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Exempting Circumstances:Accident

US vs. Tanedo
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Tarlac
Facts: On January 26, 1909, Cecilio Tanedo, a landowner, went with some
workers to work on the dam on his land, carrying with him his shotgun & a few
shells. Upon reaching the dam, the accused went on his way to hunt for wild
chickens, meeting the victim, Feliciano Sanchez, the latter's Mother & Uncle. The
accused went into the forest upon the recommendation of the deceased to
continue his search for the elusive wild chickens. Upon seeing one, Tanedo shot
one, but simultaneously, he heard a human cry out in pain. After seeing that
Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo ran back to his workers and asked one,
Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body, which they did by putting it
amidst the tall cogon grass, & later burying in an old well. Only 1 shot was heard
that morning & a chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were
found at the scene of the crime. There was no enmity between the accused and
the deceased. Prior to the trial, the accused denied all knowledge of the crime,
but later confessed during the trial. The lower court found the accused guilty of
homicide, having invited the deceased into the forest & intentionally shooting
him in the chest. Accused was sentenced to 14 yrs, 8 mos & 1 day of reclusion
temporal, accessories, indemnifications & costs. The accused appealed.
Issue: WON the accused is guilty
Held: No. The idea that Tanedo intended to kill Sanchez is negated by the fact
that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having only
one shot fired. Also, according to:

Article 1 of the Penal Code: Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary
acts and omissions punished by law…

Article 8: He who while performing a legal act with due care, causes
some injury by mere accident without liability or intention of causing it.

Section 57 of Code of Criminal Procedure: A defendant in a criminal
action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in
case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be
entitled to an acquittal.
In this case there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the accused, nor
is it disputed that the accused was engaged in a legal act, nor is there
evidence that the accused intended to kill the deceased. The only thing
suspicious is his denial of the act and his concealment of the body.
The court quoted State vs. Legg: "Where accidental killing is relied upon as a
defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing,
and the burden is upon the state to show that it was intentional, and if, from a
consideration of all the evidence, both that for the state and the prisoner,
there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or
intentional, the jury should acquit."

Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment of
conviction.
Decision: Judgment of Conviction is reversed, the accused acquitted, and
discharged from custody.

Bindoy appealed. In the course of the struggle. wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand. without Bindoy's seeing him. alleging that the death of Omamdam was caused accidentally and withoutmalicious intent. and instead of doing so. 8 of the Revised Penal Code RATIO: 1. the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8. The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal. In the course of the struggle. 2. Held: Yes. and that when the latter let go. Bindoy appealed. The witness for the defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo. On the contrary. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife and attempted to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. HELD: Yes. Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay. he would be liable for his act. the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent. with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Omamdam's chest. the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards Omamdam. and instead of doing so. 1930. The witness for the defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo. 1930. 8 of the Revised Penal Code Ratio: 1. There is no evidence to show that Bindoy deliberately and intentionally killed Omamdam. . although the wrongful act done is different from that which he intended.Exempting Circumstances:Accident People vs. @  No evidence that Bindoy was aware of Omamdam's presence. Bindoy Facts: On May 6. 3. 2. @  No evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy & Omamdam. If. who was then behind Bindoy. who was then behind Bindoy. since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability. they were nephew & uncle. who was therefore hit in the chest. Faustino Pacas' wife. since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability. Decision is reversed. Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas. This is not the case here. ISSUE: WON the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be mitigated on the ground of accident. There is no evidence to show that Bindoy deliberately and intentionally killed Omamdam. which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him. @  No evidence that Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas. Issue: WON the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be mitigated on the ground of accident. He was only trying to defend his possession of the bolo. The trial court held that Bindoy was guilty of the crime of homicide. 3. On the contrary. although the wrongful act done is different from that which he intended. No. because Omamdam had passed behind him. in the struggle. in the struggle. This is not the case here. Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay. Decision is reversed. & were on good terms with each other. alleging that the death of Omamdam was caused accidentally and without malicious intent. People vs. & were on good terms with each other. they were nephew & uncle. The trial court held that Bindoy was guilty of the crime of homicide. She refused and Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. If. because Omamdam had passed behind him. had wounded Omamdam. who was therefore hit in the chest. His conduct was perfectly lawful. without Bindoy's seeing him. had wounded Omamdam. He was only trying to defend his possession of the bolo. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife and attempted to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. No. wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand. Faustino Pacas' wife. the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards Omamdam. She refused and Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept.  No evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy & Omamdam.  No evidence that Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. and that when the latter let go. Bindoy FACTS: On May 6. The disturbance attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam. with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Omamdam's chest.  No evidence that Bindoy was aware of Omamdam's presence. which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him. The disturbance attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam. His conduct was perfectly lawful. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas. The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal. he would be liable for his act.

