Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2d 718
* In June 1985, more than 45,000 baptists who had been elected as
When the evening session convened, Chairman Stanley ruled that Messenger
Slatton's motion was out of order because SBC bylaw sixteen states that
members to the Committee on Boards "shall be nominated to the Convention
by the Committee on Committees." The 1985 Convention parliamentarian
explained that this bylaw does not permit any motion from the floor of the
convention to amend the list of nominations received from the Committee on
Committees because the word "shall" indicates that the Committee on
Committees is exclusively responsible for such nominations. Chairman Stanley
then refused to recognize several messengers attempting to raise points of order,
and called for a vote on the Committee on Committees' nominations. The
nominations were approved by a majority of messengers.
petition and affirmed the election of the Committee on Boards because "
[w]hatever mistakes might have occurred in Dallas with reference to
interpretation of the bylaws is history. To seek to re-do or un-do an action of the
Southern Baptist Convention will accomplish no positive good." The Executive
Committee adopted the recommendations of the Executive Committee Bylaws
Workgroup indicating, inter alia: (1) that messengers control the SBC within
the SBC's procedures; (2) that the messengers at the 1985 Convention elected
the nominees of the Committee on Committees; (3) that the Committee on
Committee's nominees for the Committee on Boards would, in the opinion of
the Executive Committee, have been elected even if the nominees offered from
the floor had been voted upon; (4) that messengers to the 1986 Convention will
have an opportunity to erase any influence of the Committee on Boards elected
at the 1985 Convention by rejecting the committee's nominations from the
floor of the 1986 Convention; and (5) that the polity of the SBC gives the
Executive Committee the power to render moot any procedural defects in the
election of the Committee on Boards at the 1985 Convention by affirming the
election.5
6
The Crowder appellants and appellant Cooper then brought this diversity action
against appellees,6 the Southern Baptist Convention and the Executive
Committee of the Southern Baptist Convention. Appellants sought a declaration
as to the proper construction of the bylaws in question;7 a declaration that
Chairman Stanley's rulings were invalid;8 and a declaration that the members of
the Committee on Boards selected at the 1985 Convention were without
authority to serve in that capacity.9 In addition, appellants sought to enjoin
appellees from violating the declaratory judgments and from permitting the
members of the Committee on Boards elected at the 1985 Convention from
serving in that capacity.
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the federal court lacked
jurisdiction due to insufficiency of the amount in controversy, 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1332(a), and that the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the controversy would
violate the First Amendment.10 The district court converted appellees' motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because appellees relied upon
matters outside of the pleadings, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); it denied appellees'
motion for a stay of proceedings because the amount in controversy and first
amendment issues were intertwined with the merits. Appellants then moved for
summary judgment and responded to appellees' motion for summary judgment.
The district court granted summary judgment for appellees on first amendment
grounds and denied all other pending motions as moot. The court reasoned that
the preliminary consideration in determining whether judicial resolution of the
10
The wholesome [government] "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak ...
stems from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or
groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a
concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of
the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of
all orthodoxies. This the Establishment Clause prohibits. And a further reason
for neutrality is found in the Free Exercise Clause, which recognizes ... the right
of every person to freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of
any compulsion from the state. This the Free Exercise Clause guarantees.
11
Nevertheless, the Court has also rejected an absolute rule that civil courts are
powerless to resolve any church property dispute. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82
U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 21 L.Ed. 69 (1872); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601,
21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d
775 (1979). Thus, Supreme Court decisions have attempted to strike an
appropriate balance between the establishment and free exercise concerns
implicated when a court is asked to resolve an ecclesiastical dispute, and the
interests of the state and the aggrieved party in resolution of the controversy by
The Court has recognized two primary first amendment interests that favor
judicial noninvolvement in an ecclesiastical dispute. The first of these first
amendment concerns is the extent to which judicial resolution of the particular
controversy would involve deciding issues of religious doctrine or beliefs. In
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872), for example, the
Court found that the first amendment barred judicial resolution of a controversy
over which of two factions within the church should be recognized as the "true"
Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville. The Court reasoned that,
although courts could resolve certain types of property disputes and set aside
any punishment for crimes imposed by ecclesiastical tribunals:
15
16
general church's jurisdiction and authority over them because they believed that
the general church had violated its own constitution and had departed from its
doctrine in force at the time the local churches became affiliated with the
general church. Georgia law at the time implied a trust in favor of the general
church as long as the general church's actions did not "amount to a fundamental
or substantial abandonment of the original tenets and doctrines of the [general
church], so that the new tenets and doctrines are utterly variant from the
purposes for which the [general church] was founded." Hull Church, 393 U.S.
at 443-44, 89 S.Ct. at 603. The Georgia courts therefore enjoined the general
church from asserting a right to the local church property because a jury found
that the implied trust had terminated due to the general church's departure from
its doctrine.
