all
future human generations: it requires 5 to 10 million years for biodiversity to recover after
a mass extinction of the current scope. In light of this fact, I submit that unless global
warming unleashes appalling penaltiesin which case, the climate crisis and biodepletion
will merge into one devastating event for virtually all life 29the implications of
humanity's impact on biodiversity are so far-reaching that they may, in reality, dwarf the
repercussions of climate change. And yet, the current framing of climate change as the
urgent issue encourages regarding the unwinding of biodiversity as a less critical matter
than the forthcoming repercussions of global warming. Attention to the long-standing ruination
of biodiversity underway is subverted in two ways in climate-change discourse: either it gets elided

through a focus on anthropocentric anxieties about how climate change will specifically affect
people and nations; or biodepletion is presented as a corollary of climate change in writings that
closely consider how global warming will cause biodiversity losses. Climate change is

undoubtedly speeding up the unraveling of life's interconnectedness and variety. But if


global warming has such potential to afflict the natural world, it is because the latter's
"immunity" has been severely compromised. It is on an already profoundly wounded
natural world that global warming is delivering its blow. Focusing on the added blow of
climate change is important, but this focus should not come at the expense of erasing from
view the prior, ongoing, and climate-change-independent wounding of life on Earth .
Depictions of climate conflict cause pre-emptive military build-up starting great power conflict
before the migration even occurs
Michael Brzoska 8, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg
[The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security, Paper prepared for the International Studies
Association Convention 2008, 3/26-29]
It will affect the living conditions of many people. In many cases the change in living conditions will be for the worse. This
may, in turn, lead to violent conflict. The deterioration of the human environment and the resulting violent conflict may induce
large numbers of people to migrate, thus also creating conflicts in areas less negatively affected by climate change. Beyond local

and regional effects, climate change increases the global risk of violent conflict by adding another element
of contention to the competition among major powers. These dangers associated with climate change are by
now quite well rehearsed. But how high is the probability that they will occur? How likely is it that climate change will lead to
more interstate wars, intrastate wars or terrorism? How much do we know about the links between climate change and violence? Are
these dangers real in the sense of having a high likelihood of occurring or are they largely fictitious, edgeof-range possibilities that are used to draw attention to climate change, a level of attention that would not
be attainable by stressing the more likely, but less spectacular economic and social consequences of the
problem? The latter would be understandable but potentially counterproductive. In the literature on securitization it is implied that
when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to
mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round exceptionalism
in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards security experts (Bigot
2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations
such as more use of arms, force and violence will gain in importance in the discourse on what to do . A
good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political
conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential
conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of
humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military
capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the
distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from
change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of
military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate
change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less
affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the
poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change . It could also be used by
major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers,
thus leading to arms races.

The impact is extinction


Heinberg 4 [Richard Heinberg, Senior Fellow at the Post-Carbon Institute, 2004, Book Excerpt: Powerdown: Options and
Actions for a Port-Carbon World, News Gateway, September 26th, Available Online at http://www.energybulletin.net/node/2291,
Accessed 12-04-2008]

Last One Standing The path of competition for remaining resources. If the leadership of the US

continues with current policies, the next decades will be filled with war, economic crises,
and environmental catastrophe. Resource depletion and population pressure are about to
catch up with us, and no one is prepared. The political elites, especially in the US, are
incapable of dealing with the situation. Their preferred solution is simply to commandeer
other nations resources, using military force. The worst-case scenario would be the general

destruction of human civilization and most of the ecological life-support system of the
planet. That is, of course, a breathtakingly alarming prospect. As such, we might prefer not to
contemplate it except for the fact that considerable evidence attests to its likelihood . The
notion that resource scarcity often leads to increased competition is certainly well founded.
This is general true among non-human animals, among which competition for diminishing
resources typically leads to aggressive behaviour. Iraq is actually the nexus of several
different kinds of conflict between consuming nations (e.g., France and the US); between western
industrial nations and terrorist groups; and most obviously between a powerful consuming
nation and a weaker, troublesome, producing nation. Politicians may find it easier to persuade
their constituents to fight a common enemy than to conserve and share . War is always

grim, but as resources become more scarce and valuable, as societies become more
centralized and therefore more vulnerable, and as weaponry becomes more sophisticated
and widely dispersed, warfare could become even more destructive that the case during the
past century. By far the greatest concern for the future of warfare must be the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. The US is conducting research into new types of nuclear weapons
bunker busters, small earth-penetrators, etc. Recent US administrations have enunciated a
policy of nuclear first-strike. Chemical and biological weapons are of secondary concern,
although new genetic engineering techniques may enable the creation of highly infectious
and antibiotic-resistant supergerms cable of singling out specific ethnic groups.
Additionally, the US has announced its intention to maintain clear military superiority to any
potential rival (full-spectrum dominance), and is actively developing space-based weapons
and supersonic drone aircraft capable of destroying targets anywhere on the planet at a
moments notice. It is also developing an entirely new class of gamma-ray weapons that
blur the critical distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons .

Attempting to halt global warming produces securitization- countries compete


against each other to reduce, or avoid reducing their emissions
Buzan et al, 1998 (Barry Buzan, Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London
School of Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University, Ole
Waever, a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of
Copenhagen Jaap de Wilde, Professor of International Relations and World Politics at the University of
Groningen., 1998 Security: A New Framework for Analysis p.86)
The third sequence of questions is decisive, because it is here that a political constellation of
mutual security concerns is formed. Who feels threatened? Who must those parties cooperate
with if action is to be effective? Effects and causes are significant conditions in disposing who
will become involved with whom and how, but they do not fully determine our outcomes.
Securitization always involves political choice: thus, actors might choose to ignore major causes
for political or pragmatic reasons and therefore may form a security constellation that is different
from what one would expect based on ones knowledge of effects and causes. Occasionally ,
pragmatism may prescribe global action, but even then it is necessary to subdivide global issues
according to the context of their causes and effects. Dealing with the causes of, for instance,
global warming require a global contest. The fossil CO2 emissions that contribute to the
greenhouse effect occur worldwide are therefore a global problem, even though important
regional differences should be realized. Meeting the causes of global warming points to the
urgency of a global regime, which was recognized at UNCED where the climate treaty that
became effective in March 1994 was signed. It is telling, however tat at the follow-up
conference in Berlin (28 March-7 April 1995), saving the intentions declared at UNCED was the
optimum goal. Further decision making and regime formation were postponed to the third
Climate Summit, to be held in Tokyo in 1997. This postponement is in part a result of the fact
that those who have to pay the price for prevention are different from those who pay the price of
failure.

This technological enframing makes warming strategically


even more dangerous.
Crist 7 Ass. Prof. Sci & Tech in Society @ VT (Eileen, Telos 141, Winter, Beyond the Climate Crisis)
While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as
the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two
reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the
needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planets ecological
predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying
climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the
proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio
thereof, will solve the problem. Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines,
using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering
technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the suns rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident:
confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them,
capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to
face climate change by changing our whole style of living.16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come
away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, the one lifeline we can use
immediately.17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with
implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to
that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. The Montreal protocol, he submits, marks a signal
moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.18 He hopes
for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in
the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the
planets predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated
climate crisis, so it would be nave not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hopedfor) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and
innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of
production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth,
would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer
civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the
entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest
for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisisamong
numerous other catastrophesclimate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes
over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive
and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate
change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other
facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued

old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development,
and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages
the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisisa crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite
decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other
academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global
warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades,
centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate
species and ecosystem lossesindeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate
change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to
will barely addressthe ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

Warming Anxiety Link

Dodds 12 Joseph, MPhil, Psychoanalytic Studies, Sheffield University, UK, MA, Psychoanalytic
Studies, Sheffield University, UK BSc, Psychology and Neuroscience, Manchester University, UK,
Chartered Psychologist (CPsychol) of the British Psychological Society (BPS), and a member of several
other professional organizations such as the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society, Psychoanalysis

and Ecology at the Edge of Chaos p 27 *gender mod


Why psychoanalysis? On the face of it, it seems frankly irrelevant. Surely it is the basic
sciences of geology, ecology, biology, and climatology that we need, combined with various
hi-tech engineering? Yes and no. The science informing us of the risks and possible technical solutions

has run far ahead of our psychological state. We are not yet at the point emotionally of
being able to clearly grasp the threat, and act accordingly. We need to ask why this issue,
despite its current prominence, fails to ignite people's motivation for the major changes science tells
us is necessary. This concerns not only the 'public' but the academy and the psychoanalytic
community. In spite of the fact that Harold Searles was already writing in 1960 that psychoanalysts need to acknowledge the psychological importance of the non-human environment, until very
recently his colleagues have almost entirely ignored him.

In this section we explore some of the theories with which we may be able to construct a psychoanalysis of
ecology. Fuller elaboration will involve incorporating approaches from the sciences of complexity and
ecology, and Deleuze and Guattari's 'geophilosophy' or 'ecosophy', which itself emerged in critical dialogue
with psychoanalysis and complexity theory. However, we first need to explore the ecological potential
within psychoanalysis itself, as without the latter's methods and theories for unmasking hidden motivations
and phantasies, this investigation will not be able to proceed.

Lertzman (2008), one of the first psychoanalytically informed social scientists to engage with the ecological crisis, describes a common surreal
aspect of our everyday responses to 'eco-anxiety', the experience of flipping through a
newspaper and being suddenly confronted with:
the stop-dead-in-your-tracks, bone-chilling kind of ecological travesties taking place around our planet today ... declining honey
bees, melting glaciers, plastics in the sea, or the rate of coal plants being built in China each second. But how
many of us actually do stop dead in our tracks? Have we become numb? ... if so, how can we
become more awake and engaged to what is happening?
Environmental campaigners have become increasingly frustrated and pessimistic. Even as
their messages spread further and further, and as scientists unite around their core
concerns, there is an alarming gap between increasingly firm evidence and public response.
Renee

The fact that oil companies donate millions to climate 'sceptic' groups doesn't help (Vidal 2010). Nor does the fact that eight European companies which are together responsible for 5-10 per cent of the emissions covered in the EU emissions trading system (Bayet,
BASF, BP, GDF Suez, ArcelorMittal, Lafarge, E.ON, and Solvay) gave $306,100 to senatorial candidates in the 2010 United States midterm elections who either outright deny climate change ($107,200) or pledge they will block all climate change legislation
($240,200), with the most flagrant deniers getting the most funds (Goldenberg 2010; Climate Action Network 2010). These are the same companies that campaign against EU targets of 30 per cent reductions in emissions using current inaction in the United
States as a justification, while claiming their official policy is that climate change is a major threat and they are committed to doing all they can to help in the common cause of dealing with the danger (for the full report see Climate Action Network 2010).

as well. In February 2010 a BBC-commissioned poll by Populus (BBC


2010a, 2010b) of 1,001 adults found that 25 per cent didn't think global warming was happening, a rise of 8
per cent since a similar poll in November 2009. Belief that climate change was real fell from 83 per cent to
75 per cent, while only 26 per cent believed climate change was established as largely man-made compared
with 41 per cent in November. A third of those agreeing climate change was real felt consequences had
been exaggerated (up from a fifth) while the number of those who felt risks had been understated fell from
38 per cent to 25 per cent (see Figure 3). According to Populus director M. Simmonds, 'it is very unusual ...
to see such a dramatic shift in opinion in such a short period ... The British public are sceptical about man's
contribution to climate change and becoming more so' (BBC 2010a).
. According to the chief scientific advisor at the Department for the
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Professor Robert Watson: 'Action is urgently needed ... We need the
public to understand that climate change is serious so they will change their habits and help us move
towards a low-carbon economy.' Why this shift? Whilst the poll took place with the background of heavy
snow and blizzards in the UK, always a convenient backdrop to climate sceptic jokes,
(2010a) article
(UEA).
Recent opinion polls show climate scepticism is on the rise in the UK

Most remarkable here is the discrepancy between public and expert opinion

the BBC

focused on a high-profile story concerning stolen emails alleging scientific malpractice at the University of East Anglia
way the overall science, and yet this is not how the public perceived it.

While this was a very serious accusation, no mainstream scientific body seriously imagines it changes in any real

Subsequently, the UK Parliament's Commons Science and Technology Committee completed its
investigation into the case (BBC 2010c). The MPs' committee concluded there was no evidence that UEA's
Professor Phil Jones had manipulated data, or tried 'to subvert the peer review process' and that 'his
reputation, and that of his climate research unit, remained intact' (BBC
2010c). The report noted that 'it is not standard practice in climate science to publish the raw data and the
computer code in academic papers' and that 'much of the data that critics claimed Prof Jones has hidden,
was in fact already publicly available' (BBC 2010c) but called strongly for a greater culture of transparency
in science. The report concluded that it 'found no reason in this unfortunate episode to challenge the
scientific consensus that global warming is happening and is induced by human activity' (BBC 2010c).
. In such a lengthy report of over 3 000
pages, produced from the combined efforts of the world scientific community on a topic with as many
variables as climate change, it is unsurprising some estimates need revising. Undoubtably there will be
more revisions in the future, some major.
. No doubt many sceptics will use the Parliamentary committee's report as further
evidence of an institutional cover-up.
This story was followed closely by another in January 2010 when the IPCC admitted a mistake concerning the timetable of Himalayan glacial melting

It is important to emphasize that for the world's scientists the overall picture has not been affected, but public perception is completely different, with

triumphant claims of proof 'it is all made up'

people are ready for such events


- the psychosocial equivalent of a
sandpile in a state of self-organized criticality (Palombo 1999; Bak 1994), when a single grain can cause a
major avalanche cascading through the whole system. Understanding such subtle shifts, and the often
unconscious motivations behind them, is where psychoanalysis perhaps more than any
other discipline has a lot to offer. As Lertzman (2008) writes:
What if the core issue is more about how humans respond to anxiety? ... [Environmental
problems ... conjure up anxieties that ... we are done for, and nothing can really be done ... To help me
understand more, I turn to Freud ... because I have found few others who speak as eloquently, and sensitively about what humans do when faced with anxiety or anxietyThe important psychological point is that

, indeed eager for it

provoking news.

Freud, civilization, nature and the dialectic of the Enlightenment

Is Freud really relevant to understanding our current crisis? While he was very much engaged in
relating psychology to social issues, from war to racism, group psychology and the discontents of
civilization (Freud 1913a, 1915, 1921, 1927, 1930), he was writing during a period when the possibility
that human activities could bring the Earth's ecosystems to the brink of collapse would have been hard to
contemplate. Romanticism may have complained about 'unweaving rainbows' and industry's 'dark satanic
mills', but by Freud's day this could be seen as Luddite anti-progress talk, especially for those working
within the Weltangschung of science and the Enlightenment to which Freud (1933) pinned his
psychoanalytic flag. However, much of our current bewildering situation can be understood as
rooted in part in a world view that was at its zenith during Freud's day and, as Lertzman
(2008) suggests, in our responses to anxiety. In addition, Freud did offer us some crucial

reflections on our relationship with nature:


The principle task of civilization, its actual raison d'etre, is to defend us against nature. We all know that
in many ways civilization does this fairly well already, and clearly as time goes on it will do it much
better. But no one is under the illusion that nature has already been vanquished; and few dare hope that she will ever be entirely subdued to man.
(Freud 1927: 51)
Here we can see an interesting ambivalence in Freud's rhetorical style, which perhaps unwittingly captures
two crucial aspects of our civilization's relationship to 'Nature' and thus begins to open up a
psychoanalytic approach to ecology. First, he depicts a series of binary oppositions typical for
his era, and not so different in our own: human versus nature, man versus woman and (more
implicitly) order versus chaos. Here we find the classic tropes of the Enlightenment, modernity,
patriarchy, industrialism and capitalism, which Jungian ecopsychologist Mary-Jane Rust (2008)
calls the myths we live by. The myths she is referring to in particular are the 'myth of progress'
and the 'myth of the Fall'. She argues that in order to create a sustainable future, or indeed any
future, we need to find other stories, other myths, through which to live our lives, to rethink
how we have fallen and what it means to progress. Freud's work suggests that Western culture views
civilization as a defence against nature, and against wildness, inner and outer, but as Rust (2008: 5)
writes, at 'this critical point in human history we most urgently need a myth to live by which
is about living with nature, rather than fighting it.' Thus, according to Rust,
we find ourselves ... between stories (Berry 1999), in a transitional space ... of great turbulence, with little
to hold onto save the ground of our own experience. Our therapeutic task ... is to understand how
these myths still shape our internal worlds, our language, and our defences ... [S]omewhere in
the midst of 'sustainability' ... lies an inspiring vision of transformation ... We need to dig deep, to re-read
our own myths as well as find inspiration from the stories of others.
(ibid.)

The myth of progress enters the climate change debate in calls for geo-engineering and
Utopian techno-fixes such as putting thousands of mirrors in space, and in the dismissal of
even gentle questioning of current economic models of unlimited growth. We will later look at Harold Searles' (1972)
approach to our fascination with technology and its role in the current crisis . Returning to Freud, however, there is, as
always, another side, an implicit awareness that the feeling of mastery civilization gives us is in
many ways a dangerous illusion. Behind our need for mastery lies our fear and trembling in
the face of the awesome power of mother nature.

There are the elements which seem to mock at all human control: the earth, which quakes
and is torn apart and buries all human life and its works; water, which deluges and drowns everything in turmoil; storms, which blow everything before
them ... With these forces nature rises up against us, majestic, cruel and inexorable; she brings
to our mind once more our weakness and helplessness, which we thought to escape through the work
of civilization.
(Freud 1927: 15-16)
Here is the other side of Freud's writing on the relation between 'Nature' and 'Civilization', with humanity
portrayed as a weak and helpless infant in awe and fear of a mighty and terrible mother. The lure and
horror of matriarchy lie behind the defensive constructs of patriarchal civilization , just as
Klein's paranoid-schizoid fears of fragmentation, engulfment, and annihilation lie behind later castration
threats (Hinshelwood 1991).
With each new earthquake or flood, nature erupts into culture -similar to Kristeva's (1982) description of
the eruption of the 'semiotic' into the 'symbolic' - and we are thrown back into a state of terror. The 'illusion'
in the title of Freud's 1927 essay The Future of an Illusion was meant to refer to how religion arose to

deal with these anxieties. However, the structural function of the myth of progress, while
undoubtably more successful in terms of practical benefits, can also be included here . In these
words of Freud we have already a deep understanding, albeit largely implicit, of our own current
crisis: a relationship to nature based on a master-slave system of absolute binaries, and an
attempt to maintain an illusory autonomy and control in the face of chaos.
There is often a tension in Freud, between the celebration of Enlightenment values found in works such as
The Future of an Illusion (1927) and the more Romantic Freud who won the Goethe prize and constantly
emphasized the elements Enlightenment rationality leaves out such as jokes, dreams, slips and
psychological symptoms. Thus, as well as being a perfect example of the Enlightenment with its call to
make the unconscious conscious and give the 'rational' ego greater power over the wilds of the id,
psychoanalysis also provides a serious challenge to this way of thinking. There will always
be something beyond our control. We are not, and never can be, masters in our own house,
and the core of who we are is irrational, and often frightening . Marcuse (1998) touched on a
similar tension when declaring Freud's (1930) Civilization and Its Discontents both the most radical
critique of Western culture and its most trenchant defence. Psychoanalysis, as always, is exquisitely
ambivalent.
Ultimately, for Freud, both the natural world and our inner nature are untamable and the most we can hope for are temporary, fragile, anxious compromises between competing
forces (Winter & Koger 2004). The chaos of nature we defend against is also the chaos of our inner
nature, the wildness in the depths of our psyche. Civilization does not only domesticate
livestock but also humanity itself (Freud & Einstein 1933: 214). However, attempts to eliminate
the risk have in many ways dangerously backfired, comparable to the ways that the

historical programmes aiming to eliminate forest fires in the United States have led to far
bigger and more uncontrollable fires taking the place of previously smaller and more
manageable ones (Diamond 2006: 43-47).
The control promised by the Enlightenment, the power of the intellect to overcome chaos
(environmental and emotional), is therefore at least partly a defensive and at times
dangerous illusion. In our age of anxiety, with the destruction of civilization threatened by
nuclear holocaust, ecosystemic collapse, bioweapons and dirty bombs, Freud's warning is
more relevant than ever:
Humans* have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their
help they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last man ... hence
comes a large part of their current unrest, their unhappiness and their mood of anxiety.
(Freud 1930: 135)
Freud's binaries 'masculine/Enlightenment/control/autonomy' versus 'feminine/nature/chaos/dependency'
also lead us to consider what Gregory Bateson (2000: 95) called the 'bipolar characteristic' of Western
thought, which even tries 'to impose a binary pattern upon phenomena which are not dual in
nature: youth versus age, labor versus capital, mind versus matter - and, in general, lack[s] the
organizational devices for handling triangular systems/ In such a culture, as with the child

struggling to come to terms with the Oedipal situation, 'any "third" party is always regarded ... as a threat'
(ibid.).
Deleuze and Guattari describe such dualistic forms of thinking using the ecological metaphor of the tree with its fork-branch patterns (although they would not use the term metaphor): 'Arborescent systems are
hierarchical systems with centers of signifiance and subjectification ... an element only receives information from a higher unit, and only receives a subjective affection along preestablished paths' (Deleuze & Guattari

Freud's 'arborescent' system of binaries can also show us the way out, capturing
the psychological bind we are now in. As Deleuze and Guattari (2003a: 277) write: 'The only way to get outside the
dualisms is ... to pass between, the intermezzo.' Deconstructing these dualisms allows us to
think about how our destructive urge to dominate and control is connected to our fear of
acknowledging dependency on this largest of 'holding environments', the ultimate
'environment mother' (Winnicott
2003a: 16). However,

Link -- Water Wars


Water wars rhetoric sanitizes and legitimizes violence and obscures its underlying causes.

Trottier 2004

, (Julie, post-doctoral fellow at McGill University, Water Wars: the Rise of a

hegemonic Concept World Water Assessment Programme)

A main achievement of state power in modern times has been the persuasion of the population concerning
the legitimacy of the use of violence. In the western world, the idea according to which the state has a monopoly over the
legitimate use of violence has become hegemonic. This legitimacy or lack of it confers the status of either murder or
execution to what would otherwise be, technically, the same act. State violence is referred to as war or police
operation whereas violence from another source is referred to as terrorism or banditism. The labeling of identical acts as
war acts or terrorist acts is often enough to categorize them as legitimate or not, since the cognitive map of
each citizen has been structured according to this hegemonic concept. Any group carrying out violent acts strives to
label them as acts of war in order to secure that legitimacy. In the case of a body that is not a state, this has generally implied, over the
last century, claiming to be a liberation movement that will eventually create a state. The objective of creating a state became
necessary to acquire this legitimacy, even for groups such as the Kurds, whose form of political organization was not the territorial
state (Badie, 1992). The water war discourse started growing in a fertile soil where a very specific definition of

water development had become hegemonic and where the only legitimate violent conflicts were believed to
be wars between opposing states. Of course other hegemonic concepts contributed to this fertile ground: the idea
according to which the state is the only institution spelling out the rules of social control and determining
who will exercise this social control, for example. Investigating this assumption, Joel Migdal demonstrated how it rarely
reflects reality, especially in the developing world. He developed his state-in-society model in order to account for the interaction
between the state and the multiple other institutions that spell out the rules and exercise social control (Migdal, 1988, 2001). How

western hegemonic concepts concerning the states role in society have obscured the understanding of
water conflicts in the non-western world has been explored elsewhere (Trottier, 2003). The eventual growth of the
idea of water wars as a hegemonic concept must be analyzed within the context of other pre-existing and well-entrenched
hegemonic concepts that distorted and rationalized unequal distributions of resources and specific distributions of power in various
societies. These acted as building blocks supporting the growth of new concepts, they limited the range of
options that appeared possible and they provided fences limiting the issue definitions : states wanted water
development at all cost, therefore states might wage war in order to secure it. Such an issue definition precluded any

consideration of the fact that water development could have a different meaning for various social groups,
that states may not be the only social actors that benefit from water development, that other social groups
may actually benefit from it more than the state itself while the state may loose from it, or that states rarely choose to go to
war over one issue alone.

Water wars are an ideological fiction hegemonic concept manipulated to serve the interests of
powerful social actors and dominant interest groups regard claims with suspicion theyre
mindlessly repeating the soundbytes theyve been programmed to proliferate

Trottier 2004

, Water Wars: the Rise of a hegemonic Concept World Water Assessment

Programme,

The concept of hegemony was developed by Gramsci in order to explain how a state managed to assert its
power over a population living in a given territory. State power, said Gramsci, does not consist only of coercion. The
means of repression at the disposal of a state are only the most visible element of its power. The other fundamental element of
state power, and probably the most important one, is persuasion. A social group can become dominant and
gather state power in its hands only if it succeeds in developing its hegemony within the civil society by
persuading the subordinate groups to accept the values and ideas that it has adopted and by building a network of
alliances based on these values (Simon, 1991, p. 18). The hegemony of the dominant group is therefore very much
ideological in nature. The dominant group generates common sense, the uncritical and partly unconscious
way in which people perceive the world. This common sense is maintained by the relations existing within the civil society,
as churches, political parties, trade unions, mass media, and other institutions propagate it. Gramsci therefore distinguishes the state
apparatuses, which have a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and coercion, from the civil society
institutions, which build and maintain the hegemonic common sense that allows the population to accept the
states power as legitimate. Gramsci defined civil society as the set of all institutions that do not belong either to the state or to
the realm of economic production. The media, churches, and trade unions all belonged to this civil society within which hegemonic
concepts took root and flourished. He included schools within civil society, on the basis that the educative relation is essentially a
voluntary one even though the state usually subsidizes schools and sets the curriculum (Gramsci, 1957). Other authors have defined
civil society differently, and bodies such as the EU commonly consider private companies to be part of civil society. Private
enterprises clearly play an important role in propagating hegemonic concepts that structure the modern common sense concerning

water and water wars, and institutions such as the media are often private enterprises. Their role will therefore be included in this
article along with that of the other members of civil society. Ideologically hegemonic conceptions provide stabilizing

distortions and rationalizations of complex realities, inconsistent desires, and arbitrary distributions of
valued resources. They are presumptions that exclude outcomes, options, or questions from public consideration; thus they
advantage those elites well positioned to profit from prevailing cleavage patterns and issue definitions. That hegemonic beliefs do not
shift fluidly with changing realities and marginal interest is what makes them important. That they require some correspondence to
objective realities and interests is what limits their life and the conditions under which they can be established and maintained.
(Lustick, 1993, p. 121) Gramsci paid much attention to what he termed a war of position. Such a struggle is subtle and
nonviolent. It is conducted in the press, in educational and religious institutions, and in the political arena
(Gramsci, 1957). The outcome of a war of position is either the persistence of ideologically hegemonic concepts,
the destruction of formerly ideologically hegemonic concepts, or the emergence of new ones. Such wars of
position certainly do not imply any kind of conspiracy. Various social groups promote certain values and certain definitions they wish
to become hegemonic. This will in turn affect the resilience of other hegemonic concepts in an unpredictable manner. Many social
groups and many institutions act as vehicles for the propagation of hegemonic concepts without benefiting from them at all. The
example of the female vote in Europe illustrates this very well. The idea of females voting seemed, at best, preposterous
a hundred years ago. In England, a number of suffragettes were sent to Holloway Prison because of their activism. Their war

of position proved successful and no one in the European political landscape now challenges the legitimacy
of the right to vote for women. This successful war of position later affected many other hegemonic concepts concerning
gender, such as the legitimacy of womens presence in the work force. Whether or not a social group is successful at imposing or
toppling a hegemonic concept largely hinges on the echo it will find for this idea among other institutions and social groups. This
article will examine the rise of the hegemonic concept concerning water wars. It will investigate the mechanisms whereby such an
idea emerged and was propagated. It will also briefly examine the war of position that is now being waged against the concept of
water wars. 2. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF WATER WARS Hegemonic concepts are not created in a vacuum.
They emerge within a context where other hegemonic concepts have already taken hold and where other wars of
position are being waged. Before examining empirically the emergence of the concept of water wars, other hegemonic concepts
concerning water and concerning war will need to be reviewed. These, and the accompanying wars of position, are the soil in which
the concept of water wars is taking root and is growing. 2.1. Water Development The idea according to which water
should be brought where it is needed has a long history in western society and has led to the emergence of a
hegemonic concept of water development. The water literature is rife with introductory declarations concerning the great
quantity of freshwater available on the planet and the crucial necessity of redistributing this wealth more adequately. Globally,
freshwater is abundant. Each year an average of more than 7,000 cubic meters per capita enters rivers and aquifers. Unfortunately it
does not all arrive in the right place at the right time write Turner and Durbourg (1999) in a vein that is very representative of a
dominant assumption. Such a statement implies that there is a right place and a right time for water. It implies a
clear hierarchy of values concerning water users. Some are deemed to be more deserving than others. Indeed, water will

be used wherever it flows, but fish and algae living in northern Canada rate as less important than human
beings in need of drinking water, food, and sanitation. Such an anthropocentric vision of water is widely shared by most
social actors. It is also coherent with the conservationist trend in environmentalism. Two types of environmentalism can be
distinguished: that of conservationists and that of preservationists. Conservationists want to protect nature as a resource for human use
whereas preservationists seek to protect nature itself from human use (Milton, 1996). It is fair to say that the idea of water as a basic
human right is well entrenched as a hegemonic concept around the planet. The right of thirst has long been enshrined in Muslim law
and is not questioned in any international forum (Faruqui et al., 2001). It satisfies the essential criteria to qualify as a hegemonic
concept: anyone evoking the possibility of a distribution system that would not ensure a minimum supply of
freshwater and food to every human being would apologize for mentioning such a thought. Were that person to advocate
such an idea, they would be regarded as monstrous. At best, the person would be laughed at. The organizations that struggle
against the construction of big dams always put forward their adherence to the principle of water as a human right. They demonstrate
how such projects, while claiming to bring water where it is needed, would actually compromise this right for the social group they
defend (see for example: Roy, 1999). This first ideologically hegemonic concept of water and food as basic human rights has provided
the rationalization for what has become another hegemonic concept: water development. As humans have a basic right to food and
water, water development would bring clean water to them for their domestic needs, provide sanitation, and allow the development of
irrigation to provide food. Lusticks reference to hegemonic concepts rationalizing complex realities and excluding options or
questions from public consideration is very relevant here. Transferring populations from water-scarce areas to water-rich areas could
have satisfied the human right to water and food. It could have been satisfied by populations deciding to prioritize their use of water
and resorting to virtual water. 1 But water development came to signify exactly the opposite: water would be

brought to the people for domestic consumption and for irrigation even if these people elected to settle in
the middle of the desert. Which groups, which elites in Lusticks terms, benefited from such an issue definition?
Construction companies appear as obvious candidates, as they grew out of this version of water
development. They clearly participated in maintaining this belief and in propagating it. But many other
groups participated in the making of water development, as it is understood today.

LinkResource Wars
Securitization of environmental and social crises risks
genocide and mass violence.
Ahmed 11Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is an international security analyst. He is Executive Director at
the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of IR, University
of Sussex, where he obtained his DPhil. [The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international
relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society, Global Change, Peace &
Security, Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011, Taylor and Francis Online]
3.2 From theory to policy
Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a

redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential threatmultipliers of traditional security issues such as political instability around the world, the collapse
of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of
international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources.94 The US
Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a stress-multiplier that will exacerbate
tensions and complicate American foreign policy; while the EU perceives it as a threatmultiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability.95
In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis

acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their
purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling
problematic populations . Paradoxically, this securitisation of global crises does not
render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it
guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of
international conflict up to 2050. It warns of resource competition induced by growing populations and
expanding economies, particularly due to a projected youth bulge in the South, which will consume ever
increasing amounts of food, water and energy. This will prompt a return to traditional security

threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural


resources and overseas markets. Finally, climate change will compound these stressors by
generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies. 96
A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion
through to 2030. Warning of the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents, the report
concludes that The implications for future conflict are ominous.97 Once again, the subject turns to
demographics: In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8
billion by the 2030s, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed
countries slow or decline. Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge
will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.98 The
assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of
violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations.
A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable youth bulge
by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In
particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent.
Growing resentment due to endemic unemployment will be channelled through political militancy,
including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to
capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces.
More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and
an urban under-class, the report warns: The world's middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge,
resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.99
3.3 Exclusionary logics of global crisis securitisation?

Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular

religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially
extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge
prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The
previous examples illustrate how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a
process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the
prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism,
fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy
reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one
another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its
biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous
outsiders . Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new
outsider identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of Otherisation.
As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against
international terrorism reveals an underlying discursive complex, where representations about terrorism
and non-Western populations are premised on the construction of stark boundaries that operate to exclude
and include. Yet these exclusionary discourses are intimately bound up with political and
economic processes, such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle
East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of maintaining
American hegemony by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism. 100
But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is
mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests exclusionary discourses are
politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on

this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now


widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of
primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a pre-eminence in bureaucratic military
political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group
that has been socially constructed as different. 101 As Hinton observes, genocides precisely

constitute a process of othering in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so


that previously included groups become ideologically recast and dehumanised as
threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines
eventually legitimising their annihilation .102
In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological
process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and Otherised
in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and
classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of
inclusion, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without
which genocide would be impossible.103 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to
destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project or colonial project
designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the
perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of
social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to
uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of
genocidal intent become explicable.104
Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group
construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms;
and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new
outsider group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context

that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide,
can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises .105
This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal.
Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity

formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation


processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social
crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities,
and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed outsider group vindicating
various forms of violence.

And this framing is a prerequisite to resource wars


relations of power configured by resource ownership
cause conditions of scarcity to escalateonly the alt can
solve.
Ahmed 11Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is an international security analyst. He is Executive Director at
the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of IR, University
of Sussex, where he obtained his DPhil. [The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international
relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society, Global Change, Peace &
Security, Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011, Taylor and Francis Online]
As Rosenberg shows in his analysis of the dynamics of distinctive geopolitical orders from Rome to Spain
and Teschke in his exploration of the changing polities of continental Europe from the eighth to the
eighteenth centuries these orders have always been inseparably conjoined with their constitutive relations
of production as structured in the context of prevailing socialproperty relations, illustrating the mutuallyembedded nature of economic and extra-economic power.76 In contrast, orthodox IR axiomatically
fragments the economic and extra-economic (and the latter further into military, political, cultural,
etc.) into separate, autonomous spheres with no grasp of the scope of their interconnection.77
It also dislocates both the state, and human existence as such, from their fundamental

material conditions of existence, in the form of their relationship to the biophysical


environment, as mediated through relations of production , and the way these are
governed and contested through socialproperty relations.78 By externalising the biophysical
environment and thus human metabolism with nature from state praxis, orthodox IR
simply lacks the conceptual categories necessary to recognise the extent to which sociopolitical organisational forms are mutually constituted by human embeddedness in the
natural world.79 While further fragmenting the international into a multiplicity of disconnected state
units whose behaviour can only be analysed through the limited lenses of anarchy or hierarchy, orthodox
IR is incapable of situating these units in the holistic context of the global political economy,
the role of transnational capitalist classes, and the structural pressures thereby exerted on
human and state behaviour.80
Indeed, the mediating structure of the global political economy along with the beliefs and
behaviour of agents within it (through which this structure is constructed) play a critical role in
the transformation of ecological or resource-related events into concrete politically-defined
conditions of scarcity that lead to crisis or conflict. A powerful example is provided by Davis in
his study of the impact of the El NioSouthern Oscillation (ENSO) the vast oscillation in air mass and
Pacific Ocean temperature. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, ENSO created large-scale droughts
in many countries peripheral to the European empires, including those in Asia (India, China, Java, the
Philippines and Korea), and in Brazil, southern Africa, Algeria and Morocco. Davis shows that British free
market imperial policy converted these droughts into foreseeable but preventable deadly famines,
multiplying death tolls to gross proportions without any historical precedent.81

In 187476, northern harvests were more than sufficient to provide reserves for the 1878 autumn crops
deficit. But most of the grain from north-western Indian subsistence farming was controlled by a captive
export sector designed to stabilise British grain prices, which from 1876 to 1877 had increased due to poor
harvests. This generated a British demand that absorbed almost the entirety of north-western India's wheat
surplus. Meanwhile, profits from these grain exports were monopolised by wealthy property holders,
moneylenders and grain merchants, as opposed to poor Indian farmers. India's newly-constructed modern
railway system shipped grain from drought areas to central depots for hoarding, leading to exorbitant
price hikes that were co-ordinated in a thousand towns at once. Food prices rocketed out of the reach of
outcaste labourers, displaced weavers, sharecroppers and poor peasants. Consequently, the poor began to
starve to death even in well-watered districts reputed to be immune to food shortages. Thus, between
1877 and 1878, grain merchants exported a record 6.4 million hundredweight of wheat to Europe while
between 5.5 and 12 million Indians starved to death. This catastrophe occurred not outside the modern
world system, but in the very process of being forcibly incorporated into its economic and political
structures.82
As Dalby thus argues, humans live in a complex interaction with environments that adapt and

change in much more complex ways than is facilitated by linear thinking within the
territorial boxes of contemporary administrative arrangements . This suggests that global
markets and economic connections are essential to understanding the complex politics of
local environments and struggles over access to specific resources in particular places
because the geography of the domination of nature is precisely the continuing history of
colonisation and imperialism.83 Hence, environmental and energy crises are generated in
the context of historically-specific socio-political systems and whether or not they lead to
conflict depends on existing relations of power at local, national and
transnational scales, and on how those relations are configured by structures of resource
ownership, mediated by ideas and values, and supported by military power .

And symptom focus makes all aff impacts inevitableself


reflexivity is a prerequisite to solvency.
Ahmed 11Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is an international security analyst. He is Executive Director at
the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of IR, University
of Sussex, where he obtained his DPhil. [The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international
relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society, Global Change, Peace &
Security, Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011, Taylor and Francis Online]
2.4 The socio-historical evacuation of the political ecology of power
Global ecological, economic and energy crises thus expose a core contradiction at the heart

of modernity that the material progress delivered by scientific reason in the service of
unlimited economic growth is destroying the very social and environmental conditions of
modernity's very existence. This stark contradiction between official government recognition
of the potentially devastating security implications of resource scarcity and the continued
abject failure of government action to mitigate these security implications represents a
fundamental lacuna that has been largely overlooked in IR theory and policy
analysis. It reveals an analytical framework that has focused almost exclusively on
potential symptoms of scarcity. But a truly complete picture of the international relations
of resource scarcity would include not only a map of projected impacts, but would also seek
to grasp their causes by confronting how the present structure of the international system
itself has contributed to the acceleration of scarcity, while inhibiting effective national and
international responses.

It could be suggested that the present risk-oriented preoccupation with symptoms is itself

symptomatic of IR's insufficient self-reflection on its own role in this


problem. Despite the normative emphasis on ensuring national and international security, the
literature's overwhelming preoccupation with gauging the multiplicity of ways in which
ecological, energy and economic crises might challenge security in coming decades
provides very little opening in either theory or policy to develop more effective
strategies to mitigate or prevent these heightened security challenges. On the contrary, for the
most part, these approaches tend to highlight the necessity to maximise national politicalmilitary
and international regimes' powers so that states might be able to respond more robustly in the
event that new threats like resource wars and state failure do emerge. But the futility of this
trajectory is obvious a preoccupation with security ends up becoming an unwitting
accomplice in the intensification of insecurity.

Link Energy Security


Energy security militarizes energy justifies intervention
and causes serial policy failure
Ciuta 10 -- Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre of European Politics, School
of Slavonic and East European Studies @ University College London, UK (Felix, 2010, "Conceptual Notes
on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?" Security Dialogue 41(123), Sage)
Even casual observers will be familiar with the argument that energy

is a security issue because it is either a


cause or an instrument of war or conflict. Two different strands converge in this logic of energy
security. The first strand focuses on energy as an instrument: energy is what states fight their current wars with .
We can find here arguments regarding the use of the energy weapon by supplier states (Belkin, 2007: 4; Lugar, 2006: 3; Winstone,
Bolton & Gore, 2007: 1; Yergin, 2006a: 75); direct substitutions in which energy

is viewed as the equivalent

of nuclear weapons (Morse & Richard, 2002: 2); and rhetorical associations that establish policy
associations, as exemplified by the panel Guns and Gas during the Transatlantic Conference of the Bucharest NATO Summit.
The second strand comes from the literature on resource wars, defined as hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable
resources (Victor, 2007: 1). Energy is seen as a primary cause of greatpower conflicts over scarce energy resources (Hamon & Dupuy,
2008; Klare, 2001, 2008). Alternatively, energy is seen as a secondary cause of conflict; here, research has focused on the dynamics
through which resource scarcity in general and energy scarcity in particular generate socio-economic, political and environmental
conditions such as population movements, internal strife, secessionism and desertification, which cause or accelerate both interstate
and intrastate conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994, 2008; Solana, 2008; see also Dalby, 2004). As is immediately apparent, this logic
draws on a classic formulation that states that a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core
values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able . . . to maintain them by victory in such a war (Lippmann, 1943: 51). The

underlying principle of this security logic is survival : not only surviving war, but also a generalized quasiDarwinian logic of survival that produces wars over energy that are fought with
energy weapons . At work in this framing of the energy domain is therefore a definition of
security as the absence of threat to acquired values (Wolfers, 1952: 485), more recently reformulated as survival in the
face of existential threats (Buzan, Wver & de Wilde, 1998: 27). The defining parameters of this traditional security logic
are therefore: (1) an understanding of security focused on the use of force, war and conflict (Walt, 1991: 212; Freedman, 1998: 48);
and (2) a focus on states as the subjects and objects of energy security. In the war logic, energy security is derivative of

patterns of international politics often captured under the label geopolitics (Aalto & Westphal, 2007: 3) that lend
their supposedly perennial attributes to the domain of energy (Barnes, Jaffe & Morse, 2004; Jaffe & Manning, 1998). The
struggle for energy is thus subsumed under the normal competition for power, survival,
land, valuable materials or markets (Leverett & Nol, 2007). A key effect of this logic is to arrest
issues usually not associated with war, and thus erase their distinctive characteristics. Even the
significance of energy qua energy is abolished by the implacable grammar of conflict: energy becomes a resource like any
other, which matters insofar as it affects the distribution of capabilities in the international system . As a
result, a series of transpositions affect most of the issues ranked high on the energy security agenda. For example, in the European
context, the problem is not necessarily energy (or, more precisely, gas, to avoid the typical reduction performed by
such accounts). The

problem lies in the geopolitical interests of Russia and other supplier states,
whose strength becomes inherently threatening (Burrows & Treverton, 2007; Horsley, 2006).
Energy security policies become entirely euphemistic, as illustrated for example by statements that equate
avoiding energy isolation with beating Russia (Baran, 2007). Such geopolitical understanding of
international politics also habituates a distinct vocabulary. Public documents, media reports and academic
analyses of energy security are suffused with references to weapons, battles, attack, fear,
ransom, blackmail, dominance, superpowers, victims and losers . It is therefore unsurprising
that this logic is coterminous with the widely circulating narrative of the new Cold
War . This lexicon of conflict encourages modulations, reductions and transpositions in the meanings
of both energy and security. This is evident at the most fundamental level, structuring encyclopaedic

entries (Kohl, 2004) and key policy documents (White House, 2007), where

energy security becomes oil security


becomes oil geopolitics (oil modulates security into geopolitics). Once
security is understood in the grammar of conflict, the complexity of energy is abolished and
reduced to the possession of oilfields or gas pipelines. The effect of this modulation is to
habituate the war logic of security, and also to create a hierarchy between the three constitutive
dimensions of energy security (growth, sustenance and the environment). This hierarchy reflects and at the same time embeds
the dominant effect of the war logic, which is the militarization of energy (Russell & Moran,
(security modulates energy into oil), which

2008), an argument reminiscent of the debates surrounding the securitization of the environment (Deudney, 1990). It is of course
debatable whether this is a new phenomenon. Talk of oil wars has been the subject of prestigious conferences and conspiracy theories
alike, and makes the headlines of newspapers around the world. A significant literature has long focused on the relationship between
US foreign policy, oil and war (Stokes, 2007; in contrast, see Nye, 1982). The pertinence of this argument cannot be evaluated in this
short space, but it is worth noting that it too reduces energy to oil, and in/security to war. The key point is that this logic changes

not only the vocabulary of energy security but also its political rationality . As Victor
(2008: 9) puts it, this signals the arrival of military planning to the problem of natural resources and
inspires a logic of hardening, securing and protecting in the entire domain of energy. There
is, it must be underlined, some resistance to the pull of the logic of war, as attested for example by NATOs insistence that its focus on
energy security will not trigger a classical military response (De Hoop Scheffer, 2008: 2). Yet, the same NATO official claims that
the global competition for energy and natural resources will re-define the relationship between

security and economics, which hints not only at the potential militarization of energy security
policy but also at the hierarchies this will inevitably create . New geographies of insecurity will
thus emerge if the relationship between the environment, sustenance and growth is structured
by the militarized pursuit of energy (Campbell, 2005: 952; Christophe Paillard in Luft & Paillard, 2007).

Link -- OCS
Your acquisition of offshore resources for security causes
serial policy failure and environmental destruction that
results in extinction
Martens 11 (Emily, MA in Geography and Regional Studies University of Miami, The Discourses of
Energy and Environmental Security in the Debate Over Offshore Oil Drilling Policy in Florida, Open
Access Theses, 5-10, http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1253&context=oa_theses)
Amid growing concerns over access to reliable and cheap energy resources, on March 31, 2010 the Obama Administration announced the opening of additional exploratory
and drilling sites for oil within the United States Outer Continental Shelf. The announcement of an Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Strategy for 2012-2017 came only
three weeks before the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, an event that marked an unprecedented economic and environmental disaster, spilling an estimated 5 million
barrels (172 million gallons) of oil into the Gulf of Mexico over the course of 86 days. This oil disaster renewed concerns over the environmental impacts of offshore

offshore oil drilling, however, has been a concern of environmental


activists and domestic energy policy makers for decades . Since the oil crises of 1970s the political
rhetoric regarding access to energy resources has focused on the creation of domestic
supplies that can reduce heavy dependence on imports from volatile or hostile foreign producers. Yet, the rhetoric of energy security
emanating from policy making circles has been, since its beginning, internally constrained by a
rhetoric of environmental protection, because of an oil spill in January 29, 1969 resulting from a blowout on a Union Oil Co. drilling
platform six miles off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. Thus the opening of new spaces for the purpose of oil
exploration and drilling under the rubric of domestic energy security , ranging from removing protected
drilling many of which remain unknown;

place status from the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska to new offshore spaces along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, including the historically oil-rig free waters

has since been debated heavily in the public forum. 2 The impetus to
open additional offshore spaces to oil drilling and selling more leases in offshore
territory has been sustained by a dominant discourse of energy security that has called to
expand the domestic oil supply in order to establish national energy independence and ensure access
to cheap and safe energy supplies. More recently, this discourse has been lent urgency by geopolitical
rearrangements that rendered US oil imports as an indirect means of funding terrorism and states hostile to the interests of
the US. This discourse of energy security, however, is opposed to, and by an alternative expression of energy security
emanating from the environmental movement an environmental discourse of energy security that shares the
goal of reducing the dependence of the US on foreign oil not by expanding domestic oil production but by
reducing the dependence of the US on oil itself and therefore the development of alternative fuels. The fusion of
energy security and environmental protection concerns has since the energy and environmental crises of the 1970s forged
a policy aimed at creating environmentally safe extraction and production processes. The emphasis on cheap energy
resources, however, has come into contradiction with requirements of costly regulation
and oversight practices that are thought to better ensure environmental security. The
attempt to reconcile offshore drilling with concerns about environmental protection during
the Nixon and Carter years was torn asunder by the hostility to regulation during the Reagan and Clinton years. As a result, a heated debate
surrounding the state of Florida,

developed between proponents of offshore oil drilling who argue that (unregulated) offshore oil drilling and expanded domestic oil production in general ensures
energy security by making the United States energy independent and opponents of offshore oil drilling who do not 3 contest the goal of energy independence but who argue
that this should not be at the expense of the protection of marine ecosystems and coastal economies from the destructive effects of offshore drilling, regulated or not. The
debate, in other words, developed into a debate between a dominant discourse of energy security and a counter discourse of environmental security at the core of it were
questions of regulation as well as competing commercial interests. Though there are various actors and interests within each of these discourses, the primary tension
between proponents and opponents of offshore oil drilling tends to reproduce the tensions embodied in the larger discourses of energy security and environmental security
at different geographical scales. One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the credence given to either one of these two security discourses at any given time is the
result of broader socio-political forces and the changing ideologies within which they operate. Underlying both seemingly opposed discourses, however, is a common logic
that informs the path they take and the language they use to establish legitimacy the logic of the commodity an abstract representation of space that supports this
logic. This space, as Lefebvre (2007: 53) points out, includes the world of commodities, its logic and its worldwide strategies, as well as the power of money and that
of the political state. As will be shown in the following chapters, each of these competing discourses has organized its arguments around the logics of capitalism to gain
public support and federal and local state protections. This is not an arbitrary association but rather the result of specific political developments in the US that have shaped
environmental concerns, and the environment, according to free market principles. 4 Prior to the injection of neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatization into the
environment and discourses on the environment under the Reagan Administration, the Nixon and Carter Administrations were caught between an environmental movement,
which attempted to create a new perspective from which human activity could be viewed in light of its often negative impacts on the environment especially offshore oil
drilling as a result of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill and the volatility of the international oil market which threatened oil imports. The Nixon and Carter strategies
attempted to balance the two agendas through the expansion of domestic oil production in tandem with regulations and oversight that would monitor the offshore oil
industrys compliance with environmental standards. This was thought and presented as a temporary measure. Ultimately the aim was to create alternative fuels in the not
too distant future to replace oil, in light of evidence and concern that both the production and consumption of oil were proving to be detrimental to the environment which

Neoliberal restructuring under the Reagan Administration, however, promoted a marketdiscourse of energy security above, or more precisely against the discourse of

humans depended on for their own survival.


based

environmental security , advocating reduction of state oversights and reliance on market signals
Environmental security, in the form of government oversight, became a
threat to the accumulation of wealth a source of insecurity . Instead, environmental security could
instead as the more efficient means to regulate offshore drilling.

be entrusted to the multiple interests operating in the free market. The argument rested on the neoliberal mantra that the government was not as efficient as private owners

As a result, offshore oil drilling 5 activity has since enjoyed lax


oversight, while day-to-day oil pollution continues to disrupt various

and the market in managing and protecting the environment.


regulatory

ecological and economic activities that share ocean space . The fact that the
question of environmental protection and regulation concerns productive activity in ocean space lends it additional complexity deriving both from the nature of ocean space
itself, and how it has been historically perceived and constructed, and from the peculiar political system in the US that divides sovereignty between the federal government
an the individual states. This shared sovereignty over ocean space has shaped the interaction of policy-makers at the state and Federal level in their attempt to promote
policy reconciling economic imperatives and environmental concerns that differed across scale. This scalar tension finds its origin in the Submerged Lands Act that
President Eisenhower signed in 1945, which gave coastal states sovereign rights over coastal territory extending three miles from the shore. In the case of Florida and
Texas, where a rather extensive continental shelf exists on their gulf coasts, they were granted 10.3 miles of territory into the Gulf of Mexico, which was to acknowledge
historical use claims. Complementary ocean laws between the state and federal government appear to acknowledge the uncontainable nature of the ocean environment
which can carry pollutants horizontally across space, which exacerbates not only the tension between states and the federal government but also the varying interests of
different coastal states with different economies and ecologies. Where the government of Florida, a state heavily dependent on revenues from tourism, has found it
commercially necessary to keep the ocean territory free of oil pollutants, at least for now, the Federal government has implemented a moratorium that extends what can
only be seen as a buffer surrounding the state of Florida in order to reduce the risk of oil pollutants washing ashore. In Texas 6 and Louisiana, on the other hand, whose
economies are dependent on revenues from and employment in offshore oil drilling (despite some tourism, and fishing and shrimping interests in the latter), the coastal
territory has developed into a site of extensive drilling and production, with an extensive network of pipelines strewn over the ocean floor. Floridas coast, in contrast, is a

marine
sanctuaries that would be threatened by pollution from offshore oil activities and potential oil spills. But ocean space does not
protected area at both the state and Federal levels, with policy-makers at both levels acknowledging sensitive environments, such as the Everglades and a few

recognize political borders, and the shores of Florida are as susceptible to that ever present threat of a large oil spill as the spill from the explosion of the Deepwater
Horizon oil rig might come to prove I found Florida to be a significant case for studying the interaction between the discourses of energy and environmental security and
their perceived utility for ocean space because it allows for significant insight into the interaction between proponents and opponents of offshore oil drilling as well as how
the logic of commodity comes to be expressed as a vital component in creating policies that protect commercially viable interests harnessed within the security discourses.
Though a similar study could be done on California, I find the unique positioning of Florida in relation to the other Gulf States extremely intriguing, particularly due to
Florida being the only state situated along the Gulf of Mexico to ban offshore oil drilling. Furthermore, the Gulf of Mexico is considered to be partially landlocked, which
means that there is only one side that connects to the open ocean, where the rest is encapsulated by land. This means that pollution from offshore oil drilling would have to
maneuver its way through the gulf, 7 possibly traveling around the Florida Peninsula on the Loop Current, before it would reach the open ocean. This situation is very
unlike that of California, as there is no offshore oil production nearby to threaten its coasts. Though it would be an interesting point of departure to compare Floridas
offshore oil drilling policy and the reasons behind it with those of the other Gulf States of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas, my primary concern in this thesis is
to understand the interaction between the discourses of energy and environmental security which compete to define the utility of ocean space and its relationship to society.
The case study of Florida is significant, as it allows an analysis of how the security debate in crosses between the federal and state levels, and is not simply reiterated but is
also localized, made pertinent to specifically local concerns. Secondly, the case of Florida allows a look into a state that has managed to successfully commodify a clean
environment and create policy that protects that commodity from the threat posed by offshore oil drilling; and this in the Gulf of Mexico where offshore oil drilling is
widespread. The ban on offshore drilling in Florida and the uncertainty about potential, largely unexplored, offshore oil reserves lend the debate over offshore oil drilling in
Florida more significance. With advancements in exploration and drilling technology it has been argued that larger oil deposits may lie in or around what were once
commercially unproductive oil wells off the Florida coast. As a result, there has been a push at both the Federal and state levels to lift the ban on offshore oil drilling off
Floridas coasts. The push to open offshore oil drilling around Florida has been met with objections from both environmentalist groups and industries dependent on
maintaining a clean marine 8 environment, such as tourism and fishing. As a state dependent on beach tourism, with roughly $37 billion generated in revenue annually, the
cost of offshore drilling in Florida depends more heavily on the creation of unsightly oil rigs and the potential for spills that can spoil beaches and thereby the local
economy. Florida remains the only gulf state that does not allow drilling in either its coastal waters, or in the Federal waters within 100 miles from its coast, though some
drilling did take place along Floridas coast before it was banned in 1990. Operating on the notion that offshore oil drilling within and near state waters will threaten the
pristine marine environment and damage the local, tourism-dependent industries, environmental activism within the state, in conjunction with the local tourism industry,
has played a key role in keeping oil rigs out of Floridian waters since 1990. Prior to the BP oil spill in April 2010, however, a debate was underway within the Florida state
legislature to allow offshore exploration and production within state waters. Though state waters which extend some three miles into the Atlantic Ocean and ten miles into
the Gulf of Mexico ultimately remained closed to offshore oil drilling, President Obama announced a plan in March 2010 to open the Federal waters along Floridas
northeast coast, as well as an area in the eastern Gulf of Mexico to offshore oil leasing. The policy generated a backlash by drilling opponents, even though the drilling
would take place more than 100 miles from the Florida coasts. The sense of victory this created for offshore oil proponents did not last long, as the Obama administration
reversed its decision to allow oil drilling off the Florida coast in the eastern Gulf of Mexico and along the Atlantic coast until 2017 as a result of the BP oil spill. The
environmental devastation caused by the BP oil spill, along with the economic turmoil 9 suffered by the tourism and fishing industries along the Gulf coast, managed to
table the discussion on offshore oil drilling along the Florida coast until a full investigation could be conducted as to the cause of the spill and the effects it had on the
environment. The intention of this thesis is to analyze the Florida offshore oil debate within the contexts of the energy security and environmental security discourses, in
order to gain insight into the values and beliefs that lead to the implementation of policies regarding offshore oil drilling within the United States, and more particularly the
state of Florida. Using a discursive analysis, I look at how arguments for and against offshore oil drilling are framed, justified and how they are incorporated into the policymaking process. Furthermore, I aim to understand why and when certain arguments come to dominate the discussion by looking at current events and socio-economic

ocean space is
constructed as a result of perceptions about its utility to society . Social constructions of
the oceans position in relation to the social sphere, as well as its perceived utility, serve as a prominent point of departure
for the security discourses analyzed later on. The dominant energy security discourse seeks to maintain the
ocean as a source of resources and wealth accumulation external and resistant to socialization, while simultaneously
promoting a sense of national security through attempts to reduce dependence on oil imports by
structures which inform how a discourse comes to be articulated to gain credence and policy support. I begin by looking at how

increasing domestic production. On the other hand, offshore oil drilling opponents, who have adopted an environmental security discourse, have a negative reaction to
expanded offshore oil drilling as it signifies a threat to the long-term environmental sustainability and commercial interests that depend on an ocean free of dangerous

The opposition attempts to 10 reconstruct the ocean as a pristine environment, an


essential element in the Earths ecosystem as well as coastal tourism and fishing industries, while simultaneously
promoting a counter-hegemonic energy security by advocating for
alternative fuels. The discussion regarding the construction of the ocean in Chapter 2 uses a historical optic through which one can view the evolution of
ocean space in its relationship with human society. More importantly it looks at how perceptions and representations
pollutants.

of ocean space inform how policy is made

and how States, as the sources of legitimate territorial

jurisdiction, manage to acquire and secure ocean territory in order to utilize it for exclusive resource exploitation. Chapter 3 and 4 look at the historical evolution of energy

security and environmental security in relation to offshore oil drilling first at the level of the federal state (chapter 3) and then at the level of the state of Florida (chapter 4),
with the aim of deconstructing the discourses in the historical contexts from which they emanate. The 1970s mark a key turning point for, if not the initial emergence in the

concerns
about oil dependence and environmental protection in the speeches of United States Presidents as a representation of
hegemonic policy discourse. This is important beyond the discursive level, at
United States of concerns about environmental sustainability as well as concerns about the foreign oil supplies. The analysis focuses on the articulation of

the level of policy making , because US presidents have the power to directly appoint key
decisionmakers, such as the Secretary of the Interior the department which then appoints the head of the Minerals Management Service which is in charge
of leasing, overseeing and collecting revenues from the oil industry the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of the Environmental Protection Agency. These
appointed officials are in charge of the 11 agencies that implement policy and oversee
compliance with regulations in the area of offshore oil drilling. Therefore, the sentiments towards
offshore oil drilling that are held by the president tend to reflect those held by these appointed leaders and dictate regulations and
how strictly they will be enforced. The discourses of US presidents on energy and environmental security are what
Wolford (2010: 8) calls strategic essentialisms , intentional simplifications of an otherwise complex subject for the purposes of democratic
engagement. Engagement in what? Thus, the primary question behind the discursive analysis I exercise in chapters 3 and 4 is: in the discourse on energy and
environmental security, what is it that needs to be made secure, why does it need to be secured, and what are the potential threats to its security? Chapter 2 - The
Construction and Securitization of Ocean Space To look upon the ocean is to place it within a particular social context according to a perceived utility. For the Florida
beachgoer, the ocean is a pristine environment, where the horizon seems to extend infinitely as it meets the sky. For the oil entrepreneur, it holds great mineral wealth,
which, at some point in time, must be exploited to fuel the economy and expand the industry. For the ecologist the ocean contains essential biophysical processes that are
not only necessary for marine life, but part of the larger, global ecosystem that sustains all life forms on the planet. For the fisherman, the ocean is a space where both
income and sustenance may be obtained. The ocean has been used for transportation, commercial and military activities for several thousand years, but only recently has

divergent interests find themselves


competing over ocean space in order to define its utility as well as the international and State legislation
required to secure these interests against potential threats . In the case of offshore oil drilling, ocean space
is the physical arena upon which the security discourses , such as energy and environmental, create
knowledge, portraying counter-realities of the ocean and its value for society. Though the security discourses discussed in
depth in chapters 3 and 4 attach new images and values to ocean space through the perpetuation of their associated knowledges, the ocean has, throughout
history, been the subject of social representations and value constructions that persist within
these discourses. In particular, marine or ocean space, most notably in terms of its relationship to terrestrial space, has often
held the position as the spatial other in respect to human processes . As
Steinberg (2001) points out, the ocean has held many positions in its relationship with society, namely as a space for transportation, resource extraction, and, more
recently, an intricate part of the biophysical processes that sustain
much credence been given to its location within the global ecosystem. Today, these

human life . Regardless of the attempts of the latter imagination to integrate ocean spaces into a complex argument about the long-term sustainability of
life on earth, the more traditional notion that the ocean is merely a distance and not a place
where social rules do not apply, persists in contemporary discourses, managing to
distance ocean spaces from social controls and oversight (Steinberg 2001: 49; Zalik 2009). During the centuries before
widespread seafaring, the ocean was a resource provider, furnishing littoral communities with food and the occasional luxury items (i.e. pearls). With God, Glory and

the Imperial quest to map and mine the world sent many explorers across the oceans, but with little
interest given to the content of the oceans themselves . This has resulted, especially under the auspices of
capitalism and neoliberalism, which emphasize material and financial accumulation in tandem with deregulation and privatization, in policies that often
ignore or belittle social and environmental consequences to the very social processes
transpiring within ocean space. Due to the anthropocentric nature of exploration and
resource extraction, the oceans have tended to play merely a service role, as they are viewed simply
as the matter lying between the more easily inhabitable terrestrial formations . Social
constructions or representations of the ocean, attempt to provide a static image of this
space in order to define the parameters of its usefulness to society . In the processes of
resource extraction, multi-use preservation, and environmental sustainability, the often competing representations of ocean space have seen little
Gold in mind,

compromise, with regulatory policies constantly being implemented, lifted, or ignored in view of competing interests, and their associated ocean-space imaginations. This
chapter seeks to highlight the evolution of social constructions and securitization of the ocean, namely in the United States, by deconstructing and analyzing a few of the
dominant perspectives regarding ocean space throughout history. I hope to show that despite an increase in scientific inquiry aimed at increasing an understanding of ocean
spaces and reconfiguring the spatial imagination, the ocean as a resource provider and the other to terrestrial spaces remains a prominent vision that serves to inform
human actions within that space. As a result of the oceans seemingly fixed construction as the other, limited authority is placed on any knowledge that conceptualizes
ocean space as a vital element within the Earths ecosystem, and the subsequent need for protections and regulations to ensure its sustainability. In fact, where protections of
ocean space exist it is most frequently in light of efforts to maintain the ocean as a multiple use space for commercial enterprises, and not as a result of an incorporation of a
new knowledge that seeks to protect ocean space for the purpose of environmental sustainability or ecosystem protection. In the case of energy and environmental security,
the conceptualization of the ocean provides the frame of reference from which each discourse imagines the oceans relationship and utility to society. For instance,

under the discourse of energy security the ocean is constructed as the frontier for oil
resources, that would be produced and used domestically in order to secure the
American oil supply from the volatile foreign oil market and oil-funded terrorism . In the

case of environmental security, the ocean is perceived as [1] a vital element in the larger
ecosystem on which humans rely upon for long-term survival ; and [2] is the site where the
commodification of the pristine, unspoiled by dirty offshore drilling activities and rigs, is able to generate thousands of jobs and billions in annual income for coastal
tourism.

