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Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules  

 

MENS LEGISLATORIS

DECISION

[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA
MATABUENA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.

v.

PETRONILA

Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION
BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW
RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of
the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the
same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of
Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a
similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of
the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of
that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se
engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,’
[according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale
‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De
donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same
prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without
benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the
other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly
increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad
Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist lest
the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long
as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality
alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach
to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE
WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. — The lack of validity of the
donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property.
Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the
defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is
therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half
of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.

FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are
called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses
during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now
appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena,
maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit
of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void.
Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was
made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the
latter’s stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in
character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A
1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the
then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year, is
indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion
reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls within
the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a
view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in
plaintiff’s complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in
question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by Felix
Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the
aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did
assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and
her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when
the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of
facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by
their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased
Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2) That said Felix
Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant,
Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956,
which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of the
land to the defendant which took effect immediately was made during the
common law relationship as husband and wife between the defendant-done
and the now deceased donor and later said donor and done were married on
March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on
September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of
being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue
of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land
declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon’" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It
reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil
Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage. When the
donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February
20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At
that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only when they
married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been
executed." 6

Teehankee. De donat. Moreover. Concepcion. she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff.L. Zaldivar. fr. J. a 1954 Court of Appeals decision. Reyes of that Court. Makalintal.L. as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib.J." 9 2.. Bautista. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. 1). 1. in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J. Barredo. While Art. We reverse. ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV. Castro. this is it. inter virum et uxorem). the lower court decision of November 23. 1962. Villamor and Makasiar. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement. J. 7 interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. Moreover. The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. LAW IV). concur. Tit. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena.B.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     We reach a different conclusion. 11 WHEREFORE. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor. then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. JJ. As announced at the outset of this opinion. Buenaventura v.’’ 10 3. lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. Tit. . as the surviving sister. The questioned donation is declared void. if it is at all to be differentiated.. the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. C.. Reyes. with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. XI. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. As provided for in the Civil Code." policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.B. took no part. Dizon. 1. ‘it would not be just that such donations should subsist. any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. She is therefore his widow. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective.’ So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage. 24. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones. 32 ad Sabinum. If the policy of the law is. Without pronouncement as to costs. to the other half. the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended with benefits. a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law. 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk.

COURT OF KAPUNAN. CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob. 1995 SOCORRO D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am. ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako. nilapastangan mo ako. bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. ESG — Huwag na lang. kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. kasi kung baga sa no. CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko. respondents." 1 Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. nag-aaply ka sa States. HONORABLE APPEALS. and ESTER S. dahil nandito ka sa loob. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin.m. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo. ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko. CHUCHI — Eh. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent. Tamayo Plaintiff Soccoro D. CHUCHI — Kasi. good customs and public policy. kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi. 93833 September 28. Garcia. in a confrontation in the latter's office. No. ESG — Huwag na. sabing ganoon ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo. RAMIREZ. allegedly vexed. binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union. nag-aaply ka sa review mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality. NEC NOC DISTINGUERE G.R. pero hindi ka papasa.000. In support of her claim. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita). okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon. ESG — Tapos iniwan no. . ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako. Marami ang nagaaply alam kong hindi ka papasa. pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan. petitioner. ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka. makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. ESG — Bastos ka. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko. kasi hanggang 10:00 p. nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito. J. hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo. CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. vs.00. (Sic) CHUCHI — Hindi m'am. ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako. hindi mo utang na loob. petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages.. 2 The transcript reads as follows: CHUCHI — Eh. in addition to costs. Defendant Ester S.: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo. CHUCHI — Kasi M'am. nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. dahil tapos ka na. Ester S." contrary to morals. attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610. kung kakailanganin ang certification mo.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     • UBI LEX NON DEBERMUS DISTINGUIT. CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon. ESG — Oo.m. CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako. naka duty ako noon. ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. GARCIA. kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. porke member ka na. nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok. di sana — ESG — Wala na akong pakialam.

Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. 5 Consequently. 10 We disagree. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 3 As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. 1990.A. dated October 6. and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court. not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. 4 From the trial court's Order. not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication.A. Consequently. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused.A. otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R. on February 21." not a "private conversation" and that consequently. Contrary to law. legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. intercept. as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. 8 In relation to this. 12 Section 1 of R. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense. Socorro D. with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person. respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3. or however otherwise described. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes. 1988. particularly a violation of R." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person. and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". or by using any other device or arrangement. to tap any wire or cable. unlawfully and feloniously. 1989. In an order May 3. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. to secretly overhear. September 16. 4200. Lumabas ka na.A. in Pasay City Metro Manila. 4200. the trial court granted the Motion to Quash. and other purposes. Magsumbong ka. On February 9. 1989 null and void. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous. the abovenamed accused. Philippines. 4200 entitled. It shall be unlawfull for any person. 4200." provides: Sec. Petitioner vigorously argues. in lieu of a plea. as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded. 1988. 4200. 1990. and that 2) the violation punished by R. the law is applied according to its express terms. petitioner agues that R. 1989. did then and there willfully. petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information. City Fiscal Upon arraignment.A. the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private . 1990. 1.A. MARIANO M. petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. the instant petition. Metro Manila. or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape recorder. her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication. the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court. private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200. petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19. committed as follows: That on or about the 22nd day of February. First. which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R. CUNETA Asst. and holding that: [T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan? ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na.A. Hence. Pasay City. 4200. 1988 is quoted herewith: INFORMATION The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. 9 Finally.

Thus: xxx xxx xxx Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear". well. Where the law makes no distinctions. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing. Mr. simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders. he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public. that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded. 4200. Your Honor. 626. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded. Senator Tañada: Well. March 12. No. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties. Now. the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used against him." That is fairness and that is what we demand. the nature of the conversation. p. we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you. taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record. that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside? Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill. he cannot complain any more. Now. 1964) xxx xxx xxx The unambiguity of the express words of the provision. it is not sportsmanlike. p.A. 4200.A. in spite of that warning. moreover.A. there is no objection to this if all the parties know. 1964) Senator Diokno: Do you understand. I think it is unfair. would that be reasonable. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R. III. unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons." 14 . 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal. Senator Tañada: Well no. March 12. is to record the intention of the parties. Vol. but the recording is done secretly. Your Honor. No. your Honor? Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. he makes damaging statements against his own interest. intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator. It is the communication between one person and another person — not between a speaker and a public. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are being recorded. Senator Padilla: Now. the element of secrecy would not appear to be material.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. 33. therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. For example. Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons. the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover. I can understand. xxx xxx xxx (Congression Record.A. Your Honor. III. It is not fair. 31. suppose. Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded. I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording is taken. Suppose there is such a recording. one does not distinguish. 584. Senator. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records. supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R. Vol. Your honor. Senator Padilla: Now. If the purpose. What R. Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings? Senator Tañada: That is right. xxx xxx xxx (Congressional Record. Second. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being recorded. would you say. if a party secretly records a public speech. as well as its communication to a third person should be professed. for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior.

