DOCUMENT

UFD017

Giuseppe Longo

On the Borderline:
Science and Reductionism

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In this review-essay, Giuseppe Longo outlines some

important reasons for reading Sergio Chibbaro, Lamberto
Rondoni, and Angelo Vulpianis Reductionism, Emergence
and Levels of Reality: The Importance of Being Borderline,
and reflects on the damage done by reductionist
models of, and in, science
This book arrives at a most suitable time. A critique
of reductionism originating from within physics may
be the most effective way to halt and repair the
damage caused by the misuse of physicalist reductionism in biology and in other sciences. I strongly
recommend this book to all scientifically educated
persons and, in particular, to biologists, and physicists studying biological phenomena. The authors,
three working physicists, address the complex theoretical dynamics that connect theories and knowledge levels within physics, a science where, I would
dare to say, reduction never applies.
In short, the book shows the theoretical richness of
physics. Theories are proposed, insights are given
from different perspectives, and a mere change of
level or scale suffices to require a novel theoretical
invention. Then, conceptual and technical bridges
are proposed, different forms of unification are suggested or fully constructed. The book shows that
unified knowledge is not a metaphysical a priori;
the history of the search for unifying theories was
marked by hard-won successes. As a representative
example, consider the molecularist claim in biology:
we, the organisms, are just made out of molecules,
arent we? Indeed, we are, but this is a triviality
(the limit of truth is not falsity, but insignificance,
observed Ren Thom), since an organism is a rather
strange bunch of molecules. The scientific problem

then is: which is an adequate theory for dealing with

these peculiar bunches of molecules, the organisms,
i.e. with the living state of matter? Then, of course,
the problem of relating it to good theories of molecules may be soundly posed.
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The first, apparently obvious observation that I

would like to address, is the role played by mathematics in the construction of physical theories.
What is not obvious is the remark that what matters in mathematics is its asymptotic nature, as M.
Berry stresses in his Foreword. Mathematics is a
limit construction, since its beginnings with Euclids
geometry: its fundamental structure is given by definition II, the line is a length with no thickness. There
is no such a line in the world, it is a limit concept that
allowed Euclid to construct a fully general theory of
measurement of surfaces: this line is the border of
plane figures, a very difficult notion when generalized, as we know from contemporary mathematics;
it is a practice of an actual limit, the invention of a
0 thickness structure.
Similarly, Galileo opened the way to the mathematization of physics by proposing the principle of inertia, which is also a non-existing asymptotic limit of all
possible movements, and by doing so he was able to
analyze what affects them: gravitation and frictions.
Moreover, and this is crucial for the books perspective, as stated by Berry: [U]nderstanding relations
between levels must involve the study of limits, that
is, mathematical asymptotics [] wave optics reduces to geometrical optics when the wave-length
is negligibly small, quantum physics reduces to
classical physics when Plancks constant can be neglected, etc. The books analysis largely focuses on
more complex limit constructions that are responsible for fundamental phenomena inhabiting the
borderlands between theoriesphenomena at the
forefront of physics research, such as critical phenomena in statistical mechanics, fluid turbulence
and the universal statistics of the energy levels of
highly excited quantum systems.

The search for reduction of all

phenomena to the smallest particles,
for example, the myth of high
energy physics, is a consequence of
our monotheistic religions. However,
the search for unity should be
accomplished without practicing
theology like reductionists do
The first chapter of the book is a very pleasant imitation of Galileos dialogue: Salvati, Sagredo, and
Simplicio discuss the guidelines of the book through
a contemporary version of their opposing views. It
is very hard to convince Simplicio of the complexity
of the levels of description; his objections are always
smart ones. For example, Sagredo and Salviati dig
into a famous case:

As the authors say in the preface, quoting a contemporary philosopher, Severino, theology is the
fundamental form of reductionism, as it reduces
the essence of the world to God. In this sense, the
search for reduction of all phenomena to the smallest particles, for example, the myth of high energy
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physics, is a consequence of our monotheistic religions. Indeed, it seems that Democritus used to say
that the more perspectives we have on one phenomenon, the better. Thus, he was pleased by the
lively discussions on the Agora with the followers of
Parmenides and Heraclitus who stressed continuity
in nature against his atomistic perspective. Indeed,
they were polytheist, and each god had his/her own
opinion on every matter. I do advocate, instead, the
interest of our monotheistic search for unity, rather than for reduction. For example, the unification
of thermodynamics and particles trajectories, or of
quantum and relativistic physics, forced physicists,
and still forces them, to search for new unifying theories, a major scientific conquest or challenge. The
third theory aimed at unifying different existing proposals usually is a fantastic asymptotic construction.
The unifying theory adds knowledge and tools for
knowledge which often lead us far away from naive intuitions of realty. From this perspective I would
like to suggest that we should continue working towards unity of knowledge, which represents one of
the few scientific inheritances of our monotheistic
background. However, the search for unity should
be accomplished without practicing theology like
reductionists do. As a long term goal, once we manage to (asymptotically?) unify molecular dynamics
with the behaviour of living cells, we will at long last
know more about ontogenesis.