Link -- Arctic Link


Your construction of the Arctic justifies increased military
presence turns conflict and causes environmental
degradation
Dittmer et al 11 -- Professors in the Departments of Geography at University College London, University of Oulu, University
College London, and Royal Holloway, respectively (Jason Dittmer, Sami Moisi, Alan Ingrama, Klaus Dodds, Political Geography,
2011, Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic geopolitics,
http://www.uta.fi/jkk/jmc/studies/courses/reading1%20+%20arctic%20+%20moisio.pdf)
The idea of the Arctic as an open e or opening e and uncertain space also calls forth future-

oriented imaginative techniques, notably scenario analysis and the booming trade in Arctic futures (Anderson, 2010).
The rhetorical orientation of such exercises inevitably reproduces and gives free rein to
divergent conceptualizations of the future. Thus, on the one hand are dystopian imaginations of
the Arctic as a locus of social, political, economic, cultural and ecological
disaster. While during the 1990s Arctic space was infused with political idealism and hope as the end of the Cold War seemed to
open the possibility of a less explicitly territorialized governance regime (the Arctic Council), current interventions in
Arctic space raise the spectres of conict, environmental degradation and the resource
curse (Emmerson, 2010). The notion of the Arctic as an open, melting space is thus
represented as posing a multi-faceted security risk. Scott Borgerson (2008) published a
notably neo-realist intervention in Foreign Affairs which considered this kind of scenario in
more detail; he argued that the decrease in sea ice cover is directly correlated to evidence of a
new scramble for resources in the region, involving the ve Arctic Ocean coastal states and their national security
interests. According to Borgerson (2008: 65), the Arctic region could erupt in an armed
mad dash for its resources . More generally, melting ice is correlated with enhanced
accessibility and hence opportunities for new actors ranging from commercial shipping to illegal migrants and
terrorist groups to migrate within and beyond the Arctic. At the most extreme, neorealists have contended that
Arctic installations such as pipelines or terminals might be potential targets for terrorist
organizations hell-bent on undermining North American energy security (Byers, 2009). At the same time, the Arctic is
also framed as a space of promise: the locus of a potential oil bonanza, new strategic trade routes and huge shing
grounds (Powell, 2008a). No wonder then that the Arctic possibilities have resulted in a number of scenarios
on the relationship between Arctic resources and Arctic geopolitical order. Lawson Brigham, a
well known Arctic expert, has imagined an Arctic race, a scenario in which high demand and
unstable governance set the stage for a no holds barred rush for Arctic wealth and
resources (described in Bennett, 2010, n.p.). This vision, which is opposite to Arctic saga, can be regarded as a
liberal warning message. Accordingly, without new governance structures based on new international agreements, high demand
in the Arctic region could lead to political chaos which could also jeopardize Arctic
ecosystems and cultures. The emphasis on the economic potential of the Arctic maritime areas further highlights the
dominance of future over present in contemporary geopolitical discourses. The image of disaster (as epitomised
by the Exxon Valdez sinking in 1989) thus forms a counterpoint to the image of a treasure chest (the
Russian agplanting in 2007).We suggest that these assertions of Arctic disaster are used to
justify a strengthened military presence in Arctic waters in the name of
national security along with a range of futuristic possibilities (Jensen & Rottem, 2009). Here neorealism feeds off the idea of the Arctic as opening, shifting and potentially chaotic spa ce. It thus
has an affective as well as descriptive quality e invoking a mood change and associated calls to arms (Dodds, 2010). This theme of
fearing the future has emerged periodically within Canadian political discourse, with Stephen
Harpers famous use

it or lose it dictum traceable through previous governments, which have emphasized the threat of
disaster argumentation

incursion by the Soviets or the United States (Dodds, in press; Head, 1963; Huebert, 2003). The

(Berkman & Young, 2009) also

underwrites liberal calls for a new multilateral Arctic legal


agreement which would set out rules, for example, on how to exploit Arctic resources. In these representations,
multilateralism denotes peace, prosperity, stability and environmental rescue whilst
national control and interest denote increasing tension, environmental degradation and
conict. Arctic openness is central to the performance of Arctic geopolitics, enabling
sabre-rattling by the ve Arctic Ocean coastal states. The regions coding as a feminine space to be tamed by
masculine exploits provides an arena for national magnication. The remoteness and
difculty of maintaining permanent occupation of the far north also makes it a space where
overlapping territorial claims and competing understandings of access to transit passages
can (at the moment) co-exist with relatively little chance of actual combat (Baev, 2007). As we shall see, this
is particularly true of the US/Canadian arguments over the legal status of the NorthWest Passage. In this way the discursive
formation of Arctic geopolitics is also bound up with neo-realist ideas about the inherent
tendencies of states towards conict over resources, sovereignty and so on e ideas that
have been subject to extensive critical deconstruction in IR and political geography, but
which are being rapidly reassembled in relation to the Arctic. The Arctic is thus a space in
which the foundational myths of orthodox international relations are
being reasserted . It might be said that it is not just the Arctic climate that is changing, with knock on effects for state
politics and international relations, but rather that the region is being reconstituted within a discursive formation that renders it
amenable to neo-realist understandings and practices inconceivable for other, more inhabited regions. Accepting the

premises of Arctic geopolitics risks both obscuring the liveliness of Arctic geography
(Vannini, Baldacchino, Guay, Royle, & Steinberg, 2009) and enabling the sovereign fantasy that coastal states and
their civilian and military representatives have previously enjoyed security via effective
territorial control and may establish it once again.

Link -- Energy Security


Energy security functions as a metaphor for all realist thought- it organizes the world as infinite
violence being naturally deployed for finite resources
Daojiong Zha Graduate School of International Relations, International University of Japan, Alternatives 1-1-01 p. HighBeam
In addition to considerations about "balance of power," the South China Sea is closely related to
considerations of so-called energy security. This notion "energy security," as an important component of
"economic security," argues for using diplomatic/military means to secure access to energy-resource
deposits and transportation of energy, in particular, oil and gas. The significance of the South China Sea embodies oil-andgas security concerns for two basic reasons. One, the South China Sea waters are a gateway for oil and natural gas transportation from
the Persian Gulf and Indonesian islands to Japan, the United States, and increasingly China. Two, the South China Sea itself is an area
with potential deposits of oil and natural gas in the seabed. For these two reasons, China, according to the realist logic, should
rationally compete with the United States and other powers to influence the use, if not control, of the South China Sea waters. Hence,
the concern about "energy security." [19] The significance of transportation was discussed in the preceding section. Suffice it to say
here that what makes the South China Sea a security concern is the fear of having one power (China, in particular) influence/control
access through the waterways than actual hazards for transportation. Regarding the potential deposits of oil and gas in the South China
Sea seabed, Mark J. Valencia's summary of the politics of science is revealing. According to Valencia, China and the Philippines have
in recent years made the most optimistic predictions about the oil and gas potential in the South China Sea. International oil
companies, which conduct their own geological surveys of the area, are generally pessimistic, partly as a negotiation tactic; these
negotiations are often geared to ex tract concessions from governments, and the governments, in turn, that wish to materialize their
claims to territorial sovereignty by entering into joint exploration projects. [20] More and more scholars, after studying the history of
exploration and comparing the "scientific" data presented, are coming to view the "oil rich Spratlys" as more a fiction than science.
[21] For the governments that claim sovereignty over the South China Sea waters, however, it is important to keep the fiction alive. In
East Asia and other parts of the world, through the granting of hydrocarbon concessions in disputed ocean areas to international oil
corporations, a claimant state makes a declaration of its determination to exercise jurisdiction. In addition, by way of such
"commercial" acts, such states make use of an international energy operator to assist in resisting diplomatic pressures from other
claimant states. Clearly, the diplomatic/political posturing behind such joint exploration projects in part explains the huge gaps in
"scientific findings" about oil and gas deposits in the South China Sea. Of the six claimant states, China and the Philippines are in re
cent years most active in pursuing/reiterating their respective claims, and, naturally, predictions made by scientists associated with
these two states are optimistic: they are politically significant. The predictions help to aid governments in justifying investing
military/diplomatic resources to keep their claims alive, and, by extension, their claims to future access to whatever lies in the
deepwater areas. The notion of "energy security" is at the same time a powerful cognitive tool for realist
researchers to argue for guarding against military actions to solidify one government's claims (those of China,
in particular) to ownership of the energy resources. Such reasoning departs from knowledge about the growth of the Chinese
economy and its increasing dependence on "offshore" sources of oil and gas. That dependence, then, can be used as justification for
modernizing the Chinese armed forces (the navy, in particular), which in turn are meant first to safeguard and then to defend Chinese
claims to ownership of energy in the deep seabed. [22] Like wise, arms races by states in the region are either justified or

understood through the prism of energy security. What the realist arguments about "energy security" in the
area downplay in interpreting history and predicting the future is that the disintegration of the Soviet Union
has opened up vast areas of oil deposits in the former Soviet republics for exploration. Expressed concerns
about threats from China to global energy, mean while, are also but remotely related to realities . The
Chinese government's oil-and-gas development strategy for the next twenty years is to focus on its interior
regions and the area immediately off the Pearl River Delta. [23] More importantly, "geology-based assessments of the
oil and gas resources of the world" have changed from the 1980s through the 1990s largely due to "an evolving understanding of
world recoverable oil and gas resources rather than to procedural or philosophical changes." [24] That "philosophical" continuity
refers to, more than anything else, an ideology to achieve as much "energy independence" as possible, lest oil, gas, and other forms of
energy fall into "enemy hands." That same philosophy explains the Chinese government's choice of continuing to
rely on domestic coal as the dominant fuel, in spite of coal's environmental costs. [25] In short, the promotion

of the South China Sea as a priority area where the world's "energy security" is under threat seems to be
based less on facts than on preparing for the future unknown--the same logic used in arguments for military
preparedness. It serves to legitimate military strategies for maintaining/upgrading the arsenals of
destruction in the region.

Link -- Disease
The call to securitize against disease creates the
individual as a prison which the individual must now
survey and disciple. The AFF vision and fear of a
catastrophic disease outbreak necessitates the capillary
diffusion of carceral and biopolitical violence, turning life
into a biological carcass absent vitality.
Debrix and Barder 2009
/Francois, Professor and Director of the Alliance for Social, Political, Ethical, and Cultural Thought
(ASPECT) Program @ Virginia Tech, Ph.D., Purdue University and Alexander D., Department of Political
Studies & Public Administration, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon, PhD in Political Theory
from John Hopkins, Nothing to Fear but Fear: Governmentality and the Biopolitical Production of Terror,
International Political Sociology (2009) 3, 398413/
A telling example of this self-mobilization and self-anticipation against ones own conduct can
be found in the way Western states (or, rather, their governmental agencies) along with some
transnational organizations (the World Health Organization, the United Nations) have asked

populations to preemptively take care of their health, hygiene, and everyday routines in the
context of the ongoing AH1N1 or swine flu pandemic. In this recent case of popular health
scare, as with many other instances of spreading epidemics over the past decade (SARS, the
H5N1 bird flu, but also AIDS before), individuals and groups are asked to be the first
layers of securitization by turning their bodies (or those of family members, neighbors, coworkers,
etc.) into primordial sites of analysis and scrutiny from where not only the disease but, just as importantly,
the fear about what might happen with the disease will be monitored. With the swine flu, a
constant questioning of ones body movements and symptomatic features, but also of ones
daily habits, becomes an automatic (and autoimmune) measure against the endemic fear.
Individual and collective bodies become the most vital dispositifs of containment of the
pandemic and of the terror that inevitably will spread. This management or governance of
the swine flu and its scare (the disease and its terror are inseparable from the moment a pandemic
discourse is launched) is said to require constant self-checking (Do I have a fever? Is my cough a
sign that I have been infected? Did I remember to wash my hands after riding the bus or the subway?). But
it also demands what can be called selfcarceralization measures (we must stay home for several days
if we feel sick; we must wear protective masks if we venture outside and have a runny nose; we must
close entire schools for as long as necessary if we suspect that children in the community have the flu). In
the end, it is a full-blown biopolitics of selfterror that sets in whereby people must allow
themselves to be quarantined, must accept being placed in hospital isolation, and must even be
willing not to be treated if pharmaceutical companies fail to produce enough vaccines for everyone. As

the AH1N1 pandemic preemption regime reveals, individual and collective bodies must
always be prepared to immerse themselves into disciplinary and regulatory procedures,
into security mechanisms, and into governmental tactics. In fact, they must act as dispositifs
of fear governance themselves. This means that bodies become the required lines of forces that
connect the possible localized symptoms to the global pandemic and its terror . From this
perspective on how bodies in societies of unease enable regimes of biopolitical terror and are
themselves the product of operations of governmentalized fear, no return to a centralized model
of power is necessary to make sense of the terror embedded in contemporary regimes of government.
Rather, as the swine flu case shows, it is the horizontality, the capillarity, and the

propagation of carceral effects across space and through time that authenticates this (self)
imposition of governmental power and force. But what this system of reproduction of selfgovernmentalized scare tactics and biopolitical (in)security calls for , however, is the

beginning of a different understanding of life, or of what life means. Indeed, it is not enough
anymore to think of life as docile or regulated. It may also not be sufficient to think of
todays living bodies as abandoned beings (Agamben 1998) caught in a state of sovereign
exception. Rather, the self-rationalizing, self-securitizing, and self-terrorizing bodies that act,
react, and interact in coordination with agents agencies of government and are found at
the heart of societies of fear production are more likely to represent what Mick Dillon has
called emergent life (Dillon 2007).

Link -- Disease
Disease descriptions are shaped by political interests and in turn shape reality turns the aff

MacPhail 2009

(Theresa, medical anthropologist at the University of California, Berkeley

The Politics of Bird Flu: The Battle over Viral Samples and Chinas Role in Global Public Health, Journal of language and politics,
8:3, 2009)
In fact, the health development strategies of international organizations are judged as significant in

reinforcing the role of the state in relation to the production of primary products for the world market,
thereby perpetuating international relations of dominance and dependency. Soheir Morsy, Political Economy in
Medical Anthropology In July of 2007, former Surgeon General Richard H. Carmona appeared before a congressional
committee and testified that during his term in office he had been pressured by the Bush administration to suppress or
downplay any public health information that contradicted the administrations beliefs and/or policies .
Gardiner Harris of the New York Times noted that Dr. Carmona was only one of a growing list of present and former administration
officials to charge that politics often trumped science within what had previously been largely nonpartisan
government health and scientific agencies (Harris 2007). Dr. Carmona testified that he had repeatedly faced political
interference on such varied topics as stem cell research and sex education. Two days later, an editorial in the Times bemoaned the
resultant diminution of public health both its reputation as non-biased and the general understanding of important public health
issues in the eyes of the same public it was meant to serve (2007). In the wake of Dr. Carmonas testimony, it would appear that
these are grave times for public health. And yet, public health concerns and international measures to thwart disease pandemics have
never been more at the forefront of governmental policy, media focus and the public imagination. Dr. Carmonas testimony on the
fuzzy boundaries between science and state, health and policy, is in line with a recent spate of sensational stories on the dangers of
drug-resistant tuberculosis and the recurrent threat of a bird flu outbreak all of which belie any distinct separation of politics and
medical science and highlight the ever-increasing commingling of the realms of public health and political diplomacy. Until

recently, the worlds of public health and politics have generally been popularly conceptualized as separate
fields. Public health, undergirded by medicine, is primarily defined as the science and practice of protecting and improving the
health of a community (public health 2007), regardless of political borders on geographical maps. Disease prevention and care
is typically regarded as neutral ground, a conceptual space where governments can work together for the
direct (or indirect) benefit of all. Politics, on the other hand, is usually referred to in the largely Aristotelian sense of the word,
or politika, as the art or science of government or governing, especially the governing of a political entity, such as a nation, and the
administration and control of its internal and external affairs (politics 2007). If we take to be relevant Clausewitzs formulation that
war is merely the continuation of policy (or such politics) by other means, might we then argue that the recent wars on disease

specifically the one being waged on the ever-present global threat of bird flu are merely a
continuation of politics by different means? In an article written for the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC), two health
professionals suggest that the flow of influence works optimally when an unbiased science first informs public health, with public
health then influencing governmental policy decisions. The other potential direction of influence, wherein politics directly

informs public health, eventually constraining or directing scientific research, has the potential to create a
situation in which ideology clouds scientific and public health judgment, decisions go awry and politics
become dangerous (Koplan and McPheeters 2004: 2041). The authors go on to argue that: Scientists and public health
professionals often offer opinions on policy and political issues, and politicians offer theirs on public health policies, sometimes with
the support of evidence. This interaction is appropriate and healthy, and valuable insights can be acquired by these cross-discussions.
Nevertheless the interaction provides an opportunity for inappropriate and self-serving commentary, for public
grandstanding, and for promoting public anxiety for partisan political purposes. (ibid.) The authors, however,
never suggest that pure science, devoid of any political consideration, is a viable alternative to an ideologically-driven disease
prevention policy. What becomes important in the constant interplay of science, politics and ideology, is both an awareness of
potential ideological pitfalls and a balance between official public health policy and the science that underlies it. The science/ public
health/politics interaction is largely taken for granted as the foundation of any appropriate, real-world policy decisions (Tesh 1988:
132). Yet the political nature of most health policies has, until recently, been overshadowed in popular discourse
by the ostensibly altruistic nature of health medicine. Yet as Michael Taussig reminds us of the doctor/patient
relationship: The issue of control and manipulation is concealed by the aura of benevolence (Taussig 1980: 4). Might the overt
goodwill of organizations such as the WHO, the CDC, and the Chinese CDC belie such an emphasis on politics? Certainly there is
argumentation to support a claim that public health and medicine are inherently tied to politics. Examining the hidden arguments
underlying public health policies, Sylvia Noble Tesh argues: disease prevention began to acquire political meaning. No
longer merely ways to control diseases, prevention policies became standard-bearers for the contending political arguments about the
form the new society would take (1988: 11). Science is a reason of state in Ashis Nandys Science, Hegemony and Violence (1988:
1). Echoing current battles over viral samples, Nandy suggests that in the last century science was used as a political plank
within the United States in the ideological battle against ungodly communism (1988: 3). Scientific performance is
linked to political dividends (1988: 9), with science becoming a substitute for politics in many societies (1988:
10). What remains novel and of interest in all of this conflation of state and medicine is the new politics of scale of
the war on global disease, specifically its focus on reemerging disease like avian influenza. As doctor and

medical anthropologist Paul Farmer notes: the WHO

manifestly attempts to use fear of contagion to goad


wealthy nations into investing in disease surveillance and control out of self-interest an age-old public health
ploy acknowledged as such in the Institute of Medicine report on emerging infections (Farmer 2001: 5657). What Farmers
observation underlines is that public health has transformed itself into a savvy, political entity. Institutions like the WHO are
increasingly needed to negotiate between nations they function as the new diplomats of health. Modern politics, then, have
arguably turned into health politics. In 2000, the UN Security Council passed a resolution on infectious diseases. The
resolution came in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and was the first of its kind issued (Fidler 2001: 80). What started as a

reaction to a specific disease, AIDS, has since developed into an overall concern with any disease or illness
which is seen as having the potential to lay waste to global health, national security, or economic and
political stability. In other words, disease and public health have gone global. But, as law and international disease scholar
David Fidler points out, the meeting of realpolitik and pathogens that he terms microbialpolitik is anything but new (Fidler 2001:
81). Microbialpolitiks is as old as international commerce, wars, and diplomacy. Indeed, it was only the brief halfcentury respite provided by antibiotics, modern medicine and the hope of a disease-free future that made the coupling of politics and
public health seem out-of-date. But now we have (re)entered a world in which modern public health structures have weakened, thus
making a return to microbialpolitiks inevitable. As Fidler argues: The reglobalization of public health is well
underway, and the international politics of infectious disease control have returned (Fidler 2001: 81). Only three
years later, Fidler would write that the predicted return of public health was triumphant, having emerged prominently on the agendas
of many policy areas in international relations, including national security, international trade, economic development, globalization,
human rights, and global governance (Fidler 2004: 2). As Nicholas King suggests, the resurgence of such

microbialpolitiking owes much to the discourse of risk so prevalent in todays world. The current focus on
risk, as it specifically pertains to disease and its relationship to national security concerns, has been
constructed by the interaction of a variety of different social actors : scientists, the media, and health and
security experts (King 2004:62). King argues: The emerging diseases campaign employed a strategic and
historically resonant scale politics, making it attractive to journalists , biomedical researchers, activists,
politicians, and public health and national security experts . Campaigners identification of causes and consequences at
particular scales were a means of marketing risk to specific audiences and thereby securing alliances; their recommendations for
intervention at particular scales were a means of ensuring that those alliances ultimately benefited specific interests. (2004: 64) King
traces this development to the early 1990s, specifically to Stephen Morses 1989 conference on Emerging Viruses. Like the UN
Security Council resolution on emerging infections, the conference was in the wake of HIV/AIDS. In Kings retelling, it was Morses
descriptions of the causal links between isolated, local events and global effects that changed the politics of public health (2004: 66).
The epidemiological community followed in Morses footsteps, with such luminaries as Morse and Joshua Lederberg calling for a
global surveillance network to deal with emerging or reemerging diseases such as bird flu or SARS. However, although both the
problem and the effort were global by default, any interventions would involve passing through American laboratories,
biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the information science experts (King 2004: 69). Following the conference,
disease became a hot topic for the media. Such high-profile authors as Laurie Garrett (The Coming Plague) and

Richard Preston (The Hot Zone) stoked the emerging virus fires, creating what amounted to a viral
panic or viral paranoia (King 2004: 73). Stories of viruses gone haywire, such as Prestons account of Ebola, helped reify the
notion that localized events were of international importance. Such causal chains having been formed in the popular imagination, the
timing was ripe for the emergence of bioterrorism concerns. In the aftermath of 9/11, the former cold war had been transformed, using
scalar politics, into a hot war with international viruses (King 2004: 76). Of course, all of this can be tied into the
Foucaultian concept that knowledge is by its very nature political. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault outlines the
ways in which medicine is connected to the power of the state. For Foucault, medicine itself becomes a task for the
nation (Foucault 1994: 19). He argues that the practice of medicine is itself political and that the struggle against
disease must begin with a war against bad government (Foucault 1994: 33). In an article on the politics of emerging
diseases, Elisabeth Prescott has echoed Foucaults equation of disease with bad government. She suggests that a nations capacity
to combat both old and newly emergent diseases is a marker not of just biological, but of political, health .
She argues that the ability to respond [is] a reflection of the capacity of a governing system (2007: 1). Whats more, ruptures in
health can lead to break-downs in effective government or in the ability of governments to inspire confidence. Prescott suggests:
Failures in governance in the face of infectious disease outbreaks can result in challenges to social cohesion, economic performance
and political legitimacy (ibid.). In other words, an outbreak of bird flu in China would equate to an example of Foucaults bad
government. In the end, there can be no doubt that the realms of medicine and (political) power are perpetually intertwined. Foucault
writes: There is, therefore, a spontaneous and deeply rooted convergence between the requirement of political ideology and those of
medical technology (Foucault 1994: 38). In other words, we should not be overly surprised by Richard Carmonas testimony or by
debates over bird flu samples. Politics and health have always arguably gone hand-in-hand

Framing disease as a threat is an act of securitization it justifies biopolitical regulation.


Dr. Stefan

Elbe 4

"AIDS, Security, and Biopolitics".

, Ph.D. in International Relations and Senior Lecturer in International Relations at LSE, 2004,

The securitization of AIDS is also biopolitical, secondly, because of the manner in which international actors
are trying to monitor and govern the health of populations. The detailed statistical monitoring of
populations that formed such an integral component of eighteenth-century European biopolitics is today being
replicated on a global level by international agencies eager to identify and forecast the population dynamics
likely to be induced around the world by HIV/AIDS. The task of compiling these statistics has been assigned to the
World Health Organization and the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). The latter prides itself on its
efforts to provide strategic information about HIV/AIDS globally, as well as [t]racking, monitoring and
evaluation of the epidemic and of responses to it.25 Indeed, it claims to be the worlds leading resource for
epidemiological data on HIV/AIDS.26 To this end, UNAIDS also provides in a manner that recalls Englands nineteenth-century
Blue Books annual updates on the global state of the AIDS pandemic, and endeavors to keep up-to-date information on HIV
prevalence amongst adult populations for every country. 27 Crucially, UNAIDS does not restrict itself to providing data for collective
populations; its surveillance techniques penetrate further and also generate new sub-populations by singling
out specific risk groups that need to be targeted another historical hallmark of biopolitics.28 The organization thus
differentiates between adult and child populations and between urban and rural populations, and pays particularly close attention to
sex workers and drug users. Where possible, UNAIDS even gathers data on sexual behavior, such as the median age of first sexual
intercourse and the rate of condom use, as well as a variety of other knowledge indicators. UNAIDS, in short, produces the

vital knowledge about the biological characteristics of the worlds populations and sub-populations
needed to rein in the pandemic.
Framing the state as the actor to prevent disease is securitizing it makes the health of the
population the government's responsibility.
Dr. Stefan

Elbe 4

, Ph.D. in International Relations and Senior Lecturer in International Relations at LSE, 2004,

"AIDS, Security, and Biopolitics".


Today such biopolitical impulses

can also be found resonating beyond the borders of Europe through


practices such as the securitization of HIV/AIDS . The latter, after all, marks nothing other than a powerful
international intervention targeted directly at the level of population. With the arrival of HIV/AIDS on the
international security agenda, security is no longer confined to defending sovereignty, territorial integrity and
international law; but, as the unprecedented Security Council meeting demonstrates, population dynamics including levels of
disease have now become strategically significant as well. International political actors securitizing HIV/AIDS
are effectively calling upon governments around the world to make the health and longevity of their
populations a matter of highest governmental priority echoing Foucaults earlier observation that in a biopolitical age
[t]he population now appears more as the aim of government than the power of the ruler.

Disease descriptions are shaped by political interests and


in turn shape reality turns the aff
MacPhail 2009 (Theresa, medical anthropologist at the University of California, Berkeley The Politics of Bird Flu:
The Battle over Viral Samples and Chinas Role in Global Public Health, Journal of language and politics, 8:3, 2009)
In fact, the health development strategies of international organizations are judged as significant

in
reinforcing the role of the state in relation to the production of primary products for the world market,
thereby perpetuating international relations of dominance and dependency. Soheir Morsy, Political Economy in
Medical Anthropology In July of 2007, former Surgeon General Richard H. Carmona appeared before a congressional
committee and testified that during his term in office he had been pressured by the Bush administration to suppress or
downplay any public health information that contradicted the administrations beliefs and/or policies .
Gardiner Harris of the New York Times noted that Dr. Carmona was only one of a growing list of present and former administration
officials to charge that politics often trumped science within what had previously been largely nonpartisan
government health and scientific agencies (Harris 2007). Dr. Carmona testified that he had repeatedly faced political
interference on such varied topics as stem cell research and sex education. Two days later, an editorial in the Times bemoaned the
resultant diminution of public health both its reputation as non-biased and the general understanding of important public health
issues in the eyes of the same public it was meant to serve (2007). In the wake of Dr. Carmonas testimony, it would appear that
these are grave times for public health. And yet, public health concerns and international measures to thwart disease pandemics have
never been more at the forefront of governmental policy, media focus and the public imagination. Dr. Carmonas testimony on the
fuzzy boundaries between science and state, health and policy, is in line with a recent spate of sensational stories on the dangers of
drug-resistant tuberculosis and the recurrent threat of a bird flu outbreak all of which belie any distinct separation of politics and
medical science and highlight the ever-increasing commingling of the realms of public health and political diplomacy. Until

recently, the worlds of public health and politics have generally been popularly conceptualized as separate
fields. Public health, undergirded by medicine, is primarily defined as the science and practice of protecting and improving the

health of a community (public health 2007), regardless of political borders on geographical maps. Disease

prevention and care


is typically regarded as neutral ground, a conceptual space where governments can work together for the
direct (or indirect) benefit of all. Politics, on the other hand, is usually referred to in the largely Aristotelian sense of the word,
or politika, as the art or science of government or governing, especially the governing of a political entity, such as a nation, and the
administration and control of its internal and external affairs (politics 2007). If we take to be relevant Clausewitzs formulation that
war is merely the continuation of policy (or such politics) by other means, might we then argue that the recent wars on disease

specifically the one being waged on the ever-present global threat of bird flu are merely a
continuation of politics by different means? In an article written for the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC), two health
professionals suggest that the flow of influence works optimally when an unbiased science first informs public health, with public
health then influencing governmental policy decisions. The other potential direction of influence, wherein politics directly

informs public health, eventually constraining or directing scientific research, has the potential to create a
situation in which ideology clouds scientific and public health judgment, decisions go awry and politics
become dangerous (Koplan and McPheeters 2004: 2041). The authors go on to argue that: Scientists and public health
professionals often offer opinions on policy and political issues, and politicians offer theirs on public health policies, sometimes with
the support of evidence. This interaction is appropriate and healthy, and valuable insights can be acquired by these cross-discussions.
Nevertheless the interaction provides an opportunity for inappropriate and self-serving commentary, for public
grandstanding, and for promoting public anxiety for partisan political purposes. (ibid.) The authors, however,
never suggest that pure science, devoid of any political consideration, is a viable alternative to an ideologically-driven disease
prevention policy. What becomes important in the constant interplay of science, politics and ideology, is both an awareness of
potential ideological pitfalls and a balance between official public health policy and the science that underlies it. The science/ public
health/politics interaction is largely taken for granted as the foundation of any appropriate, real-world policy decisions (Tesh 1988:
132). Yet the political nature of most health policies has, until recently, been overshadowed in popular discourse
by the ostensibly altruistic nature of health medicine. Yet as Michael Taussig reminds us of the doctor/patient
relationship: The issue of control and manipulation is concealed by the aura of benevolence (Taussig 1980: 4). Might the overt
goodwill of organizations such as the WHO, the CDC, and the Chinese CDC belie such an emphasis on politics? Certainly there is
argumentation to support a claim that public health and medicine are inherently tied to politics. Examining the hidden arguments
underlying public health policies, Sylvia Noble Tesh argues: disease prevention began to acquire political meaning. No
longer merely ways to control diseases, prevention policies became standard-bearers for the contending political arguments about the
form the new society would take (1988: 11). Science is a reason of state in Ashis Nandys Science, Hegemony and Violence (1988:
1). Echoing current battles over viral samples, Nandy suggests that in the last century science was used as a political plank
within the United States in the ideological battle against ungodly communism (1988: 3). Scientific performance is
linked to political dividends (1988: 9), with science becoming a substitute for politics in many societies (1988:
10). What remains novel and of interest in all of this conflation of state and medicine is the new politics of scale of
the war on global disease, specifically its focus on reemerging disease like avian influenza. As doctor and
medical anthropologist Paul Farmer notes: the WHO manifestly attempts to use fear of contagion to goad
wealthy nations into investing in disease surveillance and control out of self-interest an age-old public health
ploy acknowledged as such in the Institute of Medicine report on emerging infections (Farmer 2001: 5657). What Farmers
observation underlines is that public health has transformed itself into a savvy, political entity. Institutions like the WHO are
increasingly needed to negotiate between nations they function as the new diplomats of health. Modern politics, then, have
arguably turned into health politics. In 2000, the UN Security Council passed a resolution on infectious diseases. The
resolution came in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and was the first of its kind issued (Fidler 2001: 80). What started as a

reaction to a specific disease, AIDS, has since developed into an overall concern with any disease or illness
which is seen as having the potential to lay waste to global health, national security, or economic and
political stability. In other words, disease and public health have gone global. But, as law and international disease scholar
David Fidler points out, the meeting of realpolitik and pathogens that he terms microbialpolitik is anything but new (Fidler 2001:
81). Microbialpolitiks is as old as international commerce, wars, and diplomacy. Indeed, it was only the brief halfcentury respite provided by antibiotics, modern medicine and the hope of a disease-free future that made the coupling of politics and
public health seem out-of-date. But now we have (re)entered a world in which modern public health structures have weakened, thus
making a return to microbialpolitiks inevitable. As Fidler argues: The reglobalization of public health is well
underway, and the international politics of infectious disease control have returned (Fidler 2001: 81). Only three
years later, Fidler would write that the predicted return of public health was triumphant, having emerged prominently on the agendas
of many policy areas in international relations, including national security, international trade, economic development, globalization,
human rights, and global governance (Fidler 2004: 2). As Nicholas King suggests, the resurgence of such

microbialpolitiking owes much to the discourse of risk so prevalent in todays world. The current focus on
risk, as it specifically pertains to disease and its relationship to national security concerns, has been
constructed by the interaction of a variety of different social actors : scientists, the media, and health and
security experts (King 2004:62). King argues: The emerging diseases campaign employed a strategic and
historically resonant scale politics, making it attractive to journalists , biomedical researchers, activists,
politicians, and public health and national security experts . Campaigners identification of causes and consequences at
particular scales were a means of marketing risk to specific audiences and thereby securing alliances; their recommendations for

intervention at particular scales were a means of ensuring that those alliances ultimately benefited specific interests. (2004: 64) King
traces this development to the early 1990s, specifically to Stephen Morses 1989 conference on Emerging Viruses. Like the UN
Security Council resolution on emerging infections, the conference was in the wake of HIV/AIDS. In Kings retelling, it was Morses
descriptions of the causal links between isolated, local events and global effects that changed the politics of public health (2004: 66).
The epidemiological community followed in Morses footsteps, with such luminaries as Morse and Joshua Lederberg calling for a
global surveillance network to deal with emerging or reemerging diseases such as bird flu or SARS. However, although both the
problem and the effort were global by default, any interventions would involve passing through American laboratories,
biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the information science experts (King 2004: 69). Following the conference,
disease became a hot topic for the media. Such high-profile authors as Laurie Garrett (The Coming Plague) and

Richard Preston (The Hot Zone) stoked the emerging virus fires, creating what amounted to a viral
panic or viral paranoia (King 2004: 73). Stories of viruses gone haywire, such as Prestons account of Ebola, helped reify the
notion that localized events were of international importance. Such causal chains having been formed in the popular imagination, the
timing was ripe for the emergence of bioterrorism concerns. In the aftermath of 9/11, the former cold war had been transformed, using
scalar politics, into a hot war with international viruses (King 2004: 76). Of course, all of this can be tied into the
Foucaultian concept that knowledge is by its very nature political. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault outlines the
ways in which medicine is connected to the power of the state. For Foucault, medicine itself becomes a task for the
nation (Foucault 1994: 19). He argues that the practice of medicine is itself political and that the struggle against
disease must begin with a war against bad government (Foucault 1994: 33). In an article on the politics of emerging
diseases, Elisabeth Prescott has echoed Foucaults equation of disease with bad government. She suggests that a nations capacity
to combat both old and newly emergent diseases is a marker not of just biological, but of political, health .
She argues that the ability to respond [is] a reflection of the capacity of a governing system (2007: 1). Whats more, ruptures in
health can lead to break-downs in effective government or in the ability of governments to inspire confidence. Prescott suggests:
Failures in governance in the face of infectious disease outbreaks can result in challenges to social cohesion, economic performance
and political legitimacy (ibid.). In other words, an outbreak of bird flu in China would equate to an example of Foucaults bad
government. In the end, there can be no doubt that the realms of medicine and (political) power are perpetually intertwined. Foucault
writes: There is, therefore, a spontaneous and deeply rooted convergence between the requirement of political ideology and those of
medical technology (Foucault 1994: 38). In other words, we should not be overly surprised by Richard Carmonas testimony or by
debates over bird flu samples. Politics and health have always arguably gone hand-in-hand

The metaphor of disease allows us to cover up the framework of securitization


under the guise of policymaking
Campbell 98 (David, Professor of International Politics at U of Newcastle, Writing Security: US
Foreign Policy and the Polities of Identity. Pg 81-82)
However one might begin to fathom the many issues located within those challenges, our current
situation leaves us with one certainty because we cannot escape the logic of differentiation, we are
often tempted by the logic of defilement. To say as much is not to argue that we are imprisoned
within a particular and permanent system of representations. To be sure, danger is often
represented as disease, dirt, or pollution. As one medical text argues: Disease is shock and
danger for existence32 Or as Karl Jaspers maintains: Disease is a general concept of non-value
which includes all possible negative values33 But such concerns have less to do with the
intrinsic qualities of those conditions that the modernist requirements of order and stability:
Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative moment, but a positive effort to
organize the environment. One might suggest that it is the extent to which we want to organize
the environment- the extent to which we want to purify our domain that determines how likely
it is that we represent danger in terms of dirt or disease. Tightly defined order and strictly
enforced stability, undergirded by notions of purity, are not a priori conditions of existence;
some order and some stability might be required for existence as we know it (i.e., in some form
of extensive political community), but it is the degree of tightness, the measure of straightness,
and the extent of desire for purity that constitute danger as dirt or disease. But the temptation
of the logic of defilement as a means of orienting ourselves to danger has more often than not been
overpowering, largely because it is founded on a particular conceptualization of the body in
its use since at lease the eighteenth century, this conceptualization demands purity as a
condition of health and thus make the temptation to defilement a natural characteristic.
This has endowed us with a mode of representation in which health and cleanliness serve the
logic of stability, and disorder is rendered as disease and dirt. In the eighteenth century, when
state forms were becoming the most prevalent articulations of extensive political community,

these modes of representation began to take a new turn that intensified the capacity of
representations of disease to act as discourses of danger of the social.

Medical security metaphors legitimate practices of violence


while simultaneously promoting a liberal subjectivity on the
basis of this violence
Dalby 2(Simon, professor of geography and political economy at
Carleton University in Ottawa, Environmental Security, p. 153-154)
Security studies might draw intellectual support from cultural studies and postcolonial critiques. It
might, as Prins argues, recognize itself in terms of a branch of interpretive humanities. In doing so
the task of academic practitioners, or insecurity specialists, to adopt Davis Bobrow's term but not his
conclusion,29 becomes one of engagement in a conversation about the fate of humanity on an
endangered planetrather than a task of scientists to "objectively" examine a given series of structural
relationships. As such, if it also takes the geographical arguments into account, security studies
might understand itself as many geographical selves, as security studies plural, with Asian, European, and American variants in addition to a variety of postcolonial and, crucially perhaps,
postdevelopment understandings." Security is not then read as a universal condition, as the
American behavioral scientists might like us to do, but understood as a highly contested
signifier that invokes numerous specifications of danger and legiti mates practices of violence
while simultaneously frequently promoting a modern liberal subjectivity on the bases of this
violence.
It also invokes the modern political impulse to control and the medical tropes of
endangerment and disease, abnormality, and threat that are, as Bobrow unreflectively notes,
pervasive in contemporary security culture. Foucault's discussions of security, power, policing,
and government have suggested that the political impulse to secure in the lives of populations
within states is linked to the formulations of all sorts of dangers as well as the questions of
social welfare. Thus the metaphors of various wars against everything from polio to drugs are
part of the larger popular geopolitical repertoires for engaging state agencies. " `[T]he end of
the Cold War' represents not a decisive break with the logic of security, but a realignment that
throws into relief problems and sites of contestation that earlier had been less accessible, that is,
intelligible.

Using medical metaphors reproduces cold war discourse and obscures attempts to
reform consumption
Dalby, professor of geography and political economy at Carleton
University in Ottawa, 2002
(Simon, Environmental Security, p. 154-156)
What threatens is a complex matter of cultural politics. Scripts of nationhood are frequently woven around heroic
deeds in wartime. Battles and wars of independence are crucial military events when rendered so by the narratives of
nation; founding myths produce shared identities. As noted in previous chapters, similar military meta phors saturate
many social phenomena concerned with protection and individual subjects. Medical language is replete with

bacterial invasions, therapeutic interventions, and the battle with disease. Im mune systems are
the patient's first line of defense prior to the use of pharmaceutical weapons. Victims of disease
struggle valiantly. The battleground is the body analogized to the body politic of the state.
Heroic struggles inscribe both national histories and discussions in hospital wards .32 This
medical intertext also haunts Davis Bobrow's formulation of the tasks of security practitioners in
terms of medical metaphors. And yet the formulations of these threats and the invocations of
such themes as the "New World Order" once again work within a spatial imaginary where the
knowledgeable clinician both specifies the condition of the patient and acts within a
disciplinary spatial apparatus that designates the spaces for treatment, the assignment to the
asylum, or the terms of quarantine. As Francois Debrix argues, borrowing from Foucault's analysis in The
Birth of the Clinic, "peacekeeping" in the medical language of such organizations as Medecins sans
Frontieres is also caught in the normalizing practices of the clinical gaze where the failed state, the
site of genocide, or a humanitarian emergency is specified in contrast to the abstraction of the
normal state.33 Such tropes require the intervention of the medical specialist to diagnose, conduct surgery, organize
a quarantine, or specify safe havens. What preventive care or a holistic medical metaphor might convey as Alternative
mode of knowing the South remains a useful counter/- argument to the assumptions of clinical medicine even if the
answers are far from easy. If at least some of the "new" threats to the geopolitical order of
modernity are fairly directly related to the ex pansion of the impacts of modernity , and Laurie
Garrett's extensive compilation of the circumstances of the emergence of new species- hopping

diseases due to the disruptions of tropical ecosystems extends the medical language
appropriately here, then the matter of causes rather than cures is especially pressing .34 This is
particularly true given the ecological shadows of "normal" states, where the assump tions of
indigenous causes requiring intervention to provide a cure fail to incorporate the crossboundary responsibilities implicit in the causes of the disruptions in the first place. None of this
is intended to disparage the work of such organizations as Medecins sans Frontieres in contemporary crises; but

thinking politics without presupposing narratives of normalization, spatial security,


intervention, and imperial control is one important task for critical thinking "after the cold
war." It is if we are to think in terms that do not reproduce the identities, practices, and
politics that cold war security discourses secured . Neither can one innocently argue that such
organizations, the mendicant orders of the twentieth century, to borrow Hardt and Negri's formulation, are outside the
contemporary practices of power however much they may advertise their practices in antigeopolitical tropes.35

Detaching these things from the traditional ethnocentrism of international relations is a


necessary part of the construction of an international and interdisciplinary security studies; it
would certainly seem to be necessary if a cosmopolitan understanding of the dynamics of
conflict and the possibilities for thwarting identity politicsbased warfare is to be the basis of a
new political order.36 If this broader critical agenda is accepted, can it be used as a way of rescuing politics and
security studies from the geopolitical stipulations of communities living in boxes with violence ultimately arbitrating
disagreements? Hopefully it can. Can such thinking also shift the referent objects of security from the state to the human
individual, as both the human security agenda and the critical security literature advocate, without presupposing the identity
of these individuals as neoliberal citizen consumers embedded in a mesh of claims to universal rights? Can all this be
accomplished in recognizing that the social processes currently in motion are interconnected, and in that sense global, but not
in a sense that requires management of the poor by the rich and powerful? To do so, such studies will need a much' more
complicated, geographically diverse world of interconnections as the ontological premise for contemplation and analysis.

Violence and insecurity then can be addressed more directly without the intel lectual detours
through assumptions of interstate violence, territorial states, national security, or even
"civilizations" obscuring the social processes in question. International relations and strategic

studies it is probably not, but security studies it might still be, albeit in a rather different guise
from that bequeathed from the hegemonic practices of the past.

LinkFood Security
Food security pays lip service to the hungry while serving
as a justification for the violent expansion of global
governance
Alcock 9 (Rupert, graduated with a distinction in the MSc in Development and Security from the Department of Politics, University of Bristol in 2009, MSc dissertation
prize joint winner 2009, Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security 2009, pdf available online, p. 10-14 MT)

the concept of food security has been the primary lens through which the ongoing
prevalence and inherent complexity of global hunger has been viewed. The adoption of the term at the FAOsanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which takes food security as an
unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called food
insecurity (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security
is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). This
pervasive predilection for empirical clarity is symptomatic of traditional positivist epistemologies and constrains a more farsighted understanding of the power functions of food security itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that to
understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, a shift of analytical
focus is required: Instead of presuming their existence and meaning, we ought to historicize
and relativize them as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories (1994: 10). The
forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in
official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these
publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity . Absent from much (if not all) of the
academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of security itself. The notion of food security is
received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more
comprehensive food security paradigm. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are
Since the 1970s,

commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution
in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first
perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind
of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I
suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal
governance. As a development expert he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a

the macro-politics of food security as a specific


rationality of government. In his article Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the
concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on

discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned (1996: 160) in food security
discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels post-modern. In line with one of the most popular words in the lexicon of postmodernism, Maxwell claims to have deconstructed the term food security; in so doing, a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food
security (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls real food insecurity
(1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwells thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwells

reconstruction of food security and re-articulation of its normative criteria reproduce


precisely the kind of technical, managerial set of solutions which characterise the positivistic
need for definitional certainty that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative and that the

ice is admittedly very thin (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately post-modern) alternative.
Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative
beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the

while lip-service is occasionally paid to the


lives and faces of hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by increasingly
extensive, technological and professedly objective methods of identifying and stratifying
the food insecure. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwells emphasis on shifts in thinking suggests the replacement of old
subjective dimension of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals,

with new the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of
food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest

food security is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous


results in a technocratic discourse which
presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact (thematic patterns) and deflects
consideration of values choices and the social, moral and political responsibility for such choices (Lemke,
that Maxwells shifts should rather be conceived as additions; the implication for

definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between experts in diverse fields. This

1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of

I adopt a broad perspective from


which to interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance .
contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis.

Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping


discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in
the 1970s. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand
and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how the militaristic component of traditional
security discourse is reproduced in the wider agenda of food security, through the notions of
risk, threat and permanent emergency that constitute its governmental rationale.

Link Hegemony
Written out of the 1AC empirical analysis hegemony is the
failure of the War in Vietnam and the subsequent
construction of neoliberal laboratories across the global
south beginning with Chile. The AFF imagines U.S.
hegemony existing in the vacuum of international
anarchy; the history told by the 1AC is a Eurocentric
history which obfuscates the U.S.s role in propping up
brutal dictatorships to reassert its hegemonic control.
Hegemony is intimately bound the brutal spread of
neoliberalism.
Barder 2013
/Alexander D., Department of Political Studies & Public Administration, American University of Beirut,
Beirut, Lebanon, PhD in Political Theory from John Hopkins, American Hegemony Comes Home: The
Chilean Laboratory and the Neoliberalization of the United States Alternatives: Global, Local, Political
2013 38: 103 originally published online 22 April 2013, DOI: 10.1177/0304375413486331/
Examining historical patterns of international hierarchy reveals a rich and multidirectional diffusion of
norms, practices, and knowledges between dominant and subordinate polities.2 Imperial historians have
for some time now have documented this transnational norm diffusion by looking more closely at how
colonial spaces were in fact laboratories of sociopolitical experimentation .3 Nonetheless, this
multidirectional norm diffusion and appreciation of the active reverberations from imperial or
subordinate spaces remains largely unexplored by international theorists , for two main
reasons. First, the fact that canonical international theory remains largely predicated upon an
assumption of international anarchy which is construed as a timeless feature of international
politics.4 This assumption implies a representation of the state ahistorically .5 Furthermore, it
construes the global South as a largely passive and peripheral actor in world history. Second,
because of a continuing Eurocentrism that conceptualizes the West as a privileged

historical actor by taking for granted that Western norms travel outbound rather than
being the product of interactions with non-Western polities.6 Socialization, when it is
theorized in international theory, is typically conceived as the socialization of the non-West into an already
constituted European society of states.7 What these two perspectives imply is a lack of appreciation

within international theory of how historical patterns of hierarchical international relations


have resulted in a set of what some have called a colonial archive that has left significant
imprints upon the historical trajectory of Western state-formation .8 Taking the above into
consideration, this article explores the conjunction between changes in American hegemony over the
course of the 1970s and the subsequent neoliberalization of the United States in the early 1980s. While the
story of the emergence of neoliberalism has been told through many different angles, I argue that this
Reagan-Thatcher neoliberal counterrevolution represents the normalization of a set of
economic theories that were initially experimented within Chile during the mid- to late 1970s
and later adapted within the United States and the United Kingdom.9 Beginning in the late 1960s
with the American defeat in the Vietnam War, and later, the collapse of the Bretton Woods
Agreement, the spike in oil prices and especially the economic crises of stagflation throughout
the industrialized North, American political and economic supremacy was radically
challenged. However, as Giovanni Arrighi has shown, this neoliberal counterrevolution was not
simply a response to a particular economic crisis condition; it was more importantly a political

reassertion of American global hegemony by the means of economic structural adjustment.


Moreover, this project of restoring American supremacy abroad was fundamentally entwined with a

domestic reassertion of governmental authority. As Greg Grandin succinctly puts it, the restoration of

Americans global military power and the restoration of laissez-faire capitalism were
increasingly understood to be indistinguishable goals.10 What connects the international
dimension of crisis management and hegemonic reassertion with domestic neoliberalization
is precisely the manner in which the operationalization of neoliberal reform was
experimented with and innovated in various informal American laboratories . The Chilean
laboratory in particular permitted, under authoritarian conditions, the radical
transformation of the economy according to principles and theories laid out by the Chicago
School of economics. This experience would then become perceived as the tried-and-true
developmental model not only across the global South, but also, with varying degrees, across
the North. This article proceeds as follows. In the first section, I depart from G. John Ikenberrys
recent discussion on postSecond World War American liberal hegemony. While Ikenberry
importantly draws our attention to the hierarchical components of this apre`s guerre international order and
its processes of norm diffusion, he crucially misses the profound crisis of American hegemony of
the 1970s. In the second section, I turn to both Robert Brenner and Giovanni Arrighi to show, first, the
importance of both intercapitalist competition (Brenner) and the collapse of American international
political legitimacy in the wake of the Vietnam War (Arrighi) to account for the erosion of American
control over the global South. Finally, in the third section, I turn to the specific case of Chile and show how
it becomes an important laboratory setting for the experimentation and development of neoliberalism.
This sociopolitical/economic innovation proved to imbricate both a project of reasserting

American hegemony abroad and governmental authority at home.

Hegemony is not based on a liberal order, rather, it is


founded on the imperial financial policies of deregulation
and SAPs which took the global south from sovereign
colonialism to neoliberal colonialism. A benign hegemonic
order is a ruse which covers up the brutal legacy of neoimperialism instated to save U.S. hegemony after our loss
in Vietnam. U.S. hegemony is not only a form of violent
imperialism; it is an unsustainable system which
necessitates escalating crises which will collapse
hegemony and neoliberalism.
Barder 2013
/Alexander D., Department of Political Studies & Public Administration, American University of Beirut,
Beirut, Lebanon, PhD in Political Theory from John Hopkins, American Hegemony Comes Home: The
Chilean Laboratory and the Neoliberalization of the United States Alternatives: Global, Local, Political
2013 38: 103 originally published online 22 April 2013, DOI: 10.1177/0304375413486331/
Brenners argument is that the economic crisis of the 1970s reflected a decline in the

manufacturing rate of profit across the advanced capitalist economies as a result of overcapacity and over-production.35 American firms were placed in a position in which they could not
increase prices in order to keep up with increasing domestic labor costs. Moreover, their profitability was
being undermined because of the higher productivity of their competitors in Germany and Japan. Brenner
acknowledges that this international situation provoked an American domestic political crisis that the
Johnson administration initially attempted to address through fiscal and monetary austerity. However, this
policy did not halt declining economic growth. As Brenner explains, the Nixon administration realized that
the political costs of sustaining a serious anti-inflationary policy proved unacceptable . . . . Well before
the defeat of the Republicans in the congressional elections of November 1970, and as high interest rates
threatened to choke off the recovery, the government turned once again to fiscal stimulus and the Fed
accompanied a policy of easy credit. As Nixon was to put it several months later, We are all Keynesians
now.36 The devaluation of the dollar was, as Brenner shows, a way of shifting the burden of declining

profits more evenly across the industrialized world (i.e., negating the inherent benefits for German and
Japanese exporters). However, this proved not to be the panacea that state administrators sought in order to
reestablish American domestic manufacturing profitability. On the contrary, as Brenner writes, By the
end of the 1970s, the manufacturing sector on an international scale was at an impasse, as was the
Keynesian programme of demand management that had been implemented to revitalize the world
economy.37 Systemwide manufacturing profitability could not be rescued on the basis of fiscal and
monetary policies: the continuation of such policies only furthered a run on the dollar provoking a threat to
the dollars position as an international reserve currency.38 The result was what Brenner calls the

shift to Reaganism/ Thatcherism which reversed fiscal and monetary stimulus in order
to dampen the growth of wages, as well as by directly redistributing income to capital
through reduced taxes on corporations and diminished spending on social services .39 The
emergent neoliberalization of economic activity, through the deregulation and liberalization
of finance and other business sectors, aimed . . . at bringing about a revitalization of, and
thereby a shift into, domestic and international financial sectors . . . by means of
suppressing inflation . . . .40 Brenner sees the transformation of the world and domestic (US)
economy as fundamentally tied to the crisis of systemic-wide manufacturing profitability.

Neoliberalization was thus meant to address this economic crisis at the very center of
American economic hegemony. Giovanni Arrighi contests Brenners explanation of the worldwide
economic crisis of profitability as the main factor in explaining the subsequent long stagnation of the
1970s and the emergence of the neoliberal alternative. To be sure, Brenners work is helpful in showing that
intracapitalist competition provoked an important crisis that had substantial reverberations for embedded
liberalism within the industrialized North. In contrast to Ikenberrys narrative, Brenner sees the

economic tribulations of the 1970s as reflecting internal contradictions in the very financial
and economic capitalist architecture that otherwise appears unproblematized within the
wider literature on American liberal hegemony . Brenner does not, as Arrighi argues, convincingly
explain the set of international geopolitical and domestic conditions that influenced policy choices leading
to the Reagan/Thatcher monetarist counter revolution.41 What Brenner misses is that the crisis of

profitability located in the first world industrialized North was fundamentally refracted by
a crisis of American liberal hegemony beginning in the late 1960s: The crisis of
profitability that marked the transition from the long boom to the long downturn, as well as
the great stagflation of the 1970 s, were themselves deeply affected by the parallel crisis of
American hegemony which ensued from the Vietnam War and the eventual American defeat. As
for the Reagan-Thatcher counterrevolution, it was not just, or even primarily, a response to
the unsolved crisis of profitability but alsoand especiallya response to the deepening
crisis of hegemony.42 Brenner, Arrighi argues, misses the broader political context underlying this
crisis in American liberal hegemony precisely because his analysis is primarily focused on intercapitalist
competitive pressures (i.e., between the United States, Germany, and Japan) and not on how the United
States was concerned with maintaining its hegemonic position throughout the global
South.43 By contrast, Arrighi shows that the changes in US balance of payments (and the
corresponding fluctuations in US currency prices that would lead to enormous fluctuations in
international and domestic fiscal and monetary policies) were fundamentally part an ongoing
geopolitical project during the 1960s: the US government sought to contain, through the
use of force, the joint challenge of nationalism and communism in the Third World .44 And,
as Arrighi shows, the changes in politicoeconomic policies beginning with Reagan and Thatcher
came from the unresolved crises of US hegemony in the Third World rather than in the crisis
of profitability as such.45 The Vietnam War was the main event of this larger US project to dominate the
global periphery either through direct military means or the use of proxies. However, the catastrophic
engagement in Vietnam proved to have not only enormous economic implications the
increase in defense expenditures resulted in growing budget deficits at the same time that the Johnson
Administration was busy funding the Great Society initiativebut also resulted in a fundamental
crisis of legitimacy. Internationally, the joint military and legitimacy crises of the US world power
were the expression of the failure of the US military-industrial complex to cope with the problems posed

by world-wide decolonization.46 Whereas Ikenberry takes for granted that American liberal

hegemony provides a basis for weaker and secondary states to make decisions to willingly
join and comply with the rules and institutions of this order, the reality was far more
complex and conflictual. Newly decolonized states were subject to intense American
pressure to satisfy its growing economic and political needs throughout the Cold War .47 Reindustrialization in many northern states, along with ever-increasing military demands to keep up
with the arms race with the Soviet Union by the United States, was predicated upon the
consistent ability to extract primary materials from the global South . What emerged over the
course of the 1950s and 1960s was a set of highly effective and efficient organizational links between
Third World primary inputs and First World purchasing power and resulted in powerful vested
interest[s] . . . in preserving maximum present and future flexibility in the use of Third World resources for
the benefit of First world states.48 There was a tension between the demands of continuous
capital accumulation by the industrialized North (in the global South) and the progressive demand
for the exercise of full sovereignty by newly decolonized states . When it became clear
that the liberal hegemon could not directly subjugate Vietnam into complying, as Ikenberry
would argue, with its demands, the US government temporarily lost most, if not all of its
credibility as the policeman of the free world.49 The loss of American credibility suffered as a result of
its defeat in Vietnam resulted in what Arrighi characterizes as a power vacuum that was accentuated
throughout the 1970s. Events such as the rise of [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries]
OPEC, the oils crises, the Yom Kippur war and the fall of the Shah in 1979, all happened
concurrently with the escalation of inter-capitalist competition, as Brenner has shown, and
resulted in a profound economic crisis throughout the North.50 This political economic crisis
perpetuated the impression among political leaders and public opinion across the world that the
United States was incapable of addressing this systemic crisis. All told the conjunction between
an international political crisis derived from the Vietnam War and the crisis in profitability produced
(though aided by extremely lax US monetary policy) the inflationary uptick in the early 1970s and the
collapse of the system of fixed exchange rates. In short, Arrighi writes, the interaction between

the crisis of profitability and the crisis of hegemony, in combination with the US
inflationary strategy of crisis management, resulted in a ten-year increase in world
monetary disorder, escalating inflation and steady deterioration in the capacity of the US dollar to
function as the worlds means of payment.51 This finally paved the way for the dramatic shifts in
the set of international and domestic policies designed to reassert American hegemony. The
monetarist counterrevolution embodied in tight monetary and fiscal policies was designed to
reassert faith in the US dollar as the international reserve currency. But what the increase in real
interest rates accomplished in a spectacular fashion was the direct reassertion of US control
over Third World countries that heavily borrowed US dollars in the open market at a time when
there was a massive supply of petrodollars being recycled through Western banks. Such countries faced
ruinous repayment rates that necessitated international organizations such as the IM F and
World Bank provide them with structural adjustment programs . Significantly, such structural
adjustment programs gave primacy to Western corporate interests through deregulation
and the ability to repatriate US dollar assets back home. Direct changes in US monetary policy
resulted in a series of debt crises, that as David Harvey argues, were in fact orchestrated,
managed and controlled both to rationalize the system and to redistribute assets during the
1980s and 1990s.52 These debt crises were part of a way of reasserting American
hegemony throughout the global South in such a way that was inconceivable merely
through military means. The American-led liberal order, and its reassertion of hegemony in
the 1980s, was in fact predicated upon the very need to discipline and coerce weaker
states, particularly in Latin America and the Middle Eastas Ikenberry writesthrough
political and economic means. The debt crises of the 1980s were part of this capacity to discipline.
However, these crises, characterized as well by the explosive development of financial
securitization and the proliferation of asset bubbles, represents what Arrighi calls a signal

crisis of the dominant regime of accumulation of the American postsecond world war
order.53 A signal crisis signifies a deeper underlying systemic crisis when leading
capitalist entities begin switching their economic activities away from production and trade
to financial intermediation and speculation.54 This initial move from investment in
material production to the fictitious world of financial speculation and engineering initially
forestalls and enhances the capacity for wealth generation for a certain class . Nonetheless, it
cannot embody a lasting resolution of the underlying contradictions. On the contrary, as
Arrighi writes, it has always been the preamble to a deepening of the crisis and to the
eventual supersession of the still dominant regime of accumulation by a new one.5 5 What
Arrighi calls the terminal crisis is then the end of the long century that encompasses the
rise, full expansion, and demise of that regimewhat is potentially occurring today.56 The
signal crisis of American political and economic hegemony provoked a set of policies to
enhance capital accumulations beneficial to American business and state to the detriment
of the global South. What Ikenberry sees as American behavior being crudely imperial in
certain contexts was in fact the way of maintaining and reinvigorating international forms of
capital accumulation for the benefit of American hegemony and its allies . As I will show in the
last section of this chapter, this manifestly neo-imperial economic order was not only meant to be
applicable throughout the global South; the Reagan-Thatcher counter revolution was also an internal
revolution that adapted some of the experiences and practices developed in the global

periphery to reinforce American hegemony at home and abroad.