approved Counsel for the defense assign ten errors as having been committed by the trial court. The ruling of the Acting Insular Auditor. S. was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan with a violation of section 35 of Act No. transaction. Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid nature. to repay the sum loaned. Filamor.000. (Donnell vs." and to ascertain if the instant transaction comes under the first or the latter denomination. for the exhibits in question speak of a "credito" (credit) and not of a " prestamo" (loan). Attorney-General Villa-Real. and May 7. en C. 29 N. to discount . upon an agreement. and placed no restriction upon discount transactions. "casada con Gral. or by imprisonment not to exceed five years. which. MALCOLM. then President of the National Bank. P20. P5. Bouvier's Law Dictionary. Gardiner [1864]. de Concepcion. were taken up and paid by July 17. 1921. Was the granting of a credit of P300. Was the granting of a credit of P300. to which reference must hereafter repeatedly be made. Venancio Concepcion. President of the Philippine National Bank." by Venancio Concepcion.) A "loan" means the delivery by one party and the receipt by the other party of a given sum of money. S. No. counsel is correct. plaintiff-appellee. P20. President of the Philippine National Bank. defendant-appellant. dated August 11. Clara Vda. credit aggregating P300. Cagayan. live. and the costs. But in its last analysis. J. growing.000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion.. 1918. and again in oral argument." was a copartnership capitalized at P100.000. Jones [1848]. 1919. Venancio Concepcion.000.000. 1919." In a letter dated August 7. inquired of the Insular Auditor whether section 37 of Act No. but only show the concession of a credit. could be increased to P10." by Venancio Concepcion.. It becomes material. In this statement of fact. President of the Philippine National Bank..Exempting Circumstances:Accident on January 30. Member Miguel S. Pursuant to this authorization. therefore. vs. Venancio Concepcion.000. 1922 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.: By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine National Bank. a "loan" or a "discount"? Counsel argue that while section 35 of Act No. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. answers the proposition of appellant one by one. S. and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and six months. 146. but were repealed by Act No. Miguel S. Judge of First Instance. S. 1918. with or without interest. Concepcion. 490. authorized an extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion. The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence or trust reposed by a lender that he will pay what he may promise. Recaredo Ma. 2747. The notes. Anacleto Concepcion contributed P5. 1919.. Concepcion was the administrator of the company. together with the interest. out of an actual.000. "Puno y Concepcion. 1916. Parker Willis. G. reads as follows: "The National Bank shall not. or by both such fine and imprisonment.000. a "loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No." in the amount of P300. L-19190 November 29. was to the effect that said section referred to loans alone.000. (Payne vs. to discover the distinction between a "loan" and a "discount. as President of the Philippine National Bank and as member of the board of directors of this bank. The question presented are reduced to their simplest elements in the opinion which follows: I. VENANCIO CONCEPCION. 2747 prohibits the granting of a "loan. Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee. effective on February 20. in an exceptionally accurate and comprehensive brief. Section 35 of Act No. 2747? Counsel argue that the documents of record do not prove that authority to make a loan was given. These errors they have argued adroitly and exhaustively in their printed brief.000." Section 49 of the same Act provides: "Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos. grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks. He was found guilty by the Honorable Enrique V. was granted the firm of "Puno y Concepcion." it does not prohibit what is commonly known as a "discount." These two sections were in effect in 1919 when the alleged unlawful acts took place. H. S." the only security required consisting of six demand notes. en C.000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion. On the facts recounted. 167. Calvo for appellant.000. Clemente Puno. directly or indirectly. 2938." P50. to grant loans and discount negotiable documents to P5. en C. limiting the discretional power of the local manager at Aparri.000. en C. express or implied. This special authorization was essential in view of the memorandum order of President Concepcion dated May 17. 2612 was intended to apply to discounts as well as to loans.R.) The concession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit of the amount fixed in the "credit. as they do. just mentioned. 13 Ala. Y." II. 2747. 1916. en C. to pay a fine of P3. in certain cases. and Rosario San Agustin. between April 10.

