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leeal systems, ln thls serue, lt ls also one of the reccnt

nrethod$ of lhe sclence of law. I



ll'OSiti 3m
Sccd ol l


thc Pitivtst Appronr:1

ln deaUng wlth mature legsl syslems, the posltlvlst

A lklw Not N essartly a Moral Concept

B, Uncltlttcrcd by Mctaphysicni Spec linti ns

26. liobbes Allstln COncept
27. Lcral POsitivlsm
lh`,P:re Posluve Law I Osponsc


The label "posttlvtslJttrtlrpntdt'nce" ls prefcrfl [,1e.

I rand

tl)1 : llCation o Posttivc Lw

(31 Emplrlcal Jusuce


The Supreme Pollucal supcrlor

48el:ual Attrtbutco or e


S'ocretc3 snt Crlto to hclP Socrate! ercapc from prlson

forfctt 8 ltfe. Socrateg
after Irc was s.rttenccd



A Consc!ou Fo==IIulation

C. thOrttauve

refurcd and told Crlto that whllc hc consldcr..d thc

centancc pa8ccd upon hltn to bc unJust end unfalr tt


war, na,ertheleac, lawfully rendcred and. therefore, hc

lntendtd to obcy lt.

Conlict th the Hlstorlcal V:eW

a41 0'ED O


Ag stated ln thc predotrs clmpter, tlrc seed of

tcEr! posltlvl8m wa8 planted oy Socratcs. In Plnlo's.
dlitoSle Crlao, Plato recorded that thc followers of

29. lhe Law and thc S lc

school of Jurt6pnrdence, whlch Jolur Austtn 11770'

18591 developcd, usee the metltod of comparatlvc
analyrls,2 But lt ts obvtous tlrat thc analyttcal
technlque ls not cxclustvc wlth thfe Jurlcuc rchool.
Conscqucntly, thc tqrm 'analytlcnl Jtrrlspnrdence' 18
not qulte approprlate,
enrphaslzes the pcrceptlon ol thls partlcular schuol of
Jurlsprudence that the law l8 consloualy cre:rled by the
state. As sucn. the law ls posltlve. that ls to 3ay poslted
by thc authorlty of the stnte..

A. lail.41annc Brand

B Vl nna


Pr,srnus: Pl:Bst'Ffi vtl


Analyucal Jurlsprudence, as somc arc lnclhed to

tabcl thls parucular perrpccuve ofthc naturc ofthe law.

ls one of the oldcr E,tstemr of le6Bl tdatccln tlrc


that thc begtnrungc of lcgal Ectencc among Roman

Jrlrlsprudents are to bc lotrnd ln the t:se of analyote.
But analytlcal Jurlsprudence deals also w,lth mature



on the
Sden" t tte un:"
M3t perepect

analytlcal or p




LE iAI Pllltns('t'tlY



Thcrc aro two tnrportant pourts tlnderlylrlA, the

Do'slrvlEt eDDrodth to t-hc problem of the nnture of thc

reler to the recurrent qlrqEuon of- thc
. Separatlon of law from moral law and frorl{nattlrnl


Q!;lLw xor nressiuurv A Monrrt'
The ldca of the telcologlsts that thc norms of moral

ana naiurat laws nre tnhirent h thc conccPt of the

bV thr
t"i"i" oi in" Iaw lr cmphnucally crttlclzed
Giu"r.t actrool of Jtrrlslinrdence' oflalv from ntoral
rttcular' a<lv'ocatd the separatton
and natural lirrw' ns followq:
lhe law
Soodness or badness of

of lhe
as tried by the. tcet of uulrty or by ony
test3 wl


mankttrd lt has no

hmedlst' concem'r

chould be noted that wlth thc usc of tlte

aareciGt ptraae'no lmmedlate conccm- John Austln
ilJ *rrti Gi tn" hw trl nol nccessertly tntcrtrtedin
or an:Aouifor the norms of morallty' Sl'oted
they may tndlrccUy tnlluencc
rctauoruhlP bctwecn lew etrd morauty
b only accdental.


Thc prlnclpol tluust, thdr. of thc posttlvtrE

kcm thi


out of the laboratory. The legal posltlvlsts are pcr-


wlth thc




tclBl ordcr apart fBo[l tE pcrplcJdu6 ol

thc ptrviart would llkc to kecp thcm

suaded thirt lhe legnl ordcr can exlst Mthout cotrsclotls

rcSard for the norms of morallty, although the latter'E
lnfltrence arc not completely dented.S There are legal
rules that do not mcagure up to the norma of moral law
but they do not. on that account alollc. ceasc to bc legal
rules. Thcy conunue to comnnnd the obedlcncc of thc
memberg of &ctety.

/ Bi Urlcr.t rrrnrD By MET^l'lrslc^L

SptcuL,rno s

ffre, aecontl eharactcrlctlc of thc posltlvlst

approaclr to thc problern of lhe traturc ofthe law ls that

It vlev,s lhe lssuc by uray of the cmplrlcal rphere of
rcsUty - the ts - rether than the tren3cendenl,El
sphere ofthc t<teal- th. ought. Thc legsl postuvlst! do
not hldc tlrel, dlslllustorunent wlth the use of thc
n&turat low tlleor:, i,r thc lcgnl ordertng ('f 3oclcty. Thc
teleotoglcal tdea ofa Eupraposltlvc law as thc standard
of wtldtty of pettlvc la'r tE ('rltlclzed ac 'trunsccndenlal nonainae." The reason for thts crttlquc ls that thc
precepta of the natural taw are rague, for, lndeed, thcE
mcanlng are nct sharcd ln eommon by cverybody.
What the prccepls of the naturel liw mean are mattcrt
ofpcnond undcrstandlngand evcn dEctlmlnauon' To
bc eure, ihcre arc eonlllcttng notlonr about what thc
prccepta of thc natural law preclrcly mean makln8 lt
vcry dfmcult to ecccpt wtrtch onc l! csrcct. and to
accept all would almply bc relf-decepuon,6 fhe pcl'
Uv{Bt lchool of Jurtsprudencc ha3 felt all slong thet lt
l! bctter to frcc the conccpt of lav from mctaphyrlcal


ff.. feOot ffteory.

