CIVIL CODE

PRELIMINARY TITLE (ARTICLES 1-18)

effective. The public cannot be held liable for violations of laws or regulations unless they are
informed of its contents and penalties for violation.

ARTICLE 2
ARTICLE 3
Tanada vs. Tuvera
No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Ponente: Justice Cruz
Facts:
The petitioners sought the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees, which they
claimed had not been published as required by law. The governments contention that the
phrase otherwise provided means that a decree will become effective immediately after their
approval. The trial court affirmed the decision of having the necessity for the publication of
the said decrees. The petitioners now sought for the reconsideration or clarification of the said
decision. The prayer constitutes of ordering the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all the unpublished Presidential decrees of general application and unless published they shall
not be binding.
Issue:
Whether or not the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity
of laws or to the requirement of publication.
Held:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot be omitted. Publication is indispensable in
every case, but the legislature in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be
shortened or extended. The omission of the said publication would run against the due process
clause and would deny the public knowledge of the laws. The court held that all statutes,
including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity. The publication must be in full since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the law.
Petition granted.

Garcia v. Recio
G. R. No. 138322 Oct. 2, 2001
Panganiban, J.
FACTS
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married an Australian citizen named Editha Samson in 1987.
Two years later a decree of divorce was released by the Australian government.
On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and married a certain Grace Garcia in
1994 in Cabanatuan City with the former declaring that he was single and Filipino.
Garcia filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy alleging that Recio
had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her and only had knowledge of it in
1997.
Recio countered wifes claim asserting that he disclosed the previous marriage to her in 1993.
Moreover, he contended that his first marriage had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989 making him legally capacitated to marry.
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in
Australia by Recio ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Samson thereby capacitating him
to contract a second marriage with Garcia.
HELD

People vs. Que Po Lay

No. 6791, March 29, 1954
Montemayor, J.
FACTS:
Que Po Lay is accused of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank requiring those who
are in possession of foreign currency to sell the same to the Central Bank. Que Po Lay alleges
that said circular was not published in the Official Gazette before he committed the act and
therefore, it had no force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not Central Bank Circular No. 20 has no force and effect
HELD:
Yes, the said Circular has no force and effect because it was not published. Article 2 of the
new Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. While Central Bank Circular
No. 20 is not of a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing
its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. Rules and
regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming

The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree obtained by Recio does not ipso facto
terminated his first marriage to Samson on the account that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient. Article 15 and 17 of the Civil Code establish the rule that a marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who
are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws. The Court highlights that before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.
ARTICLE 6
DM Consunji, Inc. Vs CA
Facts: On May 9, 1991, private respondent Maria Juego filed in the Pasig Regional Trial Court

a complaint for damages against petitioner for the the death of her husband Jose juego. Jose
was employed by petitioner as a construction worker. While working on November 2, 1990,
Jose fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower in Pasig. He died. Maria availed of the death
benefits form the State Insurance Fund. Petitioner is claiming that she can no longer recover
damages under the Civil Code because her prior availment of the benefits form the State
Insurance Fund. The trial court and CA decided in favour of maria.
Issue: Whether Marias availment of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code
amounts to a waiver of her rights to claim for damages from petition under the Civil Code?
Held: No because maria was not only ignorant of the fact but of her rights as well. Marias
election of the death benefits does not bar any action inconsistent with the elected remedy.
For a waiver to become valid, there must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Where one lacks knowledge of a rights, there is no basis upon which waiver of its can rest.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the right waived with an awareness of its consequences. Thus
ignorance of material fact negates waiver.
Cui vs. Arellano University (2 SCRA 205)
Facts: Plaintiff Emeterio Cui, studying law, received scholarship grants for scholastic merit at
Arellano University. During his last semester of his fourth year, he left the defendant
university and enrolled at Abad Santos University, wherein he finished his law degree. After
graduating, he applied for the bar examinations. To secure to take the bar examinations, he
needed the transcript of records from the defendant university. Defendant refused to give him
a transcript until he paid back the tuition that the university returned when he was granted
scholarship. According to the contract signed by the plaintiff, scholarships are good only if the
student should continue in the same school. This contract was followed from Memorandum
No. 38 made by the Director of Private Schools.
Issue: Whether or not the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of
his scholarship in cash valid or not?
Held: The contract between plaintiff and defendant is not binding since the memorandum
made by the Director of Private Schools is not a law. The provisions are only advisory and not
mandatory in nature. Furthermore, the said officer had not authority to issue such
memorandum and that provisions were not published in the Official Gazette.
ARTICLE 15-16
Minciano vs. Brimo
50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924
J. Romualdez
Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan
Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However,
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimos opposition is based on
the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimos will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are
void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
disposition.
Held: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must
govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the
testator.
Therefore, the testators national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil
Code.
Pilapil VS. Ibay-Somera
G.R No. 80116
June 30, 1989
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, marriage and deaths in Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where they had a daughter.
After three and a half years of disharmonic marriage, private respondent Geiling initiated
divorce proceedings against petitioner in his native Germany. He claimed that there was
failure of the marriage and they had been living apart since 1982.While petitioner filed an
action for Legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court
in Manila.
On January 15, 1986, the Schoneberg local Court of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
On June 27, 1986, five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent
filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that during the
marriage Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia and another man named Jesus Chua.
After corresponding investigation, the assistant fiscal recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However upon review of the respondent City fiscal
a resolution was approved and the cases were raffled to two branches of the RTC of Manila.
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice that the cases
be dismissed. The Secretary of justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to
both petitions and directed city fiscal to inform the DOJ if the accused have already been
arraigned and if not, to move to defer further proceedings and to elevate the entire record of
the cases to his office for review.
Pilapil filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings. As a result, one of the criminal cases was suspended, while the date of
arraignment of the other was merely reset.
During the arraignment of the criminal case, the William Chia pleaded not guilty while the
petitioner refused not to be arraigned. The petitioner was then held in contempt and was
detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. She later entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 27, 1987 petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari on the ground that
the court is without jurisdiction to decide and try the case.
On March 29, 1988, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines and if the private respondet can
file a complaint of adultery against the petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes, the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines. In the present case, the fact that the