17
18 First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in
[T]he
resolving church property disputes. It is obvious, however, that not every civil court
decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values
protected by the First Amendment. Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of
religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property. And
there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which
can be applied without "establishing churches to which property is awarded. But
First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is
made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine
and practice.... the Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church
property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.
19
20
of property disputes within the church itself in order to avoid either: reviewing
and revising church decisions on matters of religious doctrine and practice; or
interfering indirectly with the religious governance of those who have formed
the association and submitted themselves to its authority. See id. at 618, 99
S.Ct. at 3033 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court
reasoned that resolving church property disputes by a rule of compulsory
deference to religious authority would create a greater risk of excessive
government entanglement in religious affairs than would application of the
"neutral principles of law" method:
21
Under
[the dissent's] approach ... civil courts would always be required to examine
the polity and administration of a church to determine which unit of [church]
government has ultimate control over church property. In some cases, this task
would not prove to be difficult. But in others, the locus of control would be
ambiguous.... In such cases, the suggested rule would appear to require "a searching
and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity."
22
23
The Jones majority thus recognized and reaffirmed the importance of the
second major first amendment interest favoring judicial noninvolvement in a
religious dispute: that where religious organizations establish rules for their
internal discipline and governance, and tribunals for adjudicating disputes over
these matters, "the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions
as binding upon them." Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 725, 96 S.Ct. at 2387-88. The
disagreement between the justices in Jones reflects differing assessments of the
extent to which resolution of the property dispute at issue in that case by
adherence to this principle might involve a greater intrusion into religious
affairs than would resolution by the "neutral principles of law" method.
24
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 73
S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952), and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), made it
clear that the principle of deference to decisions of church authorities applies to
disputes concerning matters of internal church governance. In Kedroff, the
Court held that a state may not dictate which of two factions within the Russian
Orthodox Church has the power to appoint the ruling hierarchy for the Russian
Orthodox churches in America. The Court found that state legislation regulating
matters of "church administration, the operation of the churches, [and] the
appointment of clergy, by requiring conformity to church statutes adopted at a
general [church] convention," was contrary to the first amendment because, in
the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness,15 matters of church governance
are for the church to decide free from state interference.16 Id. 107-08, 116, 73
S.Ct. at 150, 154.
26
In Milivojevich, the Court further limited the "marginal civil court review"
endorsed in Gonzalez 17 by overruling Gonzalez to the extent that it allowed
civil courts to decide whether the decision of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal
of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations and was
therefore not "arbitrary." Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382. The
Court found that such "arbitrariness" review is inconsistent with the "general
rule" that "religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court
inquiry," and that "civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest
judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of
discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law."18
Id. Thus, the Court concluded that civil courts may not decide, consistent with
the first amendment, whether the church complied with the procedural rules
contained in the church constitution and penal code in defrocking one of its
bishops. Similarly, the Court held that civil courts may not use the guise of the
"neutral principles" approach to delve into issues concerning whether the
general church acted beyond its authority under the church constitution in
declaring a reorganization of the diocese. Id. at 721-24, 96 S.Ct. at 2386-87.
27
Balanced against these two first amendment considerations favoring civil court
noninvolvement are the state interests in resolving disputes concerning rights to
property and the individual interests in adjudicating before a civil court forum.
Even where church property is involved, the state has a strong interest in rapid
resolution of disputes concerning ownership rights to property. See, e.g., Jones
v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3025, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) ("The
State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of
property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church
property can be determined conclusively"); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445, 89 S.Ct.
601, 604, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969) ("It is of course true that the State has a
legitimate interest in resolving property disputes, and that a civil court is a
proper forum for that resolution."); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 120, 73 S.Ct. 143, 156-57, 97 L.Ed.
120 (1952) ("There are occasions when civil courts must draw lines between
the responsibilities of church and state for the disposition and use of
property."). The Jones Court's refusal to adopt a rule of compulsory deference
to authoritative decisions of church bodies was grounded at least in part upon
the fact: (1) that the state ultimately must determine who has the rights to the
property; and (2) that doing so by deference to church tribunals would be
difficult in many cases because ambiguity in the locus of church authority may
itself necessitate an impermissible inquiry into church polity. See also
Maryland and Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 370, 90 S.Ct. 499, 501, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (1970)
("[U]se of the Watson approach is consonant with the prohibitions of the First
Amendment only if the appropriate church governing body can be determined
without ... extensive inquiry into religious polity.") (Brennan, J., concurring). In
Milivojevich, the Court emphasized that no change in formal title to property
was involved in the defrocking and church reorganization at issue in that case.