as in a conversation. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited.A. Needless to state here. obscenity.A. and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously." In its ordinary signification. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     Finally. The right to the privacy of communication. and free exchange of communication between individuals — free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations. 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal. communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting. on February 22. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein. of his feelings and of his intellect. in the privacy of the latter's office. furthermore. among others. 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping. has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are. . if not all. communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity. because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare. 1988. Intermediate Appellate Court. because the law. the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature." 20 The instant case turns on a different note. as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion. SO ORDERED. put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below: It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. the instant petition is hereby DENIED. written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange. 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Costs against petitioner. 17 In Gaanan vs. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R. meaning "to share or to impart. agreeable falsehoods. we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R. between petitioner and private respondent. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. WHEREFORE.A. and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention. mention being made of pens. setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity.." 8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself. after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat.. hats. however. J.R. any constitutional command or prescription. 6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. On November 3. an order which. 1970. considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. respondent. 1970. athletic goods or materials. As made clear in our resolution of November 3. of the factual allegations set forth in the petition. no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. Felizmena arguing in behalf of respondent. matches. request or distribute sample ballots. No. whether of domestic or foreign origin. This Court. issued on the afternoon of the same day. 1970." 5 For respondent Commission. and the like. To repeat. The more serious objection. No preliminary injunction was issued. We view the matter differently. according to petitioner. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any express power granted to respondent by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication arising from any provision found therein. 1970. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent on November 2. MUTUC. bandanas. athletic goods or materials. Pampanga. 9 . or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens. that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets. In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29. Amelito R. 1970. this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not later than November 2. 1970. then a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. flashlights. we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis. hats. at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency. On the very next day. 2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase. cigarettes. and concluding with the words "and the like. as prayed for. and cigarettes. according to him. to the ruling of respondent Commission was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with. respondent Commission on Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo. petitioner. if deference be paid to the principle that a statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental law. lighters. alleged that respondent Commission on Elections. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a statute provides and what the Constitution requires. however. This opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision." 4 1. to freedom of speech. the conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. FERNANDO. which accords the utmost priority to freedom of expression. It did contend. five days after its filing. the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. 1970 AMELITO R. L-32717 November 26. speedy and adequate remedy. but also grave doubts upon that score. was not in vain. the very same day the case was orally argued. produce." 1 There being no plain. at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3. lighters. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. Felizmena for respondent. wallets. with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. matches. Its concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly. by a telegram sent to him five days previously." 3It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material. a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition. the election being barely a week away. if at all possible. rather than repugnant to. fans. certain Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law. is "violative of [his] constitutional right . but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act. Mutuc in his own behalf. shirts. shirts. The case was argued. petitioner. on November 3. This resolution is immediately executory. with the election barely a week away. informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it free from constitutional defects.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     • EJUSDEM GENERIS When do we apply this rule? G. fans (of whatever nature). bandanas. flashlights. in this special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes. he would seek a writ of prohibition. 7 Thus. vs. wallets. under the above statute subject to confiscation. the question before us was one of power. much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. 1970. Romulo C.: The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc. Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner.

TEEHANKEE.. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy. has in its favor obeisance to such a cardinal precept. then. as it could not have been otherwise. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no justification . orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled. as set forth in our resolution of November 3. in unequivocal language...J. (E) of sec. respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition — "provided that there are no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers. For. 12 of R. for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission. in effect. the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary.. the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission. the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. Petitioner's case." 2Acting upon petitioner's application.A..B. 13 There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority. JJ. Separate Opinions In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. however. 3. Castro. Without pronouncement as to costs. either by himself or through others. there is no violation.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     2. 6132. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion that petitioner. would be free. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases. 12 of R. Makalintal. and both forms of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. was to impose censorship on petitioner.L. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law.. with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law. the constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say. an evil against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor is this all. Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures..'" 11 It has been the constant holding of this Court. as the branch of the executive department — although independent of the President — to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The view advanced by him that if the above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited. as was obvious from the time of its filing. J. is prohibited." I would only add the following observations: This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness required by the due process clause of our Constitution. that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law. to use his mobile loudspeakers. Reyes.A. I concur with the views of Mr.. be transcended. C. What respondent Commission did. 10 responsibility under the Constitution to insure free. is a postulate of our system of government.' a printed form of election propaganda. whether substantive or formal. Zaldivar. Originally. JJ. Barredo and Villamor. 12 Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its WHEREFORE. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law. are on leave. That cannot be validly done. if he would not resort to taped jingle.. then the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet.' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions. respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands." Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle. 1970. If it is used only for a certain place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself." and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit — roaming around and announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate . and there is no higher law than the Constitution." In this modern day and age of the electronically . concurring: To be more specific. then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. J. Precisely. stood on solid footing. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates.' a verbally recorded form of election propaganda. 6132. Concepcion. Dizon and Makasiar.. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly. concur. the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech.

If it is used only for a certain place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself. respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of section 12. Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate.. oppressive and arbitrary. paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. 6132. oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right. even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears. They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable. (E) of sec. I concur with the views of Mr. Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is concerned. I would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' . They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable. The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission. petitioner's basic freedom of speech and expression... respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit — roaming around and announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate . 12 of R. paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner.. concurring: In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs..A. for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission. respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of section 12. Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is concerned. is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster.." I would only add the following observations: This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness required by the due process clause of our Constitution. respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make use of the mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more expensive and less effective than using a recorded or taped voice. therefore. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably. the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the . the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably. but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another person with his knowledge and consent. laudable as it may be.. oppressive and arbitrary. but its conclusion is not. oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression.' a printed form of election propaganda... however. petitioner's basic freedom of speech and expression. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no justification . even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears. therefore.. Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act.' a verbally recorded form of election propaganda. should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy. is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election advertisements — to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters — is correct. which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable. Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate. # Separate Opinions TEEHANKEE." In this modern day and age of the electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district. I would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' . and both forms of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election advertisements — to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters — is correct. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is through the voters' eyes. is prohibited. but its conclusion is not. respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition — "provided that there are no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers. 6132. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is through the voters' eyes.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district. oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression." 2Acting upon petitioner's application.A. respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make use of the mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more expensive and less effective than using a recorded or taped voice. there is no violation. 12 of R." Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle. J." and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. Originally.