Rutgcrt Unlvcnlty Law



sJcnktm, I., Tru lrqlcrrm&sr a 7blr,cd oq)nllrrlt at

ld.ulEm and hr0tu&trt 12&unrd o{ lr8d Educ.alqr l8'


8Xctr.n, x.. n tua ltsqy { tr'/laorrd *1,,,gtto,t,l-tsp,u'

&no., 55 HrrYrd l.u RcaLrt iH, 70.


spcculatlons. 'I1lc poslllvlsts tritvc thlrs 0voldd(l (he

sirrdy of tlrr: rta(rire o( tltc litr'; fhartctrrized l)-v (lrl'



Whlle rrx)rc thrtr a ce ntlrry alrd a turlf separitt( Ihc

wrlttngs of Thomas tlobbes (1588-1679) and John

Aulttn (179O- 1859) they are, ne.verthclcs3, rccognlzed
as th Jurlspnldents who devcloped thc conccpt of law
In terms of legal po8iuvBtn.
Thomas ttobbcs wll$ lrrltat(:d by the attacks lcv"
elled at laws whlch tlld not nluet the crltrrlon or tesl of
Justice. Bul, ltccordtng to tlobbcs, "bcfore the tttnrcs of

juat and unjust carr lake place, there urrtsl t:c $cine


powff lo


ance of thetr eovenants


re1 eqtrally to 01" pe.rformltld strch po$'er there ls

none beforc the creatlon o[ thc comlnonwenllh.'
Hobbcs, then, postted the ldea that lt ls lmprobable for
any statutc io be unjust. lle explalned that'law$ are
thi rules of Juat arld trluust' notlllng bcillg'lhtrs,
unjust that ie ttot contrary lo somc law.'E
Thlmas Hobbca, the'Edrerelg,n . . ts not subJect to

the taws for havlng thc power to make and repeal laws'
hc may. when hc pleases. free hhself from thelr
subjcclon.{ Stresslng '.he poht furthcr. Thomas
Hobbce stated that'to the carc olthe loverclr,n bclong!
the rrlaklng of good lanr6.'lo By 'good' laws Hobbcs
mcant not llust' laws for laws cannot bG unJult alnce
tlrcyarc rnatie by tlre tiortrclgn power. Hobbca concluded
thai 'au that lJ done by such power ls warranted and
TLnt rul, H^rr^x'cl^tAEr.87. P,f. colltsr
cDa. tae.
eDu., tso.

lood.. lgt.


llisrnvtsr l'r.t{sPu(


owncd by r:vcryonc ol tlrc F'oplc, an(l ltral wNch (:v(.ry

nltn Mll hirve $o. tto rnan (;ut siry ls ul{usl.'l I

JohnAustln cmbcdded somc of tlu'ideas ol'l l romas

lobbes lrr lrts perceptton o[ the uature of the lnw. Llke
llobbes. AusLh was also pcrplcxcd by Urc crtllctsms

dtrected at leglslatton whlch dld not conlorm to Ure

prGcepts of tlrc natural law. Thus, ln Austln'i vlew, tt
ls abourd foronc to rsy, aswllllanr Blackstonedld lnhts
Comrrcntnrics ortttu I/d,ws ef Englcnd. that posltlve luw
ls vold lf tl is not lrr acr:ortlance wlth the nattrrrl law.
Arrstln strongly ft'lt lh;rt Bl;rckslone errcd becnttse lrt'
fallcd to dlsthgulslt lhr lsstlc of conlbrnuty of p('slttv('
law lo the prccepls oll tre n;rlur l law from thc qucstbn
ol wlldlty of posltlve Ltw. For Auslln, the lsstte of
conforri ty alrd tlre qrrt'sUrxt of validlty ate two cutlrely problenis r.4lh dllfcrenl sohtllolrs. Oti tllls
rnattcr Austln elnptutslzcd th l:

What appcars penllcloirs to otte persr;tt

nray appear tnne0ctel to onother. . . . 'fo provc

lry pertlrrcnt ransone that n(rltlv{} lf,w ls p,,rr"

nlclous lr htghly useful bccatrr such process
may lead to thc abrogatlon of the pct] clous
law. To lnclte thc publlc to reslstan('e Eoundcd
on clear elrd derlnlte prospects of good ls
somctlme3bcncllctal. But to proclalm gcncrally
that all lirws wtuch arc cnntrary to the natur l
law ere vold and not tobe tolerated tc to prcech
anarchy, hostuc and pernictou8 ai much to
the wi8c and bcntgn rulc as to stupld and
galllng tyranny, I 2

sonr, NaPYorh.



.P.Putnem a Son3.New Y rk

2:' b


l,r.r i^t.


Illtlirsr r.try

John Austln's averslorr to tll(! phllosoplty of the

nntural law ls basetl r)n ihr vi('w that tlx: 'ouAltl" ls
reauy non-ejdstent. Tllc actuallT,alllon or re ll/jrtloll of
that whlch ought to bc rc$ults only ln ltc own cancella'
The conctrm, then. o[.lurtspnldence l$ to exalnlne
the qrresllon ofthe nature of Ule law wtthout clrttterhg
tt up wlth axlok)gleal bnggage.lJ

27, LDOI&


For.rohn Austin. tllo dcrl\rdtion, developmt:I)t hnd

thrust of the larv ts one tllng lls mertt or dcmerlt

arrother. I { Au$tln lrr$ists, even thouf,h lmpallenily and

rtgtdly, tllat there ls a cleirr-crrt dlst[lctto]r bctwcen Iaw
alrd nrora!$ an(l h.:twcc.n law and natulill law. as

'fhe confuslnn of Lhem under a common

name atrd thc colrscqucnl telldency to conlound law and moralsand lawand natural law
ls onc prollllc aource ofJargon. darkncs! and
pcrplodty. By a careful arulyels of leadlng
ternrs. law ts detachcd from mornls and natural
law, and the attcntlon of the gtudentu of
Jrlrtsprudcnce ls c{n0ned to thc dlsuncttotr
and dldslon wtrlch relatc to law excluslvcly. 16


lllon, o,('old UnlwElty Prcu. London.

l6Du.. szt.



moral.l6 llunttngton Calrns ls sttnllarly mlldcd, Catnrgr

erglalned that one can ergue that posltlve law must
conforn to morol law and tBtural law but to say that
posltlve law ls null and wtd slmply bccouse lt ts
contrary to moral law and natuml lew t8 foollrh and


ln the perspcctlve of po6lLtyrst Jurl6pru-

dcnce, legal rules can bc round or slllv, good or bad. so

lon* ns lh"lr sllllne.s$ or bndne$3 ls Eeneral ln scope.
that lu io 3ay Juch rulcs allect all persons belongng to
a p8rllcxlar ch$s.

ll lB at lhls polnt that lhequestlonof blndlng forcezl

of ponltlve law arl"ses. ll'nroral conslderalloll3 do not
conscrotrsly prcccdc thc law how. thrtr. can lt mcrlt
obedlencc'/ .Iohn Austln ma(lc lt abund::ntly clear that
poslt vc law does not crdst ln a \racuum strnpiy because
of the ceparattotr of postl lve larv frorn nroral law ond
nattrr al [arv. PoBlllrc law has a crllerlon or tcst of lls
own, namely, the phtlosophy of le{61 poeltNrsm whtctl
r6tr on the triune conccpts ofsoverel*n, commandand
Eanction. TtUr elrnply mearu that any vlolatlon of the
command ls8ucd by the strprema pollucal superlor ls
en lnfracUon thercofand subject to sanctton.lS



Notwlthstandlng thc loglcal structure of the

3Arrrr,,.r,, th"


/ffnn,rence on posltlvc law. Austtn, cotrttnued Hart.

