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SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies
Kenneth K. lnada, Editor

M iidhyamika and Yogiiciira
A Study

Mahayana Philosophies
Collected Papers of G. M. Nagao

Edited, Collated, and Translated

L. S. Kawamura in
Collaboration with
G. M. Nagao

Published by
State University of New York Press, Albany
© 1991 State University of New York

All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced
in any manner whatsoever without written permission
except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical
articles and reviews.
For information, address State University of New York
Press, State University Plaza, Albany, N.Y., 12246
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Nagao, Gadjin, 1907Madhyamika and Yogacara.

(SUNY series in Buddhist studies)
Rev. translation of: Chiikan to yuish
G. M. Nagao.

Includes index.
I. Madhyamika (Buddhism) 2. Yo
ISBN 0-7914-0186-3
ISBN 0-7914-0187-1 (pbk.)


wife of Professor G. M. Nagao

Author's Preface

1. Buddhist Subjectivity
2. An Interpretation of the Term "S
in Buddhism
3. The Bodhisattva Returns to this
4. The Silence of the Buddha and i
~s. What Remains in Sunyatii:

A Yogacara Interpretation of Em
6. The Buddhist World View as Elu
in the Three-nature Theory and
7. Connotations of the Word Asray
in the Mahiiyiina-Siitriilal!lkiira
8. Usages and Meanings of Parit:~iim
9. Tranquil Flow of Mind:

An Interpretation of Upek$ii
On the Theory of Buddha Body
Logic of Convertibility
Ontology in Mahayana Buddhis
From Madhyamika to Yogacara
An Analysis of MMK, XXIV.l8
14. Ascent and Descent: Two-Direc
in Buddhist Thought
15. Emptiness
16. Yogacara-A Reappraisal

Appendix-Sources of Essays

Bibliography Index of Terms Index of Tibetan Terms Index of Chinese and Japanese Terms Index of Sanskrit Terms .

M. Michele Martin. John Keenan. the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC). therefore. It was. It was known to me. Japan. Division of International Programs. She asked whether I would be willing to undertake the task of editing and translating Professor Nagao's work. Institut Orientaliste. granted me the Grant for Visiting Foreign Scholars and the University of Calgary research grants of-fice responded positively to my application for travel to and joint research in Kyoto." has been amended with comments that do not appear in the original Japanese text. many difficulties began to emerge. M. For example. approached me in the Spring of 1984. The project deadline was targeted for the end of 1986. it be-came evident that the newly translated papers for this volume had to be more than a simple translation. The many occasions that gave me the opportunity to work closely with Professor Nagao clearly impressed upon me his arduous intent to per-fect his work.Acknowledgments When Professor G. obvious that without his collaboration. the thought of translating the text into English seemed a good idea. the book is three years late. that without Professor Nagao's ap-proval such an undertaking would be impossible. The article "Buddhist Ontology. the then editor of the State University of New York Press (SUNY). when the work of translating the papers began. in the early part of 1985. Lake for typing the early draft of the manuscript. the task of translation could not be accomplished. I would like to thank Ms. As we worked on the materials. but as is evident from the publication date. of course. V. the article "Logic of Convert-ibility" has been thoroughly reworked into the present form. However. The papers comprising Professor Nagao's book seemed straight for-ward enough. Professor Nagao was ap-proached and permission to commence the work of translation was obtained. Nagao. Universite Catholique de Lou- . Fortunately. G. This work could not have reached its conclusion without the support of many people and the aid of various financial grants. Nagao's book Chukan to Yuishiki appeared in 1978. Permissions to reproduce articles are acknowledged with thanks to the following.

Tokyo. LESLIE S. and editors of Journal of International Association of Bud-dhist Studies. Kyoto.X ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vain. KAWAMURA . editors of Jimbvn." The financial aid given by SSHRCC and the University of Calgary is hereby acknowledged in deepest appreciation. Kyoto. Risosha. editors of the Eastern Buddhist. please refer to "Appendix-Sources of Essays. For detailed information regarding the essays. Iwanami Shoten. Indiana. Bloomington. Hozokan. the University of Hawaii Press. Tokyo. Kyoto.

During the later centuries. the three-nature theory. Mahayana Buddhism would not have reached its present perfection. the Yogacara established the positive affirmative aspect of sunyatii (abhiivasya bhiiva!z). founded on Nagarjuna's (A. Indian Bud-dhism (as well as Tibetan Buddhism) focused its attention on only the Madhyamika school as the main stream of Buddhism while it overlooked the Yogacara as an independent school. however. Some of the papers found in this collection were written very early in my career and consequently show certain inadequacies. The paper "Logic of Convertibility. and it can be said further that. My study has been focussed on these two schools for more than forty years. that it was brought to completion by the Yogacara. ex-plains the fundamental idea of "convertibility" that has been and still con-tinues to be of great concern to me. as they contain important aspects of the development of my thought. fifth century). the theory of Buddha's body.D. It is my contention. the Madhyamika and the Yogacara. and so on. which complemented the Madhyamika. sec-ond to third century) philosophy of absolute negation (sunyatii). they have been included here." for instance. The Madhyamaka (middle) philosophy. especially through the works of Asm'lga and Vasubandhu (A. The Yogacara theories are said to be ''positive'' because by accepting the negative idea of sunyatii as a whole.D. is really a remarkable and probably one of the greatest achievements in the history of Buddhism. They complemented the sunyatii philosophy with vari-ous positive theories such as the theory of consciousness-only. 691). ideas and terminol-ogies created by the Yogacara school continued to influence the develop-ment of Buddhism in India (also in Tibet) for a long time.Author's Preface According to 1-ching's report from India (A.D. The papers written later presuppose. Mahayana Bud-dhism was divided into two schools. more or less. In spite of that. . however. this idea of convertibility and it is foundational to the ideas discussed there. without the effort and achievement of the Yogacara.

Many kalyiirwmitras helped me in preparing these papers by either translating them or improving my English.xii PREFACE In more recent years. Ms. and conse-quently. in earlier papers from time to time. I do not mean to imply a purely linguistic investigation. That is. Professor Norman Waddell. but rather. If these papers are helpful to my readers concerning their understanding of Buddhism. I avoided the danger of being too specula-tive. In fact. I shall be satisfied. NAGAO . The Madhyamika. I discuss the two notions of "ascent and descent. I refer to the process of interpreting a text as faithful as possible. By the term philological. GADJIN M. This is probably owing to the fact that sunyatii is in sharp contrast to Western ontological ideas. et al. Yogacara thought is no less important than Madhyamika ideas. The two notions have appeared. Profes-sor John Keenan. Michele Martin. the Reverend Yoshiaki Fujitani. the criterion for discerning whether that system is Mahayana or not is established. seems to have been studied rather widely by western scholars. This means that I have interpreted the purport of those treatises through the acarya's own words. when these two notions are found within a certain Buddhist system. although only vaguely. My hearty thanks go to. but it is only in recent days that it became evident that the two notions of ascent and descent were con-venient ways for gaining a proper understanding of the various doctrinal meanings." and show how they apply to our interpretation of the various teach-ings found in Buddhism. among others. However. My study has been philological rather than philosophical. and thus. more than the Yogacara. even though they are opposites and indicate contrary directions. My special gratitude is due to Professor Leslie S. it can be said that Mahayana thought is characterized as such when they are present. the readers will find that more attention has been paid to the Yogacara in this book. Kawamura for his tireless effort in translating and edit-ing this book.

Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. Monier-Williams. 1962). 1950). Editeur. Mahiivyutpatti (Kyoto: 1917. M.. Y. "Fragments from the AS of Asa111ga. ed. ed. Reprint 1966). MSg = Etienne Lamotte. Madhyiintavibhiiga-bhii$ya (Tokyo: Suzuki Re-search Foundation. La somme du grand vehicule d' Asmiga (Mahiiyiinasa1J1graha). Three volumes. Johnston.. Reprint Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation. 1962). Nagao. F. Nirvii(za = T. 1907 and 1911. (Louvain: Bureaux du Museon. Mvy = R. Le traite = Etienne Lamotte. La Theorie du Tathagatagarbha et du Gotra (Paris: Ecole fran<. Ruegg. MMK = Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin. Miilamadhyamakakiirikiis (miidhyamikasiitras) de Nagiirjuna. RGV = E. La theory = S. MW = Sir M. IsMeo = 1947.. H. Ratnagotravibhiiga Mahiiyiinottaratantra-sclstra (Patna: Bihar Research Society. ed.Abbreviations *(asterisk) in front of a title of a text indicates that the Sanskrit title has been reconstructed. Gokhale. 1949. AS = Abhidharmasamuccaya. Sanskrit-English Dictionary. 1969). avec La Prasannapadii Commen-taire de Candrakirti. Mahiiyiina-siitriilaiJ1kiira (Paris: Librairie Honore Champion. xiv . Bibliotheca Buddhica IV (St. Two volumes. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co. 1964).. Le Traite de Ia Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Niigiirjuna (Mahaprjiiiipiiramitiisiistra) (Louvain: Insitute Orientaliste. Sakaki. Royal Asiatic Society. Y. ed. The Conception ()f Buddhist Nirviifla (Lenin-grad: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR. 1983 re-print).. Stcherbatsky.aise d'extreme-orient. MV = G. 1927)." JA = Journal of the Bombay Branch.-Petersbourg: 1903-13) MSA = Sylvain Levi.

Two volumes. 2e vol. P Jayaswal Research Institute. printed in Yamaguchi Susumu Bukkyogaku Bunshu (Tokyo: Shunjusha. pp. Sphu{iirthii Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii-The Work of Yasomitra. Diazokyo (Tokyo: Taisho Issai-kyo Kanko Kai. Karunesha Shukla ed.Siddhi = Louis de Hiuan-Tsang. Re-print. 1973).. 1962). "Le petit traite de Vasubandhu-Nagarjuna sur les trois natures. text and Japanese translation with annotation. "Trisvabhavanirdesa Skt. 1934." gious Studies. . Sriivaka-bhumi of Aciirya Aswiga (Patna: K. Yasomitra = Unrai Wogihara ed." Melanges chinois et bouddhiques. TTP = Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition (Tokyo-Kyoto: Suzuki Research Foundation. ViJTisatika et 1925). 1966). siddhi: Deux traites de Vasubandhu. 1932-33.. Shunjusha. Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin. Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store. Trisvabhiiva = Susumu Yamaguchi. reprinted Tokyo. Trif!lsikii = Trif!lsikiivijfiaptibhii$ya. 147. SrBh = Sriivakabhumi. T or Taisho = Takakusu. Sthiramati = Yamaguchi. 161. 1972). 1971. (Tokyo: 1936 first edition