private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concern in
view of the nationality principle on our civil law on the matter of the status of persons.
Under this consideration, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the petitioner,
had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed the suit.
The allegations of the private respondent that he could not have brought this case befor the
decree of divorce for lack of knowledge even if true, is of no legal significance or
consequence in this case. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other.
Roehr vs. Rodriguez
GR No. 142820
June 20, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married a Filipina, Carmen Rodriguez in
Germany. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.. Private respondent filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. The petitioner obtained a decree of divorce
from the Cout of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the
children to the father.

and carried a basket of fruits, the latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it
was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive
Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them.
He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the
hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner
claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms.
Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes
was with Dr. Filarts group. She wasnt able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter
was talking over the phone and doesnt want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave
because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of
those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then
leave the party.
During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close because we nearly kissed
each other. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request
only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what
happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
HELD:

Issue:
Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as
support and custody of the children can be determined in our courts
Held:
Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgement must clearly show that the opposing party
has been given ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civel Procedure. Accoringly,
the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgement of the German Court,
therefore, legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. The court held that the
trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody.
HUMAN RELATIONS (ARTICLES 19-36)
ARTICLE 19-22
TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes
CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in
reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to
Roberto Reyes aka Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of
Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to
Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels
former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him

Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all
the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to
leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is
experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held
liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
TITLE: Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO
CITATION: GR No. 142943, April 3, 2002
FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94
Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendants
inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot
inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as standard operating
procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiffs secretary. After the inspection,
it was found that the meter had been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary
who conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the
meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was
indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple.
After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the
couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their
electric supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.
ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without

due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBINGs rights, feelings, social and business
reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.

quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in
the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus:

HELD:
Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing
differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary
damages including attorneys fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of
individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due process of law are
violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction
for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity.
However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. Under the
law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on
the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no government official or ERB
representative was present.
Petitioners claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and was
premised only upon Lornas testimony. These are compensation for an injury that will put the
injure position where it was before it was injured.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals
219 scra 115
Article 21 of the Civil Code
This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private
respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for
the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she
is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20,
1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that
they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of
complaint, petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to
kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked
her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in
Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her
damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed
to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on
the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a mans
promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs, or public policy.
CASE DIGEST ON GLOBE MACKAY V. CA [176 S 778 (1989)] - While an employer has
the right to dismiss an employee who was involved in anomalous transactions, the right of
dismissal should not be exercised in an abusive manner, such as by making accusations of
being a crook, forcing him to take a forced leave, threatening to file a hundred suits against
him. Hence, the employer is liable for damages.
Art. 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims
of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury.
This article should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
University of the East vs Jader
327 scra 804
Article 19 of the Civil Code
Petitioner was enrolled in the defendants College of Law. He failed to take the regular
examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for
the second semester as a fourth year student, and filed an application for the removal of the
incomplete grade which was approved by the Dean. In the meantime, the faculty members and
the Dean met to deliberate who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate.
The plaintiffs name appeared on the tentative list, he also attended the investiture ceremonies
to which he tendered blowout afterwards. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar
examination and took review classes. However, he was not able to take the bar examination
because his academic requirements is not complete. Consequently, respondent sued petitioner
for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
sleepless nights, when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the
latters negligence. He prayed for an award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorneys
fees and cost of suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a
student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when
such is not the case.