Mnnot even br: sald to l lply that posltlve hlw ts non-


Herbert ,\. L. Hart agcca wlth John Aurth. I lart.

however, potnted out that Ausun dld not say that the
normc of moral law and lhe precrcptrof mlurallaw herc


l-lriltt- Ptlltrrstll'llY


lttxl lltt' explanatton of

t)llilosotllly ol lt'Aitl
-',' l)"sitl\1snr
lilt";;;;l;;, ;,, "''
ll"ll ",l';.i'l,l' :',,,*t
th(' IliUJqlllA clrirlllt lllill ll li whtle' thts tssuc
ln a
;';il;lii;iiiiv. l:vtry rlelntts'
lvlst Jurtsprudents
;:H;;:;;i1 i,,lx' ltnnxrrirl Jxrsll
or arnoral that tr letpl'
of legel pod'
v that tht plrrlosophv


ffiil;;;ii; '"
H"fi *Hi:i;.;lh,m:m*t,:.#.ff"fxllHi
Orrr srrch,UUrn,",r",'t,rrrtt l)twcen
o' w'
,o"rJ#li v."i ,,tr"''ttr and l"(li'ssor
ili'"ii"t ,t,it " rit*i's or thc ' '('rrnrrrt"'J,f#rgffiS

Prolcalrrtelv-' r'roli"ssor lutcornacir'

i;ilR;;r.'6i;"il;l,;i*u1,fi :8.:;#,'#ils'iltr*5J1x

made to ttorl6lt
Tlltlt . cer[^tlr sltldles lvrve been
o[ the lav' rhc
tl-iu.i';;tcepi oftorm
posltlvc lar'


A' L^us

BR t{D


Ern8t Roeutn of ttE thlverslty o[
rr r{qllr
n , tlte Rr**rrr.olvdrc Jut:r!cn''


; J"mif if:r*lffi




b- *- lry:
"*-,t}'l.'',kffi H'#.H"'


I'irsr vtsr l\:rst't:(- I lvl;

fdlowln( thc tntellectrral m(x(:nrcrt avay [r' om lbman

l{arl vo n Sa'lgny
l:w priitctples whl<'h Frcrlcrld poslttve
law ot thc'
startcd, sotight the
felt very'
bests of crduve
strongly that
of poeilve
wlih thc culture of Ulc Pcoge'

A cesc ln polnt ls the contovc6y fh rat .JaeOt

eround therodlllcatlon of ttre cld laua of tlne rqlonlit

oermany whlch wf,r nnafly eo mpl&,4' ln l/

i agti and took elTcct ln lgoo;rs tte Geffiun Clvll(:odc /
Ittor to the publtcatlon of the ftrc drall of t he Crdelnr ,
t8gz. F .d.a"h tt rl von SdytglyanJ Otto uon Clerk(f>./
vtlorously ontended thnt the PpUotlon of hman/
cama c pr ovlnc! fol'
iI* p"nirpUt tn thc dtferort
ln sull b th':
ncariv 40O YeaB whs en
f''lt thtt th':
di,rirn -fitg"lsl Ssvlgry
s hadbccrt
ctvtt tave of tfre dfiferent
rged ly tht:
,*iriv suutc"t.a
nple' Fot'
legal uadltlonr
sr"iqny ana Orerfe'
ttr. Uash of
lc(al rnatcrlrb. Anothcr cast ln o nt l! Urc c ontrorcrs.vEhte of,
rEo"narnf rtt. .odltlcatiol of Oe lavs of I :he pdcmk:
Ue", votf Jamcr
ctrutled Otr ahe ProIplclt odlfi(Iltalr d et e,/nnpn
iourlo wnr*r Oavrd tr. Ftetdanrtrer.d wlth I r parPhlct
iotitfO a st ott n t Wtttc L a l,lg Dltou' 5' Csrter
d tlr:
iJ a iucccssf"t oppotuor tu lhc rdopt edtonbyflcldntlDclaudlan'
ArU Cra"qf$rDst
[n ius oppodtron Carter dtllzd a grod r teal lhe
arErments of SavlgrY and Glcrkr

ir.*rrr.." if


YlEtrr{. Bn

Amo6t a quartcr of a ccnlry rcpar atcs Enrst

[.t,r:^l l'tttl ( r lllt

gf,grrln's'pureltrrldlcill sclclt('(" lrom thc'pure tx)slllvv/

iurr; theorv of H trs Kelsctl ( Lt{H I ' 1953} of the I hllver(
sltv o[Vtcnna. Kclscn slmPFr('llx]v(\l froltr the onccpt
of iawany moral
conctDt of Iegal podlUvlsm'hirs no lmmcdlate cottcem'
for thi normi oi morallty and the prccepts of tralural
law. Kctsen's concept of 'pure posltlve law' slmply
droppcd Austin's qualtfytng fl dJecUve-'lmrhedlate" and
oosited the tdca thnt "tlre concepi of law ltas tro moral
connotatlons wlt:t lsotler.-2 |

The lhrust ^f ll:lns Ketserr's purc posttlve law

theorv ts to un(ler$tand thc nature of the law cnrplrleally. He Pxplal,rs tl:at 'tlle pure posltlve lirw theory
const<tcrs oniy trrlnlan tlot llls, liot n()rm! corning from
othet suErhumntl sollrces' erld that 'lt docs nol try to
consld?; the lflw ar thc olTsprtng of moral law and
natural l8w, at e human chtld of a dlvtnc parent' The
Dure Dorllll,t law thcory lrnslsts upon I char dlstlncllon
Ltr*aan empl cal la\r, and transcefldental norru by
exctudhr th; l tte. from lts 3pcctllc concem' Only by
scoarattnl tre theory of thc law from i phtlosophy of
irriuce eet ttl es from soclolos/ ts lt Polrlble to eslab'Ustr

a cpcclnc actence of law.'22

Ttrue. for Hanr Kelgcn. thcre ls no r'aEolt anymore

3lnterprct the pure poclttE law brt any of the

vartouc tests whlch dlvtde lhc oplnlolt! of manklnd''''


