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article ii section 1.

philippines as a democratic and republican state


in re letter of associate justice puno, 210 scra 588
facts:
the ascendancy to presidency of the aquino administration was considered to be a violation of the
previous constitutional process. though achieved through violation, the newly-instituted government
met little resistance evidenced through aquinos designation of cabinet members. thus, the obedience
of the people to the previous constitution ceased to exist.
issue:
whether or not the aquino administration is a legitimate government.
held:
the supreme court held that the revolutionary government is valid and legitimate. it is classified as a de
jure as it is established by authority of the legitimate sovereign through practice of a peaceful
revolution of the people. the aquinos government is taken from a direct exercise of the power of the
filipino people. thus, the aquino administration is legitimate and that it is a revolutionary government
classified as de jure.

article ii section 1. philippines as a democratic and republican state


co kim cham v. valdez tan keh, 75 phil 113 (1945)
facts:
prior to the liberation of manila, co kim cham has a pending civil case. after the liberation and during
the occupation of the americans, the judge of the lower court ignored of the case and refused its
continuation. the ground asserted by the respondent judge is that a proclamation of gen. douglas
macarthur pertaining to the nullification of all judicial judgment on courts of the japanese-established
republic of the philippines makes such complaint void. in contention, the respondent judge stated that
governments established during the japanese occupation cannot be classified as de facto governments.
issue:
whether or not the governments established during the japanese occupation are de facto governments.
held:
the supreme court held that the two governments established during the japanese occupation, namely
the philippine executive commission and the republic of the philippines, are both de facto government
of the second kind. both governments were authorized by the japanese military and were government
imposed by laws of war.
article ii section 2. generally accepted principles of international law
jbl reyes v. bagatsing, gr no. 65366, october 25, 1983
facts:
petitioner jbl reyes, in behalf of the anti-bases coalition, applied for a permit to a peaceful rally in a
public park near the us embassy in the office of the city of manila. such permit was denied by the city
of manila. stated by the mayor of the city, such assembly would be violative of ordinance 7295, which
prohibits the staging of rallies within 500 feet of foreign embassies. issue: whether or not such city
ordinance violates the clause on freedom of expression by the constitution.
issue:
whether or not such city ordinance violates the clause on freedom of expression by the constitution.
held:
the supreme court held that such ordinance is of relevant relation to the vienna convention on
diplomatic relations and does not violate any constitutional provisions. the philippines is a signatory
of the said convention and the adoption of which is consistent with the second section of article 2 in
which the philippines adopt generally accepted principle of international law as rule of the land. thus,
the city ordinance does not violate the freedom of expression but adheres to generally accepted
principles of international law.
article ii section 2. generally accepted principles of international law

mijares v. ranada, gr 139325, april 12, 2005


facts:
invoking the alien tort act, petitioners mijares, et al., all of whom suffered human rights violations
during the marcos era, obtained a final judgment in their favor against the estate of the late ferdinand
marcos amounting to roughly $1.9b in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations
of international law in the us district court of hawaii. this final judgment was affirmed by the us court
of appeals. as a consequence, petitioners filed a complaint with the rtc makati for the enforcement of
the final judgment, paying p410 as docket and filing fees based on rule 141, par. 7(b) where the value
of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. the estate of marcos however, filed a mtd
alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. rtc makati dismissed the complaint stating that the
subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign
court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the
value of the foreign judgment. as such, the proper filing fee was p472m, which petitioners had not
paid.
issue:
whether or not a judgment rendered by a foreign state can be recognized and enforced in the
philippines.
held:
the supreme court held that it can be enforced in our country. there is no obligatory rule derived from
treaties or conventions that requires the philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a
procedure for the enforcement thereof. however, generally accepted principles of international law, by
virtue of the incorporation clause of the constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do
not derive from treaty obligations. the classical formulation in international law sees those customary
rules accepted as binding result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread,
and consistent practice on the part of states; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
article ii section 2. generally accepted principles of international law
shangri-la v. developers, gr 159938, march 31, 2006
facts:
the petitioners seek the nullification of the previous court decision. the case started when the
defendant filed a complaint for the use of shargri-la of the registered logo of dgci in the philippines.
dgci accordingly patented the design with the bureau of patents, trademarks and technology transfer
on 1982. however, the petitioners claim that they have been using the trademark since 1962, which
was even before they have entered business in the philippines. the petitioner now uses the
international treaty which is the paris convention as a defense.
issue:
whether or not the petitioners are entitled to protection under the paris convention for the protection of
industrial property
held:
the supreme court held that even though the philippines is a signatory of the said convention, the
petitioners cannot seek defense from it. the supreme court stated that our municipal law on trademarks
regarding the requirement of actual use in the philippines must subordinate an international
agreement. however, with violations to the local laws of trademark by the defendant, the petition for
nullification is granted.
article ii section 8. freedom from nuclear weapons
bayan v. zamora, gr 138570, october 10, 2000
facts:
with the denial of the extension of the military bases agreement between the united states and the
philippines, former president ramos approved of the visiting forces agreement. such agreement states

that the philippines and united states would exchange military strategies on complementing areas
between the two. a few months later, the new president estrada, through the secretary of foreign
affairs, moved for the ratification of the vfa. the petitioners argue that the agreement violates the
constitution.
issues:
whether or not the vfa is a generally accepted principle of international law that should be considered
as part of the law of the land.
whether or not the vfa violates the prohibition of nuclear weapons stated in the constitution.
held:
the court holds that since the agreement is considered to be a treaty between the two countries, it
should be adhered as a law of the land. as the court recognizes the phrase recognized as a treaty as
stated by the us ambassador, means that the other party acknowledges such agreement as a treaty. with
this, we apply the vienna convention on laws of treaties, in which the state is a signatory to.
article ii section 12. family life; mother; unborn
roe v. wade, 410 us 113 (1973)
facts:
petitioners argue the constitutionality of the texan abortion laws. the said laws only allow abortion at a
prescription of a medical authority if the mothers life is endangered by the pregnancy and does not
give the right to for the mother to pursue abortion.
issue:
whether or not the texan abortion laws violates the american constitution
held:
the u.s. supreme court held that a state criminal abortion statute of the current texas type that exempts
from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy
stage and without recognition of the interests involved (such as liberty interests), is violative of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
article ii section 16. right to healthful ecology
llda vs ca 231 scra 292 (1994)
facts:
this is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision by the court of appeals declaring that the llda
has no power and authority to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order enjoining the city government
of caloocan city from dumping garbage in an open dumpsite in barangay camarin of said city.
in 1991, the task force camarin dumpsite of barangay camarin, caloocan city, filed a letter-complaint
with the laguna lake development authority (llda) seeking to stop the operation of the open garbage
dumpsite in the said area due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of
pollution of the water content of the surrounding area. acting on the complaint, the llda conducted an
investigation and found out that the dumpsite operation did not procure any clearance from the former,
among others. further, the water content of the surrounding area indicates the presence of bacteria.
the llda then issued a cease and desist order ordering the city government of caloocan and other
entities to completely stop from dumping garbage at the dumpsite. the dumping operation was
forthwith stopped but was resumed shortly thereafter when a meeting among the parties failed to settle
the problem. the llda then issued another cease and desist order enjoining the city government of
caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the said area.
the city government of caloocan filed with the rtc of caloocan city an action for the declaration of
nullity of the cease and desist order. the llda filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cease and
desist order it issued is reviewable by the court of appeals (ca) and not by the rtc. the rtc denied llda s
motion to dismiss and enjoined the llda from enforcing its cease and desist order. on petition to the ca,
the latter held that the rtc has no jurisdiction on the petition for annulment of llda's cease and desist
order since this is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ca. however, the ca also ruled that the llda
has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order. hence, llda appealed to the supreme

court. while both parties agree on the need to protect the environment and to maintain the ecological
balance of the surrounding areas of the camarin open dumpsite, the question is which agency can
lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
the city government of caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant
to the general welfare provision of the local government code, to determine the effects of the operation
of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. it argues that
authority to issue an cease and desist order was not incorporated in republic act no. 4850 (the act
creating the llda) and its amendatory laws (pd 813 and eo 927). on the other hand, the llda contends
that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions
by ra 4850 and its amendatory laws, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order.
issues:
1) whether or not the llda has the authority to entertain the complaint of task force camarin dumpsite
on the dumpsite operations authorized by the city government of caloocan.
2) whether or not the llda has the authority to issue a "cease and desist" enjoining the dumpsite
operations of the city government of caloocan.
held:
on the first issue:
the llda has that authority. the llda, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated
under ra 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of
promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the laguna lake area and the
surrounding provinces with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. under such a broad grant of power and authority,
the llda obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the laguna lake region from the
deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
thus, to carry out this responsibility, the llda is mandated to pass upon and approve or disapprove all
related plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region,
public corporations, and private persons or enterprises.
when task force camarin dumpsite filed its complaint before the llda, the latter's jurisdiction was
validly invoked on the basis of its allegation that the dumpsite operations was undertaken without a
clearance from the llda.
on the second issue:
the llda has that authority. ra 4850 and its amendatory laws did not expressly state that the llda has
power to issue a cease and desist order. however, ra 4850 and its amendatory laws authorizes the
llda to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution."
while it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. in the exercise, therefore, of its express
powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the laguna lake
region, the authority of the llda to issue a "cease and desist order" is necessarily implied. otherwise, it
may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency. the power to issue a cease and desist order is
granted when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set
by the anti-pollution laws of the country because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the philippines cannot be made to wait
until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full
course. it is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process
yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests. this immediate response to the demands of
"the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology
embodied in art. 2 sec.16 of 1987 constitution which provides that, "the state shall protect and advance

the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature."
article ii section 16. right to healthful ecology
llda vs ca 251 scra 42 (1995)
facts:
this is a petition for review by certiorari on a judgment made by the court of appeals rendering that the
laguna lake development authority has no authority over the issuance of permits for fishery privileges
in laguna lake and its environs.
ra 4850 created the laguna lake development authority (llda), a government agency tasked with the
environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development of the laguna
lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns. in view of the rapid expansion of the areas
surrounding the laguna lake and the related environmental impact of such development on the lake, pd
813 was issued amending certain sections of ra 4850. among the amendments made were the granting
of the llda exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens,
fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. subsequently, eo 927 further defined and enlarged the
functions and powers of the llda and named the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term
"laguna de bay region". it also provided that the llda shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit
for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
then came ra 7160 or the local government code of 1991 which provides that municipalities shall have
the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or
charges therefor. municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges
and fishpen permits. big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and
fishcages, with unregulated fishpens and fishcages occupying almost one-third of the entire lake water
surface area as of 1995. the mayor's permit to construct these were all undertaken in violation of the
policies adopted by the llda on fishpen zoning and the laguna lake carrying capacity. this aggravated
the current environmental problems and ecological stress of laguna lake. thus, the llda served notice to
the general public that all such fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures not registered or
to which no application for registration has been filed with llda are declared outrightly as illegal and
subject to demolition by the llda if not dismantled by the owners themselves within 10 days from
receipt of the notice.
reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the llda before various
regional trial courts, to which the llda filed motions to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. the rtcs
dismissed lldas motions and ordered temporary restraining order enjoining the llda from proceeding
with the demolition.
on petition, the court of appeals (ca) dismissed the lldas petitions and held that the provisions of the
llda charter had been repealed by the local government code of 1991 and that the power to grant
permits is now vested with their respective local government units concerned. hence, llda appealed to
the supreme court.
issue:
whether or not the llda, instead of the local governments, exercise jurisdiction over the laguna lake
and its environs in the issuance of permits for fishery privileges
held:
the llda has the jurisdiction.
first, the provisions of ra 7160 do not necessarily repeal ra 4850 creating the llda and its amendatory
laws.
ra 4850 is a special law. ra 7160 is a general law. it is basic in statutory construction that the enactment
of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. a
special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute,

general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest,
although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special
law.ra 7160 does not contain any express provision repealing the charter of the llda. implied repeals
are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. a
special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
second, considering that the reason behind the establishment of llda is for environmental protection,
navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is
for the llda to proceed with its mission. a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management
policy like that of llda is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop laguna de bay rather
than fragmented concepts of management policies where local government units exercise exclusive
dominion over specific portions of the lake water. the former is in accordance with the promotion of a
balanced and healthful ecology as provided in art. ii, sec. 16 of the constitution.
third, the power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for
revenue purposes, given the fact that the provision on issuance of fishing permits is embodied under
the heading, "specific provisions on the taxing and other revenue raising powers of local government
units." on the other hand, the power of the llda to grant permits for such privileges is for the purpose
of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the laguna de bay region and does partake of the
nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all
state powers.
accordingly, the charter of the llda which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail
over that of ra 7160 on matters affecting laguna de bay.
article ii section 26. equal access to political opportunities and political dynasties
pamatong v. comelec, 427 scra 96 (2004)
facts:
rev. elly velez pamatong filed his certificate of candidacy for president on december 17, 2003. the
commission on elections (comelec) refused to give due course to pamatongs certificate of candidacy
in its resolution 6558 dated january 17, 2004. the decision, however, was not unanimous since
commissioners luzviminda g. tancangco and mehol k. sadain voted to include pamatong as they
believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy. on 15 january 2004, pamatong moved
for reconsideration of resolution6558. the comelec, acting on pamatongs motion for reconsideration
and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under
the aegis of omnibus resolution 6604 dated 11 february 2004.the comelec declared pamatong and 35
others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
commissioner sadain maintained his vote for pamatong. by then, commissioner tancangco had retired.
pamatong filed the petition for writ of certiorari, seeking to reverse the resolutions which were
allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under
section 26, article ii of the 1987 constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to
those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties.
pamatong argued that comelec indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral
process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. comelec supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he
possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he
also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries,
and he has a platform of government. pamatong also attacked the validity of the form for the
certificate of candidacy prepared by the comelec. he claimed that the form did not provide clear and
reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it did not ask for the
candidates bio-data and his program of government.
issue:

whether or not elly pamatong has a constitutional right to run for, or hold public office, or to be a
candidate for presidency philippines.
held:
the supreme court held that elly pamatong has no constitutional right to run for or hold public office
and, particularly, to seek the presidency. what is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. section 26, article ii of the 1987 constitution, neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. there is nothing in the plain language of the
provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. the "equal access"
provision is a subsumed part of article ii of the constitution, entitled "declaration of principles and
state policies." the provisions under the article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is
no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. like the rest of
the policies enumerated in article ii, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. the disregard of
the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. an inquiry into the intent of
the framers produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory.
the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. some
valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
omnibus election code on "nuisance candidates" and comelec resolution 645210 dated december 10,
2002, outlining the instances wherein the comelec may refuse to give due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. as long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
however, the equal access clause is not violated. equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens
engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by anyone who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. in the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the
burdens which they create.
article vi section 1. legislative power; non-delegation
cebu oxygen acetylene co. v. drilon, 176 scra 24 (1989)
facts:
petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, cebu oxygen, acetylene and central visayas
employees association (coavea) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (cba) covering the
years 1986 to 1988. pursuant thereto, the management gave salary increases, among others.in sum,
section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases
negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by republic
act no. 6640. accordingly, petitioner credited the first year increase of p200.00 under the cba and
added the difference of p61.66 (rounded to p62.00) and p31.00 to the monthly salary and the 13th
month pay, respectively, of its employees from the effectivity of republic act no. 6640 on december
14,1987 to february 15, 1988 . on february 22, 1988 , a labor and employment development officer,
pursuant to inspection authority no. 058-88, commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's
establishment. upon completion of the inspection on march 10, 1988 , and based on payrolls and other
records, he found that petitioner committed violations of the law like under payment of basic wage per
r.a. no. 6640 covering the period of two (2) months representing 208 employees, among others. in
sum, the assistant regional director ordered petitioner to pay the deficiency of p200.00 in the monthly
salary and p 231.00 in the 13th month pay of its employees for the period stated. petitioner protested
the order of the regional director on the ground that the anniversary wage increases under the cba can
be credited against the wage increase mandated by republic act no. 6640. hence, petitioner contended
that inasmuch as it had credited the first year increase negotiated under the cba, it was liable only for a
salary differential of p 62.00 and a 13th month pay differential of p31.00. petitioner argued that the
payment of the differentials constitutes full compliance with republic act no. 6640. apparently, the
protest was not entertained. petitioner brought the case immediately to this court without appealing the
matter to the secretary of labor and employment. on may 9, 1988 , the court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the assistant regional director from enforcing his order dated april 7, 1988.

issue:
whether or not, section 8 of the rules implementing the provisions of republic act no. 6640 is null and
void.
held:
the supreme court held that implementing rules cannot provide for a prohibition not contemplated by
the law. administrative regulations must harmonize with the law and not unduly expand it. an
administrative agency cannot amend an act of congress.
petitioner entered into a collective bargaining agreement (cba) with its employees, increasing the
salaries by p200 for the years 1986 and 1987 and p300 for 1989. it was stipulated in the contract that
if ever there were legislations passed that would increase salaries greater than the one in the cba, the
company would pay the difference. ra 6640 was passed which directs minimum daily wage to be
increased by p10 per day. the secretary of the department of labor and employment (dole) drilon
promulgated implementing rules and regulations for ra 6640, section 8 of which provides that
increases by companies will not be credited as compliance if these werent stated in the cba in
anticipation of ra 6640. the implementing rules and regulations (irr) promulgated by dole is not in
harmony with the law since ra 6640 did not provide for the prohibitions set in section 8 of the assailed
irr. therefore, section 8 is null and void
article vi section 1. legislative power; non-delegation
rodrigo v. sandiganbayan, 309 scra 661
facts:
the municipality of san nicolas, represented by mayor conrado rodrigo, entered into an agreement with
philwood construction, represented by larry lu, for the electrification of barangay caboloan, san
nicolas, for thesum of p486,386.18. on september 2, 1992, reynaldo mejica, the planningand
development coordinator of san nicolas, prepared an accomplishmentreport stating that the caboloan
power generation project was 97.5%accomplished. said report was supposedly approved by mayor
rodrigo andconfirmed by larry lu. on the basis of said report, payment of p452, 825.53was effected by
the municipal treasurer, petitioner alejandro facundo, to philwood construction. on 14 august 1993,
petitioners received a notice of disallowancedated 21 june 1993 from the provincial auditor of
pangasinan, atty. agustinchan, jr., who found that as per evaluation of theelectrification project, only
60.0171% of the project (equivalent top291,915.07) was actually accomplished. the ombudsman
approved thefiling of an information against rodrigo et. al, for violation of the anti-graft law before
the sandiganbayan. petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan. they contend that
mayor rodrigooccupies a position of grade 24 under ra 6758 and is, therefore, beyond the original
andexclusive jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan.
issue:
whether or not the delegated powers to the ombudsman is delegable.
held:
the supreme court held that there was no undue delegation of powers. the said law, ra 6758, is in itself,
complete of the necessary standards and adequate guidelines and limitations and the proper delegated
authority. thus, the grading in salary is valid and is covered under the jurisdiction of the
sandiganbayan.
article vi section 1. legislative power; non-delegation
people v. rosenthal, 68 phil 328
facts:
osmena and rosenthal are organizers of the oro oil company which was engaged in mining
activities.they are alleged to have violated the act 2581: blue sky law by selling speculative
securities without first obtaining the written permit or license from the insular treasurer. the shares are
said to be speculative because their value materially depended upon a promise of future promotion
and development of the oil business, rather than based on actual tangible assets.the rtc found them

guilty. on appeal, they assail the constitutionality of the law, that it contravenes the constitutional
provisions of the jones act because the law constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers to the
insular treasurer. under the bsl, all persons who offer to sell securities to the public must obtain license
from the it. the license to sell is issued only whenever the it is satisfied that the applicant has complied
with the provisions of the bsl. furthermore, the bsl provides that the it shall have authority, whenever
in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said license or permit. osmena and rosenthal argue
however that the bsl provides no standard or rule which can guide the it in determining the cases in
which a certificate or permit ought to be issued or cancelled, thereby making his opinion the sole
criterion. consequently, they argue, legislative powers have been unduly delegated to the insular
treasurer.
issues:
whether the blue sky law (bsl), provides a sufficient standard for the internal treasurer in reaching a
decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a license or permit.
whether there was undue delegation of legislative powers.
held:
the supreme court held that law is valid and with sufficient standard.
in view of the intent and purpose of the bsl to protect the public against speculative schemes which
have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky, and against the sale of stock by fly-by-night
concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations.
we incline to hold that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the insular treasurer.
there is no undue delegation of authority since there is a stated criterion public interest. it is a
mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to
guide determinations.
1. the purpose of the act
2. the requirements imposed
3. the context of the provisions
all show that there is a stated criterion.
also, the decisions of the it is appealable to the secretary of finance, hence the it does not act and
decide without any restraining influence.
article vi section 1. legislative power; non-delegation
ynot v. iac, 148 scra 659
facts:
eo 626 was enacted prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos. those found violating the
law shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government. the law further provides that the
confiscated beef shall be distributed to charitable institutions, and other similar institutions as the
chairman of the nmic may see fit. ynot was found to have violated the law, transporting 6 carabaos in
a pump boat from masbate to iloilo. ynot assails the constitutionality of eo 626, claiming that there is
undue delegation of legislative powers to the chairman of the nmic, with respect to the manner of
disposition of the confiscated beef. ynot argues that the term, as may see fit is extremely generous

and dangerous, and with an opportunity for partiality and abuse.


issue:
whether the phrase as may see fit is a sufficient standard.
held:
the supreme court held that the law is invalid and with no sufficient standard. there are no limitations
or reasonable guidelines which said officers of the nmic must observe when they make their
distribution or disposition of the confiscated beef. there is invalid delegation of legislative powers to
the officers who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
their options are apparently boundless. who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of the beef and by
what criteria shall they be chosen? only the officers named can supply the answers, and they alone
may choose the grantee as they see fit, in the own executive discretion. definitely there is here a
roving commission, a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within the banks that keep it
from overflowing. in short, a clearly profilgate and invalid delegation of legislative powers.
article vi section 1. legislative power; non-delegation
securities and exchange commission v. interport resources corporation, 567 scra 354
facts:
on 6 august 1994, the board of directors of irc approved a memorandum of agreement with ganda
holdings berhad (ghb). under the memorandum of agreement, irc acquired 100% or the entire capital
stock of ganda energy holdings, inc. (gehi) which would own and operate a 102 megawatt (mw) gas
turbine power-generating barge. the agreement also stipulates that gehi would assume a five-year
power purchase contract with national power corporation. at that time, gehis power-generating barge
was 97% complete and would go on-line by mid-september of 1994. in exchange, irc will issue to ghb
55% of the expanded capital stock of irc amounting to 40.88 billion shares which had a total par value
of p488.44 million.irc alleged that on 8 august 1994, a press release announcing the approval of the
agreement was sent through facsimile transmission to the philippine stock exchange and the sec, but
that the facsimile machine of the sec could not receive it. upon the advice of the sec, the irc sent the
press release on the morning of 9 august 1994. the sec averred that it received reports that irc failed to
make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with ghb and that some of its directors, respondents
herein, heavily traded irc shares utilizing this material insider information. on 16 august 1994, the sec
chairman issued a directive requiring irc to submit to the sec a copy of its aforesaid memorandum of
agreement with ghb. on 19 september 1994, the sec chairman issued an order finding that irc violated
the rules on disclosure of material facts, in connection with the old securities act of 1936, when it
failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with ghb.
issue:
whether or not the sec has authority to file suit against respondents for violations of the revised
securities act (rsa).
held:
the supreme court held that the revised securities act does not require the enactment of
implementingrules to make it binding and effective. the provisions of the rsa aresufficiently clear and
complete by themselves. the requirements arespecifically set out and the acts which are enjoined are
determinable.to rule that absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of congress
would empower administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying theimplementing rules.
where the statute contains sufficient standards and anunmistakable intent (as in this case, the rsa) there
should be no impediment as to its implementation. the court does not discern any vagueness or
ambiguity in the rsa such that the acts proscribed and/or required would not be understood by a person
of ordinary intelligence.

article vi section 1. legislative power; non-delegation


gerochi v. denr, gr no. 159796, july 17, 2007
facts:
petitioners romeo p. gerochi, katulong ng bayan (kb), and environmentalist consumers network, inc.
(ecn), come before this court in this original action praying that section 34 of republic act (ra) 9136,
otherwise known as the electric power industry reform act of 2001 (epira), imposing the universal
charge, and rule 18 of the rules and regulations (irr) which seeks to implement the said imposition, be
declared unconstitutional for the delegation of said power to tax by any executive or administrative
agency like the erc, since the power to tax is strictly a legislative function . petitioners also pray that
the universal charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (tro) be issued directing the respondents to refrain from implementing,
charging, and collecting the said charge. congress enacted the epira on june 8, 2001, and on june 26,
2001, it took effect. on april 5, 2002, respondent national power corporation-strategic power utilities
group (npc-spug) filed with respondent energy regulatory commission (erc) a petition for the
availment from the universal charge of its share for missionary electrification. on may 7, 2002, npc
filed another petition with erc, praying that the proposed share from the universal charge for the
environmental charge be approved for withdrawal from the special trust fund (stf) managed by
respondent power sector assets and liabilities management group (psalm) for the rehabilitation and
management of watershed areas. on december 20, 2002, the erc issued an order provisionally
approving the computed amount as the share of the npc-spug from the universal charge for missionary
electrification and authorizing the national transmission corporation (transco) and distribution utilities
to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis.
issue:
whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the erc.
held:
the supreme court held thatprovisions of the epira such as, among others, to ensure the total
electrification of the country and thequality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of
electric power and watershed rehabilitation and management meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the erc's power to formulate the irr. these are sufficient
standards.from the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of
legislative power to the erc.
article vi section 1. legislative power; non-delegation
psl inc., v. llda 608 scra 442
facts:
petitioner pacific steam laundry, inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry
services. on 5 september 2001, the environmental quality management division of laguna lake
development authority (llda) conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent which showed
non-compliance. after a series of subsequent water sampling, psl still failed to conform tothe
regulatory standards. another wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5 june 2002, inresponse
to the 17 may 2002 request for re-sampling received by llda, finally showed compliancewith the
effluent standard in all parameters. on 16 september 2002, llda issued an order to payindicating therein
that the penalty should be imposed from the date of initial sampling to the date therequest for resampling was received by the authority.petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the llda
denied.

issue:
whether or not the grant of implied power to llda to impose penalties violate the rule on nondelegation of legislative powers.
held:
the supreme court held that the lldas power to impose fines is not unrestricted. it was only after the
investigation finding the petitioner failing to meet the established water and effluent quality standards
that the lldaimposed the penalty of p 1,000.00 per day. the p 1,000 penalty per day is in accordance
with the amount of penalty prescribed under pd 984.
article vi section 1. legislative power; non-delegation
people v. dacuycuy, 173 scra 90 (1989)
facts:
several pubic school officials of leyte were charged for violation of ra 4670 (magna carta for public
school teachers).these officials motioned to quash the charges against them for (1)lack of jurisdiction
(2) unconstitutionality of section 32. this motion was denied for lack of merit. the private respondents
filed a petition for certiorari to the court of first instance of leyte.they added to the grounds of
unconsttutionality of section 32 the following reasons: (1) it imposes a cruel and unusual punishment
(2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, for the duration of penalty of the
imprisonment is left to the discretion of the court. judge dacuycuy, the respondent judge denied the
motion saying that ra 4670 particularly section 32 is valid and constitutional.
issue:
whether or not section 32 of ra 4670 is constitutional
held:
the supreme court held that it is unconstitutional. section 32 is unconstitutional since it provides an
indeterminable period of imprisonment. too much discretion was left by the legislature to the court,
making it undue delegation of power of the legislature. section 32 did not pass the test of sufficient
standard. if section 32 will be allowed, it will violate not just the rules of separation of powers but also
the delegability of legislative powers.
note: the charge against the public school officials will still be remanded to the municipal court where
it was first filed. ra 4670 contains a separability clause in section 34. although sec 32 was declared
unconstitutional, other parts are still valid
article vi section 5. composition of the house of representatives; apportionment; party list
bagabuyo v. comelec, gr no. 176970, december 8, 2008
facts:
in 2006, rep. jaraula of cagayan de oro (cdo) sponsored a bill increasing the citys legislative district
from one to two. it eventually became a law causing comelec to promulgate a resolution that for the
election of may 2007, cagayan de oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the
second district, depending on their place of residence. bagabuyo filed a petition and argued that
comelec cannot implement the act without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the
conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government
unit.
issue:
whether or not a plebiscite is required in the case at bar.
held:
the supreme court held that it is not required. the court upheld comelecs arguments that the law
merely increased the representation of cdo in the house of representatives and sangguniang
panglungsod pursuant to section 5, article vi of the 1987 constitution and that the criteria established

under section 10, article x of the 1987 constitution only apply when there is a creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay.
in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local
government unit took place. further, the law did not bring about any change in cdos territory,
population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.
party list
vc cadangen, et al v. comelec, gr no. 177179, june 5, 2009
facts:
on september 13, 2006, petitioner alliance of civil servants, inc. (civilservants), filed a petition for
registration as a sectoral organization. it claimed thatit had been in existence since december 2004 and
to represent past and presentgovernment employees in the party-list system. the comelec issued
anorder requiring civil servants to file a memorandum that would prove its presenceor existence
nationwide, track record, financial capability to wage a nationwidecampaign, platform of government,
officers and membership, and compliance withthe provisions of the party-list system act and the eightpoint guideline laid down by this court. civil servants consequently filed the required
memorandumattaching vital documents, with manifestation of intent to participate in the may14, 2007
elections. however, the comelec issued a resolution denying civil servants petition for registration
because civil servant exists only in paraaqu and quezon city. civil servants moved for
reconsideration, arguing in the mainthat the law does not require a sectoral organization to have a
nationwide presenceor existence for it to be registered under the party-list system. subsequently, it
wasdenied by the comelec. the petitioner filed the instant case praying for the writof mandamus to
command the latter to register the former as a sectoralorganization.
issue:
whether or not the comelecs denial of the registration as a sectoral organization is valid.
held:
the supreme court held that the comelec denied the latters plea for registration as a sectoral party,
because it failed to show that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized andunderrepresented
sectors. the courts function, as mandated by section 1,article viii of the constitution, is merely to
check whether or not the governmental branch or agency went beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, notthat it erred or has a different view. the supreme court will have no occasion toexercise
its corrective power. it has no authority to inquire into what it thinks is apparent error. the court cannot
grant the prayer of petitioner for registration as asectoral party, because to do so will entail an
evaluation of the evidence todetermine whether indeed petitioner qualifies as a party-list organization
and whether it has made untruthful statements in its application for registration.
party list
veterans federation party v. comelec, 342 scra 244 (2000)
facts:
comelec proclaimed 14 party list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the
total number of votes cast as member of the house of rep. upon petition by other party-list
organization, it proclaimed another 38 additional party representatives although they received less
than 2% of the votes on the ground that under the constitution it is mandatory that at least 20% of the
members of house of representatives must come from the party list representatives.
issue:

whether or not section 5(2), article vi of the 1987 constitution is mandatory.


held:
the supreme court held that it is not, as it merely provides a ceiling for party list seats in the house of
representatives. the congress is vested with power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the partylist system of representation. in the exercise of their constitutional prerogative, congress deemed it
necessary that parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast to be
entitled to a party-list seat. this is to ensure that only parties with sufficient number of constituents are
actually represented in congress.
article vi section 6. qualifications of representatives
aquino v. comelec, 243 scra 400 (1995)
facts:
on 20 march 1995, agapito a. aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative
for the new second legislative district of makati city. in his certificate of candidacy, aquino stated that
he was aresident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. faced with a petition for
disqualification, he amended theentry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13
days. the commission on electionsdismissed the petition on 6 may and allowed aquino to run in the
election of 8 may. aquino won. acting on amotion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the
commission on election later issued an order suspendingthe proclamation of aquino until the
commission resolved the issue. on june 2, the commission on electionsfound aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
issue:
whether or not residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the
disqualification of aquino from the position in the electoral district.
held:
the supreme court held that the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matterwhere he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that towhich the constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law. the purpose is toexclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community from takingadvantage of favorable circumstances existing in
that community for electoral gain. aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election
indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of san jose,concepcion, tarlac for more than 52
years prior to that election. aquinos connection to the second district of makati city is an alleged lease
agreement of a condominium unit in the area. the intention not to establish apermanent home in
makati city is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. the shortlength of time
he claims to be a resident of makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in tarlac and his claims of
other residences in metro manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence
is not toacquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for representative of
the second districtof makati city. aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the commission on
elections
article vi section 6. qualifications of representatives
marcos v. comelec, 248 scra 300 (1995)
facts:
petitioner imelda romualdez-marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of representative
of the first district of leyte. private respondent cirilo roy montejo, a candidate for the same position,
filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the comelec alleging that petitioner did not
meet the constitutional requirement for residency. private respondent contended that petitioner lacked
the constitutions one-year residency requirement for candidates for the house of representatives.

issue:

whether or not the statement in the coc determines whether an individual satisfied the constitutions
residency qualification requirement, to warrant herein petitioners disqualification.
held:
the supreme court held that it is not. having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the house of representatives in the first district of leyte, the
comelec's questioned resolutions dated april 24, may 7, may 11, and may 25, 1995 are hereby set
aside. respondent comelec is hereby directed to order the provincial board of canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected representative of the first district of leyte.
article vi section 6. qualifications of representatives
domino v. comelec, gr 134015 (july 19, 1999)
facts:
on 25 march 1998, juan domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of
the lone legislative district of the province of sarangani indicating in item no. 9 of his certificate that
he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months
immediately preceding the election. on 30 march 1998, narciso ra. grafilo, jr., eddy b. java, juan p.
bayonito, jr.,rosario samson and dionisio p. lim, sr., filed with the comelec a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy, which was docketed as spa no. 98-022 and assigned to the
second division of the comelec. they alleged that domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate
of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of sarangani where he
seeks election .for his defense, domino maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence
requirement and that he has been residing in sarangani since january 1997.on 6 may 1998, the comelec
2nd division promulgated a resolution declaring domino disqualified as candidate for the position of
representative of the lone district of sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement. on 11
may 1998, the day of the election, the comelec issued supplemental omnibus resolution no. 3046,
ordering that the votes cast for domino be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning,
considering that the resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executor.
domino received the highest votes in the election that is why he filed an mr of his disqualification but
was denied. hence this petition.
issue:
whether or not petitioner has resided in sarangani province for at least 1 year immediately preceding
the may 11, 1998 elections
held:
the supreme court held that the term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
records show that petitioners domicile of origin was candon, ilocos sur and that sometime in 1991, he
acquired a new domicile of choice in quezon city, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the
position of representative of the third district of quezon city in the may 1995 election. petitioner is
now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in quezon city and has established a
new domicile of choice in the province of sarangani.
a persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
new one is established. to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual

removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
the contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in january 1997 does not adequately
support a change of domicile. the lease contract may be indicative of dominos intention to reside in
sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones
original domicile. the mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. thus, the date of the
contract of lease of a house and lot in sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances,
as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. further, dominos lack of intention to
abandon his residence in quezon city is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in quezon city.
while voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence
especially in this case where domino registered in his former barangay.
article vi section 6. qualifications of representatives
maquera v. boraa, 15 scra 7
facts:
petitioner leon maquera seeks to ask that ra 4421 which requires "all candidates for national,
provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or
emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the
national, provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate, except when declared
winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate
of candidacy, there being not more than four (4) candidates for the same office, as unconstiutional.
issue:
whether or not ra no. 4421 is unconstitutional.
held:
the supreme court held that property qualifications are inconsistent with the natureand essence of the
republican system ordained in our constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same.
the court reasoned out thatsovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
fromthem, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be votedshall not be
dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned. social justice presupposes equal opportunity
for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the
chance to be elected to publicoffice.
article vi section 6. qualifications of representatives
social justice society v. dangerous drugs board, gr no. 157870, november 3, 2008
facts:
in 2002, ra 9165 or the comprehensive dangerous drugs act of 2002 was implemented. sec 36 thereof
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses. on 23 dec 2003, comelec issued resolution no. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the may 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. pimentel, jr., a senator
and a candidate for re-election in the may elections, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
rule 65. in it, he seeks (1) to nullify sec. 36(g) of ra 9165 and comelec resolution no. 6486 dated
december 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 constitution; and (2) to enjoin the
comelec from implementing resolution no. 6486. according to pimentel, the constitution only
prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a
member of the senate. he says that both the congress and comelec, by requiring, via ra 9165 and
resolution no. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test,
create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. he
adds that there is no provision in the constitution authorizing the congress or comelec to expand the

qualification requirements of candidates for senator.


issue:
whether or not sec 36 of ra 9165 is an amendment to the constitution on the qualifications of senators
and as such, is unconstitutional.
held:
the supreme court held that pimentels contention is valid. accordingly, sec. 36 of ra 9165 is
unconstitutional. it is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the constitution,
that issuance is null and void and has no effect. the constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the constitution. in the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the constitution. whatever limits it imposes must be observed. the provision no person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory
drug test, is not tenableas it enlarges the qualifications. comelec cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement sec. 36, validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the constitution prescribes. if
congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the comelec, to
be sure, is also without such power. the right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the constitution.
article vi section 7. term of representatives
dimaporo v. mitra, 202 scra 779
facts:
petitioner mohamad ali dimaporo was elected representative for the second legislative district of lanao
del sur during the 1987 congressional elections. on 15 january 1990, petitioner filed with the comelec
a certificate of candidacy for the position of regional governor of the autonomous region in muslim
mindanao in the immediately following elections. upon being informed of this development by the
comelec, respondents speaker and secretary of the house of representatives excluded petitioner's name
from the roll of members of the house of representatives pursuant to section 67, article ix of the
omnibus election code which states: "any elective official whether national or local running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for president and vicepresident shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy."having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to
respondent speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected
member of congress. he maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because section
67, article ix of b.p. blg. 881 is not operative under the present constitution, being contrary thereto,
and therefore not applicable to the present members of congress.
issue:
1. whether or not section 67, article ix, of b.p. blg. 881 is operative under the present constitution.
held:
the supreme court held that it is still operative. as a voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said
section falls within the term of voluntary renunciation of office enunciated in par. 2, sec. 7, art. vi,
of the 1987 constitution. the grounds under section 6 , article ix, of b.p. blg. 881, is not included in the
constitution, does not affect its validity as these grounds are not exclusive. the filing of coc by
petitioner is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming, otherwise is presumed to be aware
of exising laws.
article vi section 7. term of representatives
farinas v. executive secretary, gr 147387 (dec. 10, 2003)
facts:
the petitioners assert that section 14 of rep. act no. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution because it repeals section 67 only of the omnibus election code, leaving intact section 66
thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

section 66.candidates holding appointive office or position any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the armed forces of the philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
respondents contend that there is no violation of the equal protection clause of the constitution. section
67 pertains to elective officials while section 66 pertains to appointive officials. a substantial
distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of
their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected by popular
will. equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
issue:
whether or not the repeal of section 67 of the omnibus election code pertaining to elective officials,
gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive and constitutes a violation of the equal
protection clause of the constitution.
held:
the supreme court held that, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. the former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. they are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions.on the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation
thereto by an appointing authority. some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under section 55, chapter 8, title
i, subsection a. civil service commission, book v of the administrative code of 1987 (executive order
no. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited
from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. under the
same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously
expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
moreover, it is not within the power of the court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification. hence, equal protection is not infringed.
article vi section 8.regular elections
codilla v. de venecia gr no. 150605, december 10, 2002
facts:
codilla, then sitting as mayor of ormoc city, and locsin, the incumbent representative of the 4th
legislative district of leyte, were candidates for the position of representative of the 4th legislative
district of leyte. a petition for disqualification was filed against codilla for violating sec. 68(a) of the
omnibus election code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the city
government of ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of kananga and
matag-ob, leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. at the
time of the elections on may 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so codillas name
remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. he garnered the highest number of votes.
however, his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the comelec. after hearing of his
disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered disqualified. codillas votes being considered
stray, locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected representative and subsequently took her oath of
office. codilla then filed a timely motion for reconsideration with the comelec and also sought the
annulmentoflocsins proclamation.
issue:
whether or not comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a representative

held:
the supreme court held that: first, the validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner. however, the comelec en banc was not divested of
its jurisdiction to review the validity of the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order of the
second division. the said order of the second division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained
finality. the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. it cannot be used as
the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected representative of the 4th
legislative district of leyte; and
second, it is the house of representatives electoral tribunal (hret) which has no jurisdiction in the
instant case.
the issue on the validity of the resolution of the comelec second division has not yet been resolved by
the comelec en banc. at the time of the proclamation of respondent locsin, the validity of the
resolution of the comelec second division was challenged by the petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration. the issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the comelec en banc to resolve.
hence, the hret cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
the issue of who is the rightful representative of the 4th legislative district of leyte has been finally
settled by the comelec en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. the rule of law
demands that its decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. there is no alternative to the rule of
law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
article vi section 9. special elections
tolentino v. comelec, gr 148334, january 21, 2004
facts:
shortly after her succession to the presidency in january 2001, president gloria macapagal-arroyo
nominated then senator teofisto t. guingona, jr. as vice-president. congress confirmed the nomination
of senator guingona who took his oath as vice-president on 9 february 2001. following senator
guingonas confirmation, the senate, on 8 february 2001, passed resolution 84 certifying to the
existence of a vacancy in the senate. resolution 84 called on comelec to fill the vacancy through a
special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 may 2001. twelve senators,
with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. resolution 84 further provided that the
senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former senator teofisto t. guingona, jr., which ends on 30 june 2004. on 5 june 2001, after
comelec had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (lanao del norte), comelec
issued resolution 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected senators. resolution
01-005 also provided that the first twelve (12) senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the
thirteenth (13th) senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of senator teofisto t.
guingona, jr. who was appointed vice-president. on 20 june 2001, arturo tolentino and arturo mojica,
as voters and taxpayers, filed the petition for prohibition, impleading only comelec as respondent.
tolentino and mojica sought to enjoin comelec from proclaiming with finality the candidate for senator
receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-year
term seat. they contend that comelec issued resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction pursuant to section
2 of ra 6645, section 73 of bp 881, and section 4, par. 4 of ra 6646.
issue:
whether or not a special election to fill a vacant three-year term senate seat was validly held.
held:
the supreme court held that a special election to fill a vacant three-year term senate seat was validly
held. although comelec did not comply with the requirements of ra 6645, either strictly or

substantially, it does not invalidate the special election. section 2, ra 6645 as amended by ra 7166
provides that the commission on elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be
earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or
communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: provided, however,
that if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be
held simultaneously with such general election.
article vi section 13. prohibitions on members of congress
liban v. gordon, gr no. 175352, july 15, 2009
facts
dante v. liban, together with other petitioners, petitioned in court to declare richard j. gordon as
having forfeited his seat in the senate. the petitioners were officers of the board of directors of the
quezon city red cross chapter, while respondent is chairman of the philippine national red cross (pnrc)
board of governors.
during gordons incumbency as a senator, he was elected chairman of the pnrc during the february 23,
2006 meeting of the pnrc board of governors, in which the petitioners alleged that by accepting the
responsibility, gordon deemed ceased to be a member of the senate as provided in sec. 13, article vi of
the constitution:
sec. 13. no senator or member of the house of representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat.
respondent contested that the petitioners citation of a constitutional provision has no basis, since pnrc
is not a gocc. thus, the prohibition under sec. 13, art. vi, of the 1987 constitution, does not apply to his
case. furthermore, service rendered in pnrc is a volunteer service to which is neither an office nor an
employment.
issue:
whether or not by accepting the pnrc chair, gordon forfeited his senate seat.
held
the supreme court held thathe did not forfeited his seat. the philippine national red cross is a private
organization performing public functions. it does not have government assets and does not receive any
appropriation from the philippine congress. the pnrc is financed primarily by contributions from
private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its board
of governors. apart from that, pnrc must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral
and independent to be able to conduct its activities in accord to their fundamental principles of
humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. hence,
article vi, section 13 could not apply to gordons case, in accepting the position in the pnrc. the
petition was deemed to have no merit.
article vi section 16. officers of congress; quorom; discipline; journal/records
(par. 1) defensor-santiago v. guingona, gr 134577 november 18, 1998
the senate convened as follows:

10 members = lamp

7 members = lakas nucd

1 member = lp

1 member = aksyon democratico

1 member = prp

1 member gabay-bayan

2 members = independent

total = 23 (*one position was vacant because gma became vice president)
there was an election for senate president. there were 2 contenders, senator fernan and senator tatad.

by a vote of 20 to 2, fernan won as senate president. senator tatad thereafter manifested that he was
assuming the post as minority leader since according to him, only those who had voted for him,
belonged to the minority.this was opposed by senator johnny flavier. he manifested that 7 lakas nucd
senators are also part of the minority and they chose senator guingona as minority leader.senator
guingona was recognized by the senate president as minority leader. senators santiago and tatad
instituted quo warranto proceedings to oust senator guingona as minority leader, and to declare tatad
as the rightful minority leader.tatad argues that the term majority refers to the group of senators who
voted for the winning senate president and accepted committee chairmanships. accordingly, the say,
that those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no committee chairmanships comprise the
minority.
issues:
1. whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the petition.
2. whether or not par. 1, sec. 16, art. vi, of the constitution, was not observed in the selection of
minority leader.
held:
the supreme court held that it has jurisdiction. the court has judicial power to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdction.
while the constitution is explicit on the manner of electing the senate president and the house speaker,
it is however, silent on the manner of selecting the other officers of congress. the constitution merely
says that each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. hence, the method
of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of prerogative
conferred by the constitution. such method must be prescribed by the senate itself, not by the courts.
the rules of senate do not provide for the positions of majority/ minority leaders. in the absence of and
specific rules, this court has no basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the senate. the
courts cannot intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.
article vi section 16. officers of congress; quorom; discipline; journal/records
(par. 2) people v. jalosjos, 324 scra 689
facts:
congressman jalosjos (first district zamboanga del norte) was confined at the national penitentiary
while his case for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal.he filed a motion that he
be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a congressman, including attendance at sessions and
committee hearings, despite his conviction for a non-bailable offense.he claims that his re-election as
congressman proves as an expression of the popular will, and cannot be rendered inutile. he claims he
has the mandate of the sovereign will. he further argues that under sec 16(2), a congressmans function
is to attend sessions. he also relies on the case of aguinaldo, were the court said that a public officer
should not be removed from office for acts done prior to his present term of office. to do otherwise
would be depriving the right of the people to elect their officers.
issue:
whether or not jalosjos be allowed to attend the sessions of congress.
held:
the supreme court held that under the constitution, privilege to be free from arrest applies only if the
offense is punishable by less than 6 years of imprisonment. the accused has not shown any reason why
he should be exempted from this. the members of congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. the confinement of a congressman charged
with a non-bailable offense (more than 6 years), is certainly authorized by law, and has constitutional
foundations.
article visection 16. officers of congress; quorom; discipline; journal/records
(par. 3) santiago v. sandiganbayan, 356 scra 636

facts:
the petitioner miriam defensor-santiago, a public officer, being then the commissioner of the
commission on immigration and deportation, willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of the stay of aliens in violation of executive order no. 324 which prohibits
the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified, thereby
giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the philippines was unlawfully legalized by
said accused. the court is called upon to review the act of the sandiganbayan in ordering the
preventive suspension of petitioner, mme. senator miriam defensor-santiago, in connection with
pending criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of republic act no. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the anti-graft and corruption practices act. the instant case arose from the
complaints filed by a group of employees of the commission of immigration and deportation (cid)
against petitioner. the investigating panel took over the case. the petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with prohibition and preliminary injunction before the court and a motion before the
sandiganbayan to defer her arraignment.
issue:
whether or not sandiganbayan has the authority to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent
public official.
held:
the supreme court held that the sandiganbayan has the authority to order the preventive suspension of
an incumbent public official. the order of suspension prescribed by republic act no. 3019 is distinct
from the power of congress to discipline its own ranks under the constitution. under section 16 (3),
article vi of the constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members,
suspend or expel a member. the doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have
effectively excluded members of congress from republic act no. 3019. each branch of the government
has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents
one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch. the petitioner has the right
to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is charged do not
constitute a violation of republic act 3019. the challenge is by way of motion to quash. in motion to
quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information. republicact no.
3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of congress and that, therefore, the
sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. the petitioner
was acquitted. the instant petition for certiorari was dismissed.
article visection 16. officers of congress; quorom; discipline; journal/records
(par. 4) us v. pons, 34 phil 729 (1916)
facts:
pons and gabino beliso were trading partners. on 5 apr 1914, the steamer lopez y lopez arrived at
manila from spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. the said barrels of wine were delivered to
beliso. beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to pons house. on the other hand, the customs
authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed
merchant (beliso not being one). and so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby
discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. since the act of trading and
dealing opium is against act 2381, pons and beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently
importing and introducing such contraband material to the philippines. pons appealed the sentence

arguing that act 2381 was not approved while the philippine commission (congress) was not in
session. he said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 march 1914
while the special session of the commission was adjourned at 12mn on 28 feb 1914. since this is the
case, act 2381 should be null and void.
issue:
whether or not the supreme court must go beyond the recitals of the journals to determine if act 2381
was indeed made as a law on february 28, 1914
held:
the supreme court held and looked into the journals to certain the date of adjournment but it refused to
go beyond the recitals in the legislative journals. the said journals are conclusive on the court and to
inquire into the veracity of the journals of the philippine legislature, when they are, as the sc have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which
the philippine government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
legislature. pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the journals
which is an act of the legislature. the journals say that the legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on
february 28, 1914. this settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these
journals. the sc passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
article visection 16. officers of congress; quorom; discipline; journal/records
(par. 4) abakada guro party list v. ermita, 469 scra 1
facts:
on may 24, 2005, the president signed into law republic act 9337 or the vat reform act. before the law
took effect on july 1, 2005, the court issued a tro enjoining government from implementing the law in
response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the
new law.
the challenged section of ra no. 9337 is the common proviso in sections 4, 5 and 6: that the president,
upon the recommendation of the secretary of finance, shall, effective january 1, 2006, raise the rate of
value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of gross domestic product (gdp) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of gdp of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1%)
petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the president to increase the vat rate is an
abdication by congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by section
28 (2), article vi constitution. they argue that vat is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and
services which cant be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since
this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually
imposed on imported/exported goods. they also said that the president has powers to cause, influence
or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. moreover, they
allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the secretary of finance will make the
recommendation.
issue:
whether or not ra 9337 is constitutional.
held:
the supreme court held that the powers which congress is prohibited from delegating are those which
are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. purely legislative power which can never be

delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect
and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its enactment. it is the
nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the
validity of its delegation.
the exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to president under constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to president under constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
for the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. a sufficient standard is
one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it.
in this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon
which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. the legislature
has made the operation of the 12% rate effective january 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. it leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside
of the control of the executive. no discretion would be exercised by the president. highlighting the
absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. the use of the word
shall connote a mandatory order. its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
thus, it is the ministerial duty of the president to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence
of any of the conditions specified by congress. this is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the president.
it is a clear directive to impose the 12% vat rate when the specified conditions are present.
congress just granted the secretary of finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--whether by december 31, 2005, the vat collection as a percentage of gdp of the previous year exceeds
2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a percentage of gdp of the previous year exceeds one
and 1%. if either of these two instances has occurred, the secretary of finance, by legislative
mandate, must submit such information to the president.
in making his recommendation to the president on the existence of either of the two conditions, the
secretary of finance is not acting as the alter ego of the president or even her subordinate. he is acting
as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed
will is to take effect. the secretary of finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is
determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and
information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. his function is to gather
and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid
out by congress is present.
congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be
done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is
frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. this is constitutionally permissible. congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law
article visection 17. electoral tribunal
angara v. electoral commission, 63 phil 134 (1936)
facts:
during the elections of september 17, 1935, petitioner jose a. angara and the respondents pedro ynsua,
miguel castillo, and dionisio mayor were candidates for the position of members of the national
assembly for the first district of tayabas.

on october 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed angara as member-elect of the
national assembly and on nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
on december 3, 1935, the national assembly passed resolution no. 8 which in effect, fixed the last date
to file election protests.
on december 8, 1935, ynsua filed before the electoral commission a "motion of protest" against angara
and praying, among other things, that ynsua be named/declared elected member of the national
assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.
on december 9, 1935, the electoral commission adopted resolution no. 6stating that the very same day
is the last day for filing of protests. angara contended that the constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the electoral commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the
national assembly and the supreme court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
issue:
whether or not the supreme court has jurisdiction over the electoral commission over the subject
matter of the controversy based on the foregoing facts.
held:
the supreme court held thatin the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as
it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the national assembly on one hand, and the
electoral commission on the other. although the electoral commission may not be interfered with,
when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. the electoral commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate
cases.
the court has jurisdiction over the electoral commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant
to the electoral commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the national assembly."
article visection 17. electoral tribunal
vera v. avelino, 77 phil 192 (1946)
facts:
after the elections, comelec submitted its report to congress & the president: the report state that there
was terrorism and violence in pampanga, nueva ecija, tarclas, which prevented the expression of the
popular will. that there was coercion and intimidation, that most of the residents left their homes in
order not to be subjected to oppression (many of them voted for roxas as president) (and that there was
terrorism to ensure the election of the members of the nationalista party). a protest against the election
of vera diokno and romero was filed with the set. the senate convened and the pendatun resolution was
approved. under the resolution, pending the termination of the protest against their election, vera,
diokno, romero (who had been included among the 16 senators who won, and proclaimed by
comelec), shall not be sworn in, nor seated as senators. the 3 filed this case for the annulment of the
pendatun resolution, and for them to be able to occupy their seats and exercise their senatorial
prerogatives.
issue:
whether or not the court may intervene in the implementationof the rules of either house of congress.
held:
the supreme court held that on matters affecting only internal operation of the legislature, the latters
formuation and implementation of its rules is beyond the reach of courts. when, however, the
legislative rule affects private rights, the courts cannot altogetherbe excluded.
article visection 17. electoral tribunal

chavez v. comelec, 211 scra 315 (1992)


facts:
on may 5, 1992, this court issued a resolution in gr no. 104704 disqualifying melchor chavez, private
respondent therein, from running for the office of senator in the may 11, 1992 elections.petitioner filed
an urgent motion with the comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means
this courts resolution dated may 5, 1992 to all regional election directors, provincial election
supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6) accredited
political parties and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of
melchor chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and to count
all votes cast for the disqualified melchor, chavez in favor of francisco i. chavez. on may 8, 1992, the
comelec issued res. no. 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of melchor chavez from the list of
qualified candidates. however, it failed to order the crediting of all chavez votes in favor of
petitioner as well as the cancellation of melchor chavez name in the list of qualified candidates.
issue:
whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the members of
the senate.
held:
the supreme court held that a simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no
cause of action. the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation.
while the commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local
elective officials (sec. 242, omnibus election code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not
allowed in elections for president, vice-president, senator and member of the house of representatives.
sec. 15 of republic act 7166 provides: for purposes of the elections for president, vice-president,
senator and member of the house of representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. however, this does not preclude the authority
of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to
correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
article visection 17. electoral tribunal
aquino v. comelec, 243 scra 400 (1995)
facts:
on 20 march 1995, agapito a. aquino filed his certificate of candidacy (coc) for the position of
representative for the new second legislative district of makati city. in his certificate of candidacy,
aquino stated that he was aresident of the aforementioned district for ten (10) months. faced with a
petition for disqualification, he amended theentry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1
year and 13 days. the commission on electionsdismissed the petition on 6 may 199, and allowed
aquino to run in the election of 8 may. aquino won. acting on amotion for reconsideration of the above
dismissal, the commission on election later issued an order suspendingthe proclamation of aquino
until the commission resolved the issue. on 2 june 1995, the commission on electionsfound aquino
ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
issue:
whether or not residency in the coc actually connotes domicile to warrant thedisqualification of
aquino from the position in the electoral district
held:
the supreme court held that the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matterwhere he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that towhich the constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law. the purpose is toexclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community from takingadvantage of favorable circumstances existing in
that community for electoral gain. aquinos coc in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a

resident and a registered voter of san jose,concepcion, tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that
election. aquinos connection to the second district of makati city is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. the intention not to establish apermanent home in makati city is evident
in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. the shortlength of time he claims to be a
resident of makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in tarlac and his claims of other residences in
metro manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a
new residence or domicile, but only to qualify as a candidate for representative of the second district
of makati city. aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the commission on elections.
article visection 17. electoral tribunal
abbas v. set, 166 scra 651 (1988)
facts:
abbas filed an election contest before the set, against 22 candidates of laban who were earlier
proclaimed as senators.
abbas moved for the disqualification / inhibition of some senators (who are part of the set) on the
ground that they are all interested parties to the case. he wanted mass disqualification of the 6 senators
who comprised the senate electoral tribunal (set). he argues that such is required by public policy, fair
play and due process. senator enrile in the meantime voluntarily inhibited himself. in effect, abbas was
also proposing to amend the sets rules so as to permit the contest being decided by only 3 members.
abbas proposes that when more than 4 members are disqualified, the remaining shall constitute a
quorum, and that if not less than 3, it may adopt resolutions by majority vote without absention.
issue:
whether or not the set may function without the participation of its senator-members.
held:
the supreme court held that it cannot function as such. it seems quite clear that in providing for the set
to be staffed by both sc justices and senators, the constitution intended that both those judicial and
legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the
erq of senators. the legislative component cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of the contests. the proposed mass disqualification would leave the set no alternative but to
abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of senators.
article visection 17. electoral tribunal
bondoc v. pineda, 201 scra 792 (1991)

facts:
marciano pineda of the ldp and emigdio bondoc of the np were candidates for the position of
representative for the fourth district of pampanga. pineda was proclaimed winner. bondoc filed a
protest in the house of representatives electoral tribunal (hret), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of
whom are justices of the sc and the remaining 6 are members of the house of representatives (5
members belong to the ldp and 1 member is from the np). thereafter, a decision had been reached in
which bondoc won over pineda. congressman camasura of the ldp voted with the sc justices and
congressman cerilles of the np to proclaim bondoc the winner of the contest.on the eve of the
promulgation of the bondoc decision, congressman camasura received a letter informing him that he
was already expelled from the ldp for allegedly helping to organize the partido pilipino of eduardo
cojuangco and for allegedly inviting ldp members in davao del sur to join said political party. on the
day of the promulgation of the decision, the chairman of hret received a letter informing the tribunal
that on the basis of the letter from the ldp, the house of representatives decided to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of congressman camasura to the hret.
issue:
whether or not the resolution of the house of representatives violates the independence of the hret
held:
yes. as judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. they must discharge their functions
with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party
to which they belong. hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds
for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. in expelling congressman camasura from the hret for
having cast a conscience vote in favor of bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the house of representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the constitution. its resolution of
expulsion against congressman camasura is, therefore, null and void.

article visection 17. electoral tribunal


robles v. hret, 181 scra 780 (1990)

facts:
petitioner virgilio robles and private respondent romeo santos were candidates for the position of
congressman. petitioner robles was proclaimed the winner. santos filed an election protest with
respondent hret. he alleged that the elections were characterized by the commission of electoral frauds
and irregularities in various forms, on the day of election and the canvassing. he likewise prayed for
the recounting of the genuine ballots in all 320 contested precincts. petitioner filed his protest and
alleged the lack of residence of protestant and the late filing of his protest. respondent hret issued an
order setting the commencement of the revision of the contested ballots and directed protestant santos
to identify 25% of the total contested precincts which he desires to revise first in accordance with the
rules of hret. the revision of the ballots for 75 precincts, representing the initial 25% of all contested
precincts, was terminated. no action on robles motion to suspend revision and santos motion to
withdraw protest on unrevised precincts were yet taken by the respondent hret when santos filed an
urgent motion to recall and disregard withdrawal of protest. robles opposed santos in an urgent motion
to cancel the revision. that same day, respondent hret issued a resolution which, among others, granted
santos urgent motion to recall and disregard withdrawal of protest. robles then filed an urgent motion
for reconsideration of the hret resolution. the hret denied robles motion for reconsideration.
issue:
whether or not the hret acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
held:
no. the mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without
any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction
over the case. jurisdiction, once acquired, is never lost upon the instance of the parties but continues
until the case is terminated. we cannot agree with the protestees contention that protestants motion
to withdraw protest on unrevised precincts effectively withdrew the precincts referred to therein from
the protest even before the tribunal has acted thereon. certainly, the tribunal retains the authority to
grant or deny the motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the motion is granted. to
hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.

