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Addendum 3 Transit Corridor Safeguarding

Fire and Life Safety Concept


Report No. 243011/F3/C3/004
Revision B
November 2008

Department of Transport
PO Box 20
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

Surface Transport
Master Plan
Addendum 3 - Transit
Corridor Safeguarding
Fire and Life Safety
Concept
November 2008

Mott MacDonald
PO Box 47094
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates
Tel: 971 2 6262 966
Fax: 971 2 6269 192

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List of Contents
1

Page

Introduction

1.1

General

1.2

Safety Objectives

1.3

Stakeholders

1.4

Standards and Guidance

Hazards

2.1

Typical Hazards
(i)
Hot Incidents (such as a fire or explosion)
(ii) Cold Incidents (such as a collision or derailment)
(iii) Prolonged stop

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3
3
3

2.2

Design Fires

General Principles

Stations

4.1

Means of Escape

4.2

Civil Defence Access and Facilities


4.2.1 Rendezvous Points
4.2.2 Fire Fighting Shafts
4.2.3 Local Control Room (LCR)

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7
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4.3

Fire Fighting Equipment (Fixed and Portable)


4.3.1 Fire Mains and Hydrant Systems
4.3.2 Hose Reels
4.3.3 Portable Fire Extinguishers

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4.4

Fire Detection and Warning Systems

4.5

Fire Suppression Systems

4.6

Smoke Ventilation Systems

4.7

Fire Separation, Compartmentation and Structural Fire Protection

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4.8

Control of the Reaction to Fire of Materials

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4.9

Fire Safety and Emergency Signs

10

4.10

Emergency Lighting

10

Tunnels

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5.1

Tunnel Configuration

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5.2

Means of Escape

11

5.3

Civil Defence Access and Facilities


5.3.1 Rendezvous Points
5.3.2 Access Shafts

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5.3.3
5.3.4

Emergency Communications
Traction Power

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5.4

Fire Fighting Equipment (Fixed and Portable)


5.4.1 Fire Mains and Hydrant Systems
5.4.2 Hose Reels
5.4.3 Portable Fire Extinguishers

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13

5.5

Fire Detection and Warning Systems

13

5.6

Fire Suppression Systems

13

5.7

Smoke Ventilation Systems

13

5.8

Fire Separation, Compartmentation and Structural Fire Protection

13

5.9

Control of the Reaction to Fire of Materials

14

5.10

Fire Safety and Emergency Signs

14

5.11

Emergency Lighting

14

Others

15

Safety Management Controls and Procedures

16

References
(i)
(ii)

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National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards


British Standards

Figures
Figure 2.1: European Recommendations for Design Fire Parameters
4
Figure 3.1: Indicative Responses for Incident between Shaft and Station, Smoke Directed Towards the
Station
6
Figure 3.2: Indicative Responses for Incident between Shaft and Station, Smoke Directed Away from
the Station
6

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Introduction

1.1

General

The Abu Dhabi Department of Transport (DOT) is the sole authority responsible for the planning and
operation of the public transport system within Abu Dhabi Emirate as well as to/from Abu Dhabi
Emirate. It is the aim of the DOT to implement the Worlds best public transport system in Abu Dhabi
and to establish a showcase for the World in terms of public transport service levels, quality and
information.
Mott MacDonald was commissioned by the DOT in February 2008 to undertake the Abu Dhabi
Surface Transport Master Plan (STMP). The purpose of the STMP is to develop the conceptual
transportation strategy outlined in Plan Abu Dhabi 2030 into a detailed master and implementation
programme for Abu Dhabi.
Due to pressure from the developers, the DOT have commissioned Mott MacDonald to undertake
Addendum 3, Transit Corridor Safeguarding, to the main STMP project.
This report describes the proposed safety concept for the Public Transit Systems (PTS), metro and rail,
and addresses the following aspects:

The hazards which could affect the rail operations;

The applicable standards and guidance;

Incident prevention and mitigation measures.

1.2

Safety Objectives

The fundamental objectives for safety in the rail system are:

To ensure the safety of passengers, of staff maintaining the facilities, and of the emergency
services attending an incident;

To minimise the disruption of train services in the event of an incident;

To minimise damage to the infrastructure.