3lt(a at. H., ttr. O*or1lr a ler rrD ltnirt, !' Hlrtrtd
UnlvrfrltY PEr.. crnbn ltc'
2lt*earr, H.. q. cf.. rv.
tilt&L.n, H., on lrE Eorb t{a'lr '17 cdlhmb law Rlvtcw'


l'ostrrrrst Pt.tsltc



'Ihe catrse, ltr other w(,r(ls. o[ the lmprtre g)Btuve law lg

the conftrslon of law wlth axlok,{k'irl ldeos. For Kelscn,
axtologtcal or nlctnphysicirl tdoas are not legally coerclve. Furthcrmorc, Ulcy rernatnag such wen when thpy
are heeded. Thcy do not, therelbre, bffome nonns of
posltlvc law. The law ls strnply not pure when clrtttered
with ardologlcal nornrs. Thus, thc yaltdtty of the norrns
of poaluvc law no longcr depend on thctr correspond.
cnce wlth ethlcal norms24 or precrpts o[trntural law.16

llereh ll?6 the dlsthctlorr bctwccn norrns of posluvc

llrw on the onc hand 6nd thc norms ofmornl nnd natural

Jar.r'orr the

olher. 'ltlls


wlvlt I lans Kclsl.n nleanswllen

hc poslts thc ldea that thc couc"pt of law lurs rro nroral

connototlons whalsocver. Tlre lnw ls ilrdecd septrra(e

from mornl law nnd natrrral lrtw.


Purlocrtlon of Po.ltl"c L.,

crelailrrn8 hlr apprnsch to tlre problent of

punllcattotr of posltlvc law, Harrs Kctscn emphastzed

that tllc pr(ness ls strnply an lnqurry ltrto the turtrlrc
of thc larv as lr B. ln much lhe same manner a9 thc
natural sclences arc atudlcd. Thc rrrrlversc, for
lrrltancc, ls studled ai lt ls and nol how tt ouliht to

Han! lGlEen gtates that the naturc o[ thc lew

murt bc prcrent(d cmplrlcally, that ts to my tt must
stBnd on ltr ourn mcrlt wlthout make-up ofa ologcal
ldeas, and th.t the law mu3t not bc bccuure
ln thc clash of diwEe polltlcel lues tt l! the law thrt
24fiara, H.. lltr Oo.r ! Tltqo o? lav r.rl, 9reh. 5, 3O4.
llrrvrrd Unltt.slav prGr. C.nrbrtdr..
f6ffrrrr. X]. lt ter: A Crmri or horrr., 23t. N.u Yoik
Unlvcnly Pr,c... l{Gt Yort.


[*:,:rl. l't tllrLsonry

ts comprornhed and invarlflbly loscs lts power as a

meangofsocli control. /!s lo lhe llrst. Kclsenexpounds
at somc len$h:
The pure law theory takes lnto corraldcratlon only the norms crenied by acts ofhuman
bcln89, not nomr.g elnanetlll8 froln othcr 9u'

pcrhuman authorltles. Thcrefore, It ?J(clude!

from the profince ofJurlsprudence any dlvlne
law. that lr lew supposed to bc cr"rted by God
or godllke crtlty. Colrlcquently. lt ercludct
also the so-called lmttlral law, law whlch
accordlng to ihe natrtrnl hw doctrlne ls lmmanenl tn ttature. klw - meanlng normc
regulatlnl human tnhavlour - can bc lm'
rulnent ln nature only lfnature lr conslrlered
to bc a lawdver. To consldtr nature at a
lcEslalor lmplles ciattribtlte6 a wlll to nntllre.
Thls l8 rrther an anlmlstlc stlpers[uon or a
theoto$cal lnterpretatlon of nature based on
the bellcf that naturc ls created by Gcd and
hcnce I manlfestatlon of God'3 ablolutc Sood
wlu. thl! lr a metaph)lcal assumpuon ln'
compatlblc wlth alry sclentlllc cognltlon and
hcncc elro wtth a oclcncl of law.

Th. camc obJectlon aPpllci to that

vcralon of thc natural law doclrlne whlch
pretcnd! to llnd thc Just normt of human
cdrduct ln thc nrture of man. parttcularly hl,r
rcalon. R.alon lr the faculty ofcogntuon. By
our rcalon urc arc ablc to know. to undcntend
or comprchend a thlql wttlch l! Slven Ns an
obJcc{ofcog tlon. lndaPcndenUy oft}rb mcntal
opcrauoir, To sct a nonn. to prcecrlbc !omc'
thtng, ts a funcUon of wtll, and human w{l le
a ps,rchlc phenomenon totally dttfcrent from
humen rcalon. Hunran reagon can know




norms after thry haw bcen creatcd by acts of

human wlll, but lt cannol create norms. Only
ln 6od uuy reagon arrd wlll bc constdercd to
colnclde: only of God can people bclteve that
knovlng what ought to bc ls ldenttcal wlth wlll
that lt ought to bc.26

Ald conccrnhg the secord polnt that thc law must

bc frec from thc vtdslttudcr of pollucs ln ordcr to
guar*ntce lts forcc, lnlluence and vaudlty tn the legal
ordertnl of soclety. Han3 Nellen elucldatcs:

It tE the tdeal of Jurtdtcal porltlvbm to

preaerve thc theory of poettlvc law ficm thc
lnfluence of any polttlcel tendency or wtrlch
amountg to the Bamc thhg from sny subjecUve Judgement of vllu;.27

(t) IorDrtlv. Irid Ordcr

wlth thts mcthodolosr. Hans Kcllcn postulater
the neiure of purc poeltlrc lew ar a hlcrarchy of noncontradlctory nornB nndng thelr forcc, ltnrlucncc and
\alldlty on thc prnd. unchalcngcablc norm.D lt a
mcans that the neturc of law 1s not almpty a ryatcm of
coordlnated norrm of equrl lcvcl but a hlaeruhy of
nornur of dllrercnt la'cle.'m If the trw uErc . ly3tcrn of
coordlnetcd norrnr ofcqud tcvd only. e.g. mnnr ofrnoral
laun. prcclptr of the naturrl taw. thcn, le8.l normE

Attct n,n,

fr4rar C atuP.r,r


lfury{,nrr? aaTulrn L.S

27fr,rrr. X., nrO.r,."^,.T[u;orLevenoSrerr. {38. Hrrrard

Unlvq{Y hcr., Crmbrld$.


o. ct.

mttctcn, ff , f.yfra rr
rdlcrx. ,6e.


fuF,t,rilwu {t

ourZ 3a


\ 'sttivtst f't:tr:,tt:r


would not be posltlve or lusslve antl would be hard ptrt

to sene as gutdes to the legal orderlnB of soclcty. lll
other words, there ntust be a pdlSrec of lloll'corrtra(llc
tory norms, a chaln, as lt were, of valld norrns ln the
lcggl order. Thue, lf for example, a rule or a regulatlon
tacks thts legpl ltneage, thcn, lt cannot clalrn a place,
let alone a rralld otte, lll tlle t erarchy ol nonns.