HELD: Yes.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual obligation
of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every
student as to where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the
conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among those who will graduate.
The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be
sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of
right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.

His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to
public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the
marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same
was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos
parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim
cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge
of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to
remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be
paid by Escao and not her parents.

Pe et al vs Pe, 5 SCRA 200

Defendant is married separated and correlative of the plaintiff unmarried woman, 24 years of
age. Defendant frequently visited the girls house on the pretext of teaching her how to pray
the rosary. They fell in love and had clandestine trust until they disappeared.
Held: No conclusion can be drawn from the fact that defendant, not only deliberately, but thru
a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love to the woman to the extent of
having illicit relations with her. The wrong caused to her and her family is contrary to morals
etc as contemplated in Art 21.

On the part of Tenchavez:

On the part of Escaos parents:

It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is
unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same
could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits
having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been
correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from
P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.

ARTICLE 26
TITLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA
CITATION: 133 SCRA 179

Tenchavez vs Escao
5 Phil 355
Torts and Damages When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises Unfounded Suit
In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without
the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was
celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a
church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she
heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship
went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute
divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos
parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence
hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the
legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counterclaim by the Escaos.

FACTS:
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay
Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times
where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio.
St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading where the heart is. This
was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramils
house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house
to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding
an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite
that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This
prompted Dr. Aramils counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March
18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but nothing on the
apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29.
During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.
ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.
HELD:

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar

St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication.

Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just
contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and
P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA
affirmed the judgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasidelict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements
pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who,
naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps.

Court dismissed the complaint, Carmen amended it but

the trial court disallowed it.
Issue:
Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing
Carmens complaint.
Held:
Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for
all purposes favorable to it.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
2 SCRA 801
ARTICLE 36
Donato vs Luna
160 scra 441
Prejudicial Question
Leonilo C. Donato was married to Rosalinda Malupig and without such marriage having been
legally dissolved; he contracted a second marriage with Paz Abayan. Facing bigamy charges
by the latter, petitioner alleged force, intimidation and undue influence employed by Paz
which forced him into marriage. A complaint of annulment of the second marriage was
instituted on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. He is raising the issue of
prejudicial question.

Facts:
Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz in 1948 through
her aunt. In 1950, Nita became pregnant by her then
boyfriend now husband but she had a baby aborted. After
getting pregnant, after their marriage, she again
aborted the fetus because of work. Less than 2 years
later, she became pregnant and aborted it again. It is
this last abortion that is the basis of this action.
Issue:
Whether or not, the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from physician who caused the same.

ARTICLE 37-41

Held:
The lower court erred in awarding damages. The
fetus is not endowed with personality as required by
the law.
Parents of unborn fetus cannot sue for damages on
its behalf. A husband of a woman who voluntary aborted
a child cannot recover damages from the abortionist
since damages must be inflicted upon the parents so as
to collect damages at all. Similarly, an action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death. Pertains primarily to the injured.

Quimiguing vs. Icao

34 SCRA 132

DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA

58 Phil 866

Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, a student, and Felix Icao,
married, were neighbors. They had carnal intercourse
several times until Carmen became pregnant.
Assisted by her parents, she filed a claim for
support at P120/month plus damages.
Icao filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause
of action since the child is yet unborn. The Trial

Facts:
Out of amorous relations, a baby was begotten by
Cesar Syquia with Antonia de Jesus. During the
pregnancy, Cesar wrote a priest to name the baby after
him for it was his. Syquia took them to a house where
they lived in a regular family style, until Antonia had
her second pregnancy and Syquia left and married
another woman. Syquia disowning the child stopped

ISSUE: Whether or not the action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question to the
prosecution for bigamy.
HELD: The court averred that the requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case
at bar. The nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donatos guilt or
innocence in the crime of bigamy.
CIVIL PERSONALITY (ARTICLES 37-47)

giving support. Thus Antonia filed this case to Compel

Syquia to acknowledge the child using the letters
written by him as evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not letters are sufficient to prove
acknowledgement of paternity.
Held:
Yes, the words of recognition junior, contained
in the note refer to a baby then conceived was expected
to be born in June. Although the child was given a name
of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia Jr., his
identity as the child who Syquia intended to
acknowledge is clear.
ARTICLE 43
LIMJOCO vs. INTESTATE OF FRAGRANTE
Facts:
Pedro O. Fragrante applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install, maintain, and operate an
ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, where the Public Service
Commission held that the public interest an convenience
will be prompted in a proper and suitable manner by
authorizing the operation and maintenance of another
ice plant of two and one-half tons in the municipality
of San Juan, that the original applicant Fragnante was
a Filipino citizen at the time of his death; and that
his intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service.
The commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased
Fragnante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through
its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and
operate said plant. Petitioners claim that the granting
of certificate applied for the estate is a
contravention of law.
Issues:
Whether or not the estate of Fragnante can be
considered as a person within the meaning of the Public
Service Act? Whether or not citizenship of decedent
extended to his estate?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the estate of P.O.F.
should be considered an artificial or juridical person
for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of
his estate which, of course, includes the exercise