1.3

Stakeholders

The main stakeholders whose safety concerns regarding this project need to be taken into account
include:

Abu Dhabi Civil Defence;

Metro and rail operators;

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1.4

Abu Dhabi Airport and terminal operators;

Abu Dhabi Airport fire and security services;

Third parties whose premises the metro and/or rail alignment passes through or in close
proximity.
Standards and Guidance

The PTS should be designed to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards, and to be
consistent with the design basis of the third party developers as far as possible.
The principal standard for the safety measures of the PTS should be NFPA 130. It should be noted
that this addresses fire safety only.
The European Safety in Railway Tunnels Technical Specification for Interoperability (TSI) should
be used as a supplementary source of information, such as concerning the spacing of intervention
shafts.
UK standards may also be referenced and applied for particular aspects not covered by the NFPA
standards where they do not conflict with NFPA requirements and rationale.

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Hazards

2.1

Typical Hazards

The main incidents that could disrupt the normal operation of the PTS are expected to be:

Collisions;

Derailment;

Fires;

Platform/train interface accidents;

Station incidents;

Explosions;

Major incidents at the Abu Dhabi Airport.

In terms of the consequences, three types of rail incidents can be identified:


(i)

Hot Incidents (such as a fire or explosion)

Fire could start in a passenger train or power-unit and could become fully developed within 15-20
minutes after ignition. Whenever possible the train should leave the tunnel. If the train comes to a
stop, passengers will be evacuated, directed by the train crew, or by self-rescue, to a safe area.
(ii)

Cold Incidents (such as a collision or derailment)

The relevant mitigation measures concentrate on access/egress facilities to support evacuation and the
intervention of rescue forces. The difference with the hot scenarios is that there is no time constraint
due to the presence of a hostile environment created by a fire.
(iii)

Prolonged stop

A prolonged stop (an unplanned stop in a tunnel, without a fire on board, for longer than 10-15
minutes) is not, by itself, a threat to passengers and staff. However, it may lead to panic and to
spontaneous, uncontrolled evacuation that exposes people to dangers present in a tunnel environment.
Measures should be provided to keep such a situation under control.

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2.2

Design Fires

Considering the severity of train fires, the largest fires historically are those that have involved
flashover within carriages.
The peak fire size (also called the heat release rate) is important primarily for design of the smoke
ventilation provisions, but it may also be considered in the evaluation of structural fire resistance and
for the analysis of certain hazards such as the thermal radiation from a fire.
The peak fire size depends on the rolling stock specifications. Since the exact specifications of the
rolling stock are not yet finalized, the peak fire sizes for generic rolling stock as recommended by
European research (Ingason, 2006) should be used:

High-speed rail passenger carriage

30 MW

Metro carriage

10 MW

Within the stations, fires could originate in a variety of locations including:

Baggage in public areas;

Staff accommodation areas;

Escalator and lift plant rooms and associated equipment;

Plant rooms and other ancillary accommodation;

Rubbish accumulated within the stations and tunnels.

Figure 2.1: European Recommendations for Design Fire Parameters

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General Principles

In the event of an incident affecting a train and its passengers, the key objectives are described below.
For tunnel egress and intervention the preferred mode of railway operations would be to keep the
incident train moving out of the tunnel, where it could be stopped in a safe location, readily accessible
by the emergency services. Under normal operations the transit time between the Terminal and
Intermediate stations will be a few minutes only.
Where the incident train or event remains within the tunnels, then the following objectives would be:

For ventilation To provide sufficient ventilation to control the smoke generated by a fire
and to force it away from the direction of evacuation. A flexible strategy for smoke control
will be adopted whereby the smoke is directed in the more appropriate direction. This will
be based on the position of the train in the tunnel and of the fire within the train, as reported
by the train crew.

For evacuees To walk along the tunnel to a station or to a shaft, or to be transferred by


relief train to safety.

For intervention To provide access for the emergency services to enter the tunnels at
regular points throughout the tunnel length. Normally this would be from the smoke-free,
upstream side of a fire. It may be more convenient to enter the tunnels via a station rather
than a shaft.