Accordlng to llane Kel8en, the gand and legaUy

rrnchallengeatrle nonn, or shply the grandnorm. 'ts
not lhe product of free lnvenuon nor ls lt presrrpposed

arbtlrarlly.'3o The Srandnorrn ls concclved by the

collecUve wltl, capactty and cotnpetencc of the people

free fronr adologlcal tdcag.3l 11. law. then, ts corrt'

plctcly objcctlve for lts force, ltrlluence and valldity no
lotrger d.:pends ott ntoral luu'attd natural law, Thus, for
Ilans l(al3cn. the!{rendnorm ndull nolr'"orrtrildlctury
norrna ernanatlng therefrom are sll raud' rePirdlc3s of
crlttctsrrc bascd'on nattrral law anrl moral law.32
Thts brlll*p the Purlllcatlon proccss ofposluvc law

qucEuon o[ ,ronnntlwnede, Why ls the law

nornatlvc or JugSlve? To phraic the lssue dlffercnuy'
why l! thc lq$ authorltatlvc and prcacrlPuv. tn character? To narrow dowr the qu6tlon, why should the
membcrc ofa Pouttually organlzed soclcty conform thelr
conduct and actloru to lhe norru of poetttlc l8w? And ,
to apcclfy the tceuc for lllustratlvc purposes, why should
the pcoplc pay thelr taxer on Ume?

to the

Thc answtr must deal wlth the dtlference that

llanr lklgcn stresscd bctwecn thc scntence 'somcthhg
3Q' H., Tlr Purc nrronv or
vcr.lty ol Clllh nL lt!!!' B.rk k .
lltrd., zoz.



Lerr, 2nd Edltlon,

2lo. Unl'



or sonlethlrrg [s tloDe'arrd the gentence 'somethln8

should be, or sonrethtng should be dolie,' Kc[gen stir tes

that thc llrst scntence ls ,rn 'ls-gtatement' while thr

sccond scntencc t9 a 'should-statement."33 The dlsl-(nctton 19 baslc to the solrrtlon of the questlong nren"
ttoncd above.
The ls-statcnrcnt that som.thhg ls or sonrethlng ls
done cxpresses a glmplc reEgon or mouve for acuon.
The should-stetement that somcthlng should hr. or
somethlng should be Cone. or somcthlng ehould not be
done ls e;presslve of a dilferent klnd of reason for
actlcrr, lt !3 a tcnse tndtcatlvc ofa (onsclentloug deslre
to dlschnrge an obllgatlon.

thke the rlarrorver queBtlon why should pr.oplg pxy

tnxcs orr tlnle? As statljd abt ve, thcre are two reasons
for cumplylng wrur the lesal noriir of pa),1n9 taxc6 on
tlme. One ts slmply to act ln order io avotd unple3sant
conscquences. lndl.attng that the taxpaycr w{ll aot pay
at all tf hc or she can Xct away wlth tt, ln thlt altuatlolr,
the motlve of lhe taxpayer ls mercly Lo avold crlmlnal
prosecutlon. 'fhe resporrse of the iaxpayer that she or
hc flay3 laxce on ttnc bccause thc legal norm commalrds
hlm or hcr to do so ls obtdouoly en li-Btatcrncnt. Herc
thc nonnauvcness of lhe legal norm har evaporated,
Thc other rcason for payhg tsxeE orr tlme ls to dlschrrgc
a consclentlous obUgattm. Accordlng to HanB Kelsen.
thc answer to the quegtlon why pcople should pay taxce
on tlrne, to bc ln any way corrcct, must be bascd on a
should-statement, uA. the people should pay taxcs
on ume because thc le6al norm rhould bc obrcrvcd or
obeycd. Here, the should-statement {why should the


Re w.269270



ancc W

l f(;^l' [\tll,r)s('l'llY

oeoDlc Dav taxes on

ttnlel ls not arrswercd by ilu ls

tlle legal rrrle collrmands thellr tt) d(r

another should'sta(cnretrt (becnrlse thc
sol but by "a'ouse
ocoole shluld obey the tegal nornr)'34 There ls a
dtlTirent luettllcatlon for actlon, nantely. a corlsclenuous deslre to dtschargc an obllgatlon wlthotlt atry
lhouSht of Seitlng, away wtth anything'
Thus. tn thc normatlve legal order. theJusslveness
of a legal norm ts not only presewed but lts ftlnctlons

are alio claflfred, nanrely. the prescrlptlve functlon

ordafillng pL'rsoll'r to glve. to do'!r lrot lo do somethlngi
itri aruiurrtattr" lunctlon dell'Satlng to percons the
r.owcr ro lsaue rule8 8nd rcgulatlons l'nplementlnli
lorne ortor le{al rronn: atld thc pcrn sstve fitnctlon
ollo*tnl ,"."oir" to dve. to do or not tc do solnethlng
ft Jtt'"n tocrl nJrm crdatne (prcscriptile [unctton)
" icuon or gspdrrct lJ prohlblted, e'9,
".".a certam
treaoass to dwetltn( or property, doubleleopardy' ren
norm should provldc sanctlons for tts vlola'
iti iu*f
"When a legnl rrorm delegets (authorltath'e
iu*tronl a ccflal;matter, c,9,' lssuanc?s by- an ad'
n dEttauve body of rulec and regulatlrrns' then thc
ieeainorm rfxr"fl provldc the force ofsoctety to back lt
,il4"d *ncn a ttfrl norm allows (pcrm lsslve-fu nct lonl
..ce.t"fi, lctnd of acUon or eonduct' e'9" Eclf'del'ense'
thrr, Ut" t.gat notm rtroutd provlde s(Gorptlon from any

Bv postulotlng the concept of ttrc hlc'rarchy o[

dtfferena bwtt of normg' Hans IGIsan cln bc r'Ll
havc iuccceded tn harmo zlnB the and
trlr theory of purc poslttve law. Now, ttre fact by whlch

H . On the Botk rvor"l '17

c'Ifomh law





a legal norm ts created may be by any o[ tlte Irx'rllts

a!lowed by the grandnorm. Wltcn tlte dlltretrt bratx'hrs
of govenrment act, thelr actlons are measutes o[ cocr'
clon.s6 lhcre are sancllons or lncenuvcs or both
annexed to the legal norm. Hans Kelsen states that lt
ls by thts very fact and only by thls fact thflt tlrc hgal
norm tr dtsungutshed from soclal norms.36 If the law
ls not coBldcred as a hlerarchy of non"contradlctory
norm!. lhen lhe law cannot bc percelved as purc and
Dosltlve, that tB to s3y normatlve orjusslve. In thls case.