Could Venancio Concepcion. 1407. This same question has been previously submitted and has received an answer adverse to such contention in the cases of United Stated vs. 1046). but was paid when the notes fell due. so should we here lay down the same ruling. President of the Philippine National Bank. therefore. because (1) interest was not deducted from the face of the notes. Knapp ([1912].. Was the granting of a credit of P300. 1401. it has been the holding. 2938 has served to take away the basis for criminal prosecution. (2) a discount is always on double-name paper.) A loan. that the repeal of these sections of Act No. interest is deducted in advance. such repeals a former Act which penalized the same offense. 2747? We are of opinion the statute forbade the loan to his copartnership firm as well as to himself directly. S. 241). without deciding. 3 Am. Rep.Exempting Circumstances:Accident a paper is only a mode of loaning money. declared in express terms that they should not borrow. relied upon in the Binalbagan Estate decision. S.. 2747. en C. a loan is generally on single-name paper. of the bank. provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the Act. depositors and creditors of the bank. with. however. en C. to a partnership of which the wife of a director of a bank is a member. convict. prior to the finding of the information and the rendition of the judgment? In the interpretation and construction of statutes. however." etc. 373). penalized by this law? .. 206 N. 40 Phil. and 1412 can be specially noted. the Supreme Court of Maryland said: What then was the purpose of the law when it declared that no director or officer should borrow of the bank. Various provisions of the Civil serve to establish the familiar relationship called a conjugal partnership. a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a member. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may serve two masters — that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers." were not discount paper but were mere evidences of indebtedness. 211). that. is an indirect loan to such director.000 to a partnership of established reputation and without asking for collateral security. it is shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business venture. Just as there it was declared that the operations constituted a loan and not a discount. The facts of the instant case having relation to this phase of the argument are not essentially different from the facts in the Binalbagan Estate case. an the his no As noted along toward the beginning of this opinion. 2938. the purpose of the Legislature is plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director of the bank. therefore. 2747 by Act No. Counsel argue that a loan to the partnership "Puno y Concepcion. against the temptation to which the directors and officers might be exposed. and the legislature unwilling to rely upon the implied understanding that in assuming this relation they would not acquire any interest hostile or adverse to the most exact and faithful discharge of duty. 653). The loan was made indirectly to him through his firm.. 1393. 33 Md. IV. It is contended.. In other words. In this instance. while in a loan. yet the conclusion is inevitable that the demand notes signed by the firm "Puno y Concepcion.. interest is taken at the expiration of a credit. when these portions of Act No. and sentenced offenders charged with violations of the old law. be convicted of a violation of section 35 of Act No. by the appellant. 218 U. en C. Y. "Puno y Concepcion. the law covers loans and not discounts. the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such occurrence is shown by the acknowledged fact that in this instance defendant was tempted to mingle his personal and family affairs with official duties. 2747." etc. President of the Philippine National Bank. 2747 in relation with section 49 of the same Act. it should be recalled that the wife of the defendant held one-half of the capital of this partnership.000 to the copartnership. an "indirect loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 43 Phil. and the power which as such they must necessarily possess in the control and management of the bank. S. section 49 of Act No. 12 Phil. Howard Bank ([1870].. "of directly or indirectly violating this section he shall be punished by fine and imprisonment?" We say to protect the stockholders. it was said: III. in violation of section 35 of Act No.. falls within the prohibition. in relation to section 35 of the same Act. 272. these distinctions: (1) In a discount. (Articles 1315." In this connection." by Venancio Concepcion. en C. and to permit the loan P300. that where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense. President of the Philippine National Bank. In the case of Lester and Wife vs. People vs. as ruled by the Insular Auditor. 2747 were repealed by Act No.. If. such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try.. In the case of People vs. 558. and Ong Chang Wing and Kwong Fok vs. Cuna ([1908]. "shall be convicted.000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion. Conceding. Was the granting of a credit of P300." was not an "indirect loan. and it must again be the holding. Concepcion ([1922]. 1408. etc. and (2) they were single-name and not double-name paper. United States ([1910]. S. S." by Venancio Concepcion. and "if any director. V.