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate indicative ventilation, emergency egress and intervention routes for two
possible scenarios, (each figure shows a plan view of part of the twin-tube system). At a later stage
during the system development, a set of response modes will need to be developed to reflect the full
range of possible incident locations and scenarios.
Regarding station safety, the objectives would be as follows:

Incident prevention, detection and warning To control fire loads and ignition sources, and
other potential hazards, to prevent the occurrence of incidents. To detect incidents and warn
staff and public, as rapidly as possible.

Mitigation of fire effects To limit fire spread and to extract the smoke generated by a
station or train fire and discharge it away at roof level.

For evacuees To walk to safety at the station exits using escalators and stairs as
appropriate. To assist persons with impaired mobility to safety via fire-fighting/evacuation
lifts.

For intervention To provide access for the emergency services via dedicated entrances.

It is important to note that the proposed infrastructure does not constrain the possible responses.
Rather, flexibility is retained, allowing appropriate responses to be developed in the future to suit the
operational practices of the emergency services and railway operator(s).

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Shaft

Cross-passages

Station

Ventilation

Emergency egress

Intervention

Figure 3.1: Indicative Responses for Incident between Shaft and Station, Smoke
Directed Towards the Station

Shaft

Cross-passages

Station

Ventilation

Emergency egress

Intervention

Figure 3.2: Indicative Responses for Incident between Shaft and Station, Smoke
Directed Away from the Station

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Stations

4.1

Means of Escape

NFPA 130 requires the application to rail stations of the general means of escape principles for an
assembly occupancy in accordance with NFPA 101. This includes general requirements on elements
such as stairs and fire doors, emergency lighting and signage.
The standard also requires that the station has sufficient capacity and diversity of escape routes. It
must be possible to evacuate the design platform occupant load from the platforms in four minutes or
less, and to evacuate from the most remote point on the platforms to a place of safety in six minutes or
less. The design platform occupant load includes consideration of service disruptions and system
reaction time, for the largest capacity train serving the station.
The means of escape from the platforms will need to include, as a minimum, escalators and stairs, plus
lifts for use by mobility impaired persons (MIPs).
4.2

Civil Defence Access and Facilities

4.2.1

Rendezvous Points

A Rendezvous Point (RVP) should be designated adjacent to each station. The RVPs should be
designed to have an adjacent 500m2 hard standing area for vehicles and incident management
purposes.
A fire plan box will need to be provided at the RVP. The box should contain layout plans for all areas
of the Station and will show sufficient detail to aid the management of evacuation and fire-fighting
activities. A duplicate set of plans should be provided in the Local Control Room (LCR) at the station.
Breeching inlets for the station fire mains system should be provided within 18m of fire appliance
access points.
4.2.2

Fire Fighting Shafts

The underground stations should have a fire-fighting shaft at each end of the platforms. Each shaft
will need to contain stairs and a fire-fighting lift. The fire-fighting lifts should be provided with
emergency voice communication systems for communication with the Central Control Room (CCR).
The shaft enclosure should have a two hour fire resistance. On each access level below ground, the
stairs and the lifts will need to open into a fire-fighting lobby. The shaft and lobbies should be
pressurised during an incident to prevent smoke ingress.
A fire main will need to be provided within the shaft, with outlet connections within the lobbies at
each access level.

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4.2.3

Local Control Room (LCR)

There should be a Local Control Room (LCR) at the station. This control room will need to be
equipped to enable monitoring of the station operations and alarm systems and will be the command
centre during an incident.
4.3

Fire Fighting Equipment (Fixed and Portable)

4.3.1

Fire Mains and Hydrant Systems

The fire mains and hydrants systems in underground or enclosed stations should be designed to meet
the requirements of NFPA 14.
The stations will need to be provided with permanently filled, non-pressurised, falling mains with
hydrant outlet points within the lobbies of the fire fighting shafts, at every level that they serve.
The fire main systems within the underground stations will have to be coordinated with the tunnel fire
main systems. Where appropriate the same fire main will serve hydrant outlets both within the
stations and within tunnel sections.
Fire main breeching inlets should be provided at the surface at all Civil Defence access shafts / access
points. These inlets should be provided within 18m of a suitable access point for a fire appliance.
Supplies of fire fighting water will need to be available from outside the railway system. In urban
areas, street hydrants should be available within 90m of the station entrance. Where street hydrants
are not available, additional street hydrants should be provided subject to agreement with the Civil
Defence.
4.3.2