ihe lawcan no longer be dlffcrcnttaterl from other soclal

ohenomena and the law wottld no longer be pttrr ittrd
oosltlve.3T grcause oI lhe jtlsslve rraltlre of I he law I hc
members of soelety are obllged to conduct lhemselves
ln lhe rnanner pr6crlbed. or iru(horlzed, or permllted
lrv the le{al norm. Thus, no firrther dellberatlon on thc

rnernoers of socl'ty ls ncccssrry. 'Ihey

or obcy the iegal notm ot othcrwlse
surer the consequenccs' Thls utrder$rds the pl losophy of legal posluvlem and ls unquesuonably the bcst
Loierrse yet for the posltlvlst thcory of the conccntual
hdepenience of law irom moral and natural laws.36


"t tir.
Ehoutd obs"rve

Obvlously, thl! concept of a hlerarchy of noncontradlctory norrns crcatc the condltlons ofp?acl nnd
ordcr. Bchavtor wtuch adverscly allcctc thcse condt'
ttoru ar e dealt wlth by the force ofa polltlcally organlzcd
socfety. lf lndlvlduab wcre ablc to do the very thlngs
that ere not prcacrtbcd. authorlzed. or prrnltted by the



d ttIOS9h

:Rcason.:O Journal of Lw and SoClety.:










legal ordcr, then the physlcirl condillorls of peace and

order would be ctncelled.'fltc litw worrld no longer tx:
Jusslve. Llcetrsc or lawlessrl(ss would supervenc.

axlologlcnl underplnnlnAs to (valuate the sourrrlness uf

Thu$, the pure posluvc law of llans Kelsen ls

dllTerent from Hobbes' and Austln's theory of thc
naturc of the law as the wlll of the soverelgn or
supreine polltlcal supcrlor. For Kelsen. ttobbes'and
Austln's vlew t3 not aJurlstlc concept but a psycholo$cal one. For Hobbes and Austh, aompltancc wlth thc
'Mll of the state depends on Ole feellng of ..we and
feJrr, But for Kelsen, psychologleal rompulslon ls not
a speclllc ehment of pure posltlve law.30 There arc
oth.r norms of conduct whlch carry the same klnd of
compulslon but they are not tcgal norms. Kelsell
pogtts the vtew that obedlcnre to legal norrns depends
on thc Dttre lact of coerclolr irnd llot oll arrv subjt( livc
tnlluenctr on human behavlor.40

soclcty, Justtce ls renl and posstble whetr tt ts approprt.

atc to the evll whlch soclety llas a rlgtrt to avold ln ihe
Ilrst place.a2 Thus, wtren the legal norm or thc aancUon
16 approprlate or suttable to the problem tnvolved, then
Justlce ls real and pos8lble tn a way s,lUsfactory to all

fgi Enplrlcrl Juttlcc

Hans Kelselt reallzed the nced firr some crlterlorr
lu&tc the soundncss of legel nonus ln the legal
ordcrtnS of soclety. Kelsen fclt that the Roman law
concePt ofJusttcc, for lnstance. expressed by Ulplan
as the constant and perpetual wlEh to gtve every
pcrson hlg due wlll not do for thl3 purpose. The reasolr
rs Olat lt bcSe the que8uon what really ts that whlch a
person ts entttled to. Obviously. wen thls quesuon tlag
to bc dcll,nc{ by a norm of posltlve law'

to e

(he lcgal nonn (leflrltng what really ls due to evt,ry

person. Kclsen was aftcr Justtce that ls .real and
po$tble."4l Arrd, ln relatton to the legal ordertng of

resultlng ln soctal iontentment.43

ln srlrn, pure po3ttlvf. lnw the()ry l:r llins Krlsrn's

celcbrated contr,butlon to Jurlsptudencc. Evcn so, lt
hao not c'ocaped crluct6m. Vtlhelm Lundstedt. one of
thc leadtng ltghts of gr,sychologtcal legal reallsm, ,cflls
tlmt lt ls 'o I'urely ctrltlrrated tdeologr cf the law.'44


TflD,IAw Ar{D txE srATE

h the legalpostttvlsnr ofThomas Hobbcs and John

Austin. the Btatets perclevedas thccreutorand enforcer
olthr law wlrh the powtr to lnlllct evll or phln ln casc s
dcslrcs are dlsregarded.'15 Thls does not rrrean that the
state can do no wrong ln ihc cxpl egslorr rif lts wlll. lt
only means lhat no dght can be clalmed agatrurt lhc
state whlch lt has not prevtously tn Han/
Kelscn's pule posltlve Iaw the persontllcatton of thi:,
slatc !E avolded by constderlng the state and the law aj

Hant Kclrn shply has no place ln hls ptrllosophy

of purc posltlv? law tor any concept of Justlce wlth



: :Jt17Sp"



IBP vlttB" u 31n lc

Ed:uon.oxrOrd unt".:ty h . ndon




}I)^r, [itlrrsr]lllY

one ft)r the rrztson tllal wllhln one natlon only one arld
not two comprlltng orders can be valld at thc same


rlttt SIrPBrur PoLmceL


Fronr tlte cottcept of the law advocated by thc

porluvtstJurlsprudcnce, the state as thc collecttve lcg8l
ascoctatton undcr thc nrle of the malorlt/? ts the su'
premc polltlcal supcrlor. As stated above' Ulc doctrlne
6f thc non'suabtltiy of the state stems from tlrts c/ncept.48

Dul th('cxcrclee of the wUlof the srtpreme polltlcill

gupcrlor by the 4o'.'Ernmt]rt ls not itbsolrtte. Wrctr tlte
exerclse o[ porvcr ,lclegated to thc govertlmcllt ls :l
deltberale artrl pcrslstent (itsrcAnr(l o[ lhc rr''lll of the
guprcrrle poltttcal stllxltor, then sttclr advctse govcrnlncntal ctnllenge catt bc blunterl, curbcci. or crren
derucd by thc response (o the majortty of the mcmllcrs
of roclety,


the uprooung type
tire f,iXts

revolut`onary r Pon
response t" not eastly nrwoked, lt can cven be sUncd
dependtng on the people themselves., It artse$ ol yln
a itttratton of speclal dtfilculty for thc people whlch
too'close elther.

arouscs them to acttdly ln order to check an(l contaln

48t<"t*n. U., Tlc

, 1

-- '.lnc.,

hw Thd!

.umtt R"

o/ taur.