article visection 17. electoral tribunal


pimentel v. hret, gr 141489 may 29, 2002
facts:
the party-list system act took effect. in accordance with the party-list system act, national elections
were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and
organizations whose nominees would become members of the house. proclaimed winners were 14
party-list representatives from 13 organizations. due to the votes it garnered, apec was able to send 2
representatives to the house, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. also
elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. subsequently, the house
constituted its hret and ca contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies.
from available records, it does not appear that after the elections the party-list groups in the house
nominated any of their representatives to the hret or the ca. as of the date of filing of the present
petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the house
contingents to the hret and the ca were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the
different political parties. senator pimentel, jr. wrote two letters addressed to then senate president

ople, as chairman of the ca, and to associate justice of the supreme court melo (now retired), as
chairman of the hret. the letters requested senate to cause the restructuring of the ca and the hret,
respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to the constitution. in its meeting, the hret
resolved to direct the secretary of the tribunal to refer senator pimentels letter to the secretary-general
of the house of representatives. on the same day, hret secretary panga-vega, in an indorsement of even
date, referred the letter to house of representatives secretary general nazareno. eballe, et al. filed with
this court their petitions for prohibition, mandamus and preliminary injunction against the hret and ca,
its chairman and members. they contend that, under the constitution and the party-list system act,
party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the hret, and 2.4 seats in the ca. they
charge that the hret, ca, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the
letter of senator pimentel. senator pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to
protect, defend and uphold the constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the ca.
he was joined by 5 party-list representatives from apec, aba, abanse, akbayan and coop-natcco as copetitioners.
issue:
whether or not the present composition of the house electoral tribunal violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret
held:
no. the constitution expressly grants to the house of representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those
who may occupy the seats allotted to the house in the hret and the ca. the constitution explicitly
confers on the senate and on the house the authority to elect among their members those who would
fill the 12 seats for senators and 12 seats for house members in the commission on appointments. each
chamber of congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among
their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal. these
constitutional provisions are reiterated in the rules of the house of representatives electoral tribunal.
the discretion of the house to choose its members to the hret and the ca is not absolute, being subject
to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. however, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the court may not interfere with the exercise by the house of this constitutionally
mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. neither does it appear that after the 11
elections, the house barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the hret or the
ca. rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the house at that time simply
refrained from participating in the election process.
article visection 17. electoral tribunal
banat v. comelec, gr no. 177508, august 7, 2009
facts:
barangay association for national advancement and transparency (banat) party list petitioned in court
for the constitutionality of ra 9369, enjoining respondent comelec from implementing the statute. ra
9369 is a consolidation of senate bill no. 2231 and house bill no. 5352. petitioner also assailed the
constitutionality of some sections of the said republic act and alleged that they were of questionable
application and their validity was doubtful. petitioner raised the issue whether ra 9369, ra 7166 as
amended, being a consolidation of senate bill no. 2231 and house bill no. 5352, violated article vi of
the constitution which states that "every bill passed by the congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof." banat also questioned the validity of other sections,
whether or not it violated article vi of the constitution which specifies that the senate and the house of
representatives should each have an electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election,
returns, and qualification contests relating to its members. petitioner alleged that the title of ra 9369 is
misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the

manual canvassing of election returns. petitioner also alleged that some sections are neither embraced
in the title nor pertaining to the subject matter of ra 9369.
issue:
whether or not the cited sections violate the constitution
held:
no. the court holds that there has not been any violation of the constitution. it is settled that every
statute is presumed to be constitutional. the presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a
valid, sensible and just law. those who petition the court to declare a law unconstitutional must show
that there is a clear an unequivocal breach of the constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or
argumentative one. otherwise, the petition must fail. said sections do not violate article vi. the comelec
maintained that the amendments introduced pertained only to the adoption and application of the
procedures on the pre-proclamation controversies. it did not provide congress and the comelec "en
banc" may entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts.
article visection 17. electoral tribunal
drilon, et al v. speaker, gr no. 180055, july 31, 2009
facts:
the first petition, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a liberal party member of
the house contingent to the ca, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn. as for the second
petition, it fails. the second petition filed by senator jamby madrigal in a summary tackle about the
reorganization of the membership of the ca and that, in the meantime, "all actions of ca be held in
abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal and unconstitutional. senator jamby madrigal
petitions to reorganize the membership of the ca, is based upon the observations that she herself
observed in the list of commission on appointments membership that there are certain political parties
acquire a seat of membership in ca held a position which supposedly are not allowed in the provision
of the constitution , moreover, she added to estopp the intention of the committee request that "all
actions of the commission be held in abeyance.
issue:
whether or not the petitioner is the proper party concerned
held:
no. senator madrigal contention has been dismissed due to the guidelines she ignored. petitioner has
no standing to file the petition .petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior
resort. each house of congress has the sole function of reconstituting or changing the composition of
its own contingent to the ca. the extraordinary remedies of prohibition and mandamus and the relief of
a tro are not available to the petitioner. the constitution provides: there shall be a commission on
appointments consisting of the president of the senate, as ex officio chairman, twelve senators and
twelve members of the house of representatives, elected by each house on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. the chairman of the commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. the
commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the congress
from their submission. the commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the members.
article vi section 18. commission on appointments
daza v. singson, 180 scra 496 (1989)
facts:
after the 1987 congressional elections, the house of representatives have proportionally appropriated
the ones to occupy the seats for the commission on appointments which included the petitioner daza.
however, in the following months, realignment on the political party the ldp, caused change in its
representation on the commission on appointments. thus, as a consequence, the petitioner was
removed from the seat in the commission and was replaced with the respondent singson. daza now
questions the validity of the replacement.
issue:
whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the

commission on appointments
held:
yes. the court holds that there is validity in the action of replacing the petitioner with the respondent
and it is with adherence to the constitution. as provided in the constitution, there should be a
commission on appointments consisting of twelve senators and twelve members of the house of
representatives elected by each house respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of congress to see to it
that the requirement is duly complied with. therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon
the initial organization of the commission but also subsequently thereto not the court.
article vi section 18. commission on appointments
coseteng v. mitra, 187 scra 377 (1990)
facts:
petitioner was the only congresswoman that was elected under the political party of kaiba. after
sometime, the ldp was organized as a political party. more than half of the members of the congress
affiliate themselves to the said party. due to this, the commission on appointments(coa) had to be
reorganized. petitioner wrote a letter to the speaker requesting that as a representative of kaiba, she be
part of the coa and the house electoral tribunal. the house of representatives then revised of the
majority membership in the coa to conform with the new political alignment by replacing
representative daza, a member of the liberal party, with representative singson, a member of the ldp.
however, representative ablan of the kbl was retained as a representative of the house minority.
petitioner then filed a petition for extraordinary legal writs praying that the supreme court declare
nullity of the election of the respondents to the coa and enjoin the other respondents from recognizing
them as members of the coa on grounds that their election was invalid because it violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation.
issue:
whether or not the members of the commission of appointments were chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in section 18, article vi of the
1987 constitution
held:
yes. the court holds that the appointment was at par with the constitution. the composition of the house
membership in the commission on appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties in the house. there are 160 members of the ldp in the house. they represent 79% of the
house membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the
commission on appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10)
members from the ldp. the remaining two seats were apportioned to the lp (respondent verano-yap) as
the next largest party in the coalesced majority and the kbl (respondent ablan) as the principal
opposition party in the house. there is no doubt that this apportionment of the house membership in
the commission on appointments was done on the basis of proportional representation of the political
parties therein.
article vi section 18. commission on appointments
guingona v. gonzales, 214 scra 789 (1992); mr, 219 scra 326 (1993)
facts:
after elections, the senate was composed of 15 ldp senators, 5 npc senators, 3 lakas-nucd senators, and
1 lp-pdp-laban senator. to suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the
coa, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula:(no. of senators of a political party) x 12 seats)
total no. of senators elected the results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for ldp, 2.5
members for npc, 1.5 members for lakas-nucd, and 0.5 members for lp-pdp-laban. romulo, as the
majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that
taada from lp-pdp-laban should represent the same party to the coa. this is also pursuant to the
proposition compromise by senator tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the coa
should consist of 8 ldp, 1 lp-pdp-laban, 2 npc and 1 lakas-nucd. guingona, a member of lakas-nucd,

opposed the said compromise. he alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.
issue:
whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the coa
held:
no. it is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on
the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. a literal
interpretation of section 18 of article vi of the constitution leads to no other manner of application. the
problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. the ldp
majority in the senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator
by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect romulo. in so doing one other partys fractional
membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the commission on
appointments to less than their proportional representation in the senate. this is clearly a violation of
section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the commission
be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. the election of senator romulo gave
more representation to the ldp and reduced the representation of one political party. a party should
have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the coa. where there are more than 2
parties in senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. in
order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional
representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.
article vi section 18. commission on appointments
drilon, et al v. speaker, gr no. 180055, july 31, 2009
facts:
the first petition, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a liberal party member of
the house contingent to the ca, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn. as for the second
petition, it fails. the second petition filed by senator jamby madrigal in a summary tackle about
the reorganization of the membership of the ca and that, in the meantime, "all actions of ca be held in
abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal and unconstitutional. senator jamby madrigal
petitions to reorganize the membership of the ca, is based upon the observations that she herself
observed in the list of commission on appointments membership that there are certain political parties
acquire a seat of membership in ca held a position which supposedly are not allowed in the provision
of the constitution , moreover, she added to estopp the intention of the committee request that "all
actions of the commission be held in abeyance.
issue:
whether or not the petition before the supreme court is proper
held:
the first petition, g.r. no. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a liberal
party member of the house contingent to the ca, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn. as for
the second petition, g.r. no. 183055, it fails. senator madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct
injury as a result of the act complained of. her petition does not in fact allege that she or her political
party pdp-laban was deprived of a seat in the ca, or that she or pdp-laban possesses personal and
substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi. senator madrigals primary recourse rests with the
respective houses of congress and not with this court. the doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that
prior recourse to the house is necessary before she may bring her petition to court. senator villars
invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken.
article vi section 21 inquiries in aid of legislation
senate blue ribbon committee v. majaducon, gr 136760 july 29, 2003
facts:
senator ople filed senate resolution no.157 directing the committee on national defense and security to
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then defense secretary mercado that a

group of active and retired military officers were organizing a coup d 'etat to prevent the
administration of then president estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the armed forces of
the philippines. on the same date, senator sotto iii also filed resolution no.160, "directing the
appropriate senate committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the alleged
mismanagement of the funds and investment portfolio of the armed forces retirement and separation
benefits system (afp-rsbs).during the public hearings conducted by the senate blue ribbon committee,
it appeared that the afp-rsbs purchased a lot in general santos city, from private respondent atty.
flaviano. however, the deed of sale filed with the register of deeds indicated that the purchase price of
the lot differed from the actual. committee thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to respondent
atty. flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. respondent refused to appear at the hearing.
instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order with rtc. the trial court issued a tro directing the committee "to cease and desist from
proceeding with the inquiry on matters affecting the patenting/titling and sale of lot and "from
issuing subpoenas to witnesses, pending the hearing of the petition for prohibition and injunction."
issue:
whether or not respondent judge majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed
petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction
held:
yes. there is grave abuse of discretion when the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment, as when the assailed order is bereft of any factual and
legal justification.in this case, the assailed resolution of respondent judge majaducon was issued
without legal basis. the principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to
congress, execution to the executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the judiciary. each is
prevented from invading the domain of the others.when the senate blue ribbon committee served
subpoena on respondent flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its investigation of
the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the afp-rsbs funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. this is clearly provided in article vi, section 21 of the
constitution.
article vi section 25 limits in power to appoint
province of batangas v. romulo 429 scra 81
facts:
then president estrada issued eo no. 48 establishing the program for devolution adjustment and
equalization to enhance the capabilities of lgus in the discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them through the lgc. the oversight committee under executive secretary zamora passed
resolutions which were approved by pres. estrada on october 6, 1999. the guidelines formulated by the
oversight committee required the lgus to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of
lgsef and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the dilg for appraisal before the
committee serves notice to the dbm for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds. hon.
mandanas, governor of batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos
contained in the general appropriations acts (gaas) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of p5billion for the internal revenue allotment (ira)
for the local government service equalization fund (lgsef) & imposed conditions for the release
thereof.
issue:
whether or not the assailed provisos in the gaas of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the ocd resolutions
infringe the constitution and the lgc of 1991
held:
yes. according to art. ii, sec.25 of the constitution, the state shall ensure the local autonomy of local
governments. consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the constitution confines the
presidents power over the lgus to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude
the power of control. a general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is

limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit any
provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an inappropriate provision.
increasing/decreasing the ira of lgus fixed in the lgc of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law.
to permit the congress to undertake these amendments through the gaas would unduly infringe the
fiscal autonomy of the lgus. the value of lgus as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree
of autonomy they enjoy. our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional
provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these
provisions are based.
article vi section 26 subject and title of bills; three readings
abas kida v. senate of the philippines, g.r. no. 196271, october 18, 2011
facts:
several laws pertaining to the armm were enacted by congress. ra no. 6734 is the organic act that
established the armm and scheduled the first regular elections for the armm regional officials. ra no.
9054 amended the armm charter and reset the regular elections for the armm regional officials to the
second monday of september 2001. ra no. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to november 26,
2001. ra no. 9333 reset for the third time the armm regional elections to the 2nd monday of august
2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. pursuant to ra no. 9333, the next armm regional
elections should have been held on august 8, 2011. comelec had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. but on june
30, 2011, ra no. 10153 was enacted, resetting once again the next armm regular elections to may 2013
to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. in these consolidated petitions
filed directly with the supreme court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of ra no. 10153.
issue:
whether or not the passage of ra no. 10153 violates the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
section 26(2), article vi of the 1987 constitution
held:
no. the passage of ra no. 10153 does not violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in
the constitution.the general rule that before bills passed by either the house or the senate can become
laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the exception when the
president certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. the presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.in
this case, records show that the president wrote to the speaker of the house to certify to the necessity
of immediate enactment of the law synchronizing the armm elections with the national and local
elections.
article vi section 27 passage of bills; item veto
cir v. cta, 185 scra 329 (1990
facts:
supreme court overruled court of tax appeals decision that caterers tax under ra6110 is illegal
because it was vetoed by former president marcos and congress had not taken steps to override the
veto. sc ruled in this case that the law has always imposed a 3% caterers tax, as provided in par 1, sec
206 of the tax code. presently, manila golf and country club, a non-stock corporation claims that it is
exempt from the 3% on gross receipts because president marcos vetoed sec 191-a of ra 6110 (omnibus
tax law). president marcos vetoed sec 191-a because according to him it would:
1) shift the burden of taxation to the consuming public and
2) restrain the development of hotels which are essential to the tourist industry.
the protestation of the club was denied by petitioners saying that sec42 was not entirely vetoed but
merely the words hotels, motels, resthouses. house of ways and means concurred with petitioners
stating that veto message only seems to object with certain portions of 191-a and that can be gleaned
by the reasons given by the president.
issue:
whether or not veto referred to the entire section on gross receipts of operators and proprietors of

eating places within hotels, motels and rest houses


held:
no. president does not have the power to repeal an existing tax. therefore, he could not have repealed
the 2% caterers tax.cta agreed with respondent club that president vetoed only a certain part. cta
mentioned that president can veto only an entire item, and not just words. the president intentionally
only vetoed a few words in sec 191-a. assuming that the veto could not apply to just one provision but
all would render the presidential veto void and still in favor of petitioner. inclusion of hotels, motels,
rest houses in the 20% caterers tax bracket are items. president has the right to veto such item, that
which is subject to tax and tax rate. it does not refer to an entire section. to construe item as an entire
section would be to tie his hands to either completely agree with a section he has objections with or to
disagree with an entire section where he only has a portion he disagrees with.
article vi section 27 passage of bills; item veto
bolinao electronics v. valencia, 11 scra 486 (1964)
facts:
this is an original petition filed by the bolinao electronics corporation, chronicle broadcasting network
(cbn), inc., and monserrat broadcasting system, inc., owners and operators of radio and television
stations enumerated therein, against respondents secretary of public works and communications and
acting chief of the radio control division. later the republic of the philippines, as operator of the
philippine broadcasting service (pbs), sought and was allowed to intervene in this case, said intervenor
having been granted a construction permit to install and operate a television station in manila.
petitioners applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied because it should be filed
two month before the expiration of the license. pursuant to republic act 584, on the powers and duties
of the secretary of public works and communications, he may approve or disapprove any application
for renewal of station or operator license, provided, however, that no application for renewal shall be
disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing. thus the notices of hearing were sent by
respondents to petitioners. clearly, the intention of the investigation is to find out whether there is
ground to disapprove the applications for renewal. according to petitioner however, the violation has
ceased to exist when the act of late filing was condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of
the circular. the lone reason given for the investigation of petitioners' applications is therefore no
longer tenable. the violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is neither reason nor need
for the present investigation.
issues:
whether or not president may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill
held:
yes. the executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions,
has been adhered to in subsequent cases. if the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same
produced no effect whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore,
remains. any expenditure made by the intervenor pbs, for the purpose of installing or operating a
television station in manila, where there are already television stations in operation, would be in
violation of the express condition for the release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void.
it is not difficult to see that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on channel 9, said
intervenor would not have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.
article vi section 28 power of taxation; limitations; exemptions
cir v. santos, gr no. 119252, august 18, 1997
facts:
guild of phil. jewellers questions the constitutionality of certain provisions of the nirc and tariff and
customs code of the philippines. it is their contention that present tariff and tax structure increases
manufacturing costs and render local jewelry manufacturers uncompetitive against other countries., in
support of their position, they submitted what they purported to be an exhaustive study of the tax rates
on jewelry prevailing in other asian countries, in comparison to tax rates levied in the country. judge

santos of rtc pasig, ruled that the laws in question are confiscatory and oppressive and declared them
inoperative and withour force and effect insofar as petitioners are concerned. petitioner cir assailed
decision rendered by respondent judge contending that the latter has no authority to pass judgment
upon the taxation policy of the government. petitioners also impugn the decision by asserting that
there was no showing that the tax laws on jewelry are confiscatory.
issue:
whether or not the regional trial court has authority to pass judgment upon taxation policy of the
government
held:
no. the policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts
of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the
contrary. this is not to say that rtc has no power whatsoever to declare a law unconstitutional. but this
authority does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy.rtc have the power
to declare the law unconstitutional but this authority does not extend to deciding questions which
pertain to legislative policy. rtc can only look into the validity of a provision, that is whether or not it
has been passed according to the provisions laid down by law, and thus cannot inquire as to the
reasons for its existence. sc held that it is within the power f the legislature whether to tax jewelry or
not.with the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object(purpose),
extent (rate), coverage (subject) and situs (place) of taxation.
article vi section 28 power of taxation; limitations; exemptions
southern cross v. philippine cement gr no. 158540, july 8, 2004
facts:
philcemcor filed a petition seeking the imposition of safeguard measures on gray portland cement with
the dti. dti secretary then issued provisional safeguard measure and referred petition to tariff
commission. the commission investigated and later reported that there was no need for definitive
safeguard measures. the dti secretary then denied philcemcors petition but expressed his disagreement
on the commissions findings. philcemcor then challenged this decision in the ca. ca ruled that the dti
secretary was not bound by the tariff commissions report since it was merely recommendatory. based
on this decision, the dti secretary then imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation on
gray portland cement for 3 years. southern cross challenges both the ca and the dti decisions.
issue:
whether or not the dti sec is barred from imposing a general safeguard measure absent a positive final
determination rendered by the tariff commission
held:
yes. the dti secretary cannot impose a general safeguard measure without a positive final
determination rendered by the tariff commission because it is a constitutional limitation imposed on
the delegation of legislative power to impose tariffs and imposts to the president. the authorization to
the president can be exercised only within the specified limits set in the law and is further subject to
limitations and restrictions which congress may impose. it is the congress which possesses inherent
powers to impose tariffs and imposts. without legislative authorization, through statute, the president
has no power, authority or right to impose such safeguard measures because taxation is inherently
legislative, not executive.
article vi section 30 appelate jurisdiction of the supreme court
first lepanto ceramics v. ca, 237 scra 519, 1994
facts:
petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of b.p. 129, eo 226 (art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by
the supreme court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasijudicial agencies such as the board of investments (boi). boi granted petitioner first lepanto ceramics,
inc.'s application to amend its boi certificate of registration. oppositor mariwasa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said boi decision. soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, mariwasa filed a
petition for review with ca. ca temporarily restrained the boi from implementing its decision.

petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that ca does not have
jurisdiction over the boi case, since the same is exclusively vested with the supreme court pursuant to
article 82 of the omnibus investments code of 1987.petitioner argued that the judiciary reorganization
act of 1980 or b.p. 129 and circular 1-91, cannot be the basis of mariwasa's appeal to respondent court
because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to article 82 of e.o. 226, which
provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the boi shall be filed directly with the supreme court.
while mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between b.p. 129 and
article 82 of e.o. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by circular 1-91
of the supreme court, which was promulgated on february 27, 1991 or four (4) years after e.o. 226 was
enacted.
issue:
whether or not the court of appeals has jurisdiction over the case
held:
yes. circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded article 82 of e.o. 226 insofar as the manner and
method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the boi are concerned. appeals from
decisions of the boi, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the supreme
court, should now be brought to the court of appeals.
article vii section 1. executive power; privileges; immunities
prov. of north cotabato v. government, g.r. no. 183591, oct. 14, 2008
facts:
memorandum of agreement on the ancestral domain (moa-ad) brought about by the government of the
republic of the philippines (grp) and the moro islamic liberation front (milf) as an aspect of tripoli
agreement of peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in kuala lumpur, malaysia. this agreement was
petitioned by the province of north cotabato for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. the agreement mentions
bangsamoro juridical entity (bje) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral
domain and ancestral lands of the bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources
within internal waters. the agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for
autonomous region in muslim mindanao and the indigenous peoples rights act (ipra).
issue:
whether or not the grp violated the constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and
the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the moa-ad and whether or not the moa-ad
brought by the grp and milf is constitutional
held:
yes. grp violated the constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and initiated the moa-ad and it are unconstitutional because it is
contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof. the grp is required by this law to carry
out public consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and
process and the mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process.
article vii section 1. executive power; privileges; immunities
webb v. de leon, 247 scra 652
facts:
this is the hubert webb- vizconde massacre case. hubert is co-accused in the crime of rape with
homicide. jessica alfaro is the star witness. alfaro qualified under the witness protection program, ra
6981. thus she was not included in the complaint or information. hubert contends that the doj failed to
include alfaro in the information for her alleged conspiratorial participation in the said crime. hubert
challenges the law, ra 6981 claiming that it constitutes an intrusion into the judicial prerogative for it
is only the court which has the power to discharge an accused as a state witness.
issue:
whether or not the doj can approve the discharge of a state witness
held:

yes. the prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department, whose principal power and
responsibility is to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. a necessary component of this power
to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. the right to prosecute vests the prosecutor
with a wide range of discretion, and the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise
of which depends on a smorgasboard of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. the law is
valid in vesting the doj with the power to determine who can qualify as a witness and who shall be
granted immunity from prosecution.
article vii section 1. executive power; privileges; immunities
senate v. ermita, gr no. 169777, april 20, 2006
facts:
this is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the president has abused power by issuing
e.o. 464 ensuring observance of the principles of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid
of legislation under the constitution, and for other purposes. petitioners pray for its declaration as null
and void for being unconstitutional. in the exercise of its legislative power, the senate of the
philippines, through its various senate committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in government owned and controlled
corporations, the armed forces of the philippines (afp), and the philippine national police (pnp). the
committee of the senate issued invitations to various officials of the executive department for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive
election fraud in the philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called
gloriagate scandal. said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the president as
provided by e.o. 464, section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the president prior to appearing before either house of congress.
issue:
whether or not section 3 of e.o. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in section 2(b)
to secure the consent of the president prior to appearing before either house of congress, valid and
constitutional
held:
no. the enumeration in section 2 (b) of e.o. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. the
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. the privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to congress, the necessity must be
of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in
aid of legislation. if the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
article vii section 1. executive power; privileges; immunities
neri v. senate, gr no. 180643, march 25, 2008, september 4, 2008
facts:
the department of transportation and communication (dotc) entered into a contract with zhong xing
telecommunications equipment (zte) for the supply of equipment and services for the national
broadband network (nbn) project. the project was to be financed by the peoples republic of china. the
senate passed various resolutions relative to the nbn deal. in the september 18, 2007 hearing jose de
venecia iii testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence
to push the approval of the nbn project by the neda. neri, the head of neda, was then invited to testify
before the senate blue ribbon. he appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and
during which he admitted that abalos of comelec tried to bribe him with p200m in exchange for his
approval of the nbn project. he further narrated that he informed president arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. however, when probed further on what

they discussed about the nbn project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. he
later refused to attend the other hearings and ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between gma and neri are privileged.
issue:
whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege
held:
yes. the communications are covered by executive privilege. the revocation of eo 464 does not in any
way diminish the concept of executive privilege. this is because this concept has constitutional
underpinnings. the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the constitution to the president, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. under our constitution, the president is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.
article vii section 4. election and canvass
lopez v. senate and house, gr no. 163556, june 8, 2004
facts:
the case is a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by lopez seeking to nullify section 13, rule
viii of the rules of the joint public session of congress. it created a joint committee that would
preliminary canvass the votes of the candidates for president and vice-president in the may 2004
election.
issue:
whether or not the congress committed grave abuse of discretion
held:
no. it did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. the court has jurisdiction following the principle
that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the initiatory proceedings, like the complaint or
petition. the court deemed that the petition provide sufficient allegations of violation of the
constitution.section 4, article vii expressly provides that congress has the power to promulgate its rules
for canvassing the certificates.the court has no power to review the internal proceedings of congress,
unless there is a clear violation of the constitution. the doctrine of separation of powers: no authority
to interfere when there is no showing of abuse of discretion; co-equal branches.
article vii section 4. election and canvass
pimentel v. joint canvassing committee, june 22, 2004
facts:
by a petition for prohibition, senator aquilino q. pimentel, jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void
the continued existence of the joint committee of congress to determine the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for presidential and
vice presidential candidates in the may 10 2004 elections following the adjournment of congress on
june 11 2004. the petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the joint
committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the rules of the
joint public session of congress on canvassing.
issue:
whether or not legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both houses of
congress supports pimentels arguments against the existence and proceedings of the joint committee
of congress after the adjournment of congress
held:
no. pimentels claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure, precedent or practice
as borne out by the rules of both houses of congress is directly contradicted by section 42 of rule xiv
of the rules adopted by the senate, of which he is an incumbent member. moreover, the precedents set
by the 1992 and 1998 presidential elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing

by the joint committee. thus, during the 1992 presidential elections, both houses of congress adjourned
on 25 may 1992. thereafter, on 22 june 1992, the eight congress convened in joint public session as the
national board of canvassers, and on even date proclaimed ramos and estrada as president and vice
president, respectively.
article vii section 4. election and canvass
macalintal v. pet, gr no. 191618, november 23, 2010
facts:
atty. romulo b. macalintal, through a motion for reconsideration reiterates his arguments that section 4,
article vii of the constitution does not provide for the creation of the presidential electoral tribunal
(pet) and that the pet violates section 12, article viii of the constitution. in order to strengthen his
position, petitioner cites the concurring opinion of justice teresita j. leonardo de castro in barok c.
biraogo v. the philippine truth commission of 2010 - that the philippine truth commission (ptc) is a
public office which cannot be created by the president, the power to do so being lodged exclusively
with congress. thus, petitioner submits that if the president, as head of the executive department,
cannot create the ptc, the supreme court, likewise, cannot create the pet in the absence of an act of
legislature.
issue:
whether or not the creation of the presidential electoral tribunal is constitutional
held:
yes. motion for reconsideration is denied. judicial power granted to the supreme court by the same
constitution is plenary. and under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction
bestowed by the last paragraph of section 4, article vii of the constitution to decide presidential and
vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. with the advent
of the 1987 constitution, judicial power was expanded. the power was expanded, but it remained
absolute. atty. romulo b. macalintal is going to town under the misplaced assumption that the text of
the provision itself was the only basis for this court to sustain the pets constitutionality. the court
reiterates that the pet is authorized by the last paragraph of section 4, article vii of the constitution and
as supported by the discussions of the members of the constitutional commission, which drafted the
present constitution. the explicit reference by the framers of our constitution to constitutionalizing
what was merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating
the supreme court to create a presidential electoral tribunal.
article vii section 4. election and canvass
fernando poe, jr. v. arroyo, pet case no. 002, march 29, 2005
facts:
fernando poe jr. (fpj) filed an election protest at the presidential electoral tribunal (pet) against the
proclaimed winner of the 2004 presidential elections. during the pendency of the case, fpj died. his
widow, susan roces, claimed before the pet that there was an urgent need for her to substitute her
husband in the election protest that he had filed as it is of paramount interest to the filipino people.
issue:
may the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latters
presidential protest case
held:
no. the fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is rule 14 of the pet rules. it
provides that only the registered candidate for president or vice president of the philippines who has
received the second or third highest number of votes may timely contest the election of the proclaimed
winner. furthermore, a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property capable of
being transmitted to his heirs upon his death. a real party in interest is the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. thus, susan
roces, is not a real-party-in-interest to the election protest of her husband fpj.
article vii section 13. prohibitions
doromal v. sandiganbayan, 177 scra 354, 1989

facts:
doromal, a former commissioner of the pcgg, as president and director of the doromal international
trading corporation (ditc). an information was filed by the tanodbayan against doromal for violation
of ra 3190 and a preliminary investigation was conducted. the petitioner then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the tanodbayan. the supreme court held that
the incumbent tanodbayan is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases with the sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the ombudsman. a
new information, duly approved by the ombudsman, was filed in the sandiganbayan, alleging that the
doromal, a public officer, being then a commissioner of the pcgg, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully, participate in a business through the doromal international trading corporation, a family
corporation of which he is the president, and which company participated in the biddings conducted
by the department of education, culture and sports and the national manpower & youth council, which
act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution. the petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that it was invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the
new information that was filed against him.
issue:
whether or not the act of doromal would constitute a violation of the constitution
held:
yes. petition was granted by the supreme court. the presence of a signed document bearing the
signature of doromal as part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with
having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by section 13 of article vii of the
constitution" because "the ditc remained a family corporation in which doromal has at least an indirect
interest." section 13, article vii of the 1987 constitution provides that "the president, vice-president,
the members of the cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, directly or
indirectly, participate in any business.
article vii section 13. prohibitions
flores v. drilon, 223 scra 568, 1993
facts:
section 13 of ra 7227, otherwise known as the bases conversion and development act of 1992 under
which respondent mayor richard j. gordon of olongapo city was appointed chairman and chief
executive officer of the subic bay metropolitan authority (sbma) is challenged in this case. said
provision provides the president the power to appoint an administrator of the sbma provided that in the
first year of operation, the olangapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of
the subic authority. petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of section
13 of article vii.
issue:
whether or not said provision of the ra 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts
held:
yes. the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective
officials to other government posts. the court held the constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to
hold multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them
function without the distraction of other government duties. the proviso violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. the
court held the constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions since they are
accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without the distraction of other
government duties.
article vii section 16. power to appoint; commission on appointments
bautista v. salonga, 172 scra 1260, 1989
facts:
president cory aquino appointed petitioner mary concepcion bautista as permanent chairman of the

commission on human rights (chr). bautista took her oath of office to chief justice marcelo fernan and
immediately acted as such. the secretary of the commission on appointments (coa) wrote a letter to
bautista requesting for her presence along with several documents at the office of coa on january 19.
bautista refused to be placed under coas review. bautista filed a petition with the supreme court. while
waiting for the progress of the case, president aquino appointed hesiquio r. mallillin as acting
chairman of the commission on human rights but he was not able to sit in his appointive office
because of bautistas refusal to surrender her post. malilin invoked eo 163-a which provides that the
tenure of the chairman and the commissioners of the chr should be at the pleasure of the president thus
stating that bautista shall be subsequently removed as well.
issue:
whether or not bautistas appointment is subject to coas confirmation
held:
no. the position of chairman of chr is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of sec.
16, art vii of the 1987 constitution, which provides the appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of coa. it therefore follows that the appointment of the chairman of chr by the president
is to be made and finalized even without the review or participation of coa. bautistas appointment as
the chairman of chr, therefore, was already a completed act on the day she took her oath as the
appointment was finalized upon her acceptance, expressly stated in her oath. the chairman of chr
cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must
have a term of office.
article vii section 16. power to appoint; commission on appointments
sarmiento v. mison, 156 scra 549, 1987
facts:
this is the 1st major case under the 1987 constitution. mison was appointed as the commissioner of the
bureau of customs and carague as the secretary of the department of budget. their appointment was
made by the president and was done without the concurrence of the coa. ulpiano, being members of
the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of mison and
carague and alleged that it needed the confirmation by the coa.
issue:
whether or not the appointment is valid
held:
yes. it is valid. it is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 constitution, there are four
(4) groups of officers whom the president shall appoint. the 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups of officers are the
present bone of contention. by following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction
that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only
those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation)
of the coa. the constitutional provision is clear and has positive intent of the framers of the 1987
constitution that presidential appointment, except those mentioned in the first sentence of sec. 16,
article 7, is not subject to confirmation by the coa. misons and caragues appointments are affirmed.
article vii section 16. power to appoint; commission on appointments
quintos-deles v. commission on appointments, 177 scra 259, 1989
facts:
the petitioner and three others were appointed sectoral representatives by the president pursuant to
article vii, section 16, paragraph 2 and article xviii, section 7 of the constitution. due to the opposition
of some congressmen-members of the commission on appointments, who insisted that sectoral
representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent commission before they could take their
oaths and/or assume office as members of the house of representatives, speaker mitra, jr. suspended
the oath taking of the four sectoral representatives which was scheduled. in view of this development,
executive secretary macaraig, jr. transmitted a letter of the president addressed to the coa submitting
for confirmation the appointments of the four sectoral representatives. meanwhile, petitioner, in a
letter addressed to speaker mitra, jr. appealed to the house of representatives alleging, among others,

that since no attempt was made to subject the sectoral representatives ** already sitting to the
confirmation process, there is no necessity for such confirmation. petitioner deles received an
invitation from the commission on appointments for the deliberation of her appointment as sectoral
representative for women. petitioner sent a reply explaining her position and questioning the
jurisdiction of the coa over the appointment of sectoral representatives. in a meeting of the committee
of the constitutional commissions and offices of the coa, chaired by sen. angara, the committee ruled
against the position of petitioner deles.
issue:
whether or not the constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the house of
representatives to be confirmed by the commission on appointments
held:
yes. the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, section 5, art. vi may be filled by
appointment by the president by express provision of section 7, art. xviii of the constitution, it is
indubitable that sectoral representatives to the house of representatives are among the other officers
whose appointments are vested in the president in this constitution, referred to in the first sentence of
section 16, art. vii whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the commission on
appointments. deles' appointment was made pursuant to art. vii, section 16, p.2 which gives the
president the power to make appointments during the recess of the congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the commission on
appointments or until the next adjournment of the congress. the records show that deles appointment
was made on april 6, 1988 or while congress was in recess; hence, the reference to the said paragraph
2 of section 16, art. vii in the appointment extended to her.
article vii section 16. power to appoint; commission on appointments
abas kida v. senate of the philippines, gr no. 196271, october 18, 2011
facts:
several laws pertaining to the armm were enacted by congress. ra no. 6734 is the organic act that
established the armm and scheduled the first regular elections for the armm regional officials. ra no.
9054 amended the armm charter and reset the regular elections for the armm regional officials to the
second monday of september 2001. ra no. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to november 26,
2001. ra no. 9333 reset for the third time the armm regional elections to the 2nd monday of august
2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. pursuant to ra no. 9333, the next armm regional
elections should have been held on august 8, 2011. comelec had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. but on june
30, 2011, ra no. 10153 was enacted, resetting once again the next armm regular elections to may 2013
to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. in these consolidated petitions
filed directly with the supreme court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of ra no. 10153.
issue:
whether or not the grant to the president of the power to appoint oics constitutional
held:
yes. the grant to the president of the power to appoint oics in the armm is constitutional. the court
identified the three options open to congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as
armm officials in the interim in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections:
(1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the armm to remain in office in a hold over capacity
until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office;
(2) hold special elections in the armm, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in
the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or
(3) authorize the president to appoint oics, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the
2013 synchronized elections assume office.
article vii section 19. executive clemency
echegaray v. sec. of justice, gr no. 132601, jan 19, 1999
facts:

the supreme court issued a tro staying the execution of petitioner leo echegaray scheduled on that
same day. the public respondent justice secretary assailed the issuance of the tro arguing that the
action of the sc not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of
the executive to grant reprieve.
issue:
whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a temporary restraining order (tro) on the
execution of echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered? and
that by granting the tro, the honorable court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function
held:
no. respondents cited sec 19, art vii. the provision is simply the source of power of the president to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. the provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality. the powers of the executive, the legislative and the
judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there
is no higher right than the right to life. for the public respondents therefore to contend that only the
executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle
of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
article vii section 21. foreign relations: senate concurrence in international agreements
usaffe veterans association v. treasurer, 105 phil 1030, 1959
facts:
the usaffe veterans associations inc., prayed in its complaint that the romulo-snyder agreement (1950)
be annulled, that payments there under be declared illegal and that defendants as officers of the
philippine republic be restrained from disbursing any funds in the national treasury in pursuance of
said agreement. said usaffe veterans further asked that the money available, instead of being remitted
to the united states, should be turned over to the finance service of the armed forces of the philippines
for the payment of all pending claims of the veterans represented by plaintiff. the complaint rested on
plaintiff's three propositions: first, that the funds to be "returned" under the agreement were funds
appropriated by the american congress for the philippine army, actually delivered to the philippine
government and actually owned by said government; second, that u.s. secretary snyder of the treasury,
had no authority to retake such funds from the p.i. government; and third, that philippine foreign
secretary romulo had no authority to return or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through
the so-called romulo-snyder agreement. the defendants moved to dismiss, alleging governmental
immunity from suit. but the court required an answer, and then heard the case merits. thereafter, it
dismissed the complaint, upheld the validity of the agreement and dissolved the preliminary injunction
i had previously issued. the plaintiff appealed.
issue:
whether or not the romulo-snyder agreement is void
held:
no. there is no doubt that president quirino approved the negotiations. and he had power to contract
budgetary loans under republic act no. 213, amending the republic act no. 16. the most important
argument, however, rests on the lack of ratification of the agreement by the senate of the philippines to
make it binding on this government. on this matter, the defendants explain as follows: that the
agreement is not a "treaty" as that term is used in the constitution is conceded. the agreement was
never submitted to the senate for concurrence .however, it must be noted that treaty is not the only
form that an international agreement may assume. for the grant of the treaty-making power to the
executive and the senate does not exhaust the power of the government over international relations.
consequently, executive agreements may be entered with other states and are effective even without
the concurrence of the senate. it is observed in this connection that from the point of view of the
international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding
effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their

powers.
article vii section 21. foreign relations: senate concurrence in international agreements
world health organization v. aquino, 48 scra 242
held:
no. there is no doubt that president quirino approved the negotiations. and he had power to contract
budgetary loans under republic act no. 213, amending the republic act no. 16. the most important
argument, however, rests on the lack of ratification of the agreement by the senate of the philippines to
make it binding on this government. on this matter, the defendants explain as follows: that the
agreement is not a "treaty" as that term is used in the constitution is conceded. the agreement was
never submitted to the senate for concurrence .however, it must be noted that treaty is not the only
form that an international agreement may assume. for the grant of the treaty-making power to the
executive and the senate does not exhaust the power of the government over international relations.
consequently, executive agreements may be entered with other states and are effective even without
the concurrence of the senate. it is observed in this connection that from the point of view of the
international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding
effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their
powers.
issue:
whether or not personal effect of who officer dr. verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure
under the diplomatic immunity
held:
yes. the executive branch of the philippines has expressly recognized that verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the host agreement. the dfa formally advised
respondent judge of the philippine government's official position. the solicitor general, as principal
law officer of the government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic
immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant. it recognized principle of international law
and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon
appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the solicitor general in this
case, or other officer acting under his discretion.
article vii section 21. foreign relations: senate concurrence in international agreements
bayan v. executive secretary zamora, 343 scra 449, 2000
facts:
the republic of the philippines and the united states of america entered into an agreement called the
visiting forces agreement (vfa). the agreement was treated as a treaty by the philippine government
and was ratified by then-president joseph estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership
of the philippine senate. the vfa defines the treatment of u.s. troops and personnel visiting the
philippines. it provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the
u.s. and the philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. petitioners argued, inter
alia, that the vfa violates 25, article xviii of the 1987 constitution, which provides that foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
issue:
whether or not the vfa unconstitutional
held:
no. vfa is not unconstitutional. section 25, article xviii disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a
treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the senate and, when so required by congress,

ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting state. to require the other contracting state, the united states of america
in this case, to submit the vfa to the united states senate for concurrence pursuant to its constitution, is
to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
article vii section 21. foreign relations: senate concurrence in international agreements
vinuya v. executive secretary, gr no. 162230, april 28, 2010
facts
petitioners are all members of the malaya lolas, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered withthe
sec for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by japanese military forces in thephilippines
during the wwii. they claim that they were comfort women at that time and have greatlysuffered
because of that. in 1998, they have approached the executive department through the doj, dfa,and osg
and requested assistance in filing a claim against the japanese officials and military officers
whoordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the philippines. however, the
officialsdeclined on that ground that the individual claims had already been satisfied by japans
compliance withthe san francisco peace treaty of 1951 and the bilateral reparations agreement of 1956
between japanand the philippines. the petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the
philippinegovernment in the treaty of peace with japan is void because the comfort women system
constituted acrime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. the same was prohibited under the jus
cogens normsfrom which no derogation is possible. thus, such waiver was a breach against the
governments obligationnot to afford impunity for crimes against humanity. in addition, they claim
that the philippine governmentsacceptance of the apologies made by japan as well as funds for the
awf were contrary to internationallaw.
issue:
was the refusal of the executive department to espouse petitioners claims against japan valid
held:
yes, it was valid. it has the exclusive prerogative for such determination. so much so, the philippines is
notunder any international obligation to espouse petitioners claim. given the extraordinary length of
time thathas lapsed between the treatys conclusion, the executive department had the ample time to
assess theforeign policy considerations of espousing a claim against japan, from the standpoint of both
the interestsof the petitioners and those of the republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are
sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.under international law, the only
means available for individuals to bring a claim within the internationallegal system has been when
the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on theindividuals behalf. when this
happens, in the eye of the international tribunal, the state is the soleclaimant.therefore, the state is the
sole judge to decide whether its protection in favor of those petitioners will begranted, to what extent
it is granted, and when will it cease. it is a discretionary power and the exercise of which may be
determined by consideration of a political or other nature.moreover, in the invocation of jus cogens
norms and ergaomnes obligation of the philippines, thepetitioners failed to show that the crimes
committed by the japanese army violated jiscogens prohibitionsat the time the treaty of peace was
signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimesin an ergaomnes obligation or
has attained the status of jus cogens.
article viii section 1. judicial power
santiago v. bautista, 32 scra 188 (2970)
facts:
teodoro santiago was a grade 6 pupil at sero elem. school. he was adjudged 3rd honors (3rd placer). 3
days before graduation, teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor
students. they filed a certiorari case against the principal and teachers who composed the committee
on rating honors. they contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion because
they claim that the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of santiago before, except in grade
5 only. the committee was composed only of grade 6 teachers. that some teachers gave santos a 75%
with an intention to pull him to a much lower rank that in the honors certificate in grade 1, the word

first place was erased and replaced with second place that the principal and district supervisors
merely passed the buck to each other to delay his grievances. the respondents filed a mtd claiming that
the action was improper, and that even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic.
respondents also argue that there was no gadalej on the part of the teachers since the committee on
ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions.
issue:
whether or not the judicial function can be exercised in this case
held:
no. a judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. the exercise of judicial
function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. in order for an action for
certiorari to exist:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing
and determination. , and
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary.
article viii section 1. judicial power
noblejas v. teehankee, 23 scra 405
fact:
antonio h. noblejas, commissioner of land registration, was under investigation by the secretary of
justice. by the terms of section 2 of ra no. 1151, the said commissioner was "entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a judge of the court of first instance." among
privileges was being suspended and investigated only by the supreme court, these being privileges
granted to judges of the court of first instance by section 67 of the judiciary act (ra no. 296) and rule
140 of the revised rules of court.
issue:
whether or not the commissioner of land registration may only be investigated by the supreme court,
in view of the conferment upon him by ra 1151 and appropriation laws of the rank and privileges of a
judge of the court of first instance.
held:
no. section 67 of the judiciary act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of judges,
specifically recites that "no district judge shall be separated or removed from office by the president
of the philippines unless sufficient causes hall exist in the judgment of the supreme court ."
article viii section 1. judicial power
manila electric company v. pasay transportation company, 57 phil 600
facts:
act no. 1446 granted a franchise to charles m. swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric
railway, and to construct, maintain and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point
in the city of manila in an easterly direction to the town in pasig, in the province of rizal."-section 11
of the act provides:"whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or
corporation, now or hereafter inexistence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein,
the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation
to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the
members of the supreme court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom
shall be final."- manila electric now asks the members of the supreme court ,sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the
pasig bridge of the manila electric company and the compensation to be paid to the manila electric
company by such transportation companies.
issue:
whether or not the members of the sc has legal right to act as board of arbitrators.
held: no. the supreme court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise a any
power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the

administering of judicial functions.


article viii section 1. judicial power
director of prisons v. ang cho kio, 33 scra 494
facts:
respondent ang cho kio ang ming huy had been charged, tried and convicted of various offenses
committed in the philippines and was sentenced to suffer penalties, to wit: a total of forty-five (45)
years, ten (10) months and twenty one (21) days of imprisonment, p6,000 indemnity, and p5,000
moral damages, plus life imprisonment and p6,000 indemnity.after serving six and one-half (6-)
years of his sentence said respondent was granted conditional pardon on july 4, 1959 by the president
of the philippines with the condition that he will voluntarily leave the philippines upon his release and
never to return to this country. should the above-named prisoner refuse to accept said condition, he
shall continue serving his sentence and upon the expiration thereof, he shall be deported from the
philippines for being an undesirable alien. ang cho kio duly accepted the conditions of his pardon and
actually left the philippines for taipeh, nationalist china, on july 28, 1959.
issue:
whether or not the courts of justice may interfere in the exercise by the president, thru his executive
secretary, of his administrative power of recommitment.
held:
it is settled jurisprudence that the chief executive may determine, alone and by himself, whether the
condition attached to a pardon given by him has been violated.
article viii section 1. judicial power
marcos v. manglapus, 177 scra 668 (1989); mr, 178 scra 760 (1989)
facts:
after ferdinand marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to hawaii. now in his
deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and
enjoin the implementation of the presidents decision to bar their return to the philippines. petitioners
contend under the provision of the bill of rights that the president is without power to impair their
liberty of abode because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. nor, according
to the petitioners, may the president impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to
do so.
issue:
whether or not the president has the power to bar the marcoses from returning to the philippines
held:
yes. the president has the obligation, under the constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance national interest. this case calls for the exercise of the presidents power as
protector of the peace. the president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order. the state,
acting through the government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its
existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of
the people is the essence of the duty of the government. the supreme court held that the president did
not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the
present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare
prohibiting their return to the philippines.
article viii section 1. judicial power
us v. nixon, 418 us 683 (1974)
facts:
the special prosecutor in the watergate scandal subpoenaed tape recordings made of president nixon
discussing the scandal with some of his advisers. the president claimed executive privilege as his basis
for refusing to turn over the tapes. the special prosecutor in the watergate scandal subpoenaed the tape
recordings of conversations involving the president and his advisers regarding the scandal. the
presidents counsel moved to quash the subpoena citing article ii of the united states constitution (the

constitution) and its grant of privilege to the president. the presidents counsel also argued it was a
non-justiciable question because it was a disagreement between parts of the executive branch.
issue:
whether or not the presidents article ii constitutional privilege absolute
held:
no. the presidents executive privilege is not absolute and must bend to amendment 4 and amendment
5 requirements of speedy and fair trials and of the ability of defendants to face their accusers. courts
are not required to proceed against the president as if the president was any other individual. courts
should review communications claimed to be privileged in camera (by the judge only in chambers).
the supreme court of the united states (supreme court) had to balance the executive privilege against
the rights of citizens to face their accusers and to have a speedy and fair trial. the court made the point
that the president is not a normal citizen, and therefore should receive great deference regarding
executive claims of privilege. however, executive privilege is not absolute and must be balanced
against the right of the accused in criminal proceedings. the court took great care to limit its opinion
because it was delving into a political dispute between the president and congress, something the
supreme court is loath to do.
article viii section 1 judicial power
estrada v. desierto, 353 scra 452 (2001); mr, 356 scra 108 (2001)
facts:
the supreme court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that estrada constructively
resigned his post. on the same day, gma took her oath of office. estrada released a letter saying he had
strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president,
but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. a heap of cases
then succeeded estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a petition for prohibition with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. it sought to enjoin the respondent ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends.
issue:
whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. if justiciable, whether or not petitioner
estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
ruling:
the court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. it is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.the court made a distinction between
the aquino presidency and the arroyo presidency. the court said that while the aquino government was a
government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 constitution,
overthrowing the old government entirely, the arroyo government on the other hand was a government
exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. in the
former, it the question of whether the previous president (president estrada) truly resigned subjects it to
judicial review. the court held that the issue is legal and not political.
article viii section 1 judicial power
mattel, inc. v. francisco, gr no. 166886, july 30, 2008
facts:
sometime around 1991, jimmy uy filed a trademark application with the bureau of patents, trademarks
and technology transfer (bpttt) for registration of the trademark "barbie" for use on confectionary
products. thereafter, the mattel inc. (the producer of barbie dolls) contested the application for the use
of barbie for use on confectionary products, for it will be confusingly similar to its trademark on dolls.
the bpttt was abolished and its functions transferred to the newly created intellectual property office
(ipo). in 2000 ipo rendered a decision, dismissing mattels opposition, stating that there was no
confusing similarity between the two competing marks because the goods were non-competing or
unrelated. uy submits that the case has become moot (debatable) and academic.
issue:
whether or not this moot case should be resolve by the judiciary
held:

courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
the instant case does not fall within the category of any of these exceptional cases in which the court
was persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar. the issues in the
present case call for an appraisal of factual considerations which are peculiar only to the transactions
and parties involved in this controversy. the issues raised in this petition do not call for a clarification
of any constitutional principle.
article viii section 1 judicial power
villarosa v. hret, gr no. 144129, september 14, 2000
facts:
on 27 may 1998 the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed villarosa as the winning candidate.
villarosa is the wife of jose t. villarosa, who was representative of the district in question for two terms;
in her certificate of candidacy, villarosa wrote jtv as her nickname/stage name, used by her husband
during his candidacy. nonetheless, she wrote in her affidavit that girlie should be inserted in her given
name. quintos filed for an electoral protest. one of the grounds was illiterate mangyan voters voting
for protestant were assisted by self-appointed assistors of protestee, who wrote jtv on the ballots
contrary to the instruction of said illiterate voters. the hret issued a resolution informing the parties
that the tribunal ruled not to count jtv and its variations as valid votes.
issue:
whether or not the supreme court may hear or review the decision of hret.
held:
the court can still determine whether the hret committed grave abuse of discretion. the hret rule on
finality of its judgment cannot divest the supreme court of its power and duty under section 1 of article
viii of the constitution to determine in a proper case whether there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of hret.
article viii section 1 judicial power
vinuya v. executive secretary, gr no. 162230, april 28, 2010
facts:
case concerned a petition by other legal scholars on behalf of the surviving filipino comfort women
(women pressed into sexual slavery by occupying japanese forces during the second world war), on the
theory that the prohibition against rape and sexual abuse in times of war is jus cogens in international
law, and therefore the state had a duty to pursue their claims from the japanese government.
issue:
whether or not the executive department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against japan.
held:
the petition lacks merit. the question whether the philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. in this case,
the executive department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against japan in the treaty of peace of 1951. the wisdom of such
decision is not for the courts to question. neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination
by the executive department via the instant petition for certiorari.
article viii section 1 judicial power
sana v. cesb, gr no. 192926, november 15, 2011
facts:
eo 883 was issued granting the rank of ceso iii or higher to officers and employees occupying legal
positions in the government executive service who have obtained graduate degrees in law and
successfully passed the bar examinations then, president aquino issued eo 3 expressly revoking eo
883. petitioner filed the present petition, contending that eo 883 and the subsequent appointment of the

13 executive officials to ceso rank are void for violating the constitutional ban on midnight
appointment.
issue:
whether or not the case at bar is moot and academic.
held:
the court dismiss the petition on the threshold ground of mootness. eo 883 and cesb resolution no. 870
having ceased to have any force and effect, the court finds no reason to reach the merits of the petition
and pass upon these issuances validity. to do so would transgress the requirement of case and
controversy as precondition for the courts exercise of judicial review. the issues presented were
grounded on peculiar set of facts giving rise to important constitutional questions capable of repetition
yet evading review or indicating intent on the part of potential or actual parties to place a constitutional
question beyond the ambit of judicial review by performing acts rendering moot an incipient or
pending justiciable controversy.
article viii section 2 role of congress
malaga vs penachos, 213 scra 516
facts:
the iloilo state college of fisheries (iscof) caused the publication of the western visayas daily an
invitation to bid for the construction of a micro laboratory building at iscof. petitioners submitted their
pre-qualification documents but they were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents
were considered late. they filed a complaint with the iloilo rtc against the officers of pbac. judge
lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting pbac from conducting the bidding and award the project.
the defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from
issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government
infrastructure project under sec. 1 of p.d. 1818.
issue:
whether or not the pd 1818 violate judicial independence.
held:
the court declared that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by
courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in
technical cases. the court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would disturb the
smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. justice teodoro padilla made it clear, however, that
on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be
prevented by p.d. no. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
p.d. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularites committed by administrative
agencies such as the anomalies above described.
article viii section 2 role of congress
lupangco v. ca, 160 scra 848 (1988)
facts:
respondent pprc issued resolution no. 105 as parts of its "additional instructions to examinees," to all
those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. herein petitioners, all
reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy filed on their own behalf of all
others similarly situated like them a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ
of a preliminary injunction against respondent prc to restrain the latter from enforcing the
abovementioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. respondent prc filed a motion to
dismiss on october 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to
enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case
and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to resolution no. 105 which
it found to be unconstitutional.
issue:
whether or not the resolution is unconstitutional.
held:

the resolution is null and void. the enforcement of resolution no. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged
leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. making the examinees
suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious dayswhen they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and
preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like
uprooting the tree to get rid of a rotten branch.
article viii section 3 fiscal autonomy
radiowealth v. agregado, 86 scra 429 (1950)
facts:
a webster teletalk and webster telephone speaker were bought for php 585 and installed in the second
and third floor of the malacanang annex which houses the supreme court. the chairman of the property
requisition committee (appointed by the president) disapproved of the purchase and its installation
invoking eo 302 which discontinues open market purchases. petitioner now contends that judicial
functions do not include purchase of property. radiowealth, inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the
payment be approved however, the auditor of the sc refused to countersign the warrant for payment.
issue:
whether or not the judicial department can make purchases without the prior approval of the executive.
held:
yes, the judicial department can. all three departments are co-equal and co-important, each is
independent from the other and cannot control or interfere with each other in the exercise of special
functions. judiciary has the power to maintain its existence and do whatever is necessary to preserve
their integrity, maintain their dignity and ensure effectiveness in the administration of justice. the court
could not maintain its independence and dignity if it executive could determine what the courts should
have. they are of equal footing when it comes to the requisition of for fixtures, equipment and supplies.
the auditor general may not question the court's expenditures except when they are, in the words of the
organic law, "irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant." outside of these exceptions his duty to
approve the payments is mandatory
article viii section 3 fiscal autonomy
bengzon v. drilon, 208 scra 133 (1992)
facts:
on 15 jan 1992, some provisions of the special provision for the supreme court and the lower courts
general appropriations were vetoed by the president because a resolution by the court providing for
appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. the vetoed bill provided for the increase of the
pensions of the retired justices of the supreme court, and the court of appeals as well as members of the
constitutional commission.
issue:
whether or not the interference of the president with the questioned veto impairs the fiscal autonomy
guaranteed to the judiciary.
held:
the presidents interference to the fiscal autonomy of the judiciary is unconstitutional. article viii of the
constitution provides for the fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. the veto of the specific provisions in the
gaa is tantamount to dictating to the judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly
repugnant to fiscal autonomy. pursuant to the constitutional mandate, the judiciary must enjoy freedom
in law. it knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints.
article viii section 4 composition; en banc and division cases
fortich v. corona, 312 scra 751 (1999)
facts:
carlos fortich was governor of bukidnon and renato corona was the deputy executive secretary during
the time of this case. the case deals with a piece of land which was converted from being a nonagricultural land to agricultural land under the agrarian reform program. some farmers were contesting
an earlier decision of the court through a motion of reconsideration. the 2 nd resolution ended with a vote

of 2-2. the farmers interpreted this pursuant to the constitutional provision that says cases or matters by
a division shall be decided by a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted there on, and in no case without a concurrence of at least three such
members. when the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc, provided that
no doctrine or principle or law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
issue:
whether or not the failure to meet the three votes justifies the referral of the case to the court en banc.
held:
the framers distinguished between cases and matters. cases are decided and are controversies brought to
the supreme court for the first time. while matters are resolved using reddendo singula singulis. cases
are disposed by the court en banc when the required number of votes is not obtained. however, if the
case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration,
the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case
undecided. in the case, there is a 2-2 vote on the motion for reconsideration. this means that the motion
is lost and the assailed decision is not reconsidered and therefore deemed affirmed.
article viii section 4 composition; en banc and division cases
people v. dy, gr 115236-37, jan. 16, 2003
facts:
accused-appellants bryan ferdinand dy and giovan bernardino filed separate motions for
reconsideration of the supreme court first division decision which affirmed the judgment of the rtc of
baguio city finding them guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. dy submits that such decision of the
supreme court first division should have been merely recommendatory, in view of the provision of
article viii, section 5 (2) (d) of the constitution which provides that the supreme court sitting en banc
has jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
issue:
whether or not the decision rendered by the supreme court first division is inferior to that rendered en
banc
held:
no. under article viii, section 4 (1) of the constitution, the supreme court may sit en banc or, in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. at present, it is made up of three divisions.
however, the divisions of the supreme court are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts.
actions considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same
tribunal. the divisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but as divisions of one
and the same court.
article viii section 4 composition; en banc and division cases
people v. ebio, gr 147750, sept. 29, 2004
facts:
gerry ebio was convicted by this court of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. the
pao moved for reconsideration on the ground that the court lacked a quorum when the case was
deliberated as the decision was signed only by 7 justices. there were 14 members of the supreme court
that time, with 1 vacancy due to the retirement of justice kapunan. in addition, there were 7 on official
leave. thus there were 7 members which took part in the deliberations in which all 7 concurred in the
decision.
issue:
whether or not the 7 constitutes a quorum of the 14-member court
held:
it does not. the term "quorum" has been defined as that number of members of the body which, when
legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business, or, in other
words, that number that makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass a law or ordinance or do any
other valid corporate act. the question of the number of judges necessary to authorize the transaction of

business by a court is as a general rule to be determined from the constitution or statutory provisions
creating and regulating the courts, and as a general rule a majority of the members of a court is a
"quorum" for the transaction of business and the decision of cases. in case of doubt in a criminal case,
especially where the death penalty is imposed, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.
thus, in this case, considering that the life of the accused is at stake, the supreme court granted the
motion for reconsideration and resubmitted the case to the court en banc for re-deliberation.
article viii section 4 composition; en banc and division cases
firestone ceramics v. ca, gr no. 127245, june 28, 2000
facts:
the case involves a vast tract of land with an area of 99 hectares presumptively belonging to the
republic of the philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private individuals by a court alleged to
be without jurisdiction. petitioner filed a motion to refer to the court en banc the case which the third
division decided. the third division voted 4-1 to deny petitioners' motion to transfer these cases to the
banc. later, the court deliberated on the matter and voted 9-5 to accept the cases for the banc to pass
upon in view of the finding that the cases above entitled are of sufficient importance to merit its
attention.
issue:
whether or not decisions of a division of supreme court appealable to the en banc.
held:
no. decisions or resolutions of a division of the court, when concurred in by a majority of its members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon is a decision or
resolution of the supreme court itself. the supreme court sitting en banc is not an appellate court vis-vis its divisions, and it exercise no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. each division is considered not
a body inferior to the court en banc, and sits veritably as the court en banc itself.
article viii section 5. powers of the supreme court
tano v. socrates, 278 scra 154 (1997)
facts:
the sangguniang panlungsod of puerto princesa city enacted ordinance no 15-92 and resolution no. 33
between 15 december 1992 and 19 february 1993 with the aim of protecting and conserving the marine
resources of palawan. these have, according to the petitioners, deprived all the fishermen of palawan of
their only means of livelihood and the merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade.
without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutors office and courts, the
petitioners directly invoked the original jurisdiction of the court through the petition with the first set of
petitioners seeking special civil case for certiorari while the second set sought for a declaratory relief.
issue:
whether or not the court has a jurisdiction on the case.
held:
in relation to the first set of petitioners, while the court has concurrent jurisdiction with regional trial
courts and with the court of appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum. the judicial policy is that the court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of a primary
jurisdiction. in relation to the second set of petitioners, supreme court is not possessed of original
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved, it being
settled that the court merely exercise appellate jurisdiction over such petitions.
judicial review
lina v. purisma, 82 scra 344 (1978)
facts:
lina was the bookkeeper of the veterans bank. she was excluded from her office by the banks
president mr. cabanos; the reason being was that she was found to be notoriously undesirable. finding

her exclusion to be unjust because cabanos acted in grave abuse of discretion in removing her, lina
appealed before the office of the president which confirmed the ruling of the banks board and the
banks president. lina petitioned before the court. judge purisima denied the initial complaint because it
was lacking in form and substance. lina amended her complaint. purisima denied the same. the judge
ruled that since the issue was already decided upon by the office of the president the court can no
longer take cognizance of the issue as expressed by go no. 3. further, a loi was already issued
dismissing lina from her office. lina appealed before the sc pleading for the sc to compel purisima to
judge on the merits of the case.
issue:
whether or not the court should take cognizance of the case.
held:
the supreme court under certain conditions may, at its option, dispense with the usual procedure of
remanding a case to the lower court for trial on the merits and, instead, render final judgment thereon.
this is if in any case elevated to the court for the correction of any supposed procedural error of any
lower court, it should be found that indeed there has been a mistake, and it further appears that all the
facts needed for a complete determination of the whole controversy are already before the court
undisputed or uncontroverted by the parties, the obvious reason for such an extension in the exercise of
the courts pervasive power is that any other procedure would amount to an unnecessary rigmarole
which can only augment the expenses, efforts and anxieties of the parties and uselessly delay the
administration of justice, no other result for all concerned being anyway perceptible. and it is the
situation in the case at bar.
judicial review
tan v. macapagal, 43 scra 678 (1972)
facts:
the petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating constitutional convention was"
without power, under section 1, article xv of the constitution and republic act 6132, to consider, discuss
and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present constitution through the adoption of a form of a
government other than the form now outlined in the present constitution. the convention being merely
empowered to propose improvements to the present constitution without altering the general plan laid
down therein."
issue:
1. won the petitioners has locus standi
2. won the court has jurisdiction over the case
held:
1. no. the unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a
direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement. taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds. expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the state for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
2. no. at the time the case was filed the con-con has not yet finalized any resolution that would radically
alter the 1935constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. the case becomes ripe when the
con-con has actually does something already. then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of
the body. separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. the
executive and the legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties; judiciary may
not interfere so that it may fulfill its duties well. the court may not interfere until the proper time comes
ripeness.
judicial review
pacu v. secretary of education, 97 phil 806 (1955)
facts:

petitioner filed a petition that acts no. 2706, amended by act no. 3075 and commonwealth act no. 180
be declared unconstitutional on the grounds. the petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the
secretary of education before opening a school is not originally included in the original act 2706. and in
support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the constitution guaranteed the
right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or
permit before such person could exercise the said right. on the other hand, the defendant legal
representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable
controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) petitioners are
in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the act is constitutionally valid. thus, the
petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court.
issue:
whether or not act no. 2706 as amended by act no. 3075 and commonwealth act no. 180 maybe
declared void and unconstitutional
held:
the petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek to
obtain. moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. the power of the courts
to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference. as such, judicial power is limited to the
decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is
incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the
legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it
must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants.
judicial review
gonzales v. marcos, 65 scra 624 (1975)
facts:
the petitioner questioned the validity of eo no. 30 creating the cultural center of the philippines, having
as its estate the real and personal property vested in it as well as donations received, financial
commitments that could thereafter be collected, and gifts that may be forthcoming in the future. it was
likewise alleged that the board of trustees did accept donations from the private sector and did secure
from the chemical bank of new york a loan guaranteed by the national investment & development
corporation. the petition was denied by the trial court arguing that with not a single centavo raised by
taxation, and the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest of petitioner that could in any wise be
prejudiced distinct from those of the general public.
issue:
whether or not a taxpayer the capacity to question the validity of the issuance in this case
held:
no. it was therein pointed out as "one more valid reason" why such an outcome was unavoidable that
"the funds administered by the president of the philippines came from donations [and] contributions
[not] by taxation." accordingly, there was that absence of the "requisite pecuniary or monetary interest."
the stand of the lower court finds support in judicial precedents. even on the assumption that public
funds raised by taxation were involved, it does not necessarily follow that such kind of an action to
assail the validity of a legislative or executive act has to be passed upon. this court is not devoid of
discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained." the lower court thus did not err in so viewing
the situation.
judicial review
oposa v. factoran, 224 scra 792 (1993)
facts:
the principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the philippine ecological network, inc. (peni). the original
defendant was the honorable fulgencio s. factoran, jr., then secretary of the department of environment
and natural resources (denr). the complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the

plaintiffs "are all citizens of the republic of the philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." this
instant petition was filed to seek for the cancelation of all existing timber license agreements (tlas) in
the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. minor petitioners contend that continued granting of timber license
constitutes a misappropriation or impairment of the natural resource property and violates their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (art. ii, sec. 16, 1987 constitution) and the
protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae. petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per section 4 of e.o. no. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
issue:
whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
held:
the court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can file a class suit because they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the
"rhythm and harmony of nature." nature means the created world in its entirety. such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations.
judicial review
anti graft league of the philippines, 260 scra 250 (1996)
facts:
petitioner telebap challenged the validity of section 92, bp no. 881 which provide comelec-time,
wherein such airtime shall be allocated equally and impartially among all candicates within the areas of
coverage of all radio and television stations, free of charge during the period of campaign. petitioner
contends that it suffered losses in providing comelec time.
issue:
whether or not telebap has legal standing to bring the case to court.
held:
the supreme court declared telebap to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other
reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the
subject law.
judicial review
white light corp v. city of manila, gr no. 122846, january 20, 2009
facts:
mayor lim signed into law the ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the city of manila. mtdc filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
and prayed that the ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. mtdc claimed that as owner and operator of
the victoria court in malate, manila it was authorized by pd no. 259 to admit customers on a short time
basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours. white light corporation
then filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in manila.
the rtc rendered a decision declaring the ordinance null and void. the city later filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the supreme court.
issue:
whether or not white light corporation has a legal standing.