Their pursuit of hegemony is based on a fantasy of control that relies upon the
existence of threatening monsters to maintain the illusion of personal strength and
discipline. This grand strategy prompts resistance and creates a permanent state of
conflict, turning constructed enemies into real enemies and flipping the case.
Ira Chernus, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at
the University of Colorado-Boulder, 2006 (Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and
Sin, Published by Paradigm Publishers, ISBN 1594512752, p. 53-54)
The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale.
The neocons want to turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it
wont stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order. So the neocons efforts inevitably
backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented power
has unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to
preserve what it already has, and so is almost by definition always overextended. Gary Dorrien
sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way, too: For the empire, every
conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it maybe, it never feels
secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below
the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was
inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons, heightened by ideological
ardor.39 If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of
resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no good way to
distinguish between nations or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that dont.
Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential threat. Everyone begins to look
like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. Its no surprise that a nation
imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to
prevent change, it is likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any
nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can say that it is selflessly trying to serve
the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will resist,
making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the
enemy really is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making
everyone less secure. Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past,
any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its plans largely secret. Indeed, the cold
war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a secret plan for world conquest. Now

here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to
[end page 53] hear. That hardly seems well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is
calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front that the neocons
long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer a statement of enveloping
peril and no hypothesis for any real solution. They have no hope of finding a real solution
because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only as a fantasy. In
reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never be
defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: We
should not try to convince people that things are getting better. Michael Ledeen: The struggle
against evil is going to go on forever.40 This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion
drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons fantasy.
Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world
ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its military
supremacy and promoting the manly virtues of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S.,
with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign
army. So they must sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in
novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to
America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy. The
neocons story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a
politically calm, orderly world. It is about creating a society full of virtuous people who are
willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having superior power is less
important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy.
Just as neocons need
monsters abroad, they need a frightened society at home. Only insecurity can justify their shrill
call for a stronger nation (and a higher military budget). The more dire their warnings of
insecurity, the more they can demand greater military strength and moral resolve. Every foreign
enemy is, above all, another occasion to prod the American people to overcome their anxiety,
identify evil, fight resolutely against it, and stand strong in defense of their highest values.
Hegemony will do no good unless there is challenge to be met, weakness to be conquered, evil
to be overcome. The American people must actively seek hegemony and make sacrifices for it,
to show that they are striving to overcome their own weakness. So the quest for strength still
demands a public confession of weakness, just as the neocons had demanded two decades earlier
when they warned of a Soviet nuclear attack through a window of vulnerability. The quest for
strength through the structures of national security still demands a public declaration of national
insecurity. Otherwise, there is nothing to overcome. The more frightened the public, the more
likely it is to believe and enact the neocon story.

Attempts to shore up U.S. hegemony are symptomatic of a dangerous obsession with


controlthis death drive terminates in apocalyptic violence.
Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, previously Distinguished
Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School and Director of The Center on Violence and
Human Survival at John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York, 2003
(Superpower Syndrome: Americas Apocalyptic Confrontation With The World, Published by Thunders
Mouth Press / Nation Books, ISBN 1560255129, p. 1-4)
The apocalyptic imagination has spawned a new kind of violence at the beginning of the twentyfirst century. We can, in fact, speak of a worldwide epidemic of violence aimed at massive
destruction in the service of various visions of purification and renewal. In particular, we are
experiencing what could be called an apocalyptic face-off between Islamist* forces, overtly
visionary in their willingness to kill and die for their religion, and American forces claiming to
be restrained and reasonable but no less visionary in their projection of a cleansing war-making
and military power. Both sides are [end page 1] energized by versions of intense idealism; both
see themselves as embarked on a mission of combating evil in order to redeem and renew the
world; and both are ready to release untold levels of violence to achieve that purpose. The war
on Iraqa country with longstanding aspirations toward weapons of mass destruction but with
no evident stockpiles of them and no apparent connection to the assaults of September 11was
a manifestation of that American visionary projection. The religious fanaticism of Osama bin

Laden and other Islamist zealots has, by now, a certain familiarity to us as to others elsewhere,
for their violent demands for spiritual purification are aimed as much at fellow Islamics as at
American infidels. Their fierce attacks on the defilement that they believe they see
everywhere in contemporary life resemble those of past movements and sects from all parts of
the world; such sects, with end-of-the-world prophecies and devout violence in the service of
bringing those prophecies about, flourished in Europe from the eleventh through the sixteenth
century. Similar sects like the fanatical Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which released sarin gas
into the Tokyo subways in 1995, have existedeven proliferatedin our own time. The
American apocalyptic entity is less familiar to us. Even if its urges to power and domination
seem historically recognizable, it nonetheless represents a new constellation of forces bound up
with what Ive come to think of [end page 2] as superpower syndrome. By that term I mean a
national mindsetput forward strongly by a tight-knit leadership groupthat takes on a sense
of omnipotence, of unique standing in the world that grants it the right to hold sway over all
other nations. The American superpower status derives from our emergence from World War II
as uniquely powerful in every respect, still more so as the only superpower left standing at the
end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. More than merely dominate, the American superpower
now seeks to control history. Such cosmic ambition is accompanied by an equally vast sense of
entitlement, of special dispensation to pursue its aims. That entitlement stems partly from
historic claims to special democratic virtue, but has much to do with an embrace of technological
power translated into military terms. That is, a superpowerthe worlds only superpoweris
entitled to dominate and control precisely because it is a superpower. The murderous events of
9/11 hardened that sense of entitlement as nothing else could have. Superpower syndrome did
not require 9/11, but the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon rendered us an aggrieved
superpower, a giant violated and made vulnerable, which no superpower can permit. Indeed, at
the core of superpower syndrome lies a powerful fear of vulnerability. A superpowers
victimization brings on both a sense of humiliation and an angry determination to restore, or
even [end page 3] extend, the boundaries of a superpower-dominated world. Integral to
superpower syndrome are its menacing nuclear stockpiles and their world-destroying capacity.
Throughout the decades of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both lived with
a godlike nuclear capacity to obliterate the cosmos, along with a fear of being annihilated by the
enemy power. Now America alone possesses that world-destroying capacity, and post-Soviet
Russia no longer looms as a nuclear or superpower adversary. We have yet to grasp the full
impact of this exclusive capacity to blow up anyone or everything, but its reverberations are
never absent in any part of the world. The confrontation between Islamist and American
versions of planetary excess has unfortunately tended to define a world in which the vast
majority of people embrace neither. But apocalyptic excess needs no majority to dominate a
landscape. All the more so when, in their mutual zealotry, Islamist and American leaders seem
to act in concert. That is, each, in its excess, nurtures the apocalypticism of the other, resulting
in a malignant synergy. * In keeping with general usage, Islamist refers to groups that are
essentially theocratic and fundamentalist, and at times apocalyptic. Islamic is a more general
ethnic as well as religious term for Muslims. The terms can of course overlap, and Islamic
state can mean one run on Islamist principles.

The aff is fueled by American Exceptionalismtheir defense of U.S. hegemony is


inextricably bound up in notions of manifest destiny.
David Grondin, Lecturer in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, 2006 (The
(Power) Politics of Space: What IR Theories have to say about American Astro-Political Discourses on
Space Weaponisation, Paper Presented At The Annual Meeting Of The International Studies Association,
March
25th,
Available
Online
via
All
Academic
at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/8/6/7/p98679_index.html,
Accessed
10-26-2008, p. 8-11)
The reterritorialization of the national security state in a global security scheme produces news
frontiers on the global map: cartographically speaking, the US "territorial" boundaries are that of
the globe and national security goes hand in hand with global security American security
interests would be read as concomitant with global security interests. This idea goes along with a

geopolitical vision centered on globalization. Recently, this idea was put forth by a former
Pentagon's strategist and professor of the US Naval War College, Thomas Barnett, who wishes
to propose the new strategic thinking for the US in the War on Terror5. He wanted to link
security concerns with globalization in a rejuvenated US global strategy that both aims to
achieve neoliberal globalization and global stability. In remapping of the world in two zones, a
Functioning Core and a Non-Integrated Gap6 with globalization (see the map7), he wished to
redefine the frontiers of globalization by using a cartography where security and economy would
be in a symbiotic relation. The US would act as the global systems administrator, as if it were the
systems administrator of computer networks. He sees disconnectedness as the source of danger
and disconnectedness expresses a country that has not accepted the security rules set of
globalization, rules set by the countries that benefit from globalization we should say. And what
should be the objective? To shrink the Gap! For Barnett, the "dangerous" countries are to be
found in the Gap. He sees the US as a global Leviathan state that could act, through its armed
forces, in the Gap in order to "export security" (security has become a commercial product); in
the Core, the US state would act as a policing and peacekeeping force. [end page 8; page 9
omitted -- graphic only] Barnett goes even further as he associates the fate of globalization as a
political and economic project and as historical development to the destiny of the US: America
serves as the ideological wellspring for globalization. These United States still stands as its first
concrete experiences. We are the only country in the world purposely built around the ideals that
animate globalization's advance: freedom of choice, freedom of movement, freedom of
expression. We are connectivity personified. Globalization is this country's gift to history the
most perfectly flawed projection of the American Dream onto the global landscape. [...] In short,
we the people needs to become we the planet (Barnett 2004: 50; original emphasis). Since 1945,
the US state has had but one global strategy, a neoliberal geopolitics of global dominance
(Sparke 2005; Robert, Secor, and Sparke 2003).8 As Barnett and other strategic documents like
the NSS and the NMS show, the Global War on Terror has been fuelled by an extremely vibrant
and patriotic nationalist base that truly believes that America is imbued with a providential
mission and sense of moral crusade. Despite an apparent discrepancy between current US
militaristic projects that draw from a neoconservative realist geopolitical discourse and other
strategic projects that fall within the scope of a global neoliberal geoeconomical discourse, I
argue that these discourses stem from the same ideological foundation, the 'liberal imagination'
in American political life. According to Daniel Nexon and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, it is a
powerful identity and ideological narrative in the American discourse on foreign policy which
makes them overtly moralistic. It is often used to conflate the US and the world in the protection
of liberal democracy and liberty. As they put it, "Indeed, no matter what the specific policy
recommended, the notion that the United States has a 'manifest destiny' as the embodiment of
freedom and liberty is a constant theme in American political discourse" (Nexon and Jackson
2003: 146). It is however known that the suffusion of liberal values and ascription of a divine
mission for the world bring about contradictions when confronted with some of the foreign
policy actions of the United States. But this is of no concern for US nationalism is committed to
an "ideological construction of the nation that insists on the global relevance of the American
project" and consequently claims "its righteous entitlement to lead the world". This remapping of
US nationalism is thus to be understood through a dialectical relationship of [end page 10]
exceptionalism/universalism, of a "city upon a hill" and a crusader state. It is in this framing of
US globalist nationalism that its neoliberal hegemonic global strategy tries to have it both ways,
to remake the world in America's image, while assuming that its national interests are global
interests, thereby conflating its national security with global security, as if the great aspirations
of the US and of mankind were one and the same (McCartney 2004: 400). In this light, the USled Global War on Terror really becomes a nation-building project that has evolved into a Global
Leviathan, but without its mandatory "social contract" with the peoples of the world (Barnett
2004: 369-370).

The impact is extinctionexceptionalism engages in an active forgetting of the


horrors of past atrocities, paving the way for ever-increasing violence.
William V. Spanos, Distinguished Professor of English at Binghamton University, State

University of New York, 2008 (American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The
Specter of Vietnam, Published by SUNY Press, ISBN 0791472892, p. ix-x) In this book I
contend that the consequence of America's intervention and conduct of the war in Vietnam was
the self-destruction of the ontological, cultural, and political foundations on which America had
perennially justified its benign" self-image and global practice from the time of the Puritan
"errand in the wilderness." In the aftermath of the defeat of the American Goliath by a small
insurgent army, the "specter" of Vietnamby which I mean, among other things, the violence,
bordering on genocide, America perpetrated against an "Other" that refused to accommodate
itself to its mission in the wilderness of Vietnamcame to haunt America as a contradiction that
menaced the legitimacy of its perennial self-representation as the exceptionalist and "redeemer
nation." In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the dominant culture in America (including the
government, the media, Hollywood, and even educational institutions) mounted a massive
campaign to "forget Vietnam." This relentless recuperative momentum to lay the ghost of that
particular war culminated in the metamorphosis of an earlier general will to "heal the wound
inflicted on the American national psyche, into the "Vietnam syndrome"; that is, it transformed a
healthy debate over the idea of America into a national neurosis. This monumentalist initiative
was aided by a series of historical events between 1989 and 1991 that deflected the American
people's attention away from the divisive memory of the Vietnam War and were represented by
the dominant culture as manifestations of the global triumph of "America": Tiananmen Square,
the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the first Gulf War. This "forgetting" of the actual history
of the Vietnam War, represented in this book by Graham Greene's The Quiet American, Philip
Caputo's A Rumor of War, and Tim OBrien's Going After Cacciato (and many other novels,
memoirs, and films to which I refer parenthetically), contributed to the rise of neoconservatism
and the religious right to power in the United States. And it provided the context for the renewal
of America's exceptionalist errand in the global wilderness, now understood, as the conservative
think tank the Project for the New American [end page ix] Century put it long before the
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, as the preserving and perpetuation of the Pax Americana.
Whatever vestigial memory of the Vietnam War remained after this turn seemed to be decisively
interred with Al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001. Completely immune to dissent, the confident American government, under President
George W. Bush and his neoconservative intellectual deputiesand with the virtually total
support of the America mediaresumed its errand in the global wilderness that had been
interrupted by the specter of Vietnam. Armed with a resurgence of self-righteous indignation and
exceptionalist pride, the American government, indifferent to the reservations of the "Old
World," unilaterally invaded Afghanistan and, then, after falsifying intelligence reports about
Saddam Hussein's nuclear capability, Iraq, with the intention, so reminiscent of its (failed)
attempts in Vietnam, of imposing American-style democracy on these alien cultures. The early
representation by the media of the immediately successful "shock and awe" acts of arrogant
violence in the name of civilization" was euphoric. They were, it was said, compelling evidence
not only of the recuperation of American consensus, but also of the rejuvenation of America's
national identity. But as immediate "victory" turned into an occupation of a world unwilling to
be occupied, and the American peace into an insurgency that now verges on becoming a civil
war, the specter of Vietnam, like the Hydra in the story of Hercules, began to reassert itself: the
unidentifiability or invisibility of the enemy, their refusal to be answerable to the American
narrative, quagmire, military victories that accomplished nothing, search and destroy missions,
body counts, the alienation of allies, moral irresolution, and so on. It is the memory of this
"Vietnamthis specter that refuses to be accommodated to the imperial exceptionalist
discourse of post-Vietnam Americathat my book is intended to bring back to presence. By
retrieving a number of representative works that bore acute witness, even against themselves, to
the singularity of a war America waged against a people seeking liberation from colonial rule
and by reconstellating them into the post-9/11 occasion, such a project can contribute a new
dimension not only to that shameful decade of American history, but also, and more important,
to our understanding of the deeply backgrounded origins of America's war on terror" in the
aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks. Indeed, it is my ultimate purpose in this book to provide
directives for resisting an American momentum that threatens to destabilize the entire planet, if
not to annihilate the human species itself, and also for rethinking the very idea of America.

By defining security around the predominance of US influence, every conflict of


interests becomes justification for militarization, escalating to war.
Campbell 98 (David, Professor International Politics at University of New Castle, "Writing Security; United States Foreign
Policy the Politics of Identity," 31-33)

Most important just as the source of danger has never been fixed, neither has the identity that it was said to
threaten. The contours of this identity have been the subject of constant (re)writing; no rewriting

in the sense of changing the meaning, but rewriting in the sense of inscribing something so that
which is contingent and subject to flux is rendered more permanent. While one might have
expected few if any references to national values or purposes in confidential prepared for the inner
sanctum of national security policy (after all, don't they know who they are or what they represent?) the texts of
foreign policy are replete with statements about the fulfillment of the republic, the fundamental purpose of the
nation, God given rights, moral codes, the principles of European civilization, the fear of cultural and spiritual
loss, and the responsibilities and duties thrust upon the gleaming example of America. In this

sense, the texts that guided national security policy did more than simply offer strategic analysis of
the "reality" they confronted: they actively concerned themselves with the scripting of a
particular American identity. Stamped "Top Secret" and read by only the select and power few, the texts effaced the boundary
between inside and outside with their quasi-Puritan figurations.
In employing this mode of representation, the foreign policy texts of the postwar period recalled the seventeenth-century literary genre of the
jeremiad, or political sermon, in which Puritan preachers combined searing critiques with appeals for spiritual renewal. Later to establish the
interpretive framework for national identity, these exhortations drew on a European tradition of preaching the omnipresence of sin so as to
instill the desire for order but they added a distinctly affirmative moment:
The American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand - which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process. Substituting
teleology for hierarchy, it discarded the Old War ideal of stasis for a New World vision of the future. Its function was to create a climate of
anxiety that helped release the restless "progressivist" energies required for the success of the venture. The European jeremiad thrived on
anxiety, of course.

Like all "Traditionalist" forms of ritual, it used fear and trembling to teach
acceptance of fixed social norms. But the American jeremiad went much further. It made anxiety its end as well as its means.
Crisis was the social norm it sought to inculcate. The very concept of errand after all, implied a state of unfulfillment. The future, though
divinely assured, was never quite there, and New England's Jeremiahs set out to provide the sense of insecurity that would ensure the outcome.
Whereas the Puritan jeremiads were preached b y religious figures in public, the national security planners entreated in private the urgency of
the manifold dangers confronting the republic. But the refrains of their political sermons have occupied a prominent place in postwar political
discourse. On two separate occasions (first in 1950, and t hen in 196), private citizens with close ties to the foreign policy bureaucracy
established a "Committee on the Present Danger" to alert a public they perceived as lacking resolve and will to necessity of confronting the

More recently, with Pentagon planners concerned


about the "guerillas, assassins, terrorists, and subversives" said to be "nibbling away" at the
United States, proclamations that the fundamental values of the country are under threat have been
no less insistent. As Oliver North announced to the U.S. Congress: "It is very important for the
American people to know that this is a dangerous world; that we live at risk and that this
nation is at risk in a dangerous world." And in a State Department report, the 1990s were foreshadowed
political and military threat of communism and the Society Union.

as an era in which divergent political critiques nonetheless would seek equally to overcome the "corruption"
and "profligacy" induced by the "loss" of "American purpose" in Vietnam the "moral renewal." To this end, the
rendering of Operation Desert Shield-turn-Storm as an overwhelming exhibition of America's rediscovered
mission stands as testament. The cold war, then , was both a struggle that exceeded the military

threat of the Soviet Union and a struggle into which any number of potential candidates,
regardless of their strategic capacity, were slotted as a threat. In this sense, the collapse, overcoming,
or surrender of one of the protagonists at this historical junction does not mean "it" is over. The cold war's
meaning will undoubtedly change, but if we recall that the phrase cold war was coined by a fourteenth

century Spanish writer to represent the persistent rivalry between Christians and Arabs, we come to
recognize that the sort of struggle the phrase demotes is a struggle over identity: a struggle that is
no context-specific and thus not rooted in the existence of a particular kind of Soviet Union. Besides, the
United States-led war against Iraq should caution us to the fact that the Western (and particularly American)
interpretive dispositions that predominated in the post-World War II international environment - with their

zero-sum analyses of international action, the sense of endangerment ascribed to all the
activities of the other, the fear of internal challenge and subversion, the tendency to militarize all
response, and the willingness to draw the lines of superiority/inferiority between us and them were not specific to one state or ideology. As a consequence, we need to rethink the convention
understanding of foreign policy, and the historicity of the cold war in particular.

Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy---the strategy


omnipotence sees threats to empire everywhere, which
necessitates constant violence---you have an obligation to
place the structural violence that hegemony invisibilizes
at the core of your decision calculus
McClintock 9chaired prof of English and Womens and Gender Studies at UWMadison. MPhil
from Cambridge; PhD from Columbia (Anne, Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantnamo and Abu
Ghraib, Small Axe Mar2009, Issue 28, p50-74)

the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous
hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the
war on terror. I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which
the US government has committed itself after 9/11two countries invaded, thousands of innocent
people imprisoned, killed, and torturedunless we grasp a defining feature of our moment,
that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now
does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with
nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream
world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both
deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and
nightmarish quality of the war on terror, a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by
the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real
war, for terror is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere a consensual
hallucination, 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and
hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the
infliction of great calamities elsewhere.
I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but
concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the
continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal
shadowlands of prisons and supermaxesthe modern slave-ships on the middle passage to nowherethat have come to
characterize the United States as a super-carceral state. 5
Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but
By now it is fair to say that

primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire,

does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political
responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the exceptional nation to
embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial
violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary , but which
also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an
imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself
invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For
imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily
ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and
violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire
are we, the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state
who, in turn, constitute us?
We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence
that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the
spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and
penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of
moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the U nited States as the
uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national

mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the
violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6

we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the
authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of
official history.
Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture

Paranoia
Even the paranoid have enemies.
Donald Rumsfeld

Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violencethe very eclipsing of which gives to our
without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has
come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a
defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadters famous identification of the US states tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather, I
conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates
precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and
dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if
suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding
Why paranoia?

moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast

paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8

Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its
structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency,
submerged mind, or Hegelian cunning of reason, nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national terror
dream. 9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial
nation-state. Nations do not have psyches or an unconscious; only people do. Rather, a social entity
such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as paranoid if the dominant powers governing
that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies,
practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and
phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a
description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an
analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of
making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries
to conceal.
Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and
society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather
than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate
memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and
revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we
understand such debauches of cruelty?
A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military
police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a
paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a
paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and
aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down,

then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body,
the methods by which schools, the military, training camps not to mention the paranoid
image-worlds of the corporate mediainstill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally
conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence . 10 In what follows, I want to trace
the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that
animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call
the enemy deficit. I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at
Guantnamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantnamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture
itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carbys brilliant work, those
contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11
The Enemy Deficit: Making the Barbarians Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not
come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And
now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution.
C. P. Cavafy, Waiting for the Barbarians

The barbarians have declared war.


President George W. Bush
C. P. Cavafy wrote Waiting for the Barbarians in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with
the force of an uncanny and prescient dj vu. To what dilemma are the barbarians a kind of solution?

Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over
territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafys insight is that an
imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians. It is only the
threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empires borders in the first
place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with
perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the rejected
from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes
like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the grand antagonism of the United States
and the USSR evaporated like a quickly fading nightmare. The cold war rhetoric of totalitarianism,
Finlandization, present danger, fifth columnist, and infiltration vanished. Where were the
enemies now to justify the continuing escalation of the military colossus? And now what
shall become of us without any barbarians? By rights, the thawing of the cold war should
have prompted an immediate downsizing of the military; any plausible external threat had
simply ceased to exist. Prior to 9/11, General Peter Schoomaker, head of the US Army,
bemoaned the enemy deficit: Its no use having an army that did nothing but train, he said. Theres
got to be a certain appetite for what the hell we exist for. Dick Cheney likewise complained: The
threats have become so remote. So remote that they are difficult to ascertain. Colin Powell
agreed: Though we can still plausibly identify specific threatsNorth Korea, Iran, Iraq, something like
thatthe real threat is the unknown, the uncertain. Before becoming president, George W. Bush
likewise fretted over the postcold war dearth of a visible enemy: We do not know who the
enemy is, but we know they are out there. It is now well established that the invasion of Iraq had
been a long-standing goal of the US administration, but there was no clear rationale with which to sell such
an invasion. In 1997 a group of neocons at the Project for the New American Century produced a
remarkable report in which they stated that to make such an invasion palatable would require a
catastrophic and catalyzing eventlike a new Pearl Harbor. 12

The 9/11 attacks came as a dazzling solution, both to the enemy deficit and the problem of
legitimacy, offering the Bush administration what they would claim as a political casus belli
and the military unimaginable license to expand its reach. General Peter Schoomaker would publicly admit that the attacks were an
immense boon: There is a huge silver lining in this cloud. . . . War is a tremendous focus. . . . Now we have this focusing opportunity, and we have the fact that (terrorists) have actually attacked our homeland,
which gives it some oomph. In his book Against All Enemies, Richard Clarke recalls thinking during the attack, Now we can perhaps attack Osama Bin Laden. After the invasion of Afghanistan, Secretary of

Krauthammer, for one, called


for a declaration of total war. We no longer have to search for a name for the post-Cold
War era, he declared. It will henceforth be known as the age of terrorism. 13
State Colin Powell noted, America will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind we could not have dreamed of before. Charles

Their paranoid projections guarantee unending wars


Hollander 3

professor of Latin American history and women's studies at California State University (Nancy, "A
Psychoanalytic Perspective on the Politics of Terror:In the Aftermath of 9/11"
www.estadosgerais.org/mundial_rj/download/FLeitor_NHollander_ingl.pdf)

9-11 has symbolically constituted a relief in the sense of a decrease in the persecutory anxiety
provoked by living in a culture undergoing a deterioration from within. The implosion reflects the economic and
social trends I described briefly above and has been manifest in many related symptoms, including the erosion of family and
community, the corruption of government in league with the wealthy and powerful, the abandonment of working people by
profit-driven corporations going international, urban plight, a drug-addicted youth, a violence addicted media reflecting and
motivating an escalating real-world violence, the corrosion of civic participation by a decadent democracy, a spiritually
bereft culture held prisoner to the almighty consumer ethic, racial discrimination, misogyny, gaybashing, growing numbers of families joining
the homeless, and environmental devastation. Was this not lived as a kind of societal suicide--an ongoing
assault, an aggressive attackagainst life and emotional well-being waged from within against the societal self?
In this sense, then,

9/11 permitted a respite from the sense of internal decay by inadvertently stimulating a renewed
vitality via a reconfiguration of political and psychological forces: tensions within this countrybetween the haves-mores
and have-lesses, as well as between the defenders and critics of the status quo, yielded to a wave of nationalism in which a united
people--Americans all--stood as one against external aggression. At the same time, the generosity, solidarity and selfsacrifice expressed by Americans
In this sense,

toward one another reaffirmed our sense of ourselves as capable of achieving the positive depressive position sentiments of love and empathy. Fractured social relations were

The enemy- -the threat to our integrity as a nation and, in D. W. Winnicotts terms, to our sense of
going on being--was no longer the web of complex internal forces so difficult to understand and change,
but a simple and identifiable enemy from outside of us, clearly marked by their difference, their foreignness and their
uncanny and unfathomable uncivilized pre-modern character. The societal relief came with the projection of aggressive impulses
onto an easily dehumanized external enemy, where they could be justifiably attacked and destroyed. This
countrys response to 9/11, then, in part demonstrates how persecutory anxiety is more easily dealt with in individuals
and in groups when it is experienced as being provoked from the outside rather than from internal sources.
As Hanna Segal9 has argued (IJP, 1987), groups often tend to be narcissistic, self-idealizing, and paranoid in relation to other groups
and to shield themselves from knowledge about the reality of their own aggression, which of necessity is
projected into an enemy-- real or imagined--so that it can be demeaned, held in contempt and then attacked. In this regard, 9/11
permitted a new discourse to arise about what is fundamentally wrong in the world: indeed, the antiterrorism rhetoric and policies of the U.S. government functioned for a period to overshadow the antiglobalization movement that has identified the fundamental global conflict to be between on the one
hand the U.S. and other governments in the First World, transnational corporations, and powerful international financial institutions, and on the other,
workers struggles, human rights organizations and environmental movements throughout the world. The new discourse presents the
fundamental conflict in the world as one between civilization and fundamentalist terrorism . But this
civilization is a wolf in sheeps clothing, and those who claim to represent it reveal the kind of
splitting Segal describes: a hyperbolic idealization of themselves and their culture and a projection of all that
is bad, including the consequences of the terrorist underbelly of decades long U.S. foreign policy in
the Middle East and Asia, onto the denigrated other, who must be annihilated. The U.S.
government, tainted for years by its ties to powerful transnational corporate interests, has recreated itself as the nationalistic
defender of the American people. In the process, patriotism has kidnapped citizens grief and mourning and militarism has high jacked
peoples fears and anxieties, converting them into a passive consensus for an increasingly authoritarian
governments domestic and foreign policies. The defensive significance of this new discourse has to do with another theme related to death anxiety as
well: the threat of species annihilation that people have lived with since the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Segal argues that the leaders of the U.S. as well as other countries with nuclear capabilities, have disavowed their own aggressive
motivations as they developed10 weapons of mass destruction. The distortion of language throughout the Cold
War, such as deterrence, flexible response, Mutual Assured Destruction, rational nuclear war, Strategic
Defense Initiative has served to deny the aggressive nature of the arms race (p. 8) and to disguise from ourselves and
symbolically repaired.

others

the horror of a nuclear war and our own part in making it possible or more likely (pp. 8-9).

Although the policy makers destructiveness can be hidden from their respective populations and justified for national security reasons, Segal believes that

such denial

only increases reliance on projective mechanisms and stimulates paranoia.

The portrayal of the U.S. as a benign hegemon justifies its violence in the name of
peace. The U.S. forces its image of an ideal world onto the world order.
Noorani, 2005. Yaseen Noorani is a Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies,
University of Edinburgh. The Rhetoric of Security, The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005.
The Bush administration perpetually affirms that the war against terrorism declared in response
to the attacks of September 2001 is "different from any other war in our history" and will
continue "for the foreseeable future." This affirmation, and indeed the very declaration of such a
war, belongs to a rhetoric of security that predates the Bush administration and which this
administration has intensified but not fundamentally altered. Rhetorically speaking, terrorism is
the ideal enemy of the United States, more so than any alien civilization and perhaps even more
so than the tyrannies of communism and fascism, terrorism's defeated sisters. This is because
terrorism is depicted in U.S. rhetoric not as an immoral tactic employed in political struggle, but
as an immoral condition that extinguishes the possibility of peaceful political deliberation. This
condition is the state of war, in absolute moral opposition to the peaceful condition of civil
society. As a state of war, terrorism portends the dissolution of the civil relations obtaining
within and among nations, particularly liberal nations, and thus portends the dissolution of
civilization itself. Terrorism is therefore outside the world order, in the sense that it cannot be

managed within this order since it is the very absence of civil order. For there to be a world order
at all, terrorism must be eradicated. In prosecuting a world war against the state of war, the
United States puts itself outside the world order as well. The Bush administration affirms, like
the Clinton administration before it, that because the identity of the United States lies in the
values that engender peace (freedom and democracy), the national interests of the United States
always coincide with the interests of the world order. The United States is the animus of the
world order and the power that sustains it. For this reason, any threat to the existence of the
United States is a threat to world peace itself, and anything that the United States does to secure
its existence is justified as necessary for the preservation of world peace. In this way, the
existence of the United States stands at the center of world peace and liberal values, yet remains
outside the purview of these values, since when under threat it is subject only to the extra-moral
necessity of self-preservation. I will argue that the symmetrical externality of the United States
and terrorism to the world order lies at the foundation of the rhetoric of security by which the
U.S. government justifies its hegemonic actions and policies. This rhetoric depicts a world in
which helpless, vulnerable citizens can achieve agency only through the U.S. government, while
terrorist individuals and organizations command magnitudes of destructive power previously
held only by states. The moral-psychological discourse of agency and fear, freedom and
enslavement invoked by this rhetoric is rooted in both classical liberalism and postwar U.S.
foreign policy. The war of "freedom" against "fear" is a psychic struggle with no specific
military enemies or objectives. It arises from the portrayal of the United States as an autarkic,
ideally impermeable collective agent that reshapes the external world in its own image. The war
of freedom against fear thereby justifies measures said to increase the defenses and internal
security of the United States as well as measures said to spread freedom and democracy over the
world. Now that the destructive capacity of warlike individuals can threaten the world order, the
power of the United States must be deployed in equal measure to neutralize this threat
throughout the world. The world as a whole now comes within the purview of U.S. disciplinary
action. Any manifestation of the state of war, terrorist activity, anywhere in the world, is now a
threat to the existence of the United States and to world peace.There is no clash of
civilizations, but the Middle East, as the current site of the state of war, is the primary danger to
the world and must be contained,controlled, and reshaped. The symmetrical externality of the
United States and terrorism to the world order, then, allows its rhetoric to envision a historic
opportunity for mankindthe final elimination of the state of war from human existence, and
fear from the political psyche. Thiswill be achieved, however, only by incorporating the world
order into the United States for the foreseeable future.

Hegemony link
The U.S. military strategy of creating a perfect safe world through its power is
impossible. It futile attempts just create more violence in the name of liberty and
peace.
Der Derian 2003 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of
Massachusetts Amherst, Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
boundary, 2 30.3, 19-27]
Regardless of authorial (or good) intentions, the NSS reads more like latevery late
nineteenth-century poetry than a strategic doctrine for the twenty-first century. The rhetoric of
the White House favors and clearly intends to mobilize the moral clarity, nostalgic
sentimentality, and uncontested dominance reminiscent of the last great empires against the
ambiguities, complexities, and messiness of the current world disorder. However, the gulf
between the nation's stated cause ("to help make the world not just safer but better" [1]) and
defensive needs (to fight "a war against terrorists of global reach" [5]) is so vast that one detects
what Nietzsche referred to as the "breath of empty space," that void between the world as it is
and as we would wish it to be, which produces all kinds of metaphysical concoctions. In short
shrift (thirty pages), the White House articulation of U.S. global objectives to the Congress
elevates strategic discourse from a traditional, temporal calculation of means and ends, to the
theological realm of monotheistic faith and monolithic truth. Relying more on aspiration than
analysis, revelation than reason, the NSS is not grand but grandiose strategy. In pursuit of an
impossible state of national security against terrorist evil, soldiers will need to be sacrificed, civil
liberties curtailed, civilians collaterally damaged, regimes destroyed. But a nation's imperial
overreach should exceed its fiduciary grasp: what's a full-spectrum dominance of the battle space
for? Were this not an official White House doctrine, the contradictions of the NSS could be
interpreted only as poetic irony. How else to comprehend the opening paragraph, which begins
with "The United States possesses unprecedentedand unequaledstrength and influence in
the world" and ends with "The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of
power that favors freedom" (1)? Perhaps the cabalistic Straussians that make up the defense
intellectual brain trust of the Bush administration (among them, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle,
and William Kristol) have come up with a nuanced, indeed, anti-Machiavellian reading of
Machiavelli that escapes the uninitiated. But so fixed is the NSS on the creation of a world in
America's image that concepts such as balance of power and imminent threat, once rooted in
historical, juridical, as well as reciprocal traditions, [End Page 20] become free-floating
signifiers. Few Europeans, "old" or "new," would recognize the balance of power principle
deployed by the NSS to justify preemptive, unilateral, military action against not actual but
"emerging" imminent threats (15). Defined by the eighteenth-century jurist Emerich de Vattel as
a state of affairs in which no one preponderant power can lay down the law to others, the
classical sense of balance of power is effectively inverted in principle by the NSS document and
in practice by the go-it-alone statecraft of the United States. Balance of power is global
suzerainty, and war is peace.

Hegemony link
The U.S. attempts to create a safe world do not always lead to the ideal world we
hope for
Der Derian 2003 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of
Massachusetts Amherst, Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
boundary, 2 30.3, 19-27]
What significance should we make of the fact that the shortest section of the NSS (barely a page
and a half) is on the "nonnegotiable demands of human dignity" and rights, including "free
speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance;
and respect for private property" (3). Are these rights so self-evident and inalienable that they do
not warrant further clarification or justification? It would seem so: "History has not been kind to
those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people" (3). And yet
this universalist avowal of rights requires a selective if not outright denial of history. Where was
the U.S. support of freedom, justice, and religious and ethnic tolerance when it supported
Saddam Hussein in his earlier war against Iran? When it provided intelligence, arms, and the
precursors for chemical weapons of mass destruction? When it abandoned the Shiites in the
south and the Kurds in the north of Iraq after the first Gulf War? Most significant is that these
rights are considered "nonnegotiable," making war, if not the first, certainly more of a viable
option when these [End Page 21] rights are violated. In this regard, President Bush's NSS is a
continuation rather than a repudiation of President Clinton's National Security Strategy of the
United States 19941995: Engagement and Enlargement. To be sure, Clinton's National Security
Strategy places greater emphasis on "preventive diplomacy" and multilateral intervention than
Bush's preference for preemptive war and unilateralist predispositions. But the virtuous
imperatives are in full evidence in the Clinton strategy: "All of America's strategic interests
from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our
territoryare served by enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations. Thus,
working with new democratic states to help preserve them as democracies committed to free
markets and respect for human rights, is a key part of our national security strategy." 1 It is
hardly surprising, then, that many liberals, both within the government and the university,
supported the war against Iraq, and hardly unfair to question the extent to which Clinton and
other moral interventionists prepared the high ground for this war. As a microcosm, consider one
of the most visible splits in the ranks at top American universities, when such "moral" liberals as
Joseph Nye, Michael Ignatieff, and Samantha Power came out in support of the war, whereas
such "amoral" realists as Stanley Hoffmann, Steve Walt, and John Mearsheimer publicly
opposed it. Nietzsche, who always detected the smell of the swamp in all talk of virtue, finds in
The Twilight of the Idols a "bestowing virtue" in the realist's "courage in the face of reality":
"My recreation, my preference, my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides.
Thucydides, and perhaps the Principe of Machiavelli, are related to me closely by their
unconditional will not to deceive themselves and to see reason in realitynot in reason,' still
less in morality.' . . ."

Our national security strategy leaves us stuck in an endless war in which the world
must either follow the U.S. or die
Der Derian 2003 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of
Massachusetts Amherst, Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
boundary, 2 30.3, 19-27]
The NSS might aim for peace, but it amounts to a blueprint for a permanent war. Gone is any
trace of the humility that presidential candidate Bush invoked in his foreign policy addresses. In
its place, hubris of an epic size obviates any historical or self-consciousness about the costs of
empire. What ends not predestined by America's righteousness are to be preempted by the
sanctity of holy war. The NSS leaves the world with two options: peace on U.S. terms, or the
perpetual peace of the grave. The evangelical seeps through the prose of global realpolitik and
mitigates its harshest pronouncements with the solace of a better life to come. We all shall be

as played by the band as the Titanic sank"Nearer My God to Thee" (coincidently, written by
Sarah Flower Adams, sister of the nineteenth-century poet Elizabeth Barrett, who secretly
married . . .) .

Hegemony link
The U.S.s hope for peace and strive to stay a hegemon usually ends violently with
more problems
Der Derian 03 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of
Massachusetts Amherst, Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
boundary, 2 30.3, 19-27]
Ultimately, however, real-world transformations exceed the grasp of the NSS. The war in Iraq
put on full display just how effective the military could be in attaining its planned goals. But
what falls outside the engineering and imaginary of the plan, what Edmund Burke called the
"empire of circumstance," is in the driver's seat and beyond the cybernetic machinations of the
NSS, as we see in the "peace" that followed. Many scholars saw the end of the Cold War as an
occasion to debate the merits of a unipolar future as well as to wax nostalgic over the stability of
a bipolar past. These debates continued to be state-centric as well as materialist in their
interpretation of how power works. By such criteria, there was little doubt that the United States
would emerge as the dominant military, economic, and, indeed, civilizational power. Even in
Paul Wolfowitz's worst-case nightmares, it was difficult to identify a potential "peer competitor"
on the horizon. [End Page 26] But then came 9/11, and blueprints for a steady-state hegemony
were shredded. Asymmetrical power and fundamentalist resentment, force-multiplied by the
mass media, prompted a permanent state of emergency. After the first responders came a
semiotic fix with a kick, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. But
from the tragedy of 9/11 to the farce of war in Iraq, after the multilateral hopes for a "safer and
better world" were subverted by the unilateral nihilism of preventive war, the syntax of order and
the code of the simulacrum began to break down. We caught a glimpse of a heteropolar matrix,
in which actors radically different in identity and interests (states versus super-empowered
individuals), using technologies in revolutionary ways (civilian airliners to create kamikaze
weapons of mass destruction, the Internet to mobilize the largest antiwar demonstrations ever),
were suddenly comparable in their capability to produce improbable global effects. It might be
small solace, but out of this deeply nihilistic moment might yet come a real balance of power
and truth, in which the Straussian reach of The National Security Strategy is foreshortened by a
Nietzschean grasp of reality.

The U.S. tries to maintain its power through preemptive actions. The U.S. is a
paradox of both vulnerability and invincibility.
Kaplan 04 (Amy Kaplan, Prof. of English @ Univ. of Pennslyvania, 3 [American Quarterly 56.1,
Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today,2004, p. muse]
This coming-out narrative, associated primarily with neoconservatives, aggressively celebrates
the United States as finally revealing its true essenceits manifest destinyon a global stage.
We won the Cold War, so the story goes, and as the only superpower, we will maintain global
supremacy primarily by military means, by preemptive strikes against any potential rivals, and
by a perpetual war against terror, defined primarily as the Muslim world. We need to remain
vigilant against those rogue states and terrorists who resist not our power but the universal
human values that we embody. This narrative is about time as well as space. It imagines an
empire in perpetuity, one that beats back the question haunting all empires in J. M. Coetzee's
Waiting for the Barbarians: "One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire:
how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era." 9 In this hypermasculine narrative
there's a paradoxical sense of invincibility and unparalleled power and at the same time utter and
incomprehensible vulnerabilitya lethal combination, which reminds us that the word
vulnerable once also referred to the capacity to harm.

Hegemony is a paranoid fantasythe most powerful


nation sees threats everywhere, legitimizing constant
war.
McClintock 9chaired prof of English and Womens and Gender Studies at UWMadison. MPhil
from Cambridge; PhD from Columbia (Anne, Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantnamo and Abu
Ghraib, Small Axe Mar2009, Issue 28, p50-74)
By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and

dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat
of the war on terror. I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the
violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11two countries invaded,
thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and torturedunless we grasp a defining
feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power.
Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite
Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the U nited
S tates has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in
paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute
power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of
the war on terror, a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US
administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is
not a real war, for terror is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on
terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere a consensual hallucination, 4 and the US
government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory
over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great
calamities elsewhere.
I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those
established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We
need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence
abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxesthe modern slaveships on the middle passage to nowherethat have come to characterize the United States as a
super-carceral state. 5
Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but
primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire,

does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political
responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the exceptional nation to
embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial
violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary , but which
also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an
imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself
invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For
imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily
ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within , the nature and
violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire
are we, the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state
who, in turn, constitute us?
We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence
that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted
by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged
to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary
people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the

traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standardbearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in
tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the
violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6
Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters

disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great
forgettings of official history.
Paranoia
Even the paranoid have enemies.
Donald Rumsfeld
Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence the very
eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric castwithout understanding the

pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across
the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not
simply Hofstadters famous identification of the US states tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather,
I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided
phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of

perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in
unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce
pyrotechnic displays of violence . The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies
in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8
Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring
identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged
mind, or Hegelian cunning of reason, nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national terror dream. 9 Nor am
I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations
do not have psyches or an unconscious; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization,
state, or empire can be spoken of as paranoid if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a
collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities
that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and
engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national
psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way
of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically
to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal.
Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and
society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than
binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate
memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and
revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we
understand such debauches of cruelty?
A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military
police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a
paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a
paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and
aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down,

then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body,
the methods by which schools, the military, training camps not to mention the paranoid
image-worlds of the corporate mediainstill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally
conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence . 10 In what follows, I
want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three
crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and
what I call the enemy deficit. I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the
torture at Guantnamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantnamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that

torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carbys brilliant work,
those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11
The Enemy Deficit: Making the Barbarians Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not
come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And
now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution.
C. P. Cavafy, Waiting for the Barbarians
The barbarians have declared war.
President George W. Bush
C. P. Cavafy wrote Waiting for the Barbarians in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with
the force of an uncanny and prescient dj vu. To what dilemma are the barbarians a kind of solution?

Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over
territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafys insight is that an
imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians .
It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empires borders
in the first place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire
with perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the
rejected from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire
vanishes like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the grand antagonism of the United States
and the USSR evaporated like a quickly fading nightmare. The cold war rhetoric of totalitarianism,
Finlandization, present danger, fifth columnist, and infiltration vanished. Where were the
enemies now to justify the continuing escalation of the military colossus? And now what
shall become of us without any barbarians? By rights, the thawing of the cold war should
have prompted an immediate downsizing of the military; any plausible external threat had
simply ceased to exist. Prior to 9/11, General Peter Schoomaker, head of the US Army,
bemoaned the enemy deficit: Its no use having an army that did nothing but train, he said. Theres
got to be a certain appetite for what the hell we exist for. Dick Cheney likewise complained: The
threats have become so remote. So remote that they are difficult to ascertain. Colin Powell
agreed: Though we can still plausibly identify specific threatsNorth Korea, Iran, Iraq, something like
thatthe real threat is the unknown, the uncertain. Before becoming president, George W. Bush
likewise fretted over the postcold war dearth of a visible enemy: We do not know who the
enemy is, but we know they are out there. It is now well established that the invasion of Iraq had
been a long-standing goal of the US administration, but there was no clear rationale with which to sell such
an invasion. In 1997 a group of neocons at the Project for the New American Century produced a
remarkable report in which they stated that to make such an invasion palatable would require a
catastrophic and catalyzing eventlike a new Pearl Harbor. 12

The discourse of American leadership is rooted in the


construction and demonization of dangerous others. Their
advantage produces the threat that it names.
Campbell et al. 7David Campbell, Geography @ Durham [Performing Security: The Imaginative
Geographies of current US strategy Political Geography 26 (4) doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.12.002 (Other
Authors: Luiza Bialasiewicz, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey and Alison J. Williams)]
It is important to highlight the way performativity's idea of reiteration calls attention to changes in
historically established imaginative geographies. While US foreign policy has been traditionally written in
the context of identity/difference expressed in self/other relationships (Campbell, 1992), we detect in

recent strategic performances a different articulation of America's relationship to the world .


Signified by the notion of integration we identify elements in the formation of a new imaginative
geography which enable the US to draw countries into its spheres of influence and

control . We show how integration (and its coeval strategies of exclusion) has been
enunciated over the last 15 years through popular-academic books, think-tank documents, policy
programmes and security strategies, as well as popular geopolitical sources. This concept of
integration, we argue, is enacted through a number of practices of representation and coercion
that encourage countries to adopt a raft of US attitudes and ways of operating or else suffer
the consequences. As such, we are witnessing the performance of a security problematic that requires
critical perspectives to move beyond a simple ideal/material dichotomy in social analysis in order to
account for more complex understandings of opposition, including the emergence of new, mobile
geographies of exclusion.
Non-state scribes
To understand the power of the imaginative geographies guiding current US strategy it is important to look
back at the recitation, reiteration and resignification of previous strategic formulations. During the Clinton
years, a number of figures who had been involved in various guises in previous Republican administrations
wrote widely on the geopolitical opportunities and threats of a post-Cold War era. From specifications of

the threat posed by international terrorism, failed states and rogue regimes, to the
dangers posed by cultural/civilisational conflicts. The individuals and institutions we choose to
examine in this section are those whose geographical imaginations have been central in laying the
ground for some of the securitizing strategies of the current Bush administration and,
specifically, whose work has been key in specifying the importance of integrating a
chaotic world where conflict is inevitable .
The writers whose work we highlight here occupy a liminal position within policy circles. While
not paid members of the administration, they have either occupied such positions in the past or were
aspiring to them in the future. They do not, therefore, directly speak for the state (a position that

grants them a veneer of objectivity), and they navigate in the interstices between
academic and policy-oriented research: a location that, in turn, absolves them from the
rigors of a scholarly discipline, including disciplinary critique. By the term non-state scribes
we wish to indicate those who occupy a liminal zone between academic and non-academic work, working
in a range of governmental and private research centres, think-tanks and study groups. What we would
like to highlight are some of the ways in which their influence problematises simple, secure understandings
of the state and the constitution of state-interest. While these individuals appear as impartial
commentators-cum-advisers-cum-analysts, their access to policy circles is open, if not privileged. To the
extent that their geographical imaginations are invoked by state power, they are also today's
consummate intellectuals of statecraft: those who designate a world and fill it with
certain dramas, subjects, histories and dilemmas ( Tuathail & Agnew, 1992: 192).
Certainly the most prominent self-styled community of experts intersecting with the Bush
administration is the Project for a New American Century (for critical analysis see Sparke, 2005).
The PNAC, founded in the spring of 1997, defines itself as a non-profit, educational organization whose
goal is to promote American global leadership (see PNAC, 2006). Putatively lying outside formal policy
networks, the Project from its inception has aimed to provide the intellectual basis for continued US
military dominance and especially the willingness to use its military might.
As sole hegemon, PNAC argued, the US could not avoid the responsibilities of global
leadership. But it should not simply react to threats as they present themselves: it should, rather,
actively shape the global scenario before such threats emerge: the history of the 20th century
should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats
before they become dire (PNAC, 2000: i).

The resonance of these views with those of the Bush administration should come as no
surprise: among the Project's founders were individuals who had held posts in previous Republican
administrations and went on to serve in Bush's cabinet: Vice-President Dick Cheney, former Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy and now World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz, along with
the former ambassador to Iraq (and soon to be US Ambassador to the UN) Zalmay Khalilzad, in addition
to well known neoconservatives shaping policy debates in the US today, including Francis Fukuyama,

Norman Podhoretz, and William Kristol (see Fukuyama, 2006 and Williams, 2005). Unsurprisingly, the
most explicit formulation of what would become goals of the Bush administration can be found in the
PNAC's manifesto Rebuilding America's Defenses, which appeared in the election year of 2000. Here and
in subsequent documents, the PNAC envisages the US military's role to be fourfold: Defend the American
Homeland; fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theatre wars; perform the
constabulary duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions; and transform
U.S. forces to exploit the revolution in military affairs (PNAC, 2000: iv, 5; cf. The White House, 2002b:
30).
It is telling just how spatialised some of these specifications become when worked through in detail.
Already in 2000, PNAC argued that the major military mission is no longer to deter Soviet
expansionism, but to secure and expand zones of democratic peace; deter rise of new greatpower competitor; defend key regions; exploit transformation of war (PNAC, 2000: 2). They
suggested that rather than the Cold War's potential global war across many theatres, the concern now is
for several potential theatre wars spread across the globe fought against separate and distinct adversaries
pursuing separate and distinct goals (2000: 2, 3). To counter such threats, the US needs to station its
troops broadly, and their presence in critical regions around the world is the visible
expression of the extent of America's status as a superpower and as the guarantor of liberty,
peace and stability (2000: 14). They claimed that while US security interests have expanded, and that
its forces provide the first line of defense in what may be described as the American security perimeter,
at the same time the worldwide archipelago of U.S. military installations has contracted (2000: 14, 15).
Because the security perimeter has expanded slowly but inexorably since the end of the Cold War, US
forces the cavalry on the new American frontier must be positioned to reflect the
shifting strategic landscape (2000: 14, 15). Equally, their use of the term homeland drew strongly on
its use in the Clinton administration and prefigured the creation of the Office for Homeland Security
under G.W. Bush, with the concept strengthened by both the PATRIOT acts and the establishment of U.S.
Northern Command.Again, it is essential that we conceptualize these strategies as both

containing and making imaginative geographies; specifying the ways the world is and, in
so doing, actively (re)making that same world. This goes beyond merely the military action or
aid programmes that governments follow, but indicates a wider concern with the production of
ways of seeing the world, which percolate through media, popular imaginations as well as
political strategy. These performative imaginative geographies are at the heart of this paper and will reoccur throughout it. Our concern lies specifically with the ways in which the US portrays and
over the past decade has portrayed certain parts of the world as requiring involvement, as threats, as
zones of instability, as rogue states, states of concern, as global hotspots, as well as the

associated suggestion that by bringing these within the integrated zones of democratic
peace, US security both economically and militarily can be preserved . Of course, the
translation of such imaginations into actual practice (and certainly results) is never as simple as some might
like to suggest. Nonetheless, what we wish to highlight here is how these strategies, in

essence, produce the effect they name . This, again, is nothing new: the United
States has long constituted its identity at least in part through discourses of danger that
materialize others as a threat (see Campbell, 1992). Equally, much has been written about the new set
of threats and enemies that emerged to fill the post-Soviet void from radical Islam through the war on
drugs to rogue states (for a critical analyses see, among others, Benjamin and Simon, 2003 and Stokes,
2005; on the genealogies of the idea of rogue states see Blum, 2002 and Litwak, 2000).

Their hegemonic approach to peace will produce error


replicationthe very discourse used to describe their
advantages causes violence. We must open the
framework of what constitutes peace to critical
interrogation
Richmond 7 [Oliver P. Richmond, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews,
Scotland, Alternatives 32 (2007), 247274]

It is generally assumed by most theorists, most policymakers, and practitioners, that peace has an
ontological stability enabling it to be understood, defined, and thus created. Indeed, the
implication of the void of debate about peace indicates that it is generally thought that peace as
a concept is so ontologically solid that no debate is required. There is clearly a resistance to
examining the concept of peace as a subjective ontology, as well as a subjective political and
ideological framework. Indeed, this might be said to be indicative of orientalism, in
impeding a discussion of a positive peace or of alternative concepts and contexts of peace.18 Indeed,
Saids humanism indicates the dangers of assuming that peace is universal, a Platonic ideal form, or
extremely limited. An emerging critical conceptualization of peace rests upon a genealogy that

illustrates its contested discourses and multiple concepts. This allows for an understanding
of the many actors, contexts, and dynamics of peace, and enables a reprioritization of what,
for whom, and why, peace is valued. Peace from this perspective is a rich, varied, and fluid
tapestry, which can be contextualized, rather than a sterile, extremely limited, and probably
unobtainable product of a secular or nonsecular imagination. It represents a discursive
framework in which the many problems that are replicated by the linear and rational
project of a universal peace (effectively camouflaged by a lack of attention within IR) can be
properly interrogated in order to prevent the discursive replication of violence .19 This
allows for an understanding of how the multiple and competing versions of peace may even
give rise to conflict, and also how this might be overcome . One area of consensus from within this
more radical literature appears to be that peace is discussed, interpreted, and referred to in a way that
nearly always disguises the fact that it is essentially contested. This is often an act of
hegemony thinly disguised as benevolence, assertiveness, or wisdom. Indeed, many assertions
about peace depend upon actors who know peace then creating it for those that do not, either
through their acts or through the implicit peace discourses that are employed to describe
conflict and war in opposition to peace. Where there should be research agendas there are
often silences. Even contemporary approaches in conflict analysis and peace studies rarely stop to
imagine the kind of peace they may actually create. IR has reproduced a science of peace
based upon political, social, economic, cultural, and legal governance frameworks , by which
conflict in the world is judged. This has led to the liberal peace framework, which masks a
hegemonic collusion over the discourses of, and creation of, peace .20 A critical interrogation
of peace indicates it should be qualified as a specific type among many .