during the judicial administration of those rights and

the fulfillment of those obligations of his which
survived after his death.
The Supreme Court furthered that if by legal
fiction the personality of P.O.F is considered extended
so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving
rights may be exercised for the benefit of his
creditors and heirs, there is no sound and cogent
reason for denying the application of the same fiction
of his citizenship, and for not considering it as
likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid
unfinished proceeding before the Public Service
Commission.
DUMLAO vs. FAMILY PLASTIC PRODUCTS
Facts:
On February 28, 1962, CFI of Pangasinan issued a
judgment ordering defendants Soliven, Oria, Laurencio,
Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity quality plastics
products, Inc. the sum of P3667.03 plus the legal rate
of interest from November of 1958.
Upon the defendants failure to pay said amount,
lower Court ordered upon motion of Quality Plastics
Products, Inc. the foreclosure of the surety bond and
the sale at public auction the land of Pedro Oria which
he has given as security under the bond.
On September 24, 1962 Orias land was sold and was
confirmed by the lower court on November 20, 1962.
However, Oria died on April 23, 1959, and on March
1, 1963 heirs of Oria sued Quality Plastics Products,
Inc. for the annulment of judgment against Oria and
execution against his land.
Issue:
Can Orias heirs claim from Quality Plastics.
Held:
Judgment against Oria was void and sale of his
land is also void. However, Orias heirs are not
entitled to claim from the corporation. It is for the
reason that the corporation is unaware of Orias death
because soliven did not appraise the Court or the
corporation of Orias demise.
CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE
MOY YA LIM YAO V. CIR1

Digest available at
http://berneguerrero.com/node/119 (last accessed
1

G.R. NO. L-21289, 4 OCTOBER 1971

FACTS: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application
for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines
to visit her greatgranduncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. She was permitted to
come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one
month which would expire on 13 April 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed
a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung
would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period
of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions,
Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25
January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim
an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of
Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary
injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was
admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few
words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothersin-law, or sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the
prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.
HELD: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be
a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of
her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer
from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to
undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus,
if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is
not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino
citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same
privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural,
stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the
alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and
established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform
an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but
such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's
acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as
to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a
judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has
to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was

September 16, 2010).

declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim
Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January
1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his
personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election
and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in
the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United
States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was
merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the
Martial Law Dictators agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be
dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days
from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code.
ISSUE:
Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18
January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon?
HELD:
The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos
citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor
General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is
assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval.
It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may
review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself
as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such
status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States
in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did
not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished
status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire
Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to
take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this
country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that
he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary
rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. Qualifications for

public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is
disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
G.R. No.119976
September 18, 1995
Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a
candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the
COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitutions one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art.
VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution.

until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again
invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods,
from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee
where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job
application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a
few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor,
Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy.
Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting
married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner
illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee.
Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the
services of an employee.
HELD:

Ruling: WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELECs questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995
are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The
Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of
candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a
minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost
only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose;
in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile
because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law;
when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new
domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband
died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
FAMILY CODE
REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE (ARTICLES 1-26)
ARTICLE 1
PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that
company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to
their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination
or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our
labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with
PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are
not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in
the labor code:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as
a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married,
or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on
the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection
with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a
woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an
intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very
essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately,
family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect,
disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land
not only for order but also imperatively required.

ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR [492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006]

Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a
son with him as well. Respondents husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary
while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear
as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation. Such a
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize
their union.
Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental
rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human
rights. The States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic
in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the
State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
against respondent or her partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to the symbolic
preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should
be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for
it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married
on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed
together for a month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint
against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent
demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner
refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid

cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed,
inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the
conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce
from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal
home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill
the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at
his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the
husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away
from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced
to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband,
she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the
conjugal home.
Balogbog vs. CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997
FACTS:
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their
Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents estate at
the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and
Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They
have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935.
Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their
grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother
has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the validity of the marriage
between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a
police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of
his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage, they
presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias
Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that
they have three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably
the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence
in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect
that the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared
by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.

Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been
proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law
in force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven
only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof
have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case
any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband
and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as
their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.
HELD:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering
Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of
their grandparents estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take
effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the
extension of that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since
this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be
determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the
former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the
Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband
and wife are legally married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it
would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in
this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom,
Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the
public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
ARTICLE 2-6
Eugenio vs Velez
186 scra 425
Custody of a Dead Body

ISSUE: Whether or not the legal right to custody of the dead body be claimed by a mere
common law husband.
HELD: Petitioner failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead
body of Vitaliana Vargas simply because they are not lawfully-wedded. Custody of the dead
body Vitaliana was rightfully awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters.
Cosca vs. Palaypayon
237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server).
Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. EsmeraldaBaroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a
marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo &
Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio
Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the
marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In
addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the
Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave
strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract
and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the
problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and
executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The
other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their
marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that
copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged
marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were
not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license
and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license
due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did
not sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.

The petitioner claims legal custody of the dead body on that basis that she was his common
law wife. On the other hand, the next of kin claim they are legal custodian of the dead body of
their sister, wanting of a decent burial.

HELD:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the
other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken
showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared

that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with
them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband and wife even
without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a
simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there were
pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates
in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano
& Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was
dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have
been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown
in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and
Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated
in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started living
together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to
ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint
affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the
formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article
21 aforesaid. The lower courts judgment is hereby affirmed.
ARTICLE 7
Navarro vs Domagtoy
presumptive death - family code
Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He has submitted evidence in
relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife. Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit
acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadans wife has been absent for seven years. The
said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it is alleged
that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del
Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters that he
solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.

Wassmer vs Velez
12 scra 648
Breach of Promise to Marry
Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left a note to
her that they have to postpone their wedding because his mother opposed it. And on the next
day he sent her the following telegram Nothing changed rest assured returning very soon
apologize mama papa love Paking. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from
again, sued by Beatrice for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. The
record reveals that on August 23, 1954, plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-bes trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared, but two days before the wedding he never returned and was never heard from again.
ISSUE: Whether or not in the case at bar, is a case of mere breach of promise to marry.
HELD: Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all
the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good

HELD: Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the law.
Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to hold
the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride NOT by
both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the
authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is
the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction.
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony
and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Araes vs. Judge Occiano
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her
late groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license,
among others.
Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioners right, upon Orobias death, to inherit the
vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of
receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against

respondent for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of the Chief
Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment on
the complaint.
Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined
the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due
to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the provisions for
the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the
solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia
assured the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did. He
attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and
negligence.

1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as a result of which the
partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate wife
and children.

Issue:

ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim from the
company of the latters share.

Whether or not respondents guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage

license and outside his territorial jurisdiction.

Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the drugstore
business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter sold her drugstore
for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as investment in Glory Commercial
Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the above-stated amount in the partnership
its business flourished and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in the
wholesale and retail trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits.
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-law
wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former had a foster child,
Antonio Nunez.

HELD:
Ruling:
Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which preceded
the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law,
it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the
petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.
ARTICLE 22
Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete
66 SCRA 425
FACTS:
Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who
was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of Glory Commercial
Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso
Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan and were
naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu
and Dy Ochay including their son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co
Oyo including also their son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took
actual and active management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share not
only in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and
personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with whom
Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and

Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take
each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as
well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary
evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage
may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be
satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a
marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of
any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at
bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine
Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely
no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of
the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal
not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides,
inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received P40,000 for
her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law marriage and
promised not to interfere with each others affairs since they are incompatible and not in the
position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her
relation was that of a common-law wife but had also settled property interests in the payment
of P40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in
respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of October
21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte proceedings against
petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent court is hereby ordered to
enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal of the action dated October 21,
1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co
Oyo. And respondent court is hereby permanently enjoined from taking any further action in
said civil case gave and except as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.
Vda. De Chua vs. CA

G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998

Facts:
Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two
illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon
the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition
for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors.
Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the
decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato
City, which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said matters.
The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the
evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of
Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of
Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that
he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in
Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent
specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled that she
failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was latter
appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity
of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in
holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the
lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the
petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports
and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has
submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage
was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he
has not solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat
copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best
evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage
contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. Failure to
present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious.

itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties
on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the
marriage was unknown to Castros parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro
discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October
19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castros brother, with the consent of
Cardenas.
Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences presented by private
respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar
of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.

Ruling:
The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license
first issued by a local registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. The above rule authorized the
custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not
exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not being found in a
registrar. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with
the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage license, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.
The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of
Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due
search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
1396182 to the contracting parties. There being no marriage license, the marriage of Angelina
and Edwin is void ab initio.
ARTICLE 26
Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.
139 SCRA 139
Facts:

ARTICLE 25
Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro
G.R. No. 103047 September 12, 1994
Facts:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a
civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The
marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castros parents. Defendant Cardenas
personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage contract

Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972.