held:
standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and
harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. more
importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does
unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal
branches of government. the court recognized third party standing, thus rights of litigants to bring
actions on behalf of third parties provided three important criteria: the litigant must have suffered
injury-in-fact; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some
hindrance to the third partys ability to protect his or her own interest. in this case, the court said that it
was clear that the business interest of motel operators were likewise injured by the ordinance.
judicial review
chavez v. pcgg, 299 scra 744 (1998)
facts:
petitioner asks this court to define the nature and the extent of the peoples constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern. petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information
and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national
interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to
pcggs task of recovering the marcoses ill-gotten wealth.
issue:
whether or not the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the marcoses within the
scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information.
held:
yes. considering the intent of the framers of the constitution, it is incumbent upon the pcgg and its
officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any
proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten
wealth. such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. there is
a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general -- such as on
matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information.
judicial review
ibp v. zamora, 342 scra 449 (2000)
facts:
in view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in metropolitan manila, the president ordered the pnp
and the phil. marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression. the
petitioner argues that the order of the president for the philippine national police and the philippine
marines to carry out joint visibility patrols to prevent and restrain crime, violated the prohibition on the
appointment of the members of the armed forces who are in active service to civilian positions. the ibp
questioned validity of the order invoking its responsibility to uphold the rule of law.
issue:
whether or not petitioner has a legal standing in the aforementioned case.
held:
the mere invocation by the ibp of its duty to preserve the rule of law is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case. this is too general an interest which is shared by the whole citizenry. the ibp has
failed to show any specific injury it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned order. the
presumed possible injury is highly speculative.
judicial review
de agbayani v. pnb, 38 scra 429 (1971)
facts:
petitioner borrowed a sum of money from pnb via realty mortgage but the latter failed to recover the

payment due to war. eo no. 32 of the debt muratorium law was then passed which suspended collection
of loans for our years which was then extended to another eight years through ra no. 342. the supreme
court later declared ra no. 342 as unconstitutional. fifteen years after the maturity date of the loan, pnb
filed a suit for the payment. petitioner asserted that the action for payments of the loan has prescribed.
issue:
whether or not the judicial declaration of unconstitutionality is retroactive in effect.
held:
the general rule is that an unconstitutional act, because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of
legal rights or duties. when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern. however, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged
legislative act must have been in force and had to be complied with. this is until after the judiciary, in
an appropriate case declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. such legislative act
was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. it is now accepted that prior to its being
nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. this is merely to reflect the awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether a
legislative act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. it would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness
and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
judicial review
david v. arroyo, 489 scra 162
facts:
president arroyo issued presidential proclamation no. 1017 (pp 1017) declaring a state of national
emergency. the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some
military officers, leftist insurgents of the new peoples army (npa), and some members of the political
opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate president arroyo. justice secretary raul gonzales stated that
political rallies, which to the presidents mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are
cancelled. presidential chief of staff announced that warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities,
including media, can already be implemented. during the dispersal of the rallyists along edsa, police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner randolf s. david, a professor at the university of the philippines
and newspaper columnist.
issue:
whether or not the issuance of pp 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.
held:
the court holds that president arroyos issuance of pp 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and
academic. the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts in resolving a case. all the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this courts
assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. petitioners alleged that the issuance of pp 1017
and g.o. no. 5 violates the constitution. there is no question that the issues being raised affect the
publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly
and of the press.
administration of justice; rule-making
pnb v. asuncion, 60 scra 321
facts:
philippine national bank granted in favor of respondent fabar incorporated various credit
accommodations and advances. petitioner likewise made advances by way of insurance premiums
covering the chattels subject matter of a mortgage securing the aforementioned credit accommodations.
for failure of private respondents to pay their obligations notwithstanding repeated demands, petitioner
instituted a case for collection against all private respondents and manuel h. barredo, who later died
before the case could be decided. the respondent court issued an order of dismissal of the case. upon a
motion for reconsideration, respondent court denied such motion. respondent court relied on section 6,
rule 86 of the revised rules of court.

issue:
whether or not respondent court's reliance on section 6, rule 86 of the revised rules of court was
erroneous.
held:
a cursory perusal of section 6, rule 86 of the revised rules of court reveals that nothing therein prevents
a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. if section 6, rule 86 of the revised
rules of court were applied literally, article 1216 of the new civil code would, in effect, be repealed
since under the rules of court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the estate of manuel
barredo only. such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require
citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. otherwise stated, section 6, rule
86 of the revised rules of court cannot be made to prevail over article 1216 of the new civil code, the
former being merely procedural, while the latter, substantive
administration of justice; rule-making
st. martin funeral homes v. nlrc, 295 scra 494
facts:
private respondent alleges that he started working as operations manager of petitioner st. martin funeral
home. however, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his
name included in the semi-monthly payroll. he was then dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating. amelita made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his
wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. as a consequence, the latter filed
a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. the labor arbiter rendered
a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the
parties and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
issue:
won the decision of the nlrc are appealable to the court of appeals.
held:
the court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the nlrc to the sc were eliminated,
the legislative intendment was that the special civil action for certiorari was and still is the proper
vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the nlrc. the use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in
the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the
original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. the
important distinction between them, however, and with which the court is particularly concerned here
is that the special civil action for certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this court
and the court of appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the sc are
allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of the congress as expressed in the
sponsorship speech on senate bill no. 1495.
administration of justice; rule-making
people v. gutierrez, 36 scra 172 (1970)
held:
two informations were filed charging the 17 private respondents, together with 82 other unidentified
persons. the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of said cases to the circuit criminal
court, invoking the above-mentioned administrative orders and calling attention to the circumstance
that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses for reason of security and personal safety. the
accused opposed such transfer and the respondent judge declined the transfer. in view of the lower
courts denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the criminal court, the prosecution resorted to the sc
for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to set aside the order of
denial of transfer and to compel the cfi to remand the cases to the circuit criminal court of the
secondary judicial district.
issue:
whether the lower court committed abuse of discretion in denying to transfer cases to the circuit
criminal court.

yes. sc, in the exercise of the judicial power vested by the constitution upon it and other statutory
courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case
pending in a cfi be transferred to another cfi within the same district whenever the interest of justice
and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that
originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a
miscarriage of justice.
administration of justice; rule-making
in re cunanan, 94 phil 534 (1953-1954)
facts:
the case at bar deals with an ra that, when effected, result in the passage and admittance to the practice
of law of people who have previously flunked the bar exams. the enactment of the ra will result in the
admittance of an additional 1,094 candidates. those who deemed to have passed by virtue of the ra shall
be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the philippine bar.
issue:
whether or not the republic act is constitutional.
held:
in the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of their profession and their suspension have been
indisputably judicial function and responsibility. the law passed by congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum guidance for the
license.
administration of justice; rule-making
echegaray v. secretary of justice, january 19, 1999
facts:
on january 4, 1999, the supreme court issued a tro staying the execution of leo echegaray scheduled on
that same day. the justice secretary assailed the issuance of such tro arguing, inter alia, that the action of
the court not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the
executive to grant reprieve.
issue:
whether or not the supreme court erred in granting the tro in favor of echegaray.
held:
the power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. it cannot be
subject of substantial subtraction of our constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one supreme
court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. the suspension of death sentence is
undisputably an exercise of judicial power. it is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve
though its effect is the same.
administration of justice; rule-making
bustos v. lucero, 81 phil 648 (1948)
facts:
the petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the cfi of pampanga after he had
been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of
the peace court of masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the
complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was
issued for the arrest of the accused. the motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this
proceeding. according to the memorandum submitted by the petitioners attorney to the cfi in support
of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. in that
investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or
not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. then his counsel moved that the complainant
present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the
manner and form provided by law. the fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, and the objection
was sustained. in view thereof, the accuseds counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to

present evidence, and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
issue:
whether the respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in
refusing to grant the accuseds motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein
held:
no. section 11 of rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter.
while section 11 of rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendants right in the preliminary
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth. defendant cannot, as a
matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at
the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest.
administration of justice; rule-making
in re admission to the bar: argosino bar matter 712, 246 scra 14 (1995)
facts:
argoncino, a law student, was charged with homicide for fraternity hazing. he then applied for
probation which was then granted. he then filed application to take the bar but he did not disclose the
criminal case. argoncino then passed but was not able to take oath.
issue:
whether or not argoncino may be allowed to take oath.
held:
yes. he was allowed to take oath. however, he was ordered to produce a certification that that he had
been a changed man, sworn into by other individuals. such statement shall also be provided to the
victims family.
administration of justice; rule-making
fabian v. desierto, gr 129742, september 16, 1998
facts:
fabian was the major stockholder and president of promat construction development corporation which
was engaged in the construction business w/ agustin. agustin was the incumbent district engineering
district (fmed) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in
the office of the ombudsman. misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties
and when fabian tried to terminate their relationship, agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so
to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. she eventually filed the
aforementioned administrative case against him. a case ensued which eventually led an appeal to the
ombudsman who inhibited himself later the case led to the deputy ombudsman. the deputy ruled in
favor of agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. fabian appealed the case to the sc. she
averred that section 27 of republic act no. 6770 (ombudsman act of 1989) pertinently provides that -in
all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the office of the ombudsman may
be appealed to the supreme court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of
the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with rule 45 of the rules of court.
issue:
whether or not sec 27 of the ombudsman act is valid.
held:
taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, section 27 of
republic act no. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this court from decisions of the office of the
ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. it consequently violates the proscription in section 30,
article vi of the constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this court. no
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition. that constitutional provision was intended to give this court a measure of control over cases
placed under its appellate jurisdiction. otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging
its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the court.
administration of justice; rule-making

in re: de vera (2003)


facts:
adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor, executive
vice-president and national president, the petitioners submit that respondent de vera lacks the requisite
moral aptitude. according to them, respondent de vera was sanctioned by the supreme court for
irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the sc justices during the deliberations on the constitutionality of
the plunder law. they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the position of eastern mindanao
governor during the ibp national convention held on may 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the ibp
by-laws. respondent de vera argues that this court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy,
contending that the election of the officers of the ibp, including the determination of the qualification of
those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the ibp bylaws and exclusively regulated and administered by the ibp.
issue:
whether or not the supreme court has jurisdiction over the case.
held:
the authority of the supreme court over the ibp has its origins in the 1935 constitution. section 13, art.
viii thereof granted the supreme court the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law. the ibp by-laws, the document invoked by respondent de vera in asserting ibp
independence from the supreme court, ironically recognizes the full range of the power of supervision
of the supreme court over the ibp. for one, section 77 of the ibp by-laws vests on the court the power to
amend, modify or repeal the ibp by-laws, either motu propio or upon recommendation of the board of
governors of the ibp. also in section 15,[ the court is authorized to send observers in ibp elections,
whether local or national. section 44 empowers the court to have the final decision on the removal of
the members of the board of governors.
administration of justice; rule-making
baguio markets vendor v. judge, gr no. 165922, february 26, 2010
facts:
baguio market vendors multi-purpose cooperative in 2004 filed a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a
mortgage under act 3135 and requested for exemption of payment of fees by invoking article 62 (2) of
the cooperation code of the philippines. respondent judge denied the request citing that exemption is
only covered by the republic of the philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities certain suits of
lgus. the judge also stated that fees collected under rule 141 are not fees payable to the philippine
government but to a special fund under the courts control.
issue:
whether or not the petitioners application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees.
held:
no. payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by the supreme court
concerning pleadings, practice and procedure, therefore such a rule cannot be validly annulled or
modified by congress.
administration of justice; rule-making
republic v. gingoyon, gr no. 166429, february 1, 2006
facts:
naia 3 was conceived, designed and constructed to serve as the country's show window to the world.
despite the apparent completion of the terminal complex way back it has not yet been operated. the
case was raffled to the pasay city rtc, presided by respondent judge hon. gingoyon. rep. act no. 8974
applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the government of at
least the proffered value of the naia 3 facilities to piatco and provides certain valuation standards or
methods for the determination of just compensation. rtc erroneously applied the provisions of rule 67 of
the rules of court, instead of rep. act no. 8974, in ascertaining compliance with the requisites for the
issuance of the writ of possession. the government filed a motion for inhibition of hon. gingoyon. the
rtc denied these motions in an omnibus order. hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition for the

nullification of the rtc orders and for the inhibition of hon. gingoyon from taking further action on the
expropriation case.
issue:
whether or not hon. gingoyon should be disqualified as a judge.
held:
as a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and
consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice.
extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the
palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. this court has an inherent power
to reverse itself, especially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment
and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant. incompetence may be a ground
for administrative sanction, but not for inhibition, which requires lack of objectivity or impartiality to
sit on a case. the mere vehemence of the government's claim of bias does not translate to clear and
convincing evidence of impairing bias. there is no sufficient ground to direct the inhibition of hon.
gingoyon from hearing the expropriation case. there is no basis for the court to direct the inhibition of
hon. gingoyon.
administration of justice; rule-making
maniago v. court of appeals, gr no. 104392, february 20, 1996.
facts:
one of the buses owned by petitioner met a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by
private respondent. consequently, a criminal case was filed against petitioners driver. a month later, a
civil case for damages was filed by private respondent against petitioner. petitioner moved for the
suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case
against his driver and because no reservation of the right to bring such civil case separately had been
made in the criminal case.
issue:
whether or not private respondent can file a separate civil action without reservation.
held:
no. the revised rules of criminal procedure is clear in providing that a separate civil action must be
reserved prior to the institution of a criminal case. without such reservation, it would be deemed that a
complainant has agreed to have the civil action for damages be included in the criminal suit. it is a
matter of procedure whenever two actions must be tried in a single proceeding.
administration of justice; rule-making
javellana v. dilg, gr no. 102549, august 10, 1992
facts:
attorney erwin b. javellana was an elected city councilor of bago city, negros occidental. city engineer
ernesto c. divinagracia filed an administrative case against javellana. divinagracia's complaint alleged
that javellana has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that
purpose from the regional director, department of local government, as required. on the other hand,
javellana filed a motion to dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly that dlg
memorandum circulars in question are unconstitutional because the supreme court has the sole and
exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.
issue:
whether or not section 90 of the lgc and the memorandum circular violate article viii, section 5 of the
constitution.
held:
no. neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the supreme court's power and authority to
prescribe rules on the practice of law. the local government code and dlg memorandum circular no. 9081 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the
discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the
law allows it. section 90 of the local government code does not discriminate against lawyers and

doctors. it applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any
occupation. section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." if there are some
prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is
more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service
administration of justice; rule-making
bar matter no. 1222, february 4, 2004
facts:
the subject of the resolution is the leakage of questions in mercantile law during the 2003 bar
examinations. petitioner at the time was employed as an assistant lawyer in a law firm, one of whose
partner was marcial balgos, the examiner for mercantile law during the bar examinations. the court had
adopted the findings of the investigating committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had
downloaded the test questions from the computer of balgos and faxed them to other persons.
issue:
whether or not the court may nullify the results of the bar examinations.
held:
yes. it is within the control of the supreme court. the court resolved to nullify the examination on this
subject in view of the courts finding which affect the integrity of the examination in mercantile law;
and hold another examination in the said subject.
administration of justice; rule-making
garrido v. garrido, ac no. 6593, february 4, 2010
facts:
the petitioner, the respondents legal wife, filed a complaint-affidavit and a supplemental affidavit for
disbarment against the respondents atty. angel e. garrido and atty. romana p. valencia before the ibp
committee on discipline, charging them with gross immorality, in violation of the code of professional
responsibility. the complaint arose after the petitioner caught wind through her daughter that her
husband was having an affair with a woman other than his wife and already had a child with her; and
the same information was confirmed when one of her daughters saw that her husband walking in a
robinsons mall with the other respondent, atty. valencia, with their child in tow. after a much further
investigation into the matter, the time and effort given yielded results telling her that atty. valencia and
her legal husband had been married in hong kong. moreover, on june 1993, her husband left their
conjugal home and joined atty. ramona paguida valencia at their residence, and has since failed to
render much needed financial support. in their defense, they postulated that they were not lawyers as of
yet when they committed the supposed immorality, so as such, they were not guilty of a violation of the
code of professional responsibility.
issue:
whether or not atty. garridos and valencias actions constitute a violation of the code of professional
responsibility and thus a good enough cause for their disbarment, despite the offense being supposedly
committed when they were not lawyers.
held:
yes. membership in the bar is a privilege, and as a privilege bestowed by law through the supreme
court, membership in the bar can be withdrawn where circumstances show the lawyers lack of the
essential qualifications required of lawyers, be they academic or moral. in the present case, the court
had resolved to withdraw this privilege from atty. angel e. garrido and atty. rowena p. valencia for the
reason of their blatant violation of the code of professional responsibility, which commands that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. furthermore, the
contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers when they got married shall not afford them
exemption from sanctions; good moral character was already required as a condition precedent to
admission to the bar.
administration of justice; rule-making
in re letter of the up law faculty, 644 scra 543
facts:

after promulgation of the sc decision in vinuya v. exec. secretary, the counsel for the petitioners therein
filed, first, a motion for reconsideration asserting that the vinuya decision was plagiarized from
different sources and that the true intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente to suit
the arguments laid down in said decision. the court formed of an ethics committee tasked to
investigate the veracity of the alleged plagiarism, the authors who were purportedly
plagiarized
sent
their
respective
letters
to
the
sc, noting the misreading and/or
misrepresentation of their articles. hence, in their articles, they argue that the crimes of rape, torture
and sexual slavery can be classified as crimes against humanity, thus attaining the jus cogens status;
consequently, it shall be obligatory upon the state to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens.
however, the vinuya decision cited them to support the contrary stand. in response to this controversy,
the faculty of up college of law came up with a statement entitled restoring integrity: a statement by
the faculty of the university of the philippines college of law on the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the supreme court, which statement alleged plagiarism against justice del castillo,
treating the same not only as an established fact, but as a truth. said statement was posted online and at
the colleges bulletin board and was submitted to the sc. the manner in presenting the arguments and
the language used therein, the court believed, were inappropriate considering its signatories are
lawyers. thus, the supreme court issued a show cause resolution directing respondents to show cause as
to why they should not be disciplined as members of the bar for violations of the code of professional
responsibility.
issue:
whether or not the show cause resolution violates respondents academic freedom as law professors.
held:
there is nothing in the show cause resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they
can teach and the manner of their instruction. moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of
academic freedom for this court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending
case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers. the
court reiterates that lawyers, when they teach law, are considered engaged in the practice of law. unlike
professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by
their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. thus, their actions as law professors
must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members
of the bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are
lawyers.
article viii section 6. supervision of courts
caoibes v. ombudsman, gr 132177, july 19, 2001
facts:
respondent filed before the office of the ombudsman a criminal complaint for physical injuries,
malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in
authority. respondent judge lodged an administrative case with the sc praying for the dismissal of
petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial
officer. the office of the ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit. petitioner contended
that the sc, not the office of the ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of
the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent judge who, both being members of the bench,
are under its exclusive supervision and control. the ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the sc
stating that it is within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges.
issue:
whether or not the ombudsman has the jurisdiction over the administrative case between the two judges
held:
no, the ombudsman does not have jurisdiction over the case. ombudsman cannot determine for it and
by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative
matter. the ombudsman is duty bound to refer to the sc all cases against judges and court personnel

filed before it for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. the
ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not
have administrative implications. to do so is to (1) deprive the court of the exercise of its administrative
prerogatives and (2) to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned.
article viii section 6.supervision of courts
escalona v. padillo, am p-10-2785
facts:
escalona sought to file a case against a certain dalit. escalona approached padillo, court stenographer iii
of the rtc of paraaque city, to help her facilitate the filing of the case against dalit. padillo promised
escalona to prepare the necessary documents in exchange for php 20,000, said amount was also alleged
to serve as payment for the prosecutor, escalona complied. subsequent verification from the
prosecutors office showed no case filed by escalana against dalit. escalona confronted padillo, who
promised to return her money. padillo went back on his promise, hence escalona filed this petition,
however escalana desisted from the case alleging that padillo already returned her money.
notwithstanding the desistance of escalona, the court administrator proceeded with the administrative
case against padillo.
issue:
whether or not the court acted within its jurisdiction in pursuing the administrative case against padillo,
despite escalonas desistance.
held:
the court acted within its jurisdiction. an issue in an administrative case is not whether or not the
complainant has a cause of action against the defendant, but whether or not the employee has breached
the norms and standards of the courts. section 6, article viii of the constitution grants the court the
jurisdiction to investigate and decide complaints against erring officials and employeeds of the
judiciary. it is the courts interest that the proper delivery of justice to people is rendered at all times.
article viii section 7. qualifications of members of the supreme court; lower courts
in re jbc b. judge quitain, jbc no. 013, august 22, 2007
facts:
judge quitain was appointed as presiding judge of the rtc of davao city. the office of the court
administrator (oca) received a confidential information that andministrative and criminal charges were
filed against judge quitain in his capacity as then assistant regional director of the national police
commission (napolcom) which resulted to his dismissal from service. in the personal data sheet
submitted to the judicial bar council, quitain declared having been charged with five criminal cases
before the sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. quitain did not disclose that he was
administratively charged and dismissed for grave misconduct pursuant to a.o. no. 183, insisting that he
had no knowledge of the said a.o. and that he was denied due process.
issue:
whether or not judge quitains appointment as presiding judge of the rtc of davao city is valid.
held:
no, by his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public service, which the judicial and bar
council would have taken into consideration in acting on his application, judge quitain committed an
act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be appointed to.
it is necessary that every prospective appointee to the judiciary should inform the appointing authority
of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances that may reflect
on his integrity and probity. these are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the judiciary
by sec. 7(3), article viii of the constitution.
article viii section 7. qualification of members of the supreme court; lower courts
kilosbayan v. ermita, gr no. 177721
facts:
gregory ong was being appointed by the executive secretary, in representation of the office of the
president, as associate justice of the supreme court. kilosbayan contended that ong is a chinese citizen,

born on may 25, 1953 to chinese parents. further, they added that even if it were granted that eleven
years after ongs birth, his father was granted filipino citizenship by naturalization, it would not make
ong a natural-born citizen. ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen being born to a filipino
mother and his father being a naturalized filipino citizen, presenting certification from the bureau of
immigration and department of justice declaring him to be such.
issue:
whether or not the appointment of ong to the supreme court was valid.
held:
the court ruled that the appointment of ong was invalid. the birth certificate of ong clearly states that his
nationality is chinese. the birth certificate of ong is binding and is prima facie evidence of ongs
citizenship. the naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not make him a natural-born
filipino citizen. unless corrected by judicial order in a non-summary proceeding for the purpose, he is
not to be appointed as associate justice of the supreme court.
article viii section 7. qualifications of members of the supreme court; lower courts
topacio v. ong, gr no. 179895
facts:
petitioner ferdinand topacio implored the office of the solicitor general (osg) to initiate post-haste a quo
warranto proceeding against gregory santos ong. he points out that natural-born citizenship is also a
qualification for appointment as member of the sandiganbayan and that ong has failed to meet the
citizenship requirement. ong, on the other hand, avers that the rtc already granted his petition and
recognized him as a natural-born citizen. the decision having become final, he caused the
corresponding annotation thereof in his certificate of birth. the osg informed topacio that it cannot
favorably act on request for the filing of a quo warranto petition until the rtc case shall have been
terminated with finality. topacio assails this position of the osg as being tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
issue:
whether or not the osg committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for quo
warranto
held:
the court ruled that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the osg in deferring action on the
filing of a quo warranto case until after the rtc case has been terminated with finality. a decision is not
deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it. the
solicitor general is the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or
agents. in the discharge of its task, the solicitor general must see to it that the best interest of the
government is upheld within the limits set by law. in the exercise of sound discretion, the solicitor
general may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and
valid reasons.
article viii section 11. security of tenure; power to discipline
vargas v. rilloraza, 80 phil 297
facts:
vargas was charged for treason before the peoples court presided by judge rilloraza. the peoples court
was created by c.a. 682, the peoples court act. its main purpose was to charge treason cases and that it
would be the final arbiter of such cases. vargas assailed such by asserting that the law crated two
supreme courts, and that it also modified constitutional provisions on the membership of the s.c., and it
also violated the s.c.c power to promulgate its own rules. the solicitor general denied all allegations.
issue.
whether or not congress can validly enact a law modifying the s.c. original jurisdiction.
held:
treason is a criminal case punishable by death or life imprisonment. as such, the sc has original

jurisdiction over it as provided for in the constitution. any treason case may be appealed before the sc
and congress may not validly enact a law depriving the sc of the original jurisdiction nor may it deprive
the sc of its appelate jurisdiction.
article viii section 11. security of tenure; power to discipline
de la llana v. alba, 112 scra 294
facts:
in 1981, bp 129, entitled an act reorganizing the judiciary, appropriating funds therefor and for other
purposes, was passed. de la llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the
judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, he
averred that only the sc can remove judges not congress.
issue:
whether or not judge de la llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (bp 129)
held:
the legislatures authority to abolish courts inferior to the sc is undeniable. the abolition of office does
not come with it a violation of security of tenure so long as it is in good faith. the court pointed out that
the law was complete in itself and there were clear standards for implementation by the president.
article viii section 12. prohibition to be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions
in re judge manzano, 166 scra 246
facts:
judge manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by ilocos sur governor rodolfo
farinas as the member of ilocos norte provincial committee on justice created pursuant to a presidential
order. he petitioned that his membership in the committee will not in any way amount to an
abandonment to his present position as executive judge of branch xix, rtc, 1st judicial region and as a
member of judiciary.
issue:
whether or not a member of the judiciary can be designated to an agency to perform quasi-judicial or
administrative functions
held:
the petition is denied. the constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.quasi-judicial has a fairly clear meaning
and judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which
adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs
of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out
the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law
of its existence.
article viii section 13. counclusion of the supreme court - how reached?
consing v. court of appeals, gr. no. 78272
facts:
consing sold a house and lot to caridad santos, a contract of sale was drafted providing for the terms of
the sale, including the purchase price and interest. consing payed her monthly installments however
defaulted at some point in the contract. a final demand letter was sent to santos compelling her to pay
otherwise the matter will be brought to court for litigation. the matter was brought before the cfi
rendering judgment in favor of santos, then consing appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed
the cfis decision, hence this appeal to the supreme court without, however certification..
issue:
whether or not the decision rendered by the court of appeals in this case complied with the
requirements of the constitution.
held:

the court ruled that the absence of the certification at the end of the decision will not have any effect of
invalidating the decision. the lack of certification will only serve as evidence of failure to observe the
certification requirement, holding the official responsible for the omission to account thereof.
article viii section 14. contents of decision; petition for review; motion for reconsideration
people v. escober, 157 scra 541
facts:
escober and three others were charged with robbery with homicide in the compound of the family
corporation owned by the chua spouses. escober was the guard on duty when the crime had happened,
two of the chua spouses died because of multiple stab wounds. rtc sentenced escober, the guard, and the
others to death penalty. the case was elevated to the supreme court. it is contended that the decision of
the rtc was not in the standard as provided for in the constitution.
issue:
whether or not the decision of the rtc did clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based.
held:
the court ruled that the rtc decision fell short of this standard. the inadequacy primarily stems from the
judges tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts of the case. sc
acquitted escober and the others were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
article viii section 14. contents of decision; petition for review; motion for reconsideration
air france v. carrascoso, 18 scra 155
facts:
carrascoso was a member of the group of filipino pilgrims that left manila. air france issued first class
tickets from manila to rome, en route, carrascoso traveled in first class, but the manager forced him to
vacate the seat because a white man had a better right than him. carrascoso refused to vacate the seat
and even had a heated discussion with the manager, but eventually gave up the seat. carrascoso filed for
damages against air france. air france contended that the first class ticket does not represent the true
intent and purposes of the parties, and that the issuance of a first class ticket does not guarantee a first
class ride. decision were rendered in favor of carrascoso. air france charges that ca failed to make
complete findings of fact on all issues presented.
issue:
whether or not the ca decision was valid in awarding damages to carrascoso
held:
the court ruled that so long as ca's decision contains the facts necessary to warrant its conclusions, there
is nothing wrong in withholding any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
defense.
article viii section 14. contents of decision; petition for review; motion for reconsideration
people v. bravo, 227 scra 285
facts:
bravo was convicted by the rtc for the murder of his mother-in-law. on appealn to the supreme court, he
contendedthat the decision rendered by judge dizon, which contains a naration of facts according to
that of the prosecution, contains only selected facts in favor of a party. he argued that this selective
finding of facts is in violation of article viii sec 14 of the constitution.
issue:
whether or not the decision rendered by the rtc is in violation of the constitution
held:
no. the constitution provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. it is for the judge to determin from the
naration of the facts and assertions made by both parties what actually happened in the case before him.
article viii section 14. contents of decision; petition for review; motion for reconsideration

nicos v. ca, 206 scra 127


facts:
upon failure of nicos to pay its loan with ucpb, ucpb foreclosed their mortgage on the parcels of land
and sold the same at public auction. nicos filed with the rtc a case for annulment of the auction sale and
recovery of possession of the land, on the ground that the sale did not meet the statutory requirements
such as proper publication. the rtc dismissed the case, which decision was affirmed by the ca. nicos
contended that the order of the rtc violated art vii sec 14 of the constitution. there was therefore no
adequate factual or legal basis for the decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the ca.
issue:
whether or not the order of rtc violated the constitution
held:
in the instant case, insufficiency of the evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriffs sale was one of
the grounds for dismissal. an order dismissing a case for insufficiency of evidence is a judgment on the
merits. thus, it is imperative that it be reasoned clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the
law on which it is based. all the trial court did was summarily conclude from the very evidence
adduced by the plaintiff that the sheriffs sale was in complete accord with the requirements.
article viii section 14. contents of decision; petition for review; motion for reconsideration
borromeo v. ca, 186 scra 1
facts:
borromeo has filed charges against officials of the court with the courts and the ombudsman repeatedly
alleging that he "suffered injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately
appealed to this court which were resolved by minute resolutions. his complaint is that the resolutions
which disposed of his cases do not bear the signatures of the justices who participated in the
deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. he complained that the
resolutions bear no certification of the chief justice and that they did not state the facts and the law on
which they were based and were signed only by the clerks of court and therefore "unconstitutional, null
and void.
issue:
whether or not the minute resolutions issued by the court, which do not bear the signatures of the
justices, are a violation of section 14 article viii of the 1987 constitution.
held:
the court ruled that the minute resolutions are not a violation of the constitution and in fact are
encouraged to be used in disposing the bulk of the cases of the lower courts. minute resolutions need
not be signed by the members of the court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they
require the certification of the chief justice. for to require members of the court to sign all resolutions
issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time
would be spent on functions more properly performed by the clerk of court.
article viii section 14. contents of decision; petition for review; motion for reconsideration
francisco v. pernskul, 173 scra 324
facts:
the case at bar started out as a simple one involving a sum of money between the francisco and the
private respondent because of the formers refusal to return the deposited money to the latter alleging
that the private respondent still owed a sum of money for the utility charges and the cost of repainting
the unit leased. the petitioner, losing the case in the metropolitan court of makati, had the case appealed
before the regional trail court which issued a memorandum decision. the motion for review as well as
the motion for reconsideration, contending that it is in violation of section 14 article viii of the 1987
constitution, was denied by the court of appeals.
issue:
whether or not the memorandum decision issued by the regional trial court is not a sufficient

compliance with section 14 article viii of the constitution.


held:
the memorandum decision was made pursuant to what is allowed by section 40 of b.pblg. 129 which is
not unconstitutional. there is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the memorandum
decision is to expedite the termination of litigations for the benefit of the parties as well as the courts
themselves. however, this should be used springily and where the facts as in the main are accepted by
both parties and in simple litigations only. the purpose of this requirement is to inform the person
reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after consideration
of the pertinent facts and examination of applicable laws.
article viii section 14. contents of decision; petition for review; motion for reconsideration
velarde v. social justice society, gr 159357
facts:
velarde challenged the decision of the regional trial court regarding the petition for declaratory relief
filed by the respondent with regards to acts of endorsing an elective candidate made by religious
leaders being violative to the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions.the assailed decision begins
with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented. then follows a brief
explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the petition sought to achieve.
thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. the decision proceeds to a
full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. without expressly
stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge
ends her "decision" with the clause "so ordered."
issue:
whether or not the rtc decision did conform to the form and substance required by the constitution, the
law and the rules of court
held:
the rtcs decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it
was based. moreover, the court a quo did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion in its so-called
decision. thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.to guide the judges in
making a decision, the court laid down the essential parts of a good decision consisting the following:
(1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in
which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion.
the ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially, in
cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.
article viii section 15. period for making decisions
re: problem of delays in cases before the sandiganbayan am no. 00-8-05-sc
facts;
submitted to the court for consideration is a resolution of the board of governors, ibp, recommending
an inquiry to the causes of delays in the resolution of incidents and motions in the decision of cases
pending before the sandiganbayan
issue:
whether or not the sc ac no. 1094 is applicable to the sandiganbayan
held:
the ac directs all judges to make a physical inventory of the cases in their dockets. the docket inventory
procedure is as applicalbe to the sandiganbayan with respect to cases within its original and appelate
jurisdiction.
article viii section 15. period for making decisions
edano v. asdala, am no. rtj-06-2007

facts
this is an administrative complaint filed by petitioner against respondent judge asdala, for allegedly
deciding a civil case in 2005, when in fact judge asdala actually ruled on several motion related to the
aforementioned even after march 2005. edano alleges that judge erred in deniying her notice of appeal,
respondent judge caused delay by going beyond the 90 day reglamentary period for rendering a
decision.
issue:
whether or not judge asdala is guilty od undue delay in rendering her decisioin
held:
the sc agreed with decision of the oca finding the respondent judge of undue delay in rendering a
decision. citing previous jurisprudence ruled that the 90 day period is mandatory, and can only be
excused for valid reasons.
article viii section 15. period for making decisions
sesbreno v. ca, gr no. 161390
facts:
sesbreno made a money market placement with philfinance with a term of 32 days. philfinance issued
to sesbreno the certificate of confirmation of sale of a corporation promisory note, the securities
delivery recipt indicating the sale of a note with a notation that said security was in the custody of
pilipinas bank, and a postdated check drawn against the insular bank of asia and america payable on
march 13, 1981, the checks was dishonored for insufficiency of fund. pilipinas bank never released an
instrument related thereto. the said security was stammped none negotiable resulting to sesbreno being
unable to collect his interest and investment thereon. he filed an action for damages against delta
motors for the ccs and pilipinas bank for the csdr.
issue:
the lapse of 90 reglamentary period on cases filed before the effectivity of the 1987 constitution has
effect
held:
even when there is delay and no decision or resolution are made within the prescribed period, there is
no automatic affirmance of the appealed decision it is different from what is provided in the 1973
constitution, wherein it is provided, in cases of delay, the decision appealed from is deemed affirmed.
article ix a. common provisions, section 1. independent commissions
macalintal v. comelec, gr 157013, july 10, 2003
facts:
macalintal, a member of the philippine bar, sought a declaration that certain provisions of republic act
no. 9189 (the overseas absentee voting act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. the petition
alleged that sec 25 of the ra which allows the congress (through the joint congressional oversight
committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
implementing rules and regulations (irr) that the comelec shall promulgate, violates the independence
of the comelec under art. ix-a, sec. 1 of the constitution.
issue:
whether or not section 25 of r.a. no. 9189 is violative of art. ix-a, sec. 1 of the constitution.
held:
the court ruled that section 25 of r.a. no. 9189, with respect to allowing congress to exercise the power
to review, revise, amend, and approve the irr that the comelec shall promulgate, is violative of art. ix-a,
sec. 1 of the constitution. the ambit of legislative power under article vi of the constitution is
circumscribed by other constitutional provisions, one of which is the aforementioned provision on the
independence of constitutional commissions. the court has held that whatever may be the nature of the

functions of the commission on elections, the fact is that the framers of the constitution wanted it to be
independent from the other departments of the government.
article ix a. common provisions, section 1. independent commissions
ombudsman v. civil service commission, gr no. 159940, february 16, 2005
facts:
melchor carandang, paul elmer clemente and jose tereso de jesus, jr., were appointed graft investigation
officers iii of the office of the ombudsman. the civil service commission (csc) approved the
appointments on the condition that for the appointees to acquire security of tenure, they must first
obtain a career executive service (ces). the ombudsman requested to the csc for the change of status
from temporary to permanent, of the appointments of carandang, clemente and de jesus, emphasizing
that since the office of the ombudsman is not governed by the career executive service board, security
of tenure can be granted despite the absence of ces eligibility. csc changed the status of carandangs and
clementes appointments to permanent but not with respect to de jesus on the ground that he "has not
met the eligibility requirements. hence, this petition for ceritiorari filed by the office of the ombudsman
seeking to nullify the csc resolution.
issue:
whether or not the general power of the civil service commission to administer civil service apply to
independent offices specifically authorized by the constitution with the discretionary power to appoint
their officials.
held:
the court ruled that csc laws and rules still apply despite the responsibility of the establishment,
administration and maintenance of qualification standards lies with the concerned department or
agency. the role of the csc however is limited only to assisting the department agency with respect to
the qualification standards and approving them.
article ix a. common provisions, section 5. fiscal autonomy
csc v. dbm, 482 scra 233
facts:
the total funds appropriated by general appropriations act of 2002 (gaa) for civil service commission
(csc) was p285 million. csc complains that the total funds released by department of budget and
management (dbm) was only p279 million, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of p5.8 million. csc
contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by dbm on the ground of their no report, no
release policy. hence, csc filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the dbm to release the
balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. at the same time, it seeks a determination by this court of the
extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
issue:
whether or not dbms policy, no report, no release is constitutional
held:
the court ruled in the negative, dbms act of withholding the subject funds from csc due to revenue
shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional. the no report, no release policy may not be validly
enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against
offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating article ix (a), section 5 of the constitution, which
provides that the commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall
be automatically and regularly released.
article ix a. common provisions, section 6. promulgation of rules
macalintal v. comelec, gr no. 157013, july 10, 2003
facts:
macalintal filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of
r.a. no. 9189 (the overseas absentee voting act of 2003) are unconstitutional. the court upheld
petitioners right to file the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and
convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the filipino people, considering that
public funds are to be used and appropriated for the implementation of said law. macalintal raised that

section 25 of ra 9189 allowing congress (through the joint congressional oversight committee created
in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the implementing
rules and regulations (irr) that the comelec shall promulgate, violates the independence of the comelec
under art. ix-a, sec. 1 of the constitution.
issue:
whether or not sec 25 is violative of the constitution
held:
the court ruled in the affirmative, by vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and
revise the irr of ra 9189, congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. congress
trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the comelec.
article ix a. common provisions, section 7. decisions of the commissions
filipinas engineering and machine shop v. ferrer, 135 scra 25
facts:
in preparation for the national elections of november 11, 1969, then respondent commissioners of the
commission on elections (comelec) issued an invitation to bid call no. 127 on september 16, 1969
calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 1 1,000 units of
voting booths.comelec awarded the contract of voting booths to private respondent. petitioner
complained to the cfi, contesting that the award was invalid.
issue:
whether or not petitioner has cause of action
held:
no. while it may be true that the lower court has the jurisdiction over controversies dealing with the
comelec's award of contracts, the same being purely administrative and civil in nature, nevertheless,
herein petitioner has no cause of action on the basis of the allegations of its complaint.it is the supreme
court, not any other courts, that has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders
or rulings of the commission. further, the issues that can be brought on certiorari are those final
decisions, orders, or rulings made in the capacity of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, not
merely administrative matters (such as in the present case)
article ix a. common provisions, section 7. decisions of the commissions
saligumba v. ca, 117 scra 669
facts:
this is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the coa regarding the administrative case filed
by petitioner against leonardo estella, auditing examiner iii of the auditors office of misamis
occidental. the charge was that the respondent raped edithasaligumba on several occasions. the coa
dropped the administrative complaint due to insufficient evidence. saligumba petition the court to
review such action taken by the coa.
issue:
whether or not the court may take cognizance of the case.
held:
the court dismissed the petition as it held that the power of the supreme court to review coa decisions
refers to money matters and not to administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel and
even assuming that it does have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as mentioned
above, the court cannot do so on factual issues since its power to review is limited to legal issues only.
article ix a. common provisions, section 7. decisions of the commissions
cua v. comelec, 156 scra 582 (1987)
facts:
the first division of comelec rendered a 2-1decision favoring junie cua but nevertheless suspended his
proclamation as winner in the lone congressional district of quirino due to the lack of the unanimous
vote required by the procedural rules in comelec resolution no. 1669. richard puzon insists that no
decision was reached by the first division because the required unanimous vote was not obtained.
it was also argued that no valid decision was reached by the comelec en banc because only three votes

were cast in favor of the petitioner and these did not constitute the majority of the body.
issue:
whether or not the 2-1 decision of the first division was valid.
held:
no. as it violates article ix section 7, the provision of the constitution is clear that it should be the
majority vote of all it members and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations.
but the court ruled that it is valid. the three members who voted to affirm the first division constituted a
majority of the five members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid
under the aforecited constitutional provision. but this obviously contradicts it.
article ix a. common provisions, section 7. decisions of the commissions
estrella v. comelec, gr no. 160465, may 27, 2004
facts:
romeo m. estrella, sought the nullification of the november 5, 2003 status quo ante order issued by the
commission on elections (comelec) en banc in eac no. a-10-2002, "romeo m. estrella v. rolando f.
salvador," directing the "parties to maintain the status quo ante order, which is the condition prevailing
before the issuance" by the regional trial court of malolos of a writ of execution for the enforcement of
said courts decision declaring petitioner as the duly elected mayor of baliwag, bulacan. in the issuance
of the questioned comelec en banc status quo ante order, five (5) of the then incumbent seven (7)
members of the comelec participated. since commissioner lantion could not participate and vote in the
issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary
votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the comelec was not attained. the order thus failed to
comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order, as required
under rule 3, section 5(a) of the comelec rules of procedure.
issue:
whether or not the failure to comply with the number of votes will grant the petition.
held:
no. even though they will attain the number of votes necessary, it will be invalid. because not all of the
members participated, it cant be considered as majority of all its members. it violates article ix section
7, it should be the majority vote of all its members and not only those who participated and took part in
the deliberations.
article ix: a. common provisions, section 7. decisions of the commissions
mison v. coa, 187 scra 445 (1990)
facts:
this is a case regarding the validity of a decision made by the commission on audit chairman that
reverses a previous decision made by the manager of the technical service under the authority of an
acting chairman. private respondents chan chiu and cheung i are claiming for the payment from bureau
of customs on the value of their ship which was previously illegally seized by customs and cannot be
returned because of its sinking while on the hands of the bureau of customs. private respondents claim
was previously denied by commission on audit through the manager by authority of the acting
chairman. this decision was later reversed by the chairman in concurrence with three of the members.
issue:
whether or not the decision rendered by the manager of technical service by authority of the acting
chairman and the subsequent decision of the commissioner reversing the aforementioned decision are
valid.
held:
the decision rendered by the manager of technical service is void ab initio but the decision rendered by
the commissioner is valid. in accordance with article ix-a section 7, a majority of the members of the
commission is necessary to validly enforce or render judgments. a single member cannot promulgate
decisions in behalf of the commission.
article ix: a. common provisions, section 7. decisions of the commissions
ambil v. comelec, 344 scra 358 [2000]

facts:
this is a case regarding the constitutionality of a resolution signed by commissioners of the first
division of comelec upon deciding on an electoral case. private respondent is the winner of the
elections for governor of eastern samar of 1998. his proclamation was questioned by private respondent
and the case was heard by the first division of comelec. after the retirement of one of the
commissioners who assented (2-1), a resolution was forwarded to the parties stating the first division
decision favoring the private respondent and the same was later promulgated. petitioner prays that the
said resolution be annulled and the case be remanded to the first division for a new trial.
issue:
whether or not the comelec first division resolution is valid.
held:
no. one who is not a member of the commission at the time of the promulgation of the final decision
cannot validly take part in the deciding the case. in this case, one of the commissioners concerned is
retired by the time the decision was promulgated; hence, his assenting vote for the decision is invalid
and has no effect.
article ix: a. common provisions, section 7. decisions of the commissions
mateo v. ca, gr no. 113219, august 14, 1995
facts:
petitioners who are board members of mowad, a quasi-public corporation, conducted an investigation
against private respondent and thereafter filed a preventive suspension against the latter. private
respondent in response filed a special civil action against petitioner in rizal rtc which ruled in favor of
respondent. petitioners contend among others that the court has no jurisdiction over the case.
issue:
whether or not the rtc has jurisdiction over the case involving alleged illegal dismissal of a quasi-public
corporation employee; and if it has no jurisdiction, whether or not the decision of the civil service
commission is final and unappealable.
held:
no. the civil service law is the governing law over officers and employees of quasi-public corporations
like the mowad. the hiring and firing of employees in such corporations shall be governed by the civil
service laws and rules and regulations. no. section 7 article ix-a of the constitution states that decisions
of the commissions can be brought to the court through certiorari within 30 days from the receipt of
copy of the decision by the parties. final decisions of the civil service commission is appealable
through the court of appeals.
article ix: a. common provisions, section 7. decisions of the commissions
reyes v. regional trial court, gr no. 108886, may 5, 1995
facts:
this is a case for certiorari regarding a decision of comelec first division. the rtc of occidental mindoro
annulled the proclamation of petitioner as councilor. the first division of comelec denied the
petitioners appeal on the ground of his failure to pay the appeal fees within the prescribed period.
issue:
whether or not a case heard and decided by a comelec division may be brought to the supreme court for
certiorari.
held:
no. in accordance with the constitution, only cases decided by comelec en banc may be brought to the
supreme court for certiorari. petitioner must first file a motion for reconsideration to the comelec en
banc and the en banc must first hear and decide the case before the same may be forwarded to the
supreme court by certiorari.
article ix: a. common provisions, section 7. decisions of the commissions
abs-cbn v. comelec, 323 scra 611
facts:
the petitioner has prepared a project, with public relation groups, to conduct radio-tv coverage of the

elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly
for president and vice president, results of which shall be broadcast immediately. upon learning of the
project, the comelec en banc issued resolution no. 98-1419 dated april 21, 1998. in the said resolution,
the poll body resolved to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop abs-cbn or any other
groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the honorable
chairman to issue the same. but petitioner contends that the holding of exit polls and the dissemination
of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the
press. hence, the comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and
credible elections. thus, petitioner has filed for certiorari questioning the resolution issued by the
comelec.
issue:
whether or not the respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any other
group, its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the elections.
held:
the court ruled exit polls properly conducted and publicized can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of
election-fixing and fraud. narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the comelec so as to
minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any
manner the fundamental rights of our people. the contention of respondent that exit polls indirectly
transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. admittedly, no law
prohibits the holding and reporting of exit polls. the freedoms of speech and of the press should all the
more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add
meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. we cannot support any ruling or order the effect of which
would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech.
article ix: a. common provisions, section 7. decisions of the commissions
aguilar v. comelec, gr no. 185140, june 30, 2009
facts:
aguilar won as barangay chairman of barangay bansarvil 1, kapatagan, lanao del norte over private
respondent insoy by a one-vote margin and was duly proclaimed. insoy protested before the mtc of
kapatagan, which, after revision, decided in his favor. on april 21, 2008, aguilar filed his notice of
appeal and paid the mtc the appeal fee of p1,000.00. when the comelec received the records of the case,
the first division ordered the dismissal of the appeal for failure to pay the proper appeal fee. aguilar
moved for reconsideration, but the comelec first division denied his motion for failure to pay the
complete motion fee of p700.00. aguilar filed another motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
comelec en banc should have ruled upon his motion for reconsideration. the same comelec division,
however, issued an order denying the motion, being a second motion for reconsideration which is a
prohibited pleading. thus, petitioner filed for certiorari questioning the dismissal of his appeal.
issue:
whether or not respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order dismissing petitioners
appeal.
held:
the court finds that the comelec first division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order
dismissing petitioners appeal. fairness and prudence dictate that the comelec first division should have
first directed petitioner to pay the additional appeal fee in accordance with the clarificatory resolution,
and if the latter should refuse to comply, then, and only then, dismiss the appeal. instead, the comelec
first division hastily dismissed the appeal on the strength of the recently promulgated clarificatory
resolution which had taken effect only a few days earlier. this unseemly haste is an invitation to
outrage. the comelec first division should have been more cautious in dismissing petitioners appeal on
the mere technicality of non-payment of the additional p3,200.00 appeal fee given the public interest
involved in election cases. this is especially true in this case where only one vote separates the
contending parties. the court stresses once more that election law and rules are to be interpreted and

applied in a liberal manner so as to give effect, not to frustrate, the will of the electorate.
article ix: a. common provisions, section 7. decisions of the commissions
garces v. ca, gr. no. 114 795, july 17, 1996
facts:
garces was appointed election registrar of gutalac, zamboanga del norte. she was to replace respondent
claudio concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to liloy, zamboanga del norte. correspondingly
approved by the civil service commission, both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of
office. concepcion, however, refused to transfer his post as he did not request for it. garces, on the
other hand, was directed by the office of assistant director for operations to assume the gutalac post. but
she was not able to do so because of a memorandum issued by respondent provincial election
supervisor salvador empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office in gutalac as the same is not
vacant. meanwhile, since respondent concepcion continued occupying the gutalac office, the comelec
en banc cancelled his appointment to liloy. on february 26, 1988, garces filed before the rtc a petition
for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against empeynado
and concepcion. meantime, the comelec en banc through a resolution dated june 3, 1988, resolved to
recognize respondent concepcion as the election registrar of gutalac, and ordered that the appointments
of garces to gutalac and of concepcion to liloy be cancelled. in view thereof, respondent empeynado
moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and academic
by the said comelec resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the comelec.
issue:
whether or not the petition filed for review on certiorari is valid.
held:
the court ruled the provision under section 7 article ix is inapplicable as there was no case or matter
filed before the comelec. the case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something within the
jurisdiction of the comelec. it must pertain to an election dispute. the settled rule is that decision,
rulings, orders of the comelec that may be brought to the supreme court on certiorari under sec. 7 art. ix
are those that relate to the comelecs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving
elective regional, provincial and city officials. the controversy involves an appointive, not an elective,
official. hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the supreme court. to rule
otherwise would surely burden the court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated
before the rtc, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over all cases
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions.
article ix: a. common provisions, section 7. decisions of the commissions
dumayas v. comelec, gr nos. 141952-53, april 29, 2001
facts:
dumayas sought the exclusion of election returns for 3 precincts during the casting and counting of
votes by municipal court of canvassers (mbc). mbc denied the petition and proceeded with the canvas
which showed bernal, respondent, garnering more votes than dumayas. petitioner appealed to comelec
2nd division, which excluded said election returns and directed mbc to finish the canvas and proclaim
the winning mayoralty candidate. respondent bernal moved for reconsideration with comelec en banc.
mbc proclaimed petitioner dumayas winner of election. bernal then filed an urgent motion to declare
void petitioners proclamation. bernal filed an action for quo warranto against dumayas before the rtc.
dumayas filed with comelec en banc a motion to cancel bernals motion for reconsideration and motion
to declare void petitioners proclamation. comelec en banc reversed decision of 2 nd division, annulled
dumayas proclamation and constituted new mbc which proclaimed bernal winner. petitioner asked sc
to set aside the comelec en banc resolution. petitioner claims that resolution of the comelec is void
because commissioners gorospe and guiani have already retired on the date of its promulgation and
submits it as a defect and therefore invalidated the entire decision and commission and that accordingly
a new vote should be taken.
issue:

whether or not said resolution by the comelec, in view of commissioners gorospe and guianis
retirement before date of promulgation of assailed resolution, be deemed null and void for being
violative of art 9-a, sec 7 of the 1987 constitution.
held:
no. the votes of gorospe and guiani should merely be considered withdrawn for the reason that their
retirement preceeded the resolutions promulgation and the effect would be as if they did not sign the
resolution at all and the only votes that would be considered in the deciding the controversy would be
that of the remaining commissioners. however, unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially
affect the result insofar as votes for or against a party is concerned, we find no reason for declaring the
decision a nullity. with the cancellation of the retired commissioners votes, the remaining votes at the
time of the resolutions promulgation would still be 3 to 1 in favor of respondent which still constituted
a quorum. the defect cited by petitioner does not affect the validity of respondent commissions
disposition of controversy.
article ix: b. csc, section 1 composition; qualifications; term
gaminde v. coa 347 scra 655 (2000)
facts:
gaminde, ad interim, commissioner of the civil service commission was appointed by the president and
assumed office after taking an oath and was later on confirmed by the commission on appointment.
gaminde sought for clarification from the president as to the expiry of her term of office and then was
opined that term of office will expire on feb. 2, 2000 and not feb. 2, 1999. feb. 4, 1999, chairman
corazon alma de leon, of the commission on audit requesting opinion on whether or not commissioner
gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their
appointments on feb. 2, 1999. feb. 18, 1999, general counsel, commission on audit, issued opinion that
term of gaminde has expired on feb. 2, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the
constitutional intent. consequently, csc resident auditor felipe issued notice of disallowance,
disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff,
effective feb. 2, 1999. petitioner appealed the disallowance to the coa en banc. coa issued decision
dismissing petitioners appeal. in time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, coa denied the
motion.
issue:
whether the term of office of atty. thelma gaminde, as commissioner (csc), to which she was appointed
on june 11, 1993, expired on feb. 2, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or feb. 2, 2000, as
claimed by her.
held:
term of office expired on feb. 2, 1999however; she served as de facto officer in good faith until feb. 2,
2000 and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual services rendered.
consequently, coa erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her
co-terminous staff. the terms of the first chairmen and commissioners of the constitutional commissions
under the 1987 constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of variations in dates of
appointments and qualifications of appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of 7, 5, and
3 years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2 year interval between the expiration of the terms.
it is ruled that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the
constitutional commissions under the 1987 constitution must be on feb. 2, 1987, the date of the
adoption of the 1987 constitution.
article ix: b. csc, section 1 composition; qualifications; term
mathay jr. v. ca, gr no. 124374, december 15, 1999
facts:
brigido r. simon appointed private respondents to positions in the civil service unit (csu) of the local
government of quezon city. csus were created pursuant to presidential decree no. 51 which was
allegedly signed into law on nov. 15 or 16, 1972. the civil service commission issued memorandum
circular no. 30, directing all civil service regional or field offices to recall, revoke and disapprove

within 1 year from issuance of said memorandum, all appointments in csu created pursuant to
presidential decree no. 51 on the ground that the same never became a law as it was never published in
the official gazette. affected by the revocation were private respondents. may 1992, petitioner ismael
mathay jr. was elected mayor of quezon city. on july 1992, mathay renewed the contractual
appointments of all private respondents effective july 1 to 31, 1992. upon expiry, these appointments
were no longer renewed. the non-renewal by mayor mathay of private respondents appointments
became the seed of discontentment from which these petitions grew. after the non-renewal of their
appointments, private respondents in these two petitions appealed to the civil service commission. the
csc issued separate resolutions holding that the reappointment of private respondents to the department
of public order and safety (dpos) was automatic, pursuant to the provision on absorption in quezon city
ordinance no. nc-140 and ordering their reinstatement to their former positions in the dpos.
issue:
whether or not the ca erred when it ruled that respondent civil service commission has the authority to
direct mathay to "reinstate" private respondents in the dpos.
held:
we find that the civil service commission erred when it applied the directives of ordinance nc-140.
section 3 of the said ordinance is invalid for being inconsistent with b.p. 337. section 3 of the
questioned ordinance directs the absorption of the personnel of the defunct csu into the new dpos. the
ordinance refers to personnel and not to positions. hence, the city council or sanggunian, through the
ordinance, is in effect dictating who shall occupy the newly created dpos positions. however, a review
of the provisions of b.p. 337 shows that the power to appoint rests exclusively with the local chief
executive and thus cannot be usurped by the city council or sanggunian through the simple expedient
of enacting ordinances that provide for the "absorption" of specific persons to certain positions.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 1
eiib v. ca, gr no. 129133, nov. 25, 1998
facts:
the civil service commission required the secretary of finance to submit all appointments made in the
economic intelligence and investigation bureau. however, instead of submitting the requirements, the
eiib sent a letter for confirmation of the organizations exemption from csc rules with regards to
appointment. the csc denied the exemption and implemented a resolution in which it states that, eiib
officials who fail to comply with the said order (submission of appointments) shall be subject to
contempt. the petitioner argues that they are practicing the exemption for the submission of
appointments which were stated in pd. no. 1458 and loi no. 71.
issue:
whether or not the eiib is subject to exemption.
held:
no. the aforecited provisions of law provide for the exemption of petitioner eiib only from civil service
rules and regulations relative to appointments and other personnel actions, but not from the civil
service law or civil service rules and regulations relative to any other matter. moreover, the petitioner is
a government agency, as provided by the administrative code, therefore subject to the scope of the csc.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 1
naseco v. nlrc, gr no. 100947, may 31, 1993
facts:
private respondent pineda decided to run for councilor but his candidacy was questioned. the reason
was that he was still holding an appointive position in the philippine national oil co.-energy
development corporation (pnoc-edc), a subsidiary of the philippine national oil co. upon winning the
elections, certain questions on his employment with pnoc-edc arose. the issue was if he was still
employed with the company even though if he was already elected as councilor. upon reaching his
office, the undersecretary of the department of local government, decided that he can hold both offices.
petitioner questions the decision of the undersecretary. solicitor general gave a recommendation stating
that a separation of employment done to pineda will be illegal. the candidacy has no effect to his

employment for pnoc-edc is not a gocc embraced within the civil service.
issue:
1 - whether or not the recommendation of the solicitor general right.
2 - whether or not an organization not subject to the civil service is an exemption to the provision on
the omnibus election code
held:
1 yes. article ix section 2 (1) of the 1987 constitution provides that the scope of the civil service
includes government-owned or controlled organizations with original charters. the pnoc-edc has no
original charter, thus, the organization is not subject to this law.
no. a government-owned or controlled corporation does not lose its character as such because of lack of
original charter. an organization whose stocks are owned by the government shall be considered as a
gocc. the law shall be taken into text: "employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations..are considered ipso facto resigned".
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 1
mwss v. hernandez, 143 scra 602
facts:
the mwss was being tried by the nlrc for not paying benefits of its employees. the petitioners contend
that they are not in the jurisdiction of the nlrc because they are a government-owned and controlled
corporation. however, the respondent arbiter decided against the petitioner on grounds that the
employees were not regular employees but hired employees for a certain period of time. the limitation
for nlrcs jurisdiction is for those regular employees that are subject to the civil service rules and
regulation.
issue:
whether or not the nlrc has jurisdiction over contractual employees of a government-owned and
controlled corporation.
held:
no. the contention of the arbiter as to the extent of nlrc over the contractual employees is absurd. the
nlrc and other goccs employees, including contractual, are subject to the civil service rules and
regulations and not other administrative bodies.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 1
philippine fisheries development authority v. nlrc and odin security agency, gr no. 94825, september 4,
1992
facts:
odin security agency (odin) and philippine fisheries development authority (pfda), a gocc and is under
the scope of civil service, entered into a security services contract for the iloilo fishing port complex on
november 11, 1985. on october 24, 1987, during the effectivity of the said security agreement, odin
requested pfda to adjust the contract rate in accordance with wage order no. 6, which provides an
increase in the minimum wage per guard and allowance rates and shall be borne by the principal/client
and the contracts shall be deemed amended accordingly. the security services contract provided for an
automatic escalation of the rate per guard in case of wage increase. two more subsequent requests for
adjustment was further made but were ignored by pfda. private-respondet filed a complaint for unpaid
amount of re-adjustment with wage salary differentials which petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and
affirmed by labor arbiter. respondent then appealed to the nlrc and the ruling of labor arbiter was set
aside in favor of respondent and subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
issue:
whether or not petitioner, being a gocc, is under the scope of csc or of nlrc law.
held:
petioner, being indirect employer of concerned security guards, is not employees of the petitioner
because the contract of services explicitly states that the security guards are not their employees thus,
no employer-employee relationship exists, therefore the jurisdiction of the csc may not be invoked in
this case. notwithstanding that the petitioner is a government agency, its liabilities, which are jointly

and solidarily with that of the contractor. its liabilities are under the nlrc scope.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 1
pagcor v. ca, gr no. 93396, september 30, 1991
facts:
pagcor terminated the services of private respondent joel montoya as table supervisor at casino filipino
on the ground of loss of confidence. he was formally notified of this action. alleging that he had been
dismissed without due process of law, montoya lodged with the rtc, a complaint against pagcor. pagcor
filed a motion to dismiss challenging the jurisdiction of the court, on which its motion was dismissed
by rtc. this is a case based on the complaint made by private respondent claiming for damages as said
respondent was dismissed by reason of loss of confidence, asserting he was illegally and arbitrarily
dismissed without conducting a hearing regarding his conduct therefore violating his constitutional
right of due process and individual right. therefore, respondent maintains not on his dismissal but on
the manner of which he is dismissed- the main point of his complaint as- being oppressive to constitute
a proper case for civil action for damages.
issue:
whether or not the case is under the jurisdiction of civil service or of labor arbiters / nlrc.
held:
the court ruled that the trial court erred in denying motion to dismiss and that the respondent court also
erred sustaining it. the issue raised by the private respondent, to the correct interpretation and
application of pd 1869, properly comes under the jurisdiction of the merit system protection board,
subject to appeal to the civil service commission, and ultimately to review by this court.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 1
agyao v. csc, 639 scra 781
facts:
agyao was re-appointed as department manager ii of peza. as a matter of course, the renewal of agyaos
appointment was submitted by peza to the csc. however, agyaos re-appointment was invalidated by the
cscfo-bsp, through a letter of director mercedes p. tabao. the letter stated that agyao lacked the
prescribed career executive service office (ceso)/career service executive examination (csee) eligibility,
and there were qualified eligibles actually available for appointment. peza director-general lilia b. de
lima sent a letter-appeal to the csc seeking a reconsideration of its action on the appointment of agyao.
the csc issued resolution no. 05-0821[2] denying director-general de limas appeal and affirming the
invalidation by the cscfobsp of agyaos appointment as department manager ii of peza. agyao filed
with the csc a letter-motion for reconsideration of its resolution. the motion, however, was denied in the
cited csc resolution no. 05-1486.
issue:
whether or not petitioner's re-appointment is valid.
held:
the supreme court held that the position of director manager ii at the peza is not among the enumerated
positions in the career executive service (sec. 7, eo 292 - the administrative code 1987), much less, a
position that requires presidential appointment. even the csc admits that the position of director
manager ii does not require presidential appointment. for said reason, agyao only needs the approval of
the peza director-general to validate his appointment or re-appointment. as he need not possess a ceso
or csee eligibility, the csc has no valid and legal basis in invalidating his appointment or re-appointment
as department manager ii.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 2
de los santos v. mallare, 87 phil 289
facts:
petitioner was appointed city engineer of baguio which was confirmed by the commission on
appointments. he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position. thereafter,
respondent was extended an ad interim appointment by the president to the same position, after which,
the undersecretary of the department of public works and communications directed santos to report to

the bureau of public works for another assignment. santos refused to vacate the office, when the city
mayor and the other officials named as mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid mallare the salary
corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings.
issue:
whether or not the removal of petitioner from the position of city engineer of baguio is valid.
held:
no, it is not valid. the constitution provides for the protection of officers or employees under the civil
service which states that "no officer or employee shall be removed or suspended except for a cause
provided by law.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 2
santiago jr. v. csc, gr no. 81467, october 27, 1989
facts:
petitioner, a customs collector i, was given a promotional appointment by the customs commissioner to
hold the position of customs collector iii. jose, a customs collector ii, filed a protest with the merit
system promotion board(mspb) arguing that he should be the one who should be appointed mainly on
the ground that he is the next-in-rank. the mspb then revoked the appointment of petitioner which was
affirmed by the csc, hence this case was filed.
issue:
whether or not the csc erred in revoking the appointment of petitioner.
held:
yes, the csc erred in revoking the appointment. one who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential
consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one
else can be appointed. to apply the next-in-rank rule would impose a rigid formula on the appointing
power contrary to the policy of the law.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 2
central bank v. csc, gr no. 80455-56, april 10, 1989
facts:
dr. jordan was appointed as assistant bank physician of the central bank of the philippines. private
respondent borja protested the said appointment on the ground that he is the next-in-rank employee,
and therefore should be the one to be appointed as assistant bank physician.
issue:
whether or not the csc can revoke appointments on the ground that one is the next-in-rank employee.
held:
no, the task given to the csc is to make sure that the appointment made has met the qualifications set
forth, when it comes to a point where both parties are qualified for the appointment, the csc can no
longer revoke the appointment. the discretion is liberally given to the appointing authority.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 2
csc v. salas, 274 scra 414
facts:
respondent salas was appointed by the pagcor chairman as internal security staff member and assigned
to the casino at the manila pavilion hotel. respondent was allegedly engaged in proxy betting as
detailed in the affidavits purportedly executed by two customers who claimed that they were used as
gunners by respondent. thus his employment was terminated by the board of directors of pagcor
allegedly for loss of confidence. respondent however argues that his position is not one which is
primarily confidential by nature.
issue:
whether or not the position held by salas is primarily confidential in nature thereby making the
termination valid.
held:
no, he is not a confidential employee and thus can only be dismissed for a cause and after due course,
not on the ground of loss of confidence.