The affs discourse of integration and leadership rehashes


the geographies of exclusion and containment in nicer
sounding terms. Construct of dangerous other versus
stable and peaceful United States confirms the material
and moral hierarchies of the dominant U.S. identity.
Campbell et al. 7David Campbell, Geography @ Durham [Performing Security: The Imaginative
Geographies of current US strategy Political Geography 26 (4) doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.12.002 (Other
Authors: Luiza Bialasiewicz, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey and Alison J. Williams)]

The concept of integration, invoked in different ways and in different measures by both Kagan and
Barnett, is similarly at the heart of the current administration's foreign and domestic policies. The
former Director of Policy at the US State Department, Richard Haass, articulated the central tenets
of the concept when he wondered:
Is there a successor idea to containment? I think there is. It is the idea of integration. The goal
of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other major powers to sign on to certain key
ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction, support for free trade, democracy, markets. Integration is about locking them into
these policies and then building institutions that lock them in even more (Haass in Lemann, 1 April 2002,
emphasis added).
That the US is no longer prepared to tolerate regimes that do not mirror its own democratic
values and practices, and that it will seek to persuade such major powers to change their policies and
behaviours to fit the American modus operandi, is not without historical precedent (Ambrosius, 2006). Nor

does the differently imagined geography of integration replace completely previous


Manichean conceptions of the world so familiar to Cold War politics. Rather, the
proliferation of new terms of antipathy such as axis of evil, rogue states, and terror cities
demonstrate how integration goes hand in hand with and is mutually constitutive of new
forms of division. Barnett's divide between the globalised world and the non-integrating gap is reflected
and complemented by Kagan's divide in ways of dealing with this state of affairs. Much of this imagined
geography pivots on the idea of the homeland. Indeed, in the imaginations of the security analysts we
highlight here, there is a direct relationship and tension between securing the homeland's borders and
challenging the sanctity of borders elsewhere (see Kaplan, 2003: 87).
Appreciating this dynamic requires us to trace some of the recent articulations of US strategy. Since
September 11th 2001 the US government and military have issued a number of documents outlining their
security strategy. Each recites, reiterates and resignifies both earlier strategic statements as
well each other, creating a sense of boundedness and fixity which naturalizes a specific view of
the world. Initially there was The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security,
2002), and then the much broader scope National Security Strategy (The White House, 2002b; see Der
Derian, 2003). These were followed by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and particular
plans for Military Strategy, Defense Strategy and the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
(Department of Defense, 2005a, Department of Defense, 2005b, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004 and The White
House, 2002a). These are seen as an interlocking whole, where the National Military Strategy (NMS)
supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the National Defense Strategy
(NDS) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 1); and the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support builds
upon the concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy (Department of
Defense, 2005b: iii; see also diagram on 6). The updated National Security Strategy (The White House,
2006) presents a further re-elaboration and re-stating of these principles.
As with the understandings we highlighted previously, it should be noted that key elements of these
strategies pre-date September 11. Significant in this continuity is the link between the Bush administration's
strategic view and the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). Written for the administration of George
H. W. Bush by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis Scooter Libby, the DPG was the first neoconservative
security manifesto for the post-Cold War; a blue print for a one-superpower world in which the US had to
be prepared to combat new regional threats and prevent the rise of a hegemonic competitor (Tyler, 8 March
1992; see Mann, 2004: 198ff, 212).
Initial versions of the DPG were deemed too controversial and were rewritten with input from then Defense
Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell (Tyler, 24 May 1992).
Nonetheless, Cheney's version still declared that, we must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential
competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role (Cheney, 1993: 2).
What we find in this is the kernel of the policies implemented in the administration of George W. Bush,
reworked through the Clinton period by such organizations as PNAC (discussed above). The assemblage of
individuals and organizations both inside and outside the formal state structures running from the DPG,
through PNAC to the plethora of Bush administration security texts cited above (all of which draw upon
well-established US security dispositions in the post-World War II era) demonstrates the performative

infrastructure through which certain ontological effects are established, and through which certain
performances are made possible and can be understood.
As we argue throughout this paper, the distinctive thing about recent National Security Strategies is their
deployment of integration as the principal foreign policy and security strategy. It is telling that Bush's claim
of either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists (Bush, 2001) relies not on a straightforward
binary, as is sometimes suggested, but a process of incorporation. It is not simply us versus them, but with
us, a mode of operating alongside, or, in the words of one of Bush's most enthusiastic supporters, shoulder
to shoulder (Blair, 2001; see White & Wintour, 2001). This works more widely through a combination of
threats and promises, as in this statement about the Palestinians: If Palestinians embrace democracy and
the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the
creation of a Palestinian state (The White House, 2002b: 9). Likewise, it can be found in some of remarks
of the British Prime Minister Blair (2004) about the significance of democracy in Afghanistan, Africa and
Iraq. Equally Bush's notorious axis of evil speech did not simply name North Korea, Iran and Iraq as its
members, but suggested that states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to
threaten the peace of the world (Bush, 2002a, emphasis added). A comparison of the like, alongside the
with the terrorists is actually a more complicated approach to the choosing of sides and the drawing of
lines than is generally credited. Simple binary oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the
process of incorporation and the policy of integration.
These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the US and followed by
certain allies. It warns those failing to adopt US values (principally liberal representative democracy and
market capitalism), that they will be excluded from an American-centric world. The place of US allies in
these representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also on its
reflection and reiteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and beyond the dismissive
pronouncements of Rumsfeld about Europe's Old and New a conception that was inchoately
articulated as early as the 1992 DPG the dissent of (even some) Europeans is a problem for the US in its
world-making endeavours (see Bialasiewicz & Minca, 2005). It is not surprising, then, that following his
re-election, George W. Bush and Condoleeza Rice embarked almost immediately on a bridge-building
tour across Europe, noting not trans-Atlantic differences but the great alliance of freedom that unites the
United States and Europe (Bush, 2005).
For although the United States may construct itself as the undisputed leader in the new global

scenario, its right and the right of its moral-political mission of spreading freedom
and justice relies on its amplification and support by allies. The construction of the United
States' world role relies also on the selective placement and representation of other
international actors who are hailed into specific subject positions (see Weldes, Laffey,
Gusterson, & Duvall, 1999). Of course, different actors are granted different roles and different degrees of
agency in the global script: the place of key European allies is different from that bestowed upon the
peripheral and semi-peripheral states that make part of the coalition of the willing. Both, however, are
vital in sustaining the representation of the US as the leader of a shared world of values and ideals. Indeed,
the lone superpower has little influence in the absence of support.
Another important dimension of integration as the key strategic concept is its dissolution of the
inside/outside spatialization of security policy. The concluding lines of the Strategy for Homeland Defense
and Civil Support are particularly telling. It contends that the Department of Defense can no longer think
in terms of the home game and the away game. There is only one game (Department of Defense,
2005b: 40). In part this is directed at the previous failure to anticipate an attack from within: indeed, the
Strategy remarks that the September 11th 2001 attacks originated in US airspace and highlighted
weaknesses in domestic radar coverage and interagency air defense coordination (2005b: 22). In other
words, the US needs to ensure the security of its homeland from within as much as without, to treat home
as away. In part, however, such rhetoric also reflects a continuity with and reiteration of

broader understandings with a much longer history, promoted by a range of US


intellectuals of statecraft since the end of the Cold War: understandings that specified
increasingly hard territorialisations of security and identity both at home and abroad to
counter the geopolitical vertigo (see Tuathail, 1996) of the post-bipolar era.
It is important to note here, moreover, that the 2002 National Security Strategy's affirmation that today, the
distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing (The White House, 2002b: 30) also
involves the US treating away as a home, or at least, as a concern. From this we can see how the pursuit of

integration enables the territorial integrity of other sovereign states to be violated in its name, as specific
places are targeted to either ensure or overcome their exclusion (see Elden, 2005). As an example,
consider this statement, which recalls the late 1970s enunciation of an arc of crisis stretching

from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to Afghanistan: There exists an arc of
instability stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East
and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats
to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from
surveillance and attack (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 5).
In his foreword to the 2002 National Security Strategy, Bush declared that We will defend the peace by
fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great
powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent (Bush,
2002b: i). This notion of extension is crucial in understanding the explicitly spatial overtones of this
strategy of integration: more than merely about values, democracy and capitalism, it is about a performative
geopolitics. Put crudely, it is about specifying the geographies of world politics; it is about specifying the
ways the world (now) is a presumably descriptive geopolitical exercise but that, as all such exercises,
also implicitly contains the prescription for putting the world right.
Imaginative geographies and popular geopolitics
As we have tried to argue, such elaborations of security rely upon the affirmation of certain understandings
of the world within the context of which the strategies and understandings advanced by them are rendered
believable. What is more, we have tried to highlight how such performances invoke earlier articulations,
even as their reiteration changes them. More broadly, we stressed how such articulations provide the
conditions of possibility for current and future action. Integration thus marks a new

performative articulation in US security strategy, but it reworks rather than replaces earlier
formulations. One of the ways in which this operates is that the ideal of integration, as we have seen,
necessarily invokes the idea of exclusion . The imagined divide between the US homeland
and the threatening frontier lands within the circle of Barnett's Non-Integrating Gap thus recalls
earlier iterations of barbarism even if their identity and spatiality are produced by more than a
simple self/other binary. In the final section of this essay, we will make some brief remarks regarding the
disjuncture between the theory and the practice of the enactment of such imaginations. First, however, we
would like to highlight some other ways in which these deployments of categories of inclusion and
incorporation, on the one hand, and exclusion and targeting, on the other, are also performed in the popular
geopolitical work done by a wide range of textual, visual, filmic and electronic media supportive of the
war on terror at home and abroad. These cultural practices resonate with the idea of fundamentally
terrorist territories, whilst, at the same time rendering the homeland zone of the continental US as a
homogenous and virtuous domestic community. Such wide-ranging and diffuse practices that are
nonetheless imbricated with each other are further indications that we are dealing with performativity rather
than construction in the production of imaginative geographies.

The logic of Hegemonic preservation festishizes the US global role, necessitating a


kill-to-save mentality
Noorani, 2005. Yaseen Noorani is a Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies,
University of Edinburgh. The Rhetoric of Security, The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005.
The U.S. government's rhetoric of global security draws its power from simultaneously instantiating Schmitt's vision of the political as
non-normative national self-preservation and the liberal vision of the political as normative civil relations. The consequence is not that
this rhetoric disavows political antagonism within the nation, as Schmitt would have it (though there is an element of this), but that it
disavows political antagonism on the global level. I argued above that the positing of a non-normative situation of national selfpreservation, the same as that of a person being murdered, is insupportable due to the inescapable presence of a moral ideal in defining
the nation's self and deciding what threatens it. This applies to all justifications of action grounded in national security. The U.S.
rhetoric of security, however, lifts the paradox to a global level, and illustrates it more forcefully, by designating

the global order's moral ideal, its "way of life" that is under threat, as civil relations, freedom and peace, but
then making the fulcrum of this way of life an independent entity upon whose survival the world's way of
life dependsthe United States. Just as an aggressor puts himself outside of normativity by initiating violence, so is the victim
not bound by any norms in defending his life. As the location of the self of the world order that must be preserved,
the United States remains unobligated by the norms of this order as long as it is threatened by terrorism. So
long as it struggles for the life of the world order, therefore, the United States remains external to this order,

just as terrorism remains external to the world order so long as it threatens a universal state of war .

Without
the United States everyone is dead. Why should this be? The reason is that the United States fully embodies the values underlying
world peace"freedom, democracy, and free enterprise" (National Security 2002, i)and is the key to their realization in the global
domain. These values are [End Page 30] universal, desired by all and the standard for all. "[T]he United States must defend liberty and
justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere" (National Security 2002, 3). The fact that the United
States "possesses unprecedentedand unequaledstrength and influence in the world" (1) cannot therefore be fortuitous. It cannot
but derive from the very founding of the United States in universal principles of peace and its absolute instantiation of these principles.
This results in "unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity" (1). In other words, the United States as a nation

stands, by virtue of its internal constitution, at the forefront of world history in advancing human freedom.
It is the subject of history. Its own principle of organization is the ultimate desire of humanity, and the development of this
principle is always at its highest stage in and through the United States. For this reason, the values of the United States and its interests
always coincide, and these in turn coincide with the interests of world peace and progress. The requirements of American security
reflect "the union of our values and our national interests," and their effect is to "make the world not just safer but better" (1). The
United States therefore is uniquely charged by history to maintain and advance world peace and universal freedom. America is a
nation with a mission, and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire.
Our aim is a democratic peacea peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this cause with
friends and allies at our side, yet we understand our special calling: This great republic will lead the cause of freedom. (Bush 2004a)
America can lead the cause of freedom because it is the cause of freedom. "American values and American interests lead in the same
direction: We stand for human liberty" (Bush 2003b). For this reason, it has no "ambitions," no private national interests or aspirations
that would run contrary to the interests of the world as a whole. It undertakes actions, like the invasion of Iraq, that further no motive
but the cause of humanity as a whole. "We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of [End Page 31]
that country to its own people" (Bush 2003a). In this way, the United States is distinct from all other nations, even though all of
humanity espouses the same values. Only the United States can be depended upon for ensuring the endurance of
these values because they are the sole basis of its existence. "Others might flag in the face of the inevitable ebb and
flow of the campaign against terrorism. But the American people will not" (NSCT 2003, 29). Any threat to the existence of
the United States is therefore a threat to the existence of the world order, which is to say, the values that make this
order possible. It is not merely that the United States, as the most powerful nation of the free world, is the most capable of defending
it. It is rather that the United States is the supreme agency advancing the underlying principle of the free order. The United States is
the world order's fulcrum, and therefore the key to its existence and perpetuation. Without the United States, freedom,

peace, civil relations among nations, and the possibility of civil society are all under threat of extinction.
This is why the most abominable terrorists and tyrants single out the United States for their schemes and
attacks. They know that the United States is the guardian of liberal values. In the rhetoric of security, therefore, the
survival of the United States, its sheer existence, becomes the content of liberal values. In other words, what does it mean to espouse
liberal values in the context of the present state of world affairs? It means to desire fervently and promote energetically the survival of
the United States of America. When the world order struggles to preserve its "self," the self that it seeks to
preserve, the primary location of its being, is the United States. Conferring this status upon the United States allows
the rhetoric of security to insist upon a threat to the existence of the world order as a whole while confining the non-normative status
that arises from this threat to the United States alone. The United Statesas the self under threatremains external to the normative
relations by which the rest of the world continues to be bound. The United States is both a specific national existence

struggling for its life and normativity itself, which makes it coextensive with the world order as a whole.
For this reason, any challenge to U.S. world dominance would be a challenge to world peace and is thus
impermissible. We read in The National Security Strategy that the United States [End Page 32] will "promote a balance of power
that favors freedom" (National Security 2002, 1). And later, we find out what is meant by such a balance of power.

Hegemony elevates security to a transcendental idealit creates a moral framework


for violence that requires the elimination of all that is different or unpredictable.
Der Derian 2003 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of
Massachusetts Amherst, Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
boundary, 2 30.3, 19-27]
From President Bush's opening lines of The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America (NSS), the gap between rhetoric and reality takes on Browningesque proportions: "Our
Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight,
for a just peacea peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from
terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great
powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every
continent'" (1). Regardless of authorial (or good) intentions, the NSS reads more like latevery
latenineteenth-century poetry than a strategic doctrine for the twenty-first century. The
rhetoric of the White House favors and clearly intends to mobilize the moral clarity, nostalgic
sentimentality, and uncontested dominance reminiscent of the last great empires against the
ambiguities, complexities, and messiness of the current world disorder. However, the gulf

between the nation's stated cause ("to help make the world not just safer but better" [1]) and
defensive needs (to fight "a war against terrorists of global reach" [5]) is so vast that one detects
what Nietzsche referred to as the "breath of empty space," that void between the world as it is
and as we would wish it to be, which produces all kinds of metaphysical concoctions. In short
shrift (thirty pages), the White House articulation of U.S. global objectives to the Congress
elevates strategic discourse from a traditional, temporal calculation of means and ends, to the
theological realm of monotheistic faith and monolithic truth. Relying more on aspiration than
analysis, revelation than reason, the NSS is not grand but grandiose strategy. In pursuit of an
impossible state of national security against terrorist evil, soldiers will need to be sacrificed, civil
liberties curtailed, civilians collaterally damaged, regimes destroyed. But a nation's imperial
overreach should exceed its fiduciary grasp: what's a full-spectrum dominance of the battle space
for? Were this not an official White House doctrine, the contradictions of the NSS could be
interpreted only as poetic irony. How else to comprehend the opening paragraph, which begins
with "The United States possesses unprecedentedand unequaledstrength and influence in
the world" and ends with "The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of
power that favors freedom" (1)? Perhaps the cabalistic Straussians that make up the defense
intellectual brain trust of the Bush administration (among them, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle,
and William Kristol) have come up with a nuanced, indeed, anti-Machiavellian reading of
Machiavelli that escapes the uninitiated. But so fixed is the NSS on the creation of a world in
America's image that concepts such as balance of power and imminent threat, once rooted in
historical, juridical, as well as reciprocal traditions, become free-floating signifiers. Few
Europeans, "old" or "new," would recognize the balance of power principle deployed by the NSS
to justify preemptive, unilateral, military action against not actual but "emerging" imminent
threats (15). Defined by the eighteenth-century jurist Emerich de Vattel as a state of affairs in
which no one preponderant power can lay down the law to others, the classical sense of balance
of power is effectively inverted in principle by the NSS document and in practice by the go-italone statecraft of the United States. Balance of power is global suzerainty, and war is peace.

The Affs Hegemonic discourse of Global Instability versus a stable US validate


the Hierarchy of Dominant US Identity, returning to the geographies of exclusion.
Daavid Campbell et. al. 7, Prof. of Geography @ Durham, 7 [Political Geography 26, Performing
security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy, 414415]
The concept of integration, invoked in different ways and in different measures by both Kagan and Barnett, is similarly at the heart of
the current administrations foreign and domestic policies. The former Director of Policy at the US State Department, Richard Haass,
articulated the central tenets of the concept when he wondered:
Is there a successor idea to containment? I think there is. It is the idea of integration. The goal of US foreign policy should be to
persuade the other major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, democracy, markets. Integration is about locking them into these policies and
then building institutions that lock them in even more (Haass in Lemann, 1 April 2002, emphasis added).

That the US is no longer prepared to tolerate regimes that do not mirror its own democratic values and
practices, and that it will seek to persuade such major powers to change their policies and behaviours to fit
the American modus operandi, is not without historical precedent (Ambrosius, 2006). Nor does the
differently imagined geography of integration replace completely previous Manichean conceptions of the
world so familiar to Cold War politics. Rather, the proliferation of new terms of antipathy such as axis of
evil, rogue states, and terror cities demonstrate how integration goes hand in hand with e and is
mutually constitutive of e new forms of division. Barnetts divide between the globalised world and the
non-integrat- ing gap is reflected and complemented by Kagans divide in ways of dealing with this state of
affairs. Much of this imagined geography pivots on the idea of the homeland. Indeed, in the imaginations
of the security analysts we highlight here, there is a direct relationship and tension between securing the
homelands borders and challenging the sanctity of borders elsewhere (see Kaplan, 2003: 87).
Appreciating this dynamic requires us to trace some of the recent articulations of US strategy . Since
September 11th 2001 the US government and military have issued a number of documents outlining their
security strategy. Each recites, reiterates and resignifies both earlier strategic statements as well each other,
creating a sense of boundedness and fixity which naturalizes a specific view of the world. Initially there was
The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 2002), and then the much broader scope National
Security Strategy (The White House, 2002b; see Der Derian, 2003). These were followed by the National Strategy for Combating

Terrorism and particular plans for Military Strategy, Defense Strategy and the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
(Department of Defense, 2005a, 2005b; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004; The White House, 2002a). These are seen as an interlocking
whole, where the National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strat- egy (NSS) and implements the
National Defense Strategy (NDS) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 1); and the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
builds upon the concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy (Department of Defense, 2005b: iii;
see also diagram on 6). The updated National Security Strategy (The White House, 2006) presents a further re-elaboration and restating of these principles.
As with the understandings we highlighted previously, it should be noted that key elements of these strategies pre-date
September 11. Significant in this continuity is the link between the Bush administrations strategic view and the 1992 Defense
Planning Guidance (DPG). Writ- ten for the administration of George H. W. Bush by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis Scooter Libby,
the DPG was the first neoconservative security manifesto for the post-Cold War; a blue print for a one-superpower world in which the
US had to be prepared to combat new regional threats and prevent the rise of a hegemonic competitor ( Tyler, 8 March 1992; see
Mann, 2004: 198ff, 212).
Initial versions of the DPG were deemed too controversial and were rewritten with input from then Defense Secretary Cheney and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell (Tyler, 24 May 1992). Nonetheless, Cheneys version still declared that, we must
maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role ( Cheney, 1993:
2).What we find in this is the kernel of the policies implemented in the administration of George W. Bush, reworked through the
Clinton period by such organizations as PNAC (dis- cussed above). The assemblage of individuals and organizations e both inside and
outside the formal state structures e running from the DPG, through PNAC to the plethora of Bush administration security

texts cited above (all of which draw upon well-established US security dispositions in the post-World War
II era) demonstrates the performative infrastructure through which certain ontological effects are
established, and through which certain performances are made possible and can be understood.

Pursuit of hegemony is a fantasy of control that relies


upon construction of threatening Otherness --- this
prompts resistance and create a permanent state of
conflict
Chernus 6 (Ira, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program University of
Colorado-Boulder, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin, p. 53-54)
The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale. The neocons want to
turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it wont stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order.
So the neocons efforts inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented
power has unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already
has, and so is almost by definition always overextended. Gary Dorrien sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way,
too: For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it maybe, it never feels
secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary
claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons,
heightened by ideological ardor.39 If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of
resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no good way to distinguish between nations
or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that dont. Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential
threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. Its no surprise that a
nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is
likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can
say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will
resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really
is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure.
Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its
plans largely secret. Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a secret plan for world conquest. Now
here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to [end page 53] hear. That hardly seems
well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front
that the neocons long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer a statement of enveloping peril and no
hypothesis for any real solution. They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their
story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never
be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: We should not try to convince people that
things are getting better. Michael Ledeen: The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.40 This vision of endless conflict is
not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless
resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the
U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the manly virtues of militarism. They have
to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must
sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes
appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy. The

neocons story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is
about creating a society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having
superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy. Just as neocons need monsters abroad,
they need a frightened society at home. Only insecurity can justify their shrill call for a stronger nation (and a higher military budget).
The more dire their warnings of insecurity, the more they can demand greater military strength and moral resolve. Every foreign
enemy is, above all, another occasion to prod the American people to overcome their anxiety, identify evil, fight resolutely against it,
and stand strong in defense of their highest values. Hegemony will do no good unless there is challenge to be met, weakness to be
conquered, evil to be overcome. The American people must actively seek hegemony and make sacrifices for it, to show that they are
striving to overcome their own weakness. So the quest for strength still demands a public confession of weakness, just as the neocons
had demanded two decades earlier when they warned of a Soviet nuclear attack through a window of vulnerability. The quest for
strength through the structures of national security still demands a public declaration of national insecurity. Otherwise, there is nothing
to overcome. The more frightened the public, the more likely it is to believe and enact the neocon story.

Conflict de-escalation is backwards assumptions of


violence become a self-fulfilling prophecy and guarantee
environmental collapse
Clark 4 (Mary E., French Cumbie Professor of Conflict Resolution at George Mason University,
Rhetoric, Patriarchy & War: Explaining the Dangers of "Leadership" in Mass Culture, Women and
Language. Urbana: Fall,. Vol. 27, Iss. 2, ProQuest)
Today's Western patriarchal world view now dominates globalwide dialogue among the "leaders" of Earth's nearly two hundred
nation-states. Its Machiavellian/Realpolitik assumptions about the necessity of' military power to preserve

order within and between groups of humans trumps--and stifles--other potential viewpoints. Founded on the
belief that "evil" is innate, it dictates that human conflict must be "controlled": global "law" backed by coercive
force. This view, when cross-culturally imposed, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy , thus "legitimating"
an escalating use of force. Western leaders (male and female) use a rhetoric couched in a
"hegemonic masculinity" to justify their ready use of military force to coerce "those who are against
us" into compliance. This translates globally as "national leaders must never lose face!" Changing this dominant paradigm requires dismantling the hierarchic hegemony of
masculine militarism and its related economic institutions, through global cross-cultural dialogues, thus replacing a hegemonic world view and institutions with new, more adaptive
visions, woven out of the most useful remnants of multiple past cultural stories. The paper concludes with a few examples where people around the worm are doing just this--using
their own small voices to insert their local "sacred social story" into the global dialogue. This global process--free from a hegemonic militaristic rhetoric--has the potential to
initiate a planetary dialogue where "boundaries" are no longer borders to be defended, but sites of social ferment and creative adaptation. When the call came for papers on War,
Language, and Gender, referring us to Carol Cohn's seminal paper "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," (1) I at first felt that little more could be added
on the subject. But events in Washington in the ensuing weeks stimulated me to a broader "take" on this topic. Defense intellectuals, after all, are embedded in a whole culture, and
the interaction is two-way. Not only does their strategic framework with its euphemistic language about war and killing have the outcome of forcing society to think in their terms;
their framework and language developed in response to our deeply embedded, Western cultural image of a Machiavellian / neo-Darwinian universe. In other words,

militarism and the

necessity for organized physical force (2) emerge out of culturewide


assumptions about human nature. Throughout historical times these assumptions have repeatedly
proved to be self-fulfilling prophecies. The pervasive perception of enemy-competitors has
generated violent conflicts that flared up and died back, only to flare up again through our failure
to achieve deep resolution and, especially, to alter our basic beliefs about human nature and our consequent social institutions. Today our
species, politically, comprises some 180190 "nations" of varying cultural homogeneity and moral legitimacy, not to mention size and physical power. Regardless of their
indigenous, internal cultural preferences, their cross-national interactions are institutionalized to fit a framework long established by former Western colonial powers among
themselves. In other words, the global "reality" constructed by Western patriarchies-a Realpolitik, ultimately grounded in military power-has come to define day-to-day crossnational politics. During the era of the Cold War, this resulted in small, powerless nations seeking alliances with one or other superpower, which offered not only development aid
but military protection, and, for locally unpopular, but "cooperating" leaders, small arms to maintain order at home. The "end" of the Cold War brought little change in this
pervasive global militarism (though it did strengthen the role of economic hegemony by the remaining superpower (3)). The enormous technological

"improvements"-i.e. efficiency

in killing power-in weaponry of all types over the past few decades has now resulted
in a dangerously over-armed planet that simultaneously faces a desperate shortage of
resources available for providing the world's people with water, energy, health care, education, and the infrastructure for
distributing them. While our environmental and social overheads continue to mount, our species
seems immobilized, trapped in an institutionalized militarism-an evolutionary cul-de-sac! We need new
insights-as Cohn said, a new language, a new set of metaphors, a new mental framework-for thinking, dialoguing and visioning new
patterns of intersocietal interaction.

Link -- Hegemony [Rule]


Framing hegemony as necessary greases the wheels of future intervention
James B

Rule

, PhD Harvard, MA Oxford, BA Brandeis, The

Dissent Vol. 57 No 1, Winter

Military State of America and the Democratic Left ,

2010

The invasion of Iraq

was a defining moment for the United States. This was the kind of war that many Americans
believed formed no part of this country's repertoire - an aggressive war of choice. Its aim was not to stop
some wider conflict or to prevent ethnic cleansing or mass killings; indeed, its predictable effect was to
promote these things. The purpose was to extirpate a regime that the United States had built up but that had morphed into an obstacle to this
country - and to replace it with one that would represent a more compliant instrument of American purpose. In short, the war was a
demonstration of American ability and willingness to remove and replace regimes anywhere in the world.
Even in the wake of the Iraq fiasco, no one in high places has declared repetitions of such exploits "off the
table" - to use the expression favored by this country's foreign policy elites. For those of us who opposed the war, there is obvious relief at the
conclusion - we hope - of a conflict that has consistently brought out the worst in this country. But at the same time, those on the democratic
Left look to the future with unease. Even under a reputedly liberal president, we have reason to worry about
new versions of Iraq - in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran or venues yet undisclosed . To its credit, Dissent has not joined the
rush to avert attention from the endgames of the Iraq conflict. The Spring 2009 edition features a section of articles under the rubric "Leaving Iraq." The
essays focus on the moral and political quandaries of America's departure from a country that it did a great deal to break, but where its ability to repair
things is rapidly diminishing. But, a look at the proposals put forward there makes it clear that the

thinking that gave us the American


invasion of Iraq in the first place has not gone away. George Packer, for example, inveighs against those seeking a
quick exit for American forces. The balance of power among Iraq's domestic forces could easily be upset , he
holds, and valuable progress undone, without a longlingering presence of Americans as enforcers. Obviously playing to the sensitivities of Dissent
readers, he concludes that "much as we might wish [the war] had never happened at all, America will have obligations as well as interests in Iraq for a
long time to come." The

sense of all this, from Packer's standpoint, becomes clear when you recall his efforts to
discredit Americans' resistance to the war in the months before it began. The antiwar movement, he wrote in
the New York Times Magazine in December, 2002, "has a serious liability . . . it's controlled by the furthest reaches of the
American Left." He goes on, in this same article, to envisage a quite different role for those on the Left, like himself, who took what he considered
a more enlightened view: The "liberal hawks could make the case for war to suspicious Europeans and to wavering fellow Americans," he wrote; "they
might even be able to explain the connection between the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism ..." Brendan O'Leary, another contributor to Dissent's
Spring 2009 "Leaving Iraq" section, also stresses responsibility. He, too, means by this continued readiness to apply U.S. coercion to manage
Iraqi domestic politics. To judge from his words, he has no difficulty in principle with the notion of remaking Iraq by outside military force: "Reasonable
historians should judge ... that removing the genocidal Baathists was overdue," he avers. "The younger Bush made up for his father's mistake, though he
did so for the wrong reasons." Still, O'Leary allows that the invasion hasn't quite unfolded as he might have wished: "... grotesque mismanagement of
regime-replacement ... unnecessary and arrogant occupation ... incompetence of American direct rule... numerous errors of policy and imagination ... in
the horrors and brutalities that have followed." The America occupiers have sometimes proved "blindly repressive," he allows - but sometimes,
apparently, not repressive enough. Still, leaving before America sets things straight would be irresponsible. If the United States just keeps trying, it may
yet get it all right. This country must now manage the political forces set in motion by its invasion according to O'Leary's exacting formula: defend the
federalist constitution, keep resurgent Sunni and Shiite forces from each other's throats, and preserve the autonomy of the Kurds. Just the same, he notes,
"After the United States exits, an Arab civil war may re-ignite, as well as Kurdish-Arab conflict." To some of us, an invasion that leaves such possibilities
simmering after six years of American-sponsored death and destruction itself seems more than a little irresponsible. Some of the aims invoked by Packer
and O'Leary are beyond reproach. Certainly the United States bears profound responsibilities to protect Iraqis at risk from their collaboration with or
employment by American forces - and for that matter, to help repair damage to the country's infrastructure resulting from the invasion. And certainly this
country should do everything possible to prevent regional, communal, and ethnic groupings from exploiting a U.S. pullout to oppress others. But making
good on any of these estimable goals, as the authors seem to realize, will be a very big order - especially given America's record thus far. Yet the

deeper, mostly unstated assumptions underlying these authors' proposals ought to strike a chill throughout
the democratic Left. Their problems with the Iraq invasion - and implicitly, future American military exploits of the same kind have to do with execution, not the larger vision of American power that inspired the enterprise . Their words
strike an eerie resonance with those of Thomas L. Friedman, before the invasion occurred: he favored George W.
Bush's "audacious" war plan as "a job worth doing," but only "if we can do it right ." America's violent remaking of Iraq would
have been entirely acceptable, it seems, if only Friedman's sensibilities could have guided it. More important: the continuing mission of the
United States as maker and breaker of regimes around the world remained unquestioned. When any country
gets seriously in the way of American power, the global responsibilities of this country are apt to require
action like that taken in Iraq. We hear this kind of thinking in its most outof-the-closet form from
neoconservatives - who gave us the Iraq invasion in the first place. But its roots in American history lie at least as far back
as notions of Manifest Destiny. Its key inspiration is a particularly aggressive form of American exceptionalism.
Some higher power - fate, Divine Providence, or special "moral clarity" - has created opportunities, indeed obligations, for
America to set things straight on a global scale. Versions of this idea are pervasive among thinkers - American
foreign policy elites, and those who would guide them - who would disclaim identification with the neocons . Often conveying the
doctrine are code words referring to special "responsibilities" of the United States to guarantee world "stability." Or, as Madeleine Albright, then U.S.

ambassador to the United Nations, stated, "If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see
further into the future. . ." To her credit, Albright's effusions in this direction stopped short of support for invading Iraq - something that cannot be said for
the so-called liberal hawks. Accepting

this view of America as the ultimate and rightful arbiter of global affairs - as
superpower, to use less upbeat terms - triggers the weightiest implications and consequences.
Nearly all of them, I hold, run in collision course to the best aims and directions of the democratic Left. Yet
even for thinkers who identify themselves as being on the Left, acceptance of a hyper-militarized America,
and its concomitant role of global enforcer, often passes without question. For those of us who challenge
this view, the invasion of Iraq was wrong for fundamental political and - indeed - moral reasons. Not because it
was mismanaged. Not because too few troops were dispatched; not because the Iraqi Army was disbanded; not because the occupation was
master hegemon or world

incompetent, corrupt, and often criminally negligent. It was wrong because wars of this kind are always wrong - aggressive, opportunistic wars of choice,
aimed at revamping entire countries to fit the dictates of the invaders. These wars

are wrong because of the destruction and


distortions that they spread both abroad and at home. Among nations, they countervail against one of the subtle
but hopeful tendencies in the world today - the movement away from sole reliance on brute state power to
resolve international conflict and toward supranational authorities, multilateral decision -making, and
establishment of powers above the level of states. At home, the effects are even more insidious. For in order
to make itself the kind of country capable of "projecting power" anywhere in the world, as America has
done so unsuccessfully in Iraq, it has had to impose vast demands and distortions upon its own domestic
life.

Link -- Hegemony [Rule]


The Logic of US Exceptionalism militarizes society and greases the wheels of intervention. Their
obsession with the specifics of military distribution instead of the framing that allowed fiascos like
Iraq to happen makes error replication and future intervention inevitable.
And, their discourse distorts their description of the world and means the affs harms only exist in
their imperialist imagination. This militarization of society makes war fighting the end point of
existence which leads to no value to life because we are cooped up in our homes with duct tape, water
bottles and Fox news too afraid to leave.
Pursuit of hegemony is a fantasy of control that relies upon construction of threatening Otherness --this prompts resistance and create a permanent state of conflict
Chernus 6 (Ira, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program University of
Colorado-Boulder, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin, p. 53-54)
The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale. The neocons want to
turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it wont stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order.
So the neocons efforts inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented
power has unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already
has, and so is almost by definition always overextended. Gary Dorrien sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way,
too: For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it maybe, it never feels
secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary
claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons,
heightened by ideological ardor.39 If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of
resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no good way to distinguish between nations
or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that dont. Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential
threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. Its no surprise that a
nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is
likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can
say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will
resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really
is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure.
Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its
plans largely secret. Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a secret plan for world conquest. Now
here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to [end page 53] hear. That hardly seems
well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front
that the neocons long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer a statement of enveloping peril and no
hypothesis for any real solution. They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their
story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never
be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: We should not try to convince people that
things are getting better. Michael Ledeen: The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.40 This vision of endless conflict is
not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless
resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the
U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the manly virtues of militarism. They have
to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must
sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes
appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy. The
neocons story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is
about creating a society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having
superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy. Just as neocons need monsters abroad,
they need a frightened society at home. Only insecurity can justify their shrill call for a stronger nation (and a higher military budget).
The more dire their warnings of insecurity, the more they can demand greater military strength and moral resolve. Every foreign
enemy is, above all, another occasion to prod the American people to overcome their anxiety, identify evil, fight resolutely against it,
and stand strong in defense of their highest values. Hegemony will do no good unless there is challenge to be met, weakness to be
conquered, evil to be overcome. The American people must actively seek hegemony and make sacrifices for it, to show that they are
striving to overcome their own weakness. So the quest for strength still demands a public confession of weakness, just as the neocons
had demanded two decades earlier when they warned of a Soviet nuclear attack through a window of vulnerability. The quest for
strength through the structures of national security still demands a public declaration of national insecurity. Otherwise, there is nothing
to overcome. The more frightened the public, the more likely it is to believe and enact the neocon story.

Culminates in planetary annihilation

Dallymayr 4 (Fred, Professor of Philosophy and Political Science University of Notre Dame, The Underside of Modernity:
Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel, Constellations, 11(1))
What Dussel here calls asymmetry is otherwise often called hegemony or else the onset of a new global imperialism
(involving the rule of the West over the Rest). In such a situation, nothing can be more important and salutary than
the cultivation of global critical awareness, of critical counter-discourses willing and able to call into question the presumptions of
global imperial rule. The dangers of such totalizing domination are becoming more evident every day. With the
growing technological sophistication of weaponry we are relentlessly instructed about the underside of

modernity, about the fateful collusion of power and knowledge in the unfolding of modern enlightenment
(as analyzed by Adorno and Horkheimer). Coupled with the globalizing momentum, military sophistication greatly
enhances the prospect of global warfare indeed of global total warfare (as envisaged by Heidegger in the 1930s).
Such warfare, moreover, is profiled against the backdrop of hegemonic asymmetry (as seen by Dussel): the vastly
unequal possession of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. In this situation, the goal of global
warfare is bound to be the total subjugation of less developed or subaltern societies a subjugation
accomplished through longdistance military offensives capable of inflicting maximum casualties on
enemies while minimizing the attackers costs.25 Given the intoxicating effects of global rule, must one not also anticipate
corresponding levels of total depravity and corruption among the rulers? In fact, must one not fear the upsurge of a new breed of
global master criminals (planetarische Hauptverbrecher) whose actions are likely to match those of their twentieth-century
predecessors, and perhaps even surpass them (behind a new shield of immunity)? Armed with unparalleled nuclear devices
and unheard-of strategic doctrines, global masters today cannot only control and subjugate populations, but in
fact destroy and incinerate them (from high above). In the words of Arundhati Roy, addressed to the worlds imperial
rulers:To slow a beast, you break its limbs. To slow a nation, you break its people; you rob them of volition. You
demonstrate your absolute command over their destiny. You make it clear that ultimately it falls to you to decide who lives, who dies,
who prospers, who doesnt. To exhibit your capability you show off all that you can do, and how easily you can do it how easily you
could press a button and annihilate the earth.26

Link -- Hegemony [Burke]


US Leadership ensures destruction we only believe it is stabilizing because we refuse to question it
Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, 7 [Beyond
Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 231-2]
Yet the first act in America's 'forward strategy of freedom' was to invade and attempt to subjugate Iraq,
suggesting that, if 'peace' is its object, its means is war: the engine of history is violence, on an enormous
and tragic scale, and violence is ultimately its only meaning. This we can glimpse in 'Toward a Pacific Union', a deeply
disingenuous chapter of Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man. This text divides the earth between a 'posthistorical' world of affluent developed democracies where 'the old rules of power-politics have decreasing relevance', and a
world still 'stuck in history' and 'riven with a variety of religious, national and ideological conflicts'. The two worlds will
maintain 'parallel but separate existences' and interact only along axes of threat, disturbance and crucial strategic interest:
oil, immigration, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Because 'the relationship between
democracies and nondemocracies will still be characterised by mutual distrust and fear', writes Fukuyama, the 'posthistorical half must still make use of realist methods when dealing with the part still in history ... force will still be the

naturalises war and


coercion as the dominant mode of dealing with billions of people defined only
ultima ratio in their relations'. For all the book's Kantian pretensions, Fukuyama

through their lack of 'development' and 'freedom'. Furthermore, in his advocacy of the 'traditional moralism of American
foreign policy' and his dismissal of the United Nations in favour of a NATO-style 'league of truly free states ... capable of
much more forceful action to protect its collective security against threats arising from the non-democratic part of the
world' we can see an early premonition of the historicist unilateralism of the Bush administration. 72 In this light, we

can see the invasion of Iraq as continuing a long process of 'world-historical' violence that
stretches back to Columbus' discovery of the Americas, and the subsequent politics of genocide, warfare
and dispossession through which the modem United States was created and then expanded
- initially with the colonisation of the Philippines and coercive trade relationships with China and Japan, and eventually
to the self-declared role Luce had argued so forcefully for: guarantor of global economic and strategic
order after 1945. This role involved the hideous destruction of Vietnam and Cambodia,
'interventions' in Chile, El Salvador, Panama, Nicaragua and Afghanistan (or an ever more
destructive 'strategic' involvement in the Persian Gulf that saw the United States first building up Iraq as a formidable
regional military power, and then punishing its people with a 14-year sanctions regime that caused the deaths of at least
200,000 people), all of which we are meant to accept as proof of America's benign intentions ,

of America putting its 'power at the service of principle'. They are merely history working itself out, the
'design of nature' writing its bliss on the world.73 The bliss 'freedom' offers us, however, is the bliss of
the graveyard, stretching endlessly into a world marked not by historical perfection or
democratic peace, but by the eternal recurrence of tragedy, as ends endlessly
disappear in the means of permanent war and permanent terror. This is how we must

understand both the prolonged trauma visited on the people of Iraq since 1990, and the inflammatory impact the US
invasion will have on the new phenomenon of global antiWestern terrorism. American exceptionalism has deluded US
policymakers into believing that they are the only actors who write history, who know where it is heading, and how it will
play out, and that in its service it is they (and no-one else) who assume an unlimited freedom to act. As a senior adviser to
Bush told a journalist in 2002: 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality . . We're history's
actors."

Link -- Hegemony [Burke]


Heg may have deterred a few foes, but the question is whether its worth it -- Burke says hegemony's
dominant means of peace is through war. Only our argument is based in empirics -- historical
violence stemming from US leadership archives genocide and dispossession in Vietnam, Cambodia,
Iraq, and Afghanistan.
The 1NC Burke ev criticizes their claims to national existence and a state that admits no questioning
their commitment to national security creates problematizations of the truth that drive out peaceful
global rule of the political.
Pursuit of hegemony is a fantasy of control that relies upon construction of threatening Otherness --this prompts resistance and create a permanent state of conflict
Chernus 6 (Ira, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program University of
Colorado-Boulder, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin, p. 53-54)
The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale. The neocons want to
turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it wont stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order.
So the neocons efforts inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented
power has unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already
has, and so is almost by definition always overextended. Gary Dorrien sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way,
too: For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it maybe, it never feels
secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary
claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons,
heightened by ideological ardor.39 If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of
resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no good way to distinguish between nations
or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that dont. Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential
threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. Its no surprise that a
nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is
likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can
say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will
resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really
is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure.
Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its
plans largely secret. Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a secret plan for world conquest. Now
here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to [end page 53] hear. That hardly seems
well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front
that the neocons long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer a statement of enveloping peril and no
hypothesis for any real solution. They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their
story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never
be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: We should not try to convince people that
things are getting better. Michael Ledeen: The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.40 This vision of endless conflict is
not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the neocons fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless
resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the
U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the manly virtues of militarism. They have
to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must
sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes
appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy. The
neocons story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is
about creating a society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having
superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy. Just as neocons need monsters abroad,
they need a frightened society at home. Only insecurity can justify their shrill call for a stronger nation (and a higher military budget).
The more dire their warnings of insecurity, the more they can demand greater military strength and moral resolve. Every foreign
enemy is, above all, another occasion to prod the American people to overcome their anxiety, identify evil, fight resolutely against it,
and stand strong in defense of their highest values. Hegemony will do no good unless there is challenge to be met, weakness to be
conquered, evil to be overcome. The American people must actively seek hegemony and make sacrifices for it, to show that they are
striving to overcome their own weakness. So the quest for strength still demands a public confession of weakness, just as the neocons
had demanded two decades earlier when they warned of a Soviet nuclear attack through a window of vulnerability. The quest for
strength through the structures of national security still demands a public declaration of national insecurity. Otherwise, there is nothing
to overcome. The more frightened the public, the more likely it is to believe and enact the neocon story.

Culminates in planetary annihilation

Dallymayr 4 (Fred, Professor of Philosophy and Political Science University of Notre Dame, The Underside of Modernity:
Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel, Constellations, 11(1))
What Dussel here calls asymmetry is otherwise often called hegemony or else the onset of a new global imperialism
(involving the rule of the West over the Rest). In such a situation, nothing can be more important and salutary than
the cultivation of global critical awareness, of critical counter-discourses willing and able to call into question the presumptions of
global imperial rule. The dangers of such totalizing domination are becoming more evident every day. With the
growing technological sophistication of weaponry we are relentlessly instructed about the underside of

modernity, about the fateful collusion of power and knowledge in the unfolding of modern enlightenment
(as analyzed by Adorno and Horkheimer). Coupled with the globalizing momentum, military sophistication greatly
enhances the prospect of global warfare indeed of global total warfare (as envisaged by Heidegger in the 1930s).
Such warfare, moreover, is profiled against the backdrop of hegemonic asymmetry (as seen by Dussel): the vastly
unequal possession of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. In this situation, the goal of global
warfare is bound to be the total subjugation of less developed or subaltern societies a subjugation
accomplished through longdistance military offensives capable of inflicting maximum casualties on
enemies while minimizing the attackers costs.25 Given the intoxicating effects of global rule, must one not also anticipate
corresponding levels of total depravity and corruption among the rulers? In fact, must one not fear the upsurge of a new breed of
global master criminals (planetarische Hauptverbrecher) whose actions are likely to match those of their twentieth-century
predecessors, and perhaps even surpass them (behind a new shield of immunity)? Armed with unparalleled nuclear devices
and unheard-of strategic doctrines, global masters today cannot only control and subjugate populations, but in
fact destroy and incinerate them (from high above). In the words of Arundhati Roy, addressed to the worlds imperial
rulers:To slow a beast, you break its limbs. To slow a nation, you break its people; you rob them of volition. You
demonstrate your absolute command over their destiny. You make it clear that ultimately it falls to you to decide who lives, who dies,
who prospers, who doesnt. To exhibit your capability you show off all that you can do, and how easily you can do it how easily you
could press a button and annihilate the earth.26

Link Global Governance


The affirmatives call to maintain or reinstate a stable and secure global order only
masquerades as international benevolence. The ritual of peddling solutions to new
global problems only perpetuates a condition of continual crises by which security
apparatuses are able to justify themselves
Dillon and Reid, Professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster and lecturer in international relations at Kings College in London, 2000 [Michael
and Julian, Alternatives vol. 25, issue 1, spring, EbscoHost]

governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order


not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms
instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific
problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the
following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics,
resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is
As a precursor to global governance,

knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted,
in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of
procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous,
formidable materiality.[ 34]
More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy
problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as
interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these

epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous
attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and
compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their
client populations.
Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is
prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to
"sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management
of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization
is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for
policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of
their favored problematizations.

Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding


accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and
epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an
epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real
problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of
analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to
circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have
is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failurethe fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a
continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.
[ 35]

Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately
overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion
the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through
fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a
particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes
that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear
problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better

it deliberately installs socially


specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and
globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.
information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge,

LinkGlobal Coop
Belief in global cooperations ability to solve obscures the
causes of overexploitation and creates a utopian belief in
technologys ability to solve.
Ahmed 11Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is an international security analyst. He is Executive Director at
the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of IR, University
of Sussex, where he obtained his DPhil. [The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international
relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society, Global Change, Peace &
Security, Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011, Taylor and Francis Online]
2.3 Neoliberalism: mutual over-exploitation as normative
On the other hand, we have strategies of international cooperation to establish new global governance
regimes by which states can develop treaties and agreements to encourage mitigating action. It is now clear
that the massive proliferation of international legal treaties designed to regulate activities impacting
detrimentally on the environment and thus limit environmental degradation simply cannot be explained
under the realist theoretical framework. While this seemingly vindicates neoliberal theoretical
approaches which underscore the scope for rational state strategies of mutual cooperation,62 the latter

are still at a loss to explain the extent to which ethical norms and values, national cultures
and environmental and scientific advocacy underpin wide-ranging environmental regimes
which cannot be reduced purely to state interests.63
Much of the liberal literature also explores the regressive dynamic of the energy industry and its
international dimensions, though failing to escape realist assumptions about anarchy. Kaldor and her coauthors, for instance, note that conflicts can erupt in regions containing abundant resources when
neopatrimonial states collapse due to competition between different ethnic and tribal factions motivated by
the desire to control revenues.64 Similarly, Collier argues that the most impoverished populations inhabit
the most resource-wealthy countries which, however, lack robust governance, encouraging rampant internal
resource predation and therefore civil wars.65 Lack of robust governance thus facilitates not only internal
anarchy over resource control, but also the illicit and corrupt activities of foreign companies, particularly in
the energy sector, in exploiting these countries.66 This sort of analysis then leads to a staple set of

normative prescriptions concerned largely with ways of inculcating good governance, such
as transparency measures to avoid excessive secrecy under which oil companies indulge in
corruption; more robust international regulation; corporate social responsibility; and
cosmopolitan principles such as democratisation, political equality and freedom of civil
society.67
Yet such well-meaning recommendations often do not lead to sufficiently strong policy
action by governments to rein in energy sector corruption. 68 Furthermore, it is painfully
clear from the examples of Kyoto, Copenhagen and Cancun that international
cooperative state strategies continue to be ineffective, with states unable to agree on the
scale of the crises concerned, let alone on the policies required to address them. Indeed, while
some modest successes were apparent in the Cancun Accord, its proposed voluntary
emissions regime would still likely guarantee according to even mid-range climate models a
global average temperature rise of 4C or more, which would in turn culminate in many of
the IPCC's more catastrophic scenarios.69
This calls into question the efficacy of longstanding recommendations such as Klare's that
the international community develop unprecedented international mechanisms to
coordinate the peaceful distribution of natural resources in the era of scarcity and environmental
degradation.70 While at face value such regulatory governance mechanisms would appear
essential to avoid violent conflict over depleting resources, they are posited in a sociopolitical and theoretical vacuum. Why is it that such potentially effective international

mechanisms continue to be ignored? What are the socio-political obstacles to their implementation?
Ultimately, the problem is that they overlook the structural and systemic
causes of resource depletion and environmental degradation.
Although neoliberalism shares neorealism's assumptions about the centrality of the state as a unitary
rational actor in the international system, it differs fundamentally in the notion that gains for one state do
not automatically imply losses for another; therefore states are able to form cooperative, interdependent
relationships conducive to mutual power gains, which do not necessarily generate tensions or conflict.71

While neoliberalism therefore encourages international negotiations and global governance


mechanisms for the resolution of global crises, it implicitly accepts the contemporary social,
political and economic organisation of the international system as an unquestionable
given , itself not subject to debate or reform.72
The focus is on developing the most optimal ways of maximising exploitation of the
biophysical environment. The role of global political economic structures (such as centralised
private resource-ownership and deregulated markets) in both generating global systemic crises
and inhibiting effective means for their amelioration is neglected. As such, neoliberalism is
axiomatically unable to view the biophysical environment in anything other than a
rationalist, instrumentalist fashion, legitimising the over-exploitation of natural resources
without limits, and inadvertently subordinating the global commons to the competitive
pressures of private sector profit-maximisation and market-driven solutions, rather
than institutional reform .73 Mutual maximisation of power gains translates into
the legitimisation of the unlimited exploitation of the biophysical environment without
recognition of the human costs of doing so, which are technocratically projected
merely as fixable aberrations from an optimal system of cooperative progress.74
Consequently, neoliberalism is powerless to interrogate how global political economic
structures consistently undermine the establishment of effective environmental regimes .

Link Soft Power


The AFFs focus on security and international order is
merely a new discursive shift to cover up the antagonistic
demonization of the other which lies at the heart of their
politics. Their pedagogy and politics of soft power is not a
benign new order attempting to bring peace to the world,
the AFF is embedded in the old school discursive economy
of militarization which justifies unending war.
Chouliaraki 2009
/Lilie, Professor of Media and Communications at the London School of Economics, The Soft Power of
War, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, pg. 6-7/
Graham and Lukes paper Militarising the Body Politic: New Mediations as Weapons of Mass Instruction
opens up the section The Iraq war in political discourse. The paper makes the interesting point that neo-

feudal corporatism goes hand in hand with the hectic militarisation of contemporary bodies
politic the world over. Militarisation, however, primarily reveals itself as a political, economic
and cultural force in many societies, and therefore it requires the power of language soft
power. This is because militarisation requires the generation of new, negative evaluations of
other, antagonistic bodies politic in order both to safeguard its own legitimacy and to redefine the contours of political communities. Such evaluations of the antagonistic other are
inculcated by new and multiple mediations of meaning, which, by virtue of their global
reach, continuity and intensity act as pervasive forms of public pedagogy. The section on
political discourse continues with Faircloughs contribution Doctrine of International Community. Tony
Blairs contribution to an emergent hegemonic discourse of global security. The paper builds upon Graham
and Lukes point that contemporary bodies politic depend upon the power of discourse to
rationalise military interventions and re-define international community . What is currently
evidenced in the case of Iraq, Fairclough argues, is that old practices and doctrines have been

perceived as outdated, and new discourses have emerged as imaginaries of alternative world
orders. A struggle for hegemony has opened up, and one way of interpreting what we are
now seeing in the case of Iraq is that a would-be hegemonic discourse is being materialised
and enacted. Looking at Blairs contribution to this process over the period 19992003, Fairclough
critically engages with the emergence, diffusion, and bid for international hegemony of new
discourses (and narratives) of international affairs, global security, and international
community. Teun van Dijks paper, War Rhetoric of a Little Ally: Political Implicatures and Aznars
Legitimatisation of the war in Iraq, examines the speeches by Jos Mara Aznar held in Spanish parliament
in 2003 justifying his decision to enter the coalition in the war against Iraq. Within a framework of
multidisciplinary critical discourse analysis, van Dijk pays special attention to political implicatures,
defined as inferences based on general and particular political knowledge as well as on the context models
of Aznars speeches. He argues that such analysis reveals significant sociopolitical aspects of Aznars
discourse and gives insight into the broad bank of discursive resources through which the

project of war is narrated and legitimised.

Their Rhetoric of Soft Power is a Reality of the Worst Forms of Violent Foreign
Policy Their Truth is Racism.
Amy Kaplan, Prof. of English @ Univ. of Pennslyvania, 3 [American Quarterly 56.1, Violent
Belongings and the Question of Empire Today, p. muse]
Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, is that of the
"reluctant imperialist." 10 In this version, the United States never sought an empire and may
even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of
earlier empires and the failures of modern states, which abuse the human rights of their own
people and spawn terrorism. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity
and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the
world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative; backed by unparalleled force, the
United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an
[End Page 4] uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writesnot reluctantly at allin "Supremacy
by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World": "The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a
fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those
characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived;
respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood.
At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an
organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society." 11 This narrative does
imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and
shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by
the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and
peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the
world is remade in our image. This is also a narrative about race. The images of an unruly
world, of anarchy and chaos, of failed modernity, recycle stereotypes of racial inferiority from
earlier colonial discourses about races who are incapable of governing themselves, Kipling's
"lesser breeds without the law," or Roosevelt's "loosening ties of civilized society," in his
corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his much-noted article in the New York Times Magazine
entitled "The American Empire," Michael Ignatieff appended the subtitle "The Burden" but
insisted that "America's empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and
the white man's burden." 12 Denial and exceptionalism are apparently alive and well. In
American studies we need to go beyond simply exposing the racism of empire and examine the
dynamics by which Arabs and the religion of Islam are becoming racialized through the
interplay of templates of U.S. racial codes and colonial Orientalism. These narratives of the
origins of the current empirethat is, the neoconservative and the liberal interventionisthave
much in common. They take American exceptionalism to new heights: its paradoxical claim to
uniqueness and universality at the same time. They share a teleological narrative of inevitability,
that America is the apotheosis of history, the embodiment of universal values of human rights,
liberalism, and democracy, the "indispensable nation," in Madeleine Albright's words. In this
logic, the United States claims the authority to "make sovereign judgments on what is right and
what is wrong" for everyone [End Page 5] else and "to exempt itself with an absolutely clear
conscience from all the rules that it proclaims and applies to others." 13 Absolutely protective of
its own sovereignty, it upholds a doctrine of limited sovereignty for others and thus deems the
entire world a potential site of intervention. Universalism thus can be made manifest only
through the threat and use of violence. If in these narratives imperial power is deemed the
solution to a broken world, then they preempt any counternarratives that claim U.S. imperial
actions, past and present, may have something to do with the world's problems. According to this
logic, resistance to empire can never be opposition to the imposition of foreign rule; rather,
resistance means irrational opposition to modernity and universal human values. Although these
narratives of empire seem ahistorical at best, they are buttressed not only by nostalgia for the
British Empire but also by an effort to rewrite the history of U.S. imperialism by appropriating a
progressive historiography that has exposed empire as a dynamic engine of American history. As
part of the "coming-out" narrative, the message is: "Hey what's the big deal. We've always been
interventionist and imperialist since the Barbary Coast and Jefferson's 'empire for liberty.' Let's
just be ourselves." A shocking example can be found in the reevaluation of the brutal U.S. war

against the Philippines in its struggle for independence a century ago. This is a chapter of history
long ignored or at best seen as a shameful aberration, one that American studies scholars here
and in the Philippines have worked hard to expose, which gained special resonance during the
U.S. war in Vietnam. Yet proponents of empire from different political perspectives are now
pointing to the Philippine-American War as a model for the twenty-first century. As Max Boot
concludes in Savage Wars of Peace, "The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U.S.
armed forces' ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaignone that was bigger
and uglier than any that America is likely to confront in the future." 14 Historians of the United
States have much work to do here, not only in disinterring the buried history of imperialism but
also in debating its meaning and its lessons for the present, and in showing how U.S.
interventions have worked from the perspective of comparative imperialisms, in relation to other
historical changes and movements across the globe. The struggle over history also entails a
struggle over language and culture. It is not enough to expose the lies when Bush hijacks words
[End Page 6] such as freedom, democracy, and liberty. It's imperative that we draw on our
knowledge of the powerful alternative meanings of these key words from both national and
transnational sources. Today's reluctant imperialists are making arguments about "soft power,"
the global circulation of American culture to promote its universal values. As Ignatieff writes,
"America fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and desires." 15 The work
of scholars in popular culture is more important than ever to show that the Americanization of
global culture is not a one-way street, but a process of transnational exchange, conflict, and
transformation, which creates new cultural forms that express dreams and desires not dictated by
empire. In this fantasy of global desire for all things American, those whose dreams are
different are often labeled terrorists who must hate our way of life and thus hate humanity itself.
As one of the authors of the Patriot Act wrote, "when you adopt a way of terror you've excused
yourself from the community of human beings." 16 Although I would not minimize the
violence caused by specific terrorist acts, I do want to point out the violence of these definitions
of who belongs to humanity. Often in our juridical system under the Patriot Act, the accusation
of terrorism alone, without due process and proof, is enough to exclude persons from the
category of humanity. As scholars of American studies, we should bring to the present crisis our
knowledge from juridical, literary, and visual representations about the way such exclusions
from personhood and humanity have been made throughout history, from the treatment of
Indians and slaves to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.

Soft Power is not a neutral phenomenon aimed towards universal good rather, soft
powers very attractiveness is the product of hegemonic and imperialist values with
which the U.S. dominates the international system. Soft Powers softness is the link
it attempts to deny the third worlds true interest by duping impoverished states to
participate in the U.S. led international system.
Bilgin, 2008. Bilgin, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University and
Elis, phd candidate, Department of International Relations, Ankara University, 2008,
Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis, Insight Turkey Vol. 10 / No. 2 / 2008
pp. 5-20
Nye is not the best candidate for presenting such a critique, for he fails to inquire into his
own core concept of attraction. This is rather unfortunate, because by doing so he replicates the
essentialism of realist power analysis. Just as realist IR fails to look into the production of
military power, Nye accepts as pre-given the stockpile of soft power, i.e. U.S. attraction, and
focuses his account on the ways in which that stockpile could best be utilized. Admittedly, Nye
assigns two ontological statuses to attraction, as Mattern points out: one as an essential
condition and one as a result of social interaction.42 Still, throughout his analysis, Nye relies on
the former and fails to push the latter to its full conclusion. Even as he identifies the sources of
soft power as the attractiveness of a countrys culture, political ideas and policies,43 Nye does
not reflect upon how was it that U.S. cul ture, political ideas and policies came to be considered
attractive by the rest of the world.44 Nyes silence on the production of soft power is somewhat
Perhaps

surprising, as his agony over the decline of U.S. soft power during George W. Bush
administration45 suggests his cognizance of its variability.46 Still, nowhere in his writings does
Nye seek to inquire into the historical processes through which the attractive ness of U.S.
culture has been produced. Indeed, as Bially Mattern also points out, while Nye favors universal
values over the parochial, he says nothing about why universal values are the right ones or
how one acquires such values.47 Perhaps more importantly, Nye remains silent on the historical
process through which particular values have come to be considered as universal and right and
others have been rendered parochial and less right. An analysis of the attractiveness of U.S.
culture and values that is historically and sociologically attentive to their produc tion would
inquire into soft power in terms of U.S. hegemony and domination.48 Failing that, stating a
preference for soft power while relying on essentialist notions of culture and identity
communicates a benign picture of U.S. hegemony and does not allow the capturing of not-sosoft aspects of soft power (see below).49 On one level, there are no surprises here. Nye is not
interested in inquiring into how the opponents of the U.S. are relegated to silence through
various expressions of soft power. As the sub-title of his book (Soft Power: the Means to
Success in World Politics) indicates, his is an unabashedly unreflexive take on the best ways to
further U.S. success.50 In offering a particular conception of soft power, Nye not only
introduces a new concept; he also calls on the United States to make more efficient use of its
existing stockpile of soft power. That the kind of soft power he calls for the United States to
utilize is not-so-soft insofar as its effects on the rest of the world are concerned does not seem
to worry him.

Soft power is colonialism masked in rhetoric and values the affirmative effaces the
violence of the political context of soft-powers emergence, guaranteeing it is nothing
more than an imperialist tool
Bilgin, 2008. Bilgin, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University and
Elis, phd candidate, Department of International Relations, Ankara University, 2008, Hard Power, Soft
Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis, Insight Turkey Vol. 10 / No. 2 / 2008 pp. 5-20
Lukes understands the third face of power as those instances when A may exercise power over B by
getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing,
shaping, or determining his very wants.52 Post-colonial peoples post-WWII rush towards sovereign
statehood may be viewed as an example of the third face of power whereby the international so ciety
shaped their wants while their actual circumstances called for other forms of political community. That is to
say, in Lukes framework, B does what A wants in apparent readiness contrary to its own interests. Put
differently, by exercising soft power, A prevents B from recognizing its own real interests. While Nyes
attention to As ability to shape Bs wants seem to render his analy sis three-dimensional, his lack of
curiosity into not-so-soft expressions of U.S. power renders his (soft) power analysis two-and-a-half
dimensional. This is mostly because Nye assumes that Bs real interests are also served when it follows
As lead. It is true that soft power does not involve physical coercion, but as Lukes reminded us, it is the
supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having
grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role
in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they
see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial.53 Going
back to the example of North/South relations, power is involved not only when the South does not express
its grievance because of the absence of opportunities to do so, but also when it seemingly has no grievances
as a consequence of the prevalent system of ideas that depoliticizes its status within the international
economic order.54 In a similar fashion, Nye is not interested in inquiring into the sources of U.S.
attraction, for he considers the U.S.s ability to shape the wants of others as befitting the latters real
interests. Accordingly, he misses a fundamental part of soft power, what Bohas describes as the early
shaping of taste, collective imaginary and ideals which con stitutes a way of dominating other countries.
This includes the reinforcing effect of the social process in favor of American power through goods and
values.55 As such, Nyes analysis remains limited in regard to the third face of soft power, where the
existing state of things is internalized by the actors, and the U.S.s expression of power seems benign and in
accordance with the real interests of others. With the aim of rendering power analysis more realistic, we

should open up to new research agendas as required by the multiple faces of power. Power is far too
complex in its sources, effects and production to be reduced to one dimension.59 Indeed, power is diffused
and enmeshed in the social world in which people live in such a way that there are no relations exempt
from power.60 Since power shapes the formation of actors consciousness, no interest formation can be
objective; defining what an actors real interests are is not free of power relations. That is to say, not only
the mobilization of bias and agenda-setting but also the produc tion and effects of all norms and values that
shape human consciousness should be critically scrutinized. This, in turn, calls for not three- but fourdimensional power analysis Lukes plus Foucault as dubbed by Guzzini.62 Contra Lukes, whose
three-dimensional power analysis rests on assumptions regarding (1) the possibility of uncovering power
relations, and (2) Bs objective (real) interests that A denies through various expressions of hard and soft
power, Foucault maintains that power and knowledge directly imply one another [in that] there is no
power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.63 The academic field of International
Relations constitutes a supreme example of the workings of the fourth face of power. Over the years,
students of IR have studied international relations as an effect of power. It is only recently that they have
begun to study power as an effect of international relations (as world politics) 64 and International
Relations (as an academic field).65 However, as Booth reminds us, such silences, as with IRs narrow
conception of power, are not natural, they are political. Things do not just happen in politics, they are
made to happen, whether it is globalization or inequality. Grammar serves power.66 One of the sites
where the productive effects of grammar in the service of power is most vis ible is the Third World. This
has been one of the central themes of postcolonial studies where [f]rom Fanon to Jan Mahomed to
Bhabha, the connecting theme is that Western representations construct meaning and reality in the Third
World. Concepts such as progress, civilized and modern powerfully shape the non-European
world.67 The ways in which grammar serves power becomes detectable through more realistic power
analysis. More realistic power analysis requires looking at instances of:68 A getting B to do what it wants
in the event of a visible conflict;a. A getting B to do what it wants in the absence of a visible articulation of
b. grievances during a visible conflict; A getting B to do what it wants by shaping Bs wants and needs so
that a visa. bile conflict does not occur; A getting B to do what it wants by constituting the field of
knowledge d. through which B realizes its subjectivity.69 It is in this last sense that IR has been complicit
in the ways in which grammar has served power. If power rolls out of the mouths of men, as well as the
barrels of guns,70 it is high time for more realistic power analyses that reflect upon their own moment(s)
and site(s) of production and expression.

