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G.R. No.

L-56077 February 28, 1985
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES PRUDENCIO MAXINO and
TARCIANA MORALES, PEDRO GONZALES, ROGELIO AQUINO,
Minor represented by his father, Manuel Aquino, and ALEJANDRO,
SOCORRO, MERCEDES, CONCHITA, REMEDIOS and FLORA, all
surnamed CONSOLACION, respondents.
Silvestre Loreria, Jr. for respondent spouses Prudencio Maxino and
Tarciana Morales.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the validity of the registration of 885 hectares of public
forestal land located in Mulanay, Quezon.
In Land Registration Case No. 81-G of the Court of First Instance at
Gumaca, Quezon, Judge Vicente del Rosario on March 21, 1961
rendered a decision, ordering the registration of said land, Lot 1,
allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang), Mulanay, in the names
of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales, less 200
hectares which should be registered in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo
Consolacion (72, Record on Appeal). The decision became final and
executory. A decree and an original certificate of title were issued.
More than eight years later, or on June 20, 1969, the Republic of the
Philippines filed with the Gumaca court an amended petition to annul the
decision, decree and title on the ground that they are void because the
land in question was still a part of the unclassified public forest.
Moreover, the possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino
spouses covered only 29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares. The
petition was verified by the Acting Director of Forestry.

The Maxinos opposed the petition. After a hearing on the merits, Judge
Agana denied the petition in his order of September 8, 1970. That order
was served upon the assistant provincial fiscal on September 16, 1970
and on the special counsel, Jaime Dispo of the Bureau of Forestry, on
November 26, 1970.
A copy of the order was transmitted by the fiscal to the Solicitor General's
Office only on September 2, 1971 or nearly one year from the issuance
of the order. Twenty-two days thereafter or on September 24 the Solicitor
General appealed from that order and filed a motion for extension of time
within which to submit a record on appeal. The appeal was given due
course.
In its decision dated October 24, 1980 the Appellate Court through
Justices Asuncion, Porfirio V. Sison and Sundiam dismissed the petition
because the 1970 order had allegedly long become final and
unappealable. The Solicitor General appealed to this Court.
That is the issue to be resolved first: whether the appeal of the State
from the trial court's 1970 order of denial was seasonably made. The
Appellate Court held that the service of the order on Dispo, as special
attorney, was binding on the Solicitor General's Office. Consequently, the
record on appeal, which was filed after thirty days from the service of the
order upon Dispo, was filed out of time.
We hold that the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be
reckoned from the time the Solicitor General's Office was apprised of the
1970 order of denial and not from the time the special counsel or the
fiscal was served with that order. These representatives of the Solicitor
General had no power to decide whether an appeal should be made.
They should have referred the matter to the Solicitor General.
In the designation of Dispo as special counsel by Solicitor General
Barredo, approved by Secretary of Justice Teehankee, it was specified
that he should consult the Solicitor General on all questions, legal and
factual, regarding the case. The question of whether an appeal should be
made could only be decided by the Solicitor General's Office.

50 Phil. BAnnulment). The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title. 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land (pasto de animales) allegedly bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks. No. the Government should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents (Gov't. the special counsel and the fiscal (Republic vs. October 31. 975. 50 Phil. 7. Quezon. L-49891. L-49247. . 1970). 16-E of Mulanay. 1979. 1983. 1516. of Pampanga. Republic vs. There is a monstrous and bewildering discrepancy between the area of 29 hectares and the actual area of the land bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks which is 970 hectares as surveyed in 1959 (Exh. D). vs. 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona pursuant to the Royal Decree of December 26. 981. We have no hesitation in saying that the composition title erred in stating the boundaries. 83 SCRA 453). the 885hectare area registered by the Maxinos. the Solicitor General's Office should be served with the final order disposing of the petition and should not be bound by the service on his surrogates. 1-Director of Forestry. S. Prudencio Tesalona died in 1905. Tria. without executing an extrajudicial settlement of Prudencio's estate and adjudicating the said 29-hectare land to themselves. The fact that after the record on appeal was filed on time. L-33983. 1983. 120 SCRA 186. 125 SCRA 539). is within the public forest. executed an " absolute sale" of the land in favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxino (Exh. 1940. mention is made of "paligawang 'Manba' ". 475. Torres and Solicitor Alicia Sempio-Diy. Polo. Mendoza. Court of Appeals. Unson. the interest of justice may warrant waiver of the rules (Republic vs. 980. May 31. He was survived by his two children Maria and Lucila. L-31303-04. like the instant case. Exhibit H. That would also explain why in the document. and as shown in paragraph 6 of the report of Forester Emerson B. and as shown in the report and testimony of Lorenzo R. 124 Phil. * Tria averred in his report and testimony that the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks mentioned in the composition title really refer to the Banguian and Mamba creeks. 27-30 tsn March 5. In exceptional cases. 89 SCRA 33. Aquino. March 13. not alienable and disposable nor susceptible of private appropriation. B-Annulment. Tria recommended that the title of the Maxino spouses be annulled (Exh. 10-15 tsn March 5. Consequently. Republic. 1978. 472. Exhibit G. the wife of applicant Prudencio Maxino who was Maria's son and the grandson of Prudencio Tesalona. where it is contended that the registration is void allegedly because public forestal land was registered and the State sought to declare the decision void. Go Tian An vs. Exhibit 1-A-Director of Forestry. On September 24. not 970 (Exh. as per Land Classification Map No. the Solicitor General's Office was late in filing the amendments to it is of no moment. Now. Tayabas Project No. F). 191-192). The unreliability or dubiousness of the composition title is evident from the sale executed by the heirs of Prudencio Tesalona in favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxino (Exh. Judge of 1st Inst. 1935 the two heirs. Its inclusion in the public forest was certified by Director of Forestry Florencio Tamesis on July 6. It is incontestable that Lot 1. 16-E of Mulanay. 990. vs. In this case. Exh. Exhibit C-Annulment. Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Abraham who recommended that the opposition to the registration entered by the Director be sustained (Exh.The 1969 petition to annul the decision. The trial court grievously erred in applying to this case the rule that the area comprised in the boundaries should prevail over that stated in the moniments of title. F). a gratuitous composition title or adjustment title issued on July 30. January 27. 1970). Republic vs. B-Annulment. Makasiar. This would mean that the actual area claimed by Maxino was only 371 hectares. 1386. a forest station warden (Exh. 1948 as per Land Classification Map No. Bachrach Motor Co. decree and titles was filed by Solicitor General Felix V. The certification was reiterated by the Director of Forestry on May 20. Report of Land Investigator Serapion Bauzon). Q. of the U. as to the merits of the case. presented by the Maxinos.