Hose Reels

Hose reels may be provided in the station areas, except on the platforms.
4.3.3

Portable Fire Extinguishers

Portable fire extinguishers should be provided in public and non-public areas of the stations and be of
a suitable size and type as described in NFPA 10.
4.4

Fire Detection and Warning Systems

Fire detection and warning systems should be provided at the stations. These systems will need to be
capable of manual operation by the public or staff and installed in accordance with the relevant NFPA
72, National Fire Alarm Code.
The types of system will need to be confirmed during the detailed design stage, but provisionally it is
recommended that these should be as follows:

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Automatic fire detection should not be provided in public areas such as the ticket halls or the
platforms. Instead, manual call points will be provided and incorporated into passenger help
points.

Multi-criteria point heat/smoke detection should be provided in rooms such as offices, plant
rooms and escalator machine rooms. Smoke detection should be provided in voids where
necessary in accordance with NFPA 72. If there are any rooms where smoke detection would
be prone to false alarms, heat detection alone should be used.

Aspirating smoke detection systems should be provided in the lift shafts for the motor-roomless lifts, and should be considered for areas where the maintenance of regular point detection
may be difficult.

Aspirating smoke detection systems should be provided in escalator machine chambers.

Linear heat detectors should be provided to all escalators.

The main Fire Control Panel (FCP) should be installed in the LCR.
A voice alarm / public address (VA/PA) system should be provided for fire warning in public and nonpublic areas in accordance with NFPA 72.
Beacons should be considered in any areas with high ambient noise levels, greater than 90 dBA, such
as escalator machine chambers.
4.5

Fire Suppression Systems

NFPA 130 requires fire suppression systems in storage areas, trash rooms, the steel truss area of all
escalators and other similar areas with combustible loadings, except trainways at underground stations.
We consider that important rooms such as comms and SCADA should also be protected, even though
there might not be immediate life safety issues.
Water suppression systems should be provided in the escalator machinery spaces, in accordance with
NFPA 13 for sprinklers or NFPA 750 for water mist systems. The type of system will need to be
confirmed at the detailed design stage.
Fire suppression for electronic rooms should be provided by a gaseous system with a medium that has
acceptable ozone-depletion potential and global warming potential, such as FM200, Inergen or
equivalent. The system should be in accordance with NFPA 2001.
4.6

Smoke Ventilation Systems

Smoke ventilation systems should be provided to cover the stations and tunnels as follows but which
should be developed further during detailed design:

Longitudinal ventilation of tunnels (and cross-passages);

Reversible tunnel ventilation systems at each station;

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Over-Track Extract (OTE) should be provided at stations, comprising smoke reservoirs


located over the tracks alongside each platform;

Any smoke produced should be drawn towards the tunnel ends of a station box and fresh air
should be drawn down escalator tubes and shafts;

Smoke discharge arrangements should be provided at the surface;

Fire-fighting shafts should be pressurised.

4.7

Fire Separation, Compartmentation and Structural Fire Protection

Fire Separation, compartmentation and structural fire protection should be provided according to
NFPA 130 as follows:

Public and non-public areas of stations should be separated by two hours fire resistance;

Escape routes should be enclosed/separated by at least one hour fire resistance;

Fire-fighting/escape shafts should be enclosed by two hours fire resistance;

Non-public areas within stations should be enclosed/separated by one hour fire resistance;

Primary structures should have two hours fire resistance;

Electrical sub-station enclosures should have three hours fire resistance.

4.8

Control of the Reaction to Fire of Materials

All materials to be used in the construction of stations and buildings should be selected to comply with
the relevant part of NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction, as prescribed in NFPA
130.
4.9

Fire Safety and Emergency Signs

Appropriate fire safety and emergency signs should be provided in accordance with NFPA 101.
4.10

Emergency Lighting

Emergency lighting should be installed in accordance with NFPA 101. The emergency lighting
should be fed by stand-by power supplies in accordance with NFPA 110, Standard for Emergency and
Standby Power Systems.