What matters in mathematics is its

asymptotic nature. Mathematics is a
limit construction

[C]omplex hydrodynamic features can be reproduced by means of cellular automata []

this artificial system does not fulfill some of the
fundamental properties of the microscopic dynamics. For example, only microscopic discrete
states are allowed: the molecules in this system move on a lattice and their velocities assume only a finite number of values. Moreover,
rather than strictly deterministic rules, such as
those of classical dynamics, the system follows
probabilistic rules.

that unifies existing approaches by an asymptotic

construction, as both the hypothesis of molecular
chaos and the thermodynamic integral are mathematical limits. The presentation is just beautiful: it is
careful, clear and complete. For example, one fully
understands how irreversibility pops out, at the limit,
from individually reversible trajectories. A particular
emphasis is also given to the analysis of hydrodynamics and meteorology and the related unification
problems. Hydrodynamics is not fully unified to an
atomistic perspective, as it is done by SM in relation
to thermodynamics. Typically, the individual behavior
of particles, as described by the one-body distribution function, depends on the global or macroscopic
hydrodynamic field, which is thus assumed, not derived, from (possibly asymptotic) particle dynamics.
Thus, there is no junction of two different theories,
but the macroscopic case is used as a bootstrap for
constructing the microscopic/macroscopic bridge.
Meteorology is then discussed and the merits of
Richardsons work, a pioneer of the mathematical
approach to this discipline (1922), are briefly mentioned. He was the first to insist on moving from
historical accounts, where predictions were based
on data from the past, to numerical solutions of hydrodynamic equations in weather forecasts. This
global approach to atmospheric dynamics was not
grounded on any sort of reduction, but on a hierarchy of models that were not mere approximations
of the original set of equations, obtained from a systematic strategy based on fundamental principles.
On the contrary, they were obtained from a subtle
mixture of hypotheses, theory and observations.
This method shows that knowledge of the ultimate
laws governing the behaviour of the atmosphere, in
its tiniest detail, is uninteresting.

There is no junction of two different

theories, but the macroscopic case is
used as a bootstrap for constructing
the microscopic/macroscopic bridge
How does this book provide a scientific answer to
the follies resulting from the reductionistic stance
dominant in many disciplines? It does so by giving
a competent account of the existing forms of unification in physics and an introduction to the ongoing tentative ones, understood through the analysis of the connections between different levels of
description or theories. Boltzmann, of course, is a
major reference for this work. Following early ideas by Maxwell, he paved the way for a major and
revolutionary unification, the understanding of
thermodynamics in atomistic terms via Statistical
Mechanics (SM). This is soundly considered a paradigmatic case by the authors: SM is a new theory

The understanding of irreversibility in thermodynamics and hydrodynamics, and thus in meteorology,

requires the peculiar and non-obvious asymptotic
constructions presented in the book. As pointed
out by the authors, this irreversibility is independent
from the presence of deterministic chaos, in spite of
Prigogines attempt to found both themodynamics
and hydrodynamics irreversibility on the latter.
The book also presents a synthetic account of
the ongoing work relating Quantum Mechanics
and Chemistry. Because Chemistry is traditionally
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Of course, this parody of reductionism precisely shows how reductionism may be misleading. In
this case, classical randomness, as determinism in
presence of non-linear dynamics and measurement
by intervals in continua, is mimicked by probabilistic
rules in discrete state machines. Unfortunately, following Wolfram, some think that this hilarious imitation coincides with the true world, which would then
be a dynamics of finite state automata. Simplicio,
who acknowledges this physically meaningless
mathematical virtuosity, is more advanced than
some of our contemporary computationalists, for
whom the Universe is a big Turing Machine, which
is computationally equivalent to a cellular automata,
also adding to both some probability values. I will go
back to these forms of extreme reductionism and
their role in biology.