5l law Ouutrrly

`O COmmumy h

o{,nsrul lnrurqnce Co., Lld, v, facPublb of ll]a

FhlrpfltPr, 32 *RA227.

lrsrnv,sr l',E(



Itrt erccsscs ilr tllc cxcr( lsc l)y the Aoverntnenl ol lllc
lxrwers (l('lcg:rle(l to ll. ltul il)(. use of this tylx' ol
r(.sponsc is dcpelrdcnt rrlxIr tlrc trrt(|nslly oI tllc
governnrcntal clnllcnge lts.l[.
When the challenge ls mirrlm l tllcrc ls no
rcsponsc Jusl fls there catr be no response anyrr)ore
when thc govemmental challenge has reachcd tts
maxlmum tntenslty. ln the former $ltrratton, lhe
govcmrncnlirl chnllenge ls ncgllglble ns to nrake any
tlnFression on the ;rcoplc cnou(h Lo oxcllc or arorrg(
tlrclr collcctlve sensc of anllpathy. Tllcre ts. lnd.(d.
re$traint ln externallzlng the rractlon of lhe tx'ople. ln
the latter sltuallon. (hc cll llenge has :rsrsurned srrch
trclnendolls proportlons th t thecapacltyof tlre people
to rrxporrd has bcrn stlllu.l. In thls evctrt, only wltlr
oulslde asslstonce or IntcF/er,tlon miry thc .vtll rrc!
power to r6lst be regrlncd. But when tire govcrn.
mrrrtal chnllenge ls at lls {rpllmunl hltcnslly the pt'ople
mcy act elfcctlvely, unless they allow thc qovern.
mcntal challcngc to pru'eed unlnrpe(l('(l t(r lLs rnaxlmum tnlenslty.
Thc challenge of the govemrnent t8 deltbcratcly
amblgu0ue, that 18 to sey cqutvocal and euphemBuc.
There B o hard and fast nrlt that can be lald down wlth
wtrlch to mcaaure the tntenslty ol Ute challenge of the
govcrnme,nt, However, there are some gutdtng factoE.
Thc evaluatlon of the govtmmental challenge lo a
rrutter that addresges ltoelf to thc conaclalcc of the
people. The revolutlonary response depends, lh.n, on
thc combhatlon of thc condttlons produchg or promlslng to produce the bcst average recult of success for
lhe people.
The response to the challenge of the goverrrment
cannot be applled by a rntnortty. That would plalnly be



l)t tIr\q(tl'rtY

rclx'llion. r\s progrosctl by,lolttr l,rrckc, tlle appllcatlon

nf tllc revolullollitry rt:slx)llsc t :ttt lrt' Inatlt only by the
hrlrlrc(l nnjorily. lf il is t(l l).' prolnpt, rt'solrttc itttd
cffectlve. Tlrottrits Jcfferson t'c]tord John lrcke ln
cnlphaslzlng lllc rcality oI lhe rcvolrlllonary response
th t "tlrc pcopl(: cannot lre all, and always, well
'ltc trce ol lilx)rty mtrst be refreshed
lnlbnned .
from tlrne to tlrne wlth. thc tllurd of the patrtots and
tyrnnts. It ts ttB rrltytlfu tnalrttre.'4{l
ln brlrulln( almttl tlr dcslrcd cotrduct from thc
rrcnrbers ofa pollllcall), orgrrllzc'.l soclcty. tile law has
ttrrce essentlal al.trlbutes, trnnrcly, cotrsclous creallon,

gerrra!lly, attd trrrtllgtltativc r:nforcetnent.


4.fu ,rlo,,r,,"


exer'r'lsc of autlmrtly' the nrlr

(Austtn s lerml or nonn (Kel$tr's ternl) ls scparate from
nrorals. ln plar: of morat or.stlbjectlve presstrre to
acccpt tire pxerclse ofauthorlty. leAal Positlvl$nl s'Jbstl'
trrted the objectlye legal nrle ^r norn for the sante
purpose, A speclnc rule or nonn o[ hunan conduct
muEt beartlculated beforc therc csn bc hw ofany klnd.
It wotrld hardly hc a rule or norrn lf tt wcre otherwlse.

tlle clement of consclous formulatlon of atlthorlty

dtstlngulshcs u rule or norm of posltll,t liaw from a rulc
or norm of poaltlrt morellty. Thls clement sets apart a
legal obltgatlon from a moral oblgStle tBlbecaE of .
a rule or norm ofpo6ltlw morallty, therc l9 noconsclous
artlculauon to lay lt down as Such. The obllgBtlons
prodded tn Arttctc 1423of (he clvtl code of thc Phlltp4otrtter toWtllom stcPhtn SrDllh datcd Nov.mbcr 13, 1787.

I'osn Ntrir,!x:tt|r


plnes rrrr gotxl ercrrnples of ntoral trl)llg;rtlolrs,'t lrry fall

short of tllr prlnclplc of rxrckl sunl .srnrudfl. '!1r('rc is
tro calusc ol a('tlori to crfor(c tltt'ir p(rlbnn:rrx c. llou,evcr, llrey are vohrntarlly performed thcy carrnot
be undorle ernymorc cvcn on the clalm that ther.r ls tro
legal cortslderatlon for thctr pcrformatlce.


Tlte nrlr or norrn must not l)c hr the pilrLlcrtlar

form for thal would lre (lelennln;rtlve only ol spccillc
arls, g.'rsons, or tlrl[As. Aftlltlollally. it ls rcally
(llfilcrrlt to lay dor,!'!I p.trti(:tllflr rrtlcs or uor:ns lirt- t';tch
and evury partlcrt[tr or spr:t lflt casc. Tltrr ntlt'or trorrtr
must lx: gerreral. that ls li)sayt( nrttst prcscrllx' c(!t I rses
of corrdrrr:t for all ntenrbers o[ soctcty cr for all in ;r
parllculnr cl.rss.

4l A^'u"nn'tur: lllrtrtlr< t:vt;wr
a.s a ild or tromt tracketl l)y lhe iluthorlty of the

state. the lirw tlrvolves a duty to obty. 'ftlls ts Ille rrtlclill

chalacter lstlc ofleg:ll rllles or legal ltorrns. lb that etrd,
s?lnctlons and/or lncen{lr'es are provl(lcd, gh'tng those

ln authortty the coerclve contpct(.Ilcc to enforcc the

rules or norms wlthh ihc llrnlts 3ct lry law. Obcdlence
to the nrles or nornr ls requlred lrccause tt ls the duty
to obey that survlves the cornrnand tlnpltclt lt1 the rulc
ornorrn. ln thc cvmt that thecournrarld lg dlsre&trdcd.
thelr, as stated abovc. the sanctlons ara applled or the
tncentlvea wlthheld. A sanctlon l8 arry errentual evll
anncxcd to lhe rule or norm and may take the fomr of
somc puulshment, speclllc or substltuted rcdress, or
enforced prevcntlon.s Tt s ls the clement that com50Al llN,J
Pd ,H07.