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Tunnels

5.1

Tunnel Configuration

Single track tubes for bored tunnels or segregated boxes for cut and cover sections are recommended
for the tunnel sections on the grounds that they will:

Minimise the risk of collisions and secondary collisions, resulting from train derailment;

Allow a longitudinal ventilation strategy, with the non-incident tube being used as a safe
means of escape in event of fire.

Multi-track tubes could be used in short sections only, notably in the sections where crossovers are to
be provided.
5.2

Means of Escape

The response to detection of a fire onboard a train should be to keep the incident train moving out of a
tunnel whenever possible. If a train has to stop in a tunnel, the primary strategy should be for people
to walk along the tunnels to a station.
There will need to be a raised access walkway situated adjacent to one side of the tracks to allow the
passengers to leave the train and proceed in a safe manner to the appropriate escape route to the
surface. There should be ramps down to the track level at crossover locations. At the cross-passages,
the walkway should allow access between tubes.
Cross-passages between the different running tunnels have to be provided at intervals no greater than
244m, reflecting the requirement of NFPA 130. Some other metro and rail systems use greater
intervals between cross-passages. For example, the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) in London has
cross-passages at approximately 500m spacing in its tunnel sections, while the Copenhagen metro uses
600m intervals in accordance with the German BOStrab requirement. In such cases, the greater
spacing seems to reflect historical precedent rather than design for safety on first principles and hence
this is not recommended for Abu Dhabi. The Technical Specification for Interoperability, EU TSI,
recommends a maximum spacing of 500m. Our recommendation is to design to NFPA 130, unless
there are specific objections to doing so.
5.3

Civil Defence Access and Facilities

5.3.1

Rendezvous Points

A Rendezvous Point (RVP) should be designated adjacent to each access point. The RVPs should
have 500m2 hard standing area (including adjacent roads) for emergency vehicles and incident
management purposes.

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5.3.2

Access Shafts

Access to any incident tube should be via one of the access shafts and then the non-incident tube. The
access shafts should comprise a protected stair and where the tunnel is more than 9m below ground
level, by a lift shaft.
5.3.3

Emergency Communications

Infrastructure should be provided to ensure the emergency services radios can operate in tunnels and
shafts.
5.3.4

Traction Power

For fire fighters to safely access the tunnel, a means of isolating the traction power should be
provided. Blue light stations should be provided along the tunnel in accordance with NFPA 130 to
allow fire fighters to communicate with the central supervising stations and disconnect traction power.
Procedures for removing and restoring traction power should be in accordance with NFPA 130.
5.4

Fire Fighting Equipment (Fixed and Portable)

5.4.1

Fire Mains and Hydrant Systems

The fire mains and hydrants systems should be designed to meet the requirements of NFPA 14.
A fire main should be installed in each running tunnel. The fire mains system will be required to be
fed from both ends and will need to be coordinated with the fire mains required at the stations.
Hydrant outlets should be positioned at both ends of cross passages on the tunnel side of the cross
passage fire doors, and arranged such that the outlet is supplied with water from the fire main in the
opposite running tunnel. Hydrant outlets should be positioned at the lower lobbies of shafts and at
portals.
The fire main systems should be a permanently filled, non-pressurised mains system. The fire main
should be kept filled with water (from a top-up reservoir), in order to minimise the time to fill.
Fire main breeching inlets should be provided at the surface at all emergency access shafts / access
points. These inlets should be provided within 18m of a suitable access point for a fire appliance.
Where necessary, additional external hydrants should be provided adjacent to the structures at ground
level.
Supplies of fire fighting water will need to be available from outside the tunnel. This can be in the
form of street hydrants available in the vicinity of the access point. Where street hydrants are not
available, water supplies will have to be provided at strategic locations. These could include dedicated
pressurised water mains, or any natural water body including sea water. However, this will need to be
coordinated and agreed with the Civil Defence.

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5.4.2

Hose Reels

It is not recommended to provide hose reels in the tunnels, at cross-passages or in access shafts.
5.4.3

Portable Fire Extinguishers

It is not recommended to provide portable fire extinguishers within the running tunnels.
Rooms and passageways adjacent to shafts should have fire extinguishers of a suitable size and type,
as described in NFPA 10.
5.5

Fire Detection and Warning Systems

It is not recommended to provide fire detection systems in the running tunnels.