1961). It was further stipulated "that in the event that any third person shall succeed in establishing right or title to said premises or to any portion thereof superior to that of the grantor and in lawfully dispossessing the Vendee therefrom the Vendee shall not be entitled to reimbursement from the Vendor of the sum of TWO HUNDRED PESOS which constitutes the consideration for these presents. or who may hereafter claim. however long. it was stipulated as an "express condition" that the said vendors had no obligation of warranty for "the premises hereby sold by them. F). Applicant Prudencio Maxino testified that the lot he was seeking to register has an area of more than seventy hectares (8 tsn Jan. areas stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal that a different land was covered thereby. 1719. Thirty-one squatters occupied the land (5 tsn March 6. As to the requirements for an adjustment proceeding under the Royal Decree of December 26. nullifies the title (Director of Lands vs. the Vendee hereby expressly releasing the Vendor(s) from all duty of defending the Vendee against all persons now claiming. It is a "quit-claim". It is stated therein that in consideration of P200 the Tesalona sisters "releases and forever quitclaim unto the said Vendee" the 29-hectare land described in the composition title (Exh. 1935. 11. He testified that the Mamba Creek is also known as Yamay Creek (13). Exhibit F (9). He came to know the . In his tax declarations it is stated that the land was located in Barrio Cambuga. whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system. 68 SCRA 177. 1199. L-28144. his 1919 and 1921 tax declarations are for land with the same boundaries but with an area of 36 hectares only (Exh. see Ventura. Director of Lands vs. 194-5. with an area of 120 hectares (Exh. December 26. Salazar. Salazar. or of any part thereof. The title states that the 29-hectare land was located in Barrio Yamay. Director of Lands vs. On the other hand. The Maxinos contend that Tesalona's gratuitous adjustment or composition title (as distinguished from anonerous adjustment title) should prevail in determining the Identity of the disputed land. 1884. supra). 50340. a far cry from the 970 hectares as surveyed (Exh. and assuming all the risk of eviction by superior title" (Exh. as shown in the deed of September 24. He purchased the lot from his aunt and mother. I).That curious document is not a sale at all. November 28. Director of Lands. They have not shown that a title for 29 hectares could be a valid title for 970 hectares. F). not the boundaries. pp. No. He did not know that the land had an area of 29 hectares in 1935 when he bought it (6). 1975. is important. Its inclusion in a title. L-24796. cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Forestry vs. The land was grazing or pasture land (15). I-5 and I-6). I-4. As an indication that the Tesalona "vendors" were not certain that their title was good. Munoz. to have a better right and title thereto. This assertion is untenable in the light of the notorious discrepancy between the area of 29 hectares stated in the title and the 970 hectares now claimed as the real area (885 hectares for Lot 1 and 84 hectares for Lot 2 which is not involved in this case). L-27594 and Alinsunurin vs. Land Registration and Mortgages. Possession of public forestal lands. It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. The Maxinos have the burden of proving that the title justified the considerable increase in area. 1958 and 1961 tax declarations use the boundaries Campalacio and Yamay Creeks but the area of the pasture land is 100 hectares only. R. 1984). G. I-2 and I-3). The most that can be said for Tesalona is that his gratuitous adjustment title granted him possessory rights over pasture land with an area of 29 hectares but not ownership over 970 hectares of grazing land. where the area in hectares. 23 SCRA 1183. June 28. The oral evidence does not bolster the case at all for the applicants. The boundaries and The 1948. now Anonang. 1961). F). Emiterio Tesalona and Felix Aguilles. or to damages" (Exh. Reyes. His 1906 tax declaration is for a parcel of land whose boundaries are not the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks but it was bounded by the Yamay Creek and the lands of Maximo Tesalona. 1968.

LOPE GUZMAN RIVAS. 60 Phil. the whole land was sold to Luis Guzman Rivas and later to Cavaco. Munoz. Pascua. all supposed sales regarding that land were void. vs. as apoderado of Bunagan's heirs. the holder of the adjustment title (11). AQUINO. J-1) or a gratuitous adjustment title as distinguished from an onerous adjustment title. The instant case bears similarities to Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez vs. According to Cavaco's evidence. The evidence shows that on March 14.500 brazas de largo y 3. VIJANDRE. 114. the owner. therefore. 573. after Bunagan's death. played decisive roles in its disposition.: This is a land registration case involving what the Republic of the Philippines claims to be grazing land. . a part of the forest reserve. is forestal and grazing land. 1198). Commanding General. petitioners. Ceferino Saddul. it may be mentioned that Presidential Decree No. ** What happened to the Nottab land? The conflicting evidence of the oppositor Cagayan Valley Agricultural Corporation (Cavaco) and petitioner Pacifico Vijandre shows that two persons. and consequently. Pedro Tesalona.called Nottab. "3. "destinado al pasto de sus ganados" y bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio del derecho que el Estado o otro tercero pudiera tener en referida finca rustica" (Exh. Spanish titles are not indefeasible (Director of Forestry vs.R. FERNANDO A.000 brazas de ancho". Director of Lands. No. C. supra. No costs. whatever its area. Incidentally. 76. Fortunato Nañadiego. not Prudencio Tesalona. according to Vijandre's evidence. 1885 mentions Bunagan as having obtained a "composicion gratuita" for a parcel of land in Enrile. and COURT OF APPEALS. 1873 the Alcalde Mayor and judge of the Court of First Instance in Tuguegarao. Psu175880 is dismissed. whereas.respondents. PACIFICO V. WHEREFORE. The Solicitor General's view is that the whole Nottab land.area of the land when it was surveyed. only a portion was sold to Luis and the remainder was sold to Lope Guzman Rivas who in turn sold portions to Vijandre and Fernando A. 892 effective February 16. the decision of the Appellate Court and the decision of Judge Del Rosario dated March 21. the brothers Luis Guzman Rivas and Lope Guzman Rivas. 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. PASCUA. Cagayan purportedly granted to Domingo Bunagan a possessory information title for a tract of land. The evidence is conflicting because. The Gaceta de Manila dated November 3. testified that the land was possessed during the Spanish regime by his stepfather. I and K). SO ORDERED SECOND DIVISION G. He was not present when it was surveyed (6). 1986 DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT. 1961 are reversed and set aside. Another witness. according to Cavaco's evidence. p.J. where an adjustment title issued in 1896 was held to be void because it was fraudulent and it covered public forestal land not subject to registration. sons of Pablo Guzman. As to void composition or patent issued in 1898. Cagayan (Exh. was inalienable land and. see Testagorda vs. L-61539 February 14. sold the land to one Manuel Guzman sometime in 1904 or 1905 or 1908. the order of Judge Agana. 6 Phil. his son-in-law. The application for registration of Lot 1.