laudable as it may be.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     candidate's mobile unit or carrier. oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right. which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable. should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy. . The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission. but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another person with his knowledge and consent.

the reopening of cadastral cases should also be extended until December 31. to petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act 2259. 1972. Branch V. presided by the respondent Judge a petition to reopen the aforesaid decision dated September 28. Act 931. HON. ETC. peaceful and notorious possession of the said parcel of land since the time immemorial. Act 931 which expired on December 31. 1976 applies also to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. Ormoc City. for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. On July 22. 1940. petitioner. ET AL. which was approved on June 20. Rep. in case such parcels of land. respondent judge rendered decision setting aside the decision of the cadastral court dated September 28. married to Victorino Gormanes. are granted the right within five years after the date on which this act shall take effect. There is merit in the petition. Act 2061. DE CASTRO. Ormoc Cadastre entitled. 1968 and this period has not been extended under the provisions of Rep. and that period has not been extended by Rep. By way of background. which took effect on June 13. Florencia. 1980. 1940 under Rep. Act 6236 because the latter applies only to the extensions of time limit for the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Respondent Judge in its order dated May 9. Act 6236 which provides for the extension of the time limit to file applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31. said land was declared public land and that they had been in adverse.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     • EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS G. married to Dulcisima Barabad. 1953. or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after their distribution as imposed by Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the same but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper court during the time limit established by law. due to their non-appearance on the date of the hearing of the Cadastral Case because of ignorance and excusable neglect. denied the opposition for lack of sufficient merit and set the case for hearing on June 24.R. versus Tiburcio. 1958. Act 6236 claiming to be the owners and possessors of Lot No. The sole issue to be resolved. 1972. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre by virtue of hereditary succession but. subject to the liability and claims of creditors. the first named is residing in Can-adiong. married to Basilio Barabad. 1972. is an act to authorize the filing in the proper court. They pray that the decision of the Cadastral Court affecting Lot No. of legal ages. married to Epefania Maglasang. petitioners. 1980 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS. 1 The following facts are undisputed in the instant case: In a decision dated September 28. private respondents Aotes filed with the Court of First Instance of Leyte. 1972. under certain conditions. Under this aforesaid act. No. 1972 of the respondent Judge in Cad. Lot No. all persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings. let the Commissioner of Land Registration Commission. refers to an act setting a new time limit for the filing of applications for free patents. considering the above facts. 4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of the private respondents in undivided interest in equal share of one-fourth (1/4) each. the period for reopening of cadastral proceedings expired on December 31. 1972. 1980 in fairness and justice to them. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre is hereby adjudicated in favor of herein movants in undivided interests and in equal share of ¼ each to GONZALA AOTES. have been. Act 931. respondents. Lot No. "The Director of Lands. all adjudicatees are Filipinos. 1940 by the Cadastral Court. J. Act 931 as amended by Rep. on account of their failure to file such claims. petitioners filed an opposition to the aforesaid petition on the ground that such petition is barred by the expiration of the period for reopening cadastral proceedings under Rep. vs. FLORENCIA AOTES. or are about to be declared land of the public domain. 4273. Ormoc Cadastre be reopened. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre was declared public land. the decision of this Court dated September 28. 2 petitioners argue that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the proceedings for reopening of the cadastral case because under the provision of Rep. On February 23. Ormoc City. In the Manifestation and Motion. interests and penalties. and that they be allowed to file their cadastral answer. Hens. 4273 Public Land is set aside and said Lot No. and for the reopening of judicial . Fabian and Gonzala. L-35376 September 11. 1940 declaring Lot No. 3 respondents Aotes claim that considering the time limit for firing applications for free patents and for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles has been extended up to December 31. Act 6236 which applies only to the extension of the time limit for the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings. by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this act. claimants-movants".: Petitioners Republic of the Philippines and The Director of Lands seek the review of the decision dated July 22. all surnamed Aotes. 1714. ESTENZO. NUMERIANO G. by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this act. petitioners filed this instant petition assigning only one error to writ: The trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for reopening of Cadastral Proceedings. 4273. 27. of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land. Case No. No. Rep. Philippines. Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court. TIBURCIO AOTES.. is whether or not Rep. Quezon City.. On March 16. 1968. GLRO Rec. and FABIAN AOTES. and as soon as this decision shall have become final. In the Brief. declaring Lot No. issue the corresponding decree of aforesaid parcel of land in the names of herein adjudicatees. paying all the taxes.