CCTV coverage should be provided at access points, cross-passages and other key locations within the
tunnel system. Further we recommend that Public Address (PA) systems should be located at the
access points and cross-passages.
Smoke detection should be provided in the lift shafts and adjacent rooms. A fire-fighters override
switch should be provided to enable the fire service to take immediate control of the lift at any time.
5.6

Fire Suppression Systems

It is not proposed to provide fire suppression systems within the running tunnels.
5.7

Smoke Ventilation Systems

A longitudinal (push-pull) smoke control strategy should be adopted to deal with tunnel fires. In the
incident tube, this will force the smoke away from the direction of evacuation, which will be chosen
according to the location of the fire onboard the train and the location of the train in the tunnel.
The airflows in the incident and non-incident tubes will be controlled so as to prevent smoke ingress
through an open cross-passage into the non incident tube.
The tunnel ventilation system should include fan and damper installations at the stations and possibly
also at the mid-tunnel shafts.
5.8

Fire Separation, Compartmentation and Structural Fire Protection

Cross-passages between running tunnels and access shaft lobbies should be provided with fire doors
with two hours fire resistance.

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5.9

Control of the Reaction to Fire of Materials

All materials to be used in the tunnels and cut and cover sections should comply with all relevant parts
of NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction, and should resist the spread of flame;
reduce the rate of heat release and reduce the products of combustion to minimise the impact of any
reasonably foreseeable fire upon the structural integrity of the tunnel.
Cable insulation should be LSOH.
5.10

Fire Safety and Emergency Signs

Appropriate fire safety and emergency signs should be provided in accordance with NFPA 101.
5.11

Emergency Lighting

The tunnels, cross passages and shafts should be equipped with emergency lighting, capable of being
switched on from access points or remotely from adjacent stations or the control room, and
automatically on failure of traction power. The emergency lighting systems should be installed in
accordance with NFPA 70.

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Others

Means of egress should also be provided for along surface and elevated trainways, in accordance with
NFPA 130. A raised access walkway should be provided adjacent to one side of the tracks to allow
the passengers to leave the train and to proceed in a safe manner to the appropriate escape exit(s).
The Central Control Room (CCR) should be equipped and resourced in accordance with NFPA 130,
Chapters 9 and 10.
Rolling stock should comply with NFPA 130, Chapter 8. This includes minimum fire-resisting
performance for materials and assemblies, electrical fire safety, emergency egress facilities,
ventilation, emergency lighting, etc.
Fire life safety provisions for train stabling areas and the depot will be addressed at the detailed design
stage.

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Safety Management Controls and Procedures

Safety management should be integrated into the management planning and procedures for the Abu
Dhabi Public Transit Network as a whole.
All of the relevant issues should be discussed and agreed with the project stakeholders in accordance
with the relevant standards and guidance.
Minimum staffing levels and the roles and responsibilities of staff will need to be agreed.
A range of safety management procedures will also need to be developed, including:

General housekeeping and management of fire loads including measures for fire prevention;

Management of passengers at the stations, particularly during crowded situations;

Incident (including fire alarm) investigation;

Evacuation of MIPs from the stations and tunnels;

Responses to incidents (including fires) on trains immobilised in tunnel sections;

Non-operational hours (including maintenance periods).

References

Ingason H. Design Fires in Tunnels. International Conference on Safe and Reliable Tunnels,
Lausanne, 2006.
Technical Specification for Interoperability (TSI) on Safety in Railway Tunnels for the TransEuropean Conventional Rail System. Official Journal of the European Union, 7.3.2008.
(i)

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards

NFPA 10

Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers.

NFPA 13

Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems.

NFPA 14

Standard for the Installation of Standpipes and Hose Systems.

NFPA 70

National Electrical Code.

NFPA 72

National Fire Alarm Code.

NFPA 92A

Standard for Smoke-Control Systems Utilizing Barriers and Pressure Differences.

NFPA 101

Life Safety Code.

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NFPA 110

Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems.

NFPA 130

Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems.

NFPA 220

Standard on Types of Building Construction.

NFPA 750

Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems.

NFPA 2001

Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems.

(ii)
BS 5588

British Standards
Fire precautions in the design, construction and use of buildings Part 5: Access and
facilities for fire-fighting.

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