1968 an application for the registration of two parcels of land located at Sitio Nottab. 1915. Parenthetically. The reason is that said Spanish titles were already used in the Cavaco case. which was already covered by OCT No. (Cagayan Valley Agricultural Corporation vs. according to Vijandre's evidence in this case. The trial court and the Court of Appeals in a land registration case adjudicated to Cavaco 1. The Nottab land was inherited by his son. The land passed to his widow. Under those Spanish titles a land grant could not exceed 1. petitioner Lope Guzman Rivas. The learned trial court declared the disputed land public land and dismissed the applications of Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and the claims of Pascua and Cavaco. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision. 12-A to 15—Pascua. it may be stated that Presidential Decree No. who sold the northern portion of the land to Saturnino Moldero in 1944 and the southern portion to Rafael Gonzales in 1951.000 the remainder of the land in Nottab. December 9. therefore. The trial court correctly held that the said adjudication means that the respondent herein cannot use anymore in this case the supposed 1873 informacion posesoria and the 1885 composicion gratuita as bases of their application for registration. In 1951 the Estrada spouses and (Gonzales sold the land to Cavaco (Exh. It is covered by Plan Psu178846. Reves. and Plan Psu-179101 covering fifteen lots with an area of 890 hectares. It is the registered owner of the land. except with respect to Lot No. 68 SCRA 177. 191 and other cases). It should be stressed that according to the Cavaco case the whole land was sold to Luis and. continuous. Enrile. 13. embracing thirteen lots with an area of 1.033 hectares. Lope has been residing in Makati. 0-393. Moldero in 1948 sold his northern portion to the spouses Antonio and Josefa Estrada. On the other hand. Should the registration of the land not materialize for causes not imputable to Vijandre. CA-G. 24931-32. It granted the application of Lope and Vijandre. Director of Lands. The Directors of Lands and Forest Development appealed to this Court. the same Nottab land previously applied for by Cavaco. Manuela Bunagan.92. exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land and that their possession was . no remainder could have been transferred to Lope. Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre filed in May.R. Before the application was filed.000 hectares by virtue of the said Spanish titles. Lope Guzman Rivas sold to his copetitioner Vijandre l/2 of the entire land at P50 a hectare. sold to Pablo Guzman for Pl. The Solicitor General contends that the Appellate Court erred (1) in not declaring that the disputed land is part of a forest reservation. then Lope would return to mall scashadvances(9-16. "una parcela de pasto de ganaderia". Right or wrong that decision is the law of the case.222 hectares of the Nottab land. 1975. Vijandre undertook to finance the registration of the land. the sole heir of Domingo. covered by Tax Declaration No. or a total of 1. 1960). It is the supposed remainder of Bunagan's land that is now involved in this case. It may be repeated that Cavaco obtained more than 1. on July 26. Dolores Enriquez. 892 since 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. In 1958 about 800 hectares of the said land were sold by Lope to Ignacio Pascua who in 1962 sold the same portion to his son. Cagayan. who leased the land for grazing purposes to other persons. Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre did not file any appellees' brief. L-27594. (2) in not finding that Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and their predecessors have not been in the open. H). sold the land in 1934 toLuis Guzman Rivas who died in 1944. Fernando. with the approval of the probate court. 242 Joint Record on Appeal).The administratrix of Manuel Guzman's estate. No. Metro Manila since 1961 because he has a heart ailment. Pablo Guzman died in 1927.000 hectares (Director of Lands vs.7 hectares. 626 (Exh. November 28. uninterrupted. the portion transferred to Lope Guzman Rivas as differentiated from the Cavaco land which came from Lope's brother Luis. Joint Record on Appeal).

containing an area of 8. I Pascua). Abad Santos. concur. Ignacio A. G. 135 SCRA 156 and other cases).222 hectares and 9 hectares. the supposed heir to Domingo Bunagan. Jr. H). the 1960 and 1962 tax declarations submitted in evidence by oppositor Pascua describe 790 or 767 hectares of the land as "pasture land" (Exh. Director of Forestry vs. 15-A of Enrile.R. (3) that the pasture lease agreements did not convert private land into public land and (4) that Bunagan's Spanish titles were authentic and valid. WHEREFORE. Eliseo Lasam and J. 637. The reservation was made prior to the instant 1968 application for registration.not in the concept of owner: (3) in not finding that Domingo Bunagan's Spanish titles were not authentic and (4) in not finding that the 1960 decision in favor of Cavaco is not res judicata. We hold that the disputed land is inalienable public grazing land. situated in Enrile. Applicant Lope Guzman Rivas and oppositor Pascua and their predecessors have always treated the 1. (Chairman). Escolin and Alampay. C. 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Pascua are dismissed. Concepcion. 1967. Rep. The application for registration of Lope Guzman Rivas and Pacifico V. Cagayan. 56 SCRA 499. It is non-registerable (Exh. Jr.. Manuela Bunagan. (Note that Exhibit J. R and S). Similarly.923 hectares as pasture land. It is not disposable public agricultural land. comprising the Timberland of the Cagayan Land Classification.T. Pascua bought from Lope Guzman Rivas the 800 hectares in 1962 as "a parcel of pasture land" (Exh. The 1960 and 1968 tax declarations of applicant Lope Guzmian Rivas describe the 2.Torres. Munoz. lawyer Pascua argues (1) that the disputed land was already private in the hands of Domingo Bunagans (2) that portions of said land. 132 Phil. On the other hand.000 hectares of land in question as for "pasture exclusively". Rep. the decision of the Appellate Court is reversed and set aside. Portions of the land had been the object of pasture lease agreements with the Bureau of Forestry. It cannot be appropriated by private persons. L. the 1885 resolution published in Gaceta de Manila. . Pascua himself.000 hectares in question to Pablo Guzman at fifty centavos a hectare as "una parcela de pasto de ganaderia (Exh.249 hectares. Domingo Bunagan. 2263. Pascua) respectively. The application for the possessory information title was approved "bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio determination derecho que el Estado o otro tercero pudiera tener en referida finca rustica" (Exh..37682. 1-B and 7. 27 and 28—Pascua). were titled in the names of Cavaco and Melardo Agapay (Benjamin V. It is intended for "wood production watershed soil protection and other forest uses" (Exh. Vijandre and the counter-application of lawyer Fernando A. being a part of the forest reserve. Grazing lands and timber lands are riot alienable under section 1. It is part of Timberland Project No. Among the lessees were oppositor Fernando A. 159 dated February 13. It is included in the Bureau of Forestry Map L. SO ORDERED. 1). 3 and 4. describes the land as "una estancia de ganado al terreno" (grazing land). sold in 1915 the 2. Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural lands(disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable). Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the object of private ownership (Republic vs. 1985. 63 OG 3364). No costs. February 28. JJ. Solana and Amulong.. is not a composition title at all).). (Exh. Republic vs. Animas. 2-Rep. meaning it is grazing land (Exh. We have stated that the supposed possessory information title issued in 1873 to the original claimant. or "un terreno destinado al pasto de sus ganados" or la estancia para ganados denominada Nottab". Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution and sections 8.). 1974. Said land is a part of the to forest reserve under Presidential Proclamation No. No. Court of Appeals. 56077. March 29. Similarly. 1. Cagayan.

que son testigos que han depuesto que la peticion del interesado es cierta en todas sus partes como consta en sus declaraciones a los fes "4" y 5 vto apereciendo (sic) en la delegencia (sic) del f. El Juzgado no obstante acordara lo que estima se mas justo. vs. respondents. do BERNARDO DE AREVALO Y BRACE Rubricada Footnotes ** The supposed possessory information title. 84464 June 21. (sic) (Lic. Loyola for petitioners.: The Regional Trial Court of Cavite dismissed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale. CRUZ. Briefly. J. Tuguegarao doca de mil ocho cientos setenta y tres. pasa acreditar en todo tiempo diho es estremo y como efectivamente prueba con Dn. en la legal posesion y tranquilogose (sic) de un terreno destinado al pasto de su ganados titulado de Nottab. Da. Mariano Pamittan . SANCHEZ. Jacinto Saddul. reads in part as follows. J. FIRST DIVISION G. petitioners. 21. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CATALINA I. holding that it was not spurious. resulta se solicita por el mismo se lo admita una informacion testifical a fin de escreditar esta. Domingo Bunagan. Franco L. instruidas por gestion de Da. The petitioners are now before us and urge that the decision of the trial court be reinstated. D\Calisto Bauay. sin entendiente la providencia.. the Solicitor General regards as not authentic (p. Domingo Bunagan. 1991 SPOUSES JAIME AND TEODORA VILLANUEVA. Del examen de estas actuaciones. y Dn. like the composition title.Cuevas. No. took no part. "6" vto que los testigos. which found that the vendor's signature on the questioned document had indeed been forged. cuyos nombres quedan espresadas sond e3 Moralidad y de responsibilidad el Ministerio fiscal es de parecer que por el Juzgado despues de aprobar este espediente por el correspondiente decreto judicial se sirva acceder a la petision echa por al Dn.R. el cual herado de sus (sic) padres y que se lo preven de un testim9oni del espediente (sic terminado que son pr convenierio. It was reversed by the Court of Appeals. which. . vacino de esta Cabesera (sic). bajo la condicion de sin perjucio del derecho que el Estado o otro tercero pudiera tener en referida finea rustien.

that the registration of the lot in the name of the petitioners be cancelled. who had both testified that the standard signature of the late Roberto Sanchez and the one written on the alleged deed of sale "were written by two different people. the petitioners questioned the personality of the private respondent to file the complaint. Cavite. Trial proceeded in due time.3 the trial judge rejected the testimony of the handwriting experts from the PC and the NBI. they claimed that Roberto Sanchez had deeded over the lot to them in 1968 for the sum of P500. contending that the late Roberto Sanchez was never married but had a common-law wife by whom he had two children. Bank of the Philippine Islands 4 in support of his action. and e) not sustaining the decision of the trial court." At that. which was registered without her knowledge in the name of the herein petitioners on the strength of an alleged deed of sale executed in their favor by her late husband on February 7." It was also doubtful if she could bring the action for reconveyance alone. He thus allowed his action to prescribe under Article 1431 of the Civil Code. the signatures examined were from 1970 to 1982 and did not include those written by Roberto Sanchez in 1968. the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.5 which held that the trial court did err. who found that the signature on the document was written by another person. Judge Alejandro C. herein private respondent Catalina Sanchez. "with the added fact that they only wanted to accept his lot for P500. The decision also noted that Roberto Sanchez did not take any step to annul the deed of sale although he had knowledge thereof as early as 1968. We see no reason to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals. the trial court required the examination of the deed of sale by the National Bureau of Investigation to determine if it was a forgery. even assuming she was the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez. considering that he left illegitimate children and collateral relatives who were also entitled to share in his estate. in holding that the deed of sale was not spurious. she prayed that the deed of sale be annulled. As earlier stated.In her complaint below. 1968. Before us now. meter parcel of land located at Rosario. 1965.00 and not for the settlement of the entire obligation of P1. Explaining the supposed differences between the signatures. On the merits." He cited Go Fay v. The Court notes at the outset that Catalina Sanchez has proved her status as the widow of Roberto Sanchez with her submission of the marriage contract denominated as Exhibit "A.00 in partial settlement of a judgment they had obtained against him. the petitioners fault the respondent court for: a) upholding the testimony of the expert witnesses against the findings of fact of the trial court. as contended by the appellant.00 loan they had secured for him and which they had been forced to settle themselves to prevent foreclosure of the mortgage on their property. the Torrens certificate issued to Roberto Sanchez over the subject land on August 25. b) annulling the deed of sale. and that she had no capacity to institute the complaint. As for the contract of a marriage submitted by the private respondent. that Catalina Sanchez was not the widow of Roberto Sanchez. he said that Roberto Sanchez was "under serious emotional stress and intensely angry" when he reluctantly signed the document after he had lost the case to them. claiming to be the widow of Roberto Sanchez. On June 25. In his decision.2 On the petitioner's motion. that the action to annul it had already prescribed. They had sued him after he had failed to pay a P1.300. he said there were really no fundamental differences between the signatures compared. with the presentation by the parties of their testimonial and documentary evidence.1 In their answer. and that the lot be reconveyed to her. 1964. described his civil status as "single.300. It is consonant with the evidence of record and the applicable law and jurisprudence. averred that her husband was the owner of a 275 sq. Moreover. this should also be rejected because although the document was dated September 21. c) declaring that the action to annul the deed of sale had not yet prescribed.00. 1986. d) not declaring the private respondent guilty of estoppel. Silapan rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. Involving the report of a handwriting expert from the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service." 6 That evidence rendered unnecessary the presumption that "a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of .

The supposed vendee's . (and curiously). undue influence."7 disregarding the elementary principle that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. The Court has itself examined the signatures of Roberto Sanchez in the several instruments among the records of this case. although the supposed common-law wife and her illegitimate children were never presented at the trial.000. As the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez. without prejudice to the succession rights of his other heirs.1avvphi1 No proof was submitted about their filing of the complaint against Roberto Sanchez." But he did not consider the fact that her findings were corroborated by NBI Examiner Torres. their existence was readily accepted by the trial court on the basis alone of the petitioner's unsupported statements. which appears to be a mere conjecture of the trial judge. and in Manila at that although the persons were residing in Cavite. Coming now to the questioned signature. Parenthetically.10 The trial judge said the testimony of PC Examiner Salvador was not reliable because her examination of the document was "done under circumstance not so trustworthy before the action was instituted. fraud or lack capacity. It would appear that they thought of simulating the sale registering the subject lot when their own lands were insufficient to secure a P100. not of the civil status of the owner. The deed of sale in question does not suffer from any of these defects. The petitioners suggest they are simple peasants and did not appreciate the need for the immediate transfer of the property in their name. Incidentally. The petitioners hoped to refute the findings of the PC handwriting expert with the findings of the NBI handwriting expert.9 They did not conjure this conclusion out of thin air but supported it with knowledgeable testimony extensively given on direct and crossexamination on the various characteristics and differences of the signatures they had examined and compared. It is strange that the trial court should reject Exhibit "A" in favor of the Transfer Certificate of Title describing Roberto Sanchez as "single. They also say that they forgot. The case invoked by the petitioners is not applicable because the differences in the signatures compared in the case at bar were. we find that the applicable rule is not Article 1391 of the Civil Code but Article 1410. the petitioners have not sufficiently established the reason for such tension. Petitioner Jaime Villanueva himself admitted under oath that he did not read the decision in the case nor did he ask his lawyer how much had been awarded against the defendant. as the trial judge found. we find it significant that the examination by the NBI was requested by the petitioners themselves but in the end it was the private respondent who presented the NBI handwriting expert as her own witness. Concerning the question of prescription. Even the witnesses to the Bilihan were not presented nor was any explanation for their absence offered.marriage" and may also explain why Roberto Sanchez could not marry the woman by whom he supposedly had two illegitimate children. mistake. The evidence shows. 8 The explanation is obvious. assuming these persons did exist. but as it turned out the findings of the two witnesses coincided. It is worth noting that the competence of the two expert witnesses was never assailed by the petitioners nor was it questioned by the trial judge. A Torrens certificate is the best evidence of ownership of registered land. who conducted her own examination at the instance of the petitioners themselves and after the action was instituted. Both PC Examiner Corazon Salvador and NBI Examiner Zenaida J. including those dating back to before 196811 and is inclined to accept the findings of the handwriting experts. the private respondent could validly file the complaint for the recovery of her late husband's property. 12 Nobody testified about Roberto's state of mind when he allegedly signed the document. The explanation given by the petitioners for their delay in registering the deed of sale is not convincing. caused not by time but by the tension gripping Roberto Sanchez when he signed the deed of sale. violence. however. that they understood the need for registering their property for purposes of using it as collateral in case they wanted to borrow money. Torres expressed the informed view that the signature on the deed of sale was not written by Roberto Sanchez.00 loan their daughter wanted to borrow. That delay lasted for all of thirteen years. The petitioners also did not present their own handwriting expert to refute the findings of the government handwriting experts. Article 1391 provides that the action for annulment of a contract prescribes in four years in cases where the vice consists of intimidation.

the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED. "the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. 2000 TRADERS ROYAL BANK. SPS..signature having been proved to be a forgery. 1994. it was totally void or inexistent and so could be challenged at any time. CYNTHIA. concur. LINDA JOY. ALFELOR II and LIZA R. WHEREFORE. No. MARGARITA. vs. ALFELOR. with costs against the petitioners. 1999. petitioner.R. in CA-G. According to Article 1410. 114299 March 9. SANTOS and MARIA CRISTINA S. Griño-Aquino Gancayco. PE. HONORATO D. we fail to see the applicability of Article 1431. CECILIO L. GONZALES. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and TRADERS ROYAL BANK. FIRST DIVISION and Medialdea. J. Narvasa. as the widow of Roberto Sanchez. Moreover. 118862 PATRIA. COURT OF APPEALS. JJ. the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24. has the capacity to sue for the recovery of the land in question and is not estopped from doing so. 33920. the instrument is totally void or inexistent as "absolutely simulated or fictitious" under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. In addition. Traders Royal Bank is ordered to pay the Capays the . SPS. G. ROSARIO. x-----------------------x G. all surnamed CAPAY and RAMON A.R. No.. The private respondent. RUBY ANN. is on leave." Neither the private respondent nor her late husband has made any admission or representation to the petitioners regarding the subject land that they are supposed to have relied upon." Finally.V. we are convinced from the testimonies of the handwriting experts that his signature had been forged on the questioned document and that he had not conveyed the subject land to the petitioners. SPS. The inference that Roberto Sanchez and the private respondent knew about the instrument from that date has not been proved by the evidence of record. petitioners. as modified by its Resolution dated August 10. C. we disposed of the consolidated cases as follows: SO ORDERED. PARIA. MARGARITA. J. and RAMON A. petitioners invoke Article 1431 of the Civil Code and contend that the respondent court erred in not declaring the private respondent and her late husband estopped from questioning the deed of sale until after fourteen years from its execution. DEAN RODERICK FERNANDO and LAARNI MAGDAMO FERNANDO. PE and JOSEFINA L. all surnamed CAPAY. REMEDIOS OCA. SPS. HON. Our own finding is that the petitioners have not proved the validity and authenticity of the deed of sale or even the circumstances that supposedly led to its execution by the late Roberto Sanchez. R E SO L U T I O N KAPUNAN. RUBY ANN. LINDA JOY. On the contrary. WHEREFORE. CYNTHIA. respondents. which provides that "through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. vs. the action for its nullification being imprescriptible. 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. FLORA LARON WESCOMBE. No. GONZALES. SANTOS. TELESFORO P. ROSARIO. respondents.: In our Decision dated September 29.R. The deed of sale being a forgery.

and interest in favor of the movants. private respondents in G. civil or administrative action against the Register of Deeds and/or his assistants that may be take by the party or parties prejudiced by the failure of the former to carry over the notice of lis pendens to the certificate of title in the name of TRB. It may be recalled that the trial court. The omission should not be read as a deletion of the award for damages. the trial court ordered TRB to pay movants P100. promulgated on February 24. 1994. Inasmuch as we affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. They also ask that Traders Royal Bank (TRB) be ordered to pay them the amount of P47. Accordingly.000. This Decision is without prejudice to whatever criminal. and P40.00 as exemplary damages. TRB appealed to this Court while the subsequent transferees filed a motion for reconsideration in the appellate court. No. attorney’s fees. as modified by its resolution. II . the appellate court merely dismissed the complaint as against the subsequent transferees. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court ordering the cancellation of the certificates of title in the name of the subsequent transferees but sustained the award of damages in favor of the movants herein. the same is hereby GRANTED. the decision of this Court. They pray for the inclusion in the dispositive portion of said Decision of an award to each of them the amount of P100.730. instead of the fair market value of the disputed property at the time of said sale. and P40. in view of the foregoing disquisitions and finding merit in the motion for reconsideration.000. No. P40.00 as exemplary damages. The decision of the Court of appeals affirming the award of damages remained unaffected by the subsequent resolution. The Court of Appeals initially affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago. Emelita Santiago. In addition.00. SO ORDERED. The complaint filed against defendants-appellants with the court a quo is hereby ordered DISMISSED. and the certificate of titles originally issued to them in their individual names are hereby restored and duly respected. the Capays and Ramon Gonzales.000. The Court of Appeals.00 as attorney’s fees. ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the certificate of titles issued in the names of the transferees and to issue new ones in favor of the movants. all with legal interest at the time of the filing of the complaint. the award of damages in favor of movants need not be stated in detail. 1994. TRB did not specifically question the award of damages when it appealed to this Court. 1999. filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the above Decision. P40.000. is hereby RECONSIDERED. we deny the prayer for the inclusion of such award in the dispositive portion of our decision. I We clarify that we did not delete the award of moral and exemplary damages. hence. granted the transferees’ motion thus: ACCORDINGLY. the price stipulated in the Deed of Absolute Sale between said bank and its transferee. In effect. not as against TRB.R.000.00 as moral damages. 1 On October 21. 114299 and petitioners in G. 3 As stated in the above Resolution. plus interest at 12% per annum from the date of said contract.00 as moral damages.R. 118862.000. in a Resolution dated August 10. We make no pronouncements as to costs. Consequently.00 as attorney’s fees. 2 SO ORDERED. in ruling for the Capays and Atty. such issue was beyond our review. with legal interest from the filing of the complaint. Gonzales.

1400. HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC. INES E. EUFEMIA LIGARAY. with 12% interest from the date of said sale until the same is paid. which we decreed in our decision. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. No. instead of the fair market value of the property at the time of said transfer. movants would ordinarily be entitled to.Movants ask that TRB be ordered to pay them the amount the former received from its immediate transferee. SOLEDAD E.00. all surnamed ERMAC. petitioners. however. 114299 and 118862 dated September 24.nêt SO ORDERED. J. CENIZA. we grant movants’ prayer for said amount. CLIMACO.: Ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. with interest from the said date. vs. Resolution dated August 10. and interest thereon. is found in Article 1400 of the Civil Code: Art. as HEIRS OF URBANO ADOLFO. 149679. To this. In accordance with the above provision. in this case.00 as appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale. with interest from said date. civil or administrative action against the Register of Deeds and/or his assistants that may be take by the party or parties prejudiced by the failure of the former to carry over the notice of lis pendens to the certificate of title in the name of TRB. Whenever the person obliged by the decree of annulment to return the thing can not do so because it has been lost through his fault. Accordingly.1âwphi1. RODULFO ERMAC andAMELITA E. SENO. which was in the amount of P47.R.R. he shall return the fruits received and the value of the thing at the time of the loss.V. namely: IRENEA E. The basis for the award of the amount constituting the value of the property. MALINAO. 2003] DECISION PANGANIBAN. with 12% per annum from said sale. The dispositive portion of this Court’s Decision in G.* respondents. LUISA DEL CASTILLO.R. Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest . insist upon the price of the property at the time of the sale to Emelita Santiago. FLORAME and FE. LIBRADA E. 33920. 1994 in CA-G.730. VICENTE DIONSON. PRECIOSA. TRB poses no objection and we take the price stated in the deed of sale as a stipulation between the parties on the value of the property. No. VIRGINIA. DANILO. Nos. This Decision is without prejudice to whatever criminal. the value of the property being equivalent to a forbearance of credit. from the sale of the property by TRB to Emelita Santiago. EMIGDIO BUSTILLO and LIZA PARAJELE. BASUBAS. 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. aside from the value of the property. ELSA. if evidence of such receipt of fruits is presented. BERNARDINO. Emelita Santiago. movants would be entitled to the fruits received from said property. ESTANESLAO DIONSON. Pursuant also to the above provision. interest thereon from the date of the loss. CESAR. namely: BENJAMIN. as HEIRS OF CLIMACO ERMAC. Traders Royal Bank is ordered to pay the Capays the amount of P47. ESTELITA ERMAC. THIRD DIVISION Movants. May 30. MIOZA. the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24. In addition. C. 1999 is hereby AMENDED as follows: WHEREFORE. the Court Resolved to GRANT IN PART the Partial Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration. as modified by its [G.730. 4 HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC.

peanuts. [Petitioners] claim that [respondents] recent occupation of some portions of Lot No. the property was inherited upon his death by his children Esteban. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. finding that the original owner of the lot in question was Claudio Ermac. Siblings Pedro and Balbina requested their brother Esteban to have their title over the property registered. and the assailed [D]ecision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City is hereby AFFIRMED. adverse and continuous possession in the concept of an owner of the entire Lot No. [Respondents] Luisa Del Castillo and Estaneslao Dionson allegedly derived their title by purchase from the children of Claudio Ermac. (plan II-5121 Amd. on the other hand. Upon the latters death. Balbina and Pedro. however. 666 are the [respondents] in this case. and did not include his fathers brother and sister. and therefore. Cebu. nor his cousins. Pedro and Balbina. The filing of the said ejectment caused a cloud of doubt upon the [respondents] ownership over their respective parcels of land. seeking to set aside the February 16. cassava and fruit products. the said Lot No. Clemente did not disturb or claim ownership over those portions occupied by his uncle. 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals[4] (CA) in CA-GR CV No. The ruling [was] supported by the admissions of Irene[a] Seno. 666. 666 was inherited and partitioned by his children.[5] The assailed Reconsideration. Esteban. 666 was only tolerated by Clemente Ermac and the [petitioners]. 2001 Decision [2] and the August 6. and planted corn. on the other hand. because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Resolution denied petitioners Motion for The Facts The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA as follows: In their Complaint. [petitioners] inherited Lot No. and they constructed their residential houses thereon. while [Respondents] Emigdio Bustillo and Liza Parajele derived their ownership from the Heirs of Balbina Ermac-Dabon. All the heirs of Claudio Ermac. but did so in his own name.title. he cultivated the said lot. witness for the [petitioners] and daughter of Clemente Ermac. With the help of his children. which lot allegedly belonged originally to Claudio Ermac. 666. [respondents] claim that they are the owners of the various parcels of real property that form part of Lot No. until recently when the [petitioners]-heirs of Clemente Ermac filed an action for ejectment against them. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. [Petitioners]. Clemente Ermac was in actual. Despite having registered the lot in his name. Esteban. peaceful. was unable to do so. namely. During his lifetime. prompting them to file this action for quieting of title. aunt and cousins even up to the time of his death. The dispositive part of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE. 666 now occupied by them by right of succession as direct descendants of the original owner. Clemente also effected the registration of the subject lot in his name. the lower [court] rendered its [D]ecision. Clemente. It is essentially claimed that it was Clemente Ermac and not his grandfather Claudio Ermac who is the original claimant of dominion over Lot No. Upon Clementes death. denied the material allegations of the [respondents]. [Respondents]-heirs of Vicente Ermac claim ownership over the portions of Lot No. 59564. therefore. 666. Among the occupants of Lot No. Clemente applied for registration of the title. by right of succession. Since the entire lot is now registered in the . bought his land from the heirs of Pedro Ermac. [respondents] ownership and possession had been peaceful and undisturbed. and the task of registration fell to his son. but that the other heirs of Claudio Ermac are entitled to two-thirds (2/3) of the lot. [Petitioners] in fact had never surrendered ownership or possession of the property to the [respondents]. Claudio Ermac. 666. should share in the ownership over Lot No.2) situated in Mandaue City. premises considered. xxxxxxxxx After trial. [Petitioners] also set up the defense of prescription and laches. and claimed that the [respondents] have no cause of action against them. establishing facts which show that [petitioners] and their predecessor Clemente did not own the entire property. 666. [Respondent] Vicente Dionson. the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

2401[.C. First Issue: Preliminary Injunction Petitioners assail the validity of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the RTC to restrain the ejectment proceedings they had filed earlier. it appearing that such titles were acquired in derogation of the existing valid and adverse interests of the plaintiffs whose title by succession were effectively disregarded.name of Clemente Ermac. this Petition. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and. It ruled that respondents were able to prove consistently and corroboratively that they -. some of which have already been purchased by some of the [respondents]. Second Issue: Indefeasibility and Incontrovertibility of Title . Whether or not O. No. after his death.[10] petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration: I. the shares belonging to the other heirs of Claudio Ermac. Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over the property in the names of petitioners predecessors-in-interest [Spouses] Clemente Ermac and Anunciacion Suyco[. Balbina and Pedro. continuous and undisturbed possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners. 666[.] [IV]. as the resolution of the issue would not involve the merits of the case. RO-752 issued in the names of [Spouses] Clemente Ermac [and] Anunciacion Suyco is indefeasible and incontrovertible under the Torrens System[. According to the appellate court. are being held in trust by the [petitioners] in favor of their actual occupants. was inherited by his children -. Branch 2. The validity of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 5. which this appeal -. Whether or not laches ha[s] set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of Lot No. If petitioners truly believed that the issuance of the Writ was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 1996 issued by the Regional Trial Court.] II.as it is now -touches upon. directing the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. to cease and desist from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No.Esteban.[8] Hence. [t]he fact that [petitioners] have in their possession certificates of title which apparently bear out that it [was] Clemente Ermac alone who claimed the entire property described therein [has] no discrediting effect upon plaintiffs claim.][11] The Courts Ruling The Petition is unmeritorious. but also moot.had been in open.as well as their predecessors-in-interests -. Branch 28. they should have challenged it by a special civil action for certiorari within the reglementary period. Any ruling by the Court at this point would be moot and academic.T.[9] The Issues In their Memorandum. The latter found that Lot No.] III.[6] Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA held that the factual finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[7] should not be disturbed on appeal. This question is not only late.

and Carpio-Morales. if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners. JJ. [14] The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a factual issue already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the appellate courts. [19] Moreover. the registration in the name of Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held the land in trust for all the heirs of the former. [15] Furthermore.. While it is true that Section 32[12] of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible after a year. ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. SO ORDERED. the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Since respondents were in actual possession of the property. Hence. and recover the property. WHEREFORE. Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title. a constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded party. became incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from its issuance. as well as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts.[18] Third Issue: Ownership of the Disputed Lot Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of respondents. because it took the latter 57 years to bring the present action. it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy [13] in law. concur. because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. [24] Its application should not prevent the rightful owners of a property to recover what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another. and Corona.[21] Since Claudio Ermac has already been established in the present case as the original owner of the land. which the CA affirmed. [17] Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate. on leave. Fourth Issue: Prescription and Laches Petitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and laches.. We disagree. does not prescribe. Puno. the certificate of title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest. Clemente Ermac. the action to enforce the trust. it can no longer be challenged.[20] Considering that respondents have been in possession of the property for a long period of time.[23] It cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice. We clarify. JJ. they may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription. . The trial courts findings of fact. [22] Because laches is an equitable doctrine. are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. Costs against petitioners. It is a hornbook doctrine that only questions of law are entertained in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership. or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner. We are not persuaded.Petitioners posit that pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529 (the Property Registration Decree). in order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio Ermac. its application is controlled by equitable considerations. (Chairman).[16] A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. and thereby quiet title thereto. When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property. there is legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional evidence to support their claim of ownership. Sandoval-Gutierrez.

supra. October 24. [22] Reyes v. 184. 331 SCRA 267. filed with the Court on May 14. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Court of Appeals. 45. 340 SCRA 154. 1999. 2002 (see Rollo. 1999. Rollo. I. [15] Bayoca v. Heirs of Segundo Uberas v. Cardenas. Written by Justice Rodrigo V. 2001. De Castro.17-18). xxxxxxxxx Upon the expiration of said period of one year. September 4. Cosico. Vol. June 20. p. 356 Phil. [10] The Rollo contains another Memorandum for petitioners. Garcia v. whose services were terminated by petitioners on July 25. Court of Appeals. August 28. August 31. [13] Since respondents were in possession of the land. Court of Appeals. 368 SCRA 347. 597. 1978. Serna v. Court of Appeals. 333. 334 SCRA 454. Branch II. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals. February 3. signed by Atty. [3] Id. July 19. Court of Appeals. the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. January 31. 1999. 86 SCRA 144. Heirs of Jose Olviga v. pp. v. Court of Appeals. 1999. 1973. [4] Eighth Division. [11] Petitioners Memorandum. January 30.10. 8. Court of Appeals. 319. 1962. 6-30. January 21. the rather confusing title of this case was copied verbatim from the Petition dated August 25. June 18. August 10. 1999. Both Memoranda for petitioners substantially raise the same issues.Republic of the Philippines v. Uy. I. 32. 1. 285 SCRA 670. 2001 signed by Atty. Nogales. Lazatin v. Vol. Javier v. Innocent purchaser for value. 361 Phil. was received by this Court on May 7. 1163. Heirs of Mariano. 75 SCRA 441. February 28. 36-46. June 8. v. Strait Times Inc. 2001. Cardenas. Heirs of Jose Olviga v. [16] Heirs of Teodoro de la Cruz v. Court of Appeals. June 28. Court of Appeals. 1994. September 12. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals. Carlos Allan F. Inc. September 30. Baguio v. 367 Phil. [17] Development Bank of the Philippines v. 313 SCRA 176. upon the Courts receipt of petitioners Memorandum signed by Atty. 217. 368 SCRA 261. 211 SCRA 129. 339 Phil. Juan v. Vol. 1993. Faja v. p. [19] Flores v. 19.Vda. de Jacinto. July 3. Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals. June 17. 367 Phil. Reyes. 34. Zuiga. 2000. 556. Court of Appeals. 361. 2002.. 227 SCRA 330. October 26. October 30. 324 SCRA 591. Santos v. Court of Appeals. Heirs of Pedro Lopez v. de Cabrera v. March 28.. Court of Appeals. 312 SCRA 180. March 28. October 21. p. p. II.1984. May 31. Esquivias v. 2001. 344 SCRA 238.* To avoid error. 152 Phil. Monteclar of Monteclar Sibi & Trinidad Law Office. 45. Court of Appeals. 361 Phil. 354 Phil. See Vda. February 3. Court of Appeals. pp. Respondents Memorandum. 1962. v. pp. 2000. Court of Appeals. 2001. Court of Appeals. Rollo. II. It was signed by Atty. [2] Id. Republic of the Philippines v. Vol. October 25.. 1999. [18] Lee Tek Sheng v. de Jacinto v. Quiones. Monticines v. supra. 729. Original in upper case. 552. 1999. Spouses Rosario v. 115 Phil. 392. . [5] Assailed Decision. 2000. supra. Barcelona (Division chairman) and Justice Alicia L.10. 2000. 411 Phil. 369 Phil. pp. Court of Appeals. I. 1992. 355 SCRA 537. [6] Id. January 21. v. Vda. 1977. 368 Phil. Rollo. October 21. 335 Phil. p. Santiago v. Vda. 2000. 1997. Carlos Allan F. [14] Heirs of Ramon Durano Sr. Santos. Vol. Tarcela and Josefa Brusas v. Guerrero v. Nabasa. 1997. 2-5 & 37-40. 2000. p. This is in effect an action to quiet title to property. [21] Juan v. the proper remedy in this case should have been an action for reconveyance. Juan. July 15. 131 SCRA 532. 324 SCRA 126. 358 Phil. 30. August 26. 114 Phil. [7] Written by Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (now a justice of the CA). Court of Appeals. 1998. 315 SCRA 626. Uy. 1998. 1998. Review of decree of registration. p. 2002. [12] SEC. 2002. 652. Alex L. Zuiga. May 29. [1] Rollo. American Express International. Republic of the Philippines. 374. Urbanes Jr. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals. 1999. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud. Bienvenido N. concurred in by Justice Ramon A. [20] Abejaron v. April 28. Court of Appeals. Millena v. April 28. 231 SCRA 498. 1999. [8] Assailed Decision. 1998. Court of Appeals. [9] This case was deemed submitted for decision on July 16.

April 14. Sotto v. Teves.[23] Agra v. Fernandez. 184 SCRA 190. Philippine National Bank. 368 Phil. 829. October 31. 365 Phil. April 6. supra. 1978. 86 SCRA 154. De Vera v. supra. 170. Jimenez v. Court of Appeals. June 21. . Court of Appeals. [24] Reyes v. De Vera v. 1999. Court of Appeals. 1999. 1990.