not only as to matters which were decided in the first action. and the law is applied as written. under the principle of res judicata. The intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands which were declared public land in Rep. Rep.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. That is a function that properly pertains to the legislative branch. It will be noted that while Rep. 4 If Rep. Act 6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law. 1980. the respondent Judge has concluded that Rep. 1968 to file applications for free patents. extended the time limit for the filing of applications for free patents and for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles not to extend beyond December 31. as we have noted. the express mention of one thing in a law. Rep. Rep. 1972 a petition to reopen the decision of the Cadastral Court under Rep. 1940. 9 The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from relitigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. this Court once more stresses and emphasizes that Rep. Under the legal maxim of statutory construction. Act 6236 expressly 'extending the time limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared public land. 1940 of the Cadastral Court declaring the land in question a public land has become final and conclusive. must be obeyed. Consequently. Act 6236. Act 931 and 2061. 1968. only were literal application is impossible or inadequate. No pronouncement as to costs. The law. As correctly pointed out by petitioners. 8 More importantly. no similar provision is found in Rep. and on the same cause of action. 1971. upon expiration of the thirty-day period to appeal therefrom. a proceeding entirely different from "filing an application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. no decree having been issued in his favor. as a general rule. That cannot be done by the judiciary. no interpretation is called for. 1968. once the decision become final. Act 6236 extended the time limit which is up to December 31. Act 6236. including land registration or cadastral proceedings. Court of Appeals: 5 "It has been repeated time and again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally. It has also acquired the status of res judicata. as a guide to probable legislative intent. expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion). Rep. approved on June 19. means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. Act 6236. in setting aside the decision dated September 28. . that the extension provided for by Rep. therefore. it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous. this Court held: Although the title of Jesus Vaño over said Lot 1-B is not as yet indefeasible. Respondent Aotes filed on February 23. Our decisions have consistently been to that effect. and interpretation. Act 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases. It is well-settled that a prior judgment is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the subject matter. the lower court has no longer jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by respondents for reopening the cadastral proceedings because the latter. 1980. We hold. Act 6236. it would have so provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. WHEREFORE. the decision dated September 30. It must be remembered that generally. Act 931 as amended by Rep. judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the decisions dated July 22. In resume. 7 for application is the first duty of courts. are deemed barred under the principle of res judicata. Act 2061 fixed the time to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond December 31. the fundamental principle of res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings. Act 6236 which is the sole basis for filing the respondents Aotes' petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings applies only to the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings like the instant case. SO ORDERED. Rep. like those of the petitioner. 11 The final judgment rendered therein is deemed to have settled the status of the land subject thereof. however. did not file the aforesaid petition within the period fixed by the applicable laws to wit: Rep. the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until December 31. the respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the petition of the respondents Aotes to reopen the cadastral proceedings. for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and for the reopening of judicial proceedings on certain lands which were declared public land. Act 2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases. 1976 for the filing of applications for free patents and for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. which. as such binds the whole world. 1976. This rule. 1940. Respondents Aotes claim that since the time limit for filing applications for free patents and applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles have been extended up to December 31. leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation. Act 6236 is applicable also to reopening of cadastral proceedings. 1953 to petition for a reopening of cadastral proceedings. but not so included in Rep. is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind." Parenthetically. there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. settled is the rule that a cadastral case is a judicial proceeding in rem. altering Rep. the very law on which respondents Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply any basis for respondents' contention. Act 2061. interests or claims existing before said date are deemed barred by said decision. Act 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings and as a consequence. thereby. expressly did. Under this act the time for filing applications shall not extend beyond December 31. 1972 of the respondent Judge and reiterating that of the Cadastral Court dated September 28. all rights. De Camacho. As was pointed out in Gonzaga vs. 6 Likewise. Act 931 granted a right within 5 years from June 20. the extension as provided for by the Rep. 12 In the case of Cano vs. 10 Indeed. but also as to every other matter which the parties could have properly set up in the prior suit. Rep. 13 By reiterating its ruling. if not noted thereon. Act 2061 fixed a new time limit which is up to December 31. Act 6236. Act 6236 is made clearer by reference to Rep.