article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 2


csc v. javier, 546 scra 485
facts:
respondent emma s. javier, utility worker i in the regional trial court, makati city, branch 145, was
formally charged by the civil service commission with grave misconduct and dishonesty due to alleged
cheating during the career service examinations. in the course of the presentation of evidence against
her, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to present the codigo and failure of
the witnesses to categorically declare that they actually saw her cheating during the examination.
issue:
whether or not the respondent can be dismissed from service and with prejudice to re-employment in
the government or any of its instrumentalities, and agencies.
held:
yes, respondents misconduct constitutes a manifest indifference to the values of integrity, uprightness
and good conduct which are expected of men and women who work with the courts of justice.
respondent is found guilty of dishonesty and is hereby dismissed from the service effective
immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice
to her reemployment in any branch or instrumentality in the government including government-owned
and controlled corporations.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 2
grino v. csc, 194 scra 458
facts:
appointments were made by the former governor to the provincial attorney's office. when petitioner
assumed the position of governor, he terminated the services of the provincial attorney as well as other
legal officers on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. the action of the governor was then taken
to the merit system promotion board which declared the termination illegal and was affirmed by the
csc, hence this petition.
issue:
w/n the position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal subordinates are primarily confidential
in nature so that the services of those holding said positions can be terminated upon loss of confidence.
held:
yes, but only the position of provincial attorney, the legal subordinates of the provincial attorney are
not considered to be primarily confidential.
article ix: b. csc, section 2 paragraph 3
briones v. osmena, 104 phil 588
facts:
ordinance no. 192 abolished 15 positions in the city mayors office and 17 positions in the office of the
municipal board with an alleged economic and efficient reason for the abolition. an action for
mandamus with damages to declare the abolition of the petitioners position void, and to order the
respondent city mayor to reinstate them to their former positions.
issue:
whether or not the abolition of the office violate the security of tenure.
held:
no, while the abolition of office does not imply removal of the incumbent officer, this is true only
where the abolition of office is done in good faith and not merely as a cover for a removal otherwise
not allowed by the constitution.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 3
abakada group party list v. purisima, 562 scra 251
facts:
the constitutionality of ra 9335 was assailed. petitioner argues that the law establishing the reward and
incentives system transforms the officials and employees into "mercenaries or bounty hunters" as they
will only do their best when rewarded. the law was enacted to revenue-generation capability and

collection of the bir and boc.


issue:
whether or not the rewards and incentives system violates the equal protection granted by the
constitution.
held:
no, both bureaus are under the dof, they principally perform specific functions of being the
instrumentality through which they state exercise its inherent power of taxation
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 3
csc v. sojor, 554 scra 160
facts:
respondent sojor was appointed president of the central visayas polytechnic college. during his second
term, it was converted to negros oriental state university. meanwhile, three administrative cases were
filed against sojor, he moved for the dismissal of the case but the csc denied. so he went to the ca which
ruled in his favor, hence this petition.
issue:
whether or not the csc has jurisdiction over the removal or dismissal of state university officials.
held:
yes, it is within the scope of the civil service. except as otherwise provided by the constitution or by
law, the civil service commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation
and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the
conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. paragraph 3
pcso board of directors v. lapid, 648 scra
facts:
respondent lapid was dismissed from work by the pcso board of directors without due process. because
of this, she appealed to the civil service commission, where the latter ruled that pcsos failure to
observe due process is irrelevant in this present case and the real issue for the commissions
determination is the termination of lapids casual employment. based on the status of lapids
employment as a casual employee, csc finds this present appeal moot and academic.
issue:
whether or not the ruling of the csc regarding casual employees of the government is correct.
held:
no. by the nature of their employment, casual employees were deemed to be not covered by the security
of tenure protection as they could be removed from the service at anytime, with or without cause.
however, even a casual or temporary employee enjoys security of tenure and cannot be dismissed
except for cause enumerated in sec. 22, rule xiv of the omnibus civil service rules and regulations and
other pertinent laws. equally important, they are entitled to due process especially if they are to be
removed.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. classifications and appointments
csc v. pagcor, gr no. 123708, june 1997
facts:
respondent salas was appointed by the pagcor chairman as internal security staff member and assigned
to the casino at the manila pavilion hotel. respondent was allegedly engaged in proxy betting as
detailed in the affidavits purportedly executed by two customers who claimed that they were used as
gunners by respondent. thus his employment was terminated by the board of directors of pagcor
allegedly for loss of confidence. respondent however argues that his position is not one which is
primarily confidential by nature.
issue:
whether or not the position held by salas is primarily confidential in nature thereby making the
termination valid.
held:

no, he is not a confidential employee and thus can only be dismissed for a cause and after due course,
not on the ground of loss of confidence.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. classifications and appointments
samson v. ca, 145 scra 654 (1986)
facts:
administrative order no.3, issued by mayor samson of caloocan city, summarily terminated the services
of respondent talens who held position of assistant secretary to the mayor on the ground of lack and
loss of confidence and appointing liwag to the position. ra no. 2260 declares the position of secretaries
to city mayors non-competitive and this was interpreted by mayor samson as to include the position of
asst. sec. to the mayor.
issue:
whether or not the interpretation of mayor samson is correct thereby making the dismissal of
respondent talens valid.
held:
no, secretary to the mayor and assistant secretary to the mayor are two separate and distinct positions.
one is of higher category and rank than the other. the functions strictly attributable to a secretary, is
not automatically vested or transferred to an assistant secretary, because the latter simply assists or
aids the former in the accomplishment of his duties. therefore the dismissal of respondent talens is not
valid.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. classifications and appointments
achacoso v. macaraig, 195 scra 235 (1991)
facts:
tomas d. achacoso was appointed administrator of the philippine overseas employment administration.
in compliance with a request addressed by the president of the philippines to all department heads,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, bureau heads, and other government officials, he filed a
courtesy resignation. he then protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office
because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the presidents directive. the
petitioner invokes security of tenure against his claimed removal without legal cause.
issue:
whether or not the president erred in replacing achacoso.
held:
no, it is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed. achacoso did not, at best therefore his appointment could be regarded only as temporary.
and being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and at a moment's notice.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. classifications and appointments
binamira v. garrucho, 188 scra 154 (1990)
facts:
in pursuant to a memorandum addressed to him by the minister of tourism, the petitioner assumed
office on april 7, 1986. minister gonzales sought approval from president aquino of the composition of
the board of directors of the pta, which included binamira as vice-chairman in his capacity as general
manager, approved by the president. binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the
duties of pta general manager and vice-chairman of its board of directors. his resignation was
demanded by respondent garrucho as the new secretary of tourism. president aquino sent respondent
garrucho a memorandum designating him concurrently as general manager, effective immediately, until
the president can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.
issue:
whether or not the petitioner was illegally removed from his designation.
held:
no, the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. the reason is that the
decree clearly provides that the appointment of the general manager of the philippine tourism authority

shall be made by the president of the philippines, not by any other officer. appointment involves the
exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated
article ix: b. csc, section 2. classifications and appointments
luego v. csc, 143 scra 327 (1986)
facts:
petitioner was appointed administrative officer ii, office of the city mayor, cebu city, by mayor
florentino solon. the appointment was described as permanent but the civil service commission
approved it as temporary. the civil service commission found the private respondent better qualified
than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private respondent in
place of petitioners position. the private respondent was so appointed mayor ronald duterte. the
petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the civil service
commissions order and the private respondents title.
issue:
whether or not the csc has the authority to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that the
other is better qualified.
held:
no, when the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the commission has
no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the civil service laws.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. classifications and appointments
santiago v. csc, 178 scra 733 (1989)
facts:
petitioner, a customs collector i, was given a promotional appointment by the customs commissioner to
hold the position of customs collector iii. jose, a customs collector ii, filed a protest with the merit
system promotion board(mspb) arguing that he should be the one who should be appointed mainly on
the ground that he is the next-in-rank. the mspb then revoked the appointment of petitioner which was
affirmed by the csc, hence this case was filed.
issue:
whether or not the csc erred in revoking the appointment of petitioner.
held:
yes, the csc erred in revoking the appointment. one who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential
consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one
else can be appointed. to apply the next-in-rank rule would impose a rigid formula on the appointing
power contrary to the policy of the law.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. classifications and appointments
astraguillo v. manglapus, 190 scra 280 (1990)
facts:
astraquillo was appointed by the president of the philippines as ambassador to the uae. after he has
occupied the post for two years, a confidential memorandum was filed against him, accusing him, his
wife and cousin-in-law of improper interference with his functions. the secretary of foreign affairs then
recommended to the president for his removal. the recommendation was approved by authority of the
president and so he was removed from position. he now questions the power of the secretary of foreign
affairs to remove him from his post.
issue:
whether or not the removal was valid.
held:
their appointments to the foreign service were made on the bases other than those of the usual test of
merit and fitness. they are under the non-career service type of employment, their tenure being so was
coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasures. it is clear in this case the
there was the approval of the president for his removal, therefore it is valid.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. classifications and appointments
aquino v. csc, gr no. 92403, april 22, 1992

facts:
petitioner was designated as oic of the division supply unit by the decs regional director in the view of
the retirement of the supply officer i. thereafter, the division superintendent of city schools issued a
promotional appointment to private respondent as supply officer i in the decs division. petitioner then
filed a protest and the appointment of private respondent was revoked. on appeal to the csc, the
appointment of petitioner was revoked and thereby restoring the appointment of private respondent on
the ground that she is more qualified.
issue:
whether or not the csc can revoke appointments on the ground that one is more qualified than the other.
held:
no, csc can only revoke appointments on the ground that one is not qualified to take over the position.
when the minimum qualifications are met, then the csc cannot revoke such appointments on the ground
that the other is better qualified.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. classifications and appointments
lampinid v. csc, gr no. 96298, may 14, 1991
facts:
petitioner lapinid was appointed by the philippine ports authority to the position of terminal supervisor
at the manila international container terminal on. this appointment was protested by private respondent
junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations with the appeals board of the ppa , for a review of the
decision of the placement committee. he contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or
to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto. private respondent was then
appointed as the terminal supervisor.
issue:
whether or not appointments may be revoked due to preferential right.
held:
no, appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this court cannot compel. while the act of
appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his
personality - is the prerogative of the appointing authority.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. classifications and appointments
nazareno, et al v. city of dumaguete, gr no. 181559, october 2, 2009
facts:
this is a petition for review on certiorari to reverse the decision of the court of appeals that affirms the
decision of csc field offices invalidation of petitioners appointment as employee of the city of
dumaguete, which was affirmed by the csc regional office. regarding the appointments made by the
outgoing mayor after the election. petitioners maintain that csc resolution is invalid because the
commission is without authority to issue regulations prohibiting mass appointments at the local
government level.
issue:
whether or not the appointment of the outgoing mayor is valid.
held:
we find that the civil service commission has the authority to issue csc resolution and that the
invalidation of petitioners appointments was warranted. csc has the authority to establish rules to
promote efficiency in the civil service. after the elections, appointments by defeated candidates are
prohibited, except under the circumstances mentioned in csc resolution , to avoid animosities between
outgoing and incoming officials, to allow the incoming administration a free hand in implementing its
policies, and to ensure that appointments and promotions are not used as a tool for political patronage
or as a reward for services rendered to the outgoing local officials.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office canonizado v. aguirre, gr no.
133132, jan. 25, 2000

facts:
petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the national police commission, when ra 8851, otherwise
known as the pnp reform and reorganization act of 1998, took effect, the terms of office of the
incumbent commissioners were deemed expired. petitioners claimed that this violated their security of
tenure.
issue:
whether or not the pnp reform and reorganization act of 1998 violated the security of tenure of the
incumbent commissioners.
held:
no, ra 8851 did not expressly abolish the positions of the petitioners. it was just made an agency
attached to the dilg, the organizational structure and the composition of the national police commission
remain essentialy the same except for the addition of the chief of pnp as ex-officio member.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office secretary gloria v. ca, gr no.
119903, august 14, 2000
facts:
respondent was appointed school division superintendent, division of city schools, quezon city. upon
recommendation of the secretary of education, culture and sports, the president reassigned him as
superintendent of the marikina institute of science and technology on the ground that he is an expert in
vocational and technical education. respondent questioned the validity of his reassignment on the
ground that it is indefinite and it violated his security of tenure.
issue:
whether or not the indefinite reassignment violated the security of tenure.
held:
yes, there is nothing to show that the reassignment of respondent is temporary. the evidence or
intention to reassign respondent had no definite period. it is violative of his security of tenure.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office
yenko and mayor estrada v. gungon, gr no. 165450, august 13, 2009
facts:
respondent gungon was extended a permanent appointment as local assessment operations officer iii in
the assessor's office of the municipality of san juan, metro manila. thereafter yenko reassigned gungon
to the public order and safety office. gungon protested his reassignment for being violative, it
amounted to a demotion in rank and it violated his constitutional right of security of tenure. yenko
called his attention and gave him a memo saying the his failure to report to his reassignment is a
ground for dismissal.
issue:
whether or not the reassignment amounted to demotion in rank and violated the security of tenure.
held:
yes, the reduction in rank is prohibited by law and the reassignment of gungon with an indefinite period
violates the right of security of tenure. therefore gungon is given back his position as local assessment
operations officer iii in the assessor's office.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office
buklod v. executive secretary, gr nos. 142801-02, july 10, 2001
facts:
during the time of president aquino, she created the eiib to primarily conduct anti-aliasing operations in
areas outside the jurisdiction of the bureau of customs. in the year 2000, president estrada issued an
order deactivating the eiib, he subsequently ordered the employees of eiib to be separated to be
separated from the service. eiib employees maintained that the legislature has no power to abolish a
public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature and that the abolition violates their
constitutional right to security of tenure.
issue:

whether or not the abolition of office violated the rights of the employees of eiib.
held:
no, there was no bad faith in the abolishment of the office. valid abolition of offices is neither removal
nor separation of the incumbents, if the public office ceases to exist, there is no separation or dismissal
to speak of. indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. except constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards to salary and tenure, no one can be said to have
any vested right in an office or its salary.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office
dimayuga v. benedicto ii, gr no. 144153, jan. 16, 2002
facts:
petitioner was appointed as executive director ii by the secretary of public works and highways.
several complaints were made against her when she assumed the position. she was then given a
memorandum directing her to report to the legal service of the department. she refused and filed a
leave of absence, she considers this as a demotion. while on her leave, she received a letter informing
her that then president estrada appointed respondent benedicto ii is her stead.
issue:
whether or not petitioner has the right to be reinstated to her office.
held:
no, it was found that she lacks the eligibility to be able to be appointed permanently. therefore she is
limited only to temporary appointments.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office
miranda v. carreon, gr no. 143540, april 11, 2003
facts:
vice-mayor navarro, while acting as the mayor because of the suspension of mayor miranda appointed
respondents to several positions in the city government, their appointments were of permanent basis.
upon the return of mayor miranda, he found that these appointees were performing poorly and therefore
ordered for their termination. respondents now contend that their right for due process was violated
and their constitutional right to security of tenure.
issue:
whether or not respondents enjoy security of tenure granted by the constitution.
held:
yes, the positions given to them were of career service category. the constitution has envisioned the
civil service to be on merit and rewards system that will truly be accountable and responsive to the
people and deserving of their trust and support. these noble objectives will be frustrated if the tenure of
its members is subject to the whim of partisan politics.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office
hernandez v. villegas, 14 scra 544 (1965)
facts:
respondent, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed as director for security of the bureau of
customs. soon he was sent to the united states to study. when he returned, he was temporarily detailed
to the arrastre service but later was proposed to and approved by the president to make the appointment
of villegas to the arrastre services permanent, on the ground that the former position is primarily
confidential. thereafter, another was appointed to the position of director for security of the bureau of
customs. it appears that respondent was not informed in time about the appointments, thereby making
him file an action for his right over the position.
issue:
whether or not the position was primarily confidential, therefore making the appointments valid.
held:
for our purpose, we do not need to consider the position involved in this case is primarily confidential,
because, even assuming the position to be, it is nevertheless subject to the constitutional provision that,
no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause.

article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office


briones v. osmena, 104 phil 588 (1958)
facts:
ordinance no. 192 abolished 15 positions in the city mayor's office and 17 positions in the office of the
municipal board with an alleged economic and efficient reason for the abolition. an action for
mandamus with damages to declare the abolition of the petitioner's position void and to order the
respondent city mayor to reinstate them to their former positions.
issue:
whether or not the abolition of positions was in bad faith and thereby violating their security of tenure.
held:
yes, the reason given for the abolition of the positions is untrue and constitutes a mere subterfuge for
the removal without cause of the said employees, in violation of the civil service tenures as provided by
the constitution.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office
mayor v. macaraig, 194 scra 672 (1991)
facts:
ra 6715 declared vacant all positions of the commissioners, executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters
of the present national labor relations commission. the old positions were declared vacant because of
the need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and
functions, and upgrade their qualifications, ranks and salaries or emoluments.
issue:
whether or not ra6715 is constitutional in declaring those positions vacant.
held:
it is constitutional because a recognized cause for removal or termination is the abolition by law of his
office as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of
functions, or clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment, the
petitioners have the right to remain in office until the expiration of the terms for which they have been
appointed, unless sooner removed "for a cause provided by law."
article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office
roque v. ericta, 53 scra 156
facts:
petitioners acdal and roque are special counsels in the office of the provincial fiscal duly appointed as
such by the secretary of justice. roque assumed office on march 11, 1964 while acdal assumed office on
march 30, 1964. the petitioners were designated special counsels to assist the provincial fiscal of this
province in the prosecution, not of specified cases, but of cases in general in connection with the
discharge of the regular duties of said provincial fiscal. since their assumption of office, they have been
discharging their duties continuously from march, 1964 up to the date of the trial in september, 1968.
the provincial fiscal testified that both petitioners have been performing their duties efficiently. they
have been receiving their salaries regularly from the date of assumption of office to july 31, 1968. after
july 31, 1968, they ceased to receive their regular salaries. on january 1, 1968, the respondents passed
resolution no. 6 abolishing the positions of the petitioners. hence, the petitioners pleaded with the
governor and asked for reconsideration.
issue:
whether or not the abolition of their positions were unconstitutional thus violating their security of
tenure.
held:
it was declared that the abolition of the positions of the petitioners was null and void, the respondent
has unlawfully excluded that petitioners from the enjoyment of a right or office to which they are
entitled, the respondent has unlawfully failed or neglected the performance of an act which the law
enjoins as a duty resulting from office.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office

mama, jr. v court of appeals, gr no. 86517, april 30, 1991


facts:
petitioners, with the exception of andres mama, jr., were either doctors, nurses, midwives or employees
of the s.m. lao memorial city emergency hospital of ozamiz city, which was then engaged in rendering
general medical services to the city residents. on february 2, 1988, respondent jesus sanciangco, jr. and
his co- respondents herein assumed office as the newly elected local officials of the city of ozamiz.
jesus sanciangco, jr. was elected mayor. on march 10, 1988, the city council passed its resolution no. 61
abolishing the s.m. lao memorial city emergency hospital of ozamiz city allegedly due to losses
incurred and poor services rendered to the constituents.
issue:
whether or not the abolition of the office violated the constitutional grant of security of tenure for the
petitioners.
held:
no, the abolition was made lawfully. nonetheless, pursuant to section 76 of batas pambansa blg. 337,
the local government code, herein petitioners who may be affected by the abolition of their positions
are entitled to be reinstated in other vacant positions without diminution of salary.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office
up board of regents v. rasul, gr no. 91551, august 16, 1991
facts:
the up board of regents appointed dr. felipe estrella as the director of philippine general hospital or pgh.
barely 2 weeks after appointment, dr. abuava, as the president of the up sent a memorandum to the
board of regents to reorganize pgh. upon this recommendation, the board of regents approved the reorganization plan and nomination committee was formed. this committee ought to choose a
replacement for dr. estrella as to fill up the alleged vacant up-pgh director. dr. estrella filed an
injunction case against the nominiation committee and the board of regents to forestall the removal or
dismissal of dr estrella
issue:
whether or not the reorganization can validly remove dr. estrella from position.
held:
no, as held in numerous cases, appointees of the up board of regents enjoy security of tenure during
their term of office. moreover, it is clear from the record that pgh itself was not abolished in the
reorganization plan approved by the up board of regents.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. security of tenure and abolition of office
kawaning eiib v. executive secretary, gr no. 142801, july 10, 2001
facts:
during the time of president aquino, she created the eiib to primarily conduct anti-aliasing operations in
areas outside the jurisdiction of the bureau of customs. in the year 2000, president estrada issued an
order deactivating the eiib, he subsequently ordered the employees of eiib to be separated to be
separated from the service. eiib employees maintained that the legislature has no power to abolish a
public office, as that is a power solely lodge in the legislature and that the abolition violates their
constitutional right to security of tenure.
issue:
whether or not the abolition of office violated the rights of the employees of eiib.
held:
no, there was no bad faith in the abolishment of the office. valid abolition of offices is neither removal
nor separation of the incumbents, if the public office ceases to exist, there is no separation or dismissal
to speak of. indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. except constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards to salary and tenure, no one can be said to have
any vested right in an office or its salary.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. partisan political activity; self-organization; temporary employees
people v. de venecia, 14 scra 864 (1965)

facts:
respondent, a public officer, was accused for electioneering. accordingly, he willfully induced,
influenced, swayed and made the electors vote in favor of candidates for public office. upon a motion
to quash, the court dismissed the case, holding that sec. 54 of the revised election code (upon which the
prosecution rested) had been repealed by sec. 29 of republic act 2260. on the other hand, an employee
(classified civil service) who contributes money for election purposes to a candidate violates sec. 54
(and is punishable with imprisonment) because he "aided a candidate" and may not invoke the privilege
reserved to him by sec. 29.
issue:
whether or not respondent may invoke the privilege reserved to him by section 29 of ra 2260.
held:
no, under the constitution, those under the "classified civil service" may not participate in any partisan
political campaign or electioneering.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. partisan political activity; self-organization; temporary employees
sss employees v. ca, 175 scra 686 (1989)
facts:
the sss employers association was given a tro for engaging in an illegal strike. they contend that the
court had no jurisdiction because it concerns labor dispute therefore dole must be the one with
jurisdiction, sss on the other hand contends that they are under the csc rules thus they have no right to
strike.
issue:
whether or not jurisdiction should be with dole, and whether or not they are allowed to strike.
held:
no, csc has jurisdiction over the case since sss is a gocc with an original charter, therefore they are
covered by the csc's memorandum prohibiting strikes of government employees.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. partisan political activity; self-organization; temporary employees
jacinto v. ca, 281 scra 557 (1997)
facts:
petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in metropolitan manila. they incurred
unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions. decs secretary carino immediately issued a
return-to-work order. they were charged with gross misconduct, gross neglect of duty for joining
unauthorized mass actions, ignoring the return-to-work directives, unjustified abandonment of teaching
post and non-observance of civil service law.
issue:
whether or not petitioners have the right to self-organization.
held:
employees in the public service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike,
although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition congress for the betterment of
employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law. public school teachers have the right
to peaceable assembly for redress of grievances by not during class hours, for then this would be a
strike, which is illegal.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. partisan political activity; self-organization; temporary employees
gloria v. ca, 338 scra 5 (2000)
facts:
respondent was appointed school division superintendent, division of city schools, quezon city. upon
recommendation of the secretary of education, culture and sports, the president reassigned him as
superintendent of the marikina institute of science and technology on the ground that he is an expert in
vocational and technical education. respondent questioned the validity of his reassignment on the
ground that it is indefinite and it violated his security of tenure.
issue:

whether or not the indefinite reassignment violated the security of tenure.


held:
yes, there is nothing to show that the reassignment of respondent is temporary. the evidence or
intention to reassign respondent had no definite period. it is violative of his security of tenure.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. partisan political activity; self-organization; temporary employees
seneres v. comelec, gr no. 178678, april 16, 2009
facts:
in the past two years, party list buhay manifested to participate in the elections with private respondent
robles to represent them as the president. seneres on the other hand filed with the comelec to deny the
certificates on the ground that robles, being the acting administrator of lrta, a gocc, would constitute a
partisan political activity. the comelec ruled in favor of private respondent.
issue:
whether or not comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion.
held:
it is undisputed that the comelec, sitting as national board of canvassers, proclaimed buhay as a
winning party-list organization. the proclamation came in the form of two resolutions. said resolutions
are official proclamations of comelec considering it is buhay that ran for election as party-list
organization and not the buhay nominees.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. right to organize
social security system v. ca, gr no. 85279, july 28, 1989
facts:
the sss employers association was given a tro for engaging in an illegal strike. they contend that the
court had no jurisdiction because it concerns labor dispute therefore dole must be the one with
jurisdiction, sss on the other hand contends that they are under the csc rules thus they have no right to
strike.
issue:
whether or not jurisdiction should be with dole, and whether or not they are allowed to strike.
held:
no, csc has jurisdiction over the case since sss is a gocc with an original charter, therefore they are
covered by the csc's memorandum prohibiting strikes of government employees.
article ix: b. csc, section 2. right to organize
manila public school teachers association v. secretary of education, gr no. 95445, august 6, 1991
facts:
a mass action was undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, the teacher's plight resulting from
the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought
to the latter's attention. the petition alleges in great detail the character and origins of those grievances
as perceived by the petitioners and the attempts to negotiate their correction.
issue:
whether or not employees in the public service are prohibited from forming unions and holding strikes.
held:
employees in the public service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike,
although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition congress for the betterment of
employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law. public school teachers have the right
to peaceable assembly for redress of grievances by not during class hours, for then this would be a
strike, which is illegal.
article ix: b. csc, section 3. purpose of a civil service system
lazo v. csc, 236 scra 469
facts:
the civil service commission received a letter from a certain efren l. pagurayan, reporting that petitioner
lazo had boasted to him that he had bought his career service eligibility from the civil service

commission of which had been paid to the examiner and computer programmers in the manila office.
considering the seriousness of the allegation in the letter, however, the csc ordered the examination
answer sheets of petitioner retrieved and hand-checked by the office of recruitment, examination and
placement. the rechecking disclosed that petitioner's actual score was 34.48%, not 76.46% as indicated
in his certificate of eligibility. accordingly, the csc charged petitioner with dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, and ordered the regional office
to conduct anew a formal investigation of the case. petitioner asked for a reconsideration, alleging that
resolution no. 92-837 was issued in violation of his right to due process and that the csc had found him
to have failed the civil service examinations without evidence being presented to support the finding.
issue:
whether or not the petition is with merit.
held:
the petition has no merit. under the constitution, the civil service commission is the central personnel
agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and
fitness of those appointed to the civil service. its power to issue a certificate of eligibility carries with it
the power to revoke a certificate for being null and void.
article ix: b. csc, section 6. prohibition of appointment of lame ducks
people v. sandiganbayan, gr no. 164185, july 23, 2008
facts:
during the may 11, 1998 elections, villapando ran for municipal mayor of san vicente, palawan. orlando
m. tiape, a relative of villapandos wife, ran for municipal mayor of kitcharao, agusan del norte.
villapando won while tiape lost. thereafter, on july 1, 1998, villapando designated tiape as municipal
administrator of the municipality of san vicente, palawan. a contract of consultancy dated february 8,
1999 was executed between the municipality of san vicente, palawan, whereby the former employed
the services of tiape as municipal administrative and development planning consultant in the office of
the municipal mayor for a period of six months. on february 4, 2000, solomon b. maagad and renato m.
fernandez charged villapando and tiape for violation of article 244 of the revised penal code before the
office of the deputy ombudsman for luzon.
issue:
whether or not petition is with merit.
held:
under the constitution, there exists a "lame duck" doctrine, wherein it states that, no candidate who has
lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the
government or any gocc and its subsidiaries.
article ix: b. csc, section 7 prohibitions; appointments; office; employment
flores v. drilon 223 scra 568 (1993)
facts:
the constitutionality of sec. 13, par. (d), of r.a. 7227, otherwise known as the "bases conversion and
development act of 1992," under which respondent mayor richard j. gordon of olongapo city was
appointed chairman and chief executive officer of the subic bay metropolitan authority (sbma), is
challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. said
provision provides the president the power to appoint an administrator of the sbma provided that in the
first year of its operation, the olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of
the subic authority. petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of sec. 7, first
par., art. ix-b, of the constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment
or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," the petitioners also
contend that congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the president to appoint.
issue:
whether or not said provision of the ra 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against appointment
or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
held:

the court held the constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions since they are
accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without the distraction of other
governmental duties. the congress gives the president the appointing authority which it cannot limit by
providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the mayor of olongapo city shall assume
the chairmanship. the court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the president
is no power at all as it curtails the right of the president to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by
limiting his choice.
article ix: b. csc, section 7 prohibitions; appointments; office; employment
in re eduardo escala, 653 scra 141
facts:
respondent was appointed by the court as sc chief judicial staff officer, security division, oas on july 14,
2008. his application papers show he has experience and training as a police officer, having been
employed as chief inspector of the philippine national police (pnp) aviation security group at the time
of his appointment in the supreme court. immediately upon his appointment on july 14, 2008,
respondent was allowed to assume office and perform his duties, for reasons of exigency in the service
although he has yet to comply with the submission of all the documentary requirements for his
appointment. during the course of his employment, an anonymous letter reached the oas reporting the
respondents gross violation of the civil service law on the prohibition against dual employment and
double compensation in the government service. the letter alleged that respondent accepted
employment, and thus received salaries and other benefits, from the court and also from the pnp of
which he remained an active member.
issue:
whether or not there was gross violation of the the prohibition against dual employment (and double
compensation) in the government service.
held:
yes. all court personnel ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity, considering
that their positions primarily involve service to the public. for knowingly and willfully transgressing
the prohibition on dual employment and double compensation, as well as the courts rules for its
personnel on conflict of interest, respondent violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by the
court. considering the sensitive and confidential nature of his position, the court is left with no choice
but to declare the respondent guilty of gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, which are grave offenses punished by dismissal.
article ix: b. csc, section 8 prohibitions; compensation; foreign gift/office/title
peralta v. mathay 38 scra 296 (1971)
facts:
peralta was the trustee of the gsis. he was granted an optional retirement gratuity of p40t. however, he
did not receive sums pertaining to 1) cola, 2) incentive bonus, 3) christmas bonus. such items were not
passed in audit, in view of the auditor generals finding that they should be deducted from his gratuity
because they partake the nature of additional compensation. the auditor general argues that the trustees
remuneration is fixed by law o p25 per diem for every board meeting. as to the cola, peralta argues that
it is in the nature of reimbursement rather than additional compensation. he argues that the cola is an
allowance to take care of expenses incurred by an official to enable him to fulfill his duties.
issue:
is peralta entitled to the other sums? are they prohibited compensation?
held:
the constitution provides that no officer or employee of the government shall receive additional or
double compensation unless specifically authorized by law. this is because public office is a public
trust. he is there to render service. he is of course entitled to be rewarded for the performance of his
functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration. thus, an officer or
employee of the government may receive only such compensation as may be fixed by law. he is not
expected to avail himself of devious or circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to his

position. it is an entirely different matter if the legislative body would itself determine for reasons
satisfactory to it that he should receive something more. if it were so, there must be a law to that effect.
as a trustee, he is an officer of the government, as such officer; he cannot receive additional or double
compensation unless specifically authorized by law. as to the cola, he was unable to show that the cola
received by him was in the nature of reimbursement. it thus amounts to additional compensation.
article ix: b. csc, section 8 prohibitions; compensation; foreign gift/office/title
santos v. ca gr no. 139792, nov. 22, 2000
facts:
santos, an appointed judge of the metc of quezon city, retired in 1992 and acquired his retirement
gratuity under ra 910. in 1993, he was appointed director iii of the traffic operation center of the mma.
in 1995, the mma was reorganized and renamed as mmda. santos, in 1996, was voluntarily separated
from the service and was entitled to separation benefits equivalent to 1 monthly salary for every year
of service as provided under sec. 11 of the mmda law.
issue:
whether or not santiago is entitled to a separation benefit computed from the years of service as metc
judge to director iii because the retirement gratuity he received under ra 910 is not considered as double
compensation.
held:
the retirement benefits which santiago had received or has been receiving, under ra 910, do not
constitute double compensation. but, to credit his years of service in the judiciary in the computation of
his separation pay under ra 7924 would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same
services.
article ix: b. csc, section 8 prohibitions; compensation; foreign gift/office/title
cabili v. csc, gr no. 156503, june 22, 2006
facts:
the petitioners appealed regarding the csc resolution thats states ruled that it is illegal for any lwua
officer or employee who sits as a member of the board of directors of a water district to receive any
additional or indirect compensation in the form of: (a) rata; (b) eme; (c) rice allowance and
medical/dental benefits; (d) uniform allowance; and, (e) christmas bonus, cash gift and productivity
incentive bonus. the csc relied on section 8, article ix(b) of the 1987 constitution which states that no
elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law
issue:
won the court of appeals seriously erred when it ruled to deny the grant of certain allowances and
benefits to lwua-designated representatives to the boards of water districts.
held:
the court ruled that all allowances and benefits, other than per diems, are prohibited to directors of
water districts the compensation of directors of water districts is governed by section 13 of p.d. no. 198,
as amended, which reads: sec. 13. compensation. - each director shall receive a per diem, to be
determined by the board, for each meeting of the board actually attended by him, but no director shall
receive per diems in any given month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diems of four meetings
in any given month. no director shall receive other compensation for services to the district.
article ix: b. csc, section 8 prohibitions; compensation; foreign gift/office/title
benguet state university v. colting, gr no. 169637, june 8, 2007
facts:
a petition for review on certiorari is filed by petitioner benguet state university (bsu) seeking to nullify
commission on audit (coa) decision no. 2003-112 and decision no. 2005-019. decision no. 2000-3,
disallowing the rice subsidy and health care allowance to the employees of bsu, while coa decision
2005-019 denied bsu's motion for reconsideration. congress passed republic act no. 8292 entitled an act
providing for the uniform composition and powers of the governing boards, the manner of appointment
and term of office of the president of chartered state universities and colleges, and for other purposes,

commonly known as the higher education modernization act of 1997. pursuant to section 4 (d) of the
said law, the board of regents of bsu passed and approved board resolution no. 794 on october 31,
1997, granting rice subsidy and health care allowance to bsus employees. the sums were taken from
the income derived from the operations of bsu and were given to the employees at different periods in
1998. bsu requested the lifting of the disallowance with the coa regional office but it was denied in coacar decision no. 2000-3 dated january 26, 2000.
issue:
whether or not coa erred in disallowing rice subsidy and health care allowance to bsus employees
held:
no. section 8, article ix-b of the 1987 constitution, is clear that: no elective or appointive public officer
or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by
law, nor accept without the consent of congress, any present, emolument, office or title of any kind
from any foreign government. pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or
indirect compensation. the guaranteed academic freedom does not grant an institution of higher
learning unbridled authority to disburse its funds and grant additional benefits sans statutory basis.
unfortunately for bsu, it failed to present any sound legal basis that would justify the grant of these
additional benefits to its employees.
article ix: b. csc, section 8 prohibitions; compensation; foreign gift/office/title
herrera, et al v. npc, gr no. 166570, december 18, 2009
facts:
this is a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the rules of court on a pure question of law
against the decision rendered by the regional trial court (for declaratory relief) entitled national power
corporation v. napocor employees and workers union (newu), napocor employees consolidated union
(necu), npc executive officers association, inc. (npc-exa), esther galvez and efren herrera, for and on
their behalf and in behalf of other separated, unrehired, and retired employees of the national power
corporation, the department of budget and management (dbm), the office of the solicitor general (osg),
the civil service commission (csc) and the commission on audit (coa). said decision ruled that the
petitioners are not entitled to receive retirement benefits under commonwealth act no. 186 (ca no. 186),
as amended, over and above the separation benefits they received under republic act (ra) no. 9136,
otherwise known as the electric power industry reform act of 2001 (epira).
issue:
whether or not the petitioners, former employees of the national power corporation (npc) who were
separated from service due to the governments initiative of restructuring the electric power industry,
are entitled to their retirement benefits in addition to the separation pay granted by law.
held:
no. section 8 of article ix (b) of the constitution provides that no elective or appointive public officer
or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized
by law. there must be a clear and unequivocal statutory provision to justify the grant of both
separation pay and retirement benefits to an employee. here, absent an express provision of law, the
grant of both separation and retirement benefits would amount to double compensation from one single
act of separation from employment.
article ix c comelec section 1. composition; qualifications; term
cayetano v. monsod, 201 scra 210 (1991)
facts:
respondent christian monsod was nominated by president corazon c. aquino to the position of chairman
of the comelec. petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. challenging
the validity of the confirmation by the commission on appointments of monsod's nomination, petitioner
as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of monsod as chairman of the commission on elections
be declared null and void.

issue:
what does engaged in the practice of law mean as a qualification for the chairman of comelec
held:
it means to engage in any activity, or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. atty. christian monsod is a member of the philippine
bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. he has been dues paying
member of the integrated bar of the philippines since its inception in 1972-73. he has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. moreover, in the instant case, monsod
had been confirmed by coa and the argument was used that there was no abuse of discretion in the
confirmation. thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the court interfere
with the commission's judgment.
article ix c comelec section 1. composition; qualifications; term
brillantes v. yorac, 192 scra 358 (1990)
facts:
respondent, as associate comelec chairman, was appointed by the president as chairman thereof,
replacing former chairman hilario davide, the former chairman was appointed to the fact-finding
commission regarding the december 1989 coup de etat. petitioner moved for her removal, stating that
her appointment was contrary to article ix-c, section 1(2) of the 1987constitution, where in no case
shall any member (of the commission on elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity."
issue:
whether or not the respondents appointment as chairman in the case at bar, unconstitutional
held:
yes. article ix-a section 1 of the constitution expressly provides for the independence of the
constitutional commissions from the executive department; this means that they are governed by the
constitution itself and cannot be under the control of the president.
article ix c comelec section 1. composition; qualifications; term
matibag v. benipayo, 380 scra 49
facts:
on february 1999, petitioner matibag was appointed acting director iv of the comelecs eid by then
comelec chairperson harriet demetriou in a temporary capacity. on march 2001, respondent benipayo
was appointed comelec chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment.
while on such ad interim appointment, respondent benipayo in his capacity as chairman issued a
memorandum address transferring petitioner to the law department. petitioner requested benipayo to
reconsider her relief as director iv of the eid and her reassignment to the law department. she cited civil
service commission memorandum circular no. 7 dated april 10, 2001, reminding heads of government
offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period. benipayo denied
her request for reconsideration on april 18, 2001, citing comelec resolution no. 3300 dated november 6,
2000, exempting comelec from the coverage of the said memo circular. petitioner appealed the denial
of her request for reconsideration to the comelec en banc. she also filed an administrative and criminal
complaint with the law department against benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated section
261 (h)of the omnibus election code, comelec resolution no. 3258, civil service memorandum circular
no. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations. during
the pendency of her complaint before the law department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of benipayo, borra and tuason, as
chairman and commissioners of the comelec, respectively. petitioner claims that the ad interim
appointments of benipayo, borra and tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence
of the comelec.
issue:
whether or not the assumption of office by benipayo, borra and tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the president amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by section 1 (2),

article ix-c of the constitution


held:
we find petitioners argument without merit. an ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the president once the appointee
has qualified into office. the fact that it is subject to confirmation by the commission on appointments
does not alter its permanent character. the constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the commission on appointments or
until the next adjournment of congress.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
pangilinan v. comelec, 228 scra 36
facts:
the petitioner francis pancratius n. pangilinan and private respondent feliciano belmonte, jr. were both
candidates for congressman in the fourth legislative district of quezon city in the 11 may 1992
elections. the petitioner filed a petition, claiming that public respondents acted with grave abuse of
discretion and/or exceeded their respective jurisdictions and/or unlawfully neglected to perform acts
that the law requires them to do, and that there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law other than the present petition, and in support thereof, the petitioner argues that:
(2) section 15 of r.a. no. 7166 and section 23 of comelec resolution no. 2413 disallowing preproclamation controversies in the election of members of the house of representatives are
unconstitutional. the petitioner claims that the constitution vests in the comelec the power to hear and
decide pre-proclamation controversies without distinction as to whether the pre-proclamation
controversy involves the election of members of the house of representatives or provincial or local
elective officials. hence, the petitioner concludes, the phrase pre-proclamation controversies in sec. 3,
article ix-c of the 1987 constitution embraces all pre-proclamation controversies, including preproclamation controversies involving the election of members of the house of representatives.
issue:
whether or not the petitioners contention is with merit.
held:
no. sec. 3, article ix-c of the 1987 constitution should be read in relation to sec. 2, article ix-c of the
same constitution. sec. 2, article ix-c of the constitution provides:
(2) exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contest relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. it will be noted that
the aforequoted provision of the constitution vests in the comelec exclusive original jurisdiction over
all contest relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and
city officials. it has no jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the house of representatives. on the other hand, under sec. 17, article vi of the 1987
constitution, the electoral tribunal of the house of representatives is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members. consequently, the phrase including
pre-proclamation controversies used in sec. 3, article ix-c of the constitution should be construed as
referring only to pre-proclamation controversies in election cases that fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the comelec, i.e., election cases pertaining to the election of regional, provincial
and city officials.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
flores v. comelec, 184 scra 484 (1990)
facts:
petitioner roque flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of votes
for kagawad on the march 1989 elections, in barangay poblacion, tayum, abra, and thus proclaimed
punong barangay in accordance with section 5 of r.a. 6679. however, his election was protested by
private respondent rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner.

the municipal circuit trial court of tayum sustained rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in
place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latters total. flores appealed to the
rtc, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. the judge agreed that the four votes cast for flores
only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of
being divided equally between the petitioner and anastacio flores, another candidate for kagawad. the
total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place. the petitioner
went to the comelec, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to review the
decision of the rtc, based on section 9 of r.a. 6679, that decisions of the rtc in a protest appealed to it
from the municipal trial court in barangay elections on questions of fact shall be final and nonappealable. in his petition for certiorari, the comelec is faulted for not taking cognizance of the
petitioners appeal.
issue:
whether or not the decisions of municipal or metropolitan courts in barangay election contests are
subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the comelec considering section 9 of r.a. no. 6679
held:
the dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground, to wit,
article ix-c, section 2(2) of the constitution, providing that the comelec shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. municipal or metropolitan courts being courts
of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the comelec under the afore-quoted section. hence, the decision rendered by
the municipal circuit trial court, should have been appealed directly to the comelec and not to the rtc.
accordingly, section 9 of rep. act no. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or
metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the rtc, must be declared
unconstitutional.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
galido v. comelec, 193 scra 78 (1991)
facts:
galido and private respondent galeon were candidates during the january1988 local elections for mayor
of garcia-hernandez, bohol. petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected mayor. private respondent filed
an election protest before the rtc. after hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner.
private respondent appealed the rtc decision to the comelec. its first division reversed the rtc decision
and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor. after the comelec en banc denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its first division. the comelec held
that the fifteen (15)ballots in the same precinct containing the initial c after the name galido were
marked ballots and, therefore, invalid. undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filed the
present petition for certiorari and injunction before the supreme court and succeeded in getting a
temporary restraining order. in his comment to the petition, private respondent moved for dismissal,
citing article ix (c), section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 constitution, that final decisions, orders or
rulings of the comelec in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory,
and not appealable.
issue:
whether or not a comelec decision may, if it sets aside the trial courts decision involving marked
ballots, be brought to the supreme court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party
held:
the fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the comelec in contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude recourse to this court by
way of a special civil action of certiorari. under article ix (a), section 7 of the constitution, which
petitioner cites, it is stated, unless otherwise provided by this constitution or bylaw, any decision,

order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the supreme court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt thereof. we resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. the
petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is
beyond the power of review of this court. the comelec found that the writing of the letter "c" after the
word "galido" in the fifteen (15) ballots of precinct 14 is a clear and convincing proof of a pattern or
design to identify the ballots and/or voters. this finding should be conclusive on the court. the
commission on elections (comelec) has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
people v. inting, 187 scra 788 (1990)
facts:
on february 6, 1988, mrs. editha barba filed a letter-complaint against oic-mayor dominador regalado of
tanjay, negros oriental with the commission on elections (comelec), for allegedly transferring her, a
permanent nursing attendant, grade i,in the office of the municipal mayor to a very remote barangay
and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from comelec as required by law.
comelec directed atty. gerardo lituanas, provincial election supervisor of dumaguete city:
1. to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case
2. to prepare and file the necessary information in court
3. to handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie case
4. to issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be.
after a preliminary investigation of barba's complaint, atty. lituanas found a primafacie case. hence, on
september 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261,
par. (h), omnibus election code against the oic-mayor. in an order dated september 30, 1988, the
respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused oic mayor. it also fixed the bail at five
thousand pesos (p5,000.00) as recommended by the provincial election supervisor. however before
mayor regalado could be arrested the trial court set aside its order on the grounds that atty. lituanas is
not authorized to determine probable cause. atty. lituanas filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
quashed by the trial courts.
issue:
whether or not comelec has the power to conduct preliminary investigation in the case at bar.
held:
article ix sec 2 of the constitution states that the comelec has the power to investigate but also prosecute
violation of election laws. this means that the comelec is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the judge determine
probable cause and for filing an information in court
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
corpus v. tanodbayan, 149 scra 281 (1987)
facts:
petitioners were members of the citizens election committee. petitioner castillejos was elected as
mayor, private respondent mangaser filed before the comelec a complaint that petitioner violated the
election code. he then withdrew his complaint from the comelec then filed it with the tanodbayan.
comelec subsequently dismissed the complaint. the tanodbayan exerted exclusive authority to prosecute
the case.
issue:
whether or not tanodbayan has jurisdiction over the election offense.
held:
no, comelec has the exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses, the nature of the offense is important
not the personality of the offender.

article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions


tan v. comelec, gr no. 112093, oct. 4, 1994
facts:
the petitioner, as an incumbent city prosecutor of davao city, was designated by the comelec as vicechairman of the city board of canvassers in the said area for the may 11, 1992, synchronized national
and local elections conformably with the provisions of section 20 (a) of ra 6646 and section 221 (b) of
the omnibus election code. manuel garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional
seat to represent the 2nd district of davao city. alterado, the private respondent, filed a number of cases
questioning the validity of the proclamation. the cases filed in the house of representatives electoral
tribunal and the office of the ombudsman was dismissed. what is still pending is an administrative
charge, against the board of canvassers and herein petitioner for misconduct, neglect of duty, gross
incompetence, and acts inimical to the service, instituted in the comelec.
issue:
whether or not the comelec has the jurisdiction to take action on the administrative case when in fact
the petitioner as a city prosecutor is under the administrative jurisdiction.
held:
the comelecs authority under section 2 (6-8), article 9 of the constitution is virtually all-encompassing
when it comes to election matters, also section 52, article 7 of the omnibus election code. it should be
stressed that the administrative case against petitioner is in relation to the performance of his duties as
an election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. the comelecs mandate includes its authority to
exercise direct and immediate suspension and control over national and local officials or employees,
including members of any national and local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the
government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
kilosbayan v. comelec, gr no. 128054, oct. 16, 1997
facts:
special provision no. 1 of the countrywide development fund (cdf) under republic act no. 7180,
allocates a specific amount of government funds for infrastructure and other priority projects and
activities. in order to be valid, the use and release of said amount should have the following mandatory
requirements: (1)approval by the president of the philippines; (2) release of the amount directly to the
appropriate implementing agency; and (3) list of projects and activities. respondent cesar sarino, the
then dilg secretary, requested for authority to negotiate, enter into, sign memoranda of agreements with
accredited non-governmental organizations (ngos) in order to utilize them to implement the projects of
the cdf provided for under r.a. no. 7180. respondent franklin drilon, the then executive secretary,
granted the abovementioned request of secretary sarino. such an authority was extended to all the
regional directors of the dilg. pursuant to the above-described authority granted him, respondent
tiburcio relucio, on april 24, 1992, entered into a memorandum of agreement with an accredited ngo
known as the philippine youth health and sports development foundation, inc. (pyhsdfi). comelec
received from petitioner kilosbayan a letter informing the former of two serious violations of election
laws, among them that the amount of p70 million was released by the budget department, shortly
before the elections of may 11, 1992, in favor of pyhsdfi a private entity, which had reportedly
engaged in dirty election tricks and practices in said elections and requesting that these offenses and
malpractices be investigated promptly, thoroughly, impartially, without fear of favor.
issue:
whether or not comelec can investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election laws
held:
the constitutional and statutory mandate for the comelec to investigate and prosecute cases of violation
of election laws translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in
cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the
judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be
issued. although only a low quantum and quality of evidence is needed to support a finding of probable

cause, the same cannot be justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given any evidentiary or
probative value in this jurisdiction.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
alvarez v. comelec, gr no. 142527, march 1, 2001
facts:
on may 12, 1997, petitioner arsenio alvarez, with 590 votes, was proclaimed punong barangay of doa
aurora, quezon city, his opponent, private respondent abad-sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. private
respondent filed an election protest in the metropolitan trial court claiming irregularities in the reading
and appreciation of ballots by the board of election inspectors. after a recount of the ballots in the
contested precincts, the trial court ruled that the private respondent won the election, garnering 596
votes while petitioner got 550 votes. on appeal, the comelecs second division ruled that private
respondent won over petitioner. petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. meanwhile, private
respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. the comelec en banc
denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the second division. it granted the
motion for execution pending appeal. petitioner brought before the supreme court this petition for
certiorari assailing the resolution of the comelec en banc, denying the motion for reconsideration of
herein petitioner and affirming the resolution of its second division alleging that the comelec en banc
granted the respondents motion for execution pending appeal when the appeal was no longer pending,
thus the motion had become obsolete and unenforceable
issue:
whether the comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion when it prematurely acted on the motion for
execution pending appeal
held:
no. the court noted that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner had a
motion for reconsideration before the second division. this pending motion for reconsideration
suspended the execution of the resolution of the second division. appropriately then, the division must
act on the motion for reconsideration. thus, when the second division resolved both petitioners motion
for reconsideration and private respondents motion for execution pending appeal, it did so in the
exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
carlos v. judge angeles, gr no. 142907, november 29, 2000
facts:
petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of
valenzuela, metro manila (later converted into a city). the board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner as
the mayor. the private respondent filed an election protest with the rtc. the court came up with revision
reports which also showed that the petitioner got the highest number of votes. nevertheless, in its
decision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of significant
badges of fraud, which it attributed to the present petitioner. the court then declared private respondent
as the winner. the petitioner appealed to the comelec, and also filed a petition to the sc questioning the
decision of the rtc. the private respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the sc.
issue:
whether or not comelec has jurisdiction
held:
both the sc and comelec have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (rtcs) in election cases involving
elective municipal officials. the court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over the case. relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with the comelec, the same would not bar the
present action as an exception to the rule because under the circumstances, appeal would not be a
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
buac v. comelec, gr no. 155855, jan. 26, 2004

facts:
the comelec conducted a plebiscite in taguig, metro manila on the conversion of this municipality into a
highly urbanized city as mandated by republic act no. 8487
the plebiscite board of canvassers (pboc), without completing the canvass of sixty-four (64) other
election returns, declared that the no votes won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion of
taguig into a city. alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes,
private respondents, filed with the comelec a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results
of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots. the comelec treated the petition as
an election protest. petitioner intervened in the case. he then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
the ground that the comelec has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite
issue:
whether or not the comelec gravely abused its discretion.
held:
petitions dismissed for lack of merit. the above factual findings of the comelec supported by evidence,
are accorded, not only respect, but finality. this is so because the conduct of plebiscite and
determination of its result have always been the business of the comelec and not the regular courts, the
acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
ldp v. comelec, gr no. 161265, feb. 24, 2004
facts:
the general counsel of the laban ng demokratikong pilipino (ldp) informed the comelec by way of
manifestation that only the party chairman, senator edgardo j. angara, or his authorized representative
may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the partys official candidates. the same manifestation
stated that sen. angara had placed the ldp secretary general, representative agapito a. aquino, on
"indefinite forced leave." in the meantime, ambassador enrique a. zaldivar was designated acting
secretary general. however, rep. aquino filed his comment, contending that the party chairman does not
have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the secretary general. as the manifestation filed
by the ldp general counsel has no basis, rep. aquino asked the comelec to disregard the same. prior to
the may 2004 elections, the laban ng demokratikong pilipino (ldp) has been divided because of a
struggle of authority between party chairman edgardo angara and party secretary general agapito
aquino, both having endorsed two different sets of candidates under the same party, ldp. the matter was
brought to the comelec. the commission in its resolution has recognized the factions creating two subparties: ldp angara wing and ldp aquino wing.
issue:
whether or not the comelec committed a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the two sets of
nominations and endorsements by the same party.
held:
yes. the comelec erred in its resolution. only those certificates of candidacy (coc) signed by the ldp
party chairman angara or his duly authorized representative/s shall be recognized.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
atienza v. comelec, gr no. 188920, february 16, 2010
facts:
private respondent antonio sia was elected mayor of the municipality of madrilejos, cebu in the 1988
local elections obtaining a plurality of 126 votes over petitioner lou atienza. following sias
proclamation by the municipal board of canvassers, petitioner filed an election protest with the rtc
questioning the results of the elections in a number of precincts in the municipality. consequently, in the
revision ordered by the lower court, petitioner obtained a total of 2,826 votes, a plurality of 12 votes
over the private respondent. the rtc rendered its decision declaring petitioner the winner of the
municipal elections and ordering the private respondent to reimburse petitioner the amount of
p300,856.19 representing petitioners expenses in the election protest. the comelec en banc issued an
order setting aside the preliminary injunction and thereby allowing petitioner to assume as mayor of the

municipality of madrilejos pending resolution of his appeal. however, following the synchronized
elections of may 11, 1992, the presiding commissioner of the comelecs second division issued an order
dismissing petitioners appeal for being moot and academic pursuant to the commissions decision in
resolution no. 2494 declaring the election protest and appeal cases arising out of the january 18, 1988
elections dismissed and terminated as of june 30, 1992. thereupon, private respondent sought
clarification of the order of dismissal of eac no. 20-89 referred to the protest case in the regional trial
court or to the appeal case in comelec. in response, the second division of comelec stated that it is only
the appeal case that was dismissed for being moot and academic, not the money judgment of the trial
court.
issue:
did the comelec abuse its discretion in reversing that portion of the trial court's decision awarding
election expenses in the amount of p300,856.19
held:
no. the omnibus election code provides: actual or compensatory damages may be granted in all
election contests or in quo warranto proceedings in accordance with law. article 2199 of the civil code
mandates that: except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. such compensation
is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
antonio v. comelec, gr no. 135869, september 22, 1999
facts:
parties in this case were rival candidates in brgy. ilaya, las pinas city. protestee rustico antonio was
proclaimed as the winner. protestant vicente miranda, jr. then filed an election protest before the las
pinas metc, which declared miranda as the duly elected barangay chairman. antonio appealed from this
judgment. meanwhile, miranda moved to execute the courts decision but such was denied and records
were forwarded to the comelec seconds division. the comelec dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. it was stated therein that petitioner failed to perfect his appeal within the prescribed period.
the period aforestated is jurisdictional and failure of the protestee to perfect his appeal within the period
deprives the commission of its appellate jurisdiction
issue:
whether or not comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in dismissing the appeal
held:
no. comelec relied on section 21, rule 35 of the comelec rules of procedure which reads:sec. 21.
appeal from any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal to the commission on
elections within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision.the 1987 constitution (article ix-a,
section 6 and article ix-c, section 3) grants and authorizes comelec to promulgate its own rules of
procedure as long as such rules concerning pleading and practice do not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. in case at bar, antonio filed his notice of appeal before the trial court 4 days after the
five-day prescribed period to appeal lapsed. therefore, the present appeal must be dismissed. comelec,
not the rtc, has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the mtc concerning election protests involving
barangay officials
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
aggabao v. comelec, gr no. 163756, january 26, 2005
facts:
this petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion resolution no. 7233 of the comelec. miranda, one of the respodents, and aggabao were rivals
in congressional run for isabela. resolution no. 7233 was passed and miranda was proclaimed as the
winner, petitioner assails the resolution. he claimed that comelec act without jurisdiction when it
ordered the proclamation of miranda. respondent miranda moved for the dismissal of the petition
considering that the issue raised should be best addressed to the house of representatives electoral

tribunal(hret).
issue:
whether or not the petition for certiorari is with merit.
held:
the court has held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a member of the house of representatives, the comelecs jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the hrets own jurisdiction begins. hence,
the instant petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
flores v. comelec, gr no. 89604, april 20, 1990
facts:
petitioner roque flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of votes
for kagawad on the march 1989 elections, in barangay poblacion, tayum, abra, and thus proclaimed
punong barangay in accordance with section 5 of r.a. 6679. however, his election was protested by
private respondent rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner.
the municipal circuit trial court of tayum sustained rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in
place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latters total. flores appealed to the
rtc, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. the judge agreed that the four votes cast for flores
only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of
being divided equally between the petitioner and anastacio flores, another candidate for kagawad. the
total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place. the petitioner
went to the comelec, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to review the
decision of the rtc, based on section 9 of r.a. 6679, that decisions of the rtc in a protest appealed to it
from the municipal trial court in barangay elections on questions of fact shall be final and nonappealable. in his petition for certiorari, the comelec is faulted for not taking cognizance of the
petitioners appeal.
issue:
whether or not the decisions of municipal or metropolitan courts in barangay election contests are
subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the comelec considering section 9 of r.a. no. 6679
held:
the dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground, to wit,
article ix-c, section 2(2) of the constitution, providing that the comelec shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. municipal or metropolitan courts being courts
of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the comelec under the afore-quoted section. hence, the decision rendered by
the municipal circuit trial court, should have been appealed directly to the comelec and not to the rtc.
accordingly, section 9 of rep. act no. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or
metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the rtc, must be declared
unconstitutional.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
alunan iii v. mirasol, gr no. 108399, july 31, 1997
facts:
lgc of 1991 provided for an sk in every barangay to be composed of a chairman, 7members, a secretary
and a treasurer, and provided that the first sk elections were to be held 30 days after the next local
elections. the first elections under the local government code were held may of 1992. august 1992,
comelec provided guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the sk on sept. 30, 1992, which
also placed the sk elections under the direct control and supervision of dilg, with the technical
assistance of comelec. after postponements, they were held december 4, 1992.