426 U.S. at 718-19 & n. 11, 96 S.Ct. at 2385. The Milivojevich Court's
rejection of the state court's attempt to apply "neutral principles of law" to
decide whether the reorganization at issue complied with the church
constitution suggests that the state's interest in providing a civil court forum for
ecclesiastical disputes is substantially diminished where the controversy does
not concern formal title to property. See id.; Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 131, 21 L.Ed. 69 (1872) ("It may be conceded that we have no power to
revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, or of excision from
membership. We have only to do with rights of property.").
28
Applying this balance of interests to the facts of this case, we conclude that the
district court correctly found that civil court resolution of this controversy
would violate the first amendment. This controversy is one step removed from
a major doctrinal conflict between two factions within the Southern Baptist
Convention. Although a civil court might be able to avoid questions of religious
beliefs or doctrines in ruling on the issue of whether the SBC Committee on
Boards elected at the 1985 Convention was entitled to serve in that capacity,
"questions of church discipline and the composition of the church hierarchy are
at the core of ecclesiastical concern." Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 716, 96 S.Ct. at
2384.
30
We need not rely, however, upon the risk that a court would have to resolve
questions of religious doctrine and belief in order to decide this case because
other interests implicated by the controversy strongly favor deferring to the
decisions of the messengers at the 1985 Convention and the 1985 SBC
Executive Committee. First, the SBC provides its own rules for determining
how the membership of the Committee on Boards is to be selected. In this case,
a majority of messengers at the 1985 Convention voted in favor of the
nominees for the Committee on Boards submitted by the Committee on
Committees.19 Appellants appealed to the Executive Committee of the SBC to
contest Chairman Stanley's rulings. The Executive Committee rejected the
arguments of appellants' counsel and affirmed the election of the 1985
Committee on Boards. The first amendment strongly favors deference to such a
decision by the highest church judicatory concerning a matter of church
governance.20 See Milivojevich, supra. Second, the controversy bears only a
tangential relationship to property rights. Although appellants contend that the
SBC bylaws create enforceable contract rights under Georgia law, the denial of
these alleged rights is unrelated to any question of ownership of property that
would give rise to a state interest in assuring prompt resolution of the
controversy by a civil court forum. The state has little interest in determining
which individuals within the SBC choose the nominees for positions in which
they administer assets that are undisputably owned by the SBC. Finally,
In balancing these interests, we hold that the first amendment bars civil court
resolution of this controversy concerning a matter of ecclesiastical
government.21 We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing
this action.
32
AFFIRMED.
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:
33
SBC bylaw sixteen stated that members to the Committee on Boards "shall be
nominated to the Convention by the Committee on Committees."
Under SBC bylaw 20(5)(a), the Executive Committee is empowered to "act for
the Convention ad interim in all matters not otherwise provided for."
The SBC has convened twice during the pendency of this lawsuit
10
Appellees also sought to limit all further proceedings in the case until the
motion to dismiss was resolved
11
The Court's Hull Church decision suggests that the establishment clause based
prohibition against excessive government entanglement with religion is
implicated where the method of dispute resolution involves an inquiry into
religious beliefs or doctrines. It is now well settled that even where the
government's action is not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting
religion, the government action still violates the establishment clause if the end
result of the action is an excessive government entanglement with religion.
Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25
L.Ed.2d 697 (1970); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29
L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). The continued vitality of this "third prong" of the Lemon
test has been reaffirmed by the Court in its most recent term. See Edwards v.
Aquillard, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm., --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190
(1987). Of course, as discussed supra, excessive government entanglement in
this context also may affect associational conduct and thereby chill the free
exercise of religious beliefs
12
13
14
15
16
the Court's holding to judicial proceedings was resolved when the St. Nicholas
Cathedral controversy came before the Court a second time after the state
courts attempted to resolve the controversy on the basis of the common law.
See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 80 S.Ct. 1037, 4
L.Ed.2d 1140 (1960) ("[i]t is not of moment that the State has here acted solely
through its judicial branch, for whether legislative or judicial, it is still the
application of state power which we are asked to scrutinize.")
17
See also Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, 73 S.Ct. at 154 ("Freedom to select the
clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now
be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of
religion.") (citing Gonzalez)
18
The Court left open the possibility that civil courts might engage in " 'marginal
civil court review' under the narrow rubrics of 'fraud' or 'collusion' when church
tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes." Id. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382
19
SBC bylaw 35(1) provided that "[a]ll propositions, decisions, and choices shall
be by a majority vote of the registered messengers present and voting."
20
21
2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) (section 702 of Civil Rights Act of 1964
exempting religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition against
discrimination in employment on the basis of religion may be applied to secular
nonprofit activities of religious corporation without violating establishment
clause)