Soft power is a realist tool used to justify transforming an


unstable world to mirror our interests
Eschen 5 [Penny Von Eschen, Associate Prof of History at UMich, 2005, Enduring Public Diplomacy,
American Quarterly 57.2 pg. 335-343. Muse]
Yet while public diplomacy has historically operated as a mystifying smoke screen , for all its
absurdities and contradictions, we cannot wish the term away. As Kennedy and Lucas demonstrate,

public diplomacy is emerging as "a crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of
American hegemony within a transformed global order," arguably as prominent as it was during
the cold war. If the resonances between the cold war and present-day public diplomacy are readily
apparent, the differences are also striking. During the cold war, the governments official disseminators of
overseas propaganda, the United States Information Agency and the Voice of America, were for export
only; it was illegal to distribute and broadcast their programs and bulletins within the United States. Yet
today, Kennedy and Lucas argue, global media and technology have made public diplomacy an open
communication forum. Any consideration of public diplomacy must take into account the greater difficulty
of the U.S. government to separate the domestic public from overseas audiences for American propaganda.
Moreover, if the state and civil society lines of cold war public diplomacy were often deliberately blurry,
through technologies of the Internet and expanded corporate power, public diplomacy has taken on

unprecedented shape-shifting characteristics. Halliburton, CNN, and Microsoft all circulate


as "America" with more authority than state agencies. While the "fake news" of the Bush
administration recently revealed by the New York Times has plenty of cold war precedents, such "public

diplomacy," as the authors contend, is rendered at once "more global by communications technology but
also more local by interventions in selected conflicts." For Kennedy and Lucas, these current efforts in
public diplomacy, even more unaccountable and amorphous than their cold war predecessors, not only

trace the contours of the new imperium, but they shape the conditions of knowledge
production and the terrain on which American studies circulates . [End Page 337] The urgency
of the authors questions about "the conditions of knowledge-formation and critical thinkingin the
expanding networks of international and transnational political cultures" was impressed upon me when I
recently spoke to a group of deans and directors of international study abroad programs. Most had worked
in the field for nearly two decades. Many worked at underfunded institutions. As they contended with the
retrenchment and possible collapse of their programs, two possible paths of salvation were presented to
them. The first was partnership with countries entering the "competition" for the George W. Bush
administrations Millennium Challenge Corporation. The program, administered by the State Department,
was established in 2003 ostensibly as a poverty reduction program through funding growth and
development initiatives. Its funding priorities, as its critics have noted, are closely tied to U.S. security
interests and do not favor the programs that would promote sustainability. Particularly jarring was the
language of assessment used in the competitive application process. If "transparency" seems an ironic
request from the secretive Bush administration, the standard of former adherence to World Bank and IMF
dictates as a criterion of eligibility seemed an especially harsh case of tough love. The second possibility
for funding dangled before the audience appeared even more sinister. The real money, a fund-raising expert
told the gathering, is in the Gulf states. Dont believe a thing you hear in the media, the educators were
instructed, about how negatively people in the Middle East perceive Americans. Rest assured, the speaker
continued, the moneyed elite from the Gulf states keenly desire degrees from American universities, and
they can afford your tuition. At a moment when journalists and scholars are denied visas and
entry into the country, making it impossible for many Middle Eastern scholars to attend the
American Studies Association meeting (as occurred in 2004 to name just one example), knowledge
production is indeed proceeding apace, as Kennedy and Lucas suggest, "by the new
configurations of U.S. imperialism." Hence, one critical task for American studies scholars is to

engage with the legacies of the institutional relationships between public diplomacy and
American studies as a field, and the contemporary reshaping of these relationships in
conditions not of our choosing. Kennedy and Lucass sobering portrait of the challenges faced by
practitioners of American studies make all the more urgent their invocation of John Carlos Rowes call for
the international field of American studies to devote its attention to the critical study of the circulation of
America. Invoking Rowe, Kennedy and Lucas propose collaborations with related disciplines in a critical
American studies. Such collaborations are crucial in the foregrounding and tracking of processes of U.S.
empire, and offer an important alternative to [End Page 338] attempts to "internationalize" American
studies that manifest themselves as a "distorted mirror of neoliberal enlargement." Following Kennedy and
Lucass call for collaboration with other fields, I want to return to the story of Duke Ellington in Iraq as a
means of decentering the "American" in critical American studies. I first want to emphasize the difficulty of
constructing even the most rudimentary context for the story of Ellington in Iraq. Despite the fine work of
such scholars as Douglas Little and Melani McAlister on the United States and the Middle East, along with
excellent work by Iraqi specialists, it is an understatement to say that the story of Iraq has been very much
on the periphery for Americanists interested in the global dimensions of U.S. power.6 Yet, when the Duke
Ellington orchestra visited Iraq, the United States was already deeply implicated in the unfolding events in
Iraq and the region. Not only had the Ellington band stumbled into the 1963 Iraqi crisis, but the experience
reprised that of Dave Brubeck and his quartet, who had been in Iraq on the eve of the coup in 1958 that had
brought Abd al-Karim Qassim to power. With surprising frequency, the State Department sent jazz
musicians to tense situations in countries and regions that have been neglected by historians yet were
constantly in the news as the U.S. went to war with Iraq in 2003. To mention only the examples from the
Middle Eastern and adjoining states, in addition to Brubecks and Ellingtons Iraqi performances, Dizzy
Gillespie toured Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1956; Dave Brubeck toured Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran in
1958; and Duke Ellington visited those same countries in 1963. The tumultuous history of U.S.Iraqi
relations simply vanishes in the still-dominant bipolar emphasis on U.S.Soviet conflict. It drops out, as
well, within the more neglected frame of anticolonialism. As Rashid Khalidi has pointed out, "there had
never been a state, empire, or nation of Iraq before British statesmen created it in the wake of World War
I."7 Yet if Iraq, along with other Gulf states, lacks the same history of colonization and decolonization

shared by Asia and Africa, it remains a central terrain for contemporary struggles over who controls the
resources of the formerly colonized world. If we, as Americanists, examine public diplomacy in this
context of the consolidation of U.S. hegemony in its quest for control over resources, the work
of specialists on Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and Latin America as well, where U.S. imperialism had
long beleaguered formally independent states, will be crucial for such an endeavor. An account of U.S.
public diplomacy and empire in Iraq can be constructed only through engaging fields outside the sphere of
American studies. Political scientist Mahmood Mamdani locates the roots of the current global crisis in
[End Page 339] U.S. cold war policies. Focusing on the proxy wars of the later cold war that led to CIA
support of Osama Bin Laden and drew Iraq and Saddam Hussein into the U.S. orbit as allies against the
Iranians, Mamdani also reminds us of disrupted democratic projects and of the arming and destabilization
of Africa and the Middle East by the superpowers, reaching back to the 1953 CIA-backed coup ousting
Mussadeq in Iran and the tyrannical rule of Idi Amin in Uganda. For Mamdani, the roots of contemporary
terrorism must be located in politics, not the "culture" of Islam. Along with the work of Tariq Ali and
Rashid Khalidi, Mamdanis account of the post1945 world takes us through those places where U.S.
policy has supported and armed military dictatorships, as in Pakistan and Iraq, or intervened clandestinely,
from Iraq and throughout the Middle East to Afghanistan and the Congo. For these scholars, these events
belong at the center of twentieth-century history, rather than on the periphery, with interventions and coups
portrayed as unfortunate anomalies. These scholars provide a critical history for what otherwise is posed as
an "Islamic threat," placing the current prominence of Pakistan in the context of its longtime support from
the United States as a countervailing force against India.8 Stretching across multiple regions, but just as
crucial for reading U.S. military practices in Iraq, Yoko Fukumura and Martha Matsuokas "Redefining
Security: Okinawa Womens Resistance to U.S. Militarism" reveals the human and environmental
destruction wrought by U.S. military bases in Asia through the living archive of activists who are
demanding redress of the toxic contamination and violence against women endemic to base communities.9
Attention to the development of exploitative and violent sex industries allows us to place such recent
horrors as the abuse, torture, and debasement at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in a history of military
practices.10 Taken together, these works are exemplary, inviting us to revisit the imposition of U.S. power
in East and South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, regions where the instrumental role of U.S. power in
the creation of undemocratic military regimes has often been overlooked. That none of these works has
been produced by scholars who were trained in American studies is perhaps not accidental, but rather
symptomatic of a field still shaped by insularity despite increasing and trenchant critiques of this insularity
by such American studies scholars as Amy Kaplan and John Carlos Rowe.11 In recommending that
American studies scholars collaborate with those in other fields and areas of study and by articulating
warnings about how easily attempts to "internationalize" can hurtle down the slippery slope of

neoliberal expansion, Kennedy and Lucas join such scholars in furthering the project of
viewing U.S. hegemony from the outside in. They [End Page 340] expose the insularity that
has been an abiding feature of U.S. politics and public discourse.

We must be especially critical of couching hegemony in


liberal terms. The hidden transcript of american security
elites creates imperialist and devstating outcomes.
Pieterse 7Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Sociology @ Illinois (Urbana) [Political and Economic
Brinkmanship, Review of International Political Economy 14: 3 p 467-468]

The neoconservative case for American power, as set forth in the Project for a New American
Century, is a straightforward geopolitical argument alongside a Wilsonian argument for
benevolent global hegemony to spread democracy. The former is relatively easy to deal with; since it
does not claim legitimacy it is plain geopolitics. The latter dominates in policy speeches and is a
harder nut to crack because it resonates with a wider constituency that shares the liberal
case for hegemony. Many liberals (not only Americans) also endorse strong American power. According
to Michael Ignatieff, it is the lesser evil (2004). According to Paul Berman, in response to terrorism war is

just (2003). It resonates with a long standing idea that spreading democracy is an American
mission (Smith, 1994).
At a recent meeting of the American Political Science Association, Joseph Nye said the United States
cannot win by hard power alone, but must pay more heed to soft power and global communications.

I asked him why should the United States win and he replied, the United States must win
because it is the worlds largest democracy and this is a dangerous world. This is a
quintessential liberal position and a tenet that runs the gamut of political positions. This may be a
dangerous and chaotic world, but the question is does American hegemony and preventive
war make it less or more dangerous?
While much recent criticism targets the neoconservatives, criticism should rather focus on
the liberal position because it claims a legitimacy that the neoconservative view lacks , is
shared by many more than the neoconservative view, is used by neoconservatives to garner
support for forward policies, and underpins bipartisan and public support for the defense industries.
Promoting democracy is controversial because exporting democracy and democracy from the barrel of a
gun are difficult propositions and inconsistent with policies of cooperating with authoritarian governments.
Indeed, the liberal view should be examined not in terms of its declared intentions but in
terms of its implementation. In the first part of this paper I discuss the views and methods of
American security professionals and argue that these stand in contrast to the declared liberal
aims of American policy. This is not merely a matter of unintentional messiness of action on
the ground but is often intentional and, I argue, part of a posture of political brinkmanship,
which goes back at least to the Kennedy administration. The Vietnam War, too, was part of

Kennedys global liberalism. Entering hegemony through the service entrance reveals the
tension between ends and means and exposes fundamental flaws in the liberal position .
The term brinkmanship was first used in relation to American policy during the Cuban missile crisis.
Brinkmanship refers to the policy or practice, especially in international politics and foreign policy, of
pushing a dangerous situation to the brink of disaster (to the limits of safety) in order to achieve the most
advantageous outcome by forcing the opposition to make concessions (Wikipedia). Brinkmanship was part
of the American stance during the cold war and has since become part of the habitus of superpower.
During the Reagan administration American foreign policy shifted from containment to rollback, pushing
back Soviet influence. Support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and the contras in Nicaragua and the
Irancontra affair were part of this (Mamdani, 2004). Rollback means occupying offensive positions, war of
maneuver and involves risk taking and brinkmanship. The unilateral policy which the United States
increasingly adopted after the end of the cold war (Skidmore, 2005) may be considered a form of
brinkmanship. Prolonging the unipolar moment as advocated by Charles Krauthammer (2002/2003) and
the grandiose defense policy guidance formulated by Paul Wolfowitz in 1992 to build American military
preparedness beyond rival challenges represent brinkmanship elevated to strategic posture. The reigning
theme of the 1990s, humanitarian intervention or the use of military force for humanitarian ends, merges
military force and Wilsonian ideals as an idea that Paul Wolfowitz and Kofi Annan can agree on (Rieff,
2005). The neoconservative approach and the Project for a New American Century is part of this series. It is
a project for turning American cold war victory into lasting supremacy and the willingness to take bold
risks to achieve this.

There is ample discussion of the outcomes of American policies, but this treatment focuses
on the intentions driving policies. Brinkmanship is a strong interpretation because it assumes
deliberate, calculated risk taking on the part of policy elites . It can be described as political
maximalism (Sestanovich, 2005). It may be difficult to demonstrate because the intentions of
policymakers are often classified. At times they are implied in policy statements and conceded
retroactively, in memoirs and biographies, though usually only in relation to policies that have proven
successful. As a source I use the views of security professionals, which are less guarded than those of
policymakers.
The cumulative effect of American economic policies are that exports become imports, the trade deficit
deepens, the economic base shrinks, income inequality widens and external deficits rise to unsustainable
levels. Could we view current American economic policies too as brinkmanship? Political brinkmanship,
though difficult to validate, is reasonable in outline and familiar as a theme. Economic brinkmanship,

which I explore in the second part, is a more difficult and unusual hypothesis. I argue that laissezfaire and
neoliberal policies represent willed risk taking by policy elites. As a source I use the arguments of
economists who argue that current trends and US debt are actually positive signs (e.g. Levey and Brown,
2005). These hypotheses may enable us to see larger patterns in American policies and raise new questions,
in particular on the relationship between intentional and unintended, unanticipated risk. The risks

accepted by policymakers and their adherents are often different from the public record
and the unanticipated consequences that follow are different again. This means that three
scenarios are in play: the public one, which is usually couched in terms of liberal hegemony
and promoting democracy; the classified script held by policy and security insiders; and the
script of actual processes as they unfold and the political and operational responses they
elicit.

Liberal intention to use hegemony for awesome produces


neoconservative results
Pieterse 7Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Sociology @ Illinois (Urbana) [Political and Economic
Brinkmanship, Review of International Political Economy 14: 3 p 474]

American military posture and action on the ground, then, do not merely fail to implement
a well intentioned project because the real world is messy and chaotic, but are in
fundamental respects designed to achieve the reverse of the liberal
mission . Real time hegemonic operations are schizophrenic double acts :
establishing order while following a politics of tension. The security institutions are
layered in formal and informal cultures and overt and covert operations (Baer, 2003). Liberal
hegemony is about bringing stability while security insiders may be concerned with
producing instability as part of a strategy of tension.

Soft power and integration are just the flip side of the
brutality of imperial containment and security.
Kennedy and Lucas 5Liam Kennedy, American Studies @ University College (Dublin) and
Scott Lucas, American Studies @ Birmingham [Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy, American
Quarterly 57.2 MUSE]
Members of the Bush Administration are fond of drawing analogies between the America of the early cold
war and the America of the present, especially to emphasize the material preponderance of the United
States at both historical moments and to underline the special responsibility that the nation bore and
continues to bear in the execution of its power.65 Yet, even as the U.S. government promotes the
assumption that "public diplomacy helped win the cold war, and it has the potential to win the war on
terror," it has established a framework for the waging of the contemporary battle that is very different from
that promoted fifty years ago.66 In both instances, a "war of ideas" is evoked to frame a bipolar

clash of civilizations and promote a national ideal of liberal democracy, yet the combination
of value and security in each instance is shaped by different geostrategic frameworks of
"national security." During the cold war the (publicly stated) regulatory paradigm was that
of "containment," which functioned to segment publics and information; in the war on terror
the leading paradigm is "integration," which seeks to draw publics into an American
designed "zone of peace." The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that "ridding the world
of terrorism is essential to a broader purpose. We strive to build an international order where more countries
and peoples are integrated into a world consistent with the interests and values we share with our
partners."67 Both paradigms, however, conceal strategic tensions. For many inside and outside U.S.
administrations in the 1950s, containment pointed toward coexistence with the Soviet bloc and its captive

peoples, precluding the extension of freedom through "liberation." For many inside and outside the current
administration, "integration" does not provide a solution for long-term war with rogue states and tyrants, a
war that has to be waged by and for a U.S. "preponderance of power."
It is our contention that political warfare tries to bridge, if not resolve, these tensions. In 1950, NSC 68
concluded with the mandate not only to "strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the nonSoviet nations" but also "to encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and
influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the
satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR."68 A half-century later Richard Haass, Director of
Policy Planning in the State Department (and far from an acolyte of the "neoconservative" movement),
easily moved from describing the goal of postcold [End Page 324]war U.S. foreign policy as

"a process of integration in which the United States works with others to promote ends that
benefit everyone" to acknowledging it is "an imperial foreign policy . . . a foreign policy that
attempts to organize the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions
within them."69
The National Security Act of 2002 states: "The U.S. will use this moment of opportunity to extend the
benefits of freedom across the globe. . . . We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy,
development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world."70 As in the cold war, "freedom" is
a prized trope of U.S. international affairs, but is now framed by a different set of ideological and policy
aims. The cold war conflation of "national interest" and the "free world" was a rhetorical reflection of a
realpolitik, state-centered approach to international affairs, often defined by struggles over territory and
sovereignty. The goal of the war on terror is "not to defend the free world but, rather, freedom itself."71
This is to say that freedom is now more fully abstracted and deterritorialized, just as the

empire is unbound in a perpetual war. "Freedom" is certainly the key trope of the war on
terror, the integer of idea and value, as Henry Hyde has clearly articulated: "In addition to genuine
altruism, our promotion of freedom can have another purpose, namely as an element in the U.S.'s
geopolitical strategy."72 In this sense, freedom is an abstracted signifier of American
imperialism; it is not a promise of negative liberty and social respect (the "empire of liberty"
reflected in the Constitution), but rather a harbinger of the "empire for liberty," which

combines the reinstantiation of the national security state with the pursuit of "virtuous
war."73 This combination makes a "regulatory fiction" of the American mythology of
freedom, transforming it into a master rationale for the neoliberal empire's symbolic
dramas of emergency and extension.74 Actions against the "enemies of freedom" (as defined by
President Bush) extend "national security" around the globe, producing spectacular military and
media campaigns in the process. In the promotion of "freedom" to foreign audiences, public
diplomacy is inextricably connected with the development and implementation of U.S.
foreign policy, charged with the awkward task of reconciling interests and ideals. This reconciliation
is always deferred, forever incomplete, yet it cannot be disavowed since it is the horizon of
the imperial imaginary projected by the extension of the national security state .

Link Multilateralism
Benign imperialismfaith in moderate multilateralism
prevents questioning imperial domination.
Shaikh 7Nermeen Shaikh, @ Asia Source [Development 50, Interrogating Charity and the
Benevolence of Empire, palgrave-journals]
And where, again, does this power for benevolent goodwill reside? In the post-war period, and especially
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it is the United States that sees itself
increasingly as the vanguard of human emancipation, John Winthrop's 'city upon a hill'. This is also
its rightful place, having emerged from a unique tradition (political, social, cultural and religious), which
has brought it to its current position of freedom and leadership. And so it is the US, sometimes in the
guise of multilateralism, most recently not as much, that exercises the most power globally. The
liberal, democratic-capitalist political system is triumphant . How, then, does one interrogate
American intervention in the world according to its own standards? How does one hold the US accountable
precisely for the goodwill it professes? Can the US hold itself accountable in any meaningful
sense?
Collateral damage One clue as to the possibility of such an auto-critique lies in a phrase that has become
part of the popular political imaginary: collateral damage. This term, inaugurated during the Cold War,
is perhaps the euphemism par excellence: it contains within it the cleansing, indeed the
impossibility, of culpability; it must be assumed that the US is always acting with good intentions,
and if events unfold in such a way as to suggest otherwise, then each instance is simply a
betrayal of the original intent, which is itself beyond reproach or at the very least, absolved of
the worst offences. In certain readings, the various forms of oppression and exclusion that make
up the collateral damage of imperial power might also be interpreted as constitutive of the
order in which they occur. In the economic realm, Joseph Stiglitz, for instance, argues that the West
has used its disproportionate share of economic power to maintain its position, most notably when it comes
to determining the terms of trade as well as the limits of free trade (an essential ingredient of the present
liberal-capitalist dispensation) (Stiglitz, 2002). This often, and perhaps unsurprisingly, results in a distinct
advantage for richer countries. In other readings, intentions may be harder to determine, but given that the
term collateral damage includes within it the possibility of its own exoneration, what can be said about the
likelihood of justice in such a system? If every inequality, every abuse, every infraction is seen as

an aberration, as a demonstration of the fact that the order has not yet reached its full
potential, are we to hope that this same order will eventually be equal to its own avowed
aspirations? The response to the latter question is of course widely affirmative. The problem is
that it is predicated on the claims of the dispensers of benevolent intervention themselves.
But it is necessary to interrogate these very claims to bring out the more egregious and
systematic forms of collateral damage and thereby question the very possibility of justice
within this order. On the one hand, as Stiglitz also points out, there is some hope: whereas previously
only the radical left was critical of the World Bank and IMF, now these critiques are far more widespread.
On the other hand, the possibility of a global, socialist revolution is scarcely found anywhere. Attempting to
speak from the perspective of the recipients of goodwill immediately, then, begs the question: is radical
structural change necessary before the possibility of justice in the realm of collateral damage can be born?

Link --Accidents
accident is a political strategy to obscure responsibility for nuclear violence
Hanna M. Segal, MB ChB FRC Training and Supervising Psychoanalyst British Pyscho-Analytic Society, 88 [Psychoanalysis
and the Nuclear Threat: Clinical and Theoretical Studies, p. 47]

The growth of technology is also used for a typically schizoid dehumanization and mechanization. There is
a kind of pervasive depersonalization and derealization. Pushing a button to annihilate parts of the world we have never
seen is a mechanized, split-off activity. Bracken (1984) contends that war is likely to happen as a result of our
machines getting Out of control. Everything is so automated that oversensitive machines could start an unstoppable nuclear
exchange. The MIT computer expert Joseph Weizen-baum (1976) comes to a similar conclusion: modern big computers are so
complicated that no expert can see through and control them. Yet the whole nuclear early warning system is based on these machines.
Since one effect of nuclear explosion is a disturbance in communication systems, it might not be within the power of governments to
stop a war even if they wished to. But the fact that we can even think that "machines will start the war, not us"
shows the extent of denial of our responsibility. We seem to live with a peculiar combination of helplessness
and terror and omnipotence-helplessness and omnipotence in a vicious circle; heightening one another . This
helplessness, which lies at the root of our apathy, is inevitable. We are faced with a horrifyingly threatening danger. But partly
it is induced by us and becomes a self--fulfilling prophesy. Confronted with the terror of the powers of

destructiveness we divest ourselves of our responsibilities by denial, projection, and fragmentation. The
responsibility is fragmented and projected further and further away-into governments, army, scientists, and,
finally, into machines beyond human control. We not only project into our so--called enemies, we also divest
ourselves of our responsibilities by projecting them onto governments. They, in turn, can not bear such responsibility, and they
project onto us, the people, public opinion, and so on, as well as fragmenting their responsibility as previously described. When we
project onto governments, we become truly helpless. We are in their hands.
Descriptions of nuclear accidents outweighs and turns the aff it dehumanizes people by describing
the process as purely mechanical removing the human element. Eliminating the role of agency in the
process and claiming machines are going to start the war not us ignores the discursive framing that
put that system in place, makes their impact inevitable thats Segal 88.
Accident fears are missile hysteria
Seng 2 [Tan See, Prof of Security Studies @ IDSS Singapore, July 2002, "What Fear Hath Wrought: Missile Hysteria and The
Writing of America, IDSS Commentary No. 28, http://www.sipri.org/contents/library/0210.pdf]
Few, to be sure, would doubt the sincerity of Secretary Rumsfeld when he averred last June: "I don't think vulnerability is a (viable)
policy."84 Clearly, Washington's preoccupation with missile defence has much to do with the Bush Administration's concern over
what it perceives as the strategic vulnerability of America to potential ballistic missile attack. Nonetheless, as important as debates
over whether or not the "missile threat" actually exists are to the study and practice of international relations, what is equally if not
more fundamental is the question of how discourses of danger figure in the incessant writing of "America" -

a particular and quite problematic identity that owes its materiality to textual inscriptions of difference and
Otherness. Missile hysteria in US national security discourse cannot be simplistically reduced to the level
of an ideological explanation - certainly not according to the classic formulation of Mannheim's. 85 Rather, what this paper has
demonstrated is the centrality of difference and deferral in discourse to the identity of America - a discourse of
danger, fear, and vulnerability posed by potential missile attacks against the US from "rogue states" and
accidental or unauthorized missile launches from a particular "China" or "Russia." The argument maintained here
has been that a particular representation of America does not exist apart from the very differences that
allegedly threaten that representation, just as the particular America of recent lore did not exist apart from Cold War-related
discourses of danger. If missile defence is (as Bauman, cited earlier, has put it) the "foolproof recipe" for exorcising the ghosts or
demons of missile hysteria, then Bush's national security advisors are the exorcists and shamans as well as the
constructors of national insecurity via missile hysteria. 86 However, the argument has not been that the Administration,
the Rumsfeld Commission, and other missile defence enthusiasts fabricated, ex nihilo, a ballistic missile threat against the US by
means of a singular, deliberate "act," which is what some constructivists in international relations, conspiracy theorists, and partisan
Democrats - an interesting if not motley collectivity - would have us believe. Nor has it been that language and discourse is
"everything" as linguistic idealists would have us imagine. Rather, through reiterative and coordinated practices by

which discourse produces the effects that it names, a certain normative representation of America
"emerges" - wrought, as it were, by fear and written into being by missile hysteria.

Link -- Democracy
Democratization is imperialism 2.0 exposing the flip side of this oppressive regime is necessary
Alison J.

Ayers

, Department of Political Science - Simon Fraser University, Imperial Liberties: Democratisation and

Governance in the New Imperial Order POLITICAL STUDIES:

2009

VOL 57, 127

Thus, far from non- or indeed anti-imperial, the current global mission to democratise the world is
internal to contemporary imperialism. For those who do constantly think within the horizons of the putatively non-imperial
present, the internationalisation of (neo)liberal democracy is presumed to be incompatible with imperialism, but this habitual and
normative acceptance is highly problematic (Marks, 2000; Tully, 2008). Mainstream accounts of democratisation

presuppose what requires explanation, taking for granted the non-imperial character of this global project,
the hegemony of a specific and impoverished model of (neo)liberal democracy, highly problematic, dehistoricised notions of state, society and self and the categorical separation of the domestic and the
international. The article seeks to address such lacunae through a critique of the project of democratisation. It provides detailed
empirical evidence from Africa. As such Africa is central while also curiously marginal to the general thesis. The article seeks to
demonstrate that far from an alternative to imperialism, the democratisation project involves the
imposition of aWestern (neo)liberal procedural form of democracy on imperialised peoples . As such,
democracy promotion is concerned, in part, with manufacturing mentalities and consent around the
dominant (neo)liberal notion of democracy, foreclosing attempts to understand or constitute democracy in
any other terms. It should be noted, however, that this project is executed somewhat inconsistently. Western powers have
been selective in their approach to liberal-democratic reform when countervailing strategic, economic or
ideological interests have prevailed. Thus Western governments have eschewed aid restrictions despite
gross and persistent violations of human rights or good governance in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Algeria,
Egypt, Colombia, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Niger (Callinicos, 2003; Crawford, 2001; Olsen, 1998). As demonstrated by
the situation in Uganda (detailed below) as well as Niger, in cases of violations of liberal democratic principles, official Western
agencies have routinely prioritised liberalisation over democratic principles. Likewise, in other instances, Western
intervention has terminated autonomous democratic processes, for example in Chile, Guatemala and Nicaragua (Slater, 2002).
Selective adherence notwithstanding, the orthodox (neo)liberal model of democracy claims universality. As Bhikhu Parekh notes in his
account of the cultural particularity of liberal democracy, such claims have aroused deep fears in the fragile and nervous societies of
the rest of the world (Parekh, 1992, p. 160). In seeking to constitute African (and other) social relations in its own particular image,

the democratisation project reproduces internal tensions and antinomies within liberal thought. As such, a
profound non-correspondence exists, in Mahmood Mamdanis (1992) terms, between received (neo)liberal democratic
theory and living African realities. Resistance is therefore widespread, with Western (neo)liberal democratic notions being reassessed in many places on the continent nowadays, often more censoriously than may be heard above the clamor of Euro-American
triumphalism (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1997, p. 141). As Michel Foucault argued in The Subject and Power,

between a relationship of power and a strategy of struggle there is a reciprocal appeal, a perpetual linking
and a perpetual reversal. The ensuing instability enables analysis either from inside the history of struggle or from the
standpoint of the power relationships as well as interaction or reference between the two (Foucault, 1994, p. 347). Each
approach is necessary but not possible within the scope of the present article. The article seeks to provide
analysis of the articulation of informal imperialism, inter alia through democracy and governance
interventions, as a necessary and prefigurative mapping exercise (Peterson, 2003) to understanding social
transformation, as well as the social conditions of possibility of alternative forms of relation and engagement.5 The mapping of
this project is essential in illuminating relations of power. The current imperial order is inimical to
democracy but to disrupt and redirect the particular orderings at work we must first be able to see them
clearly (Peterson, 2003, p. 173, emphasis in original). As such, analysis of how post-colonial imperialism is articulated is a
necessary precondition of thinking in an informed manner about resistance and transformation.

Democracy is discursive justification for imperialism it has empirically been use to invade and fix
other countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam. It also creates structural inequality because we
automatically take the side of democracies further alienating non-democratic regimes. This means
everyone is either With or Against us, that probably makes conflict more likely. The claim that
authoritarian regimes are conflict prone is laughable because the people at the top of the chain know
that wars would only risk destabilizing their position.
The myth of democratic peace is used to justify military interventionturns their advantage

Mueller, pol sci and IR prof, 9

pol sci prof and IR,

Ohio State. Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy. AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD
in pol sci from UCLA (John, Faulty Correlation, Foolish Consistency, Fatal Consequence: Democracy, Peace, and Theory in the
Middle East, 15 June 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/KENT2.PDF, p.. 7-10)
Philosophers and divines not only encased democracy in a vaporously idealistic or ideological mystique, they
have done the same for the democracy-peace correlation. After all, if correlation is taken to be cause, it
follows that peace will envelop the earth right after democracy does. Accordingly for those who value peace, the
promotion of democracy, by force or otherwise, becomes a central mission. This notion has been brewing for some
time. Woodrow Wilson's famous desire to "make the world safe for democracy" was in large part an antiwar motivation. He and many
others in Britain, France, and the United States had become convinced that, as Britain's Lloyd George put it, "Freedom is the only
warranty of Peace" (Rappard 1940, 42-44). With the growth in the systematic examination of the supposed peace-democracy
connection by the end of the century, such certain pronouncements became commonplace. Notes Bruce Russett, sentiments like those
have "issued from the White House ever since the last year of the Reagan administration" (2005, 395). Foolish consistency, fatal
consequence: the role of little statesmen It was left to George W. Bush to put mystique into practice. As he stressed to reporter Bob
Woodward during the runup to his war with Iraq, "I say that freedom is not America's gift to the world. Freedom is God's gift to
everybody in the world. I believe that. As a matter of fact, I was the person that wrote that line, or said it. I didn't write it, I just said it
in a speech. And it became part of the jargon. And I believe that. And I believe we have a duty to free people. I would hope we
wouldn't have to do it militarily, but we have a duty" (2004, 88-89). And in an address shortly before the war, he confidently
proclaimed, "The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the
ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life" (quoted, Frum and Perle 2003, 158). In this, Bush was only
trying to be consistent (foolishly so, perhaps, but nonetheless), a quality that endears him to so many of his followers. If democracy
is so wonderful, and if in addition it inevitably brings both peace and creates favorable policy preferences, then forcefully

jamming it down the throats of the decreasing number of nondemocratic countries in the world must be all
to the good. He had already done something like that, with a fair amount of success, in Afghanistan; his father had crisply slapped
Panama into shape; Reagan had straightened out Grenada; and Bill Clinton had invaded Haiti and bombed the hell out of Bosnia and
Serbia with the same lofty goal at least partly in mind. Further, the Australians had recently done it in East Timor and the British in
Sierra Leone (Mueller 2004, ch. 7). Critics have argued that democracy can't be spread at the point of a gun, but these cases, as well as
the experience with the defeated enemies after World War II, suggests that it sometimes can be, something that supporters of the
administration were quick to point out (Kaplan and Kristol 2003, 98-99. Frum and Perle 2003, 163). Even Russett, a prominent
democratic-peace analyst, eventually, if rather reluctantly, concedes the possibility (2005, 398-400; see also Peceny and Pickering
2006). However, Bush and some of his supporters--particularly those in the neo-Conservative camp --foolishly, if consistently,
extrapolated to develop an even more extravagant mystique. Not only would the invasion crisply bring viable
democracy to Iraq, but success there would have a domino effect: democracy would eventually spread from its Baghdad
bastion to envelop the Middle East. This would not only bring (it needs hardly to be said) blissful peace in its wake (because, as we
know, democracies never fight each other), but the new democracies would also adopt all sorts of other policies as well including, in
particular, love of, or at least much diminished hostility toward, the United States and Israel (because, as we know, the democratic
process itself has a way of making people think nice thoughts). Vice President Dick Cheney attests, reports Woodward, to Bush's
"abiding faith that if people were given freedom and democracy, that would begin a transformation process in Iraq that in years ahead
would change the Middle East" (Woodward 2004, 428). Moreover, since force can establish democracy and since democracies rather
automatically embrace peaceful and generally nice thoughts, after Iraq was forced to enter the democratic (and hence peaceful and
nice-thinking) camp, military force would be deftly applied as necessary to speed up the domino-toppling process wherever necessary
in the area. Such extravagant, even romantic, visions fill war-advocating neo-Conservative fulminations. In their book, The War Over
Iraq, Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol apply due reverence to the sanctified correlation--"democracies rarely, if ever, wage war
against one another"--and then extrapolate fancifully to conclude that "The more democratic the world becomes, the more likely it is
to be congenial to America" (2003, 104-5). And war architect Paul Wolfowitz also seems to have believed that the war would become
an essential stage on the march toward freedom and democracy (Woodward 2004, 428). In a 2004 article proposing what he calls
"democratic realism," Charles Krauthammer urges taking "the risky but imperative course of trying to reorder the Arab world," with a
"targeted, focused" effort that would (however) be "limited" to "that Islamic crescent stretching from North Africa to Afghanistan"
(2004 23, 17). And in a speech in late 2006, he continued to champion what he calls "the only plausible answer," an ambitious
undertaking that involves "changing the culture of that area, no matter how slow and how difficult the process. It starts in Iraq and
Lebanon, and must be allowed to proceed." Any other policy, he has divined, "would ultimately bring ruin not only on the U.S. but on
the very idea of freedom." And Kaplan and Kristol stress that "The mission begins in Baghdad, but does not end there....War in Iraq
represents but the first installment...Duly armed, the United States can act to secure its safety and to advance the cause of liberty--in
Baghdad and beyond" (2003, 124-25). With that, laments Russett, democracy and democratic peace theory became "Bushwhacked"
(2005). Democratic processes of pressure and policy promotion were deftly used by a dedicated group to wage costly war to establish
both peace and congenial policy in the otherwise intractable Middle East. It could be argued, then, that the little statesmen of the Bush
administration had the courage of the mystical convictions of the democracy and democratic peace philosophers and divines.
However, although Bush's simple faith in democracy may perhaps have its endearing side, how deeply that passion is (or was) really
shared by his neo-Conservative allies could be questioned. That is, did they really believe that the United States which, as
Francis Fukuyama notes, "cannot eliminate poverty or raise test scores in Washington, DC," could "bring democracy
to a part of the world that has stubbornly resisted it and is virulently anti-American to boot" (2004, 60)? nonIsraeli Middle East is, like Krauthammer's comparable vision, so fantastic as to border on the deranged.) Indeed, after one looks
beneath the boilerplate about democracy and the democratic peace, what seems to be principally motivating at
least some of these people is a strong desire for the United States to use military methods to make the Middle

East finally and once and for all safe for Israel (Drew 2003, 22; Fukuyama 2004; Roy 2003). All of them are devoted
supporters of Israel, and they seem to display far less interest in advocating the application of military force to deal with unsavory
dictatorial regimes in other parts of the world that do not seem to threaten Israel--such as Burma, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Haiti, or Cuba.
As John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt point out in their discussion of what they call "The Israel Lobby" (2006), such policy
advocacy is entirely appropriate and fully democratic: "There is nothing improper about American Jews and their Christian allies
attempting to sway US policy" (although they also note that Jewish Americans generally actually were less likely to support the war
than was the rest of the population). Democracy, as noted earlier, is centrally characterized by the contestings of
isolated, self-serving, and often tiny special interest groups and their political and bureaucratic allies . What
happened with Iraq policy was democracy in full flower. It does not follow, of course, that policies so
generated are necessarily wise, and Mearsheimer and Walt consider that the results of much of the Lobby's efforts--certainly in
this case--have been detrimental to American (and even Israeli) national interest, although their contentions that the Lobby was
"critical" or "a key factor" in the decision to go to war or that that decision would "have been far less likely" without the Lobby's
efforts would need more careful analysis. It is also their view that the Lobby has too much influence over U.S foreign policy--a
conclusion, as it happens, that is shared by 68 percent of over 1000 international relations scholars who responded to a 2006 survey.15
However that may be, it could certainly be maintained that, as an Israeli scholar puts it, the United States by its action eliminated what
Israel considered at the time to be a most "threatening neighbor" (Baram 2007). Following this line of thinking, then, the Israel
Lobby and its allies skillfully and legitimately used democracy to Bushwhack the democracy and democratic peace
mystiques as part of its effort to nudge, urge, or impel the United States into a war that, as it happens, has proven to be
its greatest foreign debacle in its history after Vietnam. It should be noted, however, that, although Bush and Cheney and at
least some of the neocons may actually have believed their pre-war fantasies about the blessings that imposed
democracy would in turn impose on the Middle East, the arguments they proffered for going to war stressed
national security issues, not democracy ones--the notion that Saddam's Iraq was a threat to the United States because of its
development, or potential development, of weapons of mass destruction and of its connections to terrorist groups out to get the United
States (Roy 2003). The democracy argument rose in significance, notes Russett, only after those security arguments
for going to war proved to be empty (2005, 396). As Fukuyama has crisply put it, a prewar request to spend "several hundred
billion dollars and several thousand American lives in order to bring democracy to...Iraq" would "have been laughed out of court"
(2005). Moreover, when given a list of foreign policy goals, the American public has rather consistently ranked the promotion of
democracy lower--often much lower--than such goals as combating international terrorism, protecting American jobs, preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons, strengthening the United Nations, and protecting American businesses abroad (see Figure 1).

Link -- Economy
Attempting to save the global economy from disaster is a
liberal order-building method of security
Mark Neocleous, Professor of Critique of Political Economy, Brunel University, 08 (Critique of Security,
McGill-Queens University, pp. 94-97, Published 2008)
But 'social security' was clearly an inadequate term for this, associated as it now was with 'soft' domestic policy issues such as old-age
insurance. 'Collective security' would not do, associated as it was with the dull internationalism of Wilson on the one hand and still
very much connected to the institutions of social security on the other." Only one term would do: national security. This

not to imply that 'national security' was simply adopted and adapted from 'social security'. Rather, what we
are dealing with here is another ideological circuit, this time between 'national security' and 'social security' ,
in which the policies 'insuring' the security of the population are a means of securing the

body politic , and vice versa;" a circuit in which, to paraphrase David Peace in the epigraph to this chapter, one can
have one's teeth kicked out in the name of national security and put back in through social security. Social security and national
security were woven together: the social and the national were the warp and the weft of the security fabric. The warp and the
welt, that is, of a broader vision of economic security. Robert Pollard has suggested that 'the concept of "economic

security'- the idea that American interests would be best sewed by an open and integrated economic system,
as opposed to a large peacetime military establishment - was firmly established during the wartime period'.
71 In fact, the concept of 'economic security' became a concept of international politics in this period, but the concept itself had a
longer history as the underlying idea behind social security in the 1930s, as we have seen. Economic security, in this sense,

provides the important link between social and national security, becoming liberalism's

strategic weapon of choice and the main policy instrument from 1945. As one State Department memo
of February 1944 put it, 'the development of sound international economic relations is closely related to the problem of security. But it
would also continue to be used to think about the political administration of internal order. Hence Roosevelt's comment that 'we must
plan for, and help to bring about, an expanded economy which will result in more security [and so that the conditions of 1932 and the
beginning of 1933 won't come back again'.' On security grounds, inside and outside were constantly folding into one
another, the domestic and the foreign never quite On the fabrication of economic order properly distinguishable. The
reason why lay in the kind of economic order to be secured: both domestically and internationally, 'economic security' is coda for
capitalist order.
Giving a lecture at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, Secretary of State George C.
Marshall recalled the disruption to the European economy during the war and Europe's continuing inability to feed itself, and
suggested that if the US did not help there would be serious economic, social and political deterioration which would in turn have a
knock-on effect on US capital. The outcome was a joint plan submitted to the US from European states at the end
of August, after much wrangling with the Soviet Union, requesting $28 billion over a four-year period (the
figure was reduced when finally agreed by Congress). The European Recovery Program (ERE known as the Marshall Plan) which
emerged has gone down as an economic panacea, 'saving' Europe from economic disaster. But as the first of
many such 'Plans', all the way down to the recent 'reconstruction' of Iraq, it does not take much to read the
original Marshall Plan through the lens of security and liberal order-building.
Alan Milward has suggested that

the conventional reading of the Marshall Plan and US aid tends to accept the picture of post-war

Europe on the verge of collapse and with serious social and economic discontent, such that it needed
to be rescued by US aid. In fact, excluding Germany, no country was actually on the verge of collapse.
There were no bank crashes, very few bankruptcies and the evidence of a slow down in industrial
production is unconvincing. There is also little evidence of grave distress or a general deterioration in the standard of living. By
late-1946 production had roughly equalled pre-war levels in all countries except Germany. And yet Marshall Aid came about. Milward
argues that the Marshall Plan was designed not to increase the rate of recovery in European countries or to

prevent European economies from deteriorating, but to sustain ambitious, new, expansionary economic and
social policies in Western European countries which were in fact already in full-bloom conditions. In other
words, the Marshall Plan was predominantly designed for political objectives - hence conceived and rushed through by the
Department of State itself."
Milward's figures are compelling, and complicate the conventional picture of the Marshall Plan as
simply a form of economic aid. But to distinguish reasons that are 'economic' reasons from reasons that are
'political' misses the extent to which, in terms of security, the economic and the political are entwined. This is
why the Marshall Plan is so inextricably linked to the Truman Doctrine's offer of military aid and intervention beyond us borders, a
new global commitment at the heart of which was the possibility of intervention in the affairs of other countries. As Joyce and Gabriel
Kolko have argued the important dimension of the Truman Doctrine is revealed in the various drafts of Truman's speech before it was

finally delivered on 12 March, and the private memos of the period. Members of the cabinet and other top officials understood very
clearly that the united States was now defining a strategy and budget appropriate to its new global commitments, and that a far greater
involvement in other countries was now pending especially on the economic level. Hence the plethora of references to 'a

world-wide trend away from the system of free enterprise's which the state Department's speech-writers
thought a 'grave threat' to American interests. Truman's actual speech to Congress is therefore more interesting for
what it implied than what it stated explicitly. And what it implied was the politics behind the Marshall Plan: economic security
as a means of maintaining political order against the threat of communism. The point then, is not just that
the Marshall Plan was 'political' how could any attempt to reshape global capital be anything but political ? It
is fairly clear that the Marshall Plan was multidimensional, and to distinguish reasons that are 'economic' reasons from reasons that are
'political' misses the extent to which the economic, political and military are entwined The point is that it was very much a project
driven by the ideology of security. The referent object of 'security here is 'economic order'. The government and
the emerging national security bureaucracy saw the communist threat as economic rather than military. As
Latham notes, at first glance the idea of military security within a broad context of economic containment merely appears to be one
more dimension of strength within the liberal order. But in another respect the project of economic security might itself be viewed as
the very force that made military security appear to be necessary. In this sense, the priority given to economic security

was the driving force behind the us commitment to underwrite milita ry security
for Western Europe." The protection and expansion of capital came to be seen as the path to security, and
vice versa. This created the grounds for a re-ordering of global capital involving a constellation of class and corporate forces as well
as state power, undertaken in the guise of national security. NSC-68, the most significant national security document to emerge in this
period, stated that the 'overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the
American system can survive and flourish'." In this sense we can also read the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, the Brussels Pact of March 1948 and the nascent movement towards 'European
Union' as part and parcel of the security project being mapped out." The key institutions of 'international order' in this period invoked
a particular vision of order with a view to reshaping global capital as a means of bringing 'security' political, social and economic from the communist threat.

Framing the economy in terms of security discourse leads states to implement protectionist or
unreliable policies, destroying the economic strength they attempt to preserve
Ronnie

Lipschutz

, Director Politics PhD Program, UC Santa Cruz,

1998

. On Security p.

11-12

The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere
more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and "economic security." What does it mean to be
competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue
socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: "Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International
Economic Interdependence") shows how strategic economic interdependence--a consequence of the growing liberalization
of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the everincreasing velocity of the product cycle--undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that, it is often
argued, are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies,
they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that by
and large the only such restrictions that have been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is
most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this "new security dilemma," as
Crawford has stylized it? According to Crawford, state decisionmakers can respond in three ways. First, they can try
to restore state autonomy through self-reliance although, in doing so, they are likely to undermine state
strength via reduced competitiveness. Second, they can try to restrict technology transfer to potential
enemies, or the trading partners of potential enemies, although this begins to include pretty much everybody. It also

threatens to limit the market shares of those corporations that produce the most innovative technologies.
Finally, they can enter into co-production projects or encourage strategic alliances among firms. The former
approach may slow down technological development; the latter places control in the hands of actors who are
driven by market, and not military, forces. They are, therefore, potentially unreliable. All else being equal, in all
three cases, the state appears to be a net loser where its security is concerned. But this does not prevent the state
from trying to gain.

US economic liberalism is part of the security insecurity paradox it undercuts other countries
sense of security, causing a self-fulfilling prophecy
Ronnie D.
16)

Lipschutz 95

, Assistant Professor of Politics @ UCSC, 1995. On

Security (p. 15-

Consider, then, the

consequences of the intersection of security policy and economics during and after the
Cold War. In order to establish a secure global system, the United States advocated, and put into place, a
global system of economic liberalism. It then underwrote, with dollars and other aid, the growth of this
system.43 One consequence, of this project was the globalizations of a particular mode of production and accumulation, which relied
on the re-creation, throughout the world, of the domestic political and economic environment and preferences of the United States.

That such a project cannot be accomplished under conditions of really-existing capitalism is not important:
the idea was that economic and political liberalism would reproduce the American self around the world.44
This would make the world safe and secure for the Untited States inasmuch as it would all be the self, so to
speak. The joker in this particular deck was that efforts to reproduce some version of American society abroad, in order to
make the world more secure for Americans, came to threaten the cultures and societies of the countries
being transformed, making their citizens less secure. The process thereby transformed them into the very
enemies we feared so greatly. In Iran, for example, the Shahs efforts to create a Westernized society engendered so much
domestic resistance that not only did it bring down his empire but so, for a time, seemed to pose a mortal threat to the American
Empire based on Persian Gulf oil. Islamic fundamentalism, now characterized by some as the enemy that will replace Communism,
seems to be U.S. policymakers worst nightmares made real,45 although without the United States to interfere in the Middle East and
elsewhere, the Islamic movements might never have acquired the domestic power they now have in those countries and regions that
seem so essential to American security. The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is
seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and economic security. What does it mean to be
competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security compenent of this issue
socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International
Economic Interdependence) shows how strategic economic interdependence a consequence of the growing liberalization of the
global economic sytem, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing
velocity of the product cycle undermines the ability.

Link -- Economy Poverty


Poverty securitization rhetoric encourages imperialism, enforces an us vs. them dichotomy
mindset & turns poverty because it focuses on dangerous poverty and ignores the most needy.

Smith 2007

(Katie is an author for E-International Relations a web site for international relations

studies. She attended Brown University and got a BA in International Relations. Assess the strengths and weaknesses of securitising
poverty December 22nd 2007. http://www.e-ir.info/?p=178, MT)
The idea of poverty as a security issue has been fairly commonplace since the end of the Cold War. In 1993,
the United Nations sought to redefine security with individuals as the referent object; a framework in which poverty is one of the
principal security threats as it significantly reduces quality and quantity of life. At the same time, poverty was gaining importance in
the security agendas of states. This is based on the idea that poverty is a threat to the rich as well as the poor and
that an unequal world is an unstable one; a view that has become very powerful in the years since September, 2001. This
essay will address the implications of this second type of securitisation world poverty as a threat to the west. I will use the
Copenhagen School approach to show how poverty is being securitised by western leaders in the context of the War on Terror. I will
then go on to demonstrate that, although the issue of poverty is likely to receive more attention as a result, the
securitisation of poverty may also cause many problems. Firstly, aid may be redirected from the nonthreatening poor (often those most in need) to those perceived to be dangerous. Secondly, the involvement of the
securitising states in the creation of poverty can be hidden as the rich are presented as potential victims. Finally, securitisation

necessarily presents the interests of the securitiser as more important than those who will be affected by its
actions and therefore encourages an imperialistic approach. Although the securitisation of poverty is directing some
much needed attention to the problem, a humanitarian approach is a much more appropriate when considering the needs of the poor.
The securitisation of poverty The theory of securitisation is the method by which the Copenhagen School approaches security
studies; it is the process by which an issue comes to be perceived as a security threat by a group. An issue is securitised by the

speech act; the point at which the relevant authorities are persuaded that the issue is a security threat and
warrants emergency action (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 24-5). Thus the Copenhagen School deals with subjective
security the perception of threat. Abrahamsen makes an addition to this idea to include partial securitisations. She suggests that,
instead of security threats being only existential threats, security issues can be seen to move on a continuum from normalcy to
worrisome/troublesome to risk and to existential threatand conversely, from threat to risk and back to normalcy. (2005: 5) This is a
scale which can include poverty as a security issue. While poverty has not been allocated a place near the existential
threat end of the spectrum by any Western government, recent rhetoric of world leaders (the speech act) has created a partial
securitisation of poverty. Poverty is increasingly mentioned by world leaders in the context of the War on Terror, as a
constituent part of this dominant security framework. (Buzan, 2006) In February 2002, US Secretary of State Colin
Powell stated, I fully believe that the root cause of terrorism does come from situations where there is poverty, where there is
ignorance, where people see no hope in their lives. (in Berrebi, 2003: 5) Similarly, Tony Blair claimed in November, 2001, The

dragons teeth [with regards to terrorism and terrorists] are planted in the fertile soil of . . . poverty and
deprivation. (in Berrebi, 2003: 6). Furthermore, the World Trade Centre bombings have shown that No-one in this world can feel
comfortable, or safe, while so many are suffering and deprived (Kofi Annan, BBC, 22/03/02) and that It is no longer necessary to
prove a direct link between a troubled faraway country and the order of our own societies. (Jack Straw, in Abrahamsen, 2005: 65)
The policy response to these ideas has been mixed. Between September 2001 and July 2002, US aid to countries bordering
Afghanistan rose dramatically, including a 278% increase for Pakistan. (Looney, 2002) President Bush also promised a 50% increase
in all US aid. (BBC, 22/03/02) However, in reality poverty relief has not topped many agendas; the EU, OEDC, Denmark, Australia,
Japan and others have rewritten the rules of aid to allow counter-terrorism measures to become an acceptable target of development
assistance, therefore militarizing much humanitarian aid. (Christian Aid, 2004) With or without an increase in aid for poverty under
the security agenda, I will argue below that this securitisation is not a positive move from a humanitarian perspective. The NonThreatening Poor Although poverty and terrorism are presented as clearly linked in the quotes above, this is
not generally accepted by terrorism experts. Berrebi is one of many who argue that there is, little reason to believe that
materialistic or educational improvements would help reduce terrorism. If anything, the correlation I find is that those with higher
education and higher living standards are more likely to participate in terrorist activity. (2003: 2) Pipes argues that, suicide

bombers who hurl themselves against foreign enemies offer their lives not to protest financial deprivation
but to change the world. (2002) Terrorism is therefore best understood as a response to political conditions and long-standing
feelings (either perceived or real) of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics. (Krueger and Maleckova, 2002: 1)
A vast body of literature, some carried out by government bodies themselves, points to the perpetrators of terrorism as predominantly
educated young men who perceive injustice and who feel that they have no option other than terrorism to address the problem.
Importantly, it is widely recognised that terrorism is a product of middle income people in middle income countries. (Berrebi, 2003: 3)
Poverty may still be an important factor however, because other peoples poverty may be a motivation for terrorism. One Hamas
leader identified the poverty-stricken outskirts of Algiers or the refugee camps in Gaza as the principal motivations for Islamic and,
more specifically, Palestinian terrorism. (in Pipes, 2002) What this suggests is that it is the combination of political grievance and
poverty which may become dangerous by inspiring terrorism, not poverty per se. So which types of poverty are dangerous to those
afraid of terrorism? Firstly, the poverty linked to clear political injustice. This is the poverty found alongside prosperity where
educated, mostly middle class people engage in terrorism on behalf of politically and economically marginalised communities. And
secondly, the poverty that angers young men the most likely group to participate in terrorist activities. This is the poverty linked to

masculine humiliation. While both these types of poverty clearly need to be addressed, looking at poverty from a security
point of view can overlook much poverty that is not seen to be threatening. For example, very poor countries
tend to be less susceptible to terrorism; people must focus on survival and have little time for politics. (Lazarsfeld and Zeisal
in Gurr, 1970: 34) Under a security agenda, the poverty of these people would not need to be addressed. The UK
Department for International Development notes that a disproportionately large amount of the worlds bilateral aid already goes to the
middle income countries where terrorism is most likely. (2005: 15) Further, in 2003, the UK gave a disproportionate amount

of its allocated aid for poor communities in middle income countries to Iraq, showing a further
politicisation of aid. (Christian Aid, 2004: 2) Similarly, the poverty of women will not be seen as important through the security
lens since it is men that are the primary terrorist threat. In contrast both very poor countries and women are particular
targets of non-securitised development aid. (UN, 1997) Thus a securitisation of poverty could easily overlook the nondangerous poor on behalf of the dangerous The finite pool of resources allocated to poverty reduction is unlikely to ever be able to
address all forms of poverty. More money is, and may further be allocated to those NGOs and governments that stress the security
aspect of their development work than those who work for purely humanitarian concerns. (Christian Aid, 2004: 2-3) Duffield argues
that escaping the logic of this security regime is already very difficult, emphasising the increasingly overt and accepted politicisation
of aid. (2001: 16) Aid, in other words, is being co-opted to serve in the global War on Terror . (Christian Aid, 2004:
1) What may be at stake is the allocation of resources away from the most needy on the behalf of those perceived to be most
dangerous. Externalising poverty Some theorists suggest that securitised issues always carry with them a logic of us
against them. A threat to our existence is something that we must be protected from , those threatening us are
external others whose aims are incompatible with ours. This is clear in the rhetoric surrounding terrorism and,

increasingly, in the securitisation of poverty. This can have serious implications for the attitude that is taken
towards these issues; in a study of the securitisation of the African continent, Abrahamsen identifies an important process of
shifting attitudes from a cooperative humanitarian approach to an us against them approach which
accompanies securitisations; otherness is becoming something to fear and policies are increasingly driven by this. (2005: 60,
65 The us against them logic that is so central to ideas of security involves a necessary privileging of our interests over theirs.
This is accepted logic in relation to perceived existential threats but becomes more problematic when attached to partial securitisations
and non-traditional threats. That our security is considered to be important when dealing with poverty is already clear; the UKs
foreign office minister for Africa argued that there are sound practical reasons why we cannot afford to ignore the state of Africa. The
most immediate of these is terrorism. (in Abrahamsen, 2005: 67) What are not clear are the extents that western governments are
prepared to go to ensure this security. Recent ideas of global policing and voluntary imperialism that have emerged from the British
government suggest that, in theory at least, the UK is prepared to take extensive measures. (Cooper, 2002) The combination of
privileging our interests over the interests of impoverished others and a potential voluntary imperialism is perhaps the central
problem of securitising poverty. If western society is to be the referent object in addressing poverty, the needs and wishes of those on
the receiving end are necessarily subordinate to the requirements of the west. The further the west is prepared to intervene

in poor countries to protect its own security with little consideration for the people on the receiving end, the
further the choice, democracy and diversity of those people will be eroded. While poverty and related problems
need to be addressed, it is important, for the sake of the people receiving aid, that problems are addressed on their terms and not on the
terms of others. Conclusion The securitisation of poverty is a trend that the western world has seen in the years since the World Trade
Centre bombings. That poverty is a threat to us is increasingly emphasised in political rhetoric particularly in relation to terrorism, of
which it is seen to be a cause. More detailed examinations of the subject see a subjective understanding of inequality as the root cause
of terrorism and so, while poverty may be a part of this, necessarily some types of poverty (those linked to conflict and political
discrimination on the national or global scale) are more likely to be a threat than others. The securitisation of poverty can
lead to various problems. Firstly, aid may be redirected from the non-threatening poor (often those most in need)
to those perceived to be a threat. Secondly, the involvement of the securitising states in the creation of poverty can

be hidden as the threat is increasingly presented in external terms. Finally, securitisation necessarily
presents the interests of the securitiser as more important than those who will be affected by its actions .
Recent ideas of voluntary imperialism, if carried through, could potentially be very damaging to those under their control.The
securitisation of poverty is a trend that we can see in the political rhetoric of today but it is as yet only a partial securitisation. What we
can see is possibly the beginnings of a new, securitised approach to poverty or possibly just a passing phase. The UK Department for
International Development remains careful to distance itself from UK security issues as do many other organisations giving bilateral
aid. However, securitisation can be seen as a sliding scale; the problems addressed in this essay are emerging issues that may or may
not become very problematic. Some, such as the distribution of aid, are already more pronounced than others. In light of these
potential problems and despite the increased attention that poverty can get as a result of being presented as a security threat,
humanitarian approaches to the issue are preferable.

That outweighs

Gilligan 96 [James, Professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School, Director of the Center
for the Study of Violence, and a member of the Academic Advisory Council of the National
Campaign Against Youth Violence, Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and its Causes, p. 191-196]

The deadliest form of violence is poverty. You cannot work for one day with the violent people
who fill our prisons and mental hospitals for the criminally insane without being forcible and

constantly reminded of the extreme poverty and discrimination that characterizes their lives.
Hearing about their lives, and about their families and friends, you are forced to recognize the truth
in Gandhis observation that the deadliest form of violence is poverty. Not a day goes by without
realizing that trying to understand them and their violent behavior in purely individual terms is
impossible and wrong-headed. Any theory of violence, especially a psychological theory, that
evolves from the experience of men in maximum security prisons and hospitals for the criminally
insane must begin with the recognition that these institutions are only microcosms. They are not
where the major violence in our society takes place, and the perpetrators who fill them are far from
being the main causes of most violent deaths. Any approach to a theory of violence needs to
begin with a look at the structural violence in this country. Focusing merely on those relatively
few men who commit what we define as murder could distract us from examining and learning from
those structural causes of violent death that are for more significant from a numerical or public
health, or human, standpoint. By structural violence I mean the increased rates of death, and
disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively
low death rates experienced by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a
demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of class structure; and that structure itself is a
product of societys collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of
the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting structural with behavioral violence, by
which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of
individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in
warfare, capital punishment, and so on. Structural violence differs from behavior violence in at least
three major respects. *The lethal effects of structural violence operate continuously, rather
than sporadically, whereas murders, suicides, executions, wars, and other forms of behavior
violence occur one at a time. *Structural violence operates more or less independently of
individual acts; independent of individuals and groups (politicians, political parties, voters) whose
decisions may nevertheless have lethal consequences for others. *Structural violence is normally
invisible, because it may appear to have had other (natural or violent) causes. [CONTINUED] The
finding that structural violence causes far more deaths than behavioral violence does is not limited
to this country. Kohler and Alcock attempted to arrive at the number of excess deaths caused by
socioeconomic inequities on a worldwide basis. Sweden was their model of the nation that had
come closest to eliminating structural violence. It had the least inequity in income and living
standards, and the lowest discrepancies in death rates and life expectancy; and the highest overall
life expectancy of the world. When they compared the life expectancies of those living in the other
socioeconomic systems against Sweden, they found that 18 million deaths a year could be attributed
to the structural violence to which the citizens of all the other nations were being subjected.

