CO OWNERSHIP

Avila vs. BARABAT

FACTS:
The subject of this controversy is a portion of a 433-square meter parcel of
land located in Poblacion, Toledo City, Cebu. The entire property isdesignated
as cadastral lot no. 348 registered in the name of AnunciacionBahenavda.
deNemeo. Upon her death, ownership of the lot wastransferred by
operation of law to her five children, petitioners Narcisa Avila,
NatividadMacapaz, Francisca Adlawan, Leon Nemeo and JoseBahena. These
heirs built their respective houses on the lot.In 1964, respondent Benjamin
Barabat leased a portion of the house owned by Avila. His co-respondent,
JovitaBarabat, moved in with him in1969 when they got married.Avila
subsequently relocated to Cagayan de Oro City. She came back to Toledo City
in July 1979 to sell her house and share in the lot to hersiblings but no one
showed interest in it. She then offered it to respondents who agreed to buy
it. Their agreement was evidenced by a privatedocument dated July 17,
1979.
Respondents stopped paying rentals to Avila and took possession of the
property as owners. They also assumed the payment of realty taxes
onit.Sometime in early 1982, respondents were confronted by petitioner
JanuarioAdlawan who informed them that they had until March 1982 only to
stay in Avilas place because he was buying the property. Respondents
replied that the property had already been sold to them by Avila.
Theyshowed Adlawan the July 17, 1979 document executed by Avila.On
January 6, 1983, respondents received a letter from Atty. JoselitoAlo
informing them that Avila had sold her house and share in lot no. 348to his
clients, the spouses Januario and Nanette Adlawan. Considering the sale to
the spouses Adlawan as prejudicial to their title and peacefulpossession of
the property, they demanded that Avila execute a public document
evidencing the sale of the property to them but Avila refused.Respondents
filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Toledo City, Branch 29.3 Docketed as Civil Case No. T-53, the complaint was
subsequently amended to include annulment of the deed of sale to the
spouses Adlawan, specific performance, partitionand damages as additional
causes of action. Respondents anchored their claim over the property to the
July 17, 1979 private document whichthey presented as Exhibit "A."Avila
denied having offered to sell her property to respondents. She claimed that
respondents gave her an P8,000 loan conditioned on hersigning a document
constituting her house and share in lot no. 348 as security for its payment.
She alleged that she innocently affixed hersignature on Exhibit "A" which was
prepared by respondents and which they now claim as a private deed of sale
transferring ownership tothem.

ISUE
Petitioners claim that the appellate court erred in ruling that the transaction
between respondents and Avila was an absolute sale, not an equitable
mortgage.
HELD
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by theprospective vendor,
or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded
in the Registry of Property, unlessaccompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.The
right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining
owners.Petitioners right to redeem would have existed only had there been
co
-ownership among petitioners-siblings. But there was none. For thisright to
be exercised, co-ownership must exist at the time the conveyance is made
by a co-owner and the redemption is demanded by the otherco-owner or coowner(s).7 However, by their own admission, petitioners were no longer coowners when the property was sold to respondentsin 1979. The co-ownership
had already been extinguished by partition.The regime of co-ownership
exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons.8 By the nature of co-ownership, a co-owner cannot point to any
specific portion of the property owned in common as his own because his
share in it remainsintangible and ideal.
The purpose of partition is to separate, divide and assign a thing held in
common among those to whom it belongs.14 By their ownadmission,
petitioners already segregated and took possession of their respective shares
in the lot. Their respective shares were thereforephysically determined,
clearly identifiable and no longer ideal. Thus, the co-ownership had been
legally dissolved. With that, petitionersright to redeem any part of the
property from any of their former co-owners was already extinguished. As
legal redemption is intended tominimize co-ownership,15 once a property is
subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community ceases to
exist and there isno more reason to sustain any right of legal redemption.

BALO vs. CA
G.R. No. 129704 September 30, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Doctrine: An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determine portion of the
properties involved.
Facts: A complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Properties and Accounting with
Damages, was filed by private respondent Josefina Garrido against
petitioners UlpianoBalo, Lydia Balo-Lumpas, Eugenio Balo, UlpianoBalo, Jr.,
NidaBalo-Moraleta, Nora Balo-Catano, ZaidaBalo, Judith Balo-Mandreza,
DaniloBalo and RoniloBalo, alleging that she (private respondent) and
petitioners are the co-owners of undivided parcels of land located at
Mayorga, Leyte.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR JUDICIAL PARTITION AND
ACCOUNTING HAS PRESCRIBED, WAS WAIVED, OR WAS OTHERWISE
ABANDONED
Held: No. It is noteworthy that the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners
did not ipso facto establish prescription. Dismissal prior to answer is
premature. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determine portion of the
properties involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property,
the action for partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should
resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as
a co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong
remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the
defendant to submit to partition. If, on the other hand, the court after trial
should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may
and should order the partition of the properties in the same action.