issue:
whether comelec can validly vest the dilg with the power of direct control and supervision over the sk
elections with the technical assistance of comelec
held:
comelec vesting dilg with such powers is not unconstitutional. election for sk officers are not subject to
the supervision of comelec in the same way that contests involving elections of sk officials do not fall
within the jurisdiction of comelec. moreover, dilg was only acting or performing tasks in accordance to
the framework of detailed and comprehensive rules embodied in a resolution of comelec. although it is
argued that no barangays were named in the resolution, dilg was not given discretionary powers
because they merely used the time period set by comelec as a reference in designating exempted
barangays. likewise, the lgc of 1991 was held to be curative, and thus should be given retroactive
effect, giving the mayor the authority to call elections; thus, the 1990 kb elections were not null and
void for being conducted without authority.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
taule v. secretary santos, gr no. 90336, august 12, 1991
facts:
on june 18, 1989, the federation of associations of barangay councils (fabc) of catanduanes, composed
of eleven (11) members convened in virac, catanduanes with six members, including taule, in
attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers. the group decided to hold the election
despite the absence of five (5) of its members. the governor of catanduanes sent a letter to respondent
the secretary of local government, protesting the election of the officers of the fabc and seeking its
nullification due to flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. the secretary nullifed the
election of the officers of the fabc and ordered a new one to be conducted to be presided by the regional
director of region v of the department of local government. taule, contested the decision contending
that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the respondent secretary over election
contests involving the election of officers of the fabc and that the constitution provides that it is the
comelec which has jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials.
issue:
whether or not the comelec has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the
officers of the federation of association of barangay councils?
held:
no. the jurisdiction of the comelec does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the
katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law
whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. the authority of the comelec over the
katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the
katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective
organization.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
baytan v. comelec, gr no. 153945, february 4, 2003
facts:
reynato baytan registered as a voter in two precincts and the comelec en banc affirmed the
recommendation of its law department to file information of double registration in violation of the
election code. baytan filed with the supreme court a petition for certiorari on the grounds, among
others, that there was no probable cause and that election cases must first be heard and decided by a
division before the comelec en banc can assume jurisdiction.
issue:
whether or not the acts of comelec in the case at bar is unconstitutional.
held:
under sec. 2, art. ix-c of the constitution, the comelec exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial
powers. the administrative powers are found in sec 2. (1), (3) to (9) of art ix-c. the constitution does not
provide on whether these administrative powers shall be exercised by the comelec en banc or in

division. the comelec en banc therefore can act on administrative matters, and this had been the
practice under the 1973 and 1987 constitutions. the prosecution by the comelec of violations of election
laws is an administrative power.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
balindong v. comelec, gr no. 1539991, october 16, 2003
facts:
this was a petition where the petitioner, anwar balindong ("anwar"), a candidate for mayor of
malabang, seeks to set aside the resolution of the commission on elections (comelec) en banc ordering
the municipal board of canvassers to immediately reconvene, totally exclude from canvass the election
return for a certain precinct and count eighty-eight (88) votes in the election return for another precinct,
not in favor of anwar but another mayoralty candidate by the name of amir-oden balindong.
anwar filed the present petition. he faults the comelec in taking cognizance of the consolidated cases in
the first instance without referring them to either one of its divisions, in violation of the constitution
issue:
whether or not comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
held:
the first issue is both constitutional and jurisdictional. the 1987 constitution, in section 3, article ix-c
thereof, has established the two-tiered organizational and functional structure of the comelec. the
provision requires that election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, should be heard and
decided first at the division level. this court has consistently ruled that the requirement mandating the
hearing and decision of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, at the first instance by
a division of the comelec, and not by the poll body as a whole, is mandatory and jurisdictional.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
aguilar v. comelec, gr no. 185140, june 30, 2009
facts:
petitioner aguilar won the chairmanship of brgy. bansarvil 1, kapatagan, lanao del norte, over private
respondent insoy by a margin of one vote. mtc, however, in its decision rendered insoy as the duly
elected punong barangay and consequently nullified the proclamation of aguilar. aggrieved, aguilar
filed his notice of appeal and paid to the trial court the appeal fee of p1,000.00 in accordance with rule
14, sections 8 and 9 of the recently promulgated a.m. no. 07-4-15-sc or the rules of procedure in
election contests before the courts involving elective municipal and barangay officials. pursuant to
sections 3 and 4, rule 40 of the comelec rules of procedure which provide for the payment of appeal fee
in the amount of p/3,000.00 within the period to file the notice of appeal, and section 9(a), rule 22 of
the same rules, which provides that failure to pay the correct appeal fee is a ground for the dismissal of
the appeal, the commission (first division) resolved as it hereby resolves to dismiss the instant appeal
for protestant-appellants (sic) failure to pay the appeal fee as prescribed by the comelec rules of
procedure within the five-(5)-day reglementary period.
issue:
whether or not comelec erred in dismissing petitioners appeal on the mere technicality of non-payment
of the proper amount of appeal fee
held:
the court still finds that the comelec first division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order
dismissing petitioners appeal. considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the
clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, petitioners appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by comelec
resolution no. 8486. fairness and prudence dictate that the comelec first division should have first
directed petitioner to pay the additional appeal fee in accordance with the clarificatory resolution, and
if the latter should refuse to comply, then, and only then, dismiss the appeal.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
people v. honorable delgado, gr no. 93419, september 18, 1990
facts:
on january 14, 1988 the comelec received a report-complaint from the election registrar of toledo city

against private respondents for alleged violation of the omnibus election code. the comelec directed the
provincial election supervisor of cebu to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who
eventually recommended the filing of an information against each of the private respondents for
violation of the omnibus election code. the comelec en banc resolved to file the information against the
private respondents as recommended. private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the
suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary
investigation was conducted. later, an order was issued by respondent court directing the comelec
through the regional election director of region vii to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases. the
comelec prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation
alleging therein that it is only the supreme court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and
resolutions of the comelec. this was denied by the court.
issue:
whether or not the regional trial court (rtc) has the authority to review the actions of the commission on
elections (comelec) in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court.
held:
based on the constitution and the omnibus election code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial power of the comelec to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also
vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the code before the competent
court. thus, when the comelec, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary
investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the
information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. consequently, all
the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. the comelec cannot
conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the
court.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
banat v. comelec, gr no. 177508, august 7, 2009
facts:
this is a petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner barangay association for national advancement and
transparency (banat) party list (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of republic act no. 9369 (ra
9369)and enjoining respondent commission on elections (comelec) from implementing the statute. ra
9369 is a consolidation of senate bill no. 2231 and house bill no. 5352 passed by the senate on 7
december 2006 and the house of representatives on 19 december 2006.on 23 january 2007, less than
four months before the 14 may 2007 local elections. petitioner argues that section 43 is unconstitutional
because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government concurrent power with the comelec to
investigate and prosecute election offenses.
issue:
whether or not section 43 violates section 2(6), article ix-c of the constitution
held:
section 2(6), article ix-c of the constitution vests in the comelec the power to investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. comelec has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the comelec to avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. in the 1993 comelec rules of procedure, the
authority of the comelec was subsequently qualified and explained.
article ix c comelec section 2. powers and functions
people v. judge inting, gr no. 88919, july 25, 1990
facts:
comelec directed atty. gerardo lituanas, provincial election supervisor of dumaguete city. to conduct the
preliminary investigation of the case, to handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a

prima facie case complaint against oic-mayor of tanjay. after a preliminary investigation of barba's
complaint, atty. lituanas found a primafacie case. he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal
case. the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused oic mayor. however before
mayor regalado could be arrested the trial court set aside its order on the grounds that atty. lituanas is
not authorized to determine probable cause. atty. lituanas filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
quashed by the trial courts.
issue:
does a preliminary investigation conducted by a provincial election supervisor involving election
offenses have to be coursed through the provincial prosecutor, before the regional trial court may take
cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists
held:
article ix sec 2 of the constitution states that the comelec has the power to investigate but also prosecute
violation of election laws. this means that the comelec is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the judge determine
probable cause and for filing an information in court.
article ix c comelec section 3. decisions
sarmiento v. comelec, 212 scra 307
facts:
this special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the resolutions of respondent comelec for several
cases. petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions above specified as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided
the appeals without first referring them to any of its divisions.
issue:
whether or not comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion
held:
the comelec en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the
appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned special cases without first referring them to any of its
divisions. section 3, subdivision c, article ix of the 1987 constitution expressly provides: sec. 3. the
commission on elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.
all such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration
of decisions shall be decided by the commission en banc. said resolutions are therefore, null and void
and must be set aside. consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the commission for proper
referral to a division.
article ix c comelec section 3. decisions
salazar jr. v. comelec, 184 scra 433 (1990)
facts:
petitioner salazar filed before the comelec a petition for "declaration of failure of election and holding
of new election. respondent imperial filed his answer denying the alleged irregularities. the city board
of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate for city mayor. imperial took his oath.
petitioner salazar moved for reconsideration. comelec first division promulgated its resolution,
challenged herein, denying reconsideration and, in "resolving the more compelling issue not treated in
the motion for reconsideration," held that "after the proclamation of the winning candidate, a preproclamation controversy is no longer viable. petitioner salazar further challenges the validity of the
resolution of the comelec (first division) on the ground that his motion for reconsideration should have
been resolved by the comelec en banc pursuant to section 3, article ix (c) of the 1987 constitution.
issue:
whether or not the entire pre-proclamation controversy had been rendered moot and academic; and it
deprived this court of its superior jurisdiction over the entire case by precipitately dismissing the main
case before the comelec
held:

the court declared that the resolution dismissing a pre-proclamation petition for lack of interest due to
the failure of the petitioner or his counsel to appear for hearing, was not a decision nor of such a nature
that a motion for reconsideration thereof would call for resolution by the comelec en banc. it should be
noted, nevertheless, that the pre-proclamation petition raised issues that were appropriate for an
election contest, and that the pre-proclamation controversy was no longer viable because proclamation
had already been made
article ix c comelec section 3. decisions
baytan v. comelec, gr no. 153954 , feb. 4, 2003
facts:
reynato baytan registered as a voter in two precincts and the comelec en banc affirmed the
recommendation of its law department to file information of double registration in violation of the
election code. baytan filed with the supreme court a petition for certiorari on the grounds, among
others, that there was no probable cause and that election cases must first be heard and decided by a
division before the comelec en banc can assume jurisdiction.
issue:
whether or not the acts of comelec in the case at bar is unconstitutional.
held:
under sec. 2, art. ix-c of the constitution, the comelec exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial
powers. the administrative powers are found in sec 2. (1), (3) to (9) of art ix-c. the constitution does not
provide on whether these administrative powers shall be exercised by the comelec en banc or in
division. the comelec en banc therefore can act on administrative matters, and this had been the
practice under the 1973 and 1987 constitutions. the prosecution by the comelec of violations of election
laws is an administrative power.
article ix c comelec section 3. decisions
balindong v. comelec, gr nos. 153991-2, oct. 16, 2003
facts:
this was a petition where the petitioner, anwar balindong ("anwar"), a candidate for mayor of
malabang, seeks to set aside the resolution of the commission on elections (comelec) en banc ordering
the municipal board of canvassers to immediately reconvene, totally exclude from canvass the election
return for a certain precinct and count eighty-eight (88) votes in the election return for another precinct,
not in favor of anwar but another mayoralty candidate by the name of amir-oden balindong.
anwar filed the present petition. he faults the comelec in taking cognizance of the consolidated cases in
the first instance without referring them to either one of its divisions, in violation of the constitution
issue:
whether or not comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
held:
the first issue is both constitutional and jurisdictional. the 1987 constitution, in section 3, article ix-c
thereof, has established the two-tiered organizational and functional structure of the comelec. the
provision requires that election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, should be heard and
decided first at the division level. this court has consistently ruled that the requirement mandating the
hearing and decision of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, at the first instance by
a division of the comelec, and not by the poll body as a whole, is mandatory and jurisdictional.
article ix c comelec section 3. decisions
liberal party v. comelec, gr no. 191771, may 6, 2010
facts:
the nationalista party (np) and the nationalist peoples coalition (npc) filed a single petition with the
comelec for the registration of their coalition (the np-npc coalition) and the accreditation of the npnpc coalition as the dominant minority party for purposes of the may 10, 2010 elections. the liberal
party, who was also seeking accreditation as dominant minority party, objected to this petition. instead
of passing the petition first through a comelec division, the comelec en banc directly assumed
jurisdiction of the np-npc coalitions petition and eventually decided to grant np-npc coalitions petition

for registration as a political party coalition. in justifying its direct assumption of jurisdiction (as
opposed to having the petition first be heard by division), the comelec cited a february 2003 supreme
court ruling in baytan vs. comelec in which it was held that the registration of coalitions involves the
exercise of the comelecs administrative powers and not itsquasi-judicial powers; hence, the comelec
en banc can directly act on it. baytan further held that there is no constitutional requirement that a
petition for registration of a coalition should be decided first by a division. in baytan, the supreme court
held that the constitution merely vests the comelecs administrative powers in the commission on
elections, while providing that the comelec may sit en banc or in two divisions. thus, asserted the
comelec, the comelec en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers.
issue:
whether or not coalitions have to register in order to enjoy the benefits of a registered political party
held:
yes, because the coalition is distinct in personality from that of the coalescing parties. moreover, this
issue is administrative and not quasi-judicial and therefore may be decided by the comelec en banc
without going through a division first.
article ix c comelec section 3. decisions
alvarez v. comelec, gr no. 142527, march 1, 2001
facts:
petitioner was proclaimed duly elected punong barangay. he received 590 votes while his opponent,
respondent abad-sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. private respondent filed an election protest claiming
irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the board of election inspectors. after
petitioner answered and the issues were joined, the metropolitan trial court ordered the reopening and
recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts. it subsequently rendered its decision that private
respondent won the election. she garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes after the recount. on
appeal, the second division of the comelec ruled that private respondent won over petitioner. private
respondent, meanwhile, filed a motion for execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. the
comelec en banc denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the second
division. petitioner avers that the commission violated its mandate on "preferential disposition of
election contests" as mandated by section 3, article ix-c, 1987 constitution
issue:
whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the comelec
held:
the court find no such abuse in the instant case. from the pleadings and the records, we observed that
the lower court and the comelec meticulously pored over the ballots reviewed. because of its factfinding facilities and its knowledge derived from actual experience, the comelec is in a peculiarly
advantageous position to evaluate, appreciate and decide on factual questions before it. here, we find
no basis for the allegation that abuse of discretion or arbitrariness marred the factual findings of the
comelec. as previously held, factual findings of the comelec based on its own assessments and duly
supported by evidence, are conclusive on this court, more so in the absence of a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law in the questioned resolution
article ix c comelec section 4. supervision/regulation of public utilities, media grants, privileges
unido v. comelec, 104 scra 1
facts:
in 1981, the bp proposed amendments to the 1973 constitution. the amendments were to be placed to a
plebiscite for the peoples approval. the yes vote was being advanced by kbl marcos party. while the
no vote was being advanced by unido. to ensure parity and equality, comelec issued resolutions 14671469 w/c basically provided that there be equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use
for campaigns for both sides. on 12 mar 1981, marcos campaigned for the yes vote via tv and radio
from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. the same was broadcasted live by 26 tv stations and 248 radio stations
nationwide. unido petitioned before the comelec that they be granted the same opportunity as marcos
has pursuant to resns 1467-69. comelec denied the demand. unido assailed the denial as a denial of

equal protection before the laws.


issue:
whether or not unido was denied equal protection by virtue of comelecs denial of their request.
held:
the sc ruled that unido was not denied due process nor were they not afforded equal protection. it is the
considered view of the sc that when marcos conducted his pulong-pulong or consultation with the
people on march 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as president/prime minister of the philippines and
not as the head of any political party. under the constitution, the prime minister and the cabinet shall
be responsible . . . for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national
policy. in instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that
is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the
governed. the president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. further, the sc
cannot compel tv stations and radio stations to give unido free air time as they are not party to this case.
unido must sought contract with these tv stations and radio stations at their own expense.
article ix c comelec section 4. supervision/regulation of public utilities, media grants, privileges
sanidad v. comelec, 181 scra 529 (1990)
facts:
this is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of section 19 of comelec resolution no.
2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the
press. section 19. prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. during the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues.
issue:
whether or not resolution no. 2167 is unconstitutional
held:
the instant petition is granted. section 19 of comelec resolution no. 2167 is declared null and void and
unconstitutional. plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. the people's right to be
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to
an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. the people affected by the issues presented
in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression
may be exercised
article ix: c. comelec, section 4 supervision/regulation of public utilities, media grants, privileges
philippine press institute v. comelec, gr no. 119654, may 22, 1995
facts:
respondent comelec promulgated resolution no. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free comelec
space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. the comelec
space shall be allocated by the commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to
make known their qualifications, their stand on public issue and their platforms of government. the
comelec space shall also be used by the commission for dissemination of vital election information.
petitioner philippine press institute, inc. (ppi), asks the supreme court to declare comelec resolution no.
2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. on behalf of the respondent comelec, the solicitor general claimed that the resolution is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the comelec over the information
operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial
and credible election.
issue:
whether or not comelec resolution no. 2772 is unconstitutional.
held:
the supreme court declared the resolution as unconstitutional. it held that to compel print media

companies to donate comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property without
payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. moreover, the element of necessity
for the taking has not been established by respondent comelec, considering that the newspapers were
not unwilling to sell advertising space. the taking of private property for public use is authorized by the
constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. also resolution no. 2772 does not constitute
a valid exercise of the police power of the state. in the case at bench, there is no showing of existence
of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
article ix: c. comelec, section 4 supervision/regulation of public utilities, media grants, privileges
abs-cbn v. comelec, gr no. 133486, jan. 28, 2000
facts:
this is a petition for certiorari assailing commission on elections (comelec) en banc resolution no. 981419 1 dated april 21, 1998. in the said resolution, the poll body "resolved to approve the issuance of a
restraining order to stop abs-cbn or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting
such exit survey and to authorize the honorable chairman to issue the same." the resolution was issued
by the comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that abs-cbn (lopez group) has
prepared a project, with pr groups, to conduct radio-tv coverage of the elections and to make [an] exit
survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for president and vice
president, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately." the electoral body believed that such
project might conflict with the official comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the
national movement for free elections (namfrel). it also noted that it had not authorized or deputized abscbn to undertake the exit survey.
issue:
whether the resolution issued by comelec is valid?
held:
no. the concern of the comelec cannot be justified since there is no showing that exit polls cause chaos
in voting centers. conducting exit polls and reporting their results are valid exercises of freedom of
speech and of the press. a limitation on them may be justified only by a danger of such substantive
character that the state has a right to prevent. furthermore, considering that the resolution was issued
only 20 days before the election and that the petitioners got a copy of it only on may 4, 1998, there was
hardly any opportunity to move for reconsideration and to obtain and swift resolution in time for the
may 11 elections. the petition also involves transcendental constitutional issues therefore, direct resort
to sc is justified.
article ix: c. comelec, section 4 supervision/regulation of public utilities, media grants, privileges
sws v. comelec, gr no. 147571, may 5, 2001
facts:
on the one hand, social weather stations (sws) is an institution conducting surveys in various fields.
kamahalan publishing corp., on the other hand, publishes the manila standard which is a newspaper of
general circulation and features items of information including election surveys. both sws and
kamahalan are contesting the validity and enforcement of r.a. 9006 (fair election act), especially section
5.4which provides that surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published 15days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published 7 days before the election.sws
wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and
local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly.
kamahalan, for its part, intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on
may 14, 2001.
issue:
whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint
held:
yes, section 5.4 of r.a. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech,
expression, and the press.

the power of the comelec over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space,
and the right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates of charge for the use of media facilities for
public information and forms among candidates. here, the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and
substantial. nor does this section pass the obrient test for content related regulation because (1) it
suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types such as editorials, etc.; and (2) the
restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government interest because the interest can e
protected by narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment. note: justice kapunans dissenting
opinion basically says that the test of clear and present danger is inappropriate to use in order to test the
validity of this section. instead, he purports to engage in a form of balancing by weighing and
balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the regulation of the free
enjoyment of the rights. however, he failed to show why, on the balance, the other considerations (for
example, prevention of last minute pressure on voters) should outweigh the value of freedom of
expression.
article ix: c. comelec, section section 6. free and open party system
liberal party v. comelec, gr no. 191771, may 6, 2010
facts:
this case poses to the court issues involving the registration of political coalitions, the grant of
accreditation to the dominant parties and validity of the comelec en bancs authority to act on the
registration of political party coalitions. the nationalista party (np) and the nationalist peoples coalition
(npc) filed a single petition with the comelec for the registration of their coalition (the np-npc
coalition) and the accreditation of the np-npc coalition as the dominant minority party for purposes of
the may 10, 2010 elections. the liberal party, who was also seeking accreditation as dominant minority
party, objected to this petition. instead of passing the petition first through a comelec division, the
comelec en banc directly assumed jurisdiction of the np-npc coalitions petition and eventually decided
to grant np-npc coalitions petition for registration as a political party coalition. in justifying its direct
assumption of jurisdiction (as opposed to having the petition first be heard by division), the comelec
cited a february 2003 supreme court ruling in baytan vs. comelec in which it was held that the
registration of coalitions involves the exercise of the comelecs administrative powers and not its quasijudicial powers; hence, the comelec en banc can directly act on it. baytan further held that there is no
constitutional requirement that a petition for registration of a coalition should be decided first by a
division. in baytan, the supreme court held that the constitution merely vests the comelecs
administrative powers in the commission on elections, while providing that the comelec may sit en
banc or in two divisions. thus, asserted the comelec, the comelec en banc can act directly on matters
falling within its administrative powers.
issue:
whether or not coalitions have to register in order to enjoy the benefits of a registered political party
held:
yes, because the coalition is distinct in personality from that of the coalescing parties. moreover, this
issue is administrative and not quasi-judicial and therefore may be decided by the comelec en banc
without going through a division first. without any finally confirmed registration in the coalitions
favor, np-npc does not legally exist as a coalition with a personality separate and distinct from the
component np and npc parties. we find it sufficient that the np and the npc have separately been
impleaded; as of the moment, they are the real parties-in-interest as they are the parties truly interested
in legally establishing the existence of their coalition. again, we find no resulting harm or prejudice in
the omission to implead np-npc, as the component parties have voiced out the concerns the coalition
would have raised had it been impleaded as a separate and properly existing personality.
article ix: d. coa section1. qualifications; term
mison v. coa, 187 scra 445
facts:
mison was the commissioner of customs. he declared the seizure of a japanese vessel, mv hyojin as
invalid. he thus ordered the release of said vessel. however, the vessel was not released. it sank while in

the custody of the bureau of customs. chan then filed a claim with the coa for the value of the sunken
vessel. ($50,000). by authority of the acting chair, mr. espiritu (who was the manager of the technical
services), denied the claim. the claimants thus questioned the authority of mr. espiritu in denying the
claim. thru their lawyer atty david, moved for the reconsideration, writing a letter to the acting coa
chair tantuico. he argued that the decision in the case was rendered only by the manager, and not by
the acting chairman, much less the coa itself. he contends that the decision is void because the matter
should be acted upon only by the coa duly constituted (ie, by the chair and the 2 comm.) (at this time,
the coa is not yet fully constituted) acting coa chair tantuico denied the claim as well. tantuico adopted
the espiritu decision. again, atty david moved for reconsideration, now arguing that acting chair
tantuico also had no authority to act on the case. he requested that the same be submitted for resolution
by the coa itself, after the appointment of 2 commissioners. later, the coa was finally fully constituted.
atty david still wrote another letter, for the payment of their claims. in a 4th indorsement, chairman
domingo, acting for the commission, reconsidered the decision of acting chairman tantuico. chairman
domingo granted the claim. he forwarded the decision to grant the claim to mison. mison now sought
clarification on the legal implication of the 4th indorsement. he contends that the first coa decision,
although signed only by a manger espiritu, was ratified or made valid because it was adopted in toto
as a decision of the coa in the subsequent letters.
issue:
whether or not the 4th indorsement should be invalid because coa chair domingo was the only one who
signed it
held:
4th indorsement valid. when the 4th indorsement decision was rendered, there were already 2
commissioners (meaning the coa was fully constituted already), clearly a number sufficient to satisfy
the constitutional requirement for collegial action. even so, the 4th indorsement made it clear that it
was the decision of the commission, when chairman domingo placed for the commission in the
decision. records also show that the other commissioners concurred in the decision.
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
philippine operations, inc. v. auditor general, 94 phil 868
facts:
philippine operations, inc., (poi) entered into a barter agreement with the bureau of prisons whereby it
agreed to deliver to the bureau a sawmill, complete, with a diesel fuel engine, a stop saw edge and log
turner, etc., and two lcms in good turning condition, in exchange for 350,000 board feet of sawed
lumber. the sawmill machine delivered to the bureau was lacking parts for the installation. due to the
defect, the bureau would not be able to complete the delivery of sawed lumber. the attorney for poi
filed a claim with the auditor general demanding that cash payment of p70,000 be paid to it, plus
p35,000 for damages suffered. the auditor general denied the claim of poi because the agreement
entered into was one of barter and no money consideration came to mind and that the bureau of prisons
was willing toper form its part of the obligation.
issue:
whether or not the auditor general has jurisdiction over unliquidated claim
held:
auditor general has no jurisdiction or power to take cognizance of claims for unliquidated damages. all
that is vested in the auditor general is the settlement of accounts. accounts, because of the absence of
any reasons to the contrary, must be deemed to have the same meaning as accounts under the laws in
force before the approval of the constitution. on the merits of the claim, the claim of the petitioner for
damages cannot be sustained, for admitting that the said amounts represent the difference in the value
between the lumber delivered in april, 1950, and that which was to be delivered within thirty days after
the installation of the sawmill, the delay in the delivery was due to petitioner's own fault, namely, its
failure to deliver the sawmill and the landing barges complete and in satisfactory condition it had
guaranteed them, and in part to its desire to change the lumber for surplus materials. for the foregoing
considerations, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers


euro-med laboratories, phil, inc. v. province of batangas, 495 scra 601
facts:
the province of batangas, through the various authorized representatives of the government hospitals by
euro med laboratories, were identified to have purchased various intravenous fluids (ivf) which were
products of the petitioner. the respondent was found to have an unpaid balance of p487,662.80 which
were evidenced by invoices received and signed by defendant s authorized representatives. over the
course of the trial where the petitioner s side concluded their presentation of evidence, the respondent
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the primary jurisdiction over the money claim is with the
commission on audit (coa).
issue:
who has primary jurisdiction over the case: coa/rtc?
held:
merits of the case is well within the jurisdiction of coa.
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
ramos v. aquino, 39 scra 236
facts:
a constitutional question with an element of novelty is raised in this appeal from a lower court order
dismissing an action for certiorari and prohibition against the then respondent fiscal of rizal, benjamin
h. aquino, to prevent him from conducting a preliminary investigation. it is whether there is an
encroachment on the constitutional prerogatives of the auditor general if, after the final approval of
certain vouchers by him without an appeal being made, an inquiry by a provincial fiscal to determine
whether criminal liability for malversation through falsification of public, official and commercial
documents based thereon could lawfully be conducted.it was further contended that the decisions of the
auditor-general on the correctness of the vouchers on which the alleged of cases were based having
become final and irrevocable, not even the courts could substitute its findings. otherwise the provision
of law that vouchers, claims or accounts "once finally settled shall in no case be opened or reviewed
except as herein provided" would be meaningless if the army authorities and respondent fiscal were
permitted to proceed with the preliminary investigation to determine whether criminal case could be
filed.
issue:
if the commission has already passed an account in audit, may the fiscal still look into it for the purpose
of determining possible criminal liability
held:
yes. the commissions interest is merely administrative and not criminal.
the fact that petitioners' accounts and vouchers had been passed in audit is not a ground for enjoining
the provincial fiscal from conducting a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the
criminal liability of petitioners for malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents. coa's approval of petitioner's disbursements only relates to the administrative aspect of the
matter of his accountability but it does not foreclose the ombudsman's authority to investigate and
determine whether there is a crime to be prosecuted for which petitioner is answerable.
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
blue bar coconut philippines v. tantuico, 163 scra 716
facts:
this is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction to
annul certain actions of respondents, the then acting chairman of the commission on audit and the
auditor of the philippine coconut authority (pca) to prevent them from doing specified acts and to
compel them to allow the payment by the pca of the petitioners' subsidy claims. the petitioners
questions the respondents' authority to audit them. the petitioners, as members of the coconut oil
refiners association, inc., and other allied associations contend that they are outside the ambit of
respondents' "audit" power which is confined to government-owned or controlled corporations

issue:
whether or not the petitioners are outside the audit power of coa
held:
section 2 (1) of article ix-d of the constitution provides that "the commission on audit shall have the
power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to,
the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis. ... (d) such non-governmental
entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or through the government which are
required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity."
the constitution formally embodies the long established rule that private entities who handle
government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their handling of said funds by
government auditors
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
nha v. coa, 226 scra 55
facts:
foreign loans usually obligate debtor country to hire expatriate consultants. this part of the package
makes these loans more onerous. the petition at bar assails the disallowance by the respondent coa of a
contract extending the services of a foreign consultant on the ground that his work could well be
performed by filipinos. supplemental contract was reviewed in post audit by the technical services
office and found out that based on submitted documents, it was noted that this supplemental contract
has no approval from kfw and the secretary of public works and highways, the output requirements are
not specified and there is no contract provision for liquidated damages in case of delay in project
completion attributed to direct fault of the consultant. nha filed the instant petition for certiorari
issue:
whether or not the coa acted beyond its constitutionally granted powers by
disallowing a duly entered contract, valid, regular, with all the formalities of law.
held:
the petition lacks merit. the power of the commission on audit to audit and examine government
expenditures is enshrined in section 2 (1), article ix-d of the 1987 constitution. the constitution also
granted to coa the power to "promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those
for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties." pursuant to the said
constitutional mandate, coa promulgated circular no. 88-55-a defining the term "unnecessary"
expenditures. there can be no dispute on the proposition that the continued extension of the services of
engr. murdoch as a foreign consultant constitutes at the very least an unnecessary expense
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
dingcong v. guingona, 162 scra 782 (1988)
facts:
appeal on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of respondent commission on audit
(coa) in its disallowing petitioner's claim for reimbursement of payments he had advanced for services
rendered on "pakyao" basis in the renovation and improvement of the office of the bureau of treasury,
layson was hired as a casual employee in the bureau of treasury office in order to do away with the
hiring of a private carpenter and electrician. the commission on audit, who affirmed the disallowance as
being "excessive and disadvantageous to the government.
issue:
whether or not the disallowance as invalid for being a usurpation of a management function and an
impairment of contract
held:
recourse to a "pakyao" labor contract, therefore, is not necessarily disadvantageous. in this case, it was
entered into only after public bidding pursuant to existing regulations through canvass among three

qualified "bidders." since layson submitted the lowest price, each contract was awarded to him. the
court also notes that layson was subsequently hired as a casual in the bureau of treasury office in order
to do away with the hiring of a carpenter and electrician, thereby exhibiting an awareness on
petitioner's part of government interests and a positive effort to avail of cost-cutting options. wherefore,
the decision of the commission on audit is hereby set aside, and it is hereby ordered to refund to
petitioner the disallowed item
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
danville maritime v. coa, 175 scra 701 (1989)
facts:
petition forcertiorari wherein petitioner questions the letter-directive of the respondent commission on
audit for disapproving the result of the public bidding held by the philippine national oil company of
the sale of its tanker-vessel "t/t andres bonifacio. petitioner points out that both p.d. 1445 and coa
circular no. 86- 264 do not define "failure of public bidding," so the coa committed a grave error when
it declared that a one-bidder situation constitutes such "failure of public bidding.
issue:
whether or not the public respondent coa committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there
was a failure of bidding when only one bid was submitted and subsequently ordered a rebidding
held:
the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit we see no reason to disturb the interpretation given
by the coa to the term "public bidding" and what constitutes its "failure." no less than the constitution
has ordained that the coa shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of government funds and
properties
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
mamaril v. domingo, 227 scra 206 (1993)
facts:
this is petition for under section 7 of article ix of the constitution and rule 65 of the revised rules of
court to set aside the decision no. 1614 of the commission on audit (coa), finding petitioner negligent in
the performance of his duties and holding him liable jointly and severally, with the agency head of the
land transportation office (lto). petitioner contended that he could not be held liable on the audit
disallowances because he was not an accountable officer since: (a) his work was purely clerical; (b) he
did not come into possession of any money or property for which he is now asked to pay; and (c) he
did not act in bad faith or with gross.
issue:
whether or not coas decision erred in finding the petitioner liable.
held:
art. ix-d section 2(2) states that the coa is given the "exclusive authority,
subject to the limitations in this article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the technique and methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations. the verification of the correctness of the evaluation and computation of the fees and
penalties collectible under the land transportation law are parts of the functions of the coa, which
examines and audits revenue accounts. when any person is indebted to any government agency, the coa
may direct the proper officer to withhold the payment of any money due such person or his estate to be
applied in satisfaction of the indebtedness. likewise, under the manual on certificate of settlement and
balances, a government auditor is empowered to order the withholding of the payment of any money
due a person determined to be liable for disallowances, suspensions, and, other deficiencies in the
accounts audited.
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
sambeli v. province of isabela, gr no. 92279, june 18, 1992

facts:
the instant petition seeks to annul and set aside the ruling of respondent commission on audit (coa)
affirming the action respondent provincial auditor of isabela which withheld the payment to petitioner
representing the unpaid balance of the price of 300 units of wheelbarrow and 873 pieces of shovel and
required the refund representing the overpayment to petitioner for the same items. petitioner contends
that the contract of sale has not only been perfected between the province of isabela and petitioner but
delivery has been made by it with the corresponding partial payment by the province of isabela. thus, it
is allegedly incumbent upon coa to authorize the payment of the balance because to at otherwise will
constitute an impairment of contract
issue:
whether or not the ruling of the coa as not valid
held:
the court rejects the petitioner's contention. in the exercise of the regulatory power vested upon it by the
constitution, the commission on audit adheres to the policy the government funds and property should
be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures
or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. on the proposition that improper or wasteful
spending of public funds or immoral use of government property, for being highly irregular or
unnecessary, or scandalously excessive or extravagant, offends the sovereign people's will, it behooves
the commission on audit to put a stop thereto
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
osmena v. coa, gr no. 98355, march 2, 1994
facts:
petitioner mayor of the city of cebu seeks special civil action of certiorari for nullification of the
decision of respondent commission on audit for disallowing the amount of p30,000.00 appropriated by
the city of cebu relative to a compromise agreement entered into in civil case of the regional trial court
of cebu city an action brought by the spouses benjamin and evangeline de la cerna against the city
and others which compromise was in due course embodied in a judgment of the court
issue:
won committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the payment of p30,000 for the compromise
agreement between the parties herein involved.
held:
the court believes that public respondents' disallowance of the appropriation is indeed tainted by grave
abuse of discretion and should be correspondingly rectified. it appears to the court that respondent coa
grievously misconstrued the undertaking of cebu city to pay p30,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased
reynaldo de la cerna. it is not worthy that the compromise in question was approved by and embodied
in the judgment of the court, which pronounced it, to be in conformity with law, morals and public
policy and enjoined the parties, to comply with the terms and conditions thereof. this judicial
compromise is conclusive and binding on all the parties. there was no reason whatever to object to it,
much disallow any disbursement therein stipulated, it should have been approved as a matter of course.
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
bustamante v. coa, gr no. 103309, nov. 27, 1992
facts:
petitioner is the regional legal counsel of the national power corporation, prayed for certiorari with
preliminary injunction seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the respondent commissioner on
audit which denied due course to the appeal of petitioner from the disallowance by regional auditor
martha roxana caburian of petitioner's claim for transportation allowance. under the grounds of coa
circular which provides. prohibition against use of government vehicles by officials provided with
transportation allowance. the petitioner takes exception from the coverage of said circular contending
that such circular did not mention the npc as one of the corporations/offices covered by it.
issue:
whether or not such denial to give due course to the appeal of herein petitioner constitutes grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction


held:
the court cannot sustain petitioner's contention that the commission, in the exercise of its power granted
by the constitution, usurped the statutory functions of the npc board of directors for its leads to the
absurd conclusion that a mere board of directors of a government-owned and controlled corporation, by
issuing a resolution, can put to naught a constitutional provision which has been ratified by the majority
of the filipino people. if we will not sustain the commission's power and duty to examine, audit and
settle accounts pertaining to this particular expenditures or use of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by this government-owned and controlled corporation, the npc, we will be rendering inutile this
constitutional body which has been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper
use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property.
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
caltex v. coa, 208 scra 726 (1992)
facts:
this is a questioning the authority of the commission on audit (coa) in disallowing petitioner's claims
for reimbursement from the oil price stabilization fund (opsf) and seeking the reversal of said
commission's decision denying its claim for recovery of financing charges from the fund and
reimbursement of under recovery arising from sales to the national power corporations, atlas
consolidated mining and development corporation and marcopper mining corporation preventing it
from exercising the right to offset its remittances against its reimbursement vis-a-vis the opsf and
disallowing its claims are still pending resolution before the office of energy affairs (oea) and the
department of finance (dof)
issue:
whether or not coa erred for the disallowances
held:
the court affirmed the decision of coa. in respect to the taxes for the opsf, the oil companies merely act
as agents for the government in the latter's collection since the taxes are, in reality, passed unto the endusers -- the consuming public. in that capacity, the petitioner, as one of such companies, has the
primary obligation to account for and remit the taxes collected to the administrator of the opsf. this
duty stems from the fiduciary relationship between the two; petitioner certainly cannot certainly cannot
be considered merely as a debtor. in respect, therefore, to its collection for the opsf vis-a-vis its claims
for reimbursement, no compensation is likewise legally feasible. firstly, the government and the
petitioner cannot be said to be mutually debtors and creditors of each other. secondly, there is no proof
that petitioner's claim is already due and liquidated.
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
polloso v. gangan, 335 scra 750 (2000)
facts:
petition for review from the decision of the commission on audit (coa), herein petitioner dante m.
polloso, from the disallowance by the coa unit auditor of the amount of p283,763.39 representing
payment of legal services rendered by atty. benemerito a. satorre to the national power corporation. the
respondent cited following reasons for disallowances. the contract for services did not have the written
conformity and acquiescence of the solicitor general, the contract was not supported with certificate of
availability of funds, and .the contract was not submitted to the civil service commission for final
review
issue:
whether or not the prohibition under coa circular of the government accounting and auditing manual
imposed on government agencies from hiring private lawyers "to handle their legal cases" apply to a
lawyer hired by virtue of a service contract but who actually handle purely right-of-way matters
(excluding handling of court cases).
held:
we cannot grant the prayer of the petitioner. the purpose of the circular is to curtail the unauthorized

and unnecessary disbursement of public funds to private lawyers for services rendered to the
government. this is in line with the commission on audits constitutional mandate to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government
funds and properties. having determined the intent of the law, this court has the imperative duty to give
it effect even if the policy goes beyond the letter or words of the statute
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
dbp v. coa, 231 scra 202
facts:
the monetary board adopted a resolution requiring a private external auditor for the dbp. the chairman
wrote the coa seeking approval of the dbps engagement of a private external auditor in addition to the
coa. then coa chairman teofisto guingona replied that the commission will interpose no objection to the
dbps engagement of a private external auditor provided that the terms for said audit are first reviewed
and approved by the commission under instructions to disallow any payment to the private auditor. the
new coa chairman contends that the very essence of the coa as an independent constitutional
commission in the total scheme of government, is its singular function to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the government, or any of its subdivisions, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.
issue:
whether the constitution vest in coa the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit government
banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external auditors under any circumstance?
held:
no. coas power to examine and audit under the first paragraph is not declared exclusive, while its
authority under the second paragraph is expressly declared exclusive. the clear and unmistakable
conclusion from a reading of the entire section 2 is that the coas power to examine and audit is non
exclusive while its authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations,
and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
strategic alliance v. radstock securities, gr no. 178158, december 4, 2009
facts:
the philippine national construction corp. (pncc) was incorporated under the corporation code. in 1978
and 1981, basay mining corp. an affiliate of pncc, obtained loans from marubeni corp wherein pncc,
without a board resolution authorizing the same, obliged to pay solidarily with basay. for 20 years, pncc
consistently refused to admit liability for the marubeni loans. however, in october 2010, pncc passed a
board resolution recognizing a p10.7billion liability to marubeni corp. three months later, marubeni
assigned its credit to radstock for only us $2 million(or less than p100 million, in stark contrast to the
p10.7 billion admitted receivable from pncc). radstock immediately started actions for the collection of
the amount. the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against pncc and garnished the
latters bank accounts and real properties. it denied pnccs mtd. ca also denied pnccs petition for
certiorari. later, pncc and radstock entered into a compromise agreement whereby pncc shall pay a
reduced amount of p6.185 billion instead of the total amount of the debt, which as of 2006 has
ballooned to p17 billion. coa found the terms of the compromise as fair and above board. the ca also
approved it. in the sc, the bone of contention is the pncc boards power to compromise the obligation.
issue:
whether the pncc is not a government agency making it autonomous of the government and that coa has
no jurisdiction over the case.
held:
no. the dissenters position that pncc has the power to compromise because it was incorporated under
the corporation code and is therefore an autonomous entity and is just like any other private
corporation is wrong. pncc is not just like any other private corporation because it is indisputably a
gocc. neither is pncc an autonomous entity because it is under the dti, over which the president

exercises control. the coas jurisdiction extends not only to government agencies or instrumentalities
but also to goccs with original charters and other goccs without original charters (i.e., those created
under the corporation code but are owned and controlled by the government. thus, pncc is a gocc. as
such, it is a government agency to which the provisions of rac regarding compromises apply. therefore,
it has no power to compromise the marubeni loan. only the congress can do so. since the compromise
agreement was not approved by congress, it is void.
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
uy, et al v. coa, gr no. 130685, march 21, 2000
facts:
petitioners were among the more than sixty permanent employees of the provincial engineering office
of the province of agusan del sur, who were dismissed from the service by then governor. when the
latter assumed office, allegedly to scale down the operations of the said office. a petition for
reinstatement was then filed by petitioners before the merit systems protection board (mspb) of the civil
service commission alleging that governor was motivated by political vengeance when he dismissed
them. eventually, the mspb rendered a decision holding that the reduction in work force was not done in
accordance with civil service rules and regulations, and ordering the reinstatement of petitioners. the
mspb also ordered the provincial government of agusan del sur to pay the petitioners their back salaries
and other money benefits for the period that they had been out of service until their reinstatement. the
acting provincial treasurer refused to release petitioners remaining back salaries and other monetary
benefits. a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by respondent coa.
issue:
whether coa, in its exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the payment of back wages of illegally
dismissed by the provincial government of agusan del sur this has been decreed pursuant to a final
decree of the civil service commission.
held:
no. the court ruled that the audit authority of coa is intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
payments of back wages to illegally dismissed government employees can hardly be described as
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable. the order of coa is set aside.
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
davao city water district v. csc and coa, gr no. 95237, september 13, 1991
facts:
petitioners are among the more than five hundred water districts existing throughout the country
formed pursuant to the provisions of presidential decree no. 198, known as the provincial water
utilities act of 1973. it authorized the different local legislative bodies to form and create their
respective water districts through a resolution they will pass subject to the guidelines, rules and
regulations therein laid down. petitioners contend that they are private corporations without original
charter, hence outside the jurisdiction of respondents csc and coa.
issue:
whether the local water districts formed and created pursuant to the provisions of presidential decree
no. 198, as amended, are government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter thus
falling under the jurisdiction of the visitorial power of the coa.
held:
yes.pd 198 is a special law applicable only to the different water districts created pursuant thereto.
government-owned or controlled corporations are those created by special laws and not those under the
corporation code of the philippines. the said decree is in fact the charter of the different water districts
for it clearly defines the latters primary purpose and its basic organizational set up. in other words, pd
198 is the very law which gives a water district juridical personality. the resolution of a local
sanggunian is intended only to implement the provisions of said decree. unlike a private corporation
where the members of the board are elected from among the members and stockholders thereof,
members of the board of a water district are appointed by the local chief executive of the local

subdivision unit where such district is located.


article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
parreno v. coa, gr no. 162224, june 7, 2007
facts:
parreo filed a claim before the commission on audit (coa) for the continuance of his pension,
contesting the constitutionality of section 27 of the afp military personnel retirement and separation
decree as which provides that a retiree who loses his filipino citizenship shall be removed from the
retired list and consequently have his retirement benefits terminated. citing lack of jurisdiction, coa
denied the petition and advised him to file his claim with the court authorized to rule on issue of
constitutionality of provisions of law. in his motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued that since his
pension involves government funds, it is within coas jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. coa dismissed
his appeal, citing lack of jurisdiction.
issue:
whether or not coas jurisdiction over money claims include the power to rule on the constitutionality
of the laws.
held:
no. the court ruled that the jurisdiction of coa over money claims defined as demands for payment of a
sum of money, reimbursement, or compensation arising from law or contract due or owing to a
government agency does not include the power to rule on the constitutionality of the laws.
article ix: d. coa section 2. general function; powers
boy scouts of the philippines v. coa, 651 scra 146
facts:
the coa issued a resolution in 1999 defining its policy with respect to the audit of the boy scouts of the
philippine, which was created as a public corporation. for the purposes of audit supervision, the bsp
shall be classified among the government corporations to be audited by employing the team audit
approach. the bsp sought reconsideration of the coa resolution in a letter signed by then bsp national
president jejomar c. binay, saying that it is not subject to the coas jurisdiction.
issue:
whether or not the bsp is under the audit jurisdiction of coa.
held:
yes. the bsp is a public corporation with juridical personality as it is called by the law creating it. not
all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private
corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are
otherwise known as "public corporations." these corporations are treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and
economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional
policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its
departments or offices.
article x section 1 territorial and political subdivisions of the philippines
cordillera broad coalition v. coa, gr no. 79956, january 26, 1990
facts:
eo 220 dated july 15, 1987 creates the cordillera administrative region (car) creating a temporary
administrative agency pending the creation of the cordillera autonomous region. eo 220, issued by the
president in the exercise of her legislative powers under art. xviii, sec. 6 of the constitution, created the
car. it was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the
establishment of the autonomous region in the cordilleras. its main function is to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with
the local government units as well as with the executive departments of the national government in the
supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and
activities in the region. it shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local
government projects in the region. the car shall have a cordillera regional assembly as a policy-

formulating body and a cordillera executive board as an implementing arm. the car and the assembly
and executive board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established
and organized. in these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing e.o. no. 220 the president, in
the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first congress under the 1987
constitution, has virtually pre-empted congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and
created an autonomous region in the cordilleras.
issue:
whether eo 220 thereby create a territorial and political subdivision
held:
no. what is created is not a public corporation but an executive agency under the control of the national
government. it is more similar to the regional development councils which the president may create
under art. x sec. 14.
article x section 2 local autonomy
limbona v. conte mangelin, et al, gr no. 80391, february 28, 1989
facts:
on march 12, 1987 petitioner limbona was elected speaker of the regional legislative assembly or
batasang pampook of central mindanao. on november 2, 1987, members of regional legislative
assembly sans the petitioner limbona convened in defiance to short recess called for by petitioner as the
latter was to attend a congressional committee hearing for muslim affairs in congress. during the
convention, having acquired quorum, members thereof move to declare the speakership of the regional
legislative assembly vacant, thereby expelling petitioner from office. petitioner limbona filed petition
for injunction praying that a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on november 5, 1987, and on any day
thereafter and that judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session
on november 2, 1987 as null and void. in view thereof, the jurisdiction of the supreme court to hear and
decide matters over autonomous region was challenged by respondents.
issue:
whether or not autonomous governments of mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts
held:
yes. an examination of the presidential decree creating the autonomous governments of mindanao and
promulgated on july25, 1979 shows that they were never meant to exercise autonomy such that the
central government commits an act of self--immolation. the sangguniang pampook, the legislative
arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services. autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. there is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive and accountable,
and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. at the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns
article x section 2 local autonomy
san juan v. csc, 196 scra 69 (1991)
facts:
the provincial budget officer of rizal (pbo) was left vacant; thereafter rizal governor san juan,
peititioner, nominated dalisay santos for the position and the latter quickly assumed position. however,
director abella of region iv department of budget and management (dbm) did not endorse the nominee,
and recommended private respondent cecilia almajose as pbo on the ground that she was the most
qualified. this appointment was subsequently approved by the dbm. petitioner protested the
appointment of almajose before the dbm and the civil service commission who both dismissed his
complaints. his arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend

the nominees to the position of pbo and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. the
law says that the budget officer shall be appointed by the department head upon the recommendation of
the head of local government subject to civil service rules and regulations. if none of those
recommended by the local government head meets the requirement of law.
issue:
whether or not the department head may appoint anyone he chooses
held:
no. the recommending power of the provincial governor in e.o. 112 is not directory but mandatory
pursuant to the constitutional and state policy of local autonomy as enunciated in article ii, sec. 25 and,
article x sections 2 and 3 of the 1987 constitution. if the dbm secretary hounds all the budgetary powers
and ignores the right of local government units to develop self--reliance and resoluteness in handling
their own funds, the goal of local autonomy is frustrated and setback and all the effort for the exercise
of local governments of meaningful power
article x section 2 local autonomy
magtajas v. pryce properties, gr no. 111097, july 20, 1994
facts:
on december 7, 1992, sangguniang panlungsod of cagayan de oro city enacted ordinance 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any
establishment for the using and allowing to use its premises or portion thereof for the operation of a
casino. on january 4, 1993, it enacted ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and
providing penalty for violation therefore. pryce assailed the ordinances before the ca, where it was
joined by pagcor as intervener. the court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to
prohibit their enforcement. cdo city and its mayor filed a petition for review under rules of court with
the supreme court.
issue:
whether or not the sangguniang panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino operated by
pagcor through an ordinance
held:
no. local governments have certain powers given by the constitution which may not be curtailed by the
national government, but that, outside of these, local governments may not pass ordinances contrary to
statute. the government of cagayan de oro city contended that, under its authority to prohibit gambling,
the city could prevent the philippine games and amusement board (pagcor) from operating a casino in
the city. pagcor, however, had authority under p.d. 1869 to centralize and regulate all games of chance
under the territorial jurisdiction of the philippines. in ruling that cagayan de oro city could not curtail
pagcors authority, the court in no uncertain terms said: municipal governments are only agents of the
national government. local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
congress as the national lawmaking body.
article x section 2 local autonomy
leynes v. coa, gr no. 143596, dec. 11, 2003
facts:
petitoner questions the constitutionality of the act of coa provincial auditor in disallowing the
sangguniang bayan of naujan in granting rtc judge tomas c. leynes an increase in monthly rice and
transportation allowance through the latters resolution no. 057. coa disallowed the said act on the basis
of republic act no. 7645 general appropriations act of 1993 section 36 that states that one shall not be
allowed to claim rata from more than one source.
issue:
whether or not coas application of ra 7645 section 36 is unconstitutional.
held:
yes. coa misconstrued ra 7645 section 36. the said section is merely an administrative tool employed by
the dbm to prevent the much-abused practice of multiple allowance by standardizing the grant of rata
by national agencies; it does not apply to local government funds. to unjustly widen the coverage of the

questioned section to include local government policies will be in grave violation of section 2 article 10
of the 1987 constitution which guarantees the local autonomy of the states territorial and political
subdivisions. genuine and meaningful autonomy of local government agencies shall be ensured only
when, as in this case, the power to grant allowances is provided to the local government with the
discretion as to the amount of the said allowances depending on the fund availability.
article x section 2 local autonomy
batangas catv v. ca and batangas city, gr no. 138810, september 29, 2004
facts:
the constitutionality of resolution no. 210 was in question, this was enacted by the sangguniang
panglungsod of batangas city. this resolution gave the petitioner the permit to conduct, install and
operate a catv in batangas, provided that, in accordance with section 8 of the said resolution, increase
of subscriber rates shall be subject to the approval of the sanggunian. petitioner later increased its rates
without seeking for approval; hence, respondent threatened petitioner to possible revocation of the
permit; hence, this case.
issue:
whether or not the local government have the authority to regulate catv subscriber rates.
held:
no, lgus does not have the authority to regulate catv rates. the national telecommunications commission
has the regulatory power over technical matters of catv, including the determination of fair subscriber
rates. although the lgu can regulate catvs under the general welfare clause governing local government
units, this local autonomy has limits. these limits was crossed by resolution no. 210 which violated the
mandate of existing laws and the states deregulation policy over the catv industry. in the case at bar,
the sanggunian illegally usurped the jurisdiction of the ntc.
article x section 3. local government code
garcia v. comelec, 227 scra 100 (1993)
facts:
under section 70 of the local government code, some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the
sangguniang bayan of twelve bataan municipalities formed a preparatory recall assembly (prac) to
initiate the recall election of petitioner governor garcia as governor of bataan on the ground of loss of
confidence. comelec scheduled the said elections. garcia contends the constitutionality of section 70 of
the local government code on the ground that a recall election through the prac is unconstitutional.
issue:
whether or not section 70 of the local government code is unconstitutional.
held:
no, it is not unconstitutional. the constitution did not provide for any means to be followed in
conducting a recall election. section 3 article x of the constitution mandates that the congress shall
enact a local government code which will provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum. it is clear from the aforementioned section that the congress is given the
power to choose the means of recall it deems to be most effective to support the judgment of the
electorate and not to mandate the congress into choosing a particular mechanism of initiating recall
elections
article x section 3. local government code
malonzo v. comelec, 269 scra 380 (1997)
facts
malonzo was elected as mayor of caloocan city in the elections held on may 8, 1995. however, barely a
year after his election, on july 7, 1996, 1,057 punong barangays, sangguniang barangay members and
sk chairmen constituting a majority of the preparatory recall assembly of caloocan passed preparatory
recall assembly resolution no. 01-96, expressing loss of confidence in mayor malonzo, and calling for
the initiation of recall proceedings against him. the said resolution, along with other relevant
documents, was filed by the pra with the comelec. malonzo filed a petition with comelec challenging

the validity of recall process. the comelec, however, rejected the petition. it then declared the recall
proceedings to be in order. malonzo then filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary
restraining order and application for writ of preliminary injunction", assailing the comelec's resolution
as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. malonzo challenged the recall proceedings,
essentially claiming that the notices for the meeting of the pra were not properly served. moreover, he
argued that it was the liga ng mga barangay and not the pra which initiated the recall, contrary to the
requirements under the local government code. he also claimed that the proceeding followed for
adopting the recall resolution was defective and therefore void.
issue: whether or not the recall proceeding was valid.
held: yes. the recall process was valid. the notices were properly served to the members of the pra.
moreover, it was the pra which initiated the recall and not the liga ng mga barangay. the resolution was
properly adopted in a meeting conducted by the pra. the recall proceedings cannot be denied merit on
this ground. the law on recall did not prescribe an elaborate proceeding. neither did it demand a specific
procedure. what is fundamental is compliance with the provision that there should be a session called
for the purpose of initiating recall proceedings, attended by a majority of all the members of the
preparatory recall assembly, in a public place and that the resolution resulting from such assembly be
adopted by a majority of all the pra members
article x section 4. supervision by the president
ganzon v. ca, 200 scra 271
facts:
10 complaints were filed against mayor ganzon if iloilo on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of
office. secretary of local government issued a 600 day suspension against ganzon based on the merits
of the complaints filed against him. ganzon appealed the issue to the ca and suspension order by the
secretary was affirmed. ganzon said that the constitution does not authorize the president nor any of his
alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; because the constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same and what was given by it was mere supervisory power.
issue:
whether or not the secretary of local government, as the presidents alter ego, can suspend and or
remove local officials.
held:
yes. secretary of local government is exercising a valid power. he, however, overstepped by imposing a
600 day suspension. ganzon is under the impression that the constitution has left the president mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control,
which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. legally, supervision is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority. sc had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by
the president over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over
executive officials of our govt, where it was emphasized that control and supervision are two different
things. from the pronouncement given, it cannot be inferred that the power of supervision of the
president over local govt officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.
article x section 4. supervision by the president
joson v. torres, 290 scra 279
facts:
private respondent filed a letter of complaint to the office of the president charging governor joson of
nueca ecija with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. according to respondents, in one of the
sangguniang panlalawigan meeting, joson barged into the hall in order to harass them into approving
the loan 150m pesos from pnb. they did not approve the loan because there is still a pending obligation
and they cant afford to enter into another. they were thus summoned by the dilg to a settlement but did
not comply so they were asked to give answers with regards to the non-settlement where, joson failed
to do so and so was declared of waiving his right. joson filed motion to dismiss alleging that the letter
of complaint was not verified on the day it was filed and hat dilg had no jurisdiction over the case and

no authority to require him to answer. executive secretary torres issued an order, by authority of
president, placing petitioner joson on a 60 days suspension pending investigation on the charges against
him.
issue:
whether or not the dilg has investigating authority over the case.
held:
yes. there are 2 authorities in jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials, the disciplining authority (da) president and the investigating authority(ia) the secretary of
interior and local govt. the sec of dilg is not an exclusive ia. the power of the president over admin.
disciplinary cases against elective officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local
govt. the power to discipline evidently includes investigation. however, delegates the power to
investigate to the dilg or a special investigating committee as may be constituted da which is not undue
delegation. the pres. remains the da and what is delegated is the power to investigate. the power of dilg
to investigate admin. complaints is based on the doctrine decision of executive officials is valid as if
it is the decision of the pres. the dilg was the one who asked joson to file his answer. however, what
happened is not fatal.
article x section 4. supervision by the president
drilon v. lim, 235 scra 135 (1994)
facts:
pursuant to sec 187 of the local govt code, secretary of justice had, on appeal to him, declared
ordinance no. 7794, the manila revenue code, null and void for non compliance and for being contrary
to law and public policy. in a petition for certiorari filed by the city of manila, rtc of manila revoked the
secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. it declared sec 187 of the local govt code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture in the secretary of justice of the power of control over local
govts in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the constitution and of the specific
provision therein conferring on the president of the philippines only the power of supervision over local
govts.
issue:
whether or not secretary of justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local govt.
held:
no. an officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. if not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
supervision does not cover such authority. the supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are followed,
but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.
in the opinion of the court, secretary
article x section 4. supervision by the president
province of negros v. coa, gr no. 182574, september 28, 2010
facts:
the sangguniang panglalawigan of negro occidental passed a resolution allocating 4-million of its
retained earnings for the healthcare of the employees of the province. the insurance coverage was
awarded to philam care. the provincial auditor, however, issued a notice of suspension for the
agreement between philam care and the province of negros for lack of approval from the president. the
president then ordered that the suspension be lifted up to the amount of 100,000, however, the
commission on audit ignore the presidential directive. under ao 103, no government entity, including a
local government unit, is exempt from securing prior approval from the president granting additional
benefits to its personnel. this is in conformity with the policy of standardization of compensation laid
down in ra 6758.
issue:
whether or not administrative orders applies to lgu
held:
no. the president can only exercise general supervision over the lgus which is the power of a superior

officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law. an administrative order
does not apply to lgus but only to government offices/agencies, and goccs which are under the control
of the president. the grant of additional compensation like health insurance benefits does not need the
prior approval of the president.
article x section 5. power of taxation by local government
lto v. city of butuan, 322 scra 805
facts:
he sangguniang panglunsod of the city of butuan enacted an ordinance "regulating the operation of
tricycles-for-hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of franchise, registration and permit, and
imposing penalties for violations thereof and for other purposes." the ordinance provided for, among
other things, the payment of franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for
the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof. petitioner
lto explains that one of the functions of the national government that, indeed, has been transferred to
local government units is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the land transportation
franchising and regulatory board ("ltfrb") but not, it asseverates, the authority of lto to register all motor
vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles
issue: whether under the present set-up the power of the lto to register, tricycles in particular, as well as
to issue licenses for the driving thereof has likewise devolved to local government units
held:
the sc ruled that the registration and licensing functions are vested in the lto while franchising and
regulatory responsibilities are vested in the ltfrb. under the local government code, lgus have the power
to regulate the operation of tricycle for hire and to grant franchise for the operation thereof.
article x section 5. power of taxation by local government
lina v. pano, 364 scra 76 (2001)
facts:
respondent tony calvento agent of the asked mayor calixto cataquiz of san pedro, laguna, for a mayors
permit to open lotto outlet. this was denied by mayor cataquiz on the ground that an ordinance was
passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan of lagunawhich reads: isang kapasiyahan tinututulan ang
mga illegal gambling lalo na ang lotto sa lalawiganng lagunaas a result of denial, respondent calvento
filed a complaint. petitioners contend that : (1)the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the
provincial government of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling;(2)
it is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial governments police power under the local government
code of 1991;(3) they also maintain that respondents lotto operation is illegal because no prior
consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it was implemented. the
respondent judge, francisco pano promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing
or enforcing resolution of kapasiyahan blg. 508, t. 1995. motion for reconsideration was denied. thus,
petitioners filed petition for review on certiorari.
issue/s:
1.whether kapasiyahan blg. 508, t.1995 of the sangguniang panlalawigan of laguna and the denial of a
mayors permit based thereon are valid
2. whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned sangguniana are needed before a lotto
system can be operated in a given local government unit.
held:
the petition is denied. the court ruled that the ordinance merely states the objection of the council to
said game. it is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing.
nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of
laguna. it provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent mayors refusal to issue the permit sought by
private respondent in connection with a legitimate business activity authorized by a law passed by
congress.
article x section 5. power of taxation by local government
petron v. mayor, gr no. 158881, april 16, 2008