l.t:lr,rt. ['t ttrr rsot'ttv

l)letos thc Jusslvc r)r lrnln'r'irlivl' ch:tnt( l(.r of lhc law,

'11|lrri. llro litw ls rx,t ruter0ly lrrll lirtOrv or a(l\4sory,



vlew thilt th(. law I$ co[sck)usly scl or formu.

latr'd tly lhe srrpmrno pollll(.ltl supcrlor ;lrrrl en-fotced hy
si[r({lolls or in(t:ntlvrs o[ lx)th Iras lrd thc posltlv!$t
sclrool ofJrrrlspnrclcrrce to kxrk askance ,lt the hlsiorlcal B'rspe(llvr o[ lll(l law. f'(]r thc B)sltlvist school.
cu$torns and ctrritomary rDotk:s of doclslons arc
ittypl(']ll cxr|[rpk's of posltlv(f lirw. ['i)r lhc positlvl$ls.
tlrc law lsslrnplv I lrr, r'rxrs(ior,rs Irr.itliorr r,, llle srrlrft.rr|l'
tx)litl('al sup(:rlor.

l.'r(rtll lt]c pcrspcctlv(' ol lpgrl posltlvlsm. thi:

llislorlral vi(lw lltnt thc li$' orrranales frorn lhe lll'e
;ln(l splrll of tll1. pcople tr' .r[rblguuus. {:spcckrlly w}rorr
llle (.lemcnt ol tirDc ls lake]l Irrto corrsldcrhtion. A logal
rrrle, lirr r:xtrrtplc, cannoi slnrply exlst brfurc tlre happer rlnA or occurirrrc(| 0f [lrc lhr,is lt purports [o cover or
ll{rvenl. Fol lh(' posltlvlsti. a legal nrlr: t9 cleated
('orrslously anc, llrr: rx'curencc of llre act or evellt ln the


llowever, tlte conjltct on thls partlcular l:isuc ls

mor tmaglnary than rcal. Thls rlay be cltrnijralcd by

slmply tractng o legal rule back to tts slmple

hellllmlngs. Naturally thc Eap betwcen the glmple
and the complcx lB lndced Sr?ai For lnstatrce, thc
modern rulc tlml obllgatlons cannot be asglgned
unllatcrally exlsted ln the past as a sltnple concept tllat
a promlsc ls strlcuy a prsonal rclatton between the
contracttng p6rtle8. Another rxample l! the modcm
nrle concemlng hgal llabtllty. It wtll not, of coursc, be
found tn onc broad leap back to th stmple character.
lstlcs of the pcoplc. But lt ts on good authortty that


)sr vtst Il.]r:,t,!r !lvl.l


th(: ,lrsl or $lrnple colu.cpl o[ llitbillty was lxrse<l olt

lllc "duty lp hrry o0 lltr vrng(.itn(\r of tlxr a(grhrv(:(l
; 4rr tlre okl Arrglo.saron lirlkwrry, this struple
nrle on ltabllity was re0ccled ln the aphoflsm -buy
spcar frotn slde or l)c.rr [.'52 'llrts means buy off thl
vcngeance of thc aggrleved person or sulTcr tlrc consc.
quences. lhere ls asimllar Plllpho aphorlsm: Hilrtin ong
s@dang ,ig hi,rdl na masugalaL Thu8. tn the bcglnnlng, a pcrson was ltarble, ln more scnses th:rn one, for
lnjurlescnuscd to arrolher. Accordlng to Roscoc lround,
tlre neyt stcp ln (he devclopment o[ the corrcopt o[ l('fial
Itablllty lirr itrjrrrles t.) ptrsons r)r ltllng.s \viis t(, sct (hc
ilabllrty ln trrnls oflnJury causcd, no longcr hr trrrnn of
the vengcancc of thc nggrle.ved pcrson. 1'htrs, thc
llabtllty took the fornl oIrcparfillon li)r Llle lnJ urteB (lone
irs wcll as frrr lrlurtcs duc to nnn-pcrfonnar)ce ol'tht:
obllgntk'rr errtcred lntc. Tlllg *as furlhrr rr:llnfd by
drawlll( a dlstlnctlon betw$.f i I lidblll ty ('r co{rlri&.1 r: and,..,'
llabtltty 0.r quas{ d.,liclo.
The polnt of thesf tllustrations ls to $how llut the
dwelopment of a legal rule or coitcrpt la t'tstble even ln
retrospect. The ob,rlorrs way, lhen. to deal wtth thc
conllrct ls to trace the rule or concept back to lts slrnplc
bcglru ng. l( ls crrun posstble that ln thc process thc
rulc or concept may tr found to hal'c becn borrowed or
iranrplanted from another legal system,

/Thts proccea has bcen crtuclzed as a very torrntdeblc task. But thts ls nelther a logtcal nor pcrsuaslve
reason for not dolng so. Aa a rnatter of fact. tt baa


6!P.j !,} .

!vn cr"w

. H"n

,B Pll:

/pl t 1


l-rr:,rt l't rttlt,r,tt



already ben donc.s And tlre allegcd dllllculty uuly rrot

be real after all slnce the lllslorhal vlew of thc reLlt lvlty
of the Lrw to a pitrucul;u' place and people shows tllat
thcrc ts scarely it modenl nlle or colrcept that dld not
havc lts beglrmtngs ln lhe past. Thus. the hlstorlcal
ccncept of the or dt]u;.aAan t8 defenstble not
only when gencral prrnclples of law arc conccmed but
also when detauc are tnvolved.





BackgOund o


L gal


Reactlon to idealist and Pos:tlvtst Perspccttves

A. C uci3m OrAbstnct Valu

B.Crtuclsm cr Legal P08'uVISm


Recogrution o
he intorests or ttctcty


Core or Funcuonal t:rlsprudcnce


E8 :lual Factor m the l ega1 0rdcttg or Society


Fttnction i Concept o


Pr entatio:1 Conllcilng cr ol criappinl





klatlve Wetttt orcOmpeth8 1nterests

Sochi lnteret and NeuonaI POlic:c

A Fxm L I


B.ncs oFinterestB
C.MCan3 0rSCCunng Prtvate lnterest8
D.Mearl oF Securlng Pubuc hter t3

tegones or sOclal:nterests
A Sodal hterest m the cenem: cuJty
B.Soctal interest in the Maintenance and
Protectlon o sOclallnsutuu

(1,Domeouc lnstltuuon
t21 Rdi"u Instttution

AArlulSne/crtnhal t au: ot/t^ o! @nor,.ebllrulltulbu;

ftu Aqt' dai &rrfirlrrpl Inatrtsls; guddbn d lrt tatt, o!
Arrx,diwe. EwuJrrrr o? [ar: Saraca RraDqra,o ofr flr OiloN
,vro Dnd.onrsrt oc Lr. L l ann n66. UtUc BrDvn rnd Cortpony'


O Econon c lnsutuuon