RIZALINO, substituted by his heirs, JOSEFINA,

FERNANDO, ERNESTO, LEONORA,BIBIANO, JR.,

ROLANDO
LIBRADO

and
and

ENRIQUETA,
all
surnamed
OESMER,
Petitioners,
PARAISODEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

vs.

FACTS:
Petitioners together with Adolfo Oesmer and Jesus Oesmer, are brothers and
sisters, and the co-owners of undivided shares of two parcels of agricultural
and tenanted land which were acquired by right of succession. Respondent
Paraiso Development Corporation is known to be engaged in the real estate
business. This case originated when Ernesto Oesmer, one of the co-owners of
the subject land, met with the President of respondent corporation for the
purpose of brokering the sale of petitioners properties to respondent
corporation. Pursuant to the said meeting, a Contract to Sell was drafted
whereby petitioners Ernesto and Enriqueta subsequently signed the
aforesaid Contract to Sell. A check in the amount of P100,000.00, payable to
Ernesto, was given as option money. Sometime thereafter, Rizalino,Leonora,
Bibiano, Jr., and Librado also signed the said Contract to Sell. However, two
of the brothers, Adolfo and Jesus, did not sign the document. Later on,
petitioners informed the respondent, through a letter, of their intention to
rescind the Contract to Sell and to return the amount of P100,000.00 given
by respondent as option money. Respondent did not respond to the aforesaid
letter. Afterwards, herein petitioners, together with Adolfo and Jesus, filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity or for Annulment of Option Agreement or
Contract to Sell with Damages before the RTC. The trial court held that the
assailed Contract to Sell is valid and binding only to the undivided
proportionate share of Ernesto who signed the document and received the
check. Ernesto was ordered to execute the Contract of Absolute Sale
concerning his 1/8 share over the subject two parcels of land in favor of
respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of RTC
whereby it declared that the Contract to Sell is valid and binding with respect
to the undivided proportionate share of the six signatories of the document.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract to sell binds the co-owners of Ernesto.
HELD:
Yes. The contract to sell was valid and binding. In contrast to the contention
of the five co-owners who affixed their signatures in the contract to sell that
their signatures do not confer authority to Ernesto as an agent to sell their
shares, the Court held that they were selling the same directly and in their
own right. Hence, written authority is no longer necessary since they were
selling their shares in their own capacity as owners. In addition, the
petitioners, being owners of their respective undivided shares in the subject
properties, can dispose of their shares even without the consent of all the coheirs. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides that, Each co-owner shall have
the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even

substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Consequently, even without the consent of the two co-heirs, Adolfo and
Jesus, the Contract to Sell was valid and binding with respect to the 6/8
proportionate shares of the petitioners.
AGUIRRE, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 122249 January 29, 2004
FACTS:
Leocadio Medrano and his first wife Emilia owned a piece of land.
After the death of Emilia, Leocadio married his second wife Miguela. When
Leocadio died, all his heirs agreed that Sixto Medrano, a child of the first
marriage, should manage and administer the said property. After Sixto died,
his heirs learned that he had executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property in which he falsely stated that he was the only heir of Leocadio. It
turned out that while Sixto were still alive, he sold a portion of the subject
land tp Tiburcio Balitaan and another portion to Maria Bacong, Maria Bacong
later sold the said portion to Rosendo Bacong. Petitioners, all heirs of
Leocadio who were affected by the sale demanded reconveyance of the
portions sold by Sixto but the 3 vendees refused. Resultantly, petitioners
filed a suit against them seeking the nullity of the documents and partition
thereof. The vendees contended that they acquired the property under the
valid deed of sale and petitioners cause of action was barred by laches and
prescription. Tiburcio also contended that he is an innocent purchaser for
value.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid sale between Sixto Medrano and
the three purchases considering the fact that it was made without the
consent of the co-owners.
HELD:
Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, a sale by a co-owner of
the whole property as his will affect only his own share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent to the sale). The provision clearly
provides that the sale or other disposition affects only the sellers share, and
the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share in the
partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owner is not null and void; only the rights
of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner

of the property. It is clear therefore that the deed of sale executed by Sixto in
favor of Tiburcio Balitaan is a valid conveyance only insofar as the share of
Sixto in the co-ownership is concerned. Acts which may be considered
adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse in so far as co-owners
are concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipts of
rentals, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and
fences and planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot
serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and
convincing evidence that he exercised such acts of possession which
unequivocally constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other
co-owners.
Thus, in order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to
the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must
concur:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting
to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been known to the
cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Tested against these guidelines, the respondents failed to present
competent evidence that the acts of Sixto adversely and clearly repudiate
the existing co-ownership among the heirs of Leocadio Medrano.
Respondents reliance on the tax declaration in the name of Sixto Medrano is
unworthy of credit since we have held on several occasions that tax
declarations by themselves do not conclusively prove title to land. Further,
respondents failed to show that the Affidavit executed by Sixto to the effect
that he is the sole owner of the subject property was known or made known
to the other co-heirs of Leocadio Medrano.

Robles vs CA
328 SCRA 97 GR no. 123509
March 14, 200
Facts
Leon Robles primitively owned a land in Morong Rizal. When Leon died, his
son Silvino Robles inherited the land. Both of them declared the property

under their name for taxation purposes. Upon the death of Silvino, his widow
Maria dela Cruz and his children inherited the property. They took adverse
possession of it and paid the taxes thereon. The task of cultivating the land
was assigned to one of Silvinos son, Lucio Roles while the payment of the
taxes was entrusted to their half brother, Hilario Robles.
In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the
name of Silvino Robles was canceled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena,
father of Andrea Robles who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles.
Thereafter, Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank,
using the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the tax declaration was
transferred to the name of Antipolo Rural Bank and later on, was transferred
to the name of defendant Hilario Robles and his wife. In 1996, Andrea Robles
secured a loan from the Cadona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as
security. For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedings were
had and defendant Rural Bank emerged as the highest bidder during the
auction sale in October 1968.
The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax
declaration was transferred in the name of defendant Rural Bank. On
September 25, 1987, defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses
Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos who took possession of the property and was
able to secure Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 in their names.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have the appropriate title that is essential for
them to avail themselves of the remedy of quieting of title.
Held:
Yes. The land had previously been occupied by Leon and later by Silvino
Robles, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, as evidenced by the different tax
declarations issued in their names. Also, the petitioners continued occupying
and possessing the land from the death of Silvino in 1942 until they were
allegedly ousted therefrom in 1988.

The title of the petitioners over the land in dispute is superior to the title of
the registered owner which is a total nullity. The long and continued
possession of petitioners under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by
the claim of a registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning
since Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank of Cardona
in his capacity as a mere co-owner thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did
not divest them of title to the property at the time of the institution of the
Complaint for quieting of title.

Galvez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 157954, March 24, 2006
FACTS:
Timotea Galvez died intestate in Apri. 1965 leaving behind her children
Ulpiano and PaxGalvez as heirs. Ulpiano died in July 1959, thereby,
predeceased Timotea and wassuruvived by his son, Porfino. Timotea left a
4,304.5 sq. m. land in Pagdaranan, SanFernando, La Union covered by a tax
declaration. In May 1970, Paz executed an affidavitof adjudication stating
that she is the true and lawful owner of the property. In June 2002,Paz,
without the knowledge and consent of Porfino, sold the property to Carlos
Tam forP10,000 who had it titled and sold the same to Tycoon Properties, Inc.
Porfino filed an action for legal redemption and damages.
ISSUES:
1. Has Porfinos cause of action prescribed?2. Did Paz make a repudiation of
the co-ownership?
HELD:
No. (1) Under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, prescription shall not run in favor or
co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership. For title to prescribe in favor of a co-owner, there must be a clear
showing that he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and the
latter has been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is making
to the property in question. The rule requires a clear repudiation of the coownership duly communicated to the other co-owners. It is only when such
unequivocal notice has been given that the period of prescription will begin
to run against the other co-owners and ultimately divest them of their own
title if they do not seasonably defend it. To sustain a plea of prescription, it
must always clearly appear that one who was originally a joint owner has
repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his co-owners were apprised
or should have been apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive

ownership before the alleged prescriptive period began to run. (2) Possession
of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to
the other co-owner but in fact beneficial to all of them. The execution of the
affidavit of self-adjudication does not constitute such sufficient act of
repudiation as to effectively exclude
Porfino from the property. Thus,
Porfino is entitled to redeem the whole property and to damages
Adille vs CA G.R. No. L-44546 January 29, 1988
FACTS:
The property in dispute was originally owned by Felisa Alzul who got married
twice. Her child in the first marriage was petitioner Rustico Adile and her
children in the second marriage were respondents Emetria Asejo et al.
During her lifetime, Felisa Alzul sodl the property in pacto de retro with a
three-year repurchase period.
Felisa died before she could repurchase the property.
During the redemption period, Rustico Adille repurchased the property by
himself alone at his own expense, and after that, he executed a deed of
extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of
his mother Felisa. Consequently, he was able to secure title in his name
alone.
His half-siblings, herein respondents, filed a case for partition and accounting
claiming that Rustico was only a trustee on an implied trust when he
redeemed the property, and thus, he cannot claim exclusive ownership of the
entire property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner may acquire exclusive ownership over the
property held in common.
Whether or nor Rustico had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor
HELD: No. The right to repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with
respect to his share alone. Although Rustico Adille redeemed the property in
its entirety, shouldering the expenses did not make him the owner of all of it.
Yes. The petitioner, in taking over the property, did so on behalf of his coheirs, in which event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under
Art 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is
guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the respondents being the
beneficiaries, pursuant to Art 1456.
BALOLOY v. HULAR G.R. No. 157767

(Note: This case have several issues but only the issue about co-ownership
was presented in this digest)
FACTS:
Spouses Lino and Victoriana Estopin were the original owners of a parcel of
land located in Barangay Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon ( Lot No. 3347 ) of
the Juban Cadastre. A major portion of the property was agricultural,
while the rest was residential. November 11 and 25, 1961: When Lino
Estopin died intestate, his widow, Victoriana Lagata, executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale on over the agricultural portion of Lot No. 3347, ( 15,906 sqm)
and the residential portion of the property (287 sqm) to Astrologo Hular. In
1961 or thereabouts: Iluminado asked Hulars permission to construct a
house on a portion of Lot No. 3347 near the road, and the latter agreed.
Iluminado Baloloy in 1945 acquired a coconut land (north of the residential
portion of Lot 3347 Lot No. 3353 (9302 sqm) and registered the same.
Iluminado constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353. He and
his family, including his children, forthwith resided in said house.
In 1979,
respondent Hular had his house constructed near the trail (road) on
Lot No. 3347, which, however, occupied a big portion of Lot No. 3353.
Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and their children
continued residing in the property, while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy, one of
Iluminados children, later constructed his house near that of his deceased
father. When Astrologo died, he was survived by his children, Jose,
Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the respondent, among
others, who continued to reside in their house.
Sometime in l991 the
respondent had Lot No. 3353 surveyed and discovered that the residential
area deeded by Lagata to Astrologo Hular had an area of 1,405 square
meters, instead of 287 square meters only.
Respondent Alfredo Hular filed
a complaint for quieting of title of real property against the children and heirs
of Iluminado Baloloy, namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners
Reynaldo and Adelina, all surnamed Baloloy. He prayed among others that
he be declared the absolute owner of the property in question.
ISSUE:
Whether all the indispensable parties
respondent in the trial court (NO)

had been impleaded by the

RULING:
Respondent adduced evidence that when his parents died intestate, they
were survived by their children, the respondent and his siblings Elena, Jose,
Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita.
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides
that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of
the debts of the deceased. Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any
of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers

all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion

publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession
thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners
who are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed
the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property and praying
that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other
co- owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the
same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial
court.

Mariano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101522 May 28, 1993
Facts:
Francisco Gosiengfiao is the registered owner of a residential lot located at
Ugac Sur,Tuguegarao, Cagayan recorded in the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan.The lot in question was mortgaged by the decedent to the Rural
Bank of Tuguegarao.The loanbeing unpaid, the lot in dispute was foreclosed
by the mortgagee bank and in the foreclosuresale to the mortgagee bank as
the highest bidder; third-party defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra
redeemed the property.Plaintiffs Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. filed a complaint
for "recovery of possession and legalredemption with damages" against
defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano. Plaintiffs allegedin their complaint
that as co-heirs and co-owners of the lot in question, they have the right
torecover their respective shares in the same, and property as they did not
sell the same, and theright of redemption with regard to the shares of other
co-owners sold to the defendants.
ISSUE
: Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own
personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property and terminates the
existing state of co-ownership.
Property; co-ownership; right of legal redemption.
A co-owner who redeems thewhole property with her own personal funds
does not become the sole owner of saidproperty; the redemption inures to
the benefit of all the other co-owners. Hence, a childof a decedent whose
mortgaged land was auctioned in the foreclosure sale remains aco-owner of
the property with right of redemption, notwithstanding the fact that the land
was redeemed by a co-heir and co-owner.