facts:
court records showed that petron, which maintains a depot or bulk plant at the novatas fishport
complex in navotas, received a letter from respondent navotas mayor tobias tiangco, wherein the firm
was assessed taxes covering its sale of diesel from 1997 to 2001.the navotas city government
demanded payment of p10.2 million representing petrons deficiency taxes.petron filed with navotas
a letter-protest to the notice of assessment pursuant to section 195 of the code. it argued that it was
exempt from local business taxes in view of article 232 of the implementing rules of the lgc as well as
the ruling of the bureau of local government finance of the department of finance. owing to the denial
of its protest, petron filed with the rtc in malabon a complaint for cancellation of assessment for
deficiency taxes with prayer for the issuance of a temprorary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. malabon rtc rendered its decision dismissing petrons complaint and ordering the payment
of the assessed amount. after 11 days, petron received a closure order from tiangco, directing it to cease
and desist from operating the bulk plant, prompting it to elevate the case to the sc.
issue:
whether or not local government unit is empowered under the local government code to impose
business taxes on persons or entities engaged in the sale of petroleum products.
held:
the power of a municipality to impose business taxes is provided for in section 143 of the lgc. under the
provision, a municipality is authorized to impose business taxes on a whole host of business activities.
suffice it to say, unless there is another provision of law which states otherwise, section 1 43, broad in
scope as it is, would undoubtedly cover the business of selling diesel fuels, or any other petroleum
product for that matter.
article x section 5. power of taxation by local government
yamane v. ba lepanto condominium, gr no. 154993, october 25, 2005
fact:
petitioner city treasurer of makati holds respondent, in a notice of assessment, liable to pay the correct
business taxes, fees and charges totaling to p1.6m in which the respondents protested contending that
condominium does not fall under the definition of a business, thus, they are not liable for such taxes.
issue:
whether or not the city treasurer of makati may collect business taxes on condominium corporations
held:
petition denied. accordingly, and with significant degree of comfort, we hold that condominium
corporations are generally exempt from local business taxation under the lgc, irrespective of any local
ordinance that seeks to declare otherwise. the power of the local government units to impose taxes
within its territorial jurisdiction derives from the constitution itself, which recognizes the power of
these units to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy.
article x section 5. power of taxation by local government
philippine petroleum v. municipality of pililla, gr no. 90773, june 3, 1991
facts:
petitioner, philippine petroleum corporation is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of
lubricated oil base stocks which is a petroleum product. under section 142 of the national internal
revenue code of 1939, manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax. later, the local tax
code enacted, governing the exercise by provinces, cities, municipalities and barrios of their taxing and
other revenue-raising powers, provide among others, that the municipality may impose taxes on
business, except on those for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers, importers or producers
of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. the secretary of finance issued a circular
directed to all provincial, city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed
in old or new tax ordinances in the business of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing in
petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the national internal revenue code. the national

internal revenue code of 1977 was enacted, of which specifically imposes specific tax on refined and
manufactured mineral oils and motor fuels. enforcing the provisions of the above-mentioned ordinance,
the respondent filed a complaint against ppc for the collection of the business tax from 1979 to 1986;
storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986; mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees from 1975 to 1984.
ppc, however, have already paid the last-named fees starting 1985. the trial court rendered a decision
against the petitioner.
issue:
whether or not ppc whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the nirc, is still liable to pay
taxes on business and storage fees, mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee under municipal
ordinance
held:
yes. ppc is liable to pay business taxes but it is not liable to pay storage fees. . there is no question that
pililla's municipal tax ordinance no. 1, imposing the assailed taxes, fees and charges is valid especially.
section 9 (a) which according to the trial court "was lifted in toto and/or is a literal reproduction of
section19 (a) of the local tax code as amended by p.d. no. 426." it conforms with the mandate of said
law. but p.d. no. 426 amending the local tax code is deemed to have repealed provincial circular issued
by the secretary of finance when sections 19 and 19(a) were carried over into p.d. no. 426 and no
exemptions were given to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, or dealers in petroleum products. wellsettled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. in
case of discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, the former prevails.
furthermore, while section 2 of p.d. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products,
said decree did not amend sections19 and 19 (a) of p.d. 231 as amended by p.d. 426, wherein the
municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers, importers, producers of
any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. a tax on business is distinct from a tax on the
article itself. thus, if the imposition of tax on business of manufacturers, thait is in petroleum products
contravenes a declared national policy, it should have been expressly stated in p.d. no. 436. the exercise
by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present constitution. to allow the
continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in pc no.26-73 (1) would be tantamount to restricting
their power to tax by mere administrative issuances. under section 5,article x of the 1987 constitution,
only guidelines and limitations that may be established by congress can define and limit such power of
local governments.
article x section 5. power of taxation by local government
john hay peoples alternative coalition v. lim, gr no. 119775, october 24, 2003
facts:
president ramos through proclamation no. 420 declared a portion of camp john hay as a special
economic zone (sez) and created a regime of tax exemption within the john hay special economic zone.
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the proclamation. the court also held that it is the legislature,
unless limited by a provision of the constitution, that has the full power to exempt any person or
corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax.
issue:
won the petitioners have legal standing to bring
held:
yes. the bcd act gave the president the power to create special economic zones from former bases.
however, the law granted tax incentives only to subic. the president had no authority to extend tax
exemptions to the john hay zone.
article x section 5. power of taxation by local government
manila electric v. province of laguna, gr no. 131359, may 5, 1999
facts:
certain municipalities of the province of laguna including, bian, sta rosa, san pedro, luisiana, calauan
and cabuyao, by virtue of existing laws then in effect, issued resolutions through their respective
municipal councils granting franchise in favor of petitioner manila electric company (meralco) for

the supply of electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas. meralco was likewise granted
a franchise by the national electrification administration to operate an electric light and power service
in the municipality of calamba, laguna.. the local government code of 1991, took effect, enjoining
local government units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges,
subject to the limitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
pursuant to the provisions of the code, respondent province enacted laguna provincial ordinance,
providing, in part, as follows:
sec. 2.09. franchise tax. there is hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate
of fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts, which shall include both cash
sales and sales on account realized during the preceding calendar year within this province, including
the territorial limits on any city located in the province
issue:
whether the tax exemption privilege is to be withdrawn or not rather than on whether the law can
withdraw, without violating the constitution, the tax exemption or not.
held:
while the court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax exemptions contained in special franchises as
being in the nature of contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying on the franchise, these
exemptions, nevertheless, are far from being strictly contractual in nature. contractual tax exemptions,
in the real sense of the term and where the non-impairment clause of the constitution can rightly be
invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as those contained in government
bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government,
acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity.
article x section 5. power of taxation by local government
batangas power v. batangas city, gr no. 152675, april 28, 2004
facts:
bpc filed a petition for declaratory relief with the makati rtc against batangas city & npc alleging that
under the bot agreement, npc is responsible for the payment of taxes imposed on the power station
except income and permit fees as a pioneer enterprise for 6 years under sec. 133(g) of the lgc, but since
npc is a tax-exempt corporation under its charter, both the bpc and npc arent liable for its payment.
issue:
w/n the npcs tax exemption privileges under its charter were withdrawn by the lgc.
held:
the power to tax is no longer exclusively vested on congress; local legislative bodies are now given
authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to art.x, sec.5 of the 1987 constitution. the lgc
effectively deals with the fiscal constraints faced by the lgus. it widens the tax base of lgus to include
taxes which were prohibited by previous laws. when npc assumed tax liabilities of the bpc under their
1992 bot agreement, the lgc which removed npcs tax exemption privileges had already been in effect
for 6 months. thus, while the bpc remains to be the entity doing business in the city, it is the npc that is
ultimately liable to pay said taxes under the provisions of both the 1992 bot agreement & the 1991 lgc.
article x section 5. power of taxation by local government
smart communications v. city of davao, gr no. 155491, september 16, 2008
facts:
on february 18, 2002, smart filed a special civil action for declaratory relief for the ascertainment of its
rights and obligations under the tax code of the city of davao, which imposes a franchise tax on
businesses enjoying a franchise within the territorial jurisdiction of davao. smart avers that its
telecenter in davao city is exempt from payment of franchise tax to the city.
issue:
may the power of local governments to raise revenues be limited by administrative order?
held:
the power to tax by local government units emanates from section 5, article x of the constitution which
empowers them to create their own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to

such guidelines and limitations as the congress may provide. the imposition of local franchise tax is not
inconsistent with the advent of the vat, which renders functus officio the franchise tax paid to the
national government. vat inures to the benefit of the national government, while a local franchise tax is
a revenue of the local government unit.
article x section 6. share in national taxes
pimentel v. aguirre, 336 scra 201 (2000)
facts:
this is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul section 1 of administrative order no.
372, issued by president ramos, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their
expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin
respondents from implementing section 4 of the order, which withholds 10% of their internal revenue
allotments.
issue:
w/n the administrative order attempts to control local governments and to encroach on their autonomy.
held:
section 1 can be read as merely advisory and therefore cannot be proscribed as an attempt to exercise
control over local governments; section 4, however, is in contravention of sec 286 of lgc and sec 6, art
x of the constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national
internal revenue.
article x section 6. share in national taxes
province of batangas v. executive secretary, gr no. 152774, may 27, 2004
facts:
in 1998, then president estrada issued eo no. 48 establishing the program for devolution adjustment
and equalization to enhance the capabilities of lgus in the discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them through the lgc. the oversight committee under executive secretary ronaldo zamora
passed resolutions no. ocd-99-005, ocd-99-006 and ocd-99-003 which were approved by pres. estrada
on october 6, 1999. the guidelines formulated by the oversight committee required the lgus to identify
the projects eligible for funding under the portion of lgsef and submit the project proposals and other
requirements to the dilg for appraisal before the committee serves notice to the dbm for the subsequent
release of the corresponding funds. hon. herminaldo mandanas, governor of batangas, petitioned to
declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the general appropriations acts (gaas) of
1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of
p5billion for the internal revenue allotment (ira) for the local government service equalization fund
(lgsef) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.
issue:
whether the assailed provisos in the gaas of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the ocd resolutions infringe the
constitution and the lgc of 1991.
held:
yes. the assailed provisos in the gaas of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the ocd resolutions constitute a
withholding of a portion of the ira they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by
lgus and must be struck down. the entire process involving the distribution & release of the lgsef is
constitutionally impermissible. the lgsef is part of the ira or just share of the lgus in the national
taxes. sec.6, art.x of the constitution mandates that the just shareshall be automatically released to the
lgus. since the release is automatic, thelgus arent required to perform any act to receive the just
share it shall bereleased to them without need of further action. to subject its distribution &
release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos
in the gaas of 1999-2001 and the ocd resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.
article x section 6. share in national taxes
alternative center v. zamora, gr no. 144256, june 8, 2005
facts:
on august 22, 2000, a number of non-governmental organizations (ngos), peoples organization, and

three barangay officials filed a petition for certiorari against respondents challenging the
constitutionality of special provision 1 and 4, particularly the,unprogrammed funds found in the gaa of
2000. petitioners contend that such:
1.) violates the autonomy of local governments by reducing by p10 billion from the internal revenue
allotment (ira) due to local governments by placing such under unprogrammed funds;
2.) places the control of such funds to central authorities;
3.) constitutes undue delegation of legislative power to respondents
4.) constitutes an amendment of the local government code of 1991
5.) undermines the foundation of our local governance system
6.) transgresses the constitution and the local government codes prohibition on any invalid reduction
and withholding of the local governments ira.
issue:
whether or not special provision 1 and 4 of gaa for the year 2000 is unconstitutional
held:
as the constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local
governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the
executive from performing this duty. to hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional
provisions which define its duties, provided that it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the
constitution amendable by statute a proposition which is patently absurd. moreover, if it were the
intent of the framers to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of ira conditional instead of
automatic, then article x, section 6 of the constitution would have been worded to say shall be
[automatically] released to them as provided by law.
article x section 6. share in national taxes
league of cities v. comelec august 24, 2010
facts:
on november 18, 2008, the supreme court en banc struck down the subject of 16 cityhood laws for
violating section 10, article x of the 1987 constitution and the equal protection clause. on march 31,
2009, the supreme court denied respondents first motion for reconsideration. on april 28, 2009, the
supreme court denied respondents second motion for reconsideration. accordingly, the november 18
decision became final and executory. however, the court en banc, unprecedentedly reversed the
november 18 decision by upholding the constitutionality of the cityhood laws in its december 21, 2009
decision.
issue:
whether or not the 16 cityhood laws is constitutional
held:
the court held that the 16 cityhood laws is unconstitutional, stating that section 10, article x of the
constitution expressly provides that no xxx city shall be created xxx except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code. this provision can only be interpreted in one way,
that is, all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the local government
code. if the criteria in creating lgus are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to lgus. the unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws lies in the fact
that congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the constitution. in other
words, congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged cityhood law
void for being violative of the constitution.
article x section 8. term of local officials
borja v. comelec, 295 scra 157
facts:
jose t. capco, jr. was elected vice mayor of pateros on january 18, 1988 for a term ending june 30, 1992.
on september 2, 1989, he became mayor upon the death of the incumbent, cesar borja. on may 11,
1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on june 30, 1995. on may 8,
1995, he was re-elected mayor for another term of three years ending july 30, 1998. on march 27, 1998,

capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of pateros relative to the may 11, 1998 elections.
petitioner benjamin borja, jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought capcos disqualification on
the theory that the latter would already have served as mayor for three consecutive terms by june 30,
1998 and would thereafter be ineligible to serve for another term after that. the comelec ruled in favor
of capco saying that in both the constitution and the local government code, the three-term limitation
refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. it made no reference to succession
to an office to which he was not elected. capco won in the elections against borja.
issue:
whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the
remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the threeterm limit
held:
the court ruled in favor of capco. the term served must therefore be one for which the official
concerned was elected. if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply
continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. there is a
difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the house of representatives who
succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. the vice-mayor
succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. on the other hand, the representative is elected to fill the
vacancy. in a real sense, therefore, such representative serves a term for which he was elected. to
consider capco to have served the first term in full (when he succeeded the mayorship upon demise of
cesar borja) and therefore ineligible to run a third time for re-election would be not only to falsify
reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them.
hence, the petition was dismissed.
article x section 8. term of local officials
lozanida v. comelec, gr no. 135150, july 28, 1999
facts:
petitioner lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of
zambales prior to the may 1995 elections. in the may 1995 elections, he ran and was proclaimed mayor.
his proclamation however was contested by his opponent, alvez. in 1997, the rtc of zambales declared a
failure of elections. after revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots, comelec declared alvez
winner and ordered petitioner to vacate the post. in may 1998, lonzanida again ran for mayor and his
opponent filed a petition to disqualify him on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in
the same post.
issue:
w/n petitioner lonzanidas assumption of office as mayor of zambales from 1995 to may 1998 may be
considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local
government officers.
held:
no. section 8 of article x of the constitution provides that, the term of office of elective officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected. the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the may 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.
article x section 8. term of local officials
adormeo v. comelec, gr no. 147927, february 4, 2002
facts:
ramon talaga, jr. served as mayor of lucena city during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. during the
1998 elections, talaga lost to bernard g. tagarao. however, before tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a
recall electionwas conducted in may 2000 wherein talaga won and served the unexpired term of tagarao

until june 2001. when talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground he had
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit rule.
issue:
won talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full terms and he won
in 2000 recall elections.
held:
no. the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. the time between
his second term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. thus, there was no three consecutive
terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the lgc. talaga only served two consecutive full terms.
there was a disruption when he was defeated in the 1998 elections. his election during the 2000 recall
election is not a continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby
barring him for running for a fourth term. victory in the 2000 recall election is not the voluntary
renunciation contemplated by the law.
article x section 8. term of local officials
socrates v. comelec, 391 scra 457 (2002)
facts:
hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of puerto princesa city for threeconsecutive terms: in
1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, hagedorn
opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in whichsocrates ran and
eventually won. however, midway into his term, socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall
election held, hagedorn run for the formers unexpired term as mayor. socrates sought hagedorns
disqualification under the three-term limit rule.
issue:
won hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule
held:
after hagedorn ceased to be mayor on june 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall
election of september 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, socrates. from
june 30, 2001 until the recall election on september 24, 2002, the mayor of puerto princesa was
socrates. during the same period, hagedorn was simply a private citizen. this period is clearly an
interruption in the continuity of hagedorns service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation,
but because of a legal prohibition. these constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. the first
part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. the clear
intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. the second part
states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. the clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
article x section 8. term of local officials
latasa v. comelec, gr no. 154829, dec. 10, 2003
facts:
petitioner arsenio a. latasa, was elected mayor of the municipality of digos, davao del sur in the
elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. during petitioners third term, the municipality of digos was
declared a component city, to be known as the city of digos. on february 28, 2001, petitioner filed his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the may 14, 2001 elections. he stated therein that he is
eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as
mayor of the municipality of digos, and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
private respondent romeo m. sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before
the commission on elections (comelec) a petition to deny due course, cancel certificate of candidacy
and/or for disqualification against petitioner latasa. petitioner argued that this fact does not bar him
from filing a certificate of candidacy for the may 14, 2001 elections since this will be the first time that
he will be running for the post of city mayor. the comelecs first division issued a resolution cancelling

petitioners certificate of candidacy for being in violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the
1987 constitution and the local government code of 1991.
issue:
w/n latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created city of digos
immediately after serving three consecutive terms as mayor of the municipality of digos.
held:
no. latasa cannot serve as mayor of the new city of digos. latasa having been elected as mayor in 1998,
the conversion of digos from a municipality to a city in 2000 falls within his term. as digos acquired a
new corporate existence, qualifications for its elective positions also change. as a result, the office of
the municipal mayor was abolished to make way for the creation of the office of the city mayor.
however, under the charter of the city of digos, the elective officials of the municipality of digos shall
have hold-over power until a new election and the duly elected officials have assumed their office.
latasa never ceased to discharge his duties as mayor during the conversion of digos. also, although
digos was converted into a city, digos never redefined its territory, the inhabitants are the same group of
voters who elected petitioner latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. these are
also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine
years.
article x section 8. term of local officials
david v. comelec, 271 scra 90 (1997)
facts:
david, in his capacity as barangay chairman and as president of the liga ng mga barangay sa pilipinas,
filed apetition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second monday of may
1997.meanwhile, liga ng mga barangay quezon city chapter also filed a petition to seek a judicial
review bycertiorarito declare as unconstitutional: (1) section 43(c) of r.a. 7160; (2) comelec resolution
nos. 2880 and 2887fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on may 12, 1997 and other
activities related thereto; and,(3) the budgetary appropriation of p400 million contained in republic act
no. 8250 (general appropriationsact of 1997) intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the
1997 barangay elections. petitioners contend that under ra 6679, the term of office of barangay officials
is 5 years. although the lgcreduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such
reduction does not apply to barangayofficials.
issues:
which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: ra 7160 or ra 6679.
is ra 7160 in so far as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional
held:
ra7160. ra 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. it
specifically and definitively provides in its sec. 43-c that the term of office of barangay officials shall
be for three years. it is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were
elected on the second monday of may1994. with such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a
general law. yes. the constitution did not expressly prohibit congress from fixing any term of office for
barangay officials. it merely left the determination of such term to the law-making body, without any
specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the law-makers full discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies of public service. it must be remembered that every law has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality. the petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and
to show clearly the unconstitutionality they aver. constitutional commission on how long the term of
barangay officials is:as may be determined by law; more precisely, as provided for in the local
autonomy code (sec 43-c limits their term to 3 years).
article x section 8. term of local officials
montebon v. comelec, 551 scra 50
facts:
montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of tuburan, cebu in
1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. however, in january 2004, or during his second term,

montebon succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of tuburan when the incumbent vicemayor retired. when montebon filed his certificate of candidacy againas municipal councilor, a petition
for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule.
issue:
won the private respondents assumption of the vice-mayor office, by virtue of succession, can be
considered as an effective disruption in his full service of his second term as councilor.
held:
yes. while it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms,
the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption
of office as vice-mayor of tuburan on january 12, 2004. succession in local government offices is by
operation of law. the court ruled that montebons assumption of office as vice-mayor in january 2004
was an interruption of his continuity of service as councilor. the court emphasized that succession in
local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary severance from office.
since the law no less allowed montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as
vice-mayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary
renunciation of his position as councilor.
article x section 8. term of local officials
ong v. alegre, gr no. 163295, january 23, 2006
facts:
alegre and ong were candidates for mayor of san vicente, camarines norte in the may 2004 elections.
petitioner was then the incumbent mayor. on january 2004, alegre filed the petition to disqualify ong
which was predicated on the three consecutive term rule. ong ran in the may 1995, may 1998, and may
2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three
(3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.the may 1998 elections, both ong and alegre
ran for the office of mayor, with ong as the winner. alegre filed an election protest. the rtc declared
alegre as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 election, but the decision came out only when ong had
fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and starting to serve the 2001-2004 as mayor elect.
issue:
w/n petitioner ongs assumption of office for the mayoralty term 1998-2001 should be considered as
full term service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
held:
comelec resolved the question in affirmative. the three-term limit rule for local elective officials is
found in sec 8, art x of the constitution. for the three-term limit for elective local government officials
to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully
served three (3) consecutive terms.
the court hold such assumption of office constitutes, for ong, service for the full term, and should be
counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional
and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive term for the same position.
article x section 8. term of local officials
dizon v. comelec, gr no. 182088, january 30, 2009
facts:
roberto l. dizon, filed a case with the comelec to disqualify marino p. morales, the incumbent mayor of
mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous consecutive
terms in violation of section 43 of the local government code. dizon alleged that morales was municipal
mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and
qualified to run as mayor of mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998
elections. he averred that the comelec en banc affirmed the decision of the rtc declaring anthony d. dee
as the duly elected mayor of mabalacat in the 1998 elections. thus, he was not elected for the said
position in the 1998 elections. his term should be reckoned from 2001. he added that his election in

2004 is only for his second term.


dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the comelec en banc. comelec en banc: affirmed. the
three-term limit is not applicable here for: 1) morales was not the duly-elected mayor of mabalacat
for the july 1, 2004 to june 30, 2007 term primordially because he was not even considered a candidate
thereat; and 2) morales has failed to serve the entire duration of the term of office because he has
already relinquished the disputed office on may 16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to the end
of his supposed term.
issue:
won the period served by morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted from his office as
mayor on may16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term.
held:
no. in our decision promulgated on 9 may 2007, this court unseated morales during his fourth term. we
cancelled his certificate of candidacy dated 30 december 2003. this cancellation disqualified morales
from being a candidate in the may 2004 elections. the votes cast for morales were considered stray
votes. we found that morales was elected as mayor of mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1 july
1995 to 30 june 1998, 1 july 1998 to 30 june 2001, 1 july 2001 to 30 june 2004, and 1 july 2004 to 30
june 2007. we disqualified morales from his candidacy in the may 2004 elections because of the threeterm limit. although the trial court previously ruled that moralesproclamation for the 1998-2001 term
was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of morales service with respect to the 1998-2001
term because the trial courts ruling was promulgated only on 4 july 2001, or after the expiry of the
1998-2001 term.
article x section 8. term of local officials
alboin v. comelec, gr no. 184836, december 23, 2009
facts:
wilfredo f. asilo (asilo) was elected councilor of lucena city for three consecutive terms: for the 19982001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. in september 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term
of office, the sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he
then faced. this court, however, subsequently lifted the sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he
resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. in the 2007 election, asilo filed
his candidacy for the same position. petitioners sought to deny due course to asilos candidacy or to
cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms. the comelec 2nd
division ruled against petitioners and in asilos favour reasoning that the three-term limit rule did not
apply, as asilo failed to render complete service from 2004-2007 because of the suspension the
sandiganbayan had ordered.
issue:
w/n preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit.
held:
petition is meritorious. as worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office
and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. this is the first
branch of the rule embodied in section 8, article x. significantly; this provision refers to a term as a
period of time three years during which an official can serve. the preventive suspension of a local
elective official does not interrupt his term for purposes of computing the three-term limit.
article x section 8. term of local officials
david v. comelec, gr no. 127116, april 8, 1997
facts:
section 43-c of ra 7160 (lgc code of 1991), limits the term of office of barangay officials to three years.
petitioners argue that sec 8, art x of the constitution, by excepting barangay officials whose terms
shall be determined by law from the general provision fixing the term of elective local officials at
three years, impliedly prohibits congress from legislating a three-year term for such officers.
issue:
w/n section 43-c of ra 7160 is unconstitutional.

held:
undoubtedly, the constitution did not expressly prohibit congress from fixing any term of office for
barangay officials. it merely left the determination of such term to the law making body, without any
specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the law-makers full discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies of public service. the answer of the constitutional commission wasas
may be determined by law; more precisely, as provided for in local government code. and the local
autonomy code, in its sec 43-c, limits their term to three years.
article x section 9. sectoral representatives
supangan jr. v. santos, gr no. 84662, august 24, 1990
facts:
petitioner supanganwas elected kb chairman of mabini, pangasinan and was elected kb provincial
federation president of the province of pangasinan. petitioner was appointed by president marcos as
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan of pangasinan representing the youth sector. respondent
domantay presented a letter written by respondent secretary santos advising the body that respondent
domantay has been named as member thereof to replace supangan. petitioner contends that secretary
santos hand no authority in appointing domantay, because the latter is not qualified.
issue:
whether or not the the appointment of domantay by the sec santos, replacing supangan is valid.
held:
supangan, having all the qualifications, was appointed by the president to his position. domantay, not
having the qualifications, who was appointed by sec. santos is not valid. president is the one who
makes appointments for sectoral representatives. sec. of local government can only inform the sectoral
representatives their appointments
article x section 10. creation, abolition, change of boundaries
tan v. comelec, 142 scra 727 (1986)
facts:
this case was prompted by the enactment of batas pambansa blg. 885, an act creating a new province in
the island of negros to be known as the province of negros del norte, effective dec. 3, 1985. (cities of
silay, cadiz and san carlos and the municipalities of calatrava, taboso, escalante, sagay, manapla,
victorias, e.r. magalona, and salvador benedicto proposed to belong to the new province). pursuant to
and in implementation of this law, the comelec scheduled a plebiscite for january 3, 1986. petitioners
opposed, filing a case for prohibition and contending that the b.p. 885 is unconstitutional and not in
complete accord with the local government code because:
1. the voters of the parent province of negros occidental, other than those living within the territory of
the new province of negros del norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
2. the area which would comprise the new province of negros del norte would only be about 2,856.56
sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, sec. 197 of lgc.
issue:
w/n the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisite under article xi, sec 3 of the
1973 constitution which states that no province, city, municipality or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the lgc, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected.
held:
no. whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first
be obtained. the creation of the proposed new province of negros del norte will necessarily result in the
division and alteration of the existing boundaries of negros occidental. plain and simple logic will
demonstrate that two political units would be affected. the first would be the parent province of negros
occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. the other affected entity would be
composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province

of negros del norte.the remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. the
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic
effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.
article x section 10. creation, abolition, change of boundaries
league of cities of the philippines v. comelec, gr 176951, nov. 29, 2008
facts:
during the 12th congress, ra 9009 was enacted amending sec 450 of the lgc by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city. after the effectivity of said act, the
house of representatives adopted joint resolution no. 29 which sought to exempt from the income
requirement of ra 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11 th
congress. however, the senate failed to approve the joint resolution. following the advice of sen.
pimentel, 16 municipalities filed through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills, which
contained same provision exempting all 16 municipalities from the income requirement. the bills were
approved by the house of representative and senate which then lapsed to cityhood laws without the
presidents signature. the cityhood laws direct the comelec to hold plebiscite to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve the conversion.
issue:
w/n the cityhood laws violated section 10 of article x of the constitution.
held:
the cityhood laws is unconstitutional. the constitution requires that congress shall prescribe all the
criteria for the creation of a city in the local government code and not in any other law, including
cityhood laws. the criteria prescribed in sec 450 of the local government code, as amended by ra 9009
are clear, plain, and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. the intent of
members of the 11th congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of ra 9009 remained
an intent and was never written into section 450 of the local government code. lastly, even if the
exemption in the cityhood laws were written in section 450 of the local government code, the
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
article x section 10. creation, abolition, change of boundaries
sema v. comelec, 558 scra 700
facts:
a law (ra 9054) was passed amending armms organic act and vesting it with power to create provinces,
municipalities, cities and barangays. pursuant to this law, the armm regional assembly created shariff
kabunsuan (muslim mindanao autonomy act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st
district of maguindanao with the exception of cotabato city. for the purposes of the 2007 elections,
comelec initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of cotabato city (because of mma 201).
but it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the
elections, the first district should be called shariff kabunsuan with cotabato city. later, sema was
contending that cotabato city should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be
excluded in the voting. she contended that under the constitution, upon creation of a province (s.
kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since s. kabunsuan
excludes cotabato city so in effect cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the hor.
issues:
whether or not ra 9054 is unconstitutional?
whether or not armm can create validly lgus?
held:
ra 9054 is unconstitutional. the creation of local government units is governed by section 10, article x
of the constitution. thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. first, the creation of a local government
unit must follow the criteria fixed in the local government code. second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the constitution. third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a

province, once created, should have at least one representative in the hor. note further that in order to
have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. cotabato city did not
meet the population requirement so semas contention is untenable. on the other hand, armm cannot
validly create the province of s. kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. but this can never
be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in congress. at most,
what armm can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
article x section 10. creation, abolition, change of boundaries
camid v. office of the president, gr no. 161414, january 17, 2005
facts:
the municipality of andong, lanao del sur, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is actually insisted
by some as alive and thriving. the creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by
the supreme court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that andong thrives on and, hence,
its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation.then president diosdado macapagal issued
several executive orders creating 33 municipalities in mindanao citing his powers under sec.68 of the
revised admin. code. then vp emmanuel pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition
alleging that the eos were null and void, sec. 68 having been repealed by ra 2370, and said orders
constituting an undue delegation of legislative power. after due deliberation, the sc ruled that the
challenged eos were null and void since sec. 68 of the revised admin. code did not meet the well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. among the eos
annulled was eo 107 which created the municipality of andong. petitioner represents himself as a
current resident of andong and alleged that andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality
with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its
constituents, despite the fact that no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the
local government offices of andong since 1968.
issue:
whether the judicial annulment of the municipality of andong continues despite the petitioners
allegation that andong has thrived into a full-blown municipality
held:
municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed
and exercised corporate functions with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without
interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. the question as to
whether a municipality previously annulled by the supreme court may attain recognition in the absence
of any curative/re-implementing statute has never been decided before. the effect of sec. 442(d) of the
local government code on municipalities such as andong warrants explanation. sec. 442(d) of the lgc
does not serve to affirm/reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities which had been previously
created by presidential issuances/eos. the provisions only affirms the legal personalities of those
municipalities which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate
enough not to have been judicially annulled. on the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved
remain inexistent unless recreated through specific legislative enactments.
article x section 10. creation, abolition, change of boundaries
navarro v. executive secretary, gr no. 180050, february 10, 2010
facts:
this is petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the rules of court seeking to nullify republic act (r.a.) no.
9355, otherwise known as an act creating the province of dinagat islands, for being unconstitutional.
when the dinagat islands was proclaimed a new province on december 3, 2006, it had an official
population of only 106,951 based on the 2000 census of population conducted by the national statistics
office (nso). clearly the population is short of the statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
moreover, the land area of the province failed to comply with the statutory requirement of 2,000 square
kilometers. petitioners allege that the creation of the dinagat islands as a new province, if uncorrected,
perpetuates an illegal act of congress.
issue:

whetheror not ra 9355 complied with the constitution and statutory requirements of the local
government code of 1991.
held:
the court ruled that ra 9355 is declared unconstitutional. the proclamation of the province of dinagat
islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared null and void. the provision in article 9 (2)
of the rules and regulations implementing the local government code of 1991 stating, "the land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is
declared null and void
article x section 11. metropolitan political subdivisions
mmda v. bel-air village association assoc., gr no. 135962, march 27, 2000
facts:
respondent received a letter of request from petitioner to open neptune street of bel-air village for the
use of public. the said opening of neptune street will be for the safe and convenient movement of
persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in makati city. this was pursuant to mmda law or republic act
no. 7924. on the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision and kalayaan avenue would be demolished. respondent claimed that the mmda had no
authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the respondent. petitioner appealed the
decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open neptune street to public traffic
because it is an agent of the state that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in
metro manila.
issue:
whether or not the mmda has the mandate to open neptune street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers
held:
the court held that the mmda does not have the capacity to exercise police power. police power is
primarily lodged in the national legislature. however, police power may be delegated to government
units. petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. therefore, the
mmda cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. it is not a legislative unit of
the government. republic act no. 7924 does not empower the mmda to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of manila. there is no
syllable in the said act that grants mmda police power. it is an agency created for the purpose of laying
down policies and coordinating with various national government agencies, peoples organizations,
non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
article x section 11. metropolitan political subdivisions
mmda v. garin, gr no. 130230, april 15, 2005
facts:
respondent garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (tvr) and his drivers license was confiscated for
parking illegally. garin wrote to then mmda chairman prospero oreta requesting the return of his license
and expressed his preference for his case to be file in court. without an immediate reply from the
chairman, garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that sec 5 (f) of ra 7924
violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing mmda
to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. rtc rule in his favor, directing mmda to
return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating drivers license without first giving
the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.
issue:
whether of not sec 5(f) of ra 7924 which authorizes mmda to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
license in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional
held:
the mmda is not vested with police power. it was concluded that mmda is not a local government unit
of a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the

welfare of the community. there is no provision in ra 7924 that empowers mmda or its council to enact
ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of metro
manila. it is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, peoples organizations, ngos and private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of services. all its functions are administrative in nature.
article x section 11. metropolitan political subdivisions
gancayco v. city government of quezon city, 658 scra 853
facts:
the mmda then sent a notice of demolition to justice gancayco alleging that a portion of his building
violated the national building code of the philippines in relation to ordinance no. 2904. he did not
comply with the notice. thelma then proceeded to demolish the party wall of the ground floor structure.
the city government of quezon city claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power,
regulating the use of property in a business zone. justice gancayco filed a petition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. the rtc ruled that the ordinance was
unconstitutional. the court of appeals reversed the rtcs decision and ruled that the ordinance was a
valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its
constituents pursuant to its police powers.
issue:
did mmda resolution no. 02-28, validly empower the mmda to demolish justice gancaycos property
held:
no. the supreme court held that the power to enforce the provisions of the building code was lodged in
the department of public works and highways, not in mmda. since there was no evidence that the mmda
had been delegated by the dpwh to implement the building code, it necessarily had no authority to carry
out the demolition. additionally, the penalty prescribed by ordinance no. 2904 itself does not include
the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. instead, it merely prescribes a
punishment of a fine or by imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court. the ordinance itself
clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the
ordinance.
article x section 12. highly urbanized cities, component cities
abella v. comelec, gr no. 100710, september 3, 1991
facts:
a petition was filed against larrazabal for disqualification from running as governor of leyte on the
ground that she was a resident of ormoc city and not of kananga, leyte as stated in her certificate of
candidacy. failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered voter of kananga, leyte, she
posed an alternative position that her being a registered voter in ormoc city was no impediment to her
candidacy for the position of governor of the province of leyte. under sec. 12, art. x of the constitution,
ormoc city is considered independent of the province of leyte to which it is geographically attached
because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. larrazabal
argued that such prohibition does not extend to running for provincial offices.
issue:
whether or not the prohibition against the city's registered voters electing the provincial officials
necessarily mean a prohibition of these registered voters to be elected as provincial officials.
held:
it does. this independence from the province stated in sec. 12 of art. x carries with it the prohibition or
mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices.
article x section 15. autonomous regions
abas kida v. senate of the philippines, gr no. 196271, october 18, 2011
facts:
on june 30, 2011, republic act (ra) no. 10153, entitled an act providing for the synchronization of the
elections in the autonomous region in muslim mindanao (armm) with the national and local elections
and for other purposes was enacted.the law reset the armm elections from the 8th of august 2011, to

the second monday of may 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys
regular national and local elections. the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of ra no. 10153.
issue:
w/n ra 10153 violates the autonomy granted to armm.
held:
no. the law is constitutional.the constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one mandate should not
be given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear.while
autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the constitution never equated
autonomy with independence. the armm as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger
framework of the state and is still subject to the national policies set by the national government, save
only for those specific areas reserved by the constitution for regional autonomous determination.in
other words, the autonomy granted to the armm cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and
concerns. since the synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the
armm is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the armm cannot be used to exempt the region
from having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the constitution.
article x sections 18 and19. organic act for autonomous regions
abbas v. comelec, 179 scra 287 (1989)
facts:
in 1987, the constitution was ratified which, for the first time, provided for the creation of autonomous
regions in muslim mindanao and the cordilleras. pursuant to that, republic act no6734, entitled "an act
providing for an organic act for the autonomous region in muslim mindanao was enacted on 1 august
1989. the plebiscite involving thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in mindanao and palawan is set
for 19 november 1990.
issue:
whether or not the approval of the organic act automatically creates the autonomous region
held:
no. the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect only if the organic act is approved
by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite.
article x sections 18 and19. organic act for autonomous regions
ordillos v. comelec, 192 scra 100 (1990)
facts:
on january 30, 1990, a plebiscite washeld in the cordilleras pursuant to republic act no. 6766 which
provided for the organic act for the cordillera administrative region. consequently, comelec issued
resolution no. 2259stating that the organic act for the region has been approved and subsequently
reiterated in a memorandum by the secretary of justice to the president with only the province of ifugao
comprising the region.
issue:
whether or not the province of ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation
of the cordillera autonomous region can, alone legally and validly constitute such region.
held:
no. article x, section 15 of the 1987 constitution connotes that a region, as in the case of the cordillera
administrative region, shall consist of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas, that is,
to be made up of more than one constituent unit. furthermore, the abbas case is not applicable in the
case at bar for it laid down the rule on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in the constitution and never dealt on the
issue on whether an autonomous region could exist despite the fact that only one province or city is to
constitute it. moreover, ra 6766, the organic act which was the subject of the referendum, contains itself
provisions which can be implemented only if the new political entity would consist of more than one
province
article x sections 18 and19. organic act for autonomous regions
badua v. cba, 194 scra 101 (1991)

facts:
july 1989, the petitioner spouses were forcibly ejected from the land by virtue of a "decision" of the
maeng tribal court under the cordillera bodong administration in case no. o, entitled "david quema vs.
leonor badua."the case stemmed from david quema, respondent, mortgaged two parcels of land to
dr.erotida valera whom he redeemed 22 years later through her heirs. the petitioners, on the other hand,
claimed that the said properties were sold to her by dr. valera but was unable to produce the titles to
prove the same.
issue:
whether or not a tribal court of the cordillera bodong administration can render a valid executor
decision in a land dispute
held:
no. in the plebiscite that was held on january 23, 1990 pursuant to republic act 6766, the creation of the
cordillera autonomous region was rejected by all the provinces and city of the cordillera region, except
ifugao province, hence, the cordillera autonomous region did not come to be. as a logical consequence
of that judicial declaration, the cordillera bodong administration created under section 13 of executive
order no. 220, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the
cordillera region do not exist.
article x sections 18 and19. organic act for autonomous regions
cordillera broad coalition v. coa, gr no. 82217, jan. 29, 1990
facts:
the constitutionality of executive order no. 220, dated july 15, 1987, which created the (cordillera
administrative region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic
act by the congress and the creation of' the autonomous region in the cordilleras conditional on the
approval of the act through a plebiscite.
issue:
w/n the creation of car contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces
which compose car.
held:
no. it cannot be over-emphasized that pure speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient to
cause the invalidation of e.o. no. 220.
the creation of autonomous regions in muslim mindanao and the cordilleras, which is peculiar to the
1987 constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy
these regions. thus, the provision in the constitution for an autonomous regional government with a
basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [art. x, sec. 18].
the car is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for
the cordilleras. it fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial
and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous
region vested with political autonomy.
article x sections 18 and19. organic act for autonomous regions
pandi v. ca, gr no. 116850, april 11, 2002
facts:
macacua, regional director and secretary of doh of armm, issued a memorandum designating pandi who
was then the asst. regional secretary as oic of the ipho-apgh, lanaodel sur. in the same memorandum,
macacua detailed dr.sani, then the provincial health officer of the ipho-apgh, lanaodel sur to doh-armm
regional office in cotabato city. thereafter, the governor issued an order designating saber also an oic of
the ipho-apgh, lanaodel sur.sani challenged the memorandum claiming that he was appointed as
provincial health officer in a permanent capacity.
saber filed a petition for quo warranto with a prayer for injunction claiming that he was the lawfully
designated oic. pres. ramos issued an order transferring the powers and functions of the doh in the
region to the regional government of armm. macacua issued a 2nd memorandum reiterating the

designation of dr.pandi as oic of the ipho-apgh and the detail of dr.sani to the regional office in cotabato
city.pandi and macacua sought the dismissal of sabers petition on the ground that it had become moot
and academic because of the enactment of the armm lgc, as well as the execution of the moa between
the doh- national govt and the armm regional govt. ca upheld the designation of dr.saber as oic. the
provincial governor has the power to appoint the provincial health officer under the lgc 1991; dr.sani
cannot claim to have permanent designation as provincial health officer because he was not appointed
by the provincial governor.
issue:
how may any provision of the organic act be amended
held:
an ordinary statute, whether general or special, cannot amend an organic act that provides for an
autonomous region which under the constitution may only be created, and therefore changed, through a
plebiscite called for the purpose.under section 3, article xviii of the organic act of 1989, any
amendment to the organic act required the approval of a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose within the constituent units of the armm.section 3, article xviii of the organic act of
1989 provides:"any amendment to or revision of this organic act shall become effective only when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not
earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or
revision."unless this amendatory process is followed, no subsequent law can amend or revise the
organic act of 1989. in any event, with respect to the appointment and assignment of provincial health
officers, the revised administrative code did not change the existing law applicable to the armm under
the organic act of 1989.saber as oic is declared void and the assignment of sani to doh-armm regional
office is valid.
article x sections 18 and19. organic act for autonomous regions
sema v. comelec, gr no. 177597, july 16, 2008
facts:
the armm regional assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under sec.19, art.vi of ra 9054,
enacted muslim mindanao autonomy act no. 201 (mma act 201) creating the province of shariff
kabunsuan in the first district of maguindanao. the sangguniang panlungsod of cotabato city passed
resolution no. 3999 requesting the comelec to clarify the status of cotabato city in view of the
conversion of the first district of maguindanao into a regular province under mma act 201.in an
answer to cotabato citys query, the comelec issued resolution no. 07-0407 maintaining the status quo
with cotabato city as part of shariff kabunsuan in the first legislative district of maguindanao.however,
in preparation for the elections, the comelec promulgated resolution no. 7845 stating that
maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of cotabato city because of the enactment of
mma act no. 201. the comelec issued resolution no. 7902 amending resolution no. 07-0407 by renaming
the legislative district in question as shariff kabunsan province with cotabato city.
issue:
may the armm regional assembly create a province
held:
no. only congress can create provinces because creating a province necessarily involves creating a
legislative district which only congress can do. sec.19, art.vi of ra 9054 is unconstitutional, insofar as it
grants to the armm regional assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to sec.
5 of art.vi and sec.20 of art. x of the constitution, as well as sec.3 of the ordinance appended to the
constitution.
article x section 20. legislative powers of the autonomous regions
province of north cotabato v. government of the philippines peace panel, 568 scra 492
facts:
the memorandum of agreement on the ancestral domain brought about by the government of the
philippines and the milf as an aspect of the tripoli agreement of peace was petitioned for mandamus
and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining

order. the agreement mentions bangsamoro juridical entity (bje) to which it grants the authority and
jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction
over all natural resources within internal waters. the agreement is composed of two local statutes: the
organic act for autonomous region in muslim mindanao and the indigenous peoples rights act (ipra).
issue:
w/n the moa-ad brought by the grp and milf is constitutional.
held:
no. the moa-ad is unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution
thereof. on the premise that the bje may be regarded as an autonomous region, the moa-ad would
require an amendment that would expand the provision of article x, sec 20 (9), such other matters as
may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. the
mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph no. 9 of said constitutional provision would
not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the bje the powers found in the moa-ad must, itself,
comply with other provisions of the constitution.
article xi section 1. public office
bornasal, jr. v. montes, 280 scra 181 (1997)
facts:
petitioner, clerk of court, charged respondent deputy sheriff with certain unauthorized acts relative to a
petition for extra judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage which was lodged at petitioners office, by
virtue of act no. 3115, as amended allowing extra judicial foreclosure sales under the direction of
petitioner, as ex-officio sheriff. respondent deputy sheriff categorically admitted all the accusations
made by the petitioner against him.
issue:
w/n the respondent acted violative of the norms of public accountability.
held:
it is well to remind all persons serving the government through its judicial arm that the conduct and
behaviour of every person connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is tasked
with a heavy burden of responsibility. his conduct at all times must not only be characterized by
prosperity and decorum but above all, suspicion.
article xi section 3. procedure for impeachment
in re gonzales, 160 scra 771 (1988)
facts:
gonzales was the tanodbayan or special prosecutor. he forwarded a letter-complaint to justice fernan.
the letter was said to be from concerned employees of the sc. the letter was originally addressed to
gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought by mr. miguel cuenco against justice fernan,
and asking gonzales to do something about it.
the supreme court furnished a copy to gonzales, the percuriam resolution of the sc, dismissing the
charges made by cuenco against justice fernan for lack of merit. in that resolution, cuenco was asked to
show cause why he should not be held administratively liable for making serious accusations against
fernan.
issue:
w/n a supreme court justice can be disbarred during his term of office
held:
pursuant to article xi, sec 2 of the 1987 constitution, a member of the supreme court can only be
removed by impeachment and cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such
public officer.another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under
the constitution, members of the sc may be removed only by impeachment. the above provision
proscribes removal from office by any other method. otherwise, to allow such public officer who may
be removed solely byimpeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an office that
carries the penalty of removal from office would be violative of the clear mandate of the constitution.
article xi section 3. procedure for impeachment

romulo v. yniguez, 141 scra 260 (1986)


facts:
petitioners, representing more than 1/5 of the batasan, called for the impeachment of pres. marcos
together with a verified complaint for impeachment. the resolution and complaint were referred by the
speaker to the committee on justice, hr and good government which found the complaint not sufficient
in form and substance. it dismissed all the charges and sent to the archives.they allege that the
provisions of the rules of procedure, sections 4, 5, 6, and 8 thereof are unconstitutional because they
amend sec. 3 of article xii of the 1973 constitution by empowering a smaller body to supplant and
overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all the members of the bp and that
said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings by vesting the committee the power to
impeach or not to impeach when such prerogative belongs to the bp as a collegiate body.respondents
contend that the petition should be dismissed because it is a suit against the batasan itself which the
court has no jurisdiction; even supposing that the rules are invalid, batsan has the power to dismiss
impeachment complaint even without the benefit of said rules; and the court cannot compel batasan to
give due course to the impeachment complaint.
issue:
whether or not the court can interfere with the batasans power of impeachment
held:
no. the dismissal of said petition is within the ambit of the powers vested exclusively in the batasan by
express provision of sec. 2, article xiii of the constitution and it is not within the competence of this
court to inquire whether in the exercise of said power the batasan acted wisely. there is no allegation in
the petition for certiorari that in the exercise of its powers the batasan had violated any provision of the
constitution.the batasan pursuant to its power to adopt rules of its proceedings (article viii, sec. 8), may
adopt, as it did adopt, necessary rules of procedure to govern impeachment proceedings. the rules it
adopted providing for dismissal of a complaint for impeachment which is not sufficient in form or
substance, or when sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or probable cause has not been
established, or requiring a majority vote of all members of the batasan for the approval of the resolution
setting forth the articles of impeachment, are not inconsistent with the provision of section 3 of article
xiii of the 1973 constitution.
article xi section 3. procedure for impeachment
francisco v. house of representatives, 415 scra 44
facts:
president estrada filed an impeachment complaint against chief justice davide for culpable violation of
the constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. the house committee on justice ruled
that the impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form, "but voted to dismiss the same on october 22,
2003 for being insufficient in substance. a day after dismissing the first impeachment complaint, a 2nd
complaint was filed against davide based on the investigation of fund disbursement of jdf under davide.
petitions were filed to declare the 2nd impeachment unconstitutional for it violates the provision that no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated twice against the same official. petitions also claim that the
legislative inquiry into the administration by the chief justice of the jdf infringes on the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary. senator aquilino q. pimentel, jr., in his own behalf, filed a motion to
intervene and comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and
jurisdiction of the senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the
one where the chief justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of
article xi of the constitution." petitioners plea for the sc to exercise the power of judicial review to
determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
issue:
w/n judicial review power extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.
held:

power of judicial review is the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable. judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers,
forms the bedrock of republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only
for the benefit of the people for which it serves. separation of powers is not absolute. the sc is the final
arbiter to determine if acts by the legislature and the executive are in violation of the constitution.
moreover, the power of judicial review is expressly stated in the constitution. *2nd impeachment
complaint against chief justice davide is unconstitutional.
article xi section 3. procedure for impeachment
estrada v. desierto, 353 scra 452 (2001); mr, 356 scra 108 (2001)
facts:
petitioner cites art. xi, section 3, paragraph 7of the constitution which provides thatjudgement in cases of impeachment shall not extend further then removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the republic of the philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. petitioner
argues that the purpose of the provision allowing subsequent prosecution and trial of a party convicted
in an impeachment trial is precisely to preclude a plea of double jeopardy by the accused in the event
he is convicted in the impeachment trial.
issue:
whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution
held:
it is untenable for the petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before
he can be prosecuted. his prosecution in the sandiganbayan for the same offense for which he was
impeached cannot be barred.in the first place, the impeachment proceedings against petitioner were
terminated for being functus officio, since the primary purpose of impeachment is the removal of
respondent from office and his disqualification to hold any other office under the government.in the
second place, the public official convicted in an impeachment trial is nevertheless subject to criminal
prosecution because the penalty which can be meted out on him cannot exceed removal from office and
disqualification to hold office in the future. consequently, where, as in this case, the impeachment
proceedings did not result in petitioners conviction, there can be no objection to his subsequent trial
and conviction in a criminal case. hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal,
resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts.
article xi section 3. procedure for impeachment
gutierrez v. committee on justice, 643 scra 198
facts:
private respondents risa hontiveros-baraquel, danilo lim and spouses pestao (baraquel group) filed an
impeachment complaint against gutierrez upon endorsement of party-list representatives walden bello
and arlene bag-ao. subsequently, (reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint against herein
petitioner endorsed by representatives colmenares, casio, mariano, ilagan, tinio and de jesus. hor
provisionally adopted the rules of procedure on impeachment proceedings of the 14th congress and hor
sec-gen transmitted the complaint to house speaker belmonte who then, on august 9, directed the
committee on rules to include it in the order of business. after hearing, hcoj by resolution of september
1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form. then, on 7 september 2010, the hcoj found the two
complaints hich both allege culpable violation of the constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient
in substance. petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging resolutions of
september 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and that these violated the one-year bar
rule on initiating impeachment proceedings.
issue:
whether the belated publication of the rules of procedure of impeachment proceedings of the 15th
congress denied due process to the petitioner?

held:
the impeachment rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there
must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance requirement is met if there is a
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee
the constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of promulgating the rules. impeachment is
primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.
article xi section 4. sandiganbayan
lecaroz v. sandiganbayan, 128 scra 324 (1984)
facts:
francisco, mayor of marinduque and son lenlie, kb chair and sb member, were charged with 13 counts
of estafa through falsification of public documents. it was alleged that francisco did not recognize
appointment of red as new kb chair in matalaba and sb member. and that it was alleged that leslie
continued to receive salary even after his term has expired. they were convicted by sandiganbayan.
issue:
is the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt
practices of public officers
held:
section 5 of article xiii (1973) gave to the legislature broad discretion to grant jurisdiction to the
sandiganbayan not only over graft and corrupt practices but also over such other offenses committed
by public officers and employees, including those in government owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by law. pursuant to this, broad powers were given to the
sandiganbayan through pd no. 1486.
article xi section 4. sandiganbayan
defensor-santiago, 356 scra 636 (2001)
facts:
this court is called upon to review the act of the sandiganbayan and how far it can go, in ordering the
ninety-day preventive suspension of petitioner, then commissioner of commission of immigration and
deportation (cid), in connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of ra
3019, otherwise known as anti-graft and corruption practices act.
issue:
whether or not the sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension
held:
sandiganbayan has the authority to do so.pursuant to republic act no. 3019, it does not exclude from its
coverage the members of congress and that, therefore, the sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing
the assailed preventive suspension order.in issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the
sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the court has, more than once, upheld sandiganbayans authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
article xi section 4. sandiganbayan
balmadrid v. sandiganbayan, gr no. 58327, march 22, 1991
facts:
maximo binos and teodulo alcantara were superintendent and cashier, respectively of catanduanes
agricultural and industrial college (caic) located at panganiban, catanduanes. petitioners-spouses
balmadrid were suppliers of school and construction materials. binos and alcantara were personally
indebted to spouses. they told petitioners that they could pay them in the shortest possible time only if
they would cooperate in a scheme through which funds of caic would be withdrawn to pay the debt. so,
they issued 4 checks of the caic payable to mila balmadrid, in payment of ghost and/or fictitious
deliveries of supplies and materials purportedly for the use of said institution. sandiganbayan rendered
a decision and found binos, alcantara and the petitioners-spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt. binos
and alcantara failed to appeal and were sentenced accordingly. petitioners, on the other hand filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

issue:
whether or not the sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the spouses being private individuals
held:
yes. private persons may be charged together with public officers to avoid repeated and unnecessary
presentation of witnesses and exhibits against conspirators in different venues, especially if the issue
involved are the same. it follows therefore that if a private person may be tried jointly with public
officers, he may also be jointly convicted with them.
article xi section 4. sandiganbayan
azarcon v. sandiganbanyan, gr no. 116033, february 26, 1997
facts:
petitioner alfredo azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. his
services were contracted by picop. occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like jaime
ancla whose trucks were left at the formers premises.
on may 25, 1983, a warrant of distraint of personal property was issued by bir commanding one of its
regional directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of jaime ancla, a
sub-contractor of accused azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. a warrant of garnishment was issued to
and subsequently signed by accused azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit
to bir the property in his possession owned by ancla. azarcon then volunteered himself to act as
custodian of the truck owned by ancla. after some time, azarcon wrote a letter to the reg. dir of bir
stating that while he had made representations to retain possession of the property of ancla, he thereby
relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since ancla surreptitiously withdrew
his equipment from him. in his reply, the bir reg. dir. said that azarcons failure to comply with the
provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility. along with his co-accused,
azarcon was charged before the sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or
property. on march 8, 1994, the sandiganbayan rendered a decision sentencing the accused to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17
yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was
subsequently denied by sandiganbayan.
issue:
whether or not sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by bir as a custodian
of distained property.
held:
sc held that the sandiganbayans decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
sec. 4 of pd 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan. it was specified therein that the
only instances when the sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the
complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction. the information does no
charge petitioner azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer
committing an offense under the sandiganbayans jurisdiction. thus, unless the petitioner be proven a
public officer, sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.
article xi section 5. ombudsman
carandang v. desierto, 639 scra 293
facts:
roberto s. benedicto was a stockholder of rpn, a private corporation duly registered with the securities
and exchange commission. in march 1986, the government ordered the sequestration of rpn's
properties, assets, and business. on november 3, 1990, the pcgg entered into a compromise agreement
with benedicto, whereby he ceded to the government, through the pcgg, all his shares of stock in rpn.
consequently, upon motion of the pcgg, the sandiganbayan directed the president and corporate
secretary of rpn to transfer to the pcgg benedicto's shares representing 72.4% of the total issued and
outstanding capital stock of rpn.
however, benedicto moved for a reconsideration, contending that his rpn shares ceded to the

government, through the pcgg, represented only 32.4% of rpn's outstanding capital stock, not 72.4%.
benedicto's motion for reconsideration has remained unresolved to this date. carandang sought the
dismissal of the administrative charge on the ground that the ombudsman had no jurisdiction over him
because rpn was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation.
issue:
wether or not carandang is a public official considering that rpn was not a government-owned or
-controlled corporation; and that, consequently, the ombudsman and the sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over him.
held:
we find the petitions to be meritorious. it is not disputed that the ombudsman has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving grave misconduct committed by the officials and employees of
government-owned or -controlled corporations; and that the sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try and
decide criminal actions involving violations of r.a. 3019 committed by public officials and employees,
including presidents, directors and managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations. the
respective jurisdictions of the respondents are expressly defined and delineated by the law.it is clear,
therefore, that a corporation is considered a government-owned or -controlled corporation only when
the government directly or indirectly owns or controls at least a majority or 51% share of the capital
stock. applying this statutory criterion then, the rpn is not a gocc.
article xi section 5. ombudsman
lacson v. es, 649 scra 142
facts:
leven persons believed to be members of the kuratong baleleng gang, were slain by elements of the
anti-bank robbery and intelligence task group (abritg). among those included in the abritg were
petitioners and petitioner-intervenors. acting on a media expose of spo2 eduardo delos reyes, a member
of the criminal investigation command that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not
a shoot-out between the kuratong baleleng gang members and the abritg, ombudsman aniano desierto
formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. said panel found the incident as a
legitimate police operation. however, a review board modified the panels finding and recommended
the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged
as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. after a reinvestigation, the
ombudsman filed amended informations before the sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only
as an accessory.
issue:
issue: whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the kuratong baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused pnp officers which is essential to the determination
whether the case falls within the sandiganbayans or regional trial courts jurisdiction.
held:
petitioner and intervenors posture that sections 4 and 7 of r.a. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. no concrete evidence and convincing argument
were presented to warrant such a declaration. every classification made by the law is presumed
reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. the classification
is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.
paragraph a. of section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and
under the transitory provision in section 7, to all cases pending in any court. contrary to petitioner
and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the kuratong baleleng cases. the
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the sandiganbayan but also in any court.
article xi section 5. ombudsman
people v. morales, 649 scra 182

facts:
this is a case regarding the validity of the organization of philippine centennial expo 98 corporation or
expocorp by the national centennial commission (ncc) and the bases conversion development authority
(bcda). this corporation is formed for the purpose of operating, administering, managing and
developing the philippine centennial international exposition of 1998. several allegations of anomalies
rained against the said corporation, among them the lack of public bidding. upon recommendation of
the senate blue ribbon committee and the ahicc, the office of the ombudsman conducted a more
exhaustive investigation of the corporation. as a result of the investigation, the ombudsman fact-finding
and investigation bureau filed a case against luis j. morales. morales contends among others that
philippine centennial expo 98 corporation is not under the power of the ombudsman.
issue:
whether or not the philippine centennial expo 98 corporation is under the authority of the office of the
ombudsman.
held:
no, the philippine centennial expo 98 corporation is not under the authority of the office of the
ombudsman. the said corporation was not incorporated through a special law but through the
corporation code. also, 55.16% of the capital stocks of the corporation is owned by a private
corporation and only the remaining shares representing the minority is owned by the bcda which
represents the government. a government owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the
government, or, in case of stock corporations, at least majority of the capital stocks must be owned by
the government. the said corporation is a private corporation and not a government owned or controlled
corporation; hence, it is beyond the power of the ombudsman over government owned or controlled
corporation.
article xi section 5. ombudsman
quarto v. marcelo, 658 scra 580
facts:
sometime in 2000, showing willingness to testify against the criminal syndicate that allegedly ran the
tax credit scam at the dof one-stop shop, mercado applied with the department of justice (doj) for
immunity as state witness under its witness protection program. on june 5, 2000 the doj favorably acted
on the application and granted immunity to mercado. still, since the investigation of the case fell within
the authority of the office of the ombudsman (ombudsman), the latter charged him and the other
respondents before the sandiganbayans fourth division. mercado filed a motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation before the ombudsman, citing the dojs grant of immunity to him. acting favorably on
the motion, on september 4, 2003 the ombudsman executed an immunity agreement with mercado. the
agreement provided that, in consideration for granting him immunity from suit, mercado would
produce all relevant documents in his possession and testify against the accused in all the cases,
criminal or otherwise, that may be filed against them. accordingly, on the same date, the ombudsman
filed a motion to discharge mercado from the information involving him.
but on april 30, 2008 the sandiganbayan issued a resolution, denying the ombudsmans motion. that
court held that the pieces of evidence adduced during the hearing of the ombudsmans motion failed to
establish the conditions required under section 17, rule 119 of the rules of court for the discharge of an
accused as a state witness. the ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration but the court denied it on
november 6, 2008, hence, this petition of the people of the philippines.
issue:
whether or not the sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to recognize the immunity
from criminal prosecution that the ombudsman granted respondent mercado and, as a result, in
declining to discharge him from the information as a state witness.
ruling:
we dismiss the petition for lack of merit.as a general rule, the court does not interfere with the office of
the ombudsmans exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and