who. fiscal. or to preserve public peace. pp. plaintiff-appellant.S. 54 Off. or assessor of any province. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. 422). Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code? Section 54 of the said Code reads: No justice. 14129 July 31. Thereafter. the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. "judge.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     • CASUS OMISSUS any candidate. No. the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. In its most extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity. shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote." A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above conclusion. no member of the national. the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First instance". or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service. which provided the following: SEC. — No judge of the First Instance. however. 1962 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. . and justices of the peace. is complete and accurate. The same is. Acting on this second motion to dismiss. as recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant." the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation. Clark. J. 1669. except to vote. the reply of the defense. and the opposition of the prosecution. it is said. or treasurer.e. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. who are judges of facts. "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. justice of the peace. by virtue of his office. 25 Fed. The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. and which was later amended by Act.. judges of the courts of Industrial Relations. According to Bouvier Law Dictionary. 15613-R. fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary. v. Macaraeg. Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations. while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The records show that the statement of the case and the facts. there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term. In Section 54. Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee. including justices of the peace. is clothed with judicial authority (U.. GUILLERMO Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant. section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code. Gaz. Nos. He submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code. No. Cas. here adopted. consequently. A "judge" is a public officer. 1709. REGALA. judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. Casus ominus pro omisso habendus est (Restrictive rule) G.R. defendant-appellee. like judges of the courts of First Instance. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. vs. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. if he is a peace officer. therefore.: This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant. treasurer. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding a probable cause that the crime charged as committed by defendant. The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907.R. city. to wit: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of that Province. the answer of the prosecution. provincial. 441. When. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. MANANTAN. justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges. (CA-G. 449. judge. or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein. municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. the trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty. if entitled thereto. i. and even jurors. no officer or employee of the Army. no such modification exists. In other words.

the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No.) During the time of the Commonwealth. Under the Philippine Legislature. The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. it was likewise provided: . 48. Took effect on January 15. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. (Approved December 3. however. Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly election. of these last 3 amendments. 605. That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any election. or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years. however. who aids any candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any election otherwise by exercising the right to vote. Sec. the words "justice of the peace" would follow." In other words. 867.00. Act No. if he is a peace officer. provincial. provincial fiscal. if the law simply said "judge. shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100. . 357. (Again. in Act 1709. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later. fiscal. or treasurer. and no judge of the First Instance. or Assembly election under the penalty of being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide. 1582. This law provided in Section 48: SEC. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. 599. however. 1907. No judge of the First Instance. This Act reads: SEC. 449. 1938. when the Revised Election Code was approved.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     1726 and 1768. the provisions in question read: SEC.) Again. The present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos.) (Emphasis supplied.) Act No. shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote. Rather." the words "justice of the peace" were omitted. — No justice. however. Provided. . (Enacted on August 31. provincial or Assembly election. only Act No.) Subsequently. treasurer or assessor of any province. when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March 10. — Any judge of the First Instance. except to vote. municipal or rural police. Note carefully. Included as its basic provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. treasurer. several amendments were made through the passage of Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. 3336 and 3387. during the session of Congress in 1960. 357. 1927.) Then. amended by Rep. Took effect on September 15. the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office or employment whatever for a term of 5 years. 2310. if entitled thereto. nor shall he be eligible during the time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal.000. — No judge of the First Instance. that in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. 357 was enacted on August 22. Officers and employees meddling with the election." (Enacted January 9. (Emphasis supplied) After the Administrative Code. no officer or employee of the Army. and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate. 233. In the history of our election law. and in all cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years. however. . Commonwealth Act No. the Constabulary of the national. Section 29. 1917. with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. justice of the peace. provincial. 1907. justice of the peace. which was the law enforced until June 1947. the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 2636. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No. the following should be noted: Under Act 1582. 6. fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service. Act No. only Act No. 180). whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance". judge. 1907. or officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any municipal. fiscal or assessor of any province. Act No. 3387. 180. 3587 has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen later. (Of these 4 amendments. justice of the peace. It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 666. or any officer or employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service. it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge". that the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election. or to preserve public peace. except for reelection to the position which he may be holding. This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken. any officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality. 1907.00 nor more than P2. 357 and Rep. 657. Acts Nos. it was provided: No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections. however. 2242 and again. nor exert influence in any manner in any election nor take part therein.