anti-scientific than we have been in the twentieth

century, when we produced about 80,000 artificial
molecules through practical knowledge with little
theory (physical, organismal, or ecosystemic), and
dropped them into the environment, with dramatic
consequences, including for endocrine disruption
and cancer (see USA Toxic Substances Control Act
[TSCA], Sept. 2008).
I would now like to discuss an issue that appears
in a few places in the book: the relation between
complexity, compressibility, and unpredictability.
The situation is slightly more complex than is indicated by the book, and it challenges a shallow idea
that the authors quote, namely that natural laws are
compression of empirical data (yet, at the end, they
draw a very sound conclusion against this idea). The
1966 paper by Martin-Lf (ML) quoted in the book
gives an asymptotic notion of randomness, which
is, indeed, the only one to be soundly defined in
classical discrete manifolds. Martin-Lf also proved
that any infinite sequence (of 0s and 1s) contains infinitely many compressible initial sequences. Chaitin
reconstructed a unity between finite incompressibility and asymptotic randomness, conjectured by
Kolmogorov, by defining a restricted class of Turing
Machines that generate all semidecidable sets (but
not all computable functions) and such that ML infinite random sequences are exactly those whose
initial segments are Chaitin incompressible, modulo
a constant. However, Chaitins definition requires ad
hoc constructions in order to be transferred to formalisms other than Turings, whenever this is possible. This is in contrast the beautiful invariance of ML
(asymptotic!) randomness or of computability that
are both invariant with regard to any transformation
of (sufficiently expressive) formalism. One can then
derive two major consequences. Firstly, if any long
enough finite sequence is compressible, including
randomly generated ones (!), then where would the
law be? Now, any long enough finite sequence is
compressible, as shown by Ramsey Theory, and is
made possible by the use of more than the restricted Chaitin-Turing Machines to compress data. For
example, by Van der Warden Theorem, any infinite
sequence, including ML random ones, contains arbitrarily long monochromatic (just 0s or just 1s, say)
arithmetic progressionseasy to compress at any
finite length. Secondly, it confirms the authors intuition: time incompressibility is not the same as space
incompressibility. Consider a long series of quantum

I would contest the view of science as

compression of reality by stating instead that data, produced by an active
friction with reality, are compressed
theories
As for Chemistry, the solution problems for
Schrdingers equation for more than one electron
are closely examined. The authors also refer to the
insight of Pauling, who, in the 30s, produced a clever mix of chemical intuition and quantum mechanics,
hardly reducible to mere quantum mechanical calculations. Thus, physics is facing yet another beautiful challenge: a consistent quantum understanding
of chemical phenomena, possibly in a novel unified frame. This, perhaps, could help us being less
1. <http://www.cmls.polytechnique.fr/perso/paul/>,

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presented in classical frames, the authors first clarify that classical mechanics may be obtained as
a semi-classical limit from quantum dynamics. In
short, when Plancks h goes to 0 and time goes to
infinity (in my opinion, this infinity is not sufficiently
stressed in the book), classical and quantum trajectories merge (see Paul Thierrys recent work on
this).1 Of course, this is not a form of unification, but
just says that the mathematics of the two theories asymptotically mergewhich is beautiful, but
very different from the asymptotic construction by
Boltzmann, for example, which re-introduces physical smoothness by assuming that the number of
molecules in a unitary volume goes to infinity. Thus, I
slightly disagree with the authors remark that classical mechanics can be seen as a sort of emergent
property of quantum mechanics where the interactions with the environment are modelled using some
random variable. Firstly, classical analysis, since
Poincar, describes the origin of randomness in a
very different way from quantum randomness, and
thus only the mathematics would be unified (there
would be no reciprocal conceptual understanding of
this fundamental aspect, just a mathematical virtosity). Secondly, as the authors soundly acknowledge,
Newtonian mechanics is a kind of a priori for quantum theory [] It is in principle impossible [] to formulate the basic concepts of quantum mechanics
without using classical mechanics. Thus, we are far
from any sort of emergence, whatever this word
may mean.

are at the heart of modern computing. Of course,

this dimensionless approach makes no sense in
most physical theories, where phenomena heavily
depend on the dimensions of the phase space. Yet
those who believe that the Universe is a big cellular
automaton or a Turing Machine use these sorts of
examples as proof that we have constructed the final machine, the digital computer, as it may encode
the instructions written by God to run the Universe,
with some scattered probability values. In this frame,
the brain and the DNA would then be emergent
computations (for a synthesis of the computationalist views, see Wolframs and Chaitins papers in
a volume in honor of Turing, edited by B. Cooper
in 2012).

