April 2010 Monthly Update Alden Global Distressed Opportunities Fund The Alden Global Distressed Opportunities Fund

Class A was up 8.1% net and Class B was up 9.1% net for the month of April. (Class A and Class B performance reflect performance for outside investors who invested since inception). 2010 YTD Class A is up 25.2% net and Class B is up 28.9% net through April month end. The strategy was created in October of 2008 and is up 390.5% net Class A and 419.6% net Class B from inception through April 30th. YTD through month end April, the Lyxor Distressed Securities Index is up 1.7% and the S&P Index is up 6.4%. In April, the Fund ended the month with significant investments (over 2% of long market value) in 15 companies or positions (defined as an investment in more than one company which expresses a similar thesis). Approximately 75% of the portfolio was concentrated in our top 10 positions, which is consistent with our concentration target. April was a very good month for the portfolio. Our top 10 winners were all larger by dollar value than our largest losing position, and our largest losing position which was a hedge for the portfolio was not significant in magnitude. Among the top 10 winning positions none was dominant in terms of its contribution to the overall return of the portfolio. Distressed Market Commentary We often talk about industry themes in the portfolio because individual companies in the same industry usually face similar economic drivers. When these economic drivers slow it is common that many companies in an industry experience distress at the same time. Two of our current industry themes are financials and media. Among other reasons, financials are experiencing distress as a result of the credit crisis and media companies are experiencing distress as a result of the significant slowdown in advertising in 2009. In both cases, we think that the analyst community is underestimating each industry’s emergence from distress and this out of consensus view provides support for our investment thesis. In most cases, our positions in these industries have a direct catalyst event that we feel will drive price performance in our respective positions. In others, the catalyst has passed, and we hold a position that we feel has not yet fully benefitted from the catalyst event (such as long equity). In the few that are non-event driven, valuations drive the investment when securities’ prices are tainted by membership in a distressed industry. Catalyst or not, our investments are underpinned by fundamental analysis where we seek to find mispricing of true value. At the core of most opportunities that arise from corporate distress is a belief that securities of companies facing distress are at times undervalued because of market inefficiencies, technical anomalies and human biases which can create significant investing opportunities. Many of these opportunities result from the fact that the actions a company takes when it is experiencing corporate distress are out of the ordinary and therefore difficult to understand by market participants who do not have an expertise in the effect of these types of corporate events on securities prices. In fact, many of these actions are even difficult to understand by -1-

professional securities analysts. We believe that analysts (and investors generally) often have an inclination to anchor their expectations to recent experience and as a result they underestimate or overestimate corporate performance. In a market where the general sentiment has been good and performance has been positive, analysts may be reluctant to issue a sell rating on a company which has had a long stretch of good performance despite the fact that it is facing a significant headwind or exposed to clear risks. Positive performance is the most common condition of public markets, and so this bias is one that is most familiar to many market participants. However, when sentiment changes so do the biases. We are in a market where certain industries are weighed down by negative sentiment as a result of the recent recession and credit crisis. The opposite bias occurs in markets such as we see currently when the analyst community refuses to, or is hesitant to, upgrade earnings expectations for companies and industries which have in the recent past been poor performers or in distress. For value buyers with strong knowledge of the fundamental drivers of company performance, this bias can create significant buying opportunities and it is one that we look for in industries that are on our distressed radar. We believe an example of this is occurring with the financials. Looking at a list of 29 major financial institutions from banks to brokers to specialty finance companies, all but two beat expectations in Q1. As a result of the credit crisis, most of these companies have been more transparent than in the past, and we expect that the analysts covering them have had to be more diligent. Despite this, the earnings of 27 of 29 companies were underestimated. The likelihood of this happening randomly is small. Our belief is that because analysts covering financials have had such negative experiences since the credit crisis, they are reluctant to turn positive again and have been wrong on average with respect to financials. This is not to say that every company in the financial industry is a good investment or that the industry’s problems have entirely passed, but if it is possible through fundamental analysis to take a position which is right and significantly different from consensus, this can lead to strong returns. Alden Developments On April 1 we launched the Alden Global Value Recovery Fund (AGVRF) with approximately $480mm in total capital. We were pleased that 100% of the capital was taken by current or related investors and we were significantly oversubscribed. As a result the fund is closed to new capital (with two small exceptions for additions June 1). As of the writing of this letter, in mid May, the (AGVRF) was able to take advantage of significant market dislocations in early May and the portfolio is well over halfway invested (and up for the month) in investments that fit the fund’s objectives. In hindsight it was good to have an available pool of cash during such a significant buying opportunity and we are happy that our investors have had the benefit of this strong start.

Portfolio Notes Losing position – We had no significant losing positions for the month.