During the past decade, the discrepancies between the rich and poor nations have increased
dramatically and alarmingly. The 14 to 19 million deaths a year caused by structural
violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this
frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major
military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and
civilian deaths, including those by genocide or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the
Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000 deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million,
1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (232
million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence , which
continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die
because of relative poverty as would be killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year
period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating,

thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every
decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also the main cause of behavioral
violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to
war and genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence structural or behavioral
is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to eachother, as
cause to effect.

Link -- Economy Economic Analysis Fails


Economic analysis is neither objective nor inevitable positivist economic lenses recreate violence

Tooze 5
Professor of
International Relations
Roger, Visiting

at City University The Missing : Security,

Critical International Political Economy, and Community Book: Critical Security Studies and World Politics; Edited by Ken Booth
(pg. 153-155)
Turning to the problem of the conceptualization of economics, we find even greater resistance to an integrated political

economy than in traditional political analysis and hence great resistance to an integrated theory and practice
of security. This is because a specific notion of economics has become hegemonic, especially since the
1970s. Among critical theorists, J Richard Ashley has done most to identify the problematics of knowledge
and the consequences of economism for real political agency.81 For Ashley the move from classical
political realism to IR's neorealism was the formal manifestation of a powerful and relentless economism,
expressed under and through the same conditions that in orthodox IPE gave rise to the concern with
economic security. In Ashley's words: The "given" order, including the separation of political and economic spheres, was no
longer self-evident. In matters of resource vulnerability and petroleum embargoes, monetary crises and worldwide recession,
economic processes and relations no longer seemed independent of political interventions. . . . Suddenly, the ever-so-commonsensical
realist depiction of international politics in terms of an autonomous power-political logic lost its magic.82 The resulting

theorization was the statism of neorealism, embedded within which is a logic of economy and technical
rationality. Ashley's work helps us to understand the deep relationship between politics and economics laid down within and
prefigured by a statist, orthodox IPE framed by neorealism. This is an important critical uncovering of hidden theoretical assumptions.
Yet as important as Ashley's insights are, perhaps they do not go far enough. My sense is that the fundamental basis of this

economism is already laid down, not in the theories of IR and IPE but in the construction of a hegemony of
legitimate knowledge driven by the emergence of economics as a sphere of human activity and the market
as its institutionalized form within the overall development of capitalism. The emergence of a realm of
human economic activity that required and requires a special knowledge of economics in order for it to be
made sense of within society is the province of capitalism.83 The rise and consolidation of capitalism is
one, moreover, with which the fields of IR and security studies had and have a very ambivalent and
troublesome relationship, particularly given the primacy of politics that is embedded in both fields. To
assert the primacy of politics, as we saw in the discussion of politics and economics in the last section,
presupposes not only the ontological separation of the interstate political system and "a highly integrated,
incompletely regulated, rapidly growing . . . world economy"84 but also the prior separation of politics and
economics as distinct spheres of activity. This separation is a necessary and integral part of the process of
the construction of self-regulating markets in the dynamics of capitalist growth.85 As Karl Polanyi has pointed
out, A self-regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional separation of society into an economic and political sphere.
Such a dichotomy is, in effect, merely the restatement, from the point of view of society as a whole, of the existence of a selfregulating market. It might be argued that the separateness of the two spheres obtains in every type of society at all times. Such an
inference would be based on a fallacy.86 Polanyi then shows how the existence of a separate economic system is a

specific and historically distinct creation of nineteenth-century English capitalism and indeed is a political
creation, "the outcome of a conscious and often violent intervention on the part of governments which
imposed the market organization on society for noneconomic ends."81 The construction of the market and
its corollary, the separation of economics from politics, is thus political. If the construction of an economics
separate from politics and society is itself a political act and remains a political act in that economic
structures and processes serve particular interests, it is highly problematic when, as Polanyi calls it, the
economic sphere comes to be in turn constructed and justified as neutral, as nonpolitical, and as natural,
above politics. The historical processes by and through which the construction of such a depoliticized political economy has
occurred are complex. They directly to the professionalization of knowledge,88 to the political triumph of a specific and partial view
of human rationality at the beginning of the twentieth century,89 and to the ability of those with wealth to wield the power to
reproduce and enhance those structures that guaranteed and enhanced that wealth. Suffice to say that the thirty-year hegemony

of neoliberalism in the world political economy has constructed the economic sphere in such a way as to
claim that a neoliberal economic way of organizing society within its scale of values is natural, inevitable,
neutral, and rational, with no indication of the inherently and structurally political nature of economics
itself. In other words, the claim that economics is nonpolitical is a political claim.

Focus on national economic security through a positivist lens fails cant account for non-state
actors and puts issues of major concern to all in purely economic terms

Tooze 5
Professor of
International Relations
Roger, Visiting

at City University The Missing : Security,

Critical International Political Economy, and Community Book: Critical Security Studies and World Politics; Edited by Ken Booth
(pg. 150-151)

To restate the basis of the argument: it is not that national economic security, however defined, does not
matter; it clearly does, but it is that a sole focus on national economic security, theorized only through
positivist methodology and where the economic is defined in the way it is by orthodox IPE, is too narrow,
claims too much, and is increasingly partial and inappropriate. An exemplar of this weakness is the otherwise excellent
analysis of economic security and the problem of cooperation in post-Cold War Europe by Jonathan Sperling and Emile Kirchner.68
This is an important article, both for security studies and IPE, as it argues for a redefinition of security in that "the European security
system has two mutually constitutive elements, the political-military and the economic."69 This achieves (in my view) the necessary
elevation of economic matters above the secondary level afforded by most analyses of security and makes the between security and
political economy equally important; this is all too often ignored by mainstream IPE outside the specific focus on economic security.
The article offers a powerful argument showing the mutually constitutive structures and processes that together may bring about
comprehensive security in Europe. Yet despite discussing societal security in a spatial political economy that is more integrated than
within many states, and despite the extensive discussion of European institutions, this argument still relies on a statist ontology.
This limits its epistemological and political constructivism to the activities of states and state-based

institutions. Here, in effect, politics is defined as what is done by governments, agents of states, or those
involved in formal political structures and roles. But are agents of European states the only institutions
relevant to comprehensive security? Do the large corporations and banks (e.g., Shell, Volkswagen, Credit
Suisse) or mass social movements (e.g. antiglobalization, antinuclear, environmentalist) have no relevant
power in Europe? Does the European economy exist in isolation of the world market economy? One would
think so from this analysis. In holding this position, Sperling and Kirchner maintain a particular
conceptualization of both politics and economics but inadvertently contradict their own assertions through
the assumed definitions and predefined relationships that they (and all orthodox IPE) import into their
political economy from the discipline of economics. Quite simply, the approach of Sperling and Kirchner
shares with orthodox IPE the characteristic of importing into political economy a particular theorization of
economics that has major consequences for our ability to understand political economy. Economics is
analyzed as a purely rational activity to which a technical solution is possible, that is, economics is
accepted as defined by and for economists. The analysis of the guns-versus-butter issue by Sperling and Kirchner, for
example, employs a resolutely rationalistic and economistic argument, which seems to specify the problem in order to make it
amenable to rational analysis. I would argue that the move to buttersocial welfareis the product of much more complex forces
than they identify.70 Moreover, note the argument that "until transition (to stability) is completed and consolidated, issues of political
economy must be treated as elements of the new security order rather than as simple issues of welfare maximization ."1 Does the

achievement of stability really mean that issues of political economy are magically depoliticized and/or
stripped of their power content, to make them amenable to technical rational economic resolution? Can, for
example, the support for agriculture, which directly affects the price of food, be defined as a simple issue of
welfare maximization when it is clearly and necessarily a concern of the democratic polity? It can, but only
if one understands how simple issues of welfare maximization are treated in economics and if we accept the
argument of Sperling and Kirchner.

Link -- Economy AT Econ =/= Realism


The affirmatives notion of economic security based on the states is paired with and supports
traditional conceptions of IR

Tooze 5
Professor of
International Relations
Roger, Visiting

at City University The Missing : Security,

Critical International Political Economy, and Community Book: Critical Security Studies and World Politics; Edited by Ken Booth
(pg. 148-149)
Economic Security The consideration of the economic in the theory and practice of security, and security in the

theory and practice of political economy, has taken place on the basis of prevailing discourses in
economics, political science, political economy, and international political economy. As we have seen,
these discourses not only embody deep commitments to specific (orthodox) methodology, epistemology,
and ontology; they also construct both economics and politics, and the relationship between them, in very
particular ways. This seems to have led to the possibility of a twin track for investigations into security by political economy and
into economics by security. One track starts with politics (the traditional concerns of security) but with economic added on as a new
domain of threat to states. The other track starts with a (repoliticized) economics, leading to a whole literature on economic security,
vulnerability, and systemic risk (with particular reference to the global financial system). But the way that the economic is

then related to the political (and vice versa) seems to depend upon prior ideological commitments as to the
nature of the relationship between economics and politics, normally expressed in paradigmatic terms of perspectives or
contesting approaches. For instance, a liberal interpretation of economic security is conditioned by the prior
assumption of the between economic prosperity and war based on the assumed beneficial rationality of
markets. In this sense, economic security as a concept and as an issue has been clearly constructed as an
extension of statist, positivist IPE, which brings together the twin tracks by grafting the agenda of
economics onto the classic concerns of state security via neorealism. Of course, the tradition of mercantilist
thinking, or economic nationalism, as Robert Gilpin prefers to describe it, clearly locks economic security into physical
securitybut on, and only on, a state basis. In this tradition, power and wealth, and hence national security,
are inseparable and complementary, particularly in what are regarded as strategic industries, that is, those
industries whose healthy development is considered necessary for the maintenance of national military-political security.58
Notwithstanding the mercantilist imperative for both states and theorists, the post-1945 international economic structure

emerged as a U.S. hegemony that was articulated and developed on the public basis of a liberal trade and
investment order with a constituting, rationalizing, and legitimating ideology of liberal political economy .
Hence, for twenty years after IR and economics were theoretically ed in mainstream academic practice, it was only to the extent that a
strong, broad-based modem economy was regarded as necessary to maintain security. However, the early intimations of the failure of
U.S. policy to keep apart the Bretton Woods institutional twin-track system set up after World War IIseparating international politics
(as politics) and international economics (as technical management)manifested themselves in the problems of the dollar and U.S.
payments in the late 1960s. The unwillingness of the United States to tolerate a massive outflow of dollars forced a reconnection at the
policy level of politics and economics, and this led to an upswing of interest in the international politics of economic conflict. The
possibility of trade wars was mooted.59 But the real spur to the study of what became labeled "economic security" came with action
by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 and the resultant oil-supply threats and related price shocks for
the international economic system.60 The changing structure of the international political economy at that time, with the move to
floating exchange rates and the rediscovery by the West (and the South) of economic vulnerability, brought forth a large number of
studies on the issue and problems of economic security.61 The studies of economic security stemming from the crises

of the 1970s defined their focus principally in terms of the interests of the state. Equally significant, their
definition of economics prioritized issues of trade and trade relations and tended to ignore other potentially
significant elements. This meant that deep structures of international political economy finance,
production, and knowledge62and the changing international division of labor (and its implications) were
not seen as part of this conception of economic security. In effect, IPE and IR (including that branch
conceiving itself as security studies) meekly adopted the agenda of U.S. policy economists. After all, from
the perspective of this approach, what matters when all states have adopted the goal of long-term economic
growth are threats to the economic security of the state, and the territorial economy of the state, in terms of
the ability of the state to deliver on its claimed economic goals. Such is particularly the case when this
ability is made vulnerable by an apparent change in trade relationships or is made more sensitive to the
problems of deepening economic interdependence.

Link -- Competitiveness
Competitiveness discourse mobilizes populations for economic warfare. Its produced by threat
construction for big biznis rather than economic realityVote neg to reject competitiveness
discourse

Dr.

Gillian

Bristow,

Senior Lecturer in Economic Geography @ Cardiff University,

(Journal of

Economic Geography 5.3: 285-304, Everyones a winner)


This begs the question as to why a discourse with ostensibly confused, narrow and ill-defined content has
become so salient in regional economic development policy and practice as to constitute the only valid currency
of argument (Schoenberger, 1998, 12). Whilst alternative discourses based around co-operation can be
conceived (e.g. see Hines, 2000; Bunzl, 2001), they have as yet failed to make a significant impact on the
dominant view that a particular, quantifiable form of output-related regional competitiveness is inevitable, inexorable and
ultimately beneficial. The answer appears to lie within the policy process, which refers to all aspects involved in the
provision of policy direction for the work of the public sector. This therefore includes the ideas which inform policy

conception, the talk and work which goes into providing the formulation of policy directions, and all the
talk, work and collaboration which goes into translating these into practice (Yeatman, 1998; p. 9). A major
debate exists in the policy studies literature about the scope and limitations of reason, analysis and
intelligence in policy-makinga debate which has been re-ignited with the recent emphasis upon evidence-based policymaking (see Davies et al., 2000). Keynes is often cited as the main proponent of the importance of ideas in policy making, since he
argued that policy-making should be informed by knowledge, truth, reason and facts (Keynes, 1971, vol. xxi, 289). However,
Majone (1989) has significantly challenged the assumption that policy makers engage in a purely objective,
rational, technical assessment of policy alternatives. He has argued that in practice, policy makers use theory,

knowledge and evidence selectively to justify policy choices which are heavily based on value judgements .
It is thus persuasion (through rhetoric, argument, advocacy and their institutionalisation) that is the key to the policy
process, not the logical correctness or accuracy of theory or data. In other words, it is interests rather than ideas
that shape policy making in practice. Ultimately, the language of competitiveness is the language of the business
community. Thus, critical to understanding the power of the discourse is firstly, understanding the appeal and
significance of the discourse to business interests and, secondly, exploring their role in influencing the ideas
of regional and national policy elites. Part of the allure of the discourse of competitiveness for the business
community is its seeming comprehensibility. Business leaders feel that they already understand the basics of what
competitiveness means and thus it offers them the gain of apparent sophistication without the pain of grasping
something complex and new. Furthermore, competitive images are exciting and their accoutrements of
battles, wars and races have an intuitive appeal to businesses familiar with the cycle of growth, survival and sometimes
collapse (Krugman, 1996b). The climate of globalisation and the turn towards neo-liberal, capitalist forms of regulation has
empowered business interests and created a demand for new concepts and models of development which offer guidance on how
economies can innovate and prosper in the face of increasing competition for investment and resources. Global policy elites of
governmental and corporate institutions, who share the same neo-liberal consensus, have played a critical role in
promoting both the discourse of national and regional competitiveness, and of competitiveness policies which they
think are good for them (such as supportive institutions and funding for research and development agendas). In the EU, for example,
the European Round Table of Industrialists played a prominent role in ensuring that the Commission's 1993 White Paper placed the
pursuit of international competitiveness (and thus the support of business), on an equal footing with job creation and social cohesion
objectives (Lovering, 1998; Balanya et al., 2000). This discourse rapidly spread and competitiveness policies were transferred through
global policy networks as large quasi-governmental organisations such as the OECD and World Bank pushed the national and,
subsequently, the regional competitiveness agenda upon national governments (Peet, 2003). Part of the appeal of the regional
competitiveness discourse for policy-makers is that like the discourse of globalisation, it presents a relatively structured

set of ideas, often in the form of implicit and sedimented assumptions, upon which they can draw in
formulating strategy and, indeed, in legitimating strategy pursued for quite distinct ends (Hay and Rosamond,
2002). Thus, the discourse clearly dovetails with discussions about the appropriate level at which economic governance should be
exercised and fits in well with a growing trend towards the decentralised, bottom-up approaches to economic development policy
and a focus on the indigenous potential of regions. For example, in the UK:the Government believes that a successful regional and
sub-regional economic policy must be based on building the indigenous strengths in each locality, region and county. The best
mechanisms for achieving this are likely to be based in the regions themselves (HM Treasury, 2001a, vi). The devolution of powers
and responsibilities to regional institutions, whether democratic or more narrowly administrative, is given added tour de force when
accompanied by the arguments contained within the regional competitiveness discourse. There is clear political capital to be gained
from highlighting endogenous capacities to shape economic processes, not least because it helps generate the sense of regional identity
that motivates economic actors and institutions towards a common regional purpose (Rosamond, 2002). Furthermore, the regional
competitiveness discourse points to a clear set of agendas for policy action over which regional institutions have some potential for
leverageagendas such as the development of university-business relationships and strong innovation networks. This provides

policy-makers with the ability to point to the existence of seemingly secure paths to prosperity, as reinforced
by the successes of exemplar regions. In this way, the discourse of regional competitiveness helps to provide a way of
constituting regions as legitimate agents of economic governance. The language of regional
competitiveness also fits in very neatly with the ideological shift to the Third Way popularised most notably by
the New Labour government in the UK. This promotes the reconstruction of the state rather than its shrinkage (as
under neo-liberal market imperatives) or expansion (as under traditional socialist systems of mass state intervention). Significantly,
this philosophy sees state economic competencies as being restricted to the ability to intervene in line with perceived microeconomic
or supply-side imperatives rather than active macroeconomic, demand-side interventionan agenda that is thus clearly in tune with
the discourse around competitiveness. The attractiveness of the competitiveness discourse may also be partly a product

of the power of pseudo-scientific, mathematised nature of the economics discipline and the business
strategy literature from which it emanates. This creates an innate impartiality and technicality for the
market outcomes (such as competitiveness) it describes (Schoenberger, 1998). Public policy in developed countries
experiencing the marketisation of the state, is increasingly driven by managerialism which emphasises the improved
performance and efficiency of the state. This managerialism is founded upon economistic and rationalistic assumptions
which include an emphasis upon measuring performance in the context of a planning system driven by objectives and
targets (Sanderson, 2001). The result is an increasing requirement for people, places and organisations to be
accountable and for their performance and success to be measured and assessed. In this emerging evaluative state,
performance tends to be scrutinised through a variety of means, with particular emphasis placed upon output indicators. This
provides not only a means of lending legitimacy to the institutional environment , but also some sense of
exactitude and certainty, particularly for central governments who are thus able to retain some top-down,
mechanical sense that things are somehow under their control (Boyle, 2001). The evolutionary, survival of the
fittest basis of the regional competitiveness discourse clearly resonates with this evaluative culture. The
discourse of competitiveness strongly appeals to the stratum of policy makers and analysts who can use it to
justify what they are doing and/or to find out how well they are doing it relative to their rivals. This helps explain the
interest in trying to measure regional competitiveness and the development of composite indices and league tables. It also helps
explain why particular elements of the discourse have assumed particular significanceoutput indicators of firm performance are
much easier to compare and rank on a single axis than are indicators relating to institutional behaviour, for example. This in turn
points to a central paradox in measures of regional competitiveness. The key ingredients of firm competitiveness and
regional prosperity are increasingly perceived as lying with assets such as knowledge and information which are, by
definition, intangible or at least difficult to measure with any degree of accuracy. The obsession with performance
measurement and the tendency to reduce complex variables to one, easily digestible number brings a kind of blindness with
it as to what is really important (Boyle, 2001, 60)in this case, how to improve regional prosperity. Thus while a composite
index number of regional competitiveness will attract widespread attention in the media and amongst policy-makers and development
agencies, the difficulty presented by such a measure is in knowing what exactly needs to be targeted for appropriate remedial action.
All of this suggests that regional competitiveness is more than simply the linguistic expression of powerful exogenous
interests. It has also become rhetoric. In other words, regional competitiveness is deployed in a strategic and persuasive
way, often in conjunction with other discourses (notably globalisation) to legitimate specific policy initiatives and
courses of action. The rhetoric of regional competitiveness serves a useful political purpose in that it is easier
to justify change or the adoption of a particular course of policy action by reference to some external threat that
makes change seem inevitable. It is much easier for example, for politicians to argue for the removal of supply-side
rigidities and flexible hire-and-fire workplace rules by suggesting that there is no alternative and that jobs would be lost
anyway if productivity improvement was not achieved. Thus, the language of external competitiveness...provides a rosy

glow of shared endeavour and shared enemies which can unite captains of industry and representatives of
the shop floor in the same big tent (Turner, 2001, 40). In this sense it is a discourse which provides some
shared sense of meaning and a means of legitimising neo-liberalism rather than a material focus on the
actual improvement of economic welfare. 5. Conclusions The discourse of regional competitiveness has become
ubiquitous in the deliberations and statements of policy actors and regional analysts. However, this paper has argued that
it is a rather confused, chaotic discourse which seems to conflate serious theoretical work on regional
economies, with national and international policy discourses on globalisation and the knowledge economy.
There are, however, some dominant axioms which collectively define the discourse, notably that regional competitiveness is a firmbased, output-related conception, strongly shaped by the regional business environment. However, regional competitiveness tends to
be defined in different ways, sometimes microeconomic, sometimes macroeconomic, such that it is not entirely clear when a situation
of competitiveness has been achieved. It is argued here that the discourse is based on relatively thinly developed and narrow
conceptions of how regions compete, prosper and grow in economic terms. The discourse chooses to ignore broader, non-

output related modalities of regional competition which may tend to have rather more negative than
positive connotations. Moreover, it over-emphasises the importance of the region to firm competitiveness and indeed the
importance of firm competitiveness to regional prosperity. In this sense proponents of regional competitiveness are guilty of
what the eminent philosopher Alfred North Whitehead termed the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. In other words,

they have assumed that what applies to firms can simply be read across to those other entities called
regions, and that this is a concrete reality rather than simply a belief or opinion.
Framing the US as America Inc. causes bad policy and hurts the economy A Nobel Prize Winner in
Economics Agrees

Krugman 1-23 professor of


economics and international
affairs
received the Nobel
Prize for Economics in 2008
Paul

-11 (

at Princeton University,

, The Competition Myth,

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/opinion/24krugman.html?_r=3&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1295895740-k8wCd1lX2ZIyowhgF19//A)
But lets not kid ourselves: talking about competitiveness as a goal is fundamentally misleading. At best, its a

misdiagnosis of our problems. At worst, it could lead to policies based on the false idea that whats good for
corporations is good for America. About that misdiagnosis: What sense does it make to view our current woes as stemming
from lack of competitiveness? Its true that wed have more jobs if we exported more and imported less. But the
same is true of Europe and Japan, which also have depressed economies. And we cant all export more while
importing less, unless we can find another planet to sell to. Yes, we could demand that China shrink its trade surplus
but if confronting China is what Mr. Obama is proposing, he should say that plainly. Furthermore, while America is running a trade
deficit, this deficit is smaller than it was before the Great Recession began. It would help if we could make it smaller still. But
ultimately, were in a mess because we had a financial crisis, not because American companies have lost their
ability to compete with foreign rivals. But isnt it at least somewhat useful to think of our nation as if it were America Inc.,
competing in the global marketplace? No. Consider: A corporate leader who increases profits by slashing his work
force is thought to be successful. Well, thats more or less what has happened in America recently:
employment is way down, but profits are hitting new records. Who, exactly, considers this economic success? Still, you might say
that talk of competitiveness helps Mr. Obama quiet claims that hes anti-business . Thats fine, as long as he

realizes that the interests of nominally American corporations and the interests of the nation, which were
never the same, are now less aligned than ever before. Take the case of General Electric, whose chief executive, Jeffrey
Immelt, has just been appointed to head that renamed advisory board. I have nothing against either G.E. or Mr. Immelt. But with fewer
than half its workers based in the United States and less than half its revenues coming from U.S. operations, G.E.s fortunes have very
little to do with U.S. prosperity. By the way, some have praised Mr. Immelts appointment on the grounds that at least he represents a
company that actually makes things, rather than being yet another financial wheeler-dealer. Sorry to burst this bubble, but these days
G.E. derives more revenue from its financial operations than it does from manufacturing indeed, GE Capital, which received a
government guarantee for its debt, was a major beneficiary of the Wall Street bailout. So what does the administrations
embrace of the rhetoric of competitiveness mean for economic policy? The favorable interpretation, as I said, is that
its just packaging for an economic strategy centered on public investment, investment thats actually about creating jobs now while
promoting longer-term growth. The unfavorable interpretation is that Mr. Obama and his advisers really believe that the
economy is ailing because theyve been too tough on business, and that what America needs now is corporate tax cuts
and across-the-board deregulation. My guess is that were mainly talking about packaging here. And if the president does
propose a serious increase in spending on infrastructure and education, Ill be pleased. But even if he proposes good policies,

the fact that Mr. Obama feels the need to wrap these policies in bad metaphors is a sad commentary on the
state of our discourse. The financial crisis of 2008 was a teachable moment, an object lesson in what can go wrong if you trust a
market economy to regulate itself. Nor should we forget that highly regulated economies, like Germany, did a much better job than we
did at sustaining employment after the crisis hit. For whatever reason, however, the teachable moment came and
went with nothing learned. Mr. Obama himself may do all right: his approval rating is up, the economy is showing signs of life,
and his chances of re-election look pretty good. But the ideology that brought economic disaster in 2008 is back on
top and seems likely to stay there until it brings disaster again.

Competitiveness is a hegemonic discourse- its power comes from belief, not truth or accuracy.
Dr. Gillian Bristow, Senior Lecturer in Economic Geography @ Cardiff University, 5 (Journal of Economic Geography 5.3: 285304, Everyones a winner)
Since the 1990s, in response to the work of authors such as Michael Porter (1990), the concept of regional competitiveness
has become a hegemonic discourse (Schoenberger, 1998) within public policy circles in developed countries. Indeed,
regional competitiveness has been enthusiastically adopted as a policy goal by the European Commission and by national
governments across Europe and North America (ACOA, 1996; De Vol, 1999; Commission of the European Communities, 2000). It
has risen to particular prominence in the UK where the national government has explicitly tasked Regional Development Agencies

(RDAs) with the responsibility for making their regions more competitive and akin to benchmark competitive places such as Silicon
Valley (DETR, 1999; House of Commons, 2000; HM Treasury, 2001a). The competitiveness hegemony is such that

according to certain analysts, the critical issue for regional economic development practitioners to grasp is
that the creation of competitive advantage is the most important activity they can pursue (Barclays, 2002, 10).
Current policy documents extolling the language of competitiveness tend to present it as an entirely
unproblematic term and, moreover, as an unambiguously beneficial attribute of an economy. Competitiveness is
portrayed as the means by which regional economies are externally validated in an era of globalisation, such that
there can be no principled objection to policies and strategies deemed to be competitiveness enhancing,
whatever their indirect consequences. For example, the European Commission (2004, viii) states that strengthening regional
competitiveness throughout the Union and helping people fulfil their capabilities will boost the growth potential of the EU economy as
a whole to the common benefit of all. Similarly, theUKgovernment sees its regional policy objective as being one of widening the
circle of winners in all regions and communities (DTI, 2001, 4), a sentiment clearly absorbed by the devolved administration in Wales
which has entitled its National Economic Development Strategy, A Winning Wales (Welsh Assembly Government, 2002). The
emergence of regional competitiveness as a discrete and important policy goal has spawned the development
of indicators by which policy-makers and practitioners can measure, analyse and compare relative competitive
performance, or find out who is winning. Various attempts have been made to measure and model competitiveness for European
regions (e.g. IFO, 1990; Pompili, 1994; Pinelli et al., 1998; Gardiner, 2003). Furthermore, the European Commission has placed the
analysis of regional competitiveness at the heart of its ongoing assessment of regional economic performance (Commission, 1999;
2000). In the UK, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has published sets of regional competitiveness indicators since 1995
(e.g. DTI, 2003, 2004). More recently, efforts have also been made to develop composite indices of regional competitiveness,
following similar trends in the evolution of national competitiveness indicators (e.g. World Economic Forum, 2003; see Lall, 2001).
These combine relevant indicators into one overarching measure, the results of which can be reported in the form of a league table
(Huggins, 2000; 2003). This preoccupation with competitiveness and the predilection for its measurement is
premised on certain pervasive beliefs, most notably that globalisation has created a world of intense
competition between regions (Raco, 2002).However, there is some confusion as to what the concept actually
means and how it can be effectively operationalised. Indeed, in a manner cognate with debates surrounding clusters (see
Martin and Sunley, 2003), policy acceptance of the existence and importance of regional competitiveness and its
measurement appears to have run ahead of a number of fundamental theoretical and empirical questions.
The purpose of this paper is to problematise the dominant policy discourse around regional competitiveness with
reference to theory, to explore how and why a discourse with ostensibly thin and ill-defined content has
assumed such significance in policy circles, and to consider the potential policy consequences. It is argued that the answer

lies within the political economy of economic policy and the rhetorical power and usefulness of the
prevailing competitiveness discourse. The paper begins by examining the polysemous yet overlapping meanings of regional
competitiveness in academic debates. (285-6)

Competitiveness makes environmental and economic


collapse and resource wars inevitable
Bristow 10 (School of City & Regional Planning, Cardiff University) (Gillian, Resilient regions:
re-placeing regional competitiveness, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2010, 3, 153
167)
In recent years, regional development strategies have been subjugated to the hegemonic discourse of competitiveness, such that the
ultimate objective for all regional development policy-makers and practitioners has become the creation of economic advantage
through superior productivity performance, or the attraction of new rms and labour (Bristow, 2005). A major consequence is the
developing ubiquitication of regional development strategies (Bristow, 2005; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). This reects the status
of competitiveness as a key discursive construct (Jessop, 2008) that has acquired hugely signicant rhetorical power for certain
interests intent on reinforcing capitalist relations (Bristow, 2005; Fougner, 2006). Indeed, the competitiveness hegemony

is such that many policies previously considered only indirectly relevant to unfettered economic
growth tend to be hijacked in support of competitiveness agendas (for example Raco, 2008; also
Dannestam, 2008). This paper will argue, however, that a particularly narrow discourse of
competitiveness has been constructed that has a number of negative connotations for the
resilience of regions. Resilience is dened as the regions ability to experience positive economic success that
is socially inclusive, works within environmental limits and which can ride global economic
punches (Ashby et al., 2009). As such, resilience clearly resonates with literatures on sustainability, localisation and
diversication, and the developing understanding of regions as intrinsically diverse entities with evolutionary and context-specic
development trajectories (Hayter, 2004). In contrast, the dominant discourse of competitiveness is placeless

and increasingly associated with globalised, growth-rst and environmentally malign

agendas (Hudson, 2005).

However, this paper will argue that the relationships between competitiveness and resilience are more
complex than might at rst appear. Using insights from the Cultural Political Economy (CPE) approach, which focuses on
understanding the construction, development and spread of hegemonic policy discourses, the paper will argue that the dominant
discourse of competitiveness used in regional development policy is narrowly constructed and is thus insensitive to contingencies of
place and the more nuanced role of competition within economies. This leads to problems of resilience that can be partly overcome
with the development of a more contextualised approach to competitiveness. The paper is now structured as follows. It begins by
examining the developing understanding of resilience in the theorising and policy discourse around regional development. It then
describes the CPE approach and utilises its framework to explain both how a narrow conception of competitiveness has come to
dominate regional development policy and how resilience inter-plays in subtle and complex ways with competitiveness and its
emerging critique. The paper then proceeds to illustrate what resilience means for regional development rstly, with reference to the
Transition Towns concept, and then by developing a typology of regional strategies to show the different characteristics of policy
approaches based on competitiveness and resilience. Regional resilience Resilience is rapidly emerging as an idea whose time has
come in policy discourses around localities and regions, where it is developing widespread appeal owing to the peculiarly powerful
combination of transformative pressures from below, and various catalytic, crisis-induced imperatives for change from above. It
features strongly in policy discourses around environmental management and sustainable development (see Hudson, 2008a), but has
also more recently emerged in relation to emergency and disaster planning with, for example Regional Resilience Teams established
in the English regions to support and co-ordinate civil protection activities around various emergency situations such as the threat of a
swine u pandemic. The discourse of resilience is also taking hold in discussions around desirable local and regional development
activities and strategies. The recent global credit crunch and the accompanying in-crease in livelihood insecurity has highlighted the
advantages of those local and regional economies that have greater resilience by virtue of being less dependent upon globally
footloose activities, hav-ing greater economic diversity, and/or having a de-termination to prioritise and effect more signicant
structural change (Ashby et al, 2009; Larkin and Cooper, 2009). Indeed, resilience features particular strongly in the
grey literature spawned by thinktanks, consul-tancies and environmental interest groups around

the consequences of
the global recession, catastrophic climate change and the arrival of the era of peak oil for
localities and regions with all its implications for the longevity of carbon-fuelled economies ,
cheap, long-distance transport and global trade. This popularly labelled triple crunch (New Economics
Foundation, 2008) has power-fully illuminated the potentially disastrous material consequences of
the voracious growth imperative at the heart of neoliberalism and competitiveness, both in
the form of resource constraints (especially food security) and in the inability of the current
system to manage global nancial and ecological sustainability. In so doing, it appears to be galvinising
previously disparate, fractured debates about the merits of the current system, and challenging public and political opinion to develop
a new, global concern with frugality, egalitarianism and localism (see, for example Jackson, 2009; New Economics Foundation, 2008).

LinkHuman Rights
Depictions of human rights catastrophe legitimize realism

Dunne & Wheeler 4 [Tim Dunne, University of Exeter, UK, Nicholas J. Wheeler, University of
Wales, Aberystwyth, UK, We the Peoples: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory
and Practice, International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1, 9-23,
http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/1972/1/We%2520the%2520Peoples.pdf]

Where do human rights fit into this realist picture of security? Realist proponents of
national security do not deny the existence of human rights norms such as those embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But crucially, realism argues that they are norms which
are not binding on states when they collide with other interests (such as trade or national
security). Hans J. Morgenthau, the godfather of realism, argued that the principle of the
defense of human rights cannot be consistently applied in foreign policy because it can and
must come in conflict with other interests that may be more important than the defense of
human rights in a particular circumstance.9 Realists also point to the centrality of states in implementing
human rights standards and the weak or nonexistent enforcement machinery. As a leading representative of
the US delegation at San Francisco made clear, We the peoples means that the peoples of the world were
speaking through their governments.10 Amnesty Internationals annual report is a constant reminder that
realist thinking on human rights is part of the fabric of contemporary international society .
A recent report summarized its findings against the backdrop of the war on terror as follows:
Governments have spent billions to strengthen national security and the war on terror.

Yet for millions of people, the real sources of insecurity are corruption, repression,
discrimination, extreme poverty and preventable diseases .11 This is nothing new. Driven by
expediency and self-interest, governments have long trampled on their citizens rights in order
to maintain the power and privilege of an elite few. In the language of International Relations
theory, what Amnesty is describing is the problem of statism, by which is meant the idea that the state
should be the sole source of loyalty and values for its citizens.12 Amnesty claims that the majority of

states routinely fail to deliver even basic rights to their citizens. Governments or agencies
acting on their behalf routinely imprison without trial, torture and/or kill individuals who
challenge the regime. The Westphalian practice of statism infects international bodies such as the United
Nations. Amnesty International points to the realpolitik in the General Assembly and the UN Commission
on Human Rights that it charges as being almost irrelevant to the protection of victims in Burundi,
Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.13 It is not unusual to find that no state has tabled a
condemnatory resolution at the UN General Assembly even after it has been presented with evidence of
gross human rights violations. Consistent with the charge of statism is the argument that the UN
is merely an arena for raison dtat, a kind of global Westphalian system where the language for

the conduct of international relations has changed but the interests remain the same.
Human rights in this context have represented, in the words of Norman Lewis, nothing more
than an empty abstraction whose function was the legitimation and perpetuation of the
given system of power relations, domestically and internationally .14

The aff securitizes human rightshowever government methods for solving it fail
turning the case

Kardas 5 [Saban Kardas, Ph.D. Student University of Utah Department of Political Science, working
paper no. 31, Human Rights Policy and International Relations: Realist Foundations Reconsidered,
December 6, 2005, http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/working/2005/31-kardas-2005.pdf]
The concern for and promotion of human rights has increasingly assumed an international
dimension in the post-War period.2 The Westphalian principles are not the only values advanced by
the UN Charter. To be sure, the Charter also mentions human rights among the purposes of the

organization, along with the maintenance of international peace and security , and a growing
body of human rights regime has accumulated since the enactment of the Charter. This trend is best
reflected emerged a body of legal in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two UN
Covenants and other universal and regional Human Rights Conventions and mechanisms. As a result of the
development of such a normative international order, and increasing pace of interdependence and
globalization eroding the traditional distinctions between domestic and international affairs, coupled with
the activities of powerful NGOs, the issues of human rights have found their way into
international politics. Consequently, there norms and mechanisms as well as political
instruments, ranging from human rights diplomacy to humanitarian intervention and international war
crimes tribunals, which regulate the governments treatment of their citizens .3 Though very

fragile, they provide a ground to put the domestic conduct of the governments under the
scrutiny by individuals, domestic and international non-governmental organizations, other
states and international organizations. Despite the tension to be discussed below, human rights
especially the violation of them- has become a legitimate concern to the international
society, a process which has been provided with added impetus in the post-Cold War era.4 The
end of the Cold War and the emerging international system were characterized by the
increasing possibilities for international cooperation, especially at a time where destabilizing
effects of the end of the Cold War have increased the need for international protection and
promotion of human rights. Growing activities on the part of secessionist and nationalist
movements created a growing need for the protection of human and particularly minority
rights. Against this setting, the emerging multi-centric international system and a global
wave of democratization have enabled human rights groups to mobilize liberal states and
international organizations to incorporate the promotion of human rights into their agenda .
This process was also reinforced and complemented by the expanding ideas in the post-Cold War era that
the traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention cannot be interpreted in their absolute sense and
therefore the international community may override these norms under certain conditions. The widely
cited Vienna Declaration (1993) adapted by the UN World Conference on Human Rights, thus, stated

that the protection and promotion of human rights is the primary responsibility of
governments and a legitimate concern of the international community . Nonetheless, the reality
remains there. Although respect for human rights is a stated concern of the international
community and an international system for protection of human rights has been set up, its
implementation and enforcement is far from being effective . Despite the attempts towards
international standard setting, the violations of basic human rights are still the case on many
parts of the globe. Similar to the weakness of other international regimes in general, this emerging
body of international human rights regime still lacks effective and consistent enforcement
mechanisms. In response to this picture, there is a growing belief that inclusion of human rights concerns
into foreign policy making of individual states will contribute to the betterment of the status of human
rights globally, especially to more effective implementation of the existing human rights regimes. Since
progress toward fulfillment of human rights is to a large extent conditional upon the compliance of the
states to the internationally agreed norms, in the absence of domestic dynamics for change, the external
pressure put on the governments by the international community remains a suitable avenue available to
advance human rights.

And this turns the case- security can never be achieved when ones rights are being
threatened

Dunne and Wheeler 4 [Tim Dunne, University of Exeter, UK, Nicholas J. Wheeler, University of
Wales, Aberystwyth, UK, We the Peoples: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory
and Practice, International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1, 9-23,
http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/1972/1/We%2520the%2520Peoples.pdf]

A critical security approach to human rights opens with a fundamental belief in the
indivisibility of security and human rights. How does this indivisibility play out in

practice? The human security discourse would maintain, for example, that there can be no
security for the individual if their right to life is being threatened by their government .
Similarly, security is absent when an individual is denied the rights to subsistence , such as food,
clothing and housing. If security is defined as protection from harm, then it is clear that the
infringement of fundamental rights signifies the presence of insecurity .25 Just as its prescriptive
orientation emphasizes indivisibility, the human security discourse recognizes the multidimensionality of
the sources of harm. There are military and non-military producers of harm, national and transnational,
private and public. Harm can be the outcome of intentional acts (employers using child labour) as well as
unreflective acts (children in the West buying a football that has been manufactured by slave labour in
India). Rights may be secured by one agent while simultaneously being threatened by another. For
example, the citizens of a social democratic society may have all their human rights protected by the state,
but that does not necessarily mean their community has security. It could, for example, have borders that
are contiguous with a predatory state committed to an expansionist foreign policy. Another threat could be
transnational and unintentional, such as that posed by high levels of radioactivity caused by an accident in a
nuclear power station (for example, the disaster at Chernobyl). We would argue that the

interdependence between security and human rights is at its strongest when the focus is
upon what Henry Shue, and later R.J. Vincent, referred to as basic rights.26 Security from violence
and subsistence were defined by Shue as the key basic rights. On the surface, this might seem to rely on a
narrow definition of rights but we define subsistence as covering a range of economic and social rights
(such as work, property, social security) while security from violence includes many civil and political
rights (protection from torture, racial hatred, slavery and asylum).

Link --I-Law
The affirmative orders International Relations around a myth that exists to make authoritarianism
warm and fuzzy instead we need to reorient ourselves towards a counter-politics resisting this state
of emergency.
Mark

Neocleous

, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University,

08

(Critique of Security, McGill-Queens University, pp. 72-75, Published 2008)


But there is a wider argument to be made, one with political implications. The idea

that the permanent emergency involves


a suspension of the law encourages the idea that resistance must involve a 'return to legality' , a return to the
'normal' mode of governing through the rule of law. This involves a serious misjudgement in which it is
simply assumed that legal procedures - both international and domestic are designed to protect human
rights from state violence. 'Law' are comes to appear largely unproblematic and the rule of law 'an unqualified human good'."
What this amounts to is what I have elsewhere called a form of legal fetishism, in which Law becomes a
mystical answer to the problems posed by power. In the process, the problems inherent in Law are ignored. Law is treated
as an 'indepen- dent' or 'autonomous' reality, explained according to its own dynamics, a Subject in itself whose very existence
requires that individuals and institutions 'objectify' themselves before it. This produces the illusion that Law has a life

of
its own, abstracting the rule of law from its origins in class domination, ignoring the ways in which the rule
of law is deployed as a political strategy, and obscuring the ideological mystification of these processes in
the liberal trumpeting of the rule of law. To demand the return to the 'rule of law' is to seriously misread the history of the
relation between the rule of law and emergency powers and, consequently, to get sucked into a less-than-radical politics in dealing
with state violence. Part of what I am suggesting is that emergency measures are part of the everyday exercise of powers, working
alongside rather than against the rule of law as part of a unified political strategy in the fabrication of social order. The question

to
ask, then, is less 'how can we bring law to bear on violence?' and much more 'what is it that the law permits
emergency measures to accomplish?"' This question - the question that Schmitt, with his fetish for the decision cannot
understand/' which is also why contemporary Left Schmittianism is such a dead loss - disposes of any supposed
juxtaposition between legality and emergency and allows us to recognise instead the extent to which the
concept of emergency is deeply inscribed within the law and the legal condition of the modem state, and a
central part of liberalism's authoritarian moment: the iron fist in the velvet glove of liberal
constitutionalism. Far from suspending law or bracketing off the juridical, emergency powers lie firmly within the legal domain.
How could they not, since they are so obviously central to state power and the political technology of government - part of the
deployment of law, rather than its abandonment? Once this is recognised, the supposed problematic of violence disappears completely,
for it can then be seen that emergency powers are deployed for the exercise of a violence necessary for the permanent refashioning of
order - the violence of law, not violence contra law. Liberalism struggles with this, and thus presents it as an exceptional moment;
fascism recognises it for what it is, and aestheticises the moment. As David Dyzenhaus points out, while the stripping of

liberties in the name of emergency the denial of rights on the grounds of necessity and the suspension of
freedoms through the exercise of prerogative might appear quite minor compared to what happens in fascist
regimes, the fact that the stripping, denial and suspension does happen under the guise of emergency and in
full view of the courts brings the legal order of liberal democracies far closer to the legal order of fascism
than liberals would care to admit. But in a wonderful ideological loop, the rule of law is also its own ideological obfuscation of that
fact
The political implications of this are enormous. For if emergency powers are part and parcel of the exercise of law and
violence (that is, law as violence), and if historically they have been aimed at the oppressed - in advanced capitalist states

against the proletariat and its various struggles, in reactionary regimes against genuine politicisation of the
people, in colonial systems against popular mobilisation - then they need to be fought not by demanding a
return to the 'normal' rule of law, but in what Benjamin calls a real state of emergency, on the grounds that only
this will improve our position in the struggle against the fascism of our time. And this is a task which requires violence, not the rule of
law. As Benjamin saw, the law's claim to a monopoly of violence is explained not by the intention of preserving some mythical 'legal
end' such as security or normality but, rather, for 'the intention of preserving the law itself'. But violence not in the hands of the law
threatens it by its mere existence outside the law. A violence exercised not by the state, but used for very different political ends. For 'if
the existence of violence outside the law, as pure immediate violence, is assured, [then] this furnishes proof that revolutionary violence
... is possible'."'
That this possibility of and necessity for revolutionary violence is so often omitted when emergency powers are
discussed is indicative of the extent to which much of the Left has given up any talk of political violence for the far more comfortable
world of the rule of law, regardless of how little the latter has achieved in just the last few years. But if the history of emergency
powers tells us anything it is that the least effective response to state violence is to simply insist on the rule of law. Rather than

aiming to counter state violence with a demand for legality, then, what is needed is a counter-politics:
against the permanent emergency by all means, but also against the 'normality' of everyday class power and
the bourgeois world of the rule of law. And since the logic of emergency is so deeply embedded in the rhetorical
structure of liberalism's concept of security this means being against the politics of security. For the very posing

of political questions through the trope of emergency is always already on the side of security. To grasp why, we need to now refocus
our attention more specifically on security as a political technology.

Link -- Failed States


Failed states are an entirely constructed threat with no basis in reality. Their discourse shapes policy
goals and justifies global military intervention. It should be rejected.
Logan and Preble 10 Justin is associate director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He holds a masters degree in
international relations from the University of Chicago and a bachelors degree in international relations from American University and
Christopher is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He holds a PhD in history from Temple University and a BA in
history from George Washington University. Washingtons Newest Bogeyman Debunking the Fear of Failed States Strategic Studies
Quarterly, Summer 2010
Given the growing acceptance of arguments about failed states and the fact that these ideas have begun to affect
US foreign policy, it is striking how ill-defined the terms of debate have been. How can we measure state failure?
What are the historical correlations between the attributes of failed states and the supposed security threats they pose? Below we show
that by the established definitions of state failure and a reasonable interpretation of the word threat, failed states almost always miss
the mark. Impressionism as Social Science A survey of the formal studies of state failure reveals a methodological
wasteland. Analysts have created a number of listings of failed states, which have, in fairness, overlapped considerably; all are
populated by poor countries, many of which have been wracked by interstate or civil violence.48 However, instead of adhering to
basic social-scientific standards of inquiry, in which questions or puzzles are observed and then theories are described and tested using
clearly defined independent and dependent variables, analysts began by drawing up a categoryfailed stateand then attempted to
create data sets from which theoretical inferences could be induced. To take one prominent case, the authors of the State
Failure Task Force Report contracted by the Central Intelligence Agencys Directorate of Intelligence chose to adjust

their definition of failed state after their initial criteria did not produce an adequate data set for the
quantitative tests the researchers wanted to perform. After dramatically expanding the definition, the task
force produced almost six times more countries that could be coded failed as compared with their
original criteria and then proceeded with their statistical analysis. They justified this highly questionable
decision on the judgment that events that fall beneath [the] total-collapse threshold often pose challenges
to US foreign policy as well.49 Subsequently, the task force changed its name to the Political Instability Task Force and
appeared to back away from the term failed state.50 Beyond methodological shortcomings, the lists of failed states reveal only that
there are many countries plagued by severe problems. The top 10 states in the 2009 Fund for Peace/Foreign Policy magazine Failed
States Index include two countries the United States occupies (Iraq and Afghanistan), one country without any central government to
speak of (Somalia), four poor African states (Zimbabwe, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African
Republic), two resource-rich but [ 26 ] Washingtons Newest Bogeyman unstable African countries (Sudan and Guinea) and a
nuclear-armed Muslim country, population 176 million (Pakistan). The sheer diversity of the countries on the lists makes

clear that few policy conclusions could be drawn about a country based on its designation as a failed state.
In fact, what has happened is that analysts have seized on an important single data pointAfghanistan in the 1990s and
2000sand used it to justify a focus on failed states more broadly. Because Afghanistan met anyones definition
of failed state and because it clearly contained a threat, analysts concluded en masse that failed states were
threatening. When confronted with the reality that the countries regularly included on lists of failed states include such strategic
non-entities as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and East Timor, advocates of focusing on state failure routinely point
back at the single case that can be justified directly on US national security grounds: Afghanistan.51 Even in Afghanistan,
however, remedying the condition of state failure would not have eliminated the threat , and eliminating the

threatby killing or capturing Osama bin Laden and his confederateswould not have remedied the
failure. The fact that expansive claims about the significance of state failure have been used to market
studies of the subject, when viewed in light of the diverse and mostly nonthreatening states deemed
failed, leaves the impression of a bait and switch. For instance, the 2007 update of the Failed States Index promises on
the magazines cover to explain why the worlds weakest countries pose the greatest danger. The opening lines of the article declare
that failed states arent just a danger to themselves. They can threaten the progress and stability of countries half a world away.
Strikingly, then, the article does little to back up or even argue these claims. It instead shrugs that failing states are a diverse lot and
that there are few easy answers to their troubles. By 2009, the index was conceding that greater risk of failure is not
always synonymous with greater consequences of failure, and that the state failure-terrorism link is less clear than
many have come to assume.52 Given these concessions undermining the idea that state failure is
threatening, one wonders why scholars continue to study failed states at all. As seen above, the countries on lists of
failed states are so diverse that it is difficult to draw any conclusions about a states designation as failed. But the purpose, one would
think, of creating a new category of states would be to unify countries that share attributes that can inform either how we think about
these states or how we craft policies toward these states. Instead, the scholarship on state failure has arbitrarily grouped

together countries that have so little in common that neither academic research nor policy work should be
influenced by this concept. Despite repeated claims to the contrary, learning that a task force has deemed a particular state
failed is not particularly useful. Start with the Conclusions and Work Backward Existing scholarship on state failure seems to
indicate that the conclusion led to the analysis, rather than vice versa. Scholars who argue that failed state is a

meaningful category and/or indicative of threat provide a rationale for American interventionism around the
globe. Given the arbitrary creation of the category failed state and the extravagant claims about its

significance, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that research on failed states constitutes, as one analyst
put it, an eminently political discourse, counseling intervention, trusteeship, and the abandonment of the
state form for wide swaths of the globe.53 The policy proposals offered by state failure theorists certainly meet this
description. In 2003 retired diplomats James Hooper and Paul Williams argued for what they called earned sovereigntythe idea
being that target states would need to climb back into the good graces of the intervening power to regain their sovereignty. In some
cases, this would mean that domestic governments would perform whatever functions were allowed by the intervener, but other duties
would be retained by the outside actor. The element of shared sovereignty is quite flexible . . . as well as the time frame of shared
sovereignty. . . . In some instances, it may be indefinite and subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions as opposed to specified
timelines.54 The premise seems to be that countries will be returned to the control of their indigenous populations when the
intervener decides it is appropriate. James Fearon and David Laitin, both political science professors at Stanford University, promote a
new doctrine that may be described as neotrusteeship, or more provocatively, postmodern imperialism.55 As they see it, this policy
should not carry the stigma of nineteenth- or twentieth-century imperialism. [W]e are not advocating or endorsing imperialism with
the connotation of exploitation and permanent rule by foreigners. [ 28 ] Washingtons Newest Bogeyman On the contrary, Fearon
and Laitin explain, Postmodern imperialism may have exploitative aspects, but these are to be condemned.56 While perhaps not
intentionally exploitative, postmodern imperialism certainly does appear to entail protracted and quasi-permanent rule by foreigners.
Fearon and Laitin admit that in postmodern imperialism, the search for an exit strategy is delusional, if this means a plan under which
full control of domestic security is to be handed back to local authorities by a certain date in the near future.57 To the contrary: for
some cases complete exit by the interveners may never be possible; rather, the endgame is to make the national level of government
irrelevant for people in comparison to the local and supranational levels.58 Thus, in Fearon and Laitins model, nation building may
not be an appropriate term; their ideas would more accurately be described as nation ending, replacing national governments with a
supranational governing order. Stephen D. Krasner, director of the State Departments policy planning staff under George W. Bush and
a leading advocate of focusing the department increasingly on state building, believes that the rules of conventional sovereignty . . .
no longer work, and their inadequacies have had deleterious consequences for the strong as well as the weak.59 Krasner concludes
that to resolve this dilemma, Alternative institutional arrangements supported by external actors, such as de facto trusteeships and
shared sovereignty, should be added to the list of policy options.60 He is explicit about the implications of those policies and admits
that in a trusteeship, international actors would remain in control indefinitely. The intervening power would maintain the prerogative
of revoking the targets sovereignty and should make no assumptions of withdrawal in the short or medium term.61 Krasners candor
about the implications of his policy views, however, was not equaled by a willingness to label them accurately. For policy purposes,
it would be best to refer to shared sovereignty as partnerships. This would more easily let policymakers engage in organized
hypocrisy, that is, saying one thing and doing another. . . . Shared sovereignty or partnerships would make no claim to being an
explicit alternative to conventional sovereignty. It would allow actors to obfuscate the fact that their behavior would be inconsistent
with their principles.62 Development experts with an interest in state failure agree that seizing political control of weak states is the
answer. Paul Collier, for example, writes that outside powers should take on the responsibility of providing [ 29 ] public goods in
failed states, including security guarantees to indigenous governments that pass Western democracy tests, and the removal of
guarantees coupled with the encouragement of coups against governments that fail such tests.63 In part, these sweeping admonitions
to simply seize politico-military control of the countries in question result from the failure to determine which of the failedness
indicators should be addressed first or whether there is any order at all. While some studies have proposed hierarchies of objectives,
starting with security and ending with development,64 it is clear that for many analysts, the causal arrows zigzag across the diagram.
Each metric is tangled up with others, forcing those arguing for intervention to advocate simultaneous execution of a number of
extraordinarily ambitious tasks. David Kilcullen lists cueing and synchronization of development, governance, and security efforts,
building them in a simultaneous, coordinated way that supports the political strategy as only one of eight best practices for
counterinsurgents.65 In Afghanistan, the flow chart of the December 2009 strategy seeking to repair that state looked more like a
parody:66 Discussing this dilemma of interlocking objectives in the context of Afghanistan, Rory Stewart remarks that:

Policymakers perceive Afghanistan through the categories of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, statebuilding and economic development. These categories are so closely linked that you can put them in almost
any sequence or combination. You need to defeat the Taliban in order to build a state and you need to build
a state in order to defeat the Taliban. There cannot be security without development, or development
without security. If you have the Taliban you have terrorists, if you dont have development you have
terrorists, and as Obama informed the New Yorker, If you have ungoverned spaces, they become havens
for terrorists.67 Not only do all bad things go together in these analyses, but it also becomes difficult if not
impossible to discern which objective should be the primary focus of state-building efforts. Similarly, on the
issue of state building and democracy, Francis Fukuyama informs readers that before you can have a democracy, you must have a
state, but to have a legitimate and therefore durable state you must have democracy. Acknowledging the circularity of this argument,
Fukuyama offered only the rather unsatisfying concession that the two ends are intertwined, but the precise sequencing
of how and when to build the distinct but interlocking institutions needs very careful thought .68 This is a

platitude and should be cold comfort to policymakers who are being urged forward by the same experts to
perform these ambitious tasks. The High Costs of Targeting State Failure We have argued that the failed state category
is a vacuous construct and that the countries frequently referred to as failed states are not inherently
threatening. For those whom we have not convinced, however, we now examine the historical record and attempt to examine the
costs of a national security policy that placed a high priority on attempting to fix failed states . It is of course
impossible to determine the precise cost of any mission beforehand. Historically, however, such operations have been extremely
costly and difficult. In a study for the RAND Corporation, James Dobbins and his coauthors attempt to draft a rule-of-thumb
measure for the costs of nation building in a hypothetical scenario involving a country of five million people and $500 per capita
GDP.69 For less ambitious peacekeeping missions, they calculate the need for 1.6 foreign troops and 0.2 foreign police per 1,000
population, and $1.5 billion per year. In the more ambitious [ 31 ] Justin Logan and Christopher Preble peace enforcement

scenarios, they figure 13 foreign troops and 1.6 foreign police per 1,000 population, and $15.6 billion per year.70 Curiously, though,
Dobbins et al. approach this problem by deriving average figures from eight historical nation building (peace enforcement)
missions, five of which they had coded in a previous study to indicate whether or not they had been successful. One of these (Japan)
they coded as very successful, two (Somalia and Haiti) were not successful, one (Bosnia) was a mixed result, and one (Kosovo)
was a modest success.71 The authors then simply averaged the costs of these missions and deemed the resulting figures to be a rule
of thumb.72 It is unclear why future missions should be based on historical experience when the historical examples used to derive the
figures produced successes, failures, and results in between. Our methodological criticism notwithstanding, even taking Dobbins et al.
on their own terms reveals how remarkably costly it is to attempt to fix failed states. Using the model laid out in Dobbins et al., we
calculated the cost of nation building in three countries: Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. A peace enforcement mission in Yemen would
cost roughly $78 billion the first year, whereas a peacekeeping mission would cost roughly $12 billion the first year. Similar missions
in Somalia, with a smaller population and a smaller per capita GDP, would only cost around $30 billion and $3 billion, respectively.73
In the case of a larger country, like Pakistan, the costs would be significantly higher. A peace enforcement operation in Pakistan would
cost approximately $582 billion the first year, while a peacekeeping operation would cost around $81 billion. In all these examples,
the peace enforcement numbers contain very high military costs. According to Dobbins model, a peace enforcement operation in
Pakistan would require more than two million international soldiers, costing about $200,000 each.74 Analysts Frederick Kagan and
Michael OHanlon suggest that even for the minimal task of trying to tip the balance of an intra-Pakistani conflict, the international
community would need to contribute between 100,000 and 200,000 troops (only 50,000100,000 of whom would be US, they
suggest), and this represents the best of all the worst-case scenarios.75 As quickly becomes clear, intervening in any of the
frequently mentioned failed states implies significant costs. As Kilcullen observes in the context of counterinsurgency, a corps of state
builders should be available to stay in the country indefinitely. He proposes that key personnel (commanders, ambassadors, political
staffs, [ 32 ] Washingtons Newest Bogeyman aid mission chiefs, key advisers, and intelligence officers) in a counterinsurgency
campaign should be there for the duration.76 But it is unlikely that Western governments possess large pools of workers willing and
well-equipped to deploy to Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or Haiti for the duration. Western civil services
and even most, if not all, Western militariesare not comprised of a separate class of citizens who live their lives in far-flung locales,
away from family and country, indefinitely. It is for this reason that, in addition to the structural changes highlighted above, a number
of policy reports have called for radical overhauls of the national security establishment in the United States so that it can be better
tailored to repair failed states.77 Failed Thinking, Not Failed States From new military doctrines and budget priorities, to statebuilding offices in the State Department, to the myriad proposals for transforming the entire US national security establishment, a

long-term strategy of fixing failed states would entail dramatic change and high costs . More appropriate
and far less costlythan such dramatic changes would be a fundamental rethinking of the role of nation
building and the relevance of state failure to national security planning. However, this does not appear likely.
Thrust forward by the claims of threat, but unequipped with the expensive tools necessary for the task,
policymakers look likely to persist in the failed approach to the subject that they have applied in recent
years. If we intend to seriously embark on a plan to build nations, we must be prepared to bear heavy costs in time, money, and lives
or we must be prepared to fail. Moreover, no matter how evenhanded the United States may attempt to be, if US
personnel are on the ground in dangerous parts of the world, Americans could be forced to choose sides in
other countries internal conflicts, and the nation could become entangled militarily when its vital interests
are not at stake.78 For instance, if our nation builders are killed in the line of duty, will there be a US military
response? It seems likely that Congress and the American people would demand military retaliation, and at
that point, the United States could find itself facing a choice of either a spiraling military escalation (as in
Vietnam) or a humiliating retreat (as in Somalia). Both of those prospects are troubling but may emerge if policymakers pursue
a strategy of fixing failed states without broad public support. The essence of strategy is effectively balancing
ends, ways, and means. Squandering scarce resources on threats that exist primarily in the minds of
policymakers is one indication that, as Richard Betts has pointed out, US policymakers have lost the ability to
think clearly about defense policy.79 The entire concept of state failure is flawed. The countries that appear
on the various lists of failed states reveal that state failure almost never produces meaningful threats to US
national security. Further, attempting to remedy state failurethat is, embarking on an ambitious project of
nation or state buildingwould be extremely costly and of dubious utility. Given these connected realities,
policymakers would be wise to cast off the entire concept of state failure and to evaluate potential threats to
US national security with a much more critical eye.