They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for
divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van
Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that
she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal
property. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The
defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was
barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that
the couple had no community property.
Issue:

Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife
and American husband held binding upon the latter.
Ruling:
The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no
question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is
binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15
of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the
standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of
the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the
Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
GR. No. 154380, 5 October 2005, First Division (Quisumbing, J.)
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

The respondent admits that Art. 26 is not directly applicable to his case, but insists that
since his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he
is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
The Court noted that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. The requisites of a petition for declaratory
relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in
thecontroversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. This case satisfies all
the requisites for the grant of a petition for declaratory relief.
Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage
was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized
as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry,
and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the USA.
Records of the proceedings of the FC deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.

On 24 May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva and their
marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr., which involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner where the Court held
that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

In 1986, his wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen
and sometime in 2000, learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree. His
wife then married Innocent Stanley and is now currently living in San Gabriel, California with
her child by him.

In the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals, the parties were Filipino citizens
when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained
a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can
thus remarry.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (FC). No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
the Court holds that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them became naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code
HELD: The petition is granted.
The OSG contends that par. 2 Art. 26 of FC is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs the
respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.

In view of the foregoing, the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 are as follows: (1) There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that had been celebrated between her and Cipriano. Then the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both satisfied. Thus Cipriano,
the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, the Court notes that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents
wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence. For his plea to prosper, the respondent must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, and that such foreign law must also
be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Furthermore, the
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, the Court is unanimous in holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC
should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, due to lack of sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, the Court is unable to declare, based on the respondents
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that the respondent is now capacitated to
remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon the respondents submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM LICENSE REQUIREMENT (ARTICLE 27-34)

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot
be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least
5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can
be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.
Manzano vs. Sanchez
AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married
on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On
March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous.
He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had
been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit
that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses
due to constant quarrels.

Ninal vs. Bayadog

328 SCRA 122

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both
have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years
under Article 34 of Family Code.

FACTS:

HELD:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito
to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at
least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on
February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage
license.

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their
marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their
subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD:

Mariategui vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children
with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del
Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino,
Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a
son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where

they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with
Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his
parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected
to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was
issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of
their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the
Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio.
The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to
impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage
license.
VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES (ARTICLE 35-54)
HELD:
ARTICLE 35
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record
of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity
are present.

Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572
FACTS:

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo
and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock,
there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.
Republic vs. Dayot
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been
previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage
when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from
Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with
another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by
Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of
such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the
declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide
a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.

FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least
5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June
1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a
sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a
sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the
time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.
HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage.
However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good
faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said
person is freed from being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters
had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of
property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be
separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family
Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is
the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.

ARTICLE 36

Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married.

Republic vs. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage,

FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent
Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The
couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom
he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest
with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a
result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he
abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by Leouel. The
couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start
living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse
despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to
return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in
the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to
no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their
marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to
return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes
psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is
incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels
petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.

HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not
meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness.
Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would
comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely
showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity
of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert
testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility
which is not considered as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in
this case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the
essentials of marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of
the Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must
be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on
behalf of the state.
LEOUEL SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.

HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the
term "psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it
on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with
less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application.
The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit
the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC
would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term "psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art.
68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by

(a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands
aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly
shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the
standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and
Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month.
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave
birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the
holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned
from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy
of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to
file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus,
Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.
HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical
examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence
that medically or clinically identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an
expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due
to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as
psychologically incapacitated.
Choa vs. Choa
GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002
FACTS:
Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl
Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards,
he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso
presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which
shows latters psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his
wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any
way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and
shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained
about three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and
lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively,
constitutes psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of
marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an
incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy.
The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination.
Antonio vs. Reyes
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006
FACTS:

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a
subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months
later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an
illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They
were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good
in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes
declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring
their marriage null and void.
HELD:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own
testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying
and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations
on his wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic
ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a
world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes
psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It
would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable
considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI,
G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997
FACTS: respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila
Cathedral on May 22, 1988. After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at
the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother. There,
they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
Opposite to Gina's expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having
sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof,
then turned his back and went to sleep. There where no sexual intercourse occurred during
their first night, In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did
so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the
defendant to join them. They stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period,
there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a
long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15,

1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. She
claims, that she did not even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers. A case was
then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Gina claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis.
She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a
Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man. The defendant admitted that since their marriage on
May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that every time he wants to
have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not
like it. So he stopped. The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis
was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent.
As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. It is stated there, that
there is no evidence of impotency, and he is capable of erection.
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an
erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters,
the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that
the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still
is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having
sexual intercourse with a woman
ISSUE: Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a
psychological
incapacity?
HELD: One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Continuous non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity of the marriage, In the of Chi Ming Tsoi, the senseless refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. If one of the party, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his
or her essential marriage obligation, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Marriage
tribunals
attribute
the
causes
to
psychological
incapacity.
The family code provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order. Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest
act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court. Hence the court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994. declaring the marriage entered
into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of

the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de
Vera,VOID.