S. Nevertheless. injustice. 294). or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. can the legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not.) Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. to wit: On the other hand. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which best harmonizes with their intent and purpose. p. frequently. where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity. The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature. found in Section 449 of the Revised .S. Under the said rule. v. object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. has been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U. U. it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Interpretation of Laws. 354. the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any province. and various judges. then indeed. v. p. Act No. cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56. as in this particular instance. in language that the common world will understand.." Having been completely destroyed. The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. has well said: The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended.. Katz. the language of criminal statutes. Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under that said section. Corbet. Sec. has more particular application to statutes that should be strictly construed.J. In the present case. 283 U. 816).S. 25. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity." The last mentioned phrase. Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes.S. This has been recognized time and again by decisions of various courts. 233). the conclusions drawn from the historical background of Rep. has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace. Yet. The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws. they were merely called by another term. the Court of Appeals. defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law intends to do. See also Ernest Brunchen. cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U. contradiction. instead. if a certain line is passed. 159).Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records which might have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. L. vs. but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person. 78. in McBoyle v.. 357 which legislation. etc. Statutory Construction. Justices of the Supreme Court. 271 U. If such were the evident purpose." In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case. can there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals. justices of the peace were just called "judges. v. there has been no such omission. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. Rather. 53. 252 U. defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule. 56. such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations.S. In the new law. Act No. Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. There has only been a substitution of terms. or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford. Betteridge 43 F." (Justice Holmes. a person. all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications from these records proved futile. cannot then refer to a justice of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality. defendant submits. If it is true that the phrase "of any province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial officials. judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations. The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee.S. single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. the rule merely serves as an additional.) As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States. who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute. as indicated above. are now within its encompass. 56. (U.S. The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute. If that rule is applicable to the present. Ed. This point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General.S. Supp. being restrictive in nature. treasurers and assessors who are generally known as provincial officers. Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.S. when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and justice of the peace". and for reasons already mentioned. In the case under consideration.) Thus. justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. (3 Sutherland. object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. They are national officials. 129. It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals.S. A Federal District court in the U. U. 215 U. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed against the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the state.

for not setting aside. the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied. 104. L-12601).Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     Administrative Code. 3387. Statutory Construction. We do not believe that the legislature had. Agusan. there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace should be prohibited from electioneering. they are given authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. Besides. neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54. .) Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative or executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . FOR THE ABOVE REASONS. and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be open to serious doubt. (pp. 1582 and Act No.) Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them. In that proposed legislation. 237. 307. opinions.) . Act No. House Bill No. The Executive Secretary. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was filed. the Secretary of Justice. Administrative Order No. intended to create such an unfortunate situation. Lastly. Another which expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature. Hence. p. until it has become a law. of the President of the Philippines. otherwise known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius. etc.R. In Tranquilino O. in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Likewise. it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of "expressio unius. The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court. App. 103. 6. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. On law reason and public policy. 2676. House Bill No. dated March 31. which was filed on January 25. Mullally 135 p. the proposed amendment. Appellant's Brief. . No. guided by the rule of exclusion. justices of the peace are already expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political participation. should not be invoked. but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included. contrary to the provisions of the Election Code. Indeed. . . 117-123). 708. they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. and the reasons expressed by the individual members of the legislature even in debates. 1709). dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen. est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. To begin with. and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them." The rule has no application. Act No. cannot be properly taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford. Calo. The argument is unacceptable. Jr. 519. . Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 375-376). v. Com. If the motives. (G. pp. 1957. under Section 56. a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill. . defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. and used "judge" in lieu thereof. among others. 2676 was a proposed amendment to Rep. 357. the obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one class of judges but all judges. there appears no reason for the alleged change. 1955. 180. and later. whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts. . On the other hand. Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities. Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Court of First Instance. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway. such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. 22 Cal. In other words. The argument is that with the filing of the said House Bill. the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius. cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and exclusion cases. (Appellant's Brief. Sec. Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in partisan politics. 213. it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. (Blevins v. this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondents. the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits. Act No. and to so construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities would weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. It is worthy of note that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering.