independence inherent in the office of the ombudsman which, beholden to no one, acts as the champion
of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.
article xi section 6. appointments
ombudsman v. csc, gr no. 162215, july 20, 2007
facts:
ombudsman simeon v. marcelo wrote a letter dated july 28, 2003 to the civil service commission (csc),
requesting the approval of the amendment of qualification standards for director ii positions in the
central administrative service and finance and management service of the office of the ombudsman.
the csc issued opinion no. 44, s. 2004 disapproving the request on the ground that director ii position,
being third level eligibility, is covered by the career executive service. the office of the ombudsman,
thus, filed a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside and nullify csc opinion no. 44, s. 2004.the office
of the ombudsman asserts that its specific, exclusive and discretionary constitutional and statutory
power as an independent constitutional body to administer and supervise its own officials and
personnel, including the authority to administer competitive examinations and prescribe reasonable
qualification standards for its own officials, cannot be curtailed by the general power of the csc to
administer the civil service system. any unwarranted and unreasonable restriction on its discretionary
authority, such as what the csc did when it issued opinion no. 44, s. 2004, is constitutionally and legally
infirm.
issue:
whether or not the director ii positions in the central administrative service and the finance and
management service of the office of the ombudsman are covered by the ces
held:
no. under the constitution, the ombudsman is the appointing authority for all officials and employees of
the office of the ombudsman, except the deputy ombudsmen. thus, a person occupying the position of
director ii in the central administrative service or finance and management service of the office of the
ombudsman is appointed by the ombudsman, not by the president. as such, he is neither embraced in
the ces nor does he need to possess ces eligibility.
article xi section 7. tanodbayan as special prosecutor
zaldivar v. sandiganbayan, 160 scra 843 (1988)
facts:
petitioner enrique a. zaldivar, governor of the province of antique, filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under rule 65 before the supreme court, seeking to restrain the
sandiganbayan and tanodbayan raul gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of
criminal cases against him on the ground that said cases were filed by said tanodbayan without legal
and constitutional authority, since under the 1987 constitution which took effect on february 2, 1987, it
is only the ombudsman (not the present or incumbent tanodbayan) who has the authority to file cases
with the sandiganbayan. petitioner also prayed that tanodbayan gonzalez be restrained from conducting
preliminary investigations with the sandiganbayan.
issue:
does the tanodbayan (special prosecuter) have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations and
to direct the filing of criminal cases with the sandiganbayan?
held:
no. under the 1987 constitution the incumbent tanodbayan (caged special prosecutor under the 1987
constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties not given to the ombudsman) is clearly
without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with
the sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the ombudsman. this right to do so was lost effective
february 2, 1987. from that time, he has been divested of such authority.
article xi section 7. tanodbayan as special prosecutor
acop v. ombudsman, gr no. 120422, september 27, 1995
facts:
on may 18, 1995, eleven suspected members of the notorious robbery gang, "kuratongbaleleng," were

killed in an alleged shootout with composite teams of the national capital regional command (ncrc),
traffic management command (tmc), presidential anti-crime commission (pacc), central police district
command (cpdc) and criminal investigation command (cic).spo2 eduardo de los reyes of the central
intelligence command (cic) then made an expose', stating that there was no shootout and that the
"kuratong baleleng" members were victims of summary execution.
the commission on human rights (chr) received the complaint of the relatives of the slain suspected
gang members, accusing the pacc, ncrc, tmc, cic and cpdc of murder. acting ombudsman villa directed
public respondent deputy ombudsman casaclang to create a panel to monitor the investigations being
conducted by the commission on human rights, the senate committee on justice and human rights, and
the philippine national police (pnp) director for investigation regarding the alleged shootout. the panel
recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted against petitioners and all the participating
personnel listed in the after operations report of the pnp. casaclang then issued the order directing
petitioner[s] and nine others to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence within ten
days from receipt thereof, which the petitioners failed to comply. the petitioners instead filed a motion
with casaclang to suspend the preliminary investigation against them pending resolution of the petition
for certiorari filed with the supreme court. casaclang granted the motion, only to be reversed by villa.
villa then took over "the direct supervision and control of the preliminary investigation". the petitioners
challenged the take-over, asserting that neither the ombudsman nor his deputy may conduct preliminary
investigation.
issue:
whether or not the ombudsman and deputy ombudsman are authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations.
held:
yes. by express mandate of paragraph 8, section 13, article xi of the constitution, among the functions
of the ombudsman are those other powers, functions or duties as may be provided by law.
article xi section 7. tanodbayan as special prosecutor
deloso v. domingo, 191 scra 545
facts:
by this petition for certiorari and prohibition governor amor d. deloso of zambales seeks to stop
respondent manuel c. domingo, deputy ombudsman for luzon, from conducting a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him of multiple murder in ibp case no. osp-88-01770, entitled
"pc/inp/cis vs. governor amor deloso, "on the grounds that:1. the ombudsman has no jurisdiction to
investigate the murder charge against the petitioner for its jurisdiction is confined to the investigation
only of acts or omissions that are connected with the performance of his duties as governor; and2. for
the same reason, the tanodbayan (special prosecutor) has no jurisdiction to prosecute the murder case
against the petitioner. upon receipt of the petition, the court issued a temporary restraining order on
november 7, 1989.
issue:
whether or not the office of the special prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
and if the said office is without authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case.
held:
court finds the petition to be without merit. the reason for the creation of the ombudsman in the 1987
constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority is to insulate said office from the
long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate the judges and other fiscals offices, and others
involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and
influence, quash, delay or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasance committed by
public officers.
article xi section 7. tanodbayan as special prosecutor
almonte v. vasquez, gr no. 95367, may 22, 1995
facts:
this is a case wherein respondent ombudsman, requires petitioners neriorogado and elisa rivera, as chief

accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the economic intelligence and investigation bureau
(eiib) to produce "all documents relating to personal services funds for the year 1988" and all evidence
such as vouchers from enforcing his orders. petitioner almonte was formerly commissioner of the eiib,
while perez is chief of the eiib's budget and fiscal management division. the subpoena ducestecum was
issued by the ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that
funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the eiib had been illegally disbursed. the letter,
purporting to have been written by an employee of the eiib and a concerned citizen, was addressed to
the secretary of finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the office of the
ombudsman.
issue:
w/n the office of the ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case.
held:
yes. the office of the ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of
the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official
pressure and influence, can quash, delay, or dismiss investigations against them. the joint affidavits of
state auditors cabreros and quejada contain allegations specific enough for petitioner to prepare his
evidence and counter-arguments.
article xi section 7. tanodbayan as special prosecutor
buenasada v. flavier, 226 scra 645
facts:
the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order, under rule 65 of the revised rules of court, seeks to nullify the order of the
ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners dr. brigida s. buenaseda et.al. the
questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the ombudsman
(obm-adm-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the anti-graft
and corrupt practices act. the supreme court required respondent secretary to comply with the
aforestated status quo order. the solicitor general, in his comment, stated that (a) the authority of the
ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend; and (b)
assuming the ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there
are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met
in the instant case
issue:
whether or not the ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working
in offices other than the office of the ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative
complaints filed against said officials and employees.
held:
yes. petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside. when the constitution vested on the
ombudsman the power to recommend the suspension of a public official or employees (sec. 13 [3]), it
referred to suspension, as a punitive measure. all the words associated with the word suspension in
said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. under
the rule of no scitur a sociis, the word suspension should be given the same sense as the other words
with which it is associated. where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or
with which it is associated.
article xi section 7. tanodbayan as special prosecutor
macalino v. sandiganbayan, 376 scra 452
facts:
petitioner felicito s. macalino was the assistant manager of the treasury divisionand the head of the
loans administration & insurance section of the philippines nationalconstruction corporation (pncc), a
government-controlled corporation. on september 16,1992, the special prosecutor, office of the
ombudsman, with the approval of the ombudsman,filed with the sandiganbayan two informations

against the petitioner and his spouse liwayways.tan charging them with estafa through falsification of
official documents and frustrated estafathrough falsification of mercantile documents.during the initial
presentation of evidence for the defense, petitioner moved for leave tofile a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him sincehe is not a public officer because the
philippine national construction corporation (pncc),formerly construction and development corporation
of the philippines (cdcp), is not agovernment-owned or controlled corporation with original charter. the
sandiganbayandeniedpetitioners motion to dismiss.
issue:
whether or not the sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.
held:
no, inasmuch as the pncc has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on
corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer within the coverage of ra 3019,
as amended. thus, the sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. the only instance when the
sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when thec omplaint charges him either as a
co-principal, accomplice, or accessory of a public officer whohas been charged with a crime within the
jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan. the cases cited by respondent people of the philippines are
inapplicable because theywere decided under the provisions of the 1973 constitution which included as
public officers, officials and employees of corporations owned and controlled by the government
through organized and existing under the general corporation law. the 1987 constitution excluded such
corporations. the crime charged against petitioner was committed in 1989 and 1990. the criminall
actions were instituted in 1992. it is well-settled that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is
determined by the law in force at the institution of the action.
article xi section 7. tanodbayan as special prosecutor
bir v. ombudsman, gr no. 115103, april 11, 2002
facts:
the office of the ombudsman received information from an informer-for-reward that tax refunds have
been anomalously granted to distillera limtua co& co., inc. and la tondea distilleries, inc. upon receipt
of the information, soquilon recommended to then ombudsman conrado m. vasquez that the case be
docketed and subsequently assigned to him for investigation. on the basis of the information, the omb
issued a subpoena ducestecum addressed to atty. mansequiao of the legal department of the bir ordering
him to appear before him and to bring the complete original case dockets of the refunds granted to the
said companies. bir resisted the summons on the grounds that the grant of the tax refund had already
been mooted by the sandiganbayan . bir argued that for subpoena ducestecum to be properly issued in
accordance with law, there must first be a pending action because the power to issue a subpoena
ducestecum is not an independent proceeding. the bir noted that the ombudsman issued the assailed
subpoena ducestecum based only on the information obtained from an informer-for-reward. the
ombudsman denied the motion of the bir and reiterated its instructions to the bir to produce the
documents sought. instead of complying, the bir filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
preliminary injunction, and temporary restraining order with the sc.
issue:
whether or not the prosecutory power of the ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the
sandiganbayan and that the ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the
jurisdiction of regular courts.
held:
even a perusal of the law (pd 1630) originally creating the office of the ombudsman then (to be known
as the tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception,
the office of the ombudsman was already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and
criminal cases before the sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.
article xi section 7. tanodbayan as special prosecutor
laurel v. desierto, gr no. 145368, april 12, 2002
facts:

in 1991, then president corazon aquino a committee or the preparation of the national centennial
celebration in 1998. when president fidel ramos took over, he reconstituted the said committee as the
national centennial commission (ncc). salvador laurel was appointed as the chairperson. subsequently,
the centennial exposition project was constructed at the clark special economic zone. after the
centennial celebration, then senator ana dominique coseteng, in a privilege speech, exposed certain
anomalies in the said centennial exposition project. this eventually led to the filing of graft and corrupt
practices charges against laurel. the graft charges were referred to then ombudsman aniano desierto.
laurel questioned the jurisdiction of the ombudsman as he averred that the ncc is not a public office;
that laurel is not a public officer hence he cannot be charged with graft cases and the ombudsman has
no jurisdiction. laurel avers that a public office is defined as follows: a public office is the right,
authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. the
individual so invested is a public officer.
issue:
whether or not salvador laurel is a public officer and should be under the jurisdiction of the office of
the ombudsman.
held:
yes. the supreme court ruled: laurels office was delegated with sovereign functions. based on the
executive issuances which constituted and reconstituted the ncc, as well as various executive orders, it
can be seen that the ncc was given executive functions, to wit: promote economic development
particularly in central luzon to attract investors to mitigate the eruption of mt. pinatubo, among others.
promotion of industrialization and full employment is a fundamental state policy. even if laurel did not
receive any compensation it must be remembered that a salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion
for determining the nature of the position. it is not conclusive. the salary is a mere incident and forms
no part of the office. where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or
honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. hence, the office of laurel
as ncc chairman may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an
office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. but it is a public office,
nonetheless.
article xi section 7. tanodbayan as special prosecutor
azarcon v. guerrero, gr no. 121017, feb 17, 1997
facts:
alfredo azarcon owned and operated a hauling business. occasionally, he engaged the services of subcontractors like jaime ancla whose trucks were left at the formers premises a warrant of distraint of
personal property was issued by the main office of the bir addressed to the regional director or his
authorized representative of revenue region 10,butuan city commanding the latter to distraint the goods,
chattels or effects and other personal property of ancla, a sub-contractor of accused azarcon and, a
delinquent taxpayer. the warrant of garnishment was issued to azarcon ordering him to transfer,
surrender, transmit and/or remit to bir the property in his possession owned by taxpayer ancla. azarcon,
in signing the receipt for goods, articles, and things seized under authority of the national internal
revenue, assumed the undertakings specified in the receipt.subsequently, however, ancla took out the
distrained truck from azarcons custody. for this reason, azarcon was charged before the sandiganbayan
with the crime of malversation of public funds or property under article 217 in relation to article 222 of
the revised penal code. can azarcon be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by
the bir as a depositary of distained property
issue:
w/n azarcon is a public officer thus making him under the jurisdiction of the office of the ombudsman
held:
article 223 of the rpc defines a public officer as any person who, by direct provision of the law,
popular election, or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public

functions in the government of the philippine islands, or shall perform in said government or in any of
its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes.
azarcon obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. neither can his designation by
the bir as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by
competent authority. while it is true that sec. 206 of the nirc, as pointed out by the prosecution,
authorizes the bir to effect a constructive distraint by requiring any person to preserve a distrained
property there is no provision in the nirc constituting such person a public officer by reason of such
requirement. the birs power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched
to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. the charge against azarcon should forthwith be
dismissed.
article xi section 7. tanodbayan as special prosecutor
azarcon v. guerrero , gr no. 116033, feb 26, 1997
facts:
alfredo azarcon owned and operated a hauling business. occasionally, he engagedthe services of subcontractors. the warrant of garnishment was issued to azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender,
transmit and/or remit to bir the property in his possession owned by taxpayer ancla. for this reason,
azarcon was charged before the sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or
property under article 217 in relation to article 222 of the revised penalcode. can azarcon be considered
a public officer by reason of his being designated by the bir as a depositary of distrained property?
issue:
w/n azarcon can be considered a public officer and that the sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
case.
held:
no, the sandiganbayan only has jurisdiction over a private individual when the complaint charges the
private individual as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer. the birs power
authorizing a privateindividual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to
appoint him asa public officer. the charge against azarcon should forthwith be dismissed.
article xi section 12. prompt action on complaints
laurel v. desierto, gr no. 145368, april 12, 2002
facts:
president corazon c. aquino issued administrative order no. 223 "constituting a committee which was
mandated "to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the national celebration of the philippine
centennial of the declaration of philippine independence and the inauguration of the malolos congress."
subsequently, president fidel v. ramos issued executive order no. 128, "reconstituting the said
committee and renamed it as the "national centennial commission (ncc)." appointed to chair was vice
president laurel. laurel also was the chairman of expocorp, a corporation organized to undertake the
freedom ring project in relation to the centennial celebration. later in 1999, investigation was conducted
by an independent committed due to allegations of graft and corruption against laurel as ncc and
expocorp chair. the committee recommended the filing of charges by the ombudsman upon which the
office of the ombudsman took cognizance of the case. laurel then questioned the jurisdiction of the
ombudsman by filing this petition, saying that (1) expocorp was a private corporation, (2) that ncc is
not a public office and (3) that he is not a public officer as defined in the anti-graft and corrupt
practices act.
issue/s:
whether or not petitioner is a public officer
held:
yes. the ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a
public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. clearly, the ncc performs sovereign functions.
it is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its chair, is a public officer. that he did not receive

compensation is of no consequence. a salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the
nature of the position. it is not conclusive. the salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office.
article xi section 12. prompt action on complaints
almonte v. vasquez, 244 scra 286 (1995)
facts:
this is a case wherein respondent ombudsman, requires petitioners nerio rogado and elisa rivera, as
chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the economic intelligence and investigation
bureau (eiib) to produce "all documents relating to personal services funds for the year 1988" and all
evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders. petitioner almonte was formerly commissioner of
the eiib, while perez is chief of the eiib's budget and fiscal management division. the subpoena
ducestecum was issued by the ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter
alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the eiib had been illegally disbursed.
the letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the eiib and a concerned citizen, was
addressed to the secretary of finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the
office of the ombudsman.
issue:
w/n the office of the ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case.
held:
yes. the office of the ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of
the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official
pressure and influence, can quash, delay, or dismiss investigations against them. the joint affidavits of
state auditors cabreros and quejada contain allegations specific enough for petitioner to prepare his
evidence and counter-arguments.
article xi section 12. prompt action on complaints
roxas v. vasquez, 358 scra 636 (2001)
facts:
petitioner roxas was the chairman, while nacpil was a member, of the bids and awards committee of the
philippine constabulary-integrated national police (pc-inp). the pc-inp invited bids for the supply of
sixty-five units of fire trucks. the bids and awards committee voted to award the contract to the tahei
co., ltd., manufacturer of nikko-hino. accordingly, the contract was executed between pc-inp and tahei
co. the coa subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy in the amounts indicated on the
disbursement voucher and the purchase order. consequently, the dilg secretary filed a complaint with
the ombudsman against therespondents. after preliminary investigation, the deputy ombudsman for the
military recommended the indictment of all respondents, except ramirez. on review, the office of the
special prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaints against roxas, nacpil, codoy, kairan
and ramirez. formal charges were filed with the sandiganbayan against nazareno, flores, tanchanco,
custodio, osia, espea and santos. petitioners were not included in the criminal information. flores and
tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. thereafter, the office of the special
prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges against flores and tanchanco. in the same
resolution, however, the special prosecutor made a sudden turn about as regards roxas, nacpil and
kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused.
issue:
whether or not the inclusion of the petitioners as accused violated their right to due process
held:
yes. it appears that the charge against respondents was previously dismissed. for this reason, there
being no motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased to be parties.
consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those previously indicted, without
questioning the dismissal of the charge against the said respondents, could not and should not be made
the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating their right to due process.
furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due process when the special prosecutor

reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. due process of law requires that every
litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. he has the right to be present and defend himself in
person at every stage of the proceedings.
article xi section 12. prompt action on complaints
uy v. sandiganbayan, gr no. 105965, march 20, 2001
facts:
uy, who was deputy comptroller of the philippine navy and designated as assistant chief of naval staff
for comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification of official documents and violation of
ra 3019. the petitioner filed a motion to quash, arguing that the sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over
the offense charged and that the ombudsman and the special prosecutor had no authority to file the
offense.
issue:
whether or not the prosecutory power of the ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the
sandiganbayan and that the ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the
jurisdiction of regular courts.
held:
no. the ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all
criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the
sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. the power to investigate
and to prosecute granted by law to the ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. it pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. the law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. it has been held that the clause "any illegal act
or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance
and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.
article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties
khan, jr. v. ombudsman, gr no. 125296, july 20, 2006
facts:
petitioners ismael g. khan, jr. a former officer of philippine airlines, were charged before the deputy
ombudsman with violation of ra 3019 (the anti-graft and corrupt practices act) for using their positions
in pal to secure a contract for synergy services corporation, in which they were shareholders.
petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds that the
ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them since pal was a private entity and they were not public
officers, hence, outside the application of ra 3019. the deputy ombudsman denied petitioners' omnibus
motion to dismiss, ruling that although pal was originally organized as a private corporation, its
controlling stock was later acquired by the government through the gsis. therefore, it became a
government-owned or controlled corporation .
petitioners, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the supreme court. petitioners argue that the
ombudsman's jurisdiction only covers goccs with original charters and these do not include pal, a
private entity created under the general corporation law.
issue: whether or not the ombudsman has jurisdiction over gocc without original charter
held:
jurisdiction of the ombudsman over gocc's is confined only to those with original charters. based on the
foregoing provision, the office of the ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public officials/
employees of goccs with original charters. this being so, it can only investigate and prosecute acts or
omissions of the officials/employees of government corporations. therefore, although the government
later on acquired the controlling interest in pal, the fact remains that the latter did not have an "original
charter" and its officers/employees could not be investigated and/or prosecuted by the ombudsman.
article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties
ombudsman v. estandarte, gr no. 168670, april 13, 2007
facts:

peoples graftwatch, through its chairman, dr. patricio y. tan, referred to the office of the ombudsman
(visayas), for immediate investigation, a complaint of the faculty club and department heads of the
ramon torres national high school (hereinafter the faculty club) against heidi estandarte, the school
principal. the complaint consisted of 33 allegations of improprieties ranging from illegal handling of
school funds, irregular financial transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority.2 however, the complaint
was not subscribed and sworn to by the complainant, and not supported by the sworn statements of
witnesses.the ombudsman forwarded the complaint to the department of education, culture and sports
regional office vi (decs-region vi) and the commission on audit (coa) for appropriate action pursuant to
section 15(2) of republic act no. 6770, otherwise known as the ombudsman act of 1989.4 on september
29, 1998, the decs-region vi found that the complaint did not comply with the formalities under
executive order no. 292, otherwise known as the administrative code of 1987. thus, it dismissed the
complaint, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate one.
issue:
whether or not the ombudsman has jurisdiction over disciplinary cases against government employees
facts:
the jurisdiction of the ombudsman over disciplinary cases against government employees, which
includes public school teachers, is vested by no less than section 12, article xi of the constitution.
article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties
ombudsman v. lucero, november 24, 2006
facts:
on september 29, 2000, the oic regional director of lto requested coa for audit to identify the extent of
malversation of funds. thereafter, an administrative case for dishonesty was filed against the petitioner
in the office of the ombudsman. on july 20, 2003, the office of the ombudsman (visayas) rendered its
decision finding the petitioner guilty of dishonesty. aggrieved with the aforesaid decision and order of
the respondent office of the ombudsman, the petitioner filed in this court a petition for review thereof
on the grounds the respondent office of the ombudsman has no power to directly dismiss her from the
service.
issue:
whether or not the office of the ombudsman has no power to directly dismiss her from the service.
held:
judgment is hereby rendered by us setting aside the decision dated july 20, 2003 and the order dated
january 26, 2004 rendered and issued by the respondent office of the ombudsman in but only insofar as
said office directly imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of dismissal from the service. the said office
may recommend such penalty to the proper disciplining authority.
article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties
ombudsman v. ca, gr no. 169079, july 17, 2007
facts:
sometime in 2000, sonia q. pua, a municipal councilor of carmen, cebu, filed a complaint with the
office of the deputy ombudsman for visayas, alleging thatmayorvirgilio e. villamor, municipal
treasurerbontia, and respondent municipal accountantbarriga, entered into several irregular and
anomalous transactions in their official capacity. in a decision dated 28 august 2002, the office of the
deputy ombudsman for visayas found barriga guilty of misconduct and imposed on her the penalty of
six months suspension from the service. upon review, petitioner office of the ombudsman modified the
decision and found barriga guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed
on her the penalty of suspension for one year.barriga filed a motion for reconsideration which petitioner
denied. later, in an order dated 13 november 2002, petitioner directed the municipal mayor of carmen,
cebu to implement the decision dated 28 august 2002. barriga filed a petition for review with the ca
which denied the petition for lack of merit. barriga then elevated the case to the supreme court which
also denied the petition. mr and second mr was likewise denied.
issue:
whether the court of appeals gravely abused its discretion in nullifying the orders of the office of the

ombudsman to the municipal mayor of carmen, cebu for the immediate implementation of the penalty
of suspension from service of respondent barriga even though the case was pending on appeal.
held:
the ca is incorrect. the provision in the rules of procedure of the office of the ombudsman is clear that
an appeal by a public official from a decision meted out by the ombudsman shall not stop the decision
from being executory. in office of the ombudsman v. court of appeals and macabulos, we held that
decisions of the ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal in the ca. thus, the
ombudsmans order imposing on barriga the penalty of suspension from office for one year without pay
is immediately executory even pending appeal in the court of appeals.
article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties
sangguniang barangay v. punong barangay, gr no. 170626, march 3, 2008
facts:
severino martinez, punong barangay of barangay don mariano marcos was administratively charged
with dishonesty, misconduct in office and violation of the anti-graft and practices act by
sanggunianbarangay through the filing of a verified complaint before the sangguniang bayan.pursuant
to section 61 of the lgc, the sb is the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials. charges,
among others were for failure to submit and fully remit to thebarangay treasurer the income of their
solid waste management project particularly the sale of fertilizer and recyclable materials derived from
composting and garbage collection. there was also a charge for failure to liquidate his travelling
expenses. martinez failed to file an answer, thus was declared by sb in default. sangguniang bayan
rendered its decision which imposed the penalty of removal from office. the decision was conveyed to
the municipal mayor for its implementation. mayor issued a memorandum, stating that sb is not
empowered to order martinezs removal from service. however, the decision remains valid until
reversed and must be executed by him.
issue:
won the sangguniang bayan may remove martinez, an elective localofficial, from office.
held:
no. an elective local official may beremoved from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of
theproper court.
article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties
perez v. sandiganbayan, gr no. 166062, september 26, 2006
facts:
kapisanan ng mga broad kaster ng pilipinas (kbp), an association representing duly franchised and
authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the court to
allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against
former president joseph e. estrada before the sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history."2 the request was seconded by
mr. cesar n. sarino in his letter of 05 april 2001 to the chief justice and, still later, by senator renato
cayetano and attorney ricardo romulo.
issue:
w/n the case at bar is unconstitutional.
held:
an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. a public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly
dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete
conclaves of long ago. a public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe the trial process. in the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough
facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render
the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions,
who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.

article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties


buencamino v. ca, gr no. 175895, april 4, 2007
facts:
on august 27, 2004, private respondent filed with the office of the ombudsman, public respondent, an
administrative complaint against petitioner for grave misconduct, abuse of authority, acts unbecoming
of a public officer. in his answer, petitioner denied the allegations of the complaint, explaining that he
imposed the payment of regulatory fees pursuant to kapasiyahanblg. 89a-055, an ordinance enacted by
the sangguniang bayan of san miguel, bulacan.however, according to private respondent, the municipal
ordinance was disapproved by the sangguniang panlalawigan of bulacan. in a decision dated january
23, 2006, the office of the ombudsman declared petitioner administratively liable for abuse of authority
and suspended him from office for a period of six (6) months without pay.aggrieved, petitioner filed
with the court of appeals, also impleaded as a public respondent, thus this case.
issue:
w/n the court of appeals gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions.
held:
in all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law gives the
respondent the right to appeal. it is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. the
fact that the ombudsman act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry
with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal.
article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties
medina v. coa, gr no. 176478, february 4, 2008
facts:
the commission on audit (coa) audited the cash and accounts handled by lorna medina (medina) as
municipal treasurer of general mariano alvarez, cavite and the audit team, headed by eufrocina mawak,
discovered a total cash shortage of p4,080,631.36. medina was ordered to restitute the shortage but she
failed to comply
coa filed an administrative case with the deputy ombudsman charging medina with grave misconduct
and dishonesty. later, medina filed an urgent motion stating that she complied with the directive to file a
counter-affidavit and position paper and prayed that the decision be reversed based on her defenses.
medina sought reconsideration on the grounds of newly discovered evidence consisting of her petition
for reconsideration of the audit report which petition was still pending with the audit team and letters to
the provincial auditor of cavite questioning the audit. on appeal, the ca held that medina was not
entitled to a formal investigation and it affirmed the fernandez's factual finding that she was guilty of
grave misconduct and dishonesty.
issue:
w/n medina was deprived of her right to due process when her request for a formal investigation was
denied
held:
no. as this is an administrative complaint filed before the office of the ombudsman, it is the rules of
procedure of the office of the ombudsman which shall govern; thus, in ruling that the prerogative to
elect a formal investigation pertains to the hearing officer and not to petitioner, fernandez was only
applying such procedure.
article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties
villas nor v. sandiganbayan, gr no. 180700, march 4, 2008
facts:
on august 18, 2001, disaster struck. in the wee hours of the morning, the quezon city manor hotel went
ablaze resulting in the death of seventy-four (74) people and injuries to scores of others. investigation
into the tragedy revealed that the hotel was a veritable fire trap. petitioners, together with other officials
of the city engineering office of quezon city, are presently facing criminal charges before the 5th

division of the sandiganbayan for the crime of multiple homicide through reckless imprudence and for
violation of section 3(e) of r.a. no. 3019. they were also charged administratively with gross negligence,
gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service in connection with the manor
hotel inferno. on september 20, 2006, during the pendency of the criminal case, respondent special
prosecutor louella mae oco-pesquera filed a motion for suspension pendente lite7 of petitioners.
petitioners opposed8 the motion, contending that they had already been suspended for six (6) months
relative to the administrative case, based on the same facts and circumstances. they posited that any
preventive suspension that may be warranted in the criminal case was already absorbed by the
preventive suspension in the administrative case because both the criminal and administrative cases
were anchored on the same set of facts.
issue:
whether or not the public respondent acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering suspension pendente lite of herein petitioners
despite the fact that they had already been previously suspended administratively based on the same
facts and circumstances.
held:
the court finds no merit in those arguments. the court then hastened to clarify that such a view may not
be taken as an encroachment upon the power of suspension given other officials, reiterating in the
process that a line should be drawn between administrative proceedings and criminal actions in court,
that one is apart from the other. the accused public officers whose culpability remains to be proven are
entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence.32 the law itself provides for the reinstatement
of the public officer concerned and payment to him of the salaries and benefits for the duration of the
suspension in the event of an acquittal.
article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties
honasan ii v. panel of investigating prosecutors gr no. 159747, april 13, 2004
facts:
on june 4, 2003, at on or about 11 p.m., in a house located in san juan, metro manila, a meeting was
held and presided by senator honasan. attached as annex "b" is the affidavit of perfecto ragil and made
an integral part of this complaint.
in the early morning of july 27, 2003, capt. gerardo gambala, for and in behalf of the military rebels
occupying oakwood, made a public statement aired on nation television, stating their withdrawal of
support to the chain of command of the afp and the government of president gloria macapagal arroyo
and they are willing to risk their lives in order to achieve the national recovery agenda of sen. honasan,
which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.
issue:
whether or not the powers of the ombudsman is delegable.
held:
the power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any ombudsman case may be
exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the office of the ombudsman, or by any provincial or city
prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized ombudsman prosecutors.
article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties
ombudsman v. rodriguez, gr no. 172700, july 23, 2010
facts:
on 26 august 2003, the ombudsman received a complaint for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct in office, and neglect of duty against rolson rodriguez, punong barangay in brgy. sto.
rosario, binalbagan, negros occidental. on 1 september 2003, the sangguniang bayan of binalbagan,
negros occidental, through vice-mayor jose g. yulo, received a similar complaint against. in its 29
january 2004 order, the ombudsman directed both parties to file their respective verified position
papers. in his position paper, rodriguez insisted that the sangguniang bayan still continued to exercise
jurisdiction over the complaint filed against him.
issue:

whether or not it was the sangguniang bayan or the ombudsman that first acquired jurisdiction.
held:
the petition has merit. according to the constitution the ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties: investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office, or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.the primary jurisdiction of the ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of
a public officer or employee applies only in cases cognizable by the sandiganbayan. in cases cognizable
by regular courts, the ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of
government.
article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties
garcia v. miro, gr no. 148944, feb 5, 2003
facts:
city mayor garcia was charged by ombudsman special prosecution officer jesus rodrigo tagaan for
violation of the anti-graft law as a result of his having entered into a contract with f.e. zuellig for the
supply of asphalt batching plant for three years. the joint affidavits of state auditors cabreros and
quejada alleged that petitioner entered into the contract without available funds appropriated to cover
the expenditure in violation of sections 85 and 86 of p.d. 1445 or the state audit code of the phil.; that
petitioner exceeded the authority granted him by the sangguniang panlungsod; and that the contract is
manifestly disadvantageous to the city. note however that thereafter, special prosecution officer tagaan
resigned from his office and his name was withdrawn as complainant in the case. instead of filing a
counter-affidavit, garcia filed with the supreme court a petition to prohibit the ombudsman from
conducting the preliminary investigation on the ground that there is no sufficient complaint.
issue:
whether or not the complaint/affidavits filed against garcia is sufficient in form or manner.
held:
for purposes of initiating a preliminary investigation before the office of the ombudsman, a complaint
in any form or manner is sufficient. the constitution states that the ombudsman and his deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the government. the office of the ombudsman is different from the other
investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are
public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay, or dismiss investigations
against them.
article xi section 13. powers; functions; duties
rare v. sandiganbayan, gr no. 108431, july 14, 2000
facts:
the deputy ombudsman referred the complaint against petitioner for violation of the anti-graft and
corrupt practices act to the nbi for investigation. the nbi recommended the prosecution of the case.
petitioner argued that by referring the complaint to the nbi, the office of the ombudsman abdicated its
duty to conduct preliminary investigation.
issue:
whether or not the powers of the ombudsman is delegable
held:
the office of the ombudsman did not delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to the nbi.
what was delegated was only the fact-finding function, preparatory to the preliminary investigation still
to be conducted by the ombudsman.
article xi section 18. allegiance of public officers
caasi v. ca, 191 scra 229 (1990)
facts:
g.r. no. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated january 13, in his answer to
both petitions, miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the us immigration service,
but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the united states. he allegedly obtained the green card

for convenience in order that he may freely enter the united states for his periodic medical examination
and to visit his children there. he alleged that he is a permanent resident of bolinao, pangasinan, that he
voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on february 2,1987 for the ratification of the
1987 constitution, and the congressional elections on may 18,1987.after hearing the consolidated
petitions before it, the comelec dismissed the petitions
issue:
w/n the case at bar is unconstitutional?
held:
disqualifying a "green card holder" (an immigrant of the united states) from running for a local public
office, was predicated on section 68 of the omnibus election code of the philippines. this law disallows
any person who is a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country to run for an elective
public office, unless he shall have "waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws." the danger
does not hold true with respect to immigrants abroad who would simply be discharging their right and
duty to cast a vote for their candidate of choice.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
lee hong kok v. david, 48 scra 372
facts:
aniano david acquired lawful title of a parcel of land pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application.
after approval of his application, the director of lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales
patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the undersecretary of agriculture and natural resources
issued a miscellaneous sales patent. the register of deeds then issued an original certificate of title to
david. during all this time, lee hong kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.
issue:
whether or not lee hong kok may question the government grant?
held:
only the government, represented by the director of lands or the secretary of agriculture and natural
resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. this
was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent
and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had
they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property. the
fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. whether the grant was in conformity
with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the
government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. the legality of the grant is a question
between the grantee and the government.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
cruz v. sec. of denr, 347 scra 128 (2000)
facts:
cruz assailed the validity of the ra 8371 (the indigenous peoples rights act) on the ground that the law
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the states ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein. the ipra law enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. cruz et al contended that, by
providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might
even include private lands found within said areas, sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights
of private landowners.
issue:
whether or not the ipra law is unconstitutional
held:
the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
deliberated again. however, the result is the same transpired. hence, the petition was dismissed and the
ipra law was sustained.

article xii section 2. regalian doctrine


carino v. insurer government, 41 phil 935
facts:
the petitioner, an igorot, applied for the registration of a certain land. he and his ancestors had held the
land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under his customs. there was no document of
title issued for the land when he applied for registration. the state opposed the petition averring that the
land is part of the us military reservation.
issue:
whether or not mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for more than 50
years.
held:
no. the government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). further, mateos
possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. no one
has lived upon it for many years. it was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except
insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against spain it has apparently not been used
by the petitioner for any purpose.while the state has always recognized the right of the occupant to a
deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must
make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he
did the state remained the absolute owner.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
sta. rosa mining v. leido, 156 scra 1 (1987)
facts:
pd no. 1214 was issued requiring holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining under philippine
bill of 1902 to file a mining lease of application within one year from the approval of the decree. the
sta. rosa mining company assailed the constitutionality of pd 1214 claiming that it amounts to
deprivation of property without due process of law.
issue:
whether the pd 1214 is unconstitutional.
held:
no, the constitutional mandate of pd 1214 is found in sec. 2, art. xii of the 1987 constitution. it is a valid
exercise of the sovereign power of the state, as owner over lands of the public domain of which
petitioner's mining claims still form a part.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
san miguel corporation v. ca, 185 scra 722 (1990)
facts:
petitioner san miguel corporation (smc) purchased from silverio perez parcel of land. smc filed before
regional trial court of batangas an application for its registration under the land registration act to claim
of ownership in fee simple. the solicitor general opposed the application for registration contending that
the parcel of land in question is part of the public domain, and that smc, being a private corporation, is
disqualified under section 11, article xiv of the constitution from holding alienable lands of the public
domain. petitioner's claim that its predecessor-in-interest had open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of the lot for more than thirty years, which is anchored with documentary evidence consist
of tax declaration and testimonial evidence.
issue:
whether smc can own alienable lands of the public domain. whether its application for registration of a
parcel of land may be granted.
held:
no, the sc ruled that there is paucity of evidence of actual, notorious and exclusive possession of the
property on the part of vendor silverio perez so as to attach to it the character of an express grant from
the government. the application for registration of a parcel of land is denied.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine

almeda v. court of appeals, gr no. 85322, april 30, 1991


facts:
the case involves a parcel of land with an area of 1,208 square meters located in barrio pampangin,
pateros, rizal. it was originally owned and possessed by emiliano almeda, father of the petitioners, by
virtue of an escritura de particion extrajudicial executed on june 15, 1935, between him and his
brother adriano, wherein they attested the fact that the land in question was inherited from their parents,
vedasto almeda and josefa c. concepcion, who had inherited the same from their own parents (greatgrandparents of herein petitioners). after emilianos death on may 1, 1948, his wife, ana menguito, and
their children received the produce of the land and rented out to third persons portions of the property
where emiliano had three houses built. upon anas death on april 3, 1950, her children with emiliano
inherited the property and the lessees moved out. on june 9,1980, the brothers alfredo, leonardo and
ernesto executed an extrajudicial partition adjudicating the land to themselves. the almeda brothers
applied for the registration of the land in the regional trial court of pasig, branch clvi.
issue:
whether or not applicants possession of the disputed land prior to january 3, 1968 was
held:
no. the court of appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under
section 48(b) of the public land act because their possession of the land while it was still inalienable
forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on january 13,
1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30year open and continuous possession in concept of owner required under section 48(b) of com. act 141.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
director of lands v. kalahi investments, inc, gr no. 48066, january 31, 1989
facts:
kalahi investments, inc. applied registration of mining claims; however, it was denied by the rtc. thus,
they appealed to the ca. they contended that the mineral lands were
segregated from the government lands and its mining claims thereon were deemed property rights.
likewise, they claimed the registration of title based on its actual, open, public, peaceful, continuous,
adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, or confirmation of imperfect title
under sec. 48(b) ca141, as amended by ra no. 1942. kalahi invoked anew its vested rights over the
mining claims, having been perfected and registered under the act of congress of 1902, and its
consequent ownership, exclusive even as against the government.
issue:
are mining claims acquired, registered, perfected, and patentable under the old mining law matured to
private ownership that would entitle the claimant-appellant to the ownership thereof
held:
no, the court ruled that while it is recognized that the right of a locator of a mining claim is a property
right, it is not absolute. it is merely a possessory right, more so where petitioner's claims are still
unpatented. mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the located
claim. it merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would be
locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. to rule
otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located
mining claim. this, we cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the
lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual
work and improvements in the located mining claims.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
republic v. enciso, gr no. 160145, november 11, 2005
facts
enciso, herein respondent filed for the registration of his land property in zambales in the rtc,
contending that the only tenants to the land were his family and his predecessors-in-interest. the rtc

granted his application for the registration of his land. the solicitor general challenged the decision of
the rtc contending that the respondent failed to adduce any muniment of title and/or the tax declaration
with the application to prove bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or its open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since june 12, 1945
or prior thereto. the ca affirmed the decision of the rtc in toto, hence this petition.
issue
whether or not the ca erred in affirming the rtcs decision and if the contention of the osg is valid.
held
the court ruled that the ca erred in its decision for the mere possession of the land and that of encisos
predecessors-in-interest will not suffice in for judicial confirmation of title. the court sustained the
contention of the osg, that respondent failed to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of
owners since time immemorial, or from june 12, 1945.
dir of lands v. aquino
facts: private respondent abra industrial corporation claimed to be owner in fee simple of a 70-hectare
parcel of land which the petitioners have claimed that 66 hectares of which is a part of the central
cordillera forest reserve. by way of a court decision, the commissioner of land registration issued
decrees nos. 118198, 118199 and 118200 for the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name
of aic in 1967. petitioners allege the registration contending that the lower court erred in granting the
application for registration of the parcels of land notwithstanding its finding that they are within the
forest zone.
issue: whether or not the classification of land changes when the nature of the land changes
held: no. the classification of the land as forest land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. moreover, only a positive act by the
chief executive is needed to change such. thus, in the case at bar, the respondent corporation has to
prove that the lands it claims for registration are alienable or disposable lands, which it failed to so. 1
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
chavez v. pea, gr no. 133250, july 9, 2002
facts:
petitioner moved to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares
of reclaimed public lands along roxas boulevard in metro manila. however, published reports place the
market price of land near that area at a price higher than the negotiated. the private entity somehow
managed to deceive the government to sell the reclaimed lands without public bidding in patent
violation of the government auditing code. the senate committees established the clear, indisputable and
unalterable fact that the sale of the public lands is grossly and unconscionably undervalued based on
official documents submitted by the proper government agencies during the senate investigation.
issue:
whether or not stipulations in the amended jva for the transfer to amari of lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed on portions of manila bay, violate the constitution?
held:
the bulk of the lands subject of the amended jva are still submerged lands even to this very day, and
therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. of the 750 hectares subject of the amended jva,
78% of the total area is still submerged, permanently under the waters of manila bay. under the
amended jva, the pea conveyed to amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation,
although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be

made only after actual reclamation. to allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to pea as private lands is in violation of sec. 2 article xii of the constitution.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
laurel v. garcia, 187 scra 797 (1990)
facts:
petitioners seek to stop the philippine government to sell the roppongi property, which is located in
japan. it is one of the properties given by the japanese government as reparations for damage done by
the latter to the former during the war. petitioner argues that under philippine law, the subject property
is property of public dominion. as such, it is outside the commerce of man. therefore, it cannot be
alienated. respondents aver that japanese law, and not philippine law, shall apply to the case because
the property is located in japan. they posit that the principle of lexsitus applies.
issue:
won the subject property cannot be alienated.
held:
yes. under philippine law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly
shown that the property has become patrimonial. as property of public dominion, the roppongi lot is
outside the commerce of man. it cannot be alienated.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
miners association v. factoran, 240 scra 100 (1995)
facts:
former president corazon aquino issued e.o. 211 and 279.
e.o. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the
exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to sec. 2, art. 12 of the 1987 constitution.
e.o. 279 authorizes the denr secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or
production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources.
in relation to the above e.o.s, denr issued two administrative orders.
a.o. 57 which declares that all existing mining agreements which were granted after the effectivity of
the 1987 constitutionshall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from
the effectivity of these guidelines.
a.o. 82 which provides that a failure to submit letter of intent and mineral production-sharing
agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the a.o. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining,
quarry, and sand and gravel claims.miners association of the philippines, inc. filed an instant petition
assailing their validity and constitutionality before this court.
issue:
whether or not the two issued denr administrative orders are valid.
held:
yes. the court upheld the validity and constitutionality of a.o.s 57 and 82. they must be sustained, and
their force and effect upheld. the questioned a.o.s are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the
purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest
of the public, their economic growth and welfare.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
republic v. rosemoor, gr no. 149927, march 30, 2004
facts
the four private respondents were granted permission to look for marble deposits in the mountains of
biak-na-bato. when they discovered marble deposits in mount mabio, they applied for license with the
bureau of mines to exploit such deposits. they were granted the license, issued in the name of rosemoor
mining and development corporation, a corporation for which these private respondents were
stockholders, covering an area of 330 hectares. however, in a letter, denr minister ernesto maceda
cancelled the license. proclamation no. 84 was then issued confirming the cancellation. the trial court
ruled in favor of respondents, upholding the validity of the license issued and stating that the

cancellation was made without due process and proclamation no. 84 was an ex-post facto law. the ca
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
issues
1)
won
the
license
was
valid
2) won the cancellation of the license was valid
held
1) the license was not valid. when such was issued, the governing law was pd463. while the
subsequently enacted ra7942 or philippine mining act of 1995 repealed prior mining laws, it
nonetheless respects previously issued licenses. also, sec. 2 of article xii of the 1987 constitution does
not apply retroactively to a license, concession or lease granted by the government before the
effectivity of the 1987 constitution. thus, pd463 is still controlling in the case.
pd463 states that a quarry license shall cover an area of not more than 100 hectares in any one province
and not more than 1,000 hectares in the entire philippines. this law neither provides any exception nor
makes any reference to the number of applications for a license. the license in question was issued to
rosemoor and not to the 4 individual stockholders, even if 4 separate applications were made. it clearly
violated pd463 as it covered an area of 330 hectares.
2) the cancellation was valid. the license being invalid, the cancellation is only a declaration of its
nullity. moreover, even if the license was valid, it may be revoked when the national interest so requires
and in the exercise of police power in accordance with the regalian doctrine.
the letter of the denr minister and proclamation no. 84 states that public interest would be served by
reverting the parcel of land to the former status as part of the biak-na-bato national park. the
determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the state as owner of all mineral
resources. the executive department has the prerogative in the evaluation and the consequent
cancellation of licenses. courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion without any clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion.
the exercise of police power through proclamation no. 84 is clearly in accord with jura regalia, which
reserves to the state ownership of all natural resources. this regalian doctrine is an exercise of its
sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain and of the patrimony of the nation, the mineral
deposits of which are a valuable asset.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
la bugal-blaan tribal assn. v. denr, gr127872, jan 27, 2004, mr gr 127882, dec. 1, 2004
facts: on april 9, 1995, r.a. no. 7942 took effect. r.a. no. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements
for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and
withdrawal, and fixes their terms. similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance
agreements. shortly before the effectivity of r.a. no. 7942, however, or on march 30, 1995, the president
entered into an ftaa with wmcp covering 99,387 hectares of land in south cotabato, sultan kudarat,
davao del sur and north cotabato. dao no. 96-40 was then issued by denr as the irr of ra 7942.
on january 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the denr secretary demanding that the denr
stop the implementation of r.a. no. 7942 and dao no. 96-40, giving the denr fifteen days from receipt to
act thereon. the denr, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter. petitioners claim that the
denr secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
issue :
whether or not the assailed provisions of republic act no. 7942 are unconstitutional.
held :
yes. the court finds assailed provisions of r.a. no. 7942 to be violative of section 2, article xii of the
constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void as said act authorizes service contracts.
although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the

1987 constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law. the framers of this constitution
expressly omitted the phrase service contracts that was provided for in the1973 constitution which
allowed foreign companies to manage and operate mining activities and replaced itwith technical or
financial assistance only. ra 7942, dao 96-40, and the ftaa between the government and wmcp allows
for the management and operation of the foreign-owned corporation for the large-scale exploration,
development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. although counsel for
respondents claim that technical is a very broad term that may cover the management and
operation of such activities, it is still clear from the deliberation of the constitutional commission that
they intended to limit the utilization of the natural resources for the sole enjoyment of the filipinos.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
philippine geothermal v. napocor, gr no. 144302, may 27, 2004
facts
on september 10, 1971, the national power corporation (npc) entered into a service contract with
philippine geothermal, inc. (pgi), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of california,
united states of america, for the exploration and exploitation of geothermal resources covering the tiwi
and mak-ban geothermal fields. section 3 of said contract provides for a term of 25 years renewable for
another 25 years upon the option of pgi.
when the contract was about to expire, npc was doubtful whether a renewal would be constitutional in
light of section 2, article xii of the 1987 constitution which provides that the exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
state.
as the service contract contained an arbitral clause, pgi filed on july 8, 1996 a request for arbitration
with the international court of arbitration (ica) of the international chamber of commerce (icc).
on august 21, 1996, the npc filed before the regional trial court (rtc) of quezon city a petition for
declaratory relief against pgi praying for the determination of the constitutionality of section 3 of the
service contract on the renewal of the contract at the option of pgi.
on october 2, 1996, pgi filed a motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory relief alleging, among
other things, that the trial court has no jurisdiction over it in light of the pending arbitration proceedings
it instituted.
the quezon city rtc denied the motion to dismiss, which was affirmed by the court of appeals. hence, the
present appeal to the supreme court. during the pendency of the petition, however, pgi and npc filed
several joint motions to suspend proceedings upon the ground that they were negotiating for the
settlement of the case. they subsequently entered into a compromise agreement, wherein they agreed to
terminate the service contract subject matter of the dispute, in favor of a new geothermal sales contract
and pgi has committed to form a philippine company for the development and operation of the tiwi and
mak-ban steamfields on a going-forward basis, thereby effectively erasing any doubt as to the legality
of the compromise. pgi and npc then filed a joint motion to approve compromise agreement and to
dismiss.
issue
won the motion to dismiss by the parties should be granted on the ground that they have terminated the
service contract which is the subject matter of the dispute
ruling
the supreme court granted the parties motion to dismiss, on the ground that they have terminated the
service contract subject matter of the dispute. however, the court stated that since only the issue of

jurisdiction over the constitutionality of a contract was elevated to it, it is beyond its jurisdiction to pass
upon and approve the compromise agreement of the parties.
article xii section 2. regalian doctrine
jg summit v. ca, gr no. 124293, january 31, 2005
facts: by virtue of proclamation no. 50, establishing the committee on privatization (cop) and the asset
privatization trust (apt), issued by president corazon aquino on 8 december 1986, the non-performing
assets of the government were up for privatization. philippine shipyard and engineering corporation
(philseco) was up for bidding for no less than one billion three hundred million pesos (p 1,300,000.00)
for 87.67% equity. kawasaki heavy industries, ltd. of kobe, japan (kawasaki), the other party to the joint
venture was given the right to top by five percent (5%) the highest bid for the said shares in exchange
of the right of first refusal under the joint venture agreement (jva). j.g. summit holdings, inc.topped by
submitting a bid of two billion and thirty million pesos (p2,030,000,000.00) with an acknowledgment
of kawasaki/[philyards'] right to top wherein the latter subsequently exercised its right. the petitioner
later challenged that since philseco is a landholding company, kawasaki could exercise its right of first
refusal only up to 40% of the shares of philseco due to the constitutional prohibition on landholding by
corporations with more than 40% foreign-owned equity.
issue:
whether or not the prohibition under section 7, article xii of the 1987 constitution against ownership by
aliens of real properties applies only to lands
held:
the prohibition under section 7, article xii of the 1987 constitution applies only to ownership of land.
the said prohibition does not extend to immovable or real property as defined under article 415 of the
civil code. otherwise, there would have a strange situation where the ownership of immovable property
such as trees, plants and growing fruit attached to the land would be limited to filipinos and filipino
corporations only.
article xii section 3. lands of public domain
director of lands v. aquino, 192 scra 296 (1990)
facts: private respondent abra industrial corporation claimed to be owner in fee simple of a 70-hectare
parcel of land which the petitioners have claimed that 66 hectares of which is a part of the central
cordillera forest reserve. by way of a court decision, the commissioner of land registration issued
decrees nos. 118198, 118199 and 118200 for the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name
of aic in 1967. petitioners allege the registration contending that the lower court erred in granting the
application for registration of the parcels of land notwithstanding its finding that they are within the
forest zone.
issue:
whether or not the classification of land changes when the nature of the land changes
held:
no. the classification of the land as forest land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. moreover, only a positive act by the chief
executive is needed to change such. thus, in the case at bar, the respondent corporation has to prove that
the lands it claims for registration are alienable or disposable lands, which it failed to so.
article xii section 3. lands of public domain
republic v. ca, 160 scra 228 (1988)
facts: benguet consolidated, inc., atok big wedge corporation, and the republic of the philippines,
through the bureau of forestry development, all filed petitions of opposition for the registration of lots
1 to 9, covered by plan psu-225009, by jose de la rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three
children. balbalio and alberto, the vendors of the said agricultural lands, claimed ownership as it were
handed down from their ancestors. the two mining companies claimed that they took ownership of
parts of the land prior to the 1935 constitution. the republic, meanwhile, asserted that neither the
mining companies nor the private respondents have any valid claim to the land because it is not

alienable and registerable.


issue:
1. whether or not the private owner of an agricultural land will have a right to extract or utilize the
mineral deposits found in the said land without the permission of the state.
2. whether or not a land can have a mixed classification.
held:
1. no. the regalian doctrine applies. thus, once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to
which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the state to enable it to
extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. the land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for
any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein.
2. no. the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land cannot be half mineral and half
agricultural. the classification must be categorical: the land must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural. the category of the mining land, as long as mining operations continue
underneath, does not shift to agricultural by reason of it being unlawfully enclosed with a fence and
was cultivated on the surface.
article xii section 3. lands of public domain
apex mining v. southeast mindanao gold, inc, gr no. 152613, june 23, 2006
facts
proclamation no. 369 was issued to establish the agusan-davao-surigao forest reserve. camilo banad
and his group, who claimed to have first discovered traces of gold in mount diwata, filed a declaration
of location for six mining claims in the area. apex mining corporation entered into operating
agreements with banad and his group. the permit embraced the areas claimed by apex and the other
individual mining claimants. mmc filed before the bmg a petition for the cancellation of the mining
claims of apex and small scale mining permits. mmc alleged that the areas covered by its ep 133 and
the mining claims of apex were within an established and existing forest reservation. apex filed a
motion to dismiss mmcs petition alleging that its mining claims are not within any established or
proclaimed forest reserve and the acquisition of mining rights thereto must be undertaken via
registration of dol with the bmg and not through the filing of application for permit to prospect with the
bfd. the instant petitions for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the rules of court filed by apex, balite
and mab. during the pendency of these petitions, president gloria macapagal-arroyo issued
proclamation no. 297.this proclamation excluded an area of 8,100 hectares located in monkayo,
compostela valley, and proclaimed the same as mineral reservation and as environmentally critical area.
issue
whether the subsequent acts of the executive department such as the issuance of proclamation no.
297,and dao no. 2002-18 can outweigh apex and balites claims over the diwalwal gold rush area.
held
upon the effectivity of the 1987 constitution, the state assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources of the country. with this policy, the state may
pursuefull control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys
naturalmineral resources. the options open to the state are through direct undertaking or by entering
into co- production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement
with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.recognizing
the importance of the countrys natural resources, not only for national economicdevelopment, but also
for its security and national defense, section 5 of republic act no. 7942 empowersthe president, when
the national interest so requires, to establish mineral reservations where miningoperations shall be
undertaken directly by the state or through a contractor
article xii section 3. lands of public domain
dir. of lands v. iac, 146 scra 509 (1986)

facts:
the tambac island in lingayen gulf is situated in the municipality of bani, pangasinan, which consists of
more or less 187,288 square meters. the initial application for registration was filed for pacific farms,
inc. under the provisions of the land registration act (496). the director of lands opposed the
application alleging that the pacific farms, inc. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its
predecessors possess the land for at 30 years immediately after filing the application. in an amended
application, pacific farms, inc. filed a manifestation-motion to change the applicant from pacific farms,
inc. to j. antonio araneta. despite the supposed amendment, there was no republication. so, the director
of lands alleged that the land is within the unclassified public land and inalienable.
issue: whether or not the land known as "tambac island" can be subject to registration.
held:
the amendment of the application from the name of pacific farms inc. to the name of j. antonio araneta
inc. was a mere attempt to evade disqualification. our constitution prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease. the court ruled to
release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and
jurisdiction. they reiterate that the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the
executive department of the government and not of the courts. in the absence of such classification, the
land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.
article xii section 3. lands of public domain
ten forty realty v. lorenzana, gr no. 151212, sept. 10, 2003
facts
a complaint for ejectment was filed by petitioner ten forty realty and development corporation against
respondent marina cruz for occupying the property which the petitioner believe that they are the true
and absolute owner of a parcel of lot and residential house situated in #71 18th street, e.b.b. olongapo
city. having a deed of absolute sale acquired from barbara galino and the payment of the capital gains
tax for the transfer of the property was their evidence.
issues
whether or not the respondents possession or occupation of the said property is in the nature of an
exercise of ownership.
held of the court of appeals
no. the ca held that petitioner had failed to make a case for unlawful detainer, because no contract -express or implied -- had been entered into by the parties with
regard to possession of the property. it ruled that the action should have been for forcible entry, in
which prior physical possession was indispensable -- a circumstance petitioner had not shown either.
the appellate court also held that petitioner had challenged the rtcs
held
on the question of ownership for the purpose of compensating for the latters failure to counter such
held. the rtc had held that, as a corporation, petitioner had no right to acquire the property which was
alienable public land.
article xii section 3. lands of public domain
chavez v. pea, gr no. 133250, july 9, 2002
facts: the public estates authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation
projectsnationwide. it took over the leasing and selling functions of the denr insofar as reclaimed or
about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
pea sought the transfer to amari, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
freedom islands. pea also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of manila bay to amari.
issue:
whether or not the transfer is valid.

held:
no. to allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to pea as private lands
will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.the supreme court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the freedom islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of pea, are
alienable lands of the public domain. the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of manila bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain. since the amended jva seeks to transfer to amari, a
private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the freedom islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to section 3, article xii of the 1987 constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. furthermore, since the amended jva also
seeks to transfer to amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of manila bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to section 2, article xii of the 1987 constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
article xii section 4. specific limits of forest lands and national parks
la bugal-blaan tribal assn. v. denr, gr127872, jan 27, 2004, mr gr 127882, dec. 1, 2004
facts:
on april 9, 1995, r.a. no. 7942 took effect. r.a. no. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for
mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and
withdrawal, and fixes their terms. similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance
agreements. shortly before the effectivity of r.a. no. 7942, however, or on march 30, 1995, the president
entered into an ftaa with wmcp covering 99,387 hectares of land in south cotabato, sultan kudarat,
davao del sur and north cotabato. dao no. 96-40 was then issued by denr as the irr of ra 7942. on
january 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the denr secretary demanding that the denr
stop the implementation of r.a. no. 7942 and dao no. 96-40, giving the denr fifteen days from receipt to
act thereon. the denr, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter. petitioners claim that the
denr secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
issue :
whether or not the assailed provisions of republic act no. 7942 are unconstitutional.
held :
yes. the court finds assailed provisions of r.a. no. 7942 to be violative of section 2, article xii of the
constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void as said act authorizes service contracts.
although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the
1987 constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law. the framers of this constitution
expressly omitted the phrase service contracts that was provided for in the1973 constitution which
allowed foreign companies to manage and operate mining activities and replaced itwith technical or
financial assistance only. ra 7942, dao 96-40, and the ftaa between the government and wmcp allows
for the management and operation of the foreign-owned corporation for the large-scale exploration,
development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. although counsel for
respondents claim that technical is a very broad term that may cover the management and
operation of such activities, it is still clear from the deliberation of the constitutional commission that
they intended to limit the utilization of the natural resources for the sole enjoyment of the filipinos.
article xii section 5. ancestral lands
cruz v. sec. of denr, 347 scra 128 (2000)
facts:
cruz assailed the validity of the ipra law on the ground that the law amounts to unlawful deprivation of
the states ownership over lands of public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in art 2 sec 12. cruz contends that for providing for an all
econmpassing definition of ancestral lands and domains which might even include private lands found
within said area. sections 3 a and b of said law violates the rights of private land owners.

issue:
whether or not the ipra law is unconstitutional
held:
the ipra law is constitutional. it might perhaps be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
memory or testimony goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership it
will be pressumed to have been held in the same way before the spanish conquest and never have been
part of public lands.
article xii section 6 common good
telecom v. comelec, 289 scra 337 (1998)
facts:
petitioners challenge the validity of section 92, b.p. no. 881 which provide for comelec time, wherein
such airtime (both radio and television who are granted franchise by the govt) shall be allocated
equally and impartially among all candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television
stations, free of charge during the period of campaign. petitioner claims that it suffered losses
amounting to millions in providing comelec time in connection with previous elections and thus will
also lose even more should it do so again this year. petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue
of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to
provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.
issue:
whether or not comelec may require radio and television broadcast stations to run comelec hour
stating that such exercise is for the common good.
held:
yes. the court held that a franchise is a mere privilege which may be reasonably burdened with some
form of public service. thus what better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for
free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters,
so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election. it is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
article xii section 7. private lands
republic v. ca, 235 scra 567
facts:
on june 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought 2 lots as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m.
situated in san pablo city, from one cristeta dazo belen. at the time of the purchase, respondent spouses
where then natural-born filipino citizens. on february 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for
registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the regional trial court of san pablo city, branch
xxxi. this time, however, they were no longer filipino citizens and have opted to embrace canadian
citizenship through naturalization
issue:
whether or not a foreign national may apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he
acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the public land act (ca 141).
held:
yes. the time to determine whether the person acquiring land is qualified is the time the right to own
land is acquired and not the time to register ownership.
article xii section 7. private lands
zaragosa v. ca, gr no. 106401, september 29, 2000
facts:
flavio zaragoza cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land in iloilo. during his lifetime, he
partitioned and distributed (by way of deed of sale) his properties among his children except the
youngest, alberta as she became an american citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the
philippines except by hereditary succession. however, it was understood that two lots (871 and 943)

were her share in the estate.


issue:
whether or not the partition inter vivos by flavio zaragoza cano of his properties, which include lots
871 and 943, is valid.
held:
yes. it was valid. it is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long
as legitimes are not prejudiced. please see art 1080 of ncc. however, to properly determine the legitimes
collation must be done (art.1061). , unfortunately, for this case where the original petition for delivery
of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. the petition must therefore be
dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties
are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were
prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
article xii section 7. private lands
ramirez v. vda. de ramirez, 111 scra 704 (1982)
facts:
jose eugenio ramirez, a filipino national, died in spain on december 11, 1964, willed usufructuaryrights
over real property to an austrian national who is based in spain. this was challenged on the basis of
section 7, but the lower court upheld the validity on the ground that the exception in favour of
testamentary succession applies both to succession by operation of law and to testamentary
succession.
issue:
is the will valid in vesting usufructuary rights to an alien?
held:
the will is valid but not for the reason given by the lower court.
the court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to wanda on the ground that the constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. we are of the opinion
that the constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. any alien
would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a philippine landowner in exchange
for a devise of a piece of land.
this opinion notwithstanding, we uphold the usufruct in favor of wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real
right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of
aliens which is proscribed by the constitution.
main point: usufructuary rights to an alien yes. but the entire title of the land no.
article xii section 7. private lands
halili v. ca, 287 scra 465 (1998)
facts:
simeon de guzman, an american citizen died leaving real properties in the philipppines. his forced heirs
were his widow, helen meyers de guzman, and his son, david rey de guzman both of whom are
american citizens. helen executed a deed of quitclaim conveying to david all her rights, titles, and
interests in 6 parcels of lands she inherited from simeon. thereafter, david sold the disputed lot to
emiliano cataniag a filipino citizen. petitioners, owners of the adjoining lot, questioned the
constitutionality and validity of the 2 conveyances between helen and david and between david and
cataniag.
issue:

is the deed of quitclaim by helen valid?