Failed state discourse frames the Global South as the


source of violence. This colonizes our understanding of
international society with demonized stereotypes that
justify oppression.
Cooper 5Neil Cooper, Peace Studies @ Bradford [Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces:
Representations of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy Security Dialogue 36 (4) p. 471]
The political economies of contemporary conflicts have also been the object of analyses influenced by
critical theory and post-structuralism. Mark Duffield, in particular, has identified shadow trade in the

developed world as a form of really existing development taking place outside the formal structures of the
global economy, from which large parts remain excluded. Much of this literature has also
emphasized the need to distinguish between different kinds of economies that exist in the same
environment, for instance the combat economy of the warlords, the shadow economy of the mafiosi
and the coping economy of ordinary citizens (Pugh, Cooper & Goodhand, 2004). A key feature in

this work, however, has been a concern with the way in which weak and failed states have
been incorporated into a discourse that has re-inscribed underdevelopment as the source of
multiple instabilities for the developed world what Luke & Tuathail (1997) term the virus of
disorder. Duffields work, in particular, has identified the processes by which the securitization of
underdevelopment has underpinned the new liberal peace aid paradigm, centred around
the restoration of order through the application of neoliberalism and the formal accoutrements
of democracy and civil (but not economic) rights (Duffield, 2001). Indeed, for Duffield,
development has become a form of biopolitics concerned with addressing the putative
threats posed to effective states by transborder migratory flows, shadow economies, illicit networks
and the global insurgent networks of ineffective states (Duffield, 2005). And, in contrast to the Cold War,
the geopolitics of effective states is concerned less with arming Third World allies and more with
transforming the populations inside ineffective states. In this view, development represents a security
mechanism that attempts through poverty reduction, conditional debt cancellation and selective

funding to insulate [developed] mass society from the permanent crisis on its borders
(Duffield, 2005: 157).
While Duffields analysis arguably understates the continuities between the Cold War and the post-Cold
War era, these insights are nevertheless of particular relevance when examining both shifts in discourse and
policy on development and security in general and the political economy of conflict in particular, and it is
to these that we will now turn.
Towards a Synthesis of Difference or a Difference in Synthesis?
In the aftermath of 9/11, weak and failed states have become the object of a heightened discourse

of threat that represents them as actual or potential nodal points in global terrorist
networks. In this conception, the absence of state authority and the persistence of disorder creates local
societies relatively immune to technologies of surveillance, making them ideal breeding grounds for
terrorist recruitment, training, money-laundering and armstrafficking, as well as organized crime more
generally. As Collier et al. (2003: 41) note, civil war generates territories outside the control of
governments that have become epicentres of crime and disease and that export global evils such
as drugs, AIDS and terrorism.

This has produced an element of synthesis between new-right critiques of the current aid
paradigm and at least some critics from the liberal left. In particular, the idea that the neoliberal
project has been taken too far and has had the counterproductive effect of eroding state capacity and
legitimacy a traditional refrain of the left has now been taken up by realists. Thus, Fukuyamas State
Building signs up to earlier analyses that have emphasized the way in which neopatrimonial regimes used
external conditionality as an excuse for cutting back on modern state sectors while expanding the scope of
the neopatrimonial state (Fukuyama, 2004: 22). Fukuyama has also become a belated convert to the idea
that, under the Washington Consensus, the state-building agenda was given insufficient emphasis
(Fukuyama, 2004: 7). Thus, the new-right analysis is one that emphasizes strong states and local
empowerment. Even (especially) the Bush administration concluded in its National Security Strategy of
2002 that America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing states (White House,
2002: 1).
However, this apparent consensus between the new-right analysis and the liberal critique raises a number of
concerns. First, the new-right analysis is situated as a response to the apparently new global dangers
unleashed by 9/11. As Fukuyama (2004: 126) notes, the failed state problem . . . was seen
previously as largely a humanitarian or human rights issue, whereas now it has been
constructed as a problem of Western security . This dichotomy between the situation preceding and
that after 9/11 is most certainly an exaggeration. Underdevelopment has always been securitized, just in
different ways; and even its post-Cold War manifestation was firmly in place well before 9/11. Indeed, this
historical amnesia can be understood as an intrinsic element of a securitizing discourse that justifies

regulatory interventions as a response to a specific global emergency rather than as part of longer-term
trends.
Nevertheless, it is also the case that the securitization of underdevelopment highlighted by
Duffield has become acutely heightened post-9/11, and it is in this context that current
debates about the need to eradicate debt, increase aid and reform trading structures are taking
place. Thus, the cosmopolitan emphasis on responding to the plight of other global citizens
has been merged with the security imperatives of the war on terror to create something of a

monolithic discourse across left and right that justifies intervention, regulation and
monitoring as about securing both the poor and the developed world.
Consequently, what structures the debate about addressing abuse or underdevelopment in this perspective is
not the abuse or underdevelopment per se but its links with multiple threats posed to the developed world.
A continuum is thus created for external intervention, entailing not merely the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein in Iraq but also structuring debate about Somalia or the need to address shadow trade. Moreover,
this discourse is by no means unique to new-right perspectives. Thus, the recent Barcelona Report on a
Human Security Doctrine for Europe deploys much the same kind of language, despite being situated in an
explicitly cosmopolitanist analysis that emphasizes the importance of human security. For the authors,
regional conflicts and failed states are the source of new global threats including terrorism, weapons of
mass destruction and organised crime and consequently no citizens of the world are any longer safely
ensconced behind their national border (Study Group on Europes Security Capabilities, 2004: 67).
Interventionary strategies, whether designed to address weapons of mass destruction, AIDS or

the shadow trade emanating from civil conflict, are thus explicitly framed as prophylactic
strategies designed to protect the West from terror, disease, refugees, crime and disorder . In
the words of an IISS (2002: 2) report on Somalia, the concern is with inoculating failed or failing states
against occupation by al-Qaeda.
This is not to suggest there is now complete synthesis between new-right analyses and liberal critiques. As
already noted, analyses such as the Barcelona Report are located in a cosmopolitanist perspective that still
emphasizes the importance of providing human security to the citizens of weak states and stresses the need
for a bottom-up approach that empowers locals. In contrast, for Fukuyama (2004: 115), state-building and
local ownership somehow manage to encompass approval for the idea that, on key areas such as central
banking, ten bright technocrats can be air-dropped into a developing country and bring about massive
changes for the better in public policy. The emphasis is also on state capacity for enforcement, the ability
to send someone with a uniform and a gun to force people to comply with the states laws (Fukuyama,
2004: 8) and to maintain the integrity of borders too easily traversed by networked crime and terror.
However, the promise inherent in this monolithic discourse is of a potential synthesis between
solidarism and security one in which welfare, representation and security (for both rich and poor) can
really be combined. The risk, though, is that security will delimit solidarism in terms of both the
breadth of its reach and the depth of its implementation. For example, following US allegations
of support for terrorism, the operations of a Saudi charity operating in Somalia were suspended, throwing
over 2,600 orphans onto the streets (ICG, 2005a: 15). Similarly, while the USA has increased aid, much of
the direction of this aid has been determined by the priorities of the war on terror, while bilateral trade
arrangements have been used to reward key allies in the war on terror, such as Pakistan (Tujan, Gaughran &
Mollett, 2004). A further notable feature of the post-9/11 environment is that while the war on terror
framing has colonized the representation of a wide variety of topics, including discussion of
conflict trade and shadow war economies, insights from this literature have not always travelled in
the reverse direction. Thus, even the most basis lessons from the literature on the economic challenges of
peacebuilding were ignored in Iraq. What was notable here was the failure of imagination to conceive preinvasion Iraq as an entity that exhibited many features of a war economy for example, high levels of
corruption, weak infrastructure, a shadow trade in oil and other forms of sanctions-busting, and a
militarized society. Similarly, concern at the way porous borders and informal economies may have been
exploited by terror networks in the Sahel has led the USA to develop a Pan-Sahel Initiative focused on
reinforcing borders and enhancing surveillance. In other words, cutting off networks that have become the
economic lifeblood of Saharan peoples (ICG, 2005b: i) has been prioritized rather than dealing with the
underlying dynamics driving such networks.
Conclusion

In some respects, then, there has been a degree of convergence in at least the mainstream discourse and
language deployed to discuss weak states and their various features, including shadow economies. The
current emphasis is on reversing the excesses of neoliberal reforms that are deemed to have undermined the
state in the 1980s and 1990s. The consensus is on the need for strong states and local empowerment (see
the contribution by Rolf Schwarz in this edition of Security Dialogue). However, while the discourse and
terminology are the same, the meaning applied to them is often very different. How these commonalities
and differences will play themselves out in the development of policy remains to be seen. What is
nonetheless clear is that much of the discussion of civil war economies has become infected by

the virus that is the language of the war on terror. A key concern that this gives rise to is
that such framings will structure all or much policy on inconflict and post-conflict societies
as being about providing hermetic protection for the West, rather than really addressing the
lessons about the local economic dynamics driving shadow economies. The risk is that post-9/11
post-conflict reconstruction may fuse the liberal peace aid paradigm (a continued emphasis on
the rigours of neoliberalism, albeit mitigated by a nod towards poverty reduction) with elements of more
traditional Cold War interventions that emphasized formal state strength: powerful
militaries and intelligence services (albeit mitigated by a nod to civil society). The ways in which
this synthesis between the security imperatives of the developed world, cosmopolitanist concerns with the
poor and the current reworking of the neoliberal model play themselves out will only really become clear
with the test of time. However, what seems to be emerging is a variable-geometry approach to weak states.
Some, like Iraq and Afghanistan, may become the object of heightened discourses of threat,

producing highly militarized intervention strategies that prioritize order and security issues
while failing to address other factors such as the nature of shadow economies and their
relationship to occupation and regulation. Indeed, at their extreme, as in Iraq, rather than
witnessing the modification of discredited neoliberal models, such objects of intervention
may experience even more virulent versions (Klein, 2005). Others, such as Sudan, may find
themselves subject to a post-9/11 variant of the new barbarism thesis, in which the anarchy and extremes of
violence they are deemed to exhibit are simultaneously presented not only as a rationale for intervention
but also as a reason for severely delimiting intervention in the absence of acute imperatives for action
provided by the logic of the war on terror. In between, there may be a broad swathe of states, from Sierra
Leone to Angola to Liberia, where specific intervention policies may be less strongly influenced by the
logic of war on terror and the more general securitization of underdevelopment, but where broader policies
that influence such interventions are mediated via the dictates of both solidarism and the security and
economic interests of the developed world. Thus, it is perhaps more appropriate to refer not to the
imposition of the liberal peace on post-conflict societies but to the imposition of a variety of liberal peaces
(Richmond, 2005), albeit ones still imposed within the broad constraints of neoliberalism and within the
context of profoundly unequal global trading structures that contribute to underdevelopment.

Link -- Prolif
Prolif is an epistemological excuse for violence their discourse wrecks alternative approaches
Matthew

Woods, PhD in IR
, 7

International Relations

@ Brown - Researcher @ Thomas Watson Institute of

[Journal of Language and Politics 6.1Unnatural Acts: Nuclear Language, proliferation, and order, p.

116-7]

It is important to identify, expose and understand the successful creation of 'proliferation' as the inevitable,
uncontrollable and dangerous spread of nuclear arms because it changed the world in innumerable ways . On
one hand, it is the chief motivation for a wide array of cooperative endeavors among states and the central rationale for the
most successful arms control agreement in modern history, the NPT. It inspired sacrifices that led to faith in our regard for others
and stimulated confidence in international law. On the other hand, it is the reason for an unparalleled collection of
international denial and regulatory institutions and it is the omnipresent and ineliminable threat at the heart
of our chronic, unremitting suspicion of others. It is a cause of global inequality and double-standards
among states and the progenitor of the name and identity 'rogue state' (states that reject the whaling ban are not
'rogue states'). It is a central element in world-wide toleration for human misery, such as starvation in North
Korea, and in public toleration for the clear deception and dissembling of government elites, such as in the US.
It is a vehicle in some media for racial stereotypes. The existence of 'proliferation' is a primary rationale among
nuclear states for preserving and improving their nuclear arsenals. And faith in the existence of 'Proliferation:
most recently, brought about invasion, war and continuing death in the Middle East. Every individual that
fears it, organization that studies it and state that strives to prevent it embraces 'proliferation' as a real and
known thing and, in part, orients their identity and behavior according to it. The successful creation of
'proliferation' represents the creation of our common sense, our everyday life and our natural attitude toward
the nuclear world 'out there.' It is uncontestable and to suggest otherwise that nuclear states might be to blame for any spread of
nuclear arms, or that it has actually been rare and so far benign or that it may even be beneficial (see a critical review of this literature
in Woods 2002) - is to invite derision and ostracism. The reality of 'proliferation' is so massive and solidified that the essential role of
(cell) proliferation in maintaining life and health is virtually forgotten, overwhelmed, its positive meaning restricted to the doctor's
office and biology lab. In short, the creation of 'proliferation' is a textbook example of what some term hegemony,

the creation by a dominant group of a world that realizes its ideological preferences while marginalizing
other possibilities and co-opting subordinates.
Prolif control has become a battle of good and evil creating a black check for violence

Der Derian 03 Political Science


Professor
(

, University of Massachusetts, boundary 2 30.3 (2003) 19-27, Decoding The National Security

Strategy of the United States of America, project muse)


From the perspective of the NSS, even before the shock of 9/11, the

end of the Cold War augured not global peace


but a new world disorder. "New deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists" (13); and
while they might not possess the might of the Soviet Union, they have the asymmetrical advantages garnered by
weapons of mass destruction and the will to use them. Positing that traditional deterrence no longer works,
the NSS presents axiomatically the right to preemptively strike against these new enemies : "The greater the
threat, the greater is the risk of inactionand the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack" (15). This is not a grand
strategy; this is a blank check, to take whatever actions, whenever deemed necessary, against whoever fits
the terrorist profile. Facing "an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive
technologies," the NSS sanctions a counterstrategy based on superior intelligence, ethics, and technological capability (15): "The
reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just" (16). In short, war will be virtuous. First
auditioned in the Balkans, and dress-rehearsed in Afghanistan, virtuous war took center stage in the invasion of Iraq. Virtuous war
projects a technological and ethical superiority in which computer simulation, media dissimulation, global surveillance, and networked
warfare combine to deter, discipline, and, if need be, destroy the enemy. Ethically intentioned and virtually applied, drawing on the
doctrines of just war when possible and holy war when necessary, virtuous war is more than a felicitous oxymoron. After

September 11, as the United States chose coercion over diplomacy in its foreign policy, and deployed a
rhetoric of total victory over absolute evil, virtuous war became the ultimate means by which the United States

intended to resecure its borders, assert its suzerainty, and secure the holy trinity of international order: global capitalism (VI. Ignite a
New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade [17]); Western models of democracy (VII. Expand the
Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy [21]); a hegemonic "balance of power"
(VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power [25]); and preventive interventions.

The affs prolif discourse is racist and legitimates US


militarism.
Gusterson 99Hugh Gusterson is a professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason
University. [Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14,
No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 111-143, accessed through JSTOR]
Nuclear Orientalism
According to the literature on risk in anthropology, shared fears often reveal as much about the
identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the actual dangers that are feared (Douglas
and Wildavsky 1982; Lindenbaum 1974). The immoderate reactions in the West to the nuclear

tests conducted by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq's nuclear weapons program earlier, are
examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important
role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it , in the Western
imagination. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear
weapons and those that cannot, dates back, at least, to the N on- P roliferation T reaty of 1970.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five countries that had nuclear weapons in
1970 and those countries that did not. According to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the
United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)3 promised to assist other
signatories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that
technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international inspections when
necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers
agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). One hundred
eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it
enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the
countries of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric4- designating

only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers-the treaty has
become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in
Western public discourse in racialized terms. In view of recent developments in global politicsthe collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third
World-the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is

only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S.


military programs in the post-Cold War world since the early 1990s, when U.S. military
leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new
source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995).
Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem
whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear
proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This
usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new
and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal"
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the
"proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are
being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have
turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear
powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the

Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons
will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial
move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically
formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological
weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998).

The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology
is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that
takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western
countries.6 This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as
ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by
Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a
series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where
"we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are
modem and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are
honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist
orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in
contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic
development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a
uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines,
such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary
orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse .

The affirmatives proliferation discourse is part of broader


orientalist rhetoric to construct a hierarchy of nations.
Gusterson 99Hugh Gusterson is a professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason
University. [Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14,
No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 111-143, accessed through JSTOR]
The Orientalist Underworld: A Tour of Images

These falsely obvious arguments about the political unreliability of Third World nuclear
powers are, I have been arguing, part of a broader orientalist rhetoric that seeks to
bury disturbing similarities between "us" and "them" in a discourse that systematically
produces the Third World as Other. In the process of producing the Third World, we also
produce ourselves, for the Orient, one of the West's "deepest and most recurring images of the
other," is essential in defining the West "as its contrasting image, idea, personality,
experience" (Said 1978:1-2).
The particular images and metaphors that recur in the discourse on proliferation represent
Third World nations as criminals, women, and children. But these recurrent images and
metaphors, all of which pertain in some way to disorder , can also be read as telling hints
about the facets of our own psychology and culture which we find especially troubling in
regard to our custodianship over nuclear weapons. The metaphors and images are part of
the ideological armor the West wears in the nuclear age, but they are also clues that
suggest buried, denied, and troubling parts of ourselves that have mysteriously surfaced in
our distorted representations of the Other. As Akhil Gupta has argued in his analysis of a different
orientalist discourse, the discourse on development, "within development discourse ... lies its shadowy
double ... a virtual presence, inappropriate objects that serve to open up the 'developed world' itself as an
inappropriate object" (1998:4).

In the era of so-called rogue states, one recurrent theme in this system of representations is
that of the thief, liar, and criminal: the very attempt to come into possession of nuclear
weapons is often cast in terms of racketeering and crime. After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear

tests, one newspaper headline read, "G-8 Nations Move to Punish Nuclear Outlaws" (Reid 1998: 1),
thereby characterizing the two countries as criminals even though neither had signed-and hence violatedeither the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When British customs officers
intercepted a shipment of krytrons destined for Iraq's nuclear weapons program, one newspaper account
said that Saddam Hussein was "caught red-handed trying to steal atomic detonators" (Perlmutter 1990,
emphasis added)-a curious choice of words given that Iraq had paid good money to buy the krytrons from
the company EG&G. (In fact, if any nation can be accused of theft here, surely it is the United States,
which took $650 million from Pakistan for a shipment of F-16s, cancelled the shipment when the Bush
administration determined that Pakistan was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, but never refunded the
money.) According to an article in the New York Times, "it required more than three decades, a global
network of theft and espionage, and uncounted millions for Pakistan, one of the world's poorest countries,
to explode that bomb" (Weiner 1998:6). Meanwhile the same paper's editorial page lamented that "for years
Pakistan has lied to the U.S. about not having a nuclear weapons program" and insisted that the United
States "punish Pakistan's perfidy on the Bomb" (New York Times 1987a:A34, 1987b:A34). And
Representative Stephen Solarz (Democrat, New York) warns that the bomb will give Pakistan "the nuclear
equivalent of a Saturday Night Special" (Smith 1988:38). The image of the Saturday night special
assimilates Pakistan symbolically to the disorderly underworld of ghetto hoodlums who rob comer stores
and fight gang wars. U.S. nuclear weapons are, presumably, more like the "legitimate"
weapons carried by the police to maintain order and keep the peace .18
Reacting angrily to this system of representations, the scientist in charge of Pakistan's nuclear weapons
program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, said, "Anything which we do is claimed by the West as stolen and we are
never given credit except for the things like heroin.... You think that we people who also got education are
stupid, ignorant. Things which you could do fifty years ago, don't you think that we cannot do them now"
(NNI-News 1998).

Third World nations acquiring nuclear weapons are also described in terms of passions
escaping control. In Western discourse the passionate, or instinctual, has long been
identified with women and animals and implicitly contrasted with male human rationality
(Haraway 1990; Merchant 1980; Rosaldo 1974). Thus certain recurrent figures of speech in the
Western discourse on proliferation cast proliferant nations in the Third World in imagery
that carries a subtle feminine or subhuman connotation . Whereas the United
States is spoken of as having "vital interests" and "legitimate security needs," Third World
nations have "passions," "longings," and "yearnings" for nuclear weapons which must be
controlled and contained by the strong male and adult hand of America. Pakistan has "an
evident ardor for the Bomb," says a New York Times editorial (1987a:A34). Peter Rosenfeld, writing in the
Washington Post, worries that the United States cannot forever "stifle [Pakistan's] nuclear longings"
(1987:A27). Representative Ed Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts), agreeing, warns in a letter to the
Washington Post that America's weakness in its relationship with Pakistan means that the Pakistanis "can
feed nuclear passions at home and still receive massive military aid from America" (1987:A22). The image
is of the unfaithful wife sponging off her cuckolded husband.
But throwing the woman out may cause even more disorder: the Washington Post editorial page,
having described Pakistan's nuclear weapons program-in an allusion to the ultimate symbol of Muslim
femininity-as concealed "behind a veil of secrecy," goes on to warn that there are "advantages to ... having
Pakistan stay in a close and constraining security relationship with the United States rather than be cast out
by an aid cutoff into a loneliness in which its passion could only grow" (1987:A22). Thus, even though

American intelligence had by 1986 concluded that the Pakistani uranium-enrichment plant
at Kahuta "had gone all the way" (Smith 1988: 104), and even though the president can no
longer, as he is required by law, "certify Pakistan's nuclear purity " (Molander 1986), the
disobedient, emotive femininity of Pakistan is likely to be less disruptive if it is kept within
the bounds of its uneasy relationship with the United States.
Third World nations are also often portrayed as children, and the United States, as a parental
figure. The message is succinctly conveyed by one newspaper headline: "India, Pakistan Told to Put
Weapons Away" (Marshall 1998a). Ben Sanders praises the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a means to "protect
the atomically innocent" (1990:25). But what about when innocence is lost? Steve Chapman, speaking of

India and Pakistan, argues that "it's fine to counsel teenagers against having sex. But once they have
produced a baby, another approach is in order" (1998:21). New York Times editorials speak of U.S.
"scoldings" of Pakistan and "U.S. demands for good Pakistani behavior from now on" (1987a:A34). Some

commentators fear that the U.S. parental style is too permissive and will encourage
misbehavior by Pakistan's naughty siblings: "those who advocated an aid cutoff said the time had
come for the United States to set an example for other would-be nuclear nations" (Smith 1988: 106).
Warning that American parental credibility is on the line, the New York Times says that "all
manner of reason and arguments have been tried with Pakistani leaders. It's time for stronger steps"
(1987a:A34).

These metaphorical representations of threshold nuclear nations as criminals ,


women , and children assimilate the relationship between the West and the Third
World to other hierarchies of dominance within Western culture. They use the
symbolic force of domestic hierarchies-police over criminals, men over women, and adults
over children-to buttress and construct the global hierarchy of nations , telling us
that, like women, children, and criminals, Third World nations have their proper place. The
sense in the West that Third World nations have their proper place at the bottom of a global
order in which nuclear weapons are the status symbols of the powerful alone-that nuclear
proliferation is transgressing important symbolic hierarchies-is nicely conveyed by the
condescending reactions in the Western media to India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests of
1998. Here many commentators sounded like secretaries of exclusive members- only clubs blackballing
applications from the nouveau riche. "With scant regard for the admonitions of other members of the
[nuclear] group, India has abruptly and loudly elbowed itself from the bottom into the top tier of this
privileged elite," said one commentator (Smith 1998:A 12). Putting the upstarts back in their place, U.S.
Secretary of State Madeline Albright said that it was "clear that what the Indians and Pakistanis did was
unacceptable and that they are not now members of the nuclear club" (Marshall 1998b:A12). The same
sentiment was expressed in stronger terms on the op-ed page of the New York Times by former National
Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, whose characterization of India draws on classic orientalist imagery to
make its point that the Indians are not "our" kind of people: "We must make clear to the Indian government
that it is today what it was two weeks ago, an arrogant, overreaching cabal that, by its devotion to the caste
system, the political and economic disenfranchisement of its people and its religious intolerance, is
unworthy of membership in any club" (1998:13). Mary McGrory, an alleged liberal, writing for the
Washington Post op-ed page, expressed the same reaction against people rising above their proper station in
life. In a comment extraordinary for its simple erasure of the great literary and cultural achievements made
by persons of the Indian subcontinent over many centuries, she said, "People who cannot read, write or feed
their children are forgetting these lamentable circumstances in the ghastly glory of being able to burn the
planet or their enemies to a crisp" (1998b:C1).

The proliferation metaphor is epistemologically bankrupttheir framing obscures


the root cause of the spread of weapons, turning the case.
David Mutimer, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at York University (Canada),
2000 ("The Proliferation Image," The Weapons State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security,
Published by Lynne Rienner (Boulder, CO), ISBN 1555877877, p. 58-63)
To this point I have discussed the various images through which weapons technology has been
framed in general terms. The central argument of this book is that these technologies have been
reframed in terms of proliferation, and that this has had particular practical and political
consequences. To make this argument and to explore those consequences, it is necessary to fill in
the proliferation frame in much more detail. This image joins together a number of discursive
links to create a particular discursive construction of an international security problem. The
central element of the image, the one that draws the others together into a single image, is
proliferation itself. Before its appropriation by those concerned with the development of nuclear
weapons following World War II, proliferation was commonly used (when it was commonly
used) to talk of the reproduction of animals and plants. Animalseven human animals

proliferated by having children, usually a lot of children. Rabbits were particularly proliferous.
This meaning is clearly reflected in the Oxford English Dictionary's definition [end page 58] of
proliferous: Producing offspring; procreative; prolific. Initially, analysts and policymakers
adopted the language of proliferation for the problem of an increase in the number of states with
access to nuclear technology after controlled fission was developed in 1945. This act of
discursive imagination yielded nuclear proliferation as a policy problem in the Cold War.
Nuclear technology would reproduce, spawning an ever-growing family of nuclear nations.
This image of nuclear proliferation underpinned the various solutions that were devised: the
NPT and its attendant supplier groups, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger
Committee. We can see what sort of thing is made of nuclear proliferation by its being
imagined as proliferation if we look more closely at the earlier use of proliferationthe
familiar referent in terms of which this new and unfamiliar nuclear technology came to be
understood. Animals produce offspring; they are procreative, that is, they are proliferous. To say
that an animal proliferates is to say that it has young. Often, particularly when used for humans
rather than for other animals, proliferation carries the connotation of excessive reproduction
humans proliferate when they have noticeably more than the accepted number of children rather
than just when they have children. This implication is suggested in the Oxford English
Dictionary's use of prolific in the definition I quoted earlier. Thus proliferation has two
important entailments as the metaphor chosen to imagine the development of nuclear weapons.
First, proliferation is a natural process that requires external intervention not to proceed but
rather only for prevention (e.g., various forms of birth control). Second, the result of unchecked
proliferation tends to be excessive growth in the originating organism. Both of these entailments
are captured nicely in a use of the term proliferation in a discussion of metaphor by literary
theorist Paul de Man: Worse still, abstractions [tropes] are capable of infinite proliferation.
They are like weeds, or like cancer; once you have begun using a single one, they will crop up
everywhere. 15 De Man's reference to cancer is rather ironic. Cell biologists have also adopted
the language of proliferation to talk about the way in which cells in organisms multiply . 16 In
particular, the language of proliferation is central to the study of cancers. The connection
between cell proliferation and cancer throws the entailments of proliferation into stark relief. By
itself, cell proliferation is a harmless, natural processindeed, it is essential to life as we know
it. This proliferation is managed by a series of biological control mechanisms that regulate the
growth of cells so they faithfully reproduce what is coded into their genetic material. Once these
mechanisms fail and the cells reproduce without control, cancers, often deadly to the organism
as a whole, result. As Andrew Murray and Tim Hunt write in introducing the study of cell
proliferation, Without knowing the checks and balances that normally ensure orderly cell
division, we cannot devise [end page 59] effective strategies to combat the uncontrolled cell
divisions of the cancers that will kill one in six of us. 17 Proliferation, as appropriated within
the study of cancer, refers to an autonomous process of growth and spread, internally driven but
externally controlled. Danger arises when the controls fail and the natural proliferation of cells
produces excessive reproduction. When the language of proliferation was used in thinking about
the development of nuclear technology after the discovery of controlled fission in the U. S.
Manhattan Project, a process similar to that which produces cancer was imagined as a result . 18
The U. S. nuclear program was the original technology that would multiply and spread. Such
spread, when imagined as proliferation, is a natural process and is inevitable without active
outside intervention. Once the development of nuclear technology is imagined as proliferation,
this entailment of a natural process of spread leads to the expectation of inevitable growth in the
number of nuclear powers. This, of course, is precisely what was expected. Because such a
condition was considered dangerous and undesirable, attempts were made to establish external
controls over the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Again, this follows from imagining the
problem in terms of proliferation. Some form of external control is necessary to prevent the
prolific growth of nuclear weapons outside the United States. Attempts to place such external,
international controls on nuclear proliferation resulted in the NPT of 1970, which remains the
principal mechanism of proliferation control. What are the implications of this imagewith its
understandings of autonomous, natural growth and external controlfor the policy response to
the development of nuclear technology? The first implication is that something imagined in
terms of proliferation is seen to grow or multiply from a single source. Although animal

reproduction involves two individuals, the father is quickly forgotten, and it is the mother who is
proliferous. The budding of cells, which gives rise to the proliferation of some plants and, of
course, cancers, begins with a single, or source, cell and spreads from therein the case of a
cancer, both to produce a single tumor and to create a number of separate tumors throughout the
host body. Similarly, the problem of weapons proliferation is one of a source or sources
proliferating, that is, reproducing by supplying the necessary technology to a new site of
technological application. This form of imagining highlights the transmission process from
source to recipient. Hence, the dominant response to nuclear proliferation has been the creation
of supplier groupsthe Zangger Committee and the NSGthat seek to control the spread of
nuclear technology. In other words, to paraphrase Murray and Hunt, they attempt to provide the
checks and balances that normally ensure orderly transfer and prevent the spread of nuclear
technology resulting in the cancer of a prolific number of nuclear weapons. [end page 60]
The second implication of the proliferation metaphor for the problem of nuclear weapons spread
is an extreme technological determinism. Animal reproduction is an internally driven
phenomenon, and so the metaphor of proliferation applied to the development of nuclear
technology highlights the autonomy in the growth of that technology and its problematic
weapons variant. It is worth recalling Frank Barnaby's words: A country with a nuclear power
program will inevitably acquire the technical knowledge and expertise, and will accumulate the
fissile material necessary to produce nuclear weapons. 19 In fact, the text from which this
quotation is drawn presents an interesting example of the autonomy of the proliferation
metaphor. The book is entitled How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear Weapon Proliferation in
the 1990s. Notice that the weapons themselves spread; they are not spread by some form of
external agentsay, a human being or a political institution. Under most circumstances such a
title would be unnoticed, for the implications are so deeply ingrained in our conceptual system
that they are not recognized as metaphorical. This image, by highlighting the technological and
autonomous aspects of a process of spread, downplays or even hides important aspects of the
relationship of nuclear weapons to international security. To begin with, the image hides the fact
that nuclear weapons do not spread but are spreadand, in fact, are spread largely by the
Western states. Second, the image downplaysto the point of hidingany of the political,
social, economic, and structural factors that tend to drive states and other actors both to supply
and to acquire nuclear weapons. Finally, the image downplays the politics of security and threat,
naturalizing the security dilemma to the point that it is considered an automatic dynamic. The
image of proliferation thus privileges a technical, apolitical policy by casting the problem as a
technical one. The NPT controls and safeguards the movement of the technology of nuclear
energy. The supporting supplier groups jointly impose controls on the supplythat is, the
outward flowof this same technology. The goal in both cases is to stem or at least slow the
outward movement of material and its attendant techniques. These entailments suggest that to
reimagine another problem of weapons technology in terms of proliferation is to construct that
problem as technologically autonomous and to privilege solutions that attempt to control this
natural growth by means of interventions aimed at the constituent technologies. This is precisely
the strategy institutionalized within the chemical weapons convention. The general obligations
of the states party to the CWCset out in its first articleare to refrain from developing,
producing, or holding any CW; to refrain from using CW or making military preparations for
their use; and to refrain from assisting anyone else from doing anything prohibited by the
convention. 20 These obligations are usefully compared with those assumed by states in the first
two articles [end page 61] of the NPT. 21 In both cases the obligations of states party are to
refrain from producing or procuring the weapon in question and to forego transferring the
weapon to others. The differenceand it is an important differenceis that in the case of the
NPT, five nuclear weapon states do not have to renounce their nuclear weapons capability.
Otherwise, the obligations are identical. More to the point than the initial obligations, however,
are the practices each treaty institutionalizes to prevent the spread of weapons. In both cases
direct international supervision and control are placed on precursor technologies to ensure that
they do not spread to weapons. The NPT obliges all NNWSs party to place their nuclear
industries under IAEA safeguards, and the NWSs party to the NPT have also placed their
nonmilitary nuclear facilities under international safeguard. 22 These safeguards are an
internationally monitored material accountancy, designed to ensure that all fissile material used

to produce nuclear energy is accounted for throughout the nuclear fuel cycleand thus has not
been diverted to produce nuclear weapons. Similarly, the CWC establishes an extensive
machinery to verify that chemicals from the chemical industries of the states party are not used
to produce CW. The mechanics of the CW system vary from those of the nuclear safeguards, but
the essentials do not. In both cases potential industrial sources of technological spread are
declared to the international agency, which can then monitor those industries to ensure that the
declarations are accurate and that the material of concern is properly accounted for. The CWC is
therefore a proliferation control instrument, in the same way the 1989 and 1990 bilateral
agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States over chemical weapons were arms
control agreements. The centrality to the CWC regime of the practices monitoring chemical
industries to ensure they are not used to spread chemical weapons marks it as an instrument to
control proliferation, not one designed to achieve disarmament, for instance. Only in the context
of a reimagining of the problem of chemical weapons from one of arms control or
disarmament to one of proliferation did the CWC become possible. As chemical weapons
came to be imagined as a proliferation problem in the late 1980s, the CWC as a
nonproliferation agreement for chemical technology (but without the overtly discriminatory
features of the nuclear NPT) became realizable. The end of the Cold War not only produced a
limited arms control agreement between the superpowers concerning chemical weapons but,
more important, created the conditions for realizing what reimagining in terms of the
proliferation image made possible. A proliferation image produces a particular kind of
object. It imagines a technology that reproduces naturally and autonomously, moving outward
from an identifiable origin by relentlessly multiplying. The image [end page 62] imagines this
technology as essentially benign but with the possibility of excessreproduction is natural,
expected, and even desirable, but prolific reproduction is dangerous. To permit the benign spread
of technology while preventing the dangerous conclusion to that spread, external controls are
required. Because the object of proliferation is imagined in this fashion, the forms of control
that can be applied are constrained. Put another way, the particular imagination of the object of
proliferation enables a specific series of control practices. The reverse is also true: creating
given practices will construct the object of those practices in particular ways. The result is a
neatly closed circle it is simple to reifywe face this particular problem with these practices;
these practices are employed, so we are facing this problem. Read in either direction, the
contingent becomes seen as the natural. What has happened since the late 1980s, particularly
following the war in the Gulf, has been the reimagining of all forms of military technology in
terms of the proliferation image and the embedding of that image in a series of control
practices. Alternatively, a series of control practices has been established around the range of
military technologies, which has constituted the object of those practices as a proliferation
problem.

Their framing of proliferation stabilizes a system of Nuclear Apartheid that relies on


an Orientalist construction of Us vs. Them.
Hugh Gusterson, Professor of Anthropology and Science/Technology/Society at MIT, 1999 (Nuclear
Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination, Cultural Anthropology, Volume 14, Issue 1, Available
Online via Social Sciences Full Text)
Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem
whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear
proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation.
This usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of
new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the
"horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the
"proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals
are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side.(FN5) However, the United States and
Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the
nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that

nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future.
Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of
previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against
nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). The
dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a
specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as
its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries.
(FN6) This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as
ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by
Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a
series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we"
are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modern and
flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and
compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of
the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary
politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic
development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations
in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of
popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of
contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse.

This renders their analysis of proliferation epistemologically bankrupt.


Hugh Gusterson, Professor of Anthropology and Science/Technology/Society at MIT, 1999 (Nuclear
Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination, Cultural Anthropology, Volume 14, Issue 1, Available
Online via Social Sciences Full Text)
These falsely obvious arguments about the political unreliability of Third World nuclear powers
are, I have been arguing, part of a broader orientalist rhetoric that seeks to bury disturbing
similarities between "us" and "them" in a discourse that systematically produces the Third World
as Other. In the process of producing the Third World, we also produce ourselves, for the Orient,
one of the West's "deepest and most recurring images of the other," is essential in defining the
West "as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" (Said 1978:1-2). The particular
images and metaphors that recur in the discourse on proliferation represent Third World nations
as criminals, women, and children. But these recurrent images and metaphors, all of which
pertain in some way to disorder, can also be read as telling hints about the facets of our own
psychology and culture which we find especially troubling in regard to our custodianship over
nuclear weapons. The metaphors and images are part of the ideological armor the West wears in
the nuclear age, but they are also clues that suggest buried, denied, and troubling parts of
ourselves that have mysteriously surfaced in our distorted representations of the Other . As Akhil
Gupta has argued in his analysis of a different orientalist discourse, the discourse on
development, "within development discourse ... lies its shadowy double ... a virtual presence,
inappropriate objects that serve to open up the 'developed world' itself as an inappropriate
object" (1998:4).

Link -- Prolif AT Perm


Public debate shapes the governmental discourse on proliferation. The perm continues the cooption
of anti-nuclear critiques resulting in endless militarism.
Hugh

Gusterson 4

, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Science and Technology Studies at

MIT, 2004, People of the Bomb: Portraits of Americas Nuclear Complex, pg. 220-226

Weapons systems, treaties, and strategies come to seem right (or wrong) in the context of the stories we tell
ourselves about them. Social scientists and historians call these stories discourses. Sometimes new discourses (like
our discourse on civil rights) originate from below and eventually gain enough credibility that they are co-opted
by the government. Other discourses (like the discourse on deterrence during the cold war) originate within the
government, and within the tight circle of think tanks that speak to the government, and are then propagated
outward through society by waves of speech making and media dissemination. From time to time there are
sharp historical breaks as new stories and propositions become accepted with startling suddenness . Senior
officials in the Bush administration are now trying to create this kind of radical shift in our discourse about nuclear weapons. The
cold war saw the rise of an official discourse on nuclear weapons that is now looking more than a little tattered. Its
chief assumptions were as follows: that the genie having escaped the bottle in a dangerous world, nuclear weapons could not
be abolished, and anyone who thought otherwise was nave, or worse; that even though the two superpowers were
inevitable rivals racing to improve their arsenals, they were rational enough to manage their competition in ways that
would not cause a nuclear war; that the arms race could be channeled and disciplined , though not prevented, by
arms control treaties; and that certain avenues of competition were destabilizing and should therefore be foreclosed by mutual
agreement. These included a race to build defensive antimissile systems and to put nuclear, antisatellite, or antiballistic weapons in
space. After the cold war, this way of looking at the world began to seem increasingly outmoded. The Clinton administration
attempted to strike up some new discursive themes, but its efforts were undercut by its own half-heartedness. For example, the
administration made vague remarks about moving toward a world without nuclear weapons, but it failed to
negotiate any new arms reductions and it proclaimed through its Nuclear Posture Review that the United States would rely on
nuclear weapons for its security for the indefinite future. Similarly. Clinton administration officials said that they supported the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty only to sponsor research and development programs that pointed in the direction of its erosion or
demise. And President Clinton spoke of a new global order founded on strong international treaties and institutions only to wage war
in Kosovo without UN approval and to walk away from an international convention on land mines. The administration of George W.
Bush, on the other hand, has attempted to use the debate about ballistic missile defense to transform the official
discourse on nuclear weapons and arms control. It has sought to dramatically redefine the U.S.-Russian relationship, q,
and the significance of arms control. If some of the statements made by administration officials had been uttered by President
Clinton, they would have met with Republican derision. The Bush administration has also appropriated some of the
antinuclear movement's rhetoric, only to use it in support of a further round of militarization. The new
discourse, like its predecessor, starts with the assumption that the world is a very dangerous place, although the

source of danger is no longer Soviet-style militant communism but rather the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction to rogue states." As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz recently testified to Congress: "The shortrange missile threat to our friends, allies, and deployed forces arrived a decade ago; the intermediate missile threat is now here; and
the long-range threat to American cities is just over the horizona matter of years, not decades, awayand our people and territory
are defenseless.' Within the old discourse, missile threats from abroad were used to justify nuclear deterrence. No longer.
Remarkably, it is now becoming axiomatic that leaders of "rogue states," unlike the old Soviet leaders, cannot be

deterred by nuclear weapons. This axiom is being used to justify not only the development of missile
defenses but also a new earth-penetrating "mininuke" that would supposedly hold the leaders of "rogue
states" personally at risk in their underground bunkers. Although there is no evidence to support it, and the argument
only seems plausible within the context of racist assumptions about Third World leaders' lack of rationality, the proposition that
nuclear deterrence does not work on "rogue states" is now treated as self-evident by government officials .
Just as an earlier generation of government officials would have said nuclear weapons keep the peace, as if merely articulating the
obvious, so our current officials simply state as fact the claim that leaders of countries like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea cannot be
deterred by nuclear weapons. Thus, Richard Perle said of Saddam Hussein, "I really don't want to count on the rational judgment of a
man who used poison gas against his own people." And Wolfowitz asked rhetorically, "If Saddam Hussein had the ability to strike a
Western capital with a nuclear weapon, would he really be deterred by the prospect of a U.S. nuclear strike that would kill millions of
Iraqis?"' Those who thought the answer to Wolfowitz question would he, "Yes, of course he would he deterred," would find
themselves in disagreement with the editors of the New York Times, whose reaction has typified the extraordinary credulousness with
which the media have received such claims. A May 2 New York Times editorial, repeating the new common sense, said, "By their
nature, rogue nations, sometimes ruled by irrational dictators, cannot be assumed to respond to the Cold War deterrence of 'mutually
assured destruction. The next day, Times columnist William Safire drove the point home, asking, "Why should we make it possible
for some tinpot dictator, unconcerned about retaliation, to hold an American city hostage?" What we see happening hereaided
and abetted by a striking lack of skepticism in the mediais the creation of a new axiom for what Jonathan Schell has

called the second nuclear age." The flip side of the emphasis on new threats from rogue states is an
insistence that the old threat, Russia, is no longer an enemy. For example, Wolfowitz, told the Senate that "we are
engaged in discussions with Russia on a new security framework that reflects the fact that the Cold War is over and that the U.S. and
Russia are not enemies."' And George Bush, taking aim at the ABM treaty, said that "Russia is not an enemy of the United States and
yet we still go to a treaty that assumes Russia is the enemy, a treaty that says the whole concept of peace is based on us blowing each
other up. I don't think that makes sense any more." The truth is, of course, that Russia may no longer be the enemy it once was, but it
is not exactly a friend either. Friends do not keep thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert targeted against one another. Nor
do they expel one another's diplomats forty at a time. The new discourse overstates the transformation of U.S.-Russian relations so as
to delegitimate the ABM Treaty the two countries signed in 1972 as a relic of the past, opening the way for construction of George W.
Bush's cherished missile defense system. Bush administration officials have even suggested that treaties in general have become
useless fetishes, revered out of habit, and that the fast-moving world of today requires a more flexible approach than treaties allow.
Condoleezza Rice, Bush's national security adviser, has said, for example, There's a good reason not to get into 15-year negotiations,
which is what it has taken to create arms-control treaties."' She also made the following remarkable statement in a July 12, 2001, press
conference: was one of the high priestesses of arms controla true believer. Like so many others, I eagerly anticipated those
breathtaking moments of summitry where the centerpiece was always the signing of the latest arms control treaty; the toast; the
handshake; and with Brezhnev, the hear hug. For those precious few moments the world found comfort in seeing the superpowers
affirm their peaceful intent. And the scientists would sec the clock back a few minutes further away from midnight. Deep down we
knew that arms control was a poor substitute for a real agenda based on common aspirations.... But along the way to the next summit
something hap gelled. History happened. 1989. Sri, while many of us were debating the implications of !WRVS !multiple independent
reentry vehicles' on SS18s and Peacekeepers like so many angels dancing on a warhead, the forces of history were making the old
paradigm obsolete.... We cannot cling to the old order-like medieval scholars clinging to a Ptolemaic system even after the Copernican
revolution. We must recognize that the strategic world we grew up in has been turned upside down. This

futuristic rhetoric is one of the most striking features of the new nuclear discourse, and it signifies a bold
theft of the disarmament movement's rhetorical fire by the ideologues of the Pentagon . Cold war nuclear
discourse was full of appeals for "caution," "realism," and stability, making a virtue of its distrust for radical measures, where the
new nuclear discourse is all about futuristic weapons and hold measures. One might have expected to hear of the need for visionary
thinking, the hopeful possibilities if only we could break with the assumptions of yesterday, from partisans of disarmament. Instead,
we hear it from Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, and Paul Wolfowitzveteran cold warriors all who use it as a
battering ram against the ABM Treaty. The ARM Treaty is a relic of the pan," said George W. Bush recently, the days of the Cold War
have ended, and so must the Cold War mentality as far as Im concerned." WoIfowitz used similar language, that 30-year-old treaty
designed to preserve the balance of terror during the Cold War must not be allowed to prevent us from taking steps to protect our
people, our forces, and our allies. Virginia's John Warner, the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee,
concurred: "The ARM Treaty has outlived its justification and foundations." Likewise, his colleague, North Carolina's Jesse Helms,
said, ''Russia must come to grips with the bet that the Cold War is over. It is time to iCT;11, the ABM Treaty." The new rhetoric is
more indebted to the logic of advertising than that of strategic thinking. Ache [[ hers use rhetoric glibly to create perceptions rather
than co argue for truths, and they have learned that one of the easiest ways to discredit rival products, whatever their manifest virtues,
is to make them seem old and outdated compared to one's own. While it is arguably the thinking of Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Wolfowitz
that is old and outdated, these tremors of the new nuclear discourse have learned that by simply likening the ARM Treaty to Mom and
Dad's Oldsmobile they do not need to get their hands dirty with arguments about the precise relationship between the ABM and
strategic stability. Perhaps the most extraordinary achievement of chew purveyors of the new nuclear discourse is to have appropriated
antinuclear critiques of nuclear deterrence in the service of a new generation of weaponry. Officials who only a decade ago would
have derided the naivet of disarmament advocates who criticized nuclear deterrence now sound like their cesnvhile opponents.
Wollowitz, for example, striking a sentimental note, began his recent testimony to the Senate Armed Service Committee by saying
that, in Israel during the Gulf War, "We saw children walking to school carrying gas masks in gaily decorated boxesno doubt to try
to distract them from the possibility of facing mass destruction. They were awfully young to have to think about the unthinkable."
Jesse Helms, a staunch defender of deterrence throughout the cold war, told the Senate two months earlier that it was time to "dispense
with the illogical and immoral concept of mutually assured destruction," and Rice, recycling an argument often made by the
antinuclear movement in the 1990s, stated in her July 12 press conference that we need to recognize that just as peace is not the
absence of war, stability is not a balance of terror." The new nuclear discourse holds out the hope that the United States and Russia can
be friends and that, although rising military powers in the Third World may not be rational we can be safe from their weapons of Mass
destruction, and indeed from the entire depressing logic of mutually assured destruction, if only we can let go of the ABM Treaty and
build a new generation of defensive weapons that are almost within our technical grasp. Such weapons, being purely defensive,
threaten no one; in the words of Donald Rumsfeld, "They bother no one, except a country ... that thinks they want [to] have ballistic
missiles to impose their will on their neighbors." Once people begin to realize that this is not something that is a matter of gaining
advantage over anyone but is a matter of reducing vulnerability for everybody, then I think they begin to look at it differently,
Wolfowitz told a press conference in Paris on May 9, 2001 All discourses, especially government discourses, have something to hide,
and this one is no exception. Although the Bush administration speaks of missile defense as a purely defensive technology designed to
protect the United States from "rogue states' and not to change the balance of power with established nuclear powers, I have it on good
authority from sources in the Clinton White House that, in their conversations out of public view, Pentagon planners arc very
interested in ways in which missile defense might be able to neutralize the twenty single-warhead missiles in China capable of hitting
the United States, thus effectively disarming China. Although Rush administration officials like to tell the public that missile defense
is not "a matter of gaining advantage over anyone,' they tell the Senate something different. Thus Wolfowitz recently testified that "the
countries pursuing these [ballistic missile] capabilities are doing so because ... they believe that if they can hold the American people
at risk, they can ... deter us from defending our interests around the world.... They may secure, in their estimation, the capability to
prevent us from forming international coalitions to challenge their act' of aggression and force us into a truly isolationist posture. And
they would not even have to use the weapons in their possession to affect our behavior and achieve their ends.'" In other words,
ballistic missile defense is a new means to the old dream of the cold warriors: achieving nuclear superiority. Insofar as it is about
doing away with deterrence, it is only about abolishing the ability of other countries to deter the United States. As British antinuclear
activist Helen Johns put it: Ballistic missile defense is the armed wing of globalization. It is a euphemism for plans to ensure U.S.

military and economic domination of the planet." The

new nuclear discourse puts the disarmament movement in an


awkward position. Its traditional rhetoric about the possibility of reconciliation with Russia and the
existential darkness of deterrence has been hijacked by today's superannuated cold warriors as a way of
justifying the abrogation of old arms control treaties the construction of new weapons, and the
militarization of space. Thus the movement is left either defending nuclear deterrence or arguing for
nuclear abolitiona goal that strikes much of the public as no less idealistic than the Pentagons Buck
Rogers scheme for missile defense. But unless the disarmament movement learns to tell a compelling new
story soon, very soon, the tall stories being told by the Bush administration will become the stories for our
age.

Link -- Prolif Spread Link


The affirmatives biological metaphor of proliferation frames proliferation as the outward spread of
weapons externally controlling is the ultimate embrace of the metaphor adherence constructs
proliferation as a technological and autonomous problem, diverting attention from human agency
and social facts
David

Mutimer 1994

(Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation, August 1994,)

[E.Berggren]

The proliferation metaphor as applied to nuclear weapons. The first entailment is the image of a spread outward
from a point, or source. Cell division begins with a single, or source cell, and spreads outward from there
in the case of a cancer, both to produce a single tumour and to create a number of separate tumours
throughout the host body. Similarly, the 'problem' of proliferation is one of a source or sources 'proliferating', that is reproducing itself
by supplying the necessary technology to a new site of technological application. This image highlights the transmission process from
source to recipient, and entails policy designed to cut off the supply, restricting the technology to its source. Hence, the dominant
response to nuclear proliferation is the creation of supplier groups, the Zangger Committee and the NSG, which

seeks to 'control' the spread of nuclear technology. In other words, they attempt to provide "the checks and
balances that normally ensure orderly" transfer, and prevent the spread of nuclear technology resulting in
the "cancer" of weapons' proliferation. The image is repeated even in the more extreme proposals for policy. For example,
former Prime Minster Trudeau proposed a scheme to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament for preventing weapons'
spread. This scheme included two measures currently under consideration at the Conference on Disarmament, a Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, and a Cutoff of Fissile Material Production. Trudeau's plan was known as the 'suffocation proposal'firmly in keeping
with the biological referent of proliferation. To stop, rather than control, reproduction by organisms, you need to

'suffocate' the progenitors. The second entailment of the 'proliferation' metaphor for the problem of nuclear
weapons spread is an extreme technological bias. Biological proliferation is an internally driven
phenomenon, and so the image of 'Proliferation' applied to the development of nuclear technology
highlights the autonomous spread of that technology, and its problematic weapons variant . As Frank Barnaby
writes in a recent work, "A country with a nuclear power programme will inevitably acquire the technical knowledge and expertise,
and will accumulate the fissile material necessary to produce nuclear weapons."50 In fact, the text from which this is drawn presents
an interesting example of the autonomy of the 'proliferation' metaphor. The book is entitled How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclearweapon proliferation in the 1990s. Notice that the weapons themselves spread, they are not spread by an external agent of some form
say a human being or human institution. Under most circumstances such a title would be unnoticed, for as Lakoff

and Johnson argue, the metaphors are so deeply engrained in our conceptual system that they are not
recognised as being metaphorical. This image, by highlighting the technological and autonomous aspects of
a process of spread, downplays or even hides important aspects of the relationship of nuclear weapons to
international security. To begin with, the image hides the fact that nuclear weapons do not spread, but are
spreadand in fact are spread largely by the western states. Secondly, the image downplays, to the point of hiding, any of the
political, social, economic and structural factors which tend to driv states and other actors both to supply and to acquire nuclear
weapons. Finally, the image downplays the politics of security and threat, naturalising the 'security dilemma' to the point that it is
considered as an automatic dynamic. The image of PROLIFERATION thus privileges a technical, apolitical policy,

by casting the problem as a technical, apolitical one. The Non-Proliferation Treaty controls and safeguards
the movement of the technology of nuclear energy. The supporting supplier groups jointly impose controls
on the supplythat is the outward flowof this same technology. The goal, in both cases, is to stem or, at
least slow, the outward movement of material and its attendant techniques. Such a policy is almost doomed
to fail, however, for it downplays and hides the very concerns which motivate the agents of the process. Iraq
was driven to acquire nuclear weapons, even in the face of NPT commitments, and so employed technology which is considered so
outdated that it is no longer tightly controlled. This simply does not fit with the NPT-NSG-Zangger Committee approach. In addition,
in order to gain the necessary material, the Iraqis needed access to external technology. Such technology was acquired by human
agents acting for the Iraqi state and was acquired from other agents, who had their own motivationa interests to provide the necessary
technology. The technology does not 'spread' through some autonomous process akin to that causing a zygote to become a person, but
rather they are spread, and so the agents involved are able to sidestep the technologically focussed control efforts . The second step

of this process, reimagining international security in the terms of PROLIFERATION following the end of
the Cold War, adopts the policy entailments along with the underlying biological imagery. By using the
PROLIFERATION image now to address biological and chemical weapons, missile technology and even
conventional weapons, the international community is replicating the problematic policy solutions which
highlight technology and hide politics and agency. Thus the NPT and its supplier groups are joined by the Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Australia Group, a supplier group which also oversees export controls on both chemical and biological
weapons' technology. Missile technology is controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime . Even conventional arms,

the ones we might expect to be most closely related to understandings of politics, are conceived in terms of

'excessive and destabilising accumulations'. Once more, it is the weapons themselves, rather than the
political agents acquiring and using them, which are the lexical focus of discussions of conventional arms .
What is ignored by this policy approach is any suggestion that there are political interests or motivations at work, which may cause
human institutions to act in ways which promote insecurity (which, in other words, destabilize). A good part of the reason for

this lack of understanding is that the image of the problem is one which downplays, and even hides, the
involvement of the politics of human agency in both the acts of supply and acquisition.

Link -- Prolif NPT Link


Affs management of nuclear tech re-creates nuclar apartheid and imperial aggression ensuring
prolif and escalating wars
Mike

Whitney

, Feelance Writter @ Washington State,

[February 9, Time to Scrap the NPT,

http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Feb06/Whitney09. hostile nations, it should be abandoned altogether.


The purpose of the NPT (Nonproliferation Treaty) is to reduce or eliminate the development of nuclear weapons. If it is to have any
meaning at all it must be directed at nations that not only have weapons, but that demonstrate a flagrant disregard for the international
laws condemning their use. The IAEA should focus its attention on those states that have a clear record of territorial aggression,
military intervention, or who consistently violate United Nations resolutions. In its present form the IAEA and the NPT are
utterly meaningless. Rather than leading the world towards nuclear disarmament, the agency and the treaty have simply
ignored the misbehavior of the more powerful nations and humiliated the non-nuclear states with spurious accusations and
threatening rhetoric. The NPT was never intended to be a bludgeon for battering the weaker nations; nor was it set up as a de-facto
apartheid system whereby the superpower and its allies can lord above the non-nuclear states coercing them to act according to

their diktats. It was designed to curb the development of the worlds most lethal weapons, eventually
consigning them to the ash heap. The political maneuvering surrounding Irans alleged nuclear weapons programs
demonstrates the irrelevance and hypocrisy of the current system. As yet, there is no concrete evidence that Iran is in non-compliance
with the terms of the treaty. That hasnt deterred the Bush administration from intimidating its allies and

adversaries alike to assist them in dragging Iran before the Security Council. The Bush administration is
asking the Security Council to enforce additional protocols which will preclude Iran from enriching
uranium for use in electric power plants, a right that is clearly articulateed in the NPT. Article 4 section 2
states: All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. Irans determination to enrich uranium is protected under international law and should not be abridged
to accommodate the regional ambitions of the United States. By giving up its legal rights Iran would be undermining the fundamental
principle that underscores all such agreements and tacitly accepting that the Bush administration alone has the final say-so on issues of
global concern. Why should Iran accept a standard for itself that is different than that for every other signatory

of the NPT? No nation should willingly accept being branded as a pariah without evidence of wrongdoing.
The fact that the United States is occupying the country next door and has yet to provide a coherent justification for the invasion is a
poignant reminder of the irrelevance of both the United Nations and the IAEA. The two organizations have remained

resolutely silent in the face of the massive incidents of human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. While Iran is roundly condemned by heads-of-state and the corporate media, the greatest crime of our generation
continues into its third year without a word of reproach from the world body. The international community simply looks
away in fear. This alone should illustrate the ineffectiveness of the institutions that are designed to keep the peace. If the ruling
body at the IAEA is to have any relevance, it must direct its attention to the real threats of nuclear
proliferation posed by those nations that consider nuclear weapons a privilege that should be limited to a
certain group of elite states. If the IAEA cannot perform its duties in a neutral manner that respects the
rights of all nations equally, it should disband and abolish the NPT without delay. If the IAEA is uncertain
about the real threats to regional peace, they should take note of the many recent polls that invariably list
the same belligerent nations as the leading offenders. It is these countries that should be scrutinized most
carefully. It is not the purview of the IAEA to keep the weaker nations out of the nuclear club. That simply
enables the stronger states to bully their enemies with threats of using their WMD. In fact, its plain to see
that the current disparity in military power has created a perilous imbalance between nations that is rapidly
spreading war throughout the world. One only has to look at Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq or Kosovo to see the
glaring failures of the unipolar model; where the military prowess of one country is so great it is
emboldened to resolve its differences through conflagration. The NPT was not created to facilitate the imperial
ambitions of the superpower, but to protect the innocent from the increasing likelihood of nuclear holocaust. If the NPT cannot
decrease the threat of nuclear war from conspicuously hostile nations, it should be abandoned altogether.