. 1962. Macarandang. J." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Philippines. 1962. provincial governors. soldiers. defendant-appellant. L-22301 August 30. Yes. the judgment appealed from is affirmed. to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14.: The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. plaintiff-appellee. 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code."6 The law cannot be any clearer. or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines]." Upon which. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG. dated June 2. FERNANDO. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits. We hold that it does not. 22. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13. 1963. without serial number. Accused however would rely on People v. guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons. . the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision. Assistant Solicitor General F. the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits. answered categorically: "Yes. sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed. he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm. as amended by Commonwealth Act No. Alafriz.1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee. Cal. the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case. It cannot be set aside. it no longer speaks with authority.R.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     • DURA LEX SED LEX G. possess any firearm. No provision is made for a secret agent. No. or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms. Our task is equally clear. Rosete and Solicitor O. lieutenant governors.2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent. provincial treasurers. The decision must be affirmed. 1962. Your Honor. As such he is not exempt. R. Contrary to law. that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm.3 a certificate dated March 11. municipal mayors. the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs.1äwphï1. Macarandang. Wherefore. the Philippine Constabulary. or ammunition." Such reliance is misplaced. "it shall be unlawful for any person to . It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. sailors. 1963. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision. the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik). the appeal was taken to this Court." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits. . in the City of Manila. with six (6) rounds of ammunition. parts of firearms." The only question being one of law. C.ñët Thereafter on November 27. now the appellant. 4. municipal treasurers."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. Francisco P. 1967 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila. Leviste." are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. and his counsel Atty. detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor. Cabigao for defendant-appellant. the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda. Feliciano Leviste." Forthwith. without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities." When the case was called for hearing on September 3.8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government. Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission. vs. municipal police." Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity. in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused. and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. 1963." then Governor of Batangas.

On March 9. But considering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with which the appellant was charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day or more than five (5) years.00)". The bond for his provisional release is cancelled. SO ORDERED. 1962. Resolving the issue of jurisdiction. de Castro and Trial Attorney Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee. No. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant. a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. An investigation was conducted and thereupon." At the time of appellant's apprehension. was appointed as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C. Adolfo M. or a fine of more than two hundred pesos (P200. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a license or to register the said firearm because it was government property and therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in appellant's name. On February 19. L-22291 November 15.00) pesos or more than five thousand (P5.. 4 Indeed. 286. defendant-appellant. Ernesto C. Of these assigned errors. the two main issued posed are whether or not the present subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court pursuant to Republic Act No. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment as secret agent. Jesus Santayana y Escudero. accused Jesus Santayana.R. Costs de oficio. which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over the offense charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. the case was appealed to US and the accused assigned three errors allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of this case. it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or fine of not more than two hundred (P200. vs. 1967. . Solicitor General Arturo A. 1962.00) pesos (Republic Act No. Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1. and the offense charged in the information is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than one As to the second issue to be resolved. and whether or not the appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently authorizes him to carry and posses firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto. does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. 1962. the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case of People vs. Alafriz. therefore. without a license to possess them. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenace of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879. Maristela. he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question. 5 It also appears that appellant was informed by Col. 6 Capt.000. 1976 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 2613. JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO. From the foregoing." The case of People vs. the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted. the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the above-described pistol with four rounds of ammunition. Wherefore.Statcon:  Particular  Latin  Rules     G. plaintiff-appellee.00) or more than five thousand pesos (P5.000. Hence. Court of First Instance have original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six (6) months. cal. and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General. as amended by Republic Act No. The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction over the same. appellant was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. (1) year and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years. 2613.000. Chief of the CIS. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged with its corresponding penalty. 296. the offense. there is no doubt that under Section 87 of Republic Act No. the justice over cases of illegal possession of firearms. But equally the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30.00) pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original to said courts. JR.000. a Memorandum Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in the name of the accused regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. CONCEPCION. 4). J: Accused. Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm also informed the latter that no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are already appointed as CIS agent. 25. Maristela likewise issued an undated certification 3 to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On October 29. there is no question that appellant was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. was found guilty of the crime of illegal possesion of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay the costs. Col. or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand (P1.00). The essential facts are not in dispute.