He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self
to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her
unable to assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of
others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to
blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she
had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing
suicide.

FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the
Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas close
friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena,
which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward
refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent.
They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000
and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and
Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license.
Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by
Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his
parents. Edwards parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and
demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them
to live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to
Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
ARTICLE 40
Morigo vs. People
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but
after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts.
They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed
petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married
Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground
that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a
suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab
initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.

HELD:
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist
who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help
and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and
allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly
shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with
Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a
marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his
marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit
bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Terre vs. Terre
211 SCRA 6
FACTS:
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin. Atty. Jordan
Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for the reason of
public policy and that they are free to contract marriage. They got married in 1977 where he
wrote single under Dorothys status. After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned
them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre
was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.

HELD:
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terres marriage with Dorothy is null and void.
HELD:
Dorothys first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first cousin
thereby against public policy. However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of their
marriage before she contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is
void. Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
Valdez vs. RTC
260 SCRA 211
Facts:
Same. Article 147; Emphasis to the RTCs judgment on liquidation
of properties in connection with the provision of property regime w/o
unions of marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 147 correctly applied on the status of the
parties in the liquidation of their properties.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court stated that, in avoid marriage, the property
regimes are those provided for in Article 147 or 148as, the case may be.
The liquidation of the co-ownership shall be in accordance with the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code which are not in conflict
with Article 147 or 148.
The conjugal home shall equally be co-owned by the couple and
shall be divided equally during liquidation in accordance with the rules on
co-ownership. However, the fruits of couples separate property are not
included in the co-ownership.
People vs. Aragon
100 Phil 1033
FACTS:
Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his marriage with the latter subsist,
he contracted a canonical marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is in
Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted between Iloilo and Cebu. When
Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She later on
suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo
to undergo treatment. While she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with
Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him guilty of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.

The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with Rosima
was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered
into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting
marriage cannot prosper.
Mercado vs. Tan
337 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed
bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and
Oliva null and void.
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the
former marriage.
HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as void.
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right
after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He
contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the
first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
ARTICLE 41-42
Republic vs. Nolasco
220 SCRA 20
FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that,
Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of
Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in
January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received
a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left.
Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by
securing another seamans contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where
they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of
presumptive death of Janet.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already
dead?

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that
he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking
assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract.
More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find
his wife.
Lukban vs Republic
L-8492, February 29, 1956
FACTS:
Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he left
Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents
and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since
he was absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to
have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.
ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can
remarry.
HELD:
The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her
husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that for the
purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the
law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to
be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Armas vs. Calisterio
GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000
FACTS:
Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April
1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second
husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The
latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of
Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court
declaration of Bounds presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the
sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being
allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed

as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to
her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to the absence of the
declaration of presumptive death.
HELD:
The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where
the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took
effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance
only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of
presumptive death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive
years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrietas marriage with Teodorico
is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.
Republic vs. CA
GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005
FACTS:
Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in
February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for
her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents
house but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-laws
house and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help
from the Barangay Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and
during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Leas
disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the
disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of
presumptive
death
of
his
wife.
ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
HELD:
The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his
petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the
Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to
corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding
Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility
had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's
father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police
authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss
his petition in RTC.
Valdez vs. Republic
GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009

FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named
Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May
1972, they decided to go back to her parents home. 3 years have passed without any word
from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed
a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever
since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985.
Virgilios application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with
Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration
of presumptive death of Sofio.
HELD:

Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccatmet in March 1938, became
engaged in September, and got married in Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant,
gave birth to a son. Godofredo left Luida and on March 23, 1939, he filed for an
annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she
assured him that she was a virgin. The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
WON Luidas concealment of her pregnancy constituted a ground for the annulment
of marriage (fraud)
H eld:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred
institution in which the State is interested.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy
constituting a ground for annulment; it was unlikely that Godofredo, a first- year law
student, did not suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she was in
an advanced stage of pregnancy when they got married.

The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil
Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence
is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal
and valid.

Aquino vs. Delizo

109 Phil 21

ARTICLE 45-46

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against
Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed
the fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months
after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco
represent the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only
documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did
not appear nor presented any evidence.