Winning position – Smurfit Stone Container Corp Smurfit Stone Container Corp was our largest winning position in April. Smurfit-Stone is the second largest paperboard and packaging company in the US. The company filed for bankruptcy protection in January 2009, and we started buying its debt in mid 2009 based on our belief that it was a good company faced with the combined problems of a cyclical downturn and the credit crisis. At the end of April, the company’s plan to emerge from bankruptcy was awaiting decision by the reviewing judge. We expect an emergence by mid summer at the latest. In April, we continued to think that the company was worth more than the face value of the debt and owned the senior unsecured bonds that ended the month trading at over 101. They began the month trading around 90 cents on the dollar. The debt has appreciated significantly because many aspects of the restructuring in bankruptcy have gone correctly. We continue to believe our debt will recover significantly over par when the value of the post – reorganization equity which we expect to receive in the restructuring realizes its appropriate valuation. Several positive factors have driven appreciation in 2010 including a price increase in per ton sales in January, volume uptick in export markets, and the raising of an exit facility from bankruptcy from JP Morgan. Continued economic expansion would also be a clear positive for the company and our investment. Winning position – Citigroup Our second largest winner in April was Citigroup. In Citigroup our primary position is in common shares and our combined position was up close to 10% for the month. We wrote about Citi in last month’s letter, so we apologize for any redundancy in this description. Citi has been a company in which we have had many investments since the inception of the portfolio in October 2008. At times we have owned debt, preferred stock and equity or a combination of the three. We also successfully participated in a preferred for common exchange in the summer of 2009. Citi played a key part in the credit crisis and received a significant government bailout. By virtue of the government’s equity stake, it fits our definition of distressed. Our (high level) view on Citi remains simple; we believe that it trades at a discount to book. This is very unusual from a historical perspective and in our opinion it represents a significant undervaluation of the shares. We recognize that it is hard, if not impossible, to put a true value on Citi’s book and frankly we do not think that even Citi could do so. However, even using a generous band of assumptions we believe that Citi’s common has significant upside potential from here.

Near Term Outlook We have no change in our near term outlook. We think it remains an excellent environment for our strategy and remain very optimistic for the remainder of 2010 and beyond. That said, the situation in Greece and the rest of Europe has injected uncertainty into the markets not seen since early 2009. This is not unexpected during a distressed cycle and is a byproduct of the combination of significant leverage and slow economic growth. This is unlikely to be the last aftershock of the credit crisis earthquake. In times like these we look to protect the portfolio where we can and opportunistically buy securities that we like. We have not created a


portfolio that will never lose money and as of the writing of this letter we are down in May. Poor monthly performance does not change our outlook as dislocations create opportunity.

Important Notes and Disclosures
All data is based on market value unless otherwise indicated. This document and the information herein are confidential and may not be reproduced or further disseminated without Alden's written permission. This document is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell or solicitation of an offer to buy any securities or investment services. The information presented herein is presented in summary form and is therefore subject to numerous qualifications and further explanation. More complete information regarding the investment products and services described herein, including Alden's fees thereon, is contained in the offering documents for such products and services. Terms used herein not otherwise defined have the meaning ascribed to them in such product's Confidential Private Placement Memorandum. The information contained in this document is the most recent information available to Alden, however, all of the information herein is subject to change without notice. Certain information included in this document is based on information obtained from sources considered to be reliable, however, no representation may be made with respect to the accuracy or completeness of such data. Investors in the Fund may lose some or all of their investment. The time periods shown are limited and do not reflect performance in different economic and market cycles. The net returns cited for October 2008 are the returns for the Distressed Opportunities Composite managed by Smith Management LLC, not the Fund. The Distressed Opportunities Composite is a compilation of all of the investments in the securities of businesses identified by Alden as "distressed", and the returns thereon, in the various accounts managed by Smith Management LLC from October 1, 2008 through October 31, 2008. Performance results of the composite were calculated net of any brokerage commissions and exclude any cash balances that may have been held in the accounts. The composite returns are calculated by taking the gross investment returns of the composite for the month and subtracting there from a hypothetical management fee of approximately 2% annually and a hypothetical performance fee of 20% of the net income generated by such investments. The hypothetical management fee is calculated using the following formula: (.02/12) x (Beginning month NAV + (Net purchases and sales/2)). The hypothetical performance fee is calculated as 20% per annum of the net income generated by the investments. These hypothetical calculations are used because no actual management fee or performance fees were charged during the period shown. In the Fund, the actual management fee and performance fee are calculated differently and may adversely impact any investor's returns. In the Fund, the management fee is calculated as 1/12 of 2.00% of the NAV calculated as of the first calendar day of each month prior to any accrual for or payment of any management fee or allocation of any profit allocation or withdrawal effected on such date. The returns cited from November 2008 forward are the actual returns of the Fund. The Dow Jones Hedge Fund Distressed Securities Index is published by Dow Jones Hedge Fund Indexes, Inc. For important information on this index, please see www.djhedgefundindexes.com. The S&P 500 Index is a market capitalization weighted index focusing on the large capitalization sector of the United States equity markets. The Lyxor Distressed Securities Index (LYXRDIST) aims at measuring the performance of the Distressed Securities sector of the hedge fund industry. Holdings are subject to change in the future. Portfolio holdings of stocks or bonds should not be relied on in making investment decisions and should not be construed as providing any assurance or guarantee as to actual returns.


Any person subscribing for an investment must be able to bear the risks involved and must meet the suitability requirements set forth in the Fund's Confidential Private Placement Memorandum. Some or all alternative investment programs may not be suitable for certain investors. No assurance can be given that the investment objectives set forth herein will be achieved. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Among the risks Alden wishes to call to the particular attention of prospective investors are the following: •No guarantee or representation may be made that the Fund will meet its investment objectives, or avoid losses. •The Fund is dependent on the services of certain key personnel, and, were certain or all of them to become unavailable; it may have a material and adverse effect on the Fund. •An investment in the Fund is illiquid. There is no secondary market for the Fund's limited partnership interests, and none is expected to develop. •Alden will receive performance-based compensation. Such compensation could act as an incentive to invest in riskier investments. •The Fund's portfolio will be concentrated in distressed securities, which may be affected by a variety of economic, geographic, political and other factors. •The Fund is subject to conflicts of interest. •Certain securities and instruments in which the Fund may invest can be highly volatile.