W. Gilbert, a leading molecular biologist, predicted in 1992 that we were

going to be able to encode the human
DNA in a CD-ROM and then say: Here
is a human being
As for biology, following this philosophy of nature,
F. Collins, director of the National Human Genome
Institute, publicly asserted in 2000: We have grasped
the traces of our own instruction manual, previously known to God alonewhich brings us back to
theology. How does a body fall? It follows the instructions, like a cellular automaton; no probability is
required in this case. How does an embryo develop?
It follows the instructions in the DNA; however, in
this case, some stochasticity is acknowledged. W.
Gilbert, a leading molecular biologist, predicted in
1992 that we were going to be able to encode the
human DNA in a CD-ROM and then say: Here is a
human being, this is me (sic!It should be easy to
compress such a CD-ROM, in particular in view of
the 95% of junk DNA that, for too long, too many
molecular biologists claimed we are). The ongoing,
heavily-financed project of personalized medicine
is based on these ideas: you go to a hospital, they
decode your DNA and pass it to different departments. In the near future, there will be no need for
doctors either: computers will analyze the CD-ROM
and fix it, by reprogramming it. Note that the word
reprogramming has been consistently used in the
search for genetic therapies for cancer, ever since
Nixons War on Cancer, 19711976, the latter being
the year in which those therapies were expected

In order to conclude, lets go back to a paradigmatic

case of apparent reduction. As mentioned above,
hydrodynamic equations are not very sensitive to the
details of microscopic dynamics. Thus, by mathematical virtuosity, one may derive an hydrodynamic
behaviour from probabilistic rules over discrete state
machines, such as cellular automata or, equivalently,
(two or three dimensional) Turing Machines. Note
now that, in discrete manifolds, the dynamics do not
depend on the dimensions: they can be all encoded
in one dimension at a low cost. Thus we were able
to construct the Universal Turing Machine and, subsequently, the operating systems and compilers that
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measurements or of coin flips. There is no way to

produce a program that would generate the results
before time elapses (it is time-incompressible). Yet
once the long enough series of 0s and 1s is written, a good data mining algorithm and a compressor
would allow one to produce a program shorter than
the sequence, yet capable of generating it; this is
due to Ramsey type regularities, such as Van der
Waerdens. As the authors claim throughout the
book with regard to borderline theories, space and
time randomness, also, are unified only at the infinite limit. Finite incompressibility does not yield an
invariant property of randomness as unpredictability with respect to all theories, or even with respect
to all programs within a fully expressive theory of
computation. Fortunately, the deep understanding
of physics by the authors leads them to a sound
conclusion: What is not compressible is the time
sequence generated by chaotic systems, and this
is due to the non-compressibility of a generic initial
condition. This remark, on one hand, soundly refers to time and recalls the insightful analysis of the
role of initial and border conditions made in chapter 5, where the notion of (space) incompressibility,
though, would have benefited from a more detailed
analysis. On the other, it allows the authors to depart from the view of science as compression of reality. I would further contest this view by stating instead that data, produced by an active friction with
reality, are compressed theories. The collection of
empirical data requires a perspective, the choice of
observables, metrics and measurement instruments,
in short a strong theoretical bias. Making it explicit,
changing it, comparing with other scales or forms of
knowledge, possibly in search for unity, is the job of
science, so beautifully described in the book.

to arrive. It is now 2016 and we have none, even

though, since then, most of the financial support in
cancer research has gone towards finding one (see
Weinbergs severe autocritique, in Cell 157, March
27, 2014 and an enlightening 2010 interview by C.
Venter, the human genome decoder [2001]: We
have learned nothing from the genome).2

In biology, physicalist reductionism is

based on naive, common sense reference to physics, rather than actual
physical theorizing

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In conclusion, this broad and original book may

greatly help to oppose science to the reductionist
follies that hinder its practice, particularly in crucial
domains so immediately relevant to our life. In biology, physicalist reductionism is based on naive, common sense reference to physics, rather than actual
physical theorizing. Similarly, the references to a
new observable, information, and to programming,
are based on common sense use of these words,
while ignoring their scientific meaning and its actual
implications (see my own and co-workers writings
on this, on my web page).3 Relating these two constructive critiques of reductionism may help in finding new paths, in biology in particular.

2. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-craig-venter-we-have-learned-nothing-from-thegenome-a-709174.html>.
3. <http://www.di.ens.fr/users/longo/>.