Anaya vs. Palaroan

36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for
annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force
and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and
granting Auroras counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such
pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of
her marriage with Fernando on such ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of
those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to..
chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not
constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat,
72 Phil 19 (1941)

FACTS:

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by
CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute
such fraud as would annul a marriage.
HELD:
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage.
Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage.
At this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was
naturally plump or fat. It is only on the 6thmonth of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
womans abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the
abdomen more general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision
complained is set aside.
Jimenez vs. Canizares

L-12790, August 31, 1960

FACTS:
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios
Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the
penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and
continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the
marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any
answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical
certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed
lack of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.
HELD:
The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to
defend herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known
fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly
submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical
examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and
likewise is not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal
condition should not be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court.

his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are
bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is
remanded for proper trial.
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano
107 Phil 35
FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children
who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that
his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having
found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed
for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man
other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since
then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having
illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in
1955.
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment
disallowed by the Family Code.
HELD:

ARTICLE 48-49
Sin vs. Sin
GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001
FACTS:
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987.
Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.
In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its trial, the State did not
participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation
dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not
actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more
was heard of him.

Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the
existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment
disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment,
a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery
independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of
separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the
evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on
defendants confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which
has not yet prescribed.
LEGAL SEPARATION (ARTICLE 55-67)
ARTICLE 55-56

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the
participation of the State in the proceedings.

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177

HELD:

FACTS:

Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days.
They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943
when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner
then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or
about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others,

would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on
May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the
petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed
beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of
Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.

a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are
related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting
from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the
amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify
or reduce the same.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation,
abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

Bugayong vs. Ginez

GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956

HELD:

FACTS:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree
itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency
of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for
partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August
1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with
the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to
an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about
July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that
she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study
in a local college.

Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987
FACTS:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan
Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also
filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an
application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and
ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation
and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action for legal
separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal
separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of
the criminal case for concubinage.

Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-in-law) and
some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of
alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a
certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek
the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the
house of the defendants godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the
plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they
slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information
he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a
ground for dismissal of the action.
HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation.
A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to
constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they
live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.

HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for
legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with,

Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only
by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery
or concubinage.

ARTICLE 58
Pacete vs Carriaga
231 SCRA 321
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as
well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property.
She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a
child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de
la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation
between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with
Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file
an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith
granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20,
21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March
17,1980.

and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.
ARTICLE 63
Macadangdang vs CA
GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981
FACTS:
Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were
married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a
buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune,
their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn
mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both
indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965
when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she
learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial
action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect
on the legal separation.
HELD:

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion
for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held
to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal
separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the
lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the
liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated.

HELD:

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal
property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such
final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever
remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in
order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article
88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since
the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In
this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by
the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists,

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of
the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal
separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of
the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the share of each
spouse in the conjugal assets.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBANDS AND WIVES (ARTICLE 6873)
ARTCLE 68
Potenciano vs. CA
GR No. 139789, 139808, July 19, 2001
FACTS:

In March 1999, Erlinda Illusorio, the wife of herein petitioner, Potenciano, petitioned for
habeas corpus which was dismissed on May 2000 for lack of merit and granted the petition to
nullify the CA ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda. This case before SC is Erlindas
motion to reconsider the decision made. A conference was set on September 2000 to
determine the propriety and relevance of a physical and medical examination of Potenciano
and how it will be conducted. Erlindas motion to have Potenciano be medically examined by
a team of medical experts appointed by the Court was denied with finality in March 2001.
ISSUE: Whether a court can validly issue an order compelling the husband to live together
and observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.
HELD:
Erlinda claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium but
clearly she wanted the latter to live with her and is the root cause of her petition. What the law
provides is that husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity. The sanction thereof is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court order to enforce consortium.
Evidently, there was absence of empathy between Erlinda and Potenciano having separated
from bed and board since 1972. Empathy as defined by SC is a shared feeling between
husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. It is for two loving adults
who view the relationship with respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away
from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced
to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband,
she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the
conjugal home.
Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in
March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both
weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the
parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty
herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The
decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint
to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would
prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.
HELD:

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married
on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed
together for a month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint
against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent
demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner
refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid
cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed,
inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the
conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce
from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal
home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill
the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at
his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the

SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who
sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.
Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and
subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her
petition for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages
from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.
Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and
wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and
subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly
support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled
thereto.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and
begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia,
Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at

Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he
was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother
overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda
filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the
latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after
attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which
the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant
for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom
of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or
moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86
years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He
still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of
choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he
will be deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a
wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private
reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his
right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion
of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.
ARTICLE 73
Ayala Investments vs CA
GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM,
executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and
severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence
filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and
Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the
appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy
sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale
on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against

petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for
the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was
issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.
HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching
contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of
recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety orguarantor, that
contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the
benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a
surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly
not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the
conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for
the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may
have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure,
appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art.
161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by
product or a spin off of the loan itself.