Link -- Prolif AT Cant Deter Third World


Claims that Third World nations do not follow conventional deterrence doctrine is fundamentally
wrong and based on an ethno-centric view of international affairs

Gusterson Associate Professor of


Anthropology
1999
Hugh

and Science and Technology Studies at MIT, 2/

, Nuclear

Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination, JSTOR [BB]


During the Cold War Americans were told that nuclear deterrence

prevented the smoldering enmity between the


superpowers from bursting into the full flame of war, saving millions of lives by making conventional war
too dan- gerous. When the practice of deterrence was challenged by the antinuclear movement of the 1980s, Pentagon officials and
defense intellectuals warned us that nuclear disarmament would just make the world safe for conventional war.9 Surely, then, we
should want countries such as Pakistan, India, Iraq, and Israel also to enjoy the stabilizing benefits of
nuclear weapons. This is, in fact, precisely the argument made by the father of the Pakistani bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan. He said at
a press conference in 1998, alluding to the fact that Pakistan had a nuclear capability for many years before its actual nuclear tests,
"The nuclear weapon is a peace guarantor. It gave peace to Europe, it gave peace to us .... I believe my work has saved this country for
the last twenty years from many wars" (NNI-News 1998). Western security specialists and media pundits have argued ,
on the other hand, that deterrence as practiced by the superpowers during the Cold War may not work in Third World

settings because Third World adversaries tend to share common borders and because they lack the
resources to develop secure second-strike capabilities. On closer examination these arguments, plausible enough at first,
turn out to be deeply problematic, especially in their silences about the risks of deterrence as practiced by the superpowers. I shall take
them in turn. First, there is the argument that deterrence may not work for countries, such as India and Pakistan, that share a common
border and can therefore attack one another very quickly.'0 As one commentator put it, In the heating conflict between India and
Pakistan, one of the many dangers to be reckoned with is there would be no time for caution. While it would have taken more

than a half-hour for a Soviet-based nuclear missile to reach the United States-time at least for America to
double-check its computer screen or use the hotline-the striking distance between India and Pakistan is no
more than five minutes. That is not enough time to confirm a threat or even think twice before giving the
order to return fire, and perhaps mistakenly incinerate an entire nation. [Lev 1998:A19] This formulation
focuses only on the difference in missile flight times while ignoring other countervailing differences in
missile configurations that would make deterrence in South Asia look more stable than deterrence as
practiced by the superpowers. Such a view overlooks the fact that the missiles deployed by the two superpowers were, by the
end of the Cold War, MIRVed and extraordinarily accurate. MIRVed missiles-those equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable
Reentry Vehicles-carry several warheads, each capable of striking a different target. The MX, for example, was designed to
carry ten warheads, each capable of landing within 100 feet of a separate target. The unprecedented accuracy of the MX, together
with the fact that one MX missile could-in theory at least-destroy ten Soviet missiles, made it, as some arms controllers worried at the
time, a destabilizing weapon that, together with its Russian counterparts, put each superpower in a "use-it-or-lose-it"
situation whereby it would have to launch its missiles immediately if it believed itself under attack . Thus,

once one adds accuracy and MIRVing to the strategic equation, the putative contrast between stable
deterrence in the West and unstable deterrence in South Asia looks upside down, even if one were to grant the
difference in flight times between the Cold War superpowers and between the main adversaries in South Asia. But there is no reason to
grant the alleged difference in flight times. Lev says that it would have taken "more than half an hour" for American and Russian
missiles to reach their targets during the Cold War (1998:A19). While this was more or less true for intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), it was not true for the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) the superpowers moved in against each other's coasts;
these were about ten minutes of flight time from their targets. Nor was it true of the American Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey,
right up against the Soviet border, in the early 1960s. Nor was it true of the Pershing IIs deployed in Germany in the 1980s. When the
antinuclear movement claimed that it was destabilizing to move the Pershings to within less than ten minutes of flight time of
Moscow, the U.S. government insisted that anything that strengthened NATO's attack capability strengthened

nuclear deterrence. Here again one sees a double standard in the arguments made to legitimate "our"
nuclear weapons. Finally, even if we were to accept that the superpowers would have half-an- hour's warning against five minutes
for countries in South Asia, to think that this matters is to be incited to a discourse based on the absurd premise that there is any
meaningful difference between half an hour and five minutes for a country that believes itself under nuclear attack (see Foucault
1980a: ch. 1). While half an hour does leave more time to verify warnings of an attack, would any sane na- tional leadership feel any
safer irrevocably launching nuclear weapons against an adversary in half an hour rather than five minutes? In either case, the time
frame for decision making is too compressed. In other words, the argument about missile flight times, quite apart from the fact that it
misrepresents the realities of deterrence between the superpowers, is a red herring. What really matters is not the
geographical proximity of the adversarial nations but, rather, their confidence that each could survive an
attack by the other with some sort of retaliatory capability. Many analysts have argued that newly nuclear nations with
small arsenals would lack a secure second-strike capability. Their nuclear weapons would therefore invite rather than

deter a preemptive or preventive attack, especially in a crisis. Thus the New York Times editorialized that "unlike the
superpowers, India and Pakistan will have small, poorly protected nuclear stocks. No nation in that situation can be sure that its
weapons could survive a nuclear attack" (1998:14). Similarly, British defense analyst Jonathan Power has written that "superpower
theorists have long argued that stability is not possible unless there is an assured second-strike capability. .. . Neither India and [sic]
Pakistan have the capability, as the superpowers did, to develop and build such a second-strike capability" (1997:29). This
argument has been rebutted by Kenneth Waltz (1982, 1995a, 1995b), a leading political scientist seen as a maverick for his
views on nuclear proliferation. Waltz, refusing the binary distinction at the heart of the dominant discourse, suggests that horizontal

nuclear proliferation could bring about what he calls "nuclear peace" in troubled regions of the globe just
as, in his view, it stabilized the superpower relationship. Waltz argues that, although the numbers of weapons
are different, the general mathematical principle of deterrence-the appalling asymmetry of risk and rewardremains the same and may even, perversely, work more effectively in new nuclear nations. Waltz points out that
it would take very few surviving nuclear weapons to inflict "unacceptable damage" on a Third World
adversary: "Do we expect to lose one city or two, two cities or ten? When these are the pertinent questions,
we stop thinking about running risks and start thinking about how to avoid them" (1995a:8). Waltz argues that,
while a first strike would be fraught with terrifying uncertainties in any circumstances, the discussion of building secure
retaliatory capabilities in the West has tended, ethnocentrically, to focus on the strategies the superpowers
employed to do so: building vast arsenals at huge expense on land, at sea, and in the air. But Third World
countries have cheaper, more low-tech options at their disposal too: "Nuclear warheads can be fairly small and light, and they are easy
to hide and to move. People worry about terrorists stealing nuclear warheads be- cause various states have so many of them.
Everybody seems to believe that terrorists are capable of hiding bombs. Why should states be unable to do what terrorist gangs are
thought to be capable of?" (Waltz 1995a:19). Waltz (1982, 1995a) also points out that Third World states could easily and cheaply
confuse adversaries by deploying dummy nuclear weapons, and he reminds readers that the current nuclear powers (with the exception
of the United States) all passed through and survived phases in their own nuclear infancy when their nuclear arsenals were similarly
small and vulnerable. The discourse on proliferation assumes that the superpowers' massive interlocking arsenals of highly accurate
MIRVed missiles deployed on hair-trigger alert and designed with first-strike capability backed by global satellite capability was stable
and that the small, crude arsenals of new nuclear nations would be unstable, but one could quite plausibly argue the reverse. Indeed, as
mentioned above, by the 1980s a number of analysts in the West were concerned that the MIRVing of missiles and the accuracy of
new guidance systems were generating increasing pressure to strike first in a crisis. Although the strategic logic might be a little
different, they saw temptations to preempt at the high end of the nuclear social system as well as at the low end (Aldridge 1983; Gray
and Payne 1980; Scheer 1982). There were also concerns (explored in more detail below) that the complex computerized earlywarning systems with which each superpower protected its weapons were generating false alarms that might lead to accidental war
(Blair 1993; Sagan 1993). Thus one could argue-as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1986) and a number of others
have-that deterrence between the United States and Russia would be safer and more stable if each side

replaced their current massive strategic arsenals with a small force of about one hundred nuclear weaponsabout the size India's nu- clear stockpile is believed to be, as it happens.

Link -- Prolif AT Crazy Third World


The assumption that Third World military officers cannot control their impulses entrenches an
orientalist mindset that endorses negative racial stereotypes

Gusterson, Associate Professor


of Anthropology
1999
Hugh

and Science and Technology Studies at MIT, 2/

Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination, JSTOR [BB]

After dictators and religious fanatics, the Western imagination is most afraid of Third World military
officers. The academics Brito and Intriligator, for example, tell us that Third World governments might acquire nuclear
weapons "mainly for deterrence purposes but might not be able to control such weapons once they were
available .... Unilateral initiatives by junior officers could lead to these weapons going off" (Brito and
Intriligator 1982:140). One finds the same presumption in the writings of Nigel Calder, who also worries about Third World military
officers: "An American or Russian general in Europe is not going to let off the first nuclear weapon on his own

initiative, even in the heat of battle, but will the same discipline apply to ... a Pakistani general who has a
private nuclear theory about how to liberate Kashmir?" (1979:77). Oliver North notwithstanding, it is taken as so obvious
it does not need explaining that Third World junior officers, unlike our own, are prone to take dangerous unilateral initiatives. Calder's
passage only makes sense if one accepts the contrast it states as unquestionably natural. It is the kind of ideological statement that the
French theorist Roland Barthes characterized as "falsely obvious" (1972:11). As Edward Said says, once a group has been
orientalized, "virtually anything can be written or said about it, without challenge or demurral " (1978:287).
This presumption that the Third World body politic cannot control its military loins is, I believe, a coded or

metaphorical way of discussing a more general lack of control over impulses , a pervasive lack of discipline,
assumed to afflict people of color.

Link -- Terrorism
The AFFs construction of an impending terror attack
writes the future as a site of incomprehensible trauma. To
plan for catastrophe is to graft fear and anxiety onto the
bodies of all liberal political subjects. The AFF makes
unending war the only possible future and replaces
politics with an anxiety riddled fear of the future.
Neocleous 2012
/Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy, Politics and History @ Brunel University, London,
Dont Be Scared, Be Prepared: Trauma-Anxiety-Resilience, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 2012
37: 188 originally published online 13 June 2012, DOI: 10.1177/0304375412449789, SAGEOnline/
In a discussion in 2003, Jacques Derrida asked a pertinent question: imagine that the Americans and,
through them, the entire world, had been told: what has just happened, the spectacular destruction of
two towers . . . is an awful thing, a terrible crime, a pain without measure, but its all over, it wont
happen again, there will never again be anything as awful as or more awful than that. Mourning would be
possible, selves could be remade, pages would be turned, and a line could be drawn under the trauma. But
as Derrida suggests, the traumatism which followed, like all traumatism, is produced by the

future, by the to come, by the threat of the worst to come, rather than by an aggression that
is over and done with.27 Derridas suggestion runs counter to the common trope of trauma and
memory, an approach which encourages us to think of trauma in terms of a remaking of the self in the
light of the past, as unclaimed experience, as the redemptive authority of history, as forgetfulness
and forgiveness, as struggles over representations of the past, as healing.28 This is especially the
case following 9/11, an event which is presented to us as the collective trauma of our timethese are now
the days after, as one character puts it in Don DeLillos post-9/11 novel Falling Man. But Derridas
suggestion helps us read trauma in terms of the danger of the terror to come, or which might

be to come. The trauma is the trauma of a future which is unknowable but imaginable, and
imaginable as traumatic. The wound of trauma is less the wound of the past and much
more, to paraphrase Derrida, a wound which remains open in our terror of the danger that we
imagine lies ahead. The terror lies not in what has happened in the past but in the danger
and the anxiety of what we imagine threatens to happen, and which we are encouraged to
imagine as being worse than anything that has ever taken place . In this light, the issue is not the
remaking of the self in the light of past trauma but the making of the self in preparation for the
trauma to come. And that making of the self is how political subjectivity now comes to be
shaped: endlessly, just like the war itself. What we need to consider, then, is not acts that are
somehow genuinely traumatic per se and how they are governed. Rather, what we need to consider is how
and why so many acts are produced as trauma and what that production does to contemporary political
subjectivity. For the imagination of danger and terror is the contemporary psychopolitical
condition of trauma politics. If the catastrophe must be imagined and the worst-case
scenario considered so that contingency plans, emergency measures, and, more than anything, the

security arrangements be put in place, then trauma is mobilized to integrate us into the
security measures of endless war. Trauma has become a means of organizing the subject of
security/insecurity within a social field defined as war . This is not liberation from past
violence but preparation for violence in the future. If society must be defended, as we are
now all fond of saying with Foucauldian irony (albeit with rather different levels of irony, depending on
our politics), then it must be defended more than anything from its future traumas. This is
where trauma connects to the growth of resilience as a political concept.29 If resilience has come to

the fore in the context of an anxious political psyche engaged in a war on terror and
within the wider neoliberal authoritarianism confronting us, we might add that it has done so for

a social order and international system understanding itself as traumatized and preparing for
more trauma to come. Resilience training represents a general preparation for events defined in
advance as traumatic. As Pat OMalley puts it, resilience does not seek only to render individuals able to
bounce back after trauma, an essentially reactive model. Rather, it aims to create subjects capable of
adapting to, and exploiting to their advantage, situations of radical uncertainty.30 The biological and
psychological frailty implied in the concept of trauma has to be somehow compensated for in advance by
the strength and endurance implied in the concept of resilience. To be a viable political subject, now,
means planning ones resilience to withstand the trauma to come . It is for this reason that the
psy-disciplines have been central to the growth of resilience. The American Psychological Association
launched a major Road to Resilience campaign in 2002 to link those types of traumatic events (i.e.,
September 11, 2001) with the hardships that define all of our lives, anytime that people are struggling
with an event in their communities. It became clear that these events helped to open a window to self
discovery for many, said Jan Peterson, assistant executive director of public relations in APAs Practice
Directorate. People were interested in learning more about themselvesand in particular, how to become
more resilient. The APA launched a multi-media approach, with a free tool kit including 10 ways to
build resilience, a documentary video Aftermath: The Road to Resilience with three overarching
messages (resilience can be learned; resilience is a journey, not an event or single turning point;
there is no prescribed timeline for the road to resilience), special phases of the campaign including
Resilience for Kids and Teens, and resilience workshops for journalists.31 The main theme to emerge is
how individuals, communities and organizations might bounce back from any attacks, setbacks or
challenges.32 A leading article called Providing Direction on The Road to Resilience by Russ Newman,
Executive Director at the APA, published in Behavioral Health Management in July 2003 to publicize the
campaign, has been made available on websites run by and for business management.33 Elsewhere one
finds that resilience workshops are conducted in centers specializing in trauma.34 By pairing trauma

with resilience, the subjects personal anxieties become bound up with the political dangers
facing the nation; the trauma is individual and collective, and so the resilience training is
the training in and of liberal subjects such that capitalist order might be properly secured.
The fabrication of liberal subjectivity and its martial defense are to be achieved in one and
the same moment. In this way, the traumaresilience couplet is now central to the politics of
security: the measures proposed in the unsuccessful National Resilience Development Act in 2003 found
their way into the ubiquitous powers of the Department of Homeland Security, and the UKs more
recent National Security Strategy (2008) is structured around the same problematicthe concept of
resilience runs through the text, encompassing the armed forces, the police, the British people,
the private sector, human and social resilience, community resilience, and on it go es.35

This planned defense and its prior imagining of the community and its subjects as anxious
and traumatized closes down alternate possibilities. Trauma and, relatedly, PTSD are
themselves symptomatic of the way contemporary order is constituted as a certain kind of
war, the mobilization of emotion within this war, and the kind of responses we are allowed
to have to it. We can be traumatized, we can prepare to be traumatized, we can be trained to be
resilient against the trauma to come, and we can obtain some therapy to help us cope in advance. But we
must not be challenged to respond politically. Resilience thereby designates an aptitude
for little other than keeping things exactly as they are. We can expect to be traumatized
collectively but not mobilized politically. Trauma talk is now part of the jargon of authenticity.
Seemingly irresistible, it has become pure ideology, a language providing power with its
refuge; seemingly responsive to real human need, it functions as a form of political
administration. Politics has been replaced by the administration of anxious and
traumatized subjects in their acceptance of the permanent security war.

Their impact claims are self-fulfillingconstant repetition of terrorism scenarios


creates a vicious cycle of fear and violence.
Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, previously Distinguished

Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School and Director of The Center on Violence and
Human Survival at John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York, 2003
(Superpower Syndrome: Americas Apocalyptic Confrontation With The World, Published by Thunders
Mouth Press / Nation Books, ISBN 1560255129, p. 115-116)
The amorphousness of the war on terrorism carries with it a paranoid edge, the suspicion that
terrorists and their supporters are everywhere and must be preemptively attacked lest they
emerge and attack us. Since such a war is limitless and infiniteextending from the farthest
reaches of Indonesia or Afghanistan to Hamburg, Germany, or New York City, and from
immediate combat to battles that continue into the unending futureit inevitably becomes
associated with a degree of megalomania as well. As the planet's greatest military power replaces
the complex world with its own imagined stripped-down us-versus-them version of it, our
distorted national self becomes the world. Despite the Bush administration's constant invocation
of the theme of "security," the war on terrorism has created the very oppositea sense of fear
and insecurity among Americans, which is then mobilized in support of further aggressive plans
in the extension of the larger "war." What [end page 115] results is a vicious circle that
engenders what we seek to destroy: our excessive response to Islamist attacks creating ever more
terrorists and, sooner or later, more terrorist attacks, which will in turn lead to an escalation of
the war on terrorism, and so on. The projected "victory" becomes a form of aggressive longing,
of sustained illusion, of an unending "Fourth World War" and a mythic cleansing of terrorists, of
evil, of our own fear. The American military apocalyptic can then be said to partner with and act
in concert with the Islamist apocalyptic.

Their terrorism impact rests on a simplified construction of depoliticized good and


evilthis is epistemologically bankrupt.
Anastassia Tsoukala, Research Fellow at the University of Paris V-Sorbonne and Associate Professor at
the University of Paris XI, 2008 (Boundary-creating Processes and the Social Construction of Threat,
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Volume 33, Issue 2, April-June, Available Online via Academic
Search Elite, p. 147-148)
The moral inferiority of terrorists is brought forth through the frequent use of a Manichean
image of the world, where the good lies with the threatened Western countries and the evil with
the aggressors, as is shown by the latter's lack of respect for human life and the indiscriminate
character of their targets. To further underpin the dangerousness of the threat, the terrorist act is
deprived of any political objective and is turned into a goal in itself, as if terrorists were solely
aiming to inflict pain and suffering. This alleged affective insensibility facilitates the
depoliticization of the conflict as it turns it into more classic patterns of criminal behavior. While
implying that the retaliation will not be a conventional war,45 the depoliticization and
subsequent criminalization of the conflict create, by definition, a huge moral gap between the
aggressors and the aggressed and confirm the already established moral superiority of the
aggressed. The cultural inferiority theme prolongs the Manichean image underlying the moral
inferiority theme by reinforcing the creation of an outer space, in rupture with the rest of the
world, that terrorists can be relegated to. The uncivilized nature of this outer space is usually
illustrated by the use of two opposed terms: barbaric, and civilized. Terrorism is seen as a
challenge to the Western perception of civilizationthat is, the belief in an uninterrupted
civilizing process that gradually improves the human condition. The establishment of this view
relies on a hierarchical classification of civilizations following two principles: The civilized
world is synonymous with the Western world, and all non-Western countries are culturally
inferior insofar as they do not share the same democratic ideals. As these democratic ideals
include some major moral principles, mainly related to the human-rights issue, this alleged
cultural superiority can easily imply a moral one, thus discrediting completely the political and
philosophical system the terrorists rely on. This outcasting from the overall society further rests
upon the alienation of the aggressors from the Muslim in-group. Following the assumption that
terrorism has nothing to do with the true message of Islam, Muslims are totally depoliticized to
be solely defined in cultural terms. Islam is presented as a peaceful and tolerant religion,
distorted by its illegitimate appropriators (i.e., people pursuing other, nonspecified objectives). A
clear line is thus drawn between the Muslim community and the few extremists, who are unable

or [end page 147] unwilling to share the dominant values of both the British society and their
own community.
Their representations of terrorism lend ideological support to mass violence

John Collins, Assistant Professor of Global Studies at St. Lawrence


University, and Ross Glover, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St.
Lawrence University, 2002 (Collateral Language, p. 6-7)
The Real Effects of Language As any university student knows, theories about the social construction and social effects of language
have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these
theories of language (e.g., deconstruction) are just talking about language, as opposed to talking about the
real world. The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete,

immediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of
war, mass murder (including genocide), the physical destruction of human communities, and the devastation of
the natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because
leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political
language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is justifiable.
From our perspective, then, every act of political violencefrom the horrors perpetrated against Native
Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the Soviet Union to the destruction of the World Trade
Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistanis intimately linked with the use of language. Partly what
we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of manufacturing consent and shaping peoples perception of the world around them; people are more likely to support acts of violence committed in their
name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as terrorists, or if the violence is presented as a
defense of freedom. Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive effects that this kind of process has on the political culture of supposedly democratic societies. At the risk of
stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the
objects of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages , besieges
entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As
George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of violence can easily be made more palatable through
the use of euphemisms such as pacification or, to use an example discussed in this book, targets. It is important to
point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is
abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of vital interests and surgical strikes and the flattering
language of civilization and just wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the
physical effects of violence.
Attempts to secure the world from terrorism replicate their harms

Mitchell, 05

(Andrew , Stanford U. Humanities Post-Doctoral Fellow, "Heidegger and

Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218)

Government and politics are simply further means of directing ways of life according to plan; and no one,
neither terrorist nor politician, should be able to alter these carefully constructed ways of life . Ways of life are
themselves effects of the plan, and the predominant way of life today is that of an all-consuming Americanism.
National differences fall to the wayside. The homeland, when not completely outmoded, can only appear as commodified
quaintness. All governments participate in the eradication of national differences. Insofar as Americanism represents the attempt to
annihilate the "homeland," then under the aegis of the abandonment of being, all governments and forms of

leadership become Americanism. The loss of national differences is accordant with the advent of terrorism,
since terrorism knows no national bounds but, rather, threatens difference and boundaries as such. Terrorism is
everywhere, where "everywhere" no longer refers to a collection of distinct places and locations but instead to a "here" that is the same
as there, as every "there." The threat of terrorism is not international, but antinational or, to strain a Heideggerian formulation,
unnational. Homeland security, insofar as it destroys the very thing that it claims to protect, is nothing

opposed to terrorism, but rather the consummation of its threat. Our leaders, in their attempt to secure the
world against terrorism, only serve to further drive the world towards its homogenized state. The elimination of
difference in the standing-reserve along with the elimination of national differences serve to identify the threat of terrorism with the
quest for security. The absence of this threat would be the absence of being, and its consummation would be the absence of being as
well. Security is only needed where there is a threat. If a threat is not perceived, if one believes oneself

invulnerable, then there is no need for security. Security is for those who know they can be injured, for
those who can be damaged. Does America know that it can be damaged? If security requires a recognition of one's own

vulnerability, then security can only be found in the acknowledgment of one's threatened condition, and this means that it can only be
found in a recognition of being as threat. To be secure, there must be the threat. For this reason, all of the planned

securities that attempt to abolish the threat can never achieve the security they seek. Security requires that
we preserve the threat, and this means that we must act in the office of preservers. As preservers, what we are
charged to preserve is not so much the present being as the concealment that inhabits it. Preserving a thing means to not challenge it
forth into technological availability, to let it maintain an essential concealment. That we participate in this essencing of being does not
make of it a subjective matter, for there is no isolated subject in preservation, but an opening of being. Heidegger will name this the
clearing of the truth (Wahrhet) of being, and it is this clearing that Dasein preserves (bewahrt). When a thing truthfully is, when it is
what it is in truth, then it is preserved. In preserving beings, Dasein participates in the truth (preservation) of being. The truth of

being is being as threat, and this threat only threatens when Dasein preserves it in terror. Dasein is not
innocent in the terrorization of being. On the contrary, Dasein is complicit in it. Dasein refuses to abolish
terrorism. For this reason, a Heideggerian thinking of terrorism must remain skeptical of all the various
measures taken to oppose terrorism, to root it out or to circumvent it. These are so many attempts to do
away with what threatens, measures that are themselves in the highest degree willful. This will can only impose
itself upon being, can only draw out more and more of its wrath, and this inward wrath of being maintains itself in a never-ending
supply. The will can only devastate the earth. Rather than approaching the world in terms of resources to be secured, true security can
only be found in the preservation of the threat of being. It is precisely when we are busy with security measures and

the frantic organization of resources that we directly assault the things we would preserve. The threat of
being goes unheeded when things are restlessly shuttled back and forth, harried, monitored, and surveilled.
The threat of being is only preserved when things are allowed to rest. In the notes to the "Evening Conversation,"
security is thought in just such terms: Security (what one understands by this) arises not from securing and the measures taken for this;
security resides in rest [in der Ruhe] and is itself made superfluous by this. (MA 77: 244)23 The rest in question is a rest from the
economic cycling and circulating of the standing reserve. The technological unworld, the situation of total war, is precisely the era of
restlessness ("The term 'totality' says nothing more; it names only the spread of the hitherto known into the 'restless"' [GA 69: 181]).
Security is superfluous here, which is only to say that it is unnecessary or useless. It is not found in utility, but in the preserved state of
the useless. Utility and function are precisely the dangers of a civil that has turned antagonistic towards nature. In rest, they no longer
determine the being of the thing. In resting, things are free of security measures, but not for all that rendered insecure. Instead, they are
preserved. There is no security; this is what we have to preserve. Heideggerian thinking is a thinking that thinks away from simple
presence and absence. It thinks what Heidegger calls "the between" (das Zwischen). This between is a world of nonpresence and
nonabsence. Annihilation is impossible for this world and so is security. The terror experienced today is a clue to the withdrawal of
being. The world is denatured, drained of reality. Everything is threatened and the danger only ever increases. Dasein flees to a
metaphysics of presence to escape the threatened world, hoping there to find security. But security cannot do away with the threat,
rather it must guard it. Dasein guards the truth of being in the experience of terror. What is perhaps repugnant to consider in all this is
that being calls for terrorism and for terrorists. With the enframing of being and the circulation of standing-reserve, what is
has already been destroyed. Terrorism is merely the ugly confirmation of this point. As we have seen, being does not linger behind the
scenes but is found in the staging itself. If being is to terrorize-if, in other words, this is an age of terrorism-then
being must call for terrorists. They are simply more "slaves of the history of beyng " (GA 69: 209) and, in
Heidegger's eyes, no different from the politicians of the day in service to the cause of Americanism . But
someone might object, the terrorists are murderers and the politicians are not. Granting this objection despite its obvious naivety, we
can nonetheless see that both politicians and terrorists are called for by the standing-reserve, the one to ensure its

nonabsence, that the plan will reach everyone everywhere, and the other to ensure its nonpresence, that all
beings will now be put into circulation by the threat of destruction. In this regard, "human resources" are no
different from "livestock," and with this, an evil worse than death has already taken place. Human
resources do not die, they perish.
That means only we access an external impact Collins says the only scenario for nuclear holocaust
will be if we convince the public, through hyperbolic language and an ambiguous alterity like
terrorists, can we mold the country's support in favor of an actual nuclear attack
The affirmative's depiction of an imminent terrorist threat transforms the real people who commit
terrorist acts into " the terr-ists ," a group of shadowy monsters who are always just around the
corner plotting their next attack. This framing of the terrorist threat sidesteps the question of why
they hate us and normalizes a state of permanent national insecurity.

Chernus 6, Ira, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-Director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of
Colorado-Boulder, 2006 ( Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin , Published by Paradigm
Publishers, ISBN 1594512752, p. 3-4)

Monsters are not real-unless you believe in them . Monsters exist only in fictional
stories. But if you really believe in the stories, you will believe in the
monsters. Then the monsters will have very real effects. That's how monsters

become real. That's what we are doing in our war on terrorism. On September 11,
2001, some very real people hijacked four airplanes and did very terrible, wholly
unjustifiable things. Then America turned those people, and many other people
perhaps (or perhaps not) associated with them, into monsters. We call them
"the terrorists." The real people are certainly dangerous to us. They are far more dangerous, though, as monsters.
Every day, America goes abroad searching for those monsters and trying to destroy them. Every day, that effort
puts our freedom, our civil liberties, our national spirit, and our national security at risk.
Every day, it creates new ways to harm our country and our people. Muslims are
attacked, imprisoned, and tortured, giving anti-U.S. forces a powerful recruiting tool.
Prolonged war in Iraq provides a rich training ground for the recruits. Threats of
preemptive attack against Iran, Syria, and other nations destabilize the
global political scene, creating new enemies. Increased spending for weapons,
especially nuclear weapons, encourages other nations to spend more too, spurring
nuclear proliferation. Every day, the United States sells weapons to nations that are now
allies but might someday turn those weapons against us. Bush administration policies alienate world
opinion, making it more likely that allies will turn into enemies. Meanwhile, restrictions on civil liberties
create constitutional dilemmas and growing political splits at home. The government
spies on, and sometimes imprisons, innocent people. As the costs of national security rise dramatically
(military spending in fiscal 2007 will exceed half a trillion dollars) the ballooning budget deficit plays havoc with the
nation's financial future. Huge sums must be borrowed from foreign nations, giving those nations (including most notably,
China) unpredictable leverage over the U.S. economy. And billions are wasted in homeland security efforts that tum out to
be more or less useless. As long as people want to attack us, they will find a way, no

matter how much we spend to stop them. We won't be safe until they no
longer want to attack us. So far, nearly everything the United States has
done in response to 9/11 has given them more reason to want to attack us. If
we want to reverse our course--if we want to make ourselves more secure--the most
important thing is to understand why they want to attack us. Or, as the question is so
often put, Why do they hate us? But thats a question you ask only about human beings, who have reasons and
motives for their hatred. You dont ask that question about monsters. You simply search them
out and destroy them. Americans faced a choice on that dreadful September 11 and still face the same
choice today: Treat the attackers as human beings, or treat them as monsters? To treat them
as human beings means finding out why they hate us. Its easy enough. On the night of
September 11, 2001, it took me about five minutes of Googling to find several interviews
with Osama bin Laden, where he repeated the same grievances over and over again. U.S.
troops were stationed throughout Muslim lands including Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of
Islam. U.S. bombing and sanctions were killing people in Iraq every day. The United
States supported Israels occupation of Palestine. By March, 2004, the United States had
moved the brunt of its Middle East military force from Saudi Arabia to Iraq. Otherwise,
little had changed. When three trains were bombed in Madrid, the group claiming responsibility (the Abu Hafs alMasri Brigades) said bluntly: Stop targeting us, release our prisoners, and leave our land, and we will stop attacking
you.i[2] No grievances could ever begin to justify the horrors of 9 /11 and Madrid. But were

the policies that angered the attackers so important that we should continue them, even
if it risks more attacks on our soil? Who can say? The question got, and still gets, virtually no
public discussion. By common consent, the whole subject of their motives has been
sealed by a Great Taboo. Instead, most Americans have settled for two simplistic slogans
coined in the White House: "They hate our freedoms." "They're flat evil." The attackers,
past and future, are transformed from human beings into monsters, driven by irrational
evil or a bloodthirsty desire to take away our freedoms. That means we have done
nothing to provoke them. No U.S. policy changes could reduce their desire to attack
uS,again. So there is nothing to talk about. We just hunker down, spend more billions on
security, and wait for the next attack. When the next attack comes, more than four out of
every five Americans believe, itwill "strengthen the nation's resolve to be even tougher in

going after terrorists."4 So there is every reason to expect that we'll strike out at the
monsters again, remain under the Great Taboo, and be just as insecure, waiting for yet
another round of attack and counterattack.
Secondthis turns the case the affirmatives framing of the terrorist threat entrenches a cycle of
insecurity that makes attacks more likely.

Chernus 6, Ira, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-Director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of
Colorado-Boulder, 2006 ( Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin ,
Published by Paradigm Publishers, ISBN 1594512752, p. 3-4)
The structure is simple enough. A

battle is raging between absolute good and absolute evil. Evil


threatens to unleash chaos and anarchy upon the world. The good must summon up the
strength, both moral and military, to stand firm against the threat and thus protect the
social order. That strength is the sign, and often the very definition, of moral goodness.
When this utterly familiar plot is transferred from the realm of fairy tales to the realm of
national security policy, it runs up against a chilling paradox. The stories are supposed to
provide a sense of security. Yet they can never achieve that aim. Tales of a battle between
good and evil must depict the world as a threatening or even terrifying place, full of
monsters. That alone would be enough to make people feel insecure. But there is more.
The stories always imply (and often say quite openly) that the monsters can never be destroyed.
The best to hope for is to build a stout defense against them, one strong enough to keep
them from destroying us. The monsters may be contained. But their threat will
never go away. The stories about social values that Bush and the neoconservatives created before 9/11 show this
paradox all too clearly. In those stories, the monstersliberals, sinners, secular humanistsplay a crucial
role; they cant be eliminated from the plot; they can never go away. So the battle
against them must go on forever. That is just what has been happening in the
United States since on September 11, 2001, the administration started turning its stories
about domestic values into war stories about foreign monsters to destroy. Instead of
fighting the real war that was thrust upon us on that incomprehensible morning four
years ago, as Mark Danner writes, we stubbornly insisted on fighting a war of the
imagination, an ideological struggle that we defined not by frankly
appraising the real enemy before us but by focusing on the mirror of our
own obsessions.ii[7] By substituting imagination for reality in its foreign policy, the Bush
administration has entrenched the nation deeper and deeper in the cycle of insecurity. It
was, and still is, trying to find security in stories that say we can never be truly secure.
They give us no reason even to try to be secure and every reason to go on staying
insecure. As long as such stories prevail, they distort perceptions of reality, creating
policies that are profoundly unrealistic. So its more likely that the U nited States will
suffer another grievous attack.

Aff terror claims are neither objective or truedominant


experts rely on politicized research, policymakers exclude
critique for political motives and limit the sources of
knowledge experts use
Raphael 9 [Sam, IR, Kingston University, Critical terrorism studies, ed. Richard Jackson, 50-51]
ellipses in original
The close relationship between the academic field of terrorism studies and the US slate means that it is
critically important to analyse the research output from key experts within the community. This is
particularly the case because of the aura of objectivity surrounding the terrorism knowledge
generated by academic experts. Running throughout the core literature is a positivist

assumption, explicitly slated or otherwise, that the research conducted is apolitical and objective
(see for example, Hoffman. 1992: 27; Wilkinson. 2003). There is little to no reflexivity on behalf of
the scholars, who see themselves as wholly dissociated from the politics surrounding the
subject of terrorism. This relocation of academic knowledge about terrorism is reinforced
by those in positions of power in the US who tend to distinguish the experts from other kinds
of overtly political actors. For example, academics are introduced to Congressional hearings in a
manner which privileges their nonpartisan input: Good morning. The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism
meets in open session to receive testimony and discuss the present and future course of terrorism in the
Middle EastIt has been the Terrorism Panels practice, in the interests of objectivity and gathering all the
facts, to pair classified briefings and open briefingsThis way we garner the best that the classified world
of intelligence has to offer and the best from independent scholars working in universities, think tanks, and
other institutions... (Saxton, 2000, emphasis added) The representation of terrorism expertise as
independent and as providing objectivity and facts has significance for its contribution to the
policymaking process in the US. This is particularly the case given that, as we will see, core experts
lend to insulate the broad direction of US policy from critique. Indeed, as Alexander George noted,
it is precisely because they are trained to clothe their work in the trappings of objectivity,
independence and scholarship that expert research is particularly effective in securing
influence and respect for the claims made by US policymakers (George, 1991b: 77). Given this,
it becomes vital to subject the content of terrorism studies to close scrutiny. Based upon a wider, systematic
study of the research output of key figures within the field (Raphael, forthcoming), and building upon
previous critiques of terrorism expertise (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman, 1982; Herman and
OSullivan, 1989; Chomsky, 1991; George, 1991b; Jackson, 2007g), this chapter aims to provide a critical
analysis of some of the major claims made by these experts and to reveal the ideological functions served
by much of the research. Rather than doing so across the board, this chapter focuses on research on the
subject of terrorism from the global South which is seen to challenge US interests. Examining this aspect of
research is important, given that the threat from this form of terrorism has led the US and its
allies to intervene throughout the South on behalf of their national security, with profound
consequences for the human security of people in the region. Specifically, this chapter examines two
major problematic features which characterise much of the fields research. First, in the context of anti-US
terrorism in the South, many important claims made by key terrorism experts simply replicate

official US government analyses. This replication is facilitated primarily through a


sustained and uncritical reliance on selective US government sources, combined with the
frequent use of unsubstantiated assertion. This is significant, not least because official
analyses have often been revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the
subject. Second, and partially as a result of this mirroring of government claims, the field tends to
insulate from critique those counterterrorism policies justified as a response to the
terrorist threat. In particular, the experts overwhelmingly silence the way terrorism is itself often
used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist interventions in the South. That is.
counterterrorism campaigns executed or supported by Washington often deploy terrorism as a
mode of controlling violence (Crelinsten, 2002: 83; Stohl, 2006: 18-19). These two features of the
literature are hugely significant. Overall, the core figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or
otherwise, produced a body of work plagued by substantive problems which together shatter the illusion
of objectivity. Moreover, the research output can be seen to serve a very particular
ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past thirty years, it has largely served the
interests of US state power, primarily through legitimising an extensive set of coercive
interventions in the global South undertaken under the rubric of various war(s) on terror. After
setting out the method by which key experts within the field have been identified, this chapter will outline
the two main problematic features which characterise much of the research output by these scholars. It will
then discuss the function that this research serves for the US slate.

Terror discourse constructs dominant knowledge projects


that shape policythis excludes alternate forms of
knowledgeterror discourse has broader political
currency which must be interrogated
Jackson 8 [Richard Jackson, IR, Aberystwyth University PhD, University of Canterbury, The Ghosts
of State Terror, 2008, http://users.aber.ac.uk/mys/csrv/ghost%20of%20state%20terror-richard%205.pdf]
Employing a discourse analytic approach, this paper examines the silence on state terrorism within the
mainstream terrorism studies literature. An analysis of more than a hundred academic texts on terrorism,
many by established terrorism experts, reveals that state terrorism is noticeable mainly for its absence. In
some cases, state terrorism is simply defined out of the analysis by the employment of an actor-based
definition: terrorism, it is argued, is a kind of violence performed solely by non-state actors. In
other cases, the possibility of state terrorism is acknowledged but is then given a cursory treatment or
simply ignored as a serious subject of research. Following this textual analysis, the main findingthe
silence on state terrorism within terrorism studiesis subjected to both a first and second order critique. A
first order or immanent critique uses a discourses internal contradictions, mistakes and misconceptions to
criticise it on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to
acknowledge or address. In this case, the absence of state terrorism is criticized for its illogical

actor-based definition of terrorism, its politically biased research focus and its failure to
acknowledge the empirical evidence of the extent and nature of state terrorism, particularly that
practiced by Western liberal states and their allies. A second order critique entails reflecting on
the broader political and ethical consequencesthe ideological effectsof the representations
enabled by the discourse, and the ways in which the discourse functions as a political
technology. It is argued that the absence of state terrorism from academic discourse functions to
promote particular kinds of state hegemonic projects, construct a legitimizing public
discourse for foreign and domestic policy, and deflect attention from the terroristic
practices by Western states and their allies. Importantly, the exposure and destabilisation of this
dominant terrorism knowledge opens up critical space for the articulation of alternative and
potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice. Introduction Terrorism studies, once a
fairly minor sub-field of security studies, has now expanded to become a stand-alone field with its own
dedicated journals, research centres, leading scholars and experts, research funding opportunities,
conferences, seminars, and study programmes. It is in fact, one of the fastest expanding areas of research in
the English-speaking academic world, with literally thousands of new books and articles published over the
past few years,1 significant investment in terrorism-related research projects, and increasing numbers of
postgraduate dissertations and undergraduate students.2 A perennial criticism of this voluminous output
however, has been the neglect of state terrorism as a subject for systematic and sustained research, a
problem noted during the Cold War but which seems to have become even more acute since September,
2001.3 To many observers this neglect is somewhat puzzling given that the genealogy of the term
terrorism has its earliest roots in the deployment of violence by states to terrify and intimidate civilian
populations, states have employed terrorism far more extensively than non-state actors over the past two
centuries, state terrorism is far more lethal and destructive than non-state terrorism and the employment of
terror against civilians by states continues unabated in a great many countries today. The purpose of this
paper is to explore this puzzle through the prism of discourse analysis, a form of critical theorising aimed in
part at understanding and describing the relationship between knowledge, power, and politics. Taking as its
starting point that knowledge and its production is never a purely neutral exercise but always

works for someone and for something, this paper seeks to excavate the ideological effects of
the discourse on state terrorism (or, more accurately, the silence within the discourse) in the terrorism
studies field. It argues that the way in which state terrorism is constructed as a (non)subject
both distorts the field as an area of scholarly research, and more importantly, reifies dominant
structures of power and enables particular kinds of elite and state hegemonic projects. The
argument proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I briefly outline the methodological approach
employed in the analysis. This is followed by a discussion of the main findings of the discourse analysisa

description of the ways in which the subject of state terrorism is (and is not) discursively constructed and
deployed within the broader terrorism studies literature. The third section subjects these findings to a first
and second order critique as a means of exploring the effects of the discourse on knowledge, power and
politics. Specifically, I deconstruct and dismiss the most common arguments for not including state
terrorism as a valid object of study within the field of study, as well as illuminate and describe the political
and ideological effects of its non-inclusion. Finally, in the conclusion to the paper, I argue that there are
important analytical and normative reasons for taking state terrorism seriously and incorporating its
systematic analysis into existing research programmes. Analysing the Discourse of State Terrorism As
stated above, the analytical approach employed in this study falls broadly under the mantle of discourse
analysis.4 A form of critical theorising, discourse analysis aims primarily to illustrate and describe the
relationship between textual and social and political processes. In particular, it is concerned with the
politics of representationthe manifest political or ideological consequences of adopting one
mode of representation over another. In this case, I am concerned with the ways in which
state terrorism is representedor not represented, which is itself a kind of representation
as a subject within the field of terrorism studies. Although discourse theorising is employed within a range
of different epistemological paradigmspoststructuralist, postmodernist, feminist, and social constructivist
it is predicated on a shared set of theoretical commitments. Broadly speaking, these include:5 an
understanding of language as constitutive or productive of meaning; an understanding of discourse as
structures of signification which construct social realities, particularly in terms of defining
subjects and establishing their relational positions within a system of signification ;6 an
understanding of discourse as being productive of subjects authorised to speak and act, legitimate
forms of knowledge and political practices and importantly, common sense within particular social
groups and historical settings; an understanding of discourse as necessarily exclusionary and
silencing of other modes of representation; and an understanding of discourse as historically and
culturally contingent, inter-textual, open-ended, requiring continuous articulation and re-articulation and
therefore, open to destabilisation and counter-hegemonic struggle. On this epistemological foundation and
adopting an interpretive logic rather than a causal logic, the discourse analytic technique employed in this
paper proceeded in two main stages. The first stage entailed an examination of a large number of texts from
within the terrorism studies field.7 As such, the primary units of analysis or data for this research were
more than 100 mainstream academic books, articles in the main terrorism studies and international relations
journals, conference papers presented at ISA and APSA, and reports and websites from think-tanks and
research institutions. Each text was examined initially to see if it contained the terms state terrorism or
state terror. Texts that did contain these terms were then examined to see how they were constructed as a
discursive formation and subject of knowledge, how they were deployed within broader narratives, and
how state terrorism was positioned as a subject in relation to non-state terrorism. Employing a grounded
theory approach, the analysis was considered complete when the addition of new texts did not yield any
new insights or categories. The second stage of the research involved subjecting the findings of the textual
analysis to both a first and second order critique. A first order or immanent critique uses a discourses
internal contradictions, mistakes, misconceptions, and omissions to criticise it on its own terms and expose
the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. The point of this form of
internal critique is not necessarily to establish the correct or real truth of the subject beyond doubt, but
rather to destabilise dominant interpretations and demonstrate the inherently contested and
political nature of the discourse. A second order critique entails reflecting on the broader
political and ethical consequencesthe ideological effectsof the representations and more
importantly in this case, the silences, enabled by the discourse. Specifically, it involves an
exploration of the ways in which the discourse functions as a symbolic technology 8 that
can be wielded by particular elites and institutions, to: structure the primary subject positions,
accepted knowledge, commonsense and legitimate policy responses to the actors and events being
described; exclude and de-legitimise alternative knowledge and practice; naturalise a particular
political and social order; and construct and sustain a hegemonic regime of truth. A range of
specific discourse analytic techniques are useful in second order critique: genealogical analysis, predicate
analysis, narrative analysis, and deconstructive analysis.9 It is crucial to recognise that discourses are
significant not just for what they say but also for what they do not say; the silences in a discourse can be

as important, or even more important at times, than what is openly stated. This is because silence
can function ideologically in any number of ways. For example, silence can be a deliberate means of
distraction or misdirection from uncomfortable subjects or contrasting viewpoints, the suppression or delegitimisation of alternative forms of knowledge or values, the tacit endorsement of particular kinds of
practices, setting the boundaries of legitimate knowledge, or as a kind of disciplining process directed
against certain actorsamong others. In other words, the silences within a text often function as an
exercise in power; revealing and interrogating those silences therefore, is an important part of
first and second order critique. Lastly, it is important to note that when we examine a discourse as a
broad form of knowledge and practice, it is never completely uniform, coherent, or consistent; it
always has porous borders and often contains multiple exceptions, inconsistencies, and contradictions by
different speakers and texts. Many of the terrorism scholars discussed in this paper for example, upon
a close reading of their individual texts, often express more nuanced arguments than are
necessarily presented here. The important point is not that each text or scholar can be
characterised in the same uniform way, or even that these scholars agree on a broad set of
knowledge claims. It is rather, that taken together as a broader discourse and a body of work

that has political and cultural currency, the narratives and forms of the discourse function
to construct and maintain a specific understanding of, and approach to, terrorism and state
terrorism and that this knowledge has certain political and social effects .

Discourse of terrorism in IR constructs the world in


absolute dichotomies between legitimate state violence
and illegitimate political violence. The problem-solving
policy approach of this type of knowledge reproduces the
issues that drive the violence responsible for the aff
impacts.
Gunning 7Joroen Gunning, Deputy Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and
Contemporary Political Violence @ Aberystywh (Wales) [Government and Opposition, Blackwell
Publishing, Vol.42, No. 3, p. 369-375]
Each of these critiques goes some way to explain the shortcomings in terrorism research, although the
argument that funding is not available for projects critical of the status quo is perhaps overstated.30 It will
always be difficult to obtain reliable data on clandestine violence, so that scholars will inevitably be
tempted to draw heavily on secondary sources or build elaborate theories on very little , and
often dubious, information.31 Equally, given prevailing power structures, the embeddednes of

researchers within them, and the shock that terroristic tactics typically seek to induce, it
will arguably always be tempting to demonize the terrorist other . However, what most of the
critiques overlook is the crucial fact that, beyond these inherent difficulties, many of the observed
shortcomings can be traced back to the dominance in terrorism research of what Robert Cox
famously called a problem-solving approach: one that takes the world as it finds it, with the
prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given
framework for action.32 This is not to say that terrorism research has been devoid of critical voices,
if critical is defined, with Cox, as not tak[ing] institutions and social and power relations for granted but
call[ing] them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in
the process of changing,33 and, significantly, exploring the extent to which the status quo contributes to
the problem of terrorism. Crelinsten, who takes an explicitly critical approach,34 is a long-standing
member of the editorial board of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence, as are Weinberg and
Crenshaw, who are critical in the (loose) sense of problematizing existing dichotomies, historicizing
political violence and moving beyond a state-centric security approach.35 Silke, Horgan, Schmid and
Jongman can also be considered critical in that they are explicitly self-reflexive about assumptions,
methodologies and the shortcomings of terrorism research.36 However, if we consider the typical

characteristics of a problemsolving or traditional approach,37 we find that many of these both dominate
terrorism research (including many of the contributions of Silkes one-timers)38 and can be directly
linked to the shortcomings witnessed in this research. In its most uncritical manifestation and it must be
emphasised that few scholars are wholly uncritical in a Coxian sense a problem-solving approach does
not question its framework of reference, its categories, its origins or the power relations that enable the
production of these categories.39 It is statecentric, takes security to mean the security of the
state rather than that of human beings, on the assumption that the former implies the latter, and

sees security in narrow military or law-and-order terms, as opposed to the wider conception
of human security, as for instance developed by critical security studies.40 It is ahistorical and
ignores social and historical contexts; if it did not, it would have to account for the historical
trajectory of the state, which would undermine the states claim to being uniquely
legitimate. The problem-solving approach is positivist and objectivist, and seeks to explain
the terrorist other from within state-centric paradigms rather than to understand the
other inter-subjectively using interpretative or ethnographic methods. It divides the world
sharply into dichotomies (for instance, between the legitimate and good state, and the
illegitimate and evil terrorists). It posits assumptions based on these dichotomies, often without
adequately exploring whether these assumptions are borne out in practice. It sees interests as fixed, and it
regards those opposed to the status quo as the problem, without considering whether the status quo is part
of the problem and transformation of both sides is necessary for its solution. Not only can many of these
characteristics be found in more or less diluted form in terrorism research41 a legacy of the fields
origins as a sub-field within traditional security and strategic studies but these problem-solving

characteristics can also be shown to contribute directly to its observed shortcomings. The
reported lack of primary data, the dearth of interviews with terrorists and the fields typical
unwillingness to engage subjectively with [the terrorists] motives,42 is in part fuelled by the
fields over-identification with the state, and by the adoption of dichotomies that depict terrorism as an
unredeemable atrocity like no other, that can only be approached with a heavy dose of moral indignation,
although other factors, such as security concerns, play a role too.43 Talking with terrorists thus becomes
taboo, unless it is done in the context of interrogation.44 Such a framework also makes it difficult to
enquire whether the state has used terroristic methods. If the state is the primary referent, securing its
security the main focus and its hegemonic ideology the accepted framework of analysis, terrorism,
particularly if defined in sharp dichotomies between legitimate and illegitimate, can only be logically
perpetrated by insurgents against the state, not by state actors themselves. State actors are engaged in

counterterrorism, which is logically depicted as legitimate, or at least, justifiable given the


terrorist threat and the fields focus on shortterm problem-solving . Where traditional
terrorism studies do focus on state terrorism, it is in the context of the other: the authoritarian or
totalitarian state that is the nemesis if not the actual enemy of the liberal democratic state.45 The observed
disregard for historical context and wider sociopolitical dynamics46 can similarly be traced to the
ahistorical propensity of problem-solving approaches and their state-centric understanding of security.
The typical focus is thus on violent acts against the state, and the immediate terrorist campaign, not on
how these acts relate to a wider constituency and its perception of human security, history and the state, or
what role the evolution of the state has played in creating the conditions for oppositional violence.47 The
lack of critical and theoretical reflection48 can be linked to the problem-solving tendency

to be short-termist and practical, and to deal in fixed categories and dichotomies that
privilege the state and its dominant ideological values. From such a standpoint, scholars would not
readily explore how terrorism discourse is produced and how it is used to marginalize alternative
conceptions, discredit oppositional groups, and legitimize counter-terrorism policies that transgress
international law.49 Nor would they be particularly likely to consider how the development of the modern
state or the international system might have contributed to the evolution of terrorism, or how theories of
the state and the international system can help illuminate the terrorism phenomenon. Drawing on cognate
theories more broadly is similarly discouraged since terrorism is framed as an exceptional threat, unique
and in urgent need of a practical solution.50 The state-centricity, inflexibility and dichotomous

nature of such a framework also makes it easier to recycle unproven assumptions, such as
the notion that religious terrorism is not concerned with constituencies and knows no

tactical constraints against killing infidels, 51 without having to test these assumptions
empirically across different samples. It thus becomes possible to argue, for instance, that negotiating
with terrorists encourages further terrorism without need for empirical proof a point already observed
by Martha Crenshaw in 198352 or to insist that terrorists inherently lack legitimacy without reflection
on whether the state lacks legitimacy in the experience of those who support the terrorists.53 The
combined result of these tendencies is often a less than critical support (whether tacit or explicit) for

coercive counterterrorism policy without adequate analysis of how this policy contributes to
the reproduction of the very terrorist threat it seeks to eradicate
Attempts to combat terrorism are a vain extension of US exceptionalism, embedding militaristic
notions of security in the pursuit of violent eradication
Noorani, 2005. Yaseen Noorani is a Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies,
University of Edinburgh. The Rhetoric of Security, The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005.
The Bush administration perpetually affirms that the war against terrorism declared in response
to the attacks of September 2001 is "different from any other war in our history" and will
continue "for the foreseeable future."1 This affirmation, and indeed the very declaration of such a
war, belongs to a rhetoric of security that predates the Bush administration and which this
administration has intensified but not fundamentally altered. Rhetorically speaking, terrorism is
the ideal enemy of the United States, more so than any alien civilization and perhaps even more
so than the tyrannies of communism and fascism, terrorism's defeated sisters. This is because
terrorism is depicted in U.S. rhetoric not as an immoral tactic employed in political struggle, but
as an immoral condition that extinguishes the possibility of peaceful political deliberation. This
condition is the state of war, in absolute moral opposition to the peaceful condition of civil
society. As a state of war, terrorism portends the dissolution of the civil relations obtaining
within and among nations, particularly liberal nations, and thus portends the dissolution of
civilization itself. [End Page 13] Terrorism is therefore outside the world order, in the sense that
it cannot be managed within this order since it is the very absence of civil order. For there to be a
world order at all, terrorism must be eradicated. In prosecuting a world war against the state of
war, the United States puts itself outside the world order as well. The Bush administration
affirms, like the Clinton administration before it, that because the identity of the United States
lies in the values that engender peace (freedom and democracy), the national interests of the
United States always coincide with the interests of the world order. The United States is the
animus of the world order and the power that sustains it. For this reason, any threat to the
existence of the United States is a threat to world peace itself, and anything that the United
States does to secure its existence is justified as necessary for the preservation of world peace. In
this way, the existence of the United States stands at the center of world peace and liberal values,
yet remains outside the purview of these values, since when under threat it is subject only to the
extra-moral necessity of self-preservation. I will argue that the symmetrical externality of the
United States and terrorism to the world order lies at the foundation of the rhetoric of security by
which the U.S. government justifies its hegemonic actions and policies. This rhetoric depicts a
world in which helpless, vulnerable citizens can achieve agency only through the U.S.
government, while terrorist individuals and organizations command magnitudes of destructive
power previously held only by states. The moral-psychological discourse of agency and fear,
freedom and enslavement invoked by this rhetoric is rooted in both classical liberalism and
postwar U.S. foreign policy. The war of "freedom" against "fear" is a psychic struggle with no
specific military enemies or objectives. It arises from the portrayal of the United States as an
autarkic, ideally impermeable collective agent that reshapes the external world in its own image.
The war of freedom against fear thereby justifies measures said to increase the defenses and
internal security of the United States as well as measures said to spread freedom and democracy
over the world. Now that the destructive capacity of warlike individuals can threaten the world
order, the power of the United States must be deployed in equal measure to neutralize this threat
throughout the world. The world as a [End Page 14] whole now comes within the purview of U.S.
disciplinary action. Any manifestation of the state of war, terrorist activity, anywhere in the
world, is now a threat to the existence of the United States and to world peace. There is no "clash
of civilizations," but the Middle East, as the current site of the state of war, is the primary danger

to the world and must be contained, controlled, and reshaped. The symmetrical externality of the
United States and terrorism to the world order, then, allows its rhetoric to envision a historic
opportunity for mankindthe final elimination of the state of war from human existence, and
fear from the political psyche. This will be achieved, however, only by incorporating the world
order into the United States for the foreseeable future.
Their claims to knowledge about terrorism are not neutral or objective, but rather motivated in
terms of the normative agenda of terrorism studies as a discipline.
Burke, 2008. Burke, University of New South Wales, 2008[Anthony, The end of terrorism studies,
Critical Studies on Terrorism, Volume 1, Issue 1 April 2008 , pages 37 49]
no knowledge is neutral, however scientific
its appearance. We now know, in contrast to the positivistic and instrumental assumptions of
natural science, that knowledge is not a mirror of the real nor a tool that lies reliably in the hands
of man. It was not what Francis Bacon foretold modern science to be: a vehicle for the
restoration of man's 'empire over creation' (Bacon 1620/1952). Instead, we all too often find
knowledge serving power as it conceals its political function within claims to objectivity and
expertise. We find that it harbours secrets: its discourse of expertise and epistemological
mastery, of policy rationality, sitting visibly above a silent bedrock of assumptions about the
nature of culture, the political, the necessary and the good. These it reinforces, without making
them audibleKnowledge, argued Foucault, is utterly intertwined with the exercise and
production of power, but it is not a pre-existing knowledge that serves a pre-existing power,
whose forms we understand and accept. Rather, through a series of complex and conflictual
operations, it produces and limits the possibility for each, creates a working system of relations
between them, and sets a machinery into operation. Knowledge classifies, imagines, orders and
constructs. Foucault conceived this theory as one that could be applied across the human and
social sciences. My interest, on the occasion of the inauguration of a journal entitled Critical
Studies on Terrorism, is in a particular, global social field which terrorism and counter-terrorism
as practices traverse, affect and transform. This social field intersects with a relatively new social
science known as 'terrorism studies', one drawing its methodologies and assumptions from other
social sciences (sociology, political science, security studies) and that claims an authoritative
understanding of a relatively stable object. Of particular salience is the fact that terrorism studies
is not dominated institutionally by universities so much as by think tanks, policy institutes,
intelligence agencies, militaries, media organizations, and the ideological activity of political
parties and ministers. The traditions of critical scholarship possible in the university here yield to
a more immediate and pragmatic concern with effectiveness. Even as it asserts ontological
certainty, the knowledge of terrorists and terrorism produced in such institutions is thoroughly
engaged. What then, can this tell us about 'terrorism'? About (critical) 'terrorism studies'? What is
the nature of this intellectual field and its object, terror? Critical terrorism studies has insinuated
itself into an intellectual, institutional and political space shaped by 'terrorism' and 'counterterrorism'. There it exists, uneasily and problematically, pulled back and forth between the
disparate (and often antithetical) tasks of study, critique and policy. There it must consider its
purposes, forms and functions; the kind of 'power' it wants its 'knowledge' to become. This, to
me, means that - like terrorism itself - terrorism studies cannot ignore its normative impact.
However, cautiously and reflexively, it must set out and pursue a normative agenda.
Ever since the early works of Michel Foucault, we have known that

Rhetoric of terrorism constructs imaginary threats which prevent effective, peaceful


solutions
Chernus 1 (Ira, PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT
BOULDER,
FIGHTING TERROR IN THE NATIONAL INSECURITY STATE,
http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm, AD: 7/10/09) jl
On September 11, 2001, most Americans wanted to hear the story of World War II. Pearl Harbor
had come again, and the fight was on. In this corner: the waving flags, the crowds singing
"America the Beautiful," the heroic young people vowing to go when ordered. In that corner: the
sneer of bin Ladin on every newsstand, the gas masks and antidote kits, the universal lament: "I no

longer feel safe in my own homeland." Only Muslims were surprised when George W. Bush
declared a new crusade to rid the world of the evildoers.
Nine days later, in his major address to Congress and the nation, Bush narrated the official story
of the war on terrorism. Although he spoke of "a new kind of war," it looked a lot like World
War II: Al Qaedas "goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people
everywhere. They follow in the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism Freedom itself is
under attack. This is civilization's fight." The evil was easy to explain: "Americans are asking
Why do they hate us? They hate our freedoms." Bush offered no evidence to back up this
explanation for the attacks. But it hardly mattered, since few Americans were looking for
evidence. It seemed self-evident that, now as in the past, civilization and freedom are beset by
enemies.
If anyone cares to know why they hate us, evidence is easy enough to find. Osama bin Laden, for
one, has been telling the U.S. for years why he hates us. He hates U.S. policies that dominate and
oppress Muslims. Above all, he hates U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, Islams holiest land.
Secondarily, he hates U.S. bombing and sanctions in Iraq, and (recently, at least) U.S. support
for Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. But all this has no place in the official story.
In the peace movements alternative story, bin Ladens words matter. There is no excuse for the
murder of thousands, that story goes. The murderers must be condemned. Still, their complaints
have some validity. Unless we listen to those complaints, more deaths are likely. If we simply
strike back, without reconsidering the policies that caused the problem, we only insure that
more innocents, including many Americans, will die.

The discourse of terrorism and threats makes it impossible to differentiate between


real threats and made up threats
Der Derian 95 (James, Director of the Global Security Program and Research Professor of International Studies at the Watson
Institute for International Studies at Brown University, Arms, Hostages, and the Importance of Shredding in Earnest: Reading the
National Security Culture (II), Facts, Factoids, and the Factotum of Terrorism, Duke University Press, JSTOR, AD: 7/10/09) AN

Just as Nietzsche alleged the precession of meaning to facts, North-the factotum of terror and
counter-terror-preceded the factoids of terrorism. To be sure, there are some commonly accepted
"facts" about international terrorism. A selection of Rand corporation documents on international
terrorism reveals the following: over the last ten years terrorists have seized over fifty embassies
and consulates, held the oil ministers of eleven states hostage; kidnapped hundreds of
diplomats, businessmen and journalists; made several hundred million dollars in ransom money; assassinated Lord
Mountbatten and President Sadat and the former premier of Italy, attempted to assassinate the president of France, the Pope, and Alexander

Terrorist incidents and their


severity have increased over the last ten years, but most terrorist actions involve few or no
casualties: they are symbolic acts of violence. Com-pared to the ruthlessness and
destructiveness of states, or even to natural disasters, terrorism is a mere nuisance. Yet it is
cause for crises of state, media spasms on a seismic scale, and the hyper-production of institutes,
conferences, and books on terrorism. Why is this? International terrorism does represent a crisis,
but not in terms of body-counts or a revolutionary threat to the states-system. On a political
level, the simulacrum of terrorism, that is, the production of a hyperreal threat of violence,
anticipates a crisis of legitimation.9W hat this means is that international terrorism is not a
symptom or a cause or an effect of this systemic crisis: it has become a spectacular, microcosmic simulation. International terrorism simulates a legitimating crisis of the international
order; conversely, counter-terrorism is a counter-simulation, an attempt to engender a new
disciplinary order which can save the dominant legitimacy principle of international relations.10O n a representational level, the
Haig (a near miss with a rocket launcher when he was supreme allied commander of NATO).

spectacle of terrorism displace-and distracts us from-the signs of a pervading international disorder. As a result, much of what is read and
written of terrorism displays a superficiality of reasoning and a corruption of language which effects truths about terrorism without any sense of
how these truths are produced by, and help to sustain official discourses of international relations. This was repeatedly evidenced by the
proceedings and documents of the Iran-contra hearings, in which our reason of state was exposed as ideological expediency and redressed as
principled policy. If the reader of terrorism is to break out of the dominant cultural economy, in which each of us acts as a factotum of factoids,
that is, a transmitter of official truths, then some critical interpretive skills must be deployed. Along with an empirical study of the salient