held:
no. the deed of quitclaim is invalid because it violated section 7, article xii of the constitution which
limits the transfer or conveyance of private lands to those who are qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain. as to the effect of the subsequent sale of david to cataniag, jurisprudence is
consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid.
article xii section 7. private lands
lee v. republic, 366 scra (2001)
facts:
sometime in march 1936, rafael, carmen, francisco, jr., ramon, lourdes, mercedes, concepcion, mariano,
jose, loreto, manuel, rizal and jimmy, all surnamed dinglasan sold to lee liong, a chinese citizen, a
parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631 square meters, designated as lot 398 and covered by
original certificate of title no. 3389, situated at the corner of roxas avenue and pavia street, roxas
city.however, in 1948, the former owners filed with the court of first instance, capiz an action against
the heirs of lee liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. the plaintiffs assailed the validity of
the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private
agricultural land, including residential, commercial or industrial land. rebuffed in the trial court and the
court of appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the supreme court.
issue:
whether lee liong has the qualification to own land in the philippines.
held:
the sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in march 1936, during the effectivity of the
1935 constitution. under the 1935 constitution, aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save
in cases of hereditary succession. thus, lee liong, a chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land
in question.the constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain
was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-filipinos. in this case, however, there
would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of filipinos qualified to acquire
and own such land. if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid.
article xii section 7. private lands
frenzel v. catito, gr no. 143958, july 11, 2003
facts:
alfred fritz frenzel, an australian citizen of german descent, was married to teresita santos; while
ederlina catito, a filipina, was married to klaus muller. alfred and ederlina met and later cohabited in a
common-law relationship, during which alfred acquired real properties; and since he was disqualified
from owning lands in the philippines, ederlinas name appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale.
when their relationship turned sour, alfred filed an action for the recovery of the real properties
registered in the name of ederlina, claiming that he was the real owner.
issue:
whether or not alfred is entitled to compensation for the properties?
held:
no. the court refused to declare alfred as the owner mainly because of the constitutional prohibition. the
court added that being a party to an illegal contract, he could not come to court and ask to have his
illegal objective carried out. even if, as claimed by alfred, the sales in question were entered into by
him as the real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the constitution; hence, are null and void
ab initio. a contract that violates the constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and
creates no obligations. it produces no legal effect at all. alfred, being a party to an illegal contract,
cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. one who loses his
money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral
turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. to him who moves in deliberation and

premeditation, the law is unyielding. the law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.
article xii section 7. private lands
mulller v. muller, gr no. 149615, august 29, 2006
facts:
petitioner, elena buenaventura muller and respondent, helmut muller were married in germany. during
the subsistence of their marriage, respondent purchased a parcel of land in antipolo city and constructed
a house thereon. the antipolo property was registered in the name of the elena. they eventually
separated, prompting helmut to file a petition for separation of property. specifically, helmut prayed for
reimbursement of the funds he paid for the acquisition of said property.
issue:
whether or not helmut is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the antipolo
property.
held:
no. the respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. the court held that
respondent was aware that as an alien, he was prohibited from owning a parcel of land situated in the
philippines. he had, in fact, declared that when the spouses acquired the antipolo property, he had it
titled in the name of elena because of said prohibition. hence, his attempt at subsequently asserting a
right to the said property in the form of a claim for reimbursement is denied. neither did the court
declare that an implied trust was created by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to
respondent. we said that to rule otherwise would permit circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
article xii section 7. private lands
matthews v. taylor spouses, gr no. 164584, june 22, 2009
facts:
on june 30, 1988, respondent benjamin a. taylor (benjamin), a british subject, married joselyn c. taylor,
a 17-year old filipina. on june 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, joselyn bought a property
in boracay island, malay, aklan. the sale was allegedly financed by benjamin. however, benjamin and
joselyn had a falling out, and joselyn ran away. on june 8, 1992, joselyn executed a special power of
attorney (spa) in favor of benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and
otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their boracay property. on july 20, 1992,
joselyn as lessor and petitioner philip matthews as lessee, entered into an agreement of lease involving
the boracay property. benjamin claims that the agreement was null and void since it was entered into by
joselyn without his consent; benjamin instituted an action for declaration of nullity of agreement of
lease with damages against joselyn and philip. benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the
acquisition and improvement of the boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was joselyns
husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
issue:
whether or not benjamin has the right to nullify the agreement of lease between joselyn and philip?
held:
no. benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the
philippines. considering that joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the deed of sale of said
property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. this is true even if we sustain benjamins claim that he
provided the funds for such acquisition. by entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no
implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no
declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the
spouses. in any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the
boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of
a husband in respect of conjugal property. to sustain such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. if the property were to be declared conjugal, this would
accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive
vote as to its transfer or disposition. this is a right that the constitution does not permit him to have.
article xii section 7. private lands

hulst v. pr builders, gr no. 156364, september 25, 2008


facts:
this is a case that started from a verbal agreement between petitioner and his wife who are both dutch
nationals and respondent company to enter a contract to sell over a 210-square meter residential
condominium unit in batangas. upon failure of respondent in its side of the agreement, petitioners filed
a case under the housing and land regulatory board against respondent for recession of contract with
damages, interest and attorneys fees. the hlurb ruled in favour of petitioner and issued a writ of
execution to the ex-officio sheriff of talisay rtc. the levy conducted was however set aside upon the
court of appeals decision in favour of respondents for for petition for certiorari and prohibition. sheriff
was instead ordered to levy on the personal properties of respondent. pending the hlurb decision on
respondents motion to quash, the sheriff proceeded with the action and awarded the 15 parcels of land
to holly property realty as highest bidder. upon filing of legal fees and contract to sell in favour of the
highest bidder to hulrb however, sheriff received orders to suspend the auction for gross disparity in the
appraisal value of the properties in question. the hulrb set aside the levy of the questioned properties
and the court of appeals affirmed the decision. the supreme court first division reversed the ca decision
and declared the hulrb decision null and void. however, deciding that the agreement entered into by
petitioner and respondent is null and void because of violations to article xii section 7 of the 1987
constitution, the sc ruled the petitioner to deliver to respondent the amount of p2,125,540.00 which is
the net proceeds of the auction as delivered by the sheriff to petitioner. petitioner filed present motion
for partial reconsideration on the delivery of p2,125,540.00 contending among others that the contract
to sell between petitioner and respondent does not contravene the constitutional provision against
ownership of private lands by aliens.
issue:
whether or not the contract to sell at bar violates of section 7 article xii of the 1987 constitution.
held:
no, the contract to sell in question does not contravene section 7 article xii. the case at bar involves
condominium properties which fall under the condominium act. the petitioner is merely a member of
the condominium corporation and ownership of the condominium lot remains on the respondent.
ownership of the lot is not convened to the petitioner; hence, the constitutional provision against
ownership of private lands by aliens is not violated. decision modified to eliminate the return of
p2,125,540.00 as excess proceeds of auction from petitioner to respondent.
article xii section 8. exception for former filipino citizens
republic v. ca, 235 scra 567 (1994)
facts:
this is a case regarding the validity of ownership by private respondents of residential lots. in the case
at bar, respondent spouses who were then filipino citizens bought two parcels of residential lots located
in san pablo city. the spouses later applied for registration of the property before the san pablo city rtc.
this was however opposed by petitioner contending that at the time of application, private respondents
are already canadian citizens through naturalization; hence, violating the constitutional provision
against ownership of private lands by aliens. the regional trial court ruled in favour of private
respondents and the court of appeals affirmed the decision; hence, this petition.
issue:
whether or not the registration of the lots in the case at bar in favour of respondents who are foreign
citizens is unconstitutional.
held:
no, it does not violate the constitution. the time to determine whether a person acquiring the land is
qualified is at the time the right to own is acquired and not at the time of registration. in the case at bar,
the right to own the property is conveyed to the buyer by the time the land was purchased when he was
still a filipino citizen; hence, he is qualified to register the land under his name in accordance with
section 7 article xii of the 1987 constitution.
article xii section 10. filipinization
manila prince hotel v. gsis, 267 scra 408 (1997)

facts:
this is a case regarding the constitutionality of a sale of shares of stocks to a foreign corporation. in the
case at bar, respondent pursuant to the privatization program of the philippine government decided to
sell 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the manila hotel corporation. only two bidders
participated for the 51% issued and outstanding stocks: petitioner bidding for p41.58 per share; and
renong berhad, a malaysian company, for p44.00 per share followed by a managers check as bid
security. gsis refused to accept both bids and the managers check. a tro enjoining the granting of the
shares to renong berhad as highest bidder was issued. petitioner filed this petition for prohibition and
mandamus invoking their right under article xii section 10 of the 1987 constitution.
issue:
whether or not the awarding of the 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of mhc to renong berhad,
a foreign company, as highest bidder is unconstitutional.
held:
yes, it is unconstitutional. the awarding of the stocks to a foreign company even if the said company is
the higest bidder violates the filipino first provision of the 1987 constitution as provided in section 10
article xii of the 1987 constitution. the state has the duty to protect the rights of filipinos by giving
preference to qualified filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. the manila hotel has been an important repository of philippine history and
culture and must be protected by the state; hence, ownership of its shares must not be readily
transferred to foreigners even if they give the highest bid in an auction solely for government
privatization.
article xii section 10. filipinization
army and navy club v. ca, 271 scra 36 (1997)
facts:
the petitioner occupied a land and the army navy club building owned by the city of manila by virtue of
the contract of leaseexecuted between petitioner and the city of manila in january 1983. however, the
petitioner violated the terms and conditions of the contract which prompted the city of manila to file a
case for ejectment and illegal detainer against petitioner. the mtc ruled in favour of city of manila and
ordered the petitioner to vacate the premises. the petitioner appealed the decision to the rtc but it was
denied. the petitioner again appealed to the ca but it was also denied and affirmed the decision of the
lower court. hence this petition to annul the decision of the ca.
issue:
whether or not the ca gravely erred in upholding the ouster of petitioner from the disputed premises
which is declared as a historical landmark.
held:
the court ruled that the argument of petitioner that the site is a historical landmark is not a substantial
issue of fact which does not in any way affect or alter the merit of the ejection suit. the historical
significance of the site shall not be affected if petitioners eviction is warranted. the petitioner is merely
a lessee of the property. by virtue of the lease contract, the petitioner has obligations to fulfil. petitioner
cannot just hide behind some recognition bestowed upon it in order to escape from its obligations or
remain in possession. it violated the terms and conditions of the lease contract. thus, petitioners
eviction from the premises is inevitable. the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. the instant
petition is denied for lack of merit.
article xii section 10. filipinization
tanada v. angara, 272 scra 18 (1997)
facts:
petitioners senator tanadaet. al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the philippine
senate of the presidents ratification of the international agreement establishing the world trade
organization. they argued that the wto agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 constitution to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by filipinos by giving
preference to qualified filipinos and to promote preferential use of filipino labor, domesic materials and
locally produced goods. further, they contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the
wto agreement places nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as filipinos and

local products in contravention the filipino first policy of our constitution and render meaningless the
phrase effectively controlled by filipinos.
issue:
whether or not the 1987 constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized.
held:
the courtdismissed the petition. the 1987 constitution does not prohibit our country from participating
in worldwide trade agreements. while indeed the constitution mandates a bias in favors of filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprise, at the same time, it recognized the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity. the constitution did not intend to
pursue an isolationist policy. it did not shut out foreign investments, goods and service in the
development of the philippine economy. while the constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry
of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. in fact, it
allows an exchange of good, services and products but frowns only on foreign competition that is
unfair and unjust.
article xii section 11. public utilities
bagatsing v. committee, 246 scra 344 (1995)
facts:
the petitioner amado bagatsing filed a petition for prohibition which sought to nullify the bidding
conducted for the sale of a block of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock of petron corporation
and the award made to aramco overseas company as the highest bidder and to stop the sale of said
block of shares to aramco. the petition for prohibition and certiorari sought to annul the sale of the
same block of petron shares which is subject of the petition and asked for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (tro) to stop respondents from selling the 40% block to a foreign buyer. petitioners
claim that the inclusion of petron in the privatization program contravened the declared policy of the
state to dispose of only non-performing assets of the government. petitioners also contend that petron is
a public utility in which foreign ownership of its equity shall not exceed 40% thereof and the foreign
participation in the governing body shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital.
issue:
whether or not the business of oil refining is a public utility within the purview of section 11 article xii
of the 1987 constitution.
held:
the court held that public utility under the constitution is one organized for hire and compensation to
serve the public which is given the right to demand its service. petron is not engaged in oil refining for
hire and compensation to process the oil of other parties. under its definition, petron, the refining
company of the government was not considered a public utility coming under section 11 article xii of
the 1987 constitution because it does not engage in oil refining for hire and compensation. the petition
is dismissed.
article xii section 11. public utilities
albano v. reyes, 175 scra 36 (1997)
facts:
phil. ports authority (ppa) adopted a resolution directing mgmt. to prepare the invitation to bid and all
relevant
bidding
documents
necessary
for
the
public bidding of the development,
mgmt., and operation of the manila intl. container terminal (mict) and authorized the board chairman.
the ppa published the invitation to bid with the reservation that it had the right to reject any bid and to
accept such bid it may deem advantageous to the govt. sec. reyes awarded the contract to intl.
container terminal services (ictsi) because it offered the best technical and financial proposal. two
cases were filed questioning the legality or regularity of the bidding by a concerned taxpayer and by
sharp co. which actively participated in the bidding. the president approved the proposed mict

contract. the ppa and ictfsi perfected the contract. rodolfo albano, a member of the house of
representatives filed the present case assailing the award o f the contract on the ground that since the
mict is a public utility, it needs a legislative franchise before it can legally operate as a public utility.
issue :
whether or not a legislative franchise is necessary.
held :
no. petition dismissed. a franchise specially granted by congress is not necessary for the operation
of themict by a private entity. under eo 30 and pd 857, the ppa may contract with ictsi for the mgmt.,
operation and devt. of the mict. legislative franchises are not required before each and every public
utility may operate. the law has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for
or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. that the consti provides that the issuance of a
franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
congress does not necessarily imply that only congress has the power to grant such authorization.
article xii section 11. public utilities
tatad v. garcia, 243 scra 436 (1995)
facts:
dotc planned to construct a light railway transit line along edsa. no. 6957 entitled an act
authorizing the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure projects by the
private sector, and for other purposes or bot law provided for two schemes for the financing,
construction and operation of government projects through private initiative and investment: buildoperate-transfer(bot) or build-transfer (bt). prequalification bids and awards committee (pbac) and the
technical committee were created by the dotc in relation to edsa light rail transit iii project.
only the edsa lrt consortium met the requirements of pbac. dotc requested presidential approval of the
contract but then exe. sec. drilon conveyed that the pres. could not sign the same and so dotc and
private respondents re-negotiated the agreement. the agreement provided inter alia that upon full or
partial completion and viability thereof, private respondent shall deliver the use and possession of the
completed portion to dotc which shall operate the same. ra no. 7718 amended ra no. 6957; it
expressly provides for blt scheme and allows direct negotiation of blt contracts
issue:
whether or not edsa lrt corp., ltd., a foreign corporation can own edsa lrt iii, a public utility.
held:
yes. petition dismissed. what private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the
coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. while a franchise is needed to
operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by themselves constitute a public utility. what
constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public.
sec. 11, art. xii of the const.: no franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive character or
for a longer period than fifty years.
article xii section 11. public utilities
telecom v. comelec, 289 scra 337 (1998)
facts:
petitioner telecommunications and broadcast attorneys of the philippines, inc. (telebap) was declared to
be without legal standing to sue in this case as it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual
or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. affected by the enforcement of section 92, b.p. no.
881.petitioners
challenge
the
validity
of
section
92,
b.p.
no.
881.
petitioner contends that while section 90 of the same law requires comelec to procure print space
in newspapers and magazines with payment, section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by
comelec free of charge. thus it contends that section 92 singles out radio and television stations to

provide free air time claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the
sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust
taking of private property.
issue:
whether or not section 92 of b.p. no. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal
protection of the laws.
held:
no. petitioners argument is without merit. all broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is
licensed by the government. radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises,
do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images.
they are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. thus, such exercise of the privilege may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. in
granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the
state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them. as radio and television
broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they
provide air time to the comelec.
article xii section 11. public utilities
jg summit holdings v. ca, 345 scra 143 (2000)
facts:
national investment and development corporation (nidc) and kawasaki heavy industries entered into a
joint venture agreement in a shipyard business named philseco, with a shareholding of 60-40
respectively. nidcs interest was later transferred to the national government. pursuant to president
aquinos proclamation no.5, which established the committee on privatization (cop) and asset
privatization trust (apt), and allowed for the disposition of the governments non-performing assets, the
latter allowed kawasaki heavy industries to choose a company to which it has stockholdings, to top the
winning bid of jg summit holdings over philseco. jg summit protested alleging that such act would
effectively increase kawasakis interest in philsecoa shipyard is a public utility--and thus violative of
the constitution.
issue:
whether or not the respondent is prohibited to possess the disputed property considering the prohibition
stipulated in the 1987 constitution against foreign owned companies.
held:
no. no law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares in a landholding corporation even if the latter
will exceed the allowed foreign equity, what the law disqualifies is the corporation from owning land.
article xii section 11. public utilities
associated communications v. ntc, gr no. 144109, february 17, 2003
facts:
on 1931, act 3846 was enacted which requires a congressional franchise before a radio station can
operate. on 1969, acws acquired a congressional franchise for radio which made it eligible to establish
a radio station. in 1974, pd 576 was issued which requires radio and tv stations to obtain a permit from
board of communications and dpwh. however, on 1979 eo 546, abolished bc and created ntc. there has
been a conflict of interpretation with pd 576 and eo 546 and thus, doj issued on doj opinion 98 of 1991
that eo 546modified the requirements granted by pd 576. on 1994, mou between broadcasting groups
and ntc was established which requires a congressional franchise to operate. petition, in the same year,
tried to acquire a congressional franchise but failed due to lack of requirements. however, petitioner
was given temporary permit to operate by the ntc which would expire in 1997. on 1997, ntc informed
that acws needs to acquire a congressional franchise before it can operate. yet, petitioner failed to gain
such franchise. therefore, ntc held an administrative case against petitioner and concluded that it its
channel 25 shall be recalled. petitioner raised it to ca and said that it already filed for a congressional
franchise and therefore the recall should be suspended. ca affirmed the decision of ntc

issues:
does it mean that, since television stations are not covered in act 3846, television stations are exempted
from obtaining a franchise?
held:
no. though does not literally cover televisions, the subsequent pd 576 covers the congressional
franchise requirement for television stations also.
article xii section 11. public utilities
eastern telecom v. telecom technologies, gr no. 135992, july 23, 2004
facts:
respondent international communication corporation, applied for and was given by the ntc a provisional
authority (pa) to install, operate and provide local exchange service in quezon city, malabon and
valenzuela, metro manila, and the entire bicol region.eastern telecommunications philippines, inc.
(etpi), was granted by the ntc a pa on september 25, 1996, to install, operate and maintain a local
exchange service in the provinces of batanes, cagayan valley, isabela, kalinga-apayao, nueva vizcaya,
ifugao, quirino, the cities of manila and caloocan, and the municipality of navotas, metro manila.icc
was granted by the ntc operation on manila and navotas, two areas which are already covered by
eastern telecommunication on a prior date.
issue:
ntc grant valid?
held:
yes. the power of the ntc to grant a provisional authority has long been settled. as the regulatory
agency of the national government with jurisdiction over all telecommunications entities, it is clothed
with authority and given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority.in granting icc the
pa to operate a local exchange carrier service in the manila and navotas areas, the ntc took into
consideration icc's financial and technical resources and found them to be adequate.
article xii section 11. public utilities
gamboa v. teves, 652 scra 690
facts:
this is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of philippine telecommunications investment
corporation (ptic) by the government of the republic of the philippines, acting through the inter-agency
privatization council (ipc), to metro pacific assets holdings, inc. (mpah), an affiliate of first pacific
company limited (first pacific), a hong kong-based investment management and holding company and
a shareholder of the philippine long distance telephone company (pldt). the petitioner questioned the
sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or about 6.3 percent of the
outstanding common shares) of pldt owned by ptic to first pacific. with the this sale, first pacifics
common shareholdings in pldt increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total
common shareholdings of foreigners in pldt to about 81.47%. this, according to the petitioner, violates
section 11, article xii of the 1987 philippine constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital
of a public utility to not more than 40%.
issue:
whether or not the term capital in section 11, article xii of the constitution refers to the total common
shares only, or to the total outstanding capital stock of pldt, a public utility?
held:
the term capital in section 11, article xii of the constitution refers only to common shares. however, if
the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term capital shall
include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the

corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. the supreme court ruled
and partly grant the term capital in section 11, article xii of the constitution refers only to shares of
stock that can vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and
not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares).
article xii section 11. public utilities
pagcor v. bir, 645 scra 338
facts:
with the passage of republic act no. (ra) 9337, the philippine amusement and gaming corporation
(pagcor) has been excluded from the list of (goccs) that are exempt from tax under section27(c) of the
tax code; pagcor is now subject to corporate income tax.
issue:
whether or not pagcor is exempted from vat.
held:
as regards the liability of pagcor to vat, the sc finds section 4.108-3 of revenue regulations no. (rr) 162005, which subjects pagcor and its licensees and franchisees to vat, null and void for being contrary to
the national internal revenue code (nirc), as amended by ra 9337. according to the sc, ra 9337 does not
contain any provision that subjects pagcor to vat. instead, the sc finds support to the vat exemption of
pagcor under section 109(k) of thetax code, which provides that transactions exempt under
international agreements to which the philippines is a signatory or under special laws (except pd 529)
are exempt from vat. considering that pagcors charter, that is, pd 1869 which grants pagcor exemption
from taxes is as pecial law, it is exempt from payment of vat.
article xii section 12. filipino first policy
tanada v. angara, 272 scra 18 (1997)
facts:
the wto opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. thus, provides new opportunities
for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the
country. these are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory
senators, a free market espoused by wto. petitioners on the other hand viewed the wto agreement as
one that limits, restricts and impair philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. that the
filipino first policy of the constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
issue:
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the senate in giving its concurrence of the said wto agreement.
held:
in its declaration of principles and state policies, the constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. by the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered
automatically part of our own laws. pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed
in good faith. a treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties. through wto the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute
because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. such as when philippines joined the
united nations (un) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as

auto-limitation. what senate did was a valid exercise of authority. as to determine whether such
exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. the act of
signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as wto allows withdrawal of membership
should this be the political desire of a member. also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic
sovereignty. wto remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for
the development of international trade law. its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic selfdestruction. thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
article xii section 16. corporations
ndc v. pvb, 192 scra 257 (1990)
facts:
facts: agrix marketing executed in favor of respondent a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land.
agrix later on went bankrupt. in order to rehabilitate the company, then president marcos issued
presidential decree 1717 which mandated, among others, the extinguishing of all the mortgages and
liens attaching to the property of agrix, and creating a claims committee to process claims against the
company to be administered mainly by ndc. respondent thereon filed a claim against the company
before the committee. petitioner showever filed a petition with the rtc of calamba, laguna invoking the
provision of the law which cancels all mortgage liens against it. respondent took measures to
extrajudicially foreclose which the petitioners opposed by filing another case in the same court. these
cases were consolidated. the rtc held in favor of the respondent on the ground of unconstitutionality of
the decree; mainly violation of the separation of powers, impairment of obligation of contracts, and
violation of the equal protection clause. hence this petition.
issue:
won the respondent estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the lawsince they first abided by
it by filing a claim with the committee?
won pd 1717 unconstitutional?
ruling: on the issue of estoppel, the court held that it could not apply in thepresent case since when
respondent filed his claim, president marcos was the supreme ruler of the country and they could not
question his acts even before the courts because of his absolute power over all government institutions
when he was the president. the creation of new agrix as mandated by the decree was also ruled as
unconstitutional since it violated the prohibition that the batasang pambansa (congress) shall not
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations unless such corporations
are owned or controlled by the government. pd 1717 was held as unconstitutional on the other grounds
that it was an invalid exercise of police power, it had no lawful subject and no lawful method. it
violated due process by extinguishing all mortgages and liens and interests which are property rights
unjustly taken. it also violated the equal protection clause by lumping together all secured and
unsecured creditors. it also impaired the obligation of contracts, even though it only involved purely
private interests.
article xii section 17. temporary take-over
agan v. piatco, 420 scra 575
facts:
the 1997 concession agreement gave piatco the exclusive right to operate a commercial international
passenger terminal within the island of luzon, with the exception of already existing terminals such as
those in the subic bay freeport, clark special economic zone, and in laoag city. this privilege, however,
is subject to reasonable regulation and supervision and should not violate the rights of third parties.
there are service providers at the naia i with existing contracts with the miaa valid until 2010; since the
1997 concession agreement says piatco is not bound to honor existing contracts with miaa, transferring
operations from naia i to naia iii would unduly prejudice them. piatco cannot, by law and certainly not

by contract, render a valid and binding contract nugatory. piatco, by the mere expedient claiming an
exclusive right to operate, cannot require the government to break its contractual obligations to the
service providers.
issue:
whether or not the state can temporarily take over a business affected with public interest.
held:
yes. piatco cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the constitutional provision on
temporary government takeover and obligate the government to pay reasonable cost for the use of the
terminal and/or terminal complex.
article xii section 17. temporary take-over
david v. macapagal-arroyo, gr no. 171396, may 2006
facts:
gma issued pp 1017 (declares a state of national emergency) for reasons of possible attacks of magdalo.
afp in suppressing the lawless in relation to pp 1017 cancellation of 20th edsa revolution celebration;
harsh dispersal of protesters petitioner david et al arrested (without warrants); writings (news) about
dispersal were confiscated. pnp warned to take over uncooperative media establishment. questions on
constitutionality of pp 1017
issue:
valid declarations (pp 1017/g.o. no. 5)?
held:
declaration of national emergency is valid except taking-over private media companies.
article xii section 18. nationalization
republic v. pldt, 26 scra 620 (1968)
facts:
public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the bureau of
telecommunications to demand interconnection between the government telephone system and that of
pldt, so that the government telephone system could make use of the lines and facilities of the pldt.
private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is
had between them.
issue:
whether or not interconnection between pldt and the government telephone system can be a valid object
for expropriation.
held:
yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the republic may require the telephone
company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation. the use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between
the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.
article xii section 18. nationalization
pldt v. ntc, 190 scra 717 (1990)
facts:
on 22 june 1958, ra 2090 was enacted granting felix alberto & co. (later etci) a franchise to establish
radio stations for domestic and transoceanic telecommunications. on 13 may 1987, etci filed an
application with the ntc for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate,
etc. a cellular mobile telephone system and an alpha numeric paging system in metro manila and in the
southern luzon regions, with a prayer for provisional authority to operate within metro manila. pldt
filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss. on 12 november 1987, ntc overruled pldts opposition and
declared ra 2090 should be liberally construed so as to include the operation of a cellular mobile
telephone service as part of services of the franchise. on 12 december 1988, ntc granted etci provisional
authority to install, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile telephone service initially in metro manila

subject to the terms and conditions set forth in its order, including an interconnection agreement to be
entered with pldt. pldt filed a motion to set aside order which was denied by the ntc on 8 may 1989.
pldt challenged the 12 december 1988 and 8 may 1989 ntc orders before the supreme court through a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
issues:
whether the provisional authority was properly granted.
held:
the provisional authority granted by the ntc (which is the regulatory agency of the national government
over all telecommunications entities) has a definite expiry period of 18 months unless sooner renewed;
may be revoked, amended or revised by the ntc; covers one of four phases; limited to metro manila
only; and does not authorize the installation and operation of an alphanumeric paging system. it was
further issued after due hearing, with pldt attending and granted after a prima facie showing that etci
had the necessary legal, financial and technical capabilities; and that public interest, convenience and
necessity so demanded. provisional authority would be meaningless if the grantee were not allowed to
operate, as its lifetime is limited and may be revoked by the ntc at any time in accordance with law.
article xii section 19. monopolies and combinations
erb v. ca
facts:
shell filed with the quondam bureau of energy utilization (beu) an application for authority to relocate
its shell service station at tambo, paraaque, metro manila, to imelda marcos avenue of the same
municipality. two other companies, namely petrophil and caltex, also opposed the application on the
ground that shell failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements. in a resolution, the beu
dismissed the application on jurisdictional grounds and for lack of "full title" of the lessor over the
proposed site. however, the beu reinstated the same application and thereafter conducted a hearing
thereon. the beu rendered a decision denying shell's application on a finding that there was "no
necessity for an additional petroleum products retail outlet in imelda marcos avenue, paraaque.
dissatisfied, shell appealed to the office of energy affairs (oea). on may 8, 1987, executive order no.
172 was issued creating the energy regulatory board (erb) and transferring to it the regulatory and
adjudicatory functions of the beu. oea rendered a decision denying the appeal of shell and affirming the
beu decision. shell moved for reconsideration and prayed for a new hearing or the remand of the case
for further proceedings. the erb rendered a decision allowing shell to establish the service station. pdsc
filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision. the motion was, however, denied by erb.
aggrieved, pdsc elevated to the court of appeals. it was granted. dissatisfied, both shell and erb elevated
the matter to this court by way of these petitions.

issue: won shell should be restrained from relocation.


ruling:
in the spirit of the provision of the constitution, article xii, section 19, only competition which is fair
can release the creative forces of the market. competition underlies the provision. there is a reliance
upon the operation of the market system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be produced, how
resources hall be allocated in the production process, and to whom various products will be distributed.
the market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be produced, and on
competition, among producers who will manufacture it.
the court ruled that in order that the opposition based on ruinous competition may prosper (due to the
relocation of shell), it must be shown that the opponent would be deprived of fair profits on the capital
invested in its business. the mere possibility of reduction in the earnings of a business is not
sufficient to prove ruinous competition. it must be shown that the business would not have

sufficient gains to pay a fair rate of interest on its capital investment. mere allegations by the
oppositor that its business would be ruined by the establishment will not suffice. shell is then granted to
relocate its services.
article xii section 19. monopolies and combinations
facts:
congressman enrique t. garcia, filed a petition to declare section 19 of ra 8479, which sets the time of
the full deregulation of the oil industry, as unconstitutional. it was contended that the implementation
of the oil deregulation act will result in the continued stranglehold of the oil industry by the big three
shell, caltex, petron and that the implementation will lead to a violation of section 19 of the
constitution.
issue:
whether or not deregulation will prevent monopoly?
ruling:
the court held that ra8479 was enacted precisely to enhance competition because the government
believes that deregulation will eventually prevent monopoly. towards this end, deregulation of the
industry has been chosen as the tool. whether or not the choice of deregulation as the favoured tool is
wise is not for the court to decide. on the other hand, petitioner has not shown that deregulation will
result in monopoly.
article xii section 19. monopolies and combinations
tatad v, secretary
facts
the petitions at bar challenges the constitutionality of r.a. no. 8180 or the act of deregulating the
downstream oil industry. petitioners argue that certain provision of said law imposes substantial
barriers to the entry and exit of new players in the downstream oil industry. respondent, on the other
hand, aver that such provisions implement the policies and objectives of the said law.
issue
whether or not ra 8180 violates section 19, article xii of the constitution?
ruling
the court held ra 8180 as invalid because three key provisions intended to promote free competition
were shown to achieve the opposite result. the section on tariff differential, stocking of inventiories,
and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the
free interaction of the market forces.
article xii section 19. monopolies and combinations
eastern assurance v. ltfrb
facts:
petitioner eastern assurance (easco) together with other transport groups met with the ltfrb and
proposed for the creation of [a] two-group system and [b] blacklisting scheme for insurance companies.
the proposal was referred by the ltfrb to the insurance commission, which eventually confirmed it.
ltfrb then issued memorandum circular no. 2001-001 passenger accident insurance program. in the
said circular, passenger accident managers, inc. (pami) is authorized to participate in the program and
that all other insurance companies who wish to continue participating in the program, are hereby
required to either join pami or form a second group.
easco filed a petition with the ca stating that said circulars deprived them of their right to engage in the
passenger accident insurance business.
issue
whether or not the ltrfb circulars involve restraint of trade or unfair competition for other insurance

companies?
ruling
the court held that while individual insurance companies may somehow be adversely affected by the
two-group scheme, the paramount public interest involved must be upheld. in any event, all legitimate
insurance companies are allowed to become members of the consortia, thus there is no restraint of trade
or unfair competition involved.
article xii section 19. monopolies and combinations
avon v luna
in this case, the respondent luna was the supervisor of the beautifont inc .avon, the petitioner, acquired
and controlled the said inc. luna remained as the supervisor for the said inc. avon and respondent luna
entered into an agreement, entitled supervisors agreement. section 5 and 6:
5) that the supervisor shall sell or offer to sell, display or promote only and exclusively products sold
by the company.
6) either party may terminate this agreement at will, with or without cause, at any time upon notice to
the other.
then eventually luna signed up as group franchise director of another company, sandr philippines, inc.
(spi). sold and promoted products of spi even to several employees of avon. luna wrote letters to other
members of the avon salesforce inducing them to violate their own contracts with avon. luna for
violating paragraph 5 x xx, the company, pursuant to paragraph 6 of the same agreement, is terminating
and cancels the supervisors agreement with luna. luna files for damages in the rtc and won. avon
appealed.
issue:won the section 5 of the agreement violates section 19 of article 7 of the constitution.
ruling:no. contracts requiring exclusivity are not per se void. each contract must be viewed vis--vis all
the circumstances surrounding such agreement in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.
applying the preceding principles to the case at bar, there is nothing invalid or contrary to public policy
either in the objectives sought to be attained by paragraph 5, i.e., the exclusivity clause, in prohibiting
respondent luna, and all other avon supervisors, from selling products other than those manufactured
by petitioner avon. the limitation does not affect the public at all. it is only a means by which petitioner
avon is able to protect its investment.
article xii section 19. monopolies and combinations
republic v feliciano
facts:
feliciano alleged that he was holding a property tiltle to which evidenced by an informacion posesoria
that upon his purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various
improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in july 1952, which survey was approved by the
director of lands on october 24, 1954.
on november 1, 1954, president ramon magsaysay issued proclamation no. 90 reserving for
settlement purposes, under the administration of the national resettlement and rehabilitation
administration (narra), a tract of land situated in the municipalities of tinambac and siruma, camarines
sur, after which the narra and its successor agency, the land authority, started sub-dividing and
distributing the land to the settlers. the property of feliciano was included among the properties for
subdivision and distribution. feliciano sued the government. feliciano prayed that he be declared the
rightful and true owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of
ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and
subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.
the state pleaded immunity from suit.
issue:

won government may be sued for recovery of possession of the land.


ruling:
no, article 16 sections 3, the state may not be sued without its consent.
a suit against the state, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the
state has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language
too plain to be misinterpreted. it may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the
proceedings.
waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be
construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). moreover, the proclamation is not a legislative act. the
consent of the state to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. waiver of state immunity can
only be made by an act of the legislative body.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
republic v. feliciano, 148 scra 424 (1987)
facts:
respondent pablo feliciano filed a complaint with the then court of first instance of camarines sur
against the republic of the philippines, represented by the land authority, for the recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land. feliciano alleged that he bought the property in question by virtue of
a contract of sale, followed by a deed of absolute; that the title to the said property was evidenced by an
informacion posesoria that feliciano took actual possession of the land, introduced various
improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed which was approved by the director of lands.
president ramon magsaysay issued proclamation no. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the
administration of the national resettlement and rehabilitation administration (narra), started subdividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within the
reservation established under proclamation no. 90, was the private property of plaintiff and should
therefore be excluded therefrom. plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the
property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion
posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be
ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.
issue:
whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land
held:
a suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has consented to be sued,
either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.
the complaint involves land not owned by the state but private land belonging to feliciano; hence the
government is not being divested of any of its properties. there is no showing in the case at bar that the
informacion posesoria held by the respondent had been converted into a record of ownership. however
such possessory information, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie evidence of possession.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
metran v. paredes, 79 phil 819 (1947-1948)
facts:
the national labor union filed before the court of industrial relations a case against metropolitan
transportation service (metran), wherein the labor union alleged that it was a legitimate labor
organization, thirty of whose affiliated members were working and under the employ of the respondent;
that the respondent is a semi-governmental transportation entity, popularly known as metran, and
after several other allegations concluded with the prayer that its nine demands at length set forth in the
said petition be granted. in behalf of the so-called respondent an oral petition for dismissal of the case
was made on the ground that the respondent belongs to the republic of the philippines and as such, it
cannot be sued.
issue:
whether or not metran can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit
held:

it is beyond dispute that the metropolitan transportation service (metran) is and was at the times
covered by the petition in the court of industrial relations an office created by executive order no. 59
and operating under the direct supervision and control of the department of public works and
communications. the said office not being a juridical person, any suit, action or proceeding against it, if
it were to produce any effect, would in practice be a suit, action or proceeding against the government
itself, of which metropolitan transportation service (metran) is a mere office or agency. the bureau of
public works under whose supervision the metropolitan transportation service (metran) has been
organized and functions in is an integral part of the government, just as the said office or agency. and
apart from the consideration that neither said bureau nor said office has any juridical personality to be
sued for reasons already set forth, any suit or action attempted against either will necessarily be a suit
or action against the government itself in a republican state, like the philippines, government immunity
from suit without its consent is derived from the will of the people themselves in freely creating a
government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
nac v. teodoro, 91 phil 203 (1952)
facts:
the national airports corporation was organized under republic act no. 224, which expressly made the
provisions of the corporation law applicable to the said corporation. on november 10, 1950, the
national airports corporation was abolished and the civil aeronautics administration was created to take
its place. before the abolition, the philippine airlines, inc. paid to the national airports corporation p65,
245 as fees for landing and parking on bacolod airport no. 2 for the period up to and including july 31,
1948. these fees are said to have been due and payable to the capitol subdivision, inc. which owned the
land used by the national airports corporation as airport, and the owner commenced an action in the
court of first instance of negros occidental against the philippine airlines, inc., to recover the above
amount. the philippine airlines, inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the national airports
corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the civil aeronautics
administration. the third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the national airports corporation the
fees claimed by the capitol subdivision, inc. "on the belief and assumption that the third party
defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third party defendant and its
predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers of said bacolod airport no. 2 and, further,
that the third party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly the capitol subdivision, inc., the
reasonable rentals for the use of their lands."
issue:
whether or not the national airports corporation "has lost its juridical personality," and, as an agency of
the republic of the philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is
incapable of suing and being sued.
held:
not all government entities, whether corporate or non corporate, are immune from suits. immunity from
suits is determined by the character of the obligations for which the entity was organized. these
provisions confer upon the civil aeronautics administration, in our opinion, the power to sue and be
sued. the power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. and if it has
the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the civil aeronautics administration with greater reason
should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the national airports corporation,
having acquired all the properties, funds and chooses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the
latter. to deny the national airports corporation's creditors access to the courts of justice against the civil
aeronautics administration is to say that the government could impair the obligation of its corporations
by the simple expedient of converting them into unincorporated agencies.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
mobil philippines v. customs arrastre, 18 scra 120 (1966)
facts:
four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on s.s. "leoville", consigned to mobil

philippines exploration, inc., manila. the shipment was discharged to the custody of the customs
arrastre service, the unit of the bureau of customs then handling arrastre operations therein. the customs
arrastre service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. mobil
philippines exploration, inc., filed suit in the court of first instance of manila against the customs
arrastre service and the bureau of customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of
p18, 493.37 plus other damages. defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. appellant contends that not all government
entities are immune from suit; that defendant bureau of customs as operator of the arrastre service at
the port of manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.
issue:
whether or not the defendants can invoke state immunity.
held:
now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not
necessarily result in its being suable. if said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to
its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to
such government entity. the bureau of customs, to repeat, is part of the department of finance, with no
personality of its own apart from that of the national government. its primary function is governmental,
that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs
duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (sec. 602, r.a. 1937). to this function, arrastre service is a
necessary incident. clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a
necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the bureau of customs, so that
engaging in the same does not necessarily render said bureau liable to suit. for otherwise, it could not
perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. sovereign immunity,
granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
pnr v. iac, 217 scra 401 (1993)
facts:
the case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of defendant philippine national railways,
(pnr) coming from san fernando, la union and bound for manila and a passenger bus of baliwag transit,
inc. which was on its way to hagonoy, bulacan, from manila, but upon reaching the railroad crossing at
barrio balungao, calumpit, bulacan, got stalled and was hit by defendant's express train causing
damages to plaintiff's bus and its passengers, eighteen of whom died and fifty-three others suffered
physical injuries. plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and
imprudence of defendant pnr and its locomotive engineer, honorio cirbado, in operating its passenger
train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn
the public of approaching train that would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for
damages against defendants. the defendants, in their answer traversed the material allegation of the
complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence,
imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, romeo hughes.
issue:
whether or not pnr being a governmental agency is liable for damages.
held: no, the manila railroad company, the pnrs predecessor, as a common carrier, was not immune
from suit. the state divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the pnr which is no
different from its predecessor, the manila railroad company. the pnr did not become immune from suit.
it did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the civil code on common
carriers.the correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are
immune from suits. immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the
entity was organized."thus, suits against state agencies with respect to matters in which they have
assumed to act in a private or nongovernmental capacity are not suits against the state. suits against
state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or
nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public

purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. the latter is
true, although the state may own the stock or property of such a corporation, for by engaging in
business operations through a corporation the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and
by implicating consents to suits against the corporation.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
ministerio v. cfi
facts:
petitioners sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot; alleging that in 1927 the
national government took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of a
national road, without paying just compensation and without any agreement. there was an allegation of
repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendant public highway
commissioner and the auditor general refused to restore its possession.
issue: won the defendants are immune from suit
ruling:
yes. if the property can no longer be restored and is in fact being enjoyed by the state, then the state
must be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court for purposes of fixing the just
compensation.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
municipality of sna fernando v. firme
facts:
a collision occurred between a passenger jeep and dump truck of the municipality of san fernando,
while it was on its way to get sand&gravel for the repair of san fernandos municipal street. due to the
impact, several passengers of the jeepney, including laureano banina sr. died, as a result of the injuries
they sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. the private respondents
instituted a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney. the owner
and driver of the passenger jeepney filed a third party complaint against the municipality of san
fernando and the dump truck driver. petitioner raised as of its defenses the non-suitability of the state ,
thus it cannot be held liable.
issue:
won petitioner is immune from suit.
ruling: yes.
the test of liability of the municipality depends on won the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality,
is performing governmental or proprietary functions. the construction or maintenance of roads are
governmental activities, therefore, the municipality of san fernando cannot be held liable.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
lansang v ca
facts:
private respondents general assembly of the blind, inc. (gabi) and jose iglesias were allegedly awarded
a verbal contract of lease in to occupy a portion of rizal park by the national parks
development committee (npdc). private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as
well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. after the edsa revolution, petitioner lansang, the new
chairman of the npdc, sought to clean up rizal park. petitioner terminated the so-called verbal
agreement with gabi and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately
within the public park. gabi filed an action for damages and injunction against petitioner.
issue:
won the complaint filed against the petitioner is in reality a complaint against the state.
ruling:
no. the rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment
against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as

appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
(rizal park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of lease contract. the
private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of
accommodation by the previous administrator. this being so, petitioner may validly discontinue the
accommodation extended to private respondents. private respondents cannot and do not claim a vested
right to continue to occupy rizal park.)
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
traders royal bank v. iac
traders royal bank entered into a loan agreement with the nmpc represented by dir. cendaa and the psi
represented by its president jalosjos, for the purposes of broadcasting the 1981 season of the pba
amounting to 2.5 million pesos. nmpc-psi failed to pay its obligations with traders, hence, traders filed
with the cfi a complaint against nmpc-psi for the collection of the said amount. cfi issued a writ
compelling the nmpc-psi to pay the obligations incurred in the loan, psi, through jalosjos, paid 1.8
millioin as partial payment of the obligation. nmpc filed a motion to dismiss the case contending that as
a government instrumentality it has immunity from suit, cfi denied the motion. nmpc now filed before
the iac contending that the cfi acted with grave abuse of discretion for not recognizing nmpcs
immunity from suit. iac granted nmpcs petition. traders assailed iacs decision contending that by
entering into a contract nmpc waived its right from immunity of suit.
issue: whether or not the nmpc, by entering into a contract waived its rights from immunity of suit
held: the court ruled that as a general rule, government instrumentalities are immune from suit even
though it enters a contract so long as it is still in the scope of its governmental functions, in the case at
bar broadcasting the pba season is not an act of disseminating governmental information hence it
impliedly waived its immunity from suit.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
pepublic v. sandoval
facts:farmer-rallyists marched to malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. there was a
confrontation between the police and rallyists which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores
were wounded. as a result pres. aquino issued ao 11 creating the citizens mendiola commission for the
purpose of conducting an investigation. the most significant recommendation of the commission was
for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. based on
such recommendation, the victims of mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the
republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident. petitioners claimed for a waiver of
immunity.
issues: whether or not the state is liable for damages
held:the recommendation made by the commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the
victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the state. ao 11 merely states the purpose of
the creation of the commission, whatever the finding of the commission is only serves as the basis for a
cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. the recommendation of the
commission does not in any way bind the state. the state cannot be made liable because the
military/police officers responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the
scope of their authority. it is a settled rule that the state as a person can commit no wrong. the military
and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as
they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
da v, nlrc
facts:petitioner department of agriculture (da) and sultan security agency entered into a contract for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. pursuant to their
arrangements, guards were deployed by sultan security agency in the various premises of the da.

thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay,
uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages
against the da and the security agency. the labor arbiter rendered a decision finding the da jointly and
severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security
guards. the da and the security agency did not appeal the decision. thus, the decision became final and
executory. the labor arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the
property of the da and the security agency. thereafter, the city sheriff levied on execution the motor
vehicles of the da.
issue: whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the state applies in the case
held:in the case, the da has not assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it
entered into the contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character, be
that as it may, the claims of the security guards clearly constitute money claims. act no. 3083 gives the
consent of the state to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied. pursuant, however, to commonwealth act 327, as amended by pd 1145, the money
claim must first be brought to the commission on audit.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
epg construction v. vigilar
facts:
(1983) the herein petitioners-contractors, under contracts with dpwh,constructed 145 housing units but
coverage of construction and funding under the said contracts was only for 2/3 of each
housing unit. through the verbal request and assurance of then dpwh undersecretary canlas, they
undertook
additional
constructionsfor the completion of the project, but said additional constructions were not issued payme
nt by dpwh. with a favorable recommendation from the dpwh asst. secretary for legal affairs, the
petitioners sent a demand letter to the dpwh secretary. the dpwh auditor did not object to the payment
subject to whatever action coa may adopt.(1992) through the request of then dpwh secretary de jesus,
the dbm released the amount for payment but (1996) respondent dpwh secretary vigilar denied the
money claims prompting petitioners to file a petition for mandamus before the rtc which said trial court
denied. hence,
this
petition.among others, respondentsecretary argues that the state may not be suedinvoking the constitutional doctrine of non-suability of
the state also known as the royal prerogative of dishonesty.
issue:
whether or not the principle of state immunity is applicable in the case at bar.
held:
the principle of state immunity finds no application in this case. under the circumstances, respondent
may not validly invoke the royal prerogative of dishonesty and hide under the states cloak of
invincibility against suit. considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. the rule is
not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. it is just as important that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule
of law is to be maintained. the ends of justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this instance,
the states immunity from suit. this court - as the staunch guardian of the citizens rights and welfarecannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument
of perpetration thereof. justice
and equity
sternly
demand that the
states
cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance and that petitioners-contractors be
duly compensated , on the basis of quantum meruit, for construction done on the public works housing
project petition granted.

article vxi section 3. immunity from suit


philrock v bol
facts
philrock filed in the rtc of manila branch 38 a complaint against the board of liquidators (bol) for
specific performance or revaluation w/ damages praying that the defective rock pulverizing machinery
w/c it purchased from repacom be replaced w/ a new one or in the alternative to refund the value of the
same machinery. they allege that the machinery was not in good condition. repacom was dissolved by
virtue of eo629. it authorized bol to undertake the liquidation of the remaining assets and outstanding
liabilities of repacom. bol alleged that repacom effected complete delivery of the machinery and
equipment but no demand was made regarding any hidden defect. in addition, they filed a counterclaim
for the payment of the first 10 amortizations in the amount of php284,242- . the rtc rendered a decision
in favor of philrock. it issued writ of execution. upon appeal to the ca, it set aside the rtc's decision.
issue: w/n the funds of repacom in the acct. of bol in pnb may be garnished?
held:
no - bol is a government agency under the direct supervision of the pres created by eo 372. it is tasked
w/ the specific duty of administering the assets and paying the liabilities of repacom. it was not created
for profit or to engage in business.] - when a suit is directed against unincorporated govt agency w/c
because it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the
agency's principal, the state. - if the government conducts a business through either gocc or a noncorporate agency set up primarily for a business purpose, the entity enjoys no immunity from suit.
having juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, although considered public in
character are not exempt from garnishment. - the sale of machinery although proprietary in nature was
merely incidental to the performance of the board's primary task.
- when the state consents to be sued, it does not necessarily concede its liability. by consenting to be
sued, it waives its immunity from suit, but it does not waive its lawful defenses to the action. every
disbursement of funds must be covered by a corresponding appropriation passed by legislature
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
republic of indonesia v. vinzon, gr 154705, june 26, 2003
facts:
petitioner, republic of indonesia, represented by its counsellor, siti partinah, entered into a maintenance
agreement in with respondent james vinzon. the maintenance agreement stated that respondent shall,
for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the embassy main building, embassy annex
building and the wisma duta, the official residence of petitioner ambassador soeratmin. the equipment
covered by the maintenance agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities,
water heaters, and water motor pumps. it is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective
for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving
thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. petitioners informed respondents that the
renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming chief of administration, minister
counsellor azhari kasim, who was expected to arrive in february 2000. when minister counsellor kasim
assumed the position of chief of administration in march 2000, he allegedly found respondents work
and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the maintenance agreement.
hence, the indonesian embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated august 31, 2000.respondents
claim that the termination was arbitrary and unlawful. hence respondent filed a complaint. petitioner
being the accused at that time filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the republic of
indonesia, as a foreign sovereign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a partydefendant in the philippines. the said motion further alleged that ambassador soeratmin and minister
counsellor kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the vienna convention on diplomatic relations
and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity in turn, respondent filed on march 20, 2001, an opposition to

the said motion alleging that the republic of indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. he
based this claim upon the following provision in the maintenance agreement: any legal action arising
out of this maintenance agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the philippines and by the
proper court of makati city, philippines. respondents opposition likewise alleged that ambassador
soeratmin and minister counsellor kasim can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for
tortious acts done with malice and bad faith. trial court denied the motion to dismiss. c.a. affirmed the
trial courts decision.
issue:
whether or a stipulation in a maintenance agreement can waive the states immunity from suit.
held:
no, the stipulation in an agreement cannot be a waiver of immunity from suit. apropos the present case,
the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the
ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis . such act is only the start of the
inquiry. is the foreign state engaged in the regular conduct of a business? if the foreign state is not
engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so
engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. if the act is in pursuit of a
sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii .hence, the existence alone of a
paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled
according to the laws of the philippines and by a specified court of the philippines is not necessarily a
waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be
clear and unequivocal. it must be given explicitly or by necessary implication. we find no such waiver
in this case. there is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. a
sovereign state does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of
a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. hence, the state may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and
the living quarters of its agents and officials. it is therefore clear that petitioner republic of indonesia
was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the
upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters,
and water motor pumps of the indonesian embassy and the official residence of the indonesian
ambassador. article 31 of the vienna convention on diplomatic relations provides: x x x1. a diplomatic
agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. he shall also enjoy
immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:(a) a real action relating to
private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state, unless he holds it on behalf
of the sending state for the purposes of the mission;(b) an action relating to succession in which the
diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on
behalf of the sending state;(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by
the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. the solicitor general believes
that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said provision clearly applies only to a
situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any professional or commercial activity outside official
functions, which is not the case herein. petition is granted. decision of lower court is reversed and set
aside.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
shell philippines v. jalos, gr no. 179918, september 8, 2010
facts:
this is a case against a petroleum contractor (shell philippines exploration), whose pipeline operation
has allegedly driven the fish away from coastal areas, inflicting loss of earnings among fishermen.
petitioner shell philippines exploration and the republic of the philippines entered into service contract
for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern palawan. this is the malampaya natural
gas project. the pipeline spanned 504 kilometers and crossed the oriental mindoro sea. respondents
(jalos, et al) filed a complaint for damages against shell before the rtc.respondents claimed that they

were all fishermen along that coastal area in oriental mindoro whose livelihood was affected by the
construction and operation of shells natural gas pipeline. shell moved for dismissal of the complaint
and alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction, as it is a pollution case under republic act (r.a.)
3931, or the pollution control law. pollution adjudication board (pab) has primary jurisdiction over
pollution cases and actions for related damages. shell also claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to
the doctrine of state immunity without the states consent. shell said that under the service contract, it
served merely as an agent of the philippine government in the development of the malampaya gas
reserves.
issue:
whether or not the suit is actually against the state and is barred under the doctrine of state immunity.
held:
the court ruled that shell is not an agent of the philippine government, but a provider of services,
technology and financing for the malampaya natural gas project. it is not immune from suit and may
be sued for claims even without the states consent. the respondents however can file the complaint
with the pab.
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
vigilar v. aquino, 639 scra 772
facts:
this is a case where in respondent ( arnulfo aquino) a contractor, who won the bid for a dike project
somewhere in pampanga which was awarded by the petitioner dpwh sometime in 1992. a contract of
agreement" was thereafter executed between the said contractor and the dpwh in the amount of
php1,873,790.69, to cover the project cost. the project was completed by the contractor, who was then
issued a certificate of project completion dated 16 july 1992. the certificate was signed by the dpwh
project engineer; as well as the chief of the construction section. respondent, however, claimed that
php1,262,696.20 was still due him, but petitioners refused to pay the amount. he thus filed a complaint
for the collection with damages before the rtc.
dpwh, set up the defense that the complaint was a suit against the state; and that respondent failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.
issue:
whether or not the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the state has application in this
case.
held:
the court ruled that for almost two decades, the public and the government benefitted from the work
done by respondent contractor. the petitioners cannot escape the obligation to compensate respondent
for services rendered and work done by invoking the state's immunity from suit. justice and equity
sternly demand that the state's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and
that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated -- on the basis of quantum meruit. ( latin for what
one has earned") in the context of contract law, it means something along the lines of "reasonable value
of services".
article vxi section 3. immunity from suit
ato v. ramos, 644 scra 36
facts:
spouses david and elisea ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land registered in
baguio city land records with an area of 985 square meters, more or less, was being used as part of the
runway of the loakan airport being operated by (petitioner ) air transportation office (ato). respondents
agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ato. however, the ato
failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.
respondents filed an action for collection against the ato in the rtc. rtc denied atos motion for a
preliminary hearing and motion for reconsideration.
ato appealed to the ca, but ca affirmed rtcs decision. ato elevated case to the sc.

issue:
whether the ato could be sued without the states consent.
held:
the court ruled that ato had no claim to the states immunity from suit. ato is an agency of the
government not performing a purely governmental function, but instead involved in the management
and maintenance of the said airport, an activity that does not have exclusive prerogative of the state in
its sovereign capacity.
ratio: the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the respondents property.
article vxi section 6. police force
quilonia v. the general court martial gr no. 9660, march 4, 1992
facts:
the petitioner, a policeman, was charged before respondent general court martial with the crime of
murder on 2 counts. the petitioner filed a motion expressing his desire to be tried by a civilian court
and sought a waiver of a military jurisdiction, for the reason, among others, that the enactment of the
philippine national police law creates his honest belief that he should now be under the actual and real
jurisdiction of a civilian court. the general court martial denied the motion and insisted on arraigning
the petitioner and scheduling the hearing. thus, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order filed by petitioner.
issue:
won a policeman charged with a criminal case can seek for trial in a civilian court instead of in a
military court
held:
he can do so. r6975 creating the pnp, which took effect on january 1, 1991, provides that criminal
cases against pc-inp members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this act
shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge. although
ra. 6975 was not yet in effect when petitioner was arraigned on december 28, 1990, nevertheless,
respondent court martial knew or should have known that the said act had already been signed or
approved by the president on december 13, 1990 and that the same was published in 2 national
newspaper of general circulation on december 17, 1990 and that it would take effect on january 1,
1991. the court martial thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it insisted on arraigning the
petitioner and scheduling the hearing, just so the trial will begin before january 1, 1991. the civilian
character with which the pnp is expressly invested is declared by ra 6975 as paramount, and, in line
therewith, the law mandates the transfer of criminal cases against its members to civilian courts.
article vxi section 6. police force
carpio v. executive secretary 206 scra 290 (1992)
facts
in 1990, ra 6975 entitled an act establishing the philippine national police under a reorganized
department of the interior and local government, and for other purposes was passed. carpio, as a
member of the bar, assailed the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that it only interferes
with the control power of the president. he advances the view that ra 6975 weakened the national police
commission by limiting its power to administrative control over the pnp, thus control remained
with the department secretary under whom both the npc and the pnp were placed.
issue:
won the president abdicated control power over the pnp and npc by virtue of ra 6975
held:
there is no abdication. the president has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the president, is the doctrine of
qualified political agency. the presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the

members of the cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under
their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. the circumstance that the napolcom and the
pnp are placed under the reorganized dilg is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a
system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed act, the funding of the pnp
being in large part subsidized by the national government.
article vxi section 6. police force
department of budget v. manilas finest, gr no. 169466, may 9, 2007
facts:
in 1975, pd 765 was issued constituting the integrated national police (inp) to be composed of the
philippine constabulary (pc) as the nucleus and the integrated police forces as components thereof. in
1990, ra 6975 entitled "an act establishing the philippine national police under a reorganized
department of the interior and local government, and for other purposes," (the pnp law) was enacted.
under section 23 of said law, the philippine national police (pnp) would initially consist of the members
of the inp, created under p.d. no. 765, as well as the officers and enlisted personnel of the pc. eight
years later, ra 6975 was amended by ra 8551, otherwise known as the "philippine national police
reform and reorganization act of 1998." among other things, the amendatory law reengineered the
retirement scheme in the police organization. relevantly, pnp personnel, under the new law, stood to
collect more retirement benefits than what inp members of equivalent rank, who had retired under the
inp law, received. hence, in the rtc of manila, all inp retirees, spearheaded by the manilas finest retirees
association, inc. filed a petition alleging in gist that inp retirees were equally situated as the pnp retirees
but whose retirement benefits prior to the enactment of r.a. no. 6975, as amended by r.a. no. 8551, were
unconscionably and arbitrarily excepted from the higher rates and adjusted benefits accorded to the pnp
retirees.
issue:
won the inp retirees are entitled to the same benefits as the pnp retirees
held:
they are. ra 6975 provided for the absorption, transfer and merger of the inp, as well as the officers and
enlisted personnel of the pc, with the pnp. it did not provide for the abolition of the inp. hence, inp
retirees are not excluded from availing themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to pnp retirees.
article vxi section 6. police force
mendoza v. pnp, gr no. 139658, june 21, 2005
facts:
po3 william m. mendoza , together with po2angelita ramos, were dismissed from duty by the regional
appellate boardafter forcibly arresting one teodoro conti y viceranand maltreating him. the petitioner
filed with the regional trial court (rtc), branch 61 alleging that he was denied due process and prayed
that the rab decision dated 23 august 1993 and resolution dated 17 december 1993 be annulled.rab,
through the office of the solicitor general (osg), rebuffed the argument stating that the administrative
remedies were not exhausted after failing to appeal to the department of interior and local government
and then to the civil service commission before proceeding to the courts.
issue:
whether or not the civil service commission has jurisdiction over the philippine national police
held:
yes. section 6, article xvi of the constitution provides that the state shall establish and maintain one
police force which shall be civilian in character. consequently, the pnp falls under the civil service
pursuant to section 2(1), article ix-b, also of the constitution.
article xvii section 1.amendments or revisions
imbong v. comelec, 35 scra 28 (1970)
facts:
petitioner manuel imbong and raul gonzales are questioning the validity of r.a. 6132 claiming that it
prejudices their rights as candidates.the said republic act expressly repealed ra 4914 which

implemented resolution no 2 issued by congress, sitting as a constituent assembly, in 1967. the


resolution called for a constitutional convention to be composed of two delegates from each
representative district having the same qualifications as a congressman. in 1969, congressamended
resolution no. 2 with resolution 4 limiting the delegates to only 320 with legislative districts entitled to
at least two each. furthermore, it gives authority to the constitutional convention to fill any other details
relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of,
embodied in an implementing legislation.on 24 august 1970, congress, acting as a legislative body,
enacted republic act no. 6132 repealing ra 4914 and implementing the two resolutions.
issue:
whether or not congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact implementing legislation to fill the gaps
created by the constituent assembly
held:
while the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present constitution solely and
exclusively in congress acting as a constituent assembly, the power to enact the implementing details,
which are now contained in resolution nos. 2 and 4 as well as in r.a. no. 6132, does not exclusively
pertain to congress acting as a constituent assembly. such implementing details are matters within the
competence of congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power
encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the
constitution from the ambit of legislative action. and as long as such statutory details do not clash with
any specific provision of the constitution, they are valid.
article xvii section 1. amendments or revisions
lambino v. comelec, 505 scra 160
facts:
raul lambino of sigawng bayan and ericoaumentado of the union of local authorities of the philippines
(ulap) filed a petition for people's initiative before the commission on elections on 25 august 2006,
after months of gathering signatures all over the country. lambino claimed that the petition is backed by
6.3 million registered voters. the comelec denied the petition, reasoning that a lack of an enabling law
keeps them from entertaining such petitions. it invoked a 1997 santiago vs. comelec held, where the
supreme court declared ra 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
constitution.
comelec's held prompted lambino and aumentado to bring their case before the supreme court.
issue:
whether or not the conduct of peoples initiative by the lambino group complied with the requirements