no loss has been suffered by the Philippine National Bank. with the costs of this instance against the appellant. the acts of the President of the Philippine National Bank do not fall within the purview of the rulings of the Insular Auditor. S. we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that no reversible error was committed in the trial of this case. the prohibition contained in said section 35 is without penal sanction.Exempting Circumstances:Accident Counsel argue that since the prohibition contained in section 35 of Act No. and since section 49 of said Act provides a punishment not on the bank when it violates any provisions of the law. It is furthermore stated that since the loans made to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion. and to each director separately and individually." constitute a legal defense? Counsel argue that if defendant committed the acts of which he was convicted.) VI. criminal intent is not necessarily material.lawph!l. supra. constitutes the crime. The law will not allow private profit from a trust. the prohibition extends to the board of directors. . President of the Philippine National Bank. (People vs. and with reference to previous decisions of this court on the same subject. with reference to the decision of the trial court. is conclusive. Does the alleged good faith of Venancio Concepcion. Concepcion. inhibited on account of public policy and public interest. it was because he was misled by rulings coming from the Insular Auditor. en C. The penalty imposed by the trial judge falls within the limits of the punitive provisions of the law. even if conceded to be true." have been paid. en C. and will not listen to any proof of honest intent. Morse. as previously demonstrated. JUDGMENT On a review of the evidence of record. in this instance. So ordered. And. and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information. and advantage not common to the other stockholders. Neither argument.000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion. Banks and Banking. The doing of the inhibited act. in his work. Under the statute which the defendant has violated. and the errors assigned by the appellant. Judgment is affirmed. section 125. but on a person violating any provisions of the same.net The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act. S. even conceding that such rulings have controlling effect. says: It is fraud for directors to secure by means of their trust. 2747 is on the bank. in extending the credit of P300. and imposing imprisonment as a part of the penalty.

Conchita and Rey Agliday are credible witnesses. he should be acquitted on the basis of the exempting circumstance of accident under RPC A12(4). He said that while his parents were quarrelling he did not interfere.Exempting Circumstances:Accident People vs Agliday Facts: Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do. Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do. Prosecution witness Conchita Agliday. No. Exemption is based on the lack of criminal intent. 25. Once malice is proven. wife of appellant testified that while she was washing the dishes in the kitchen when her husband shot her son. Judgment: Appeal denied . Appellant claims. brother of Richard said that he was in the house resting on a wooden bed when he saw appellant shoot his brother. criminal liability does not arise in a case where a crime is committed by any person who. shortly after appellant ran away while she brought her son first to the Sto. Firearm was a shotgun that needs to be cocked first before it can be fired. and that his witnesses (Jose Matabang and SPO1 Opina) are more credible. On Feb. Afterwards he surrendered. there should be: a) A person performing a lawful act b) Due care c) Causes an injury to another by mere accident d) Without any fault and intention of causing it Act of firing a shotgun (& an unlicensed one at that) is not lawful. an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. Another witness Rey Agliday. Matabang’s testimony was basically what appellant told him – biased and limited. fatally hitting his son (in the gluteus maximus!!!) after which he went to his son and embraced him. lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences” – connotes absence of criminal intent. it cannot. Declarations of innocence of appellant contradicted by testimonies of wife & surviving son. then to the San Carlos Hospital. Appellant contends that he is only guilty of reckless imprudence. causing his death. but his brother did that is why he was shot by appellant. Intent is not lacking in the instant case. 1999 in the evening Agliday shot his son Richard Agliday with an unlicensed shotgun. then finally to the Region I General Hospital where he died. Before shooting. without malice. 2. recklessness disappears. The court is not persuaded. Niño Hospital. & although it comes about through some act of our will. while Opina’s claim that Conchita told him that shooting was accidental is not accurate. since she was still in a state of shock. The ruling of trial court gave credence to prosecution witnesses. without malice. an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. Apellant contends that since his gun accidentally went off while he was cleaning it. When the issue is one of credibility. on the other hand that he was in the house cleaning a homemade gun to be used for evening patrol (he was a barangay tanod) when the gun accidentally went off. Richard was only 19 years old and in 4th year college. an appellate court will normally not disturb the findings of the trial court. In A12(4). Court disagrees. Accident is an occurrence that “happens outside the sway of our will. Before accused can be exempted from criminal liability under A12 (4). causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. Appellant claims court should have believed him since he does not have any reason to kill his son who has a bright future. while performing a lawful act with due care. Appellant’s external acts prove malice or criminal intent. she and appellant quarreled over her being a laundry woman. disbelieved that appellant’s shooting was an accident. Issue: 1) WON witnesses are credible 2) WON appellant’s shooting was an accident which may be used as an exempting circumstance Ruling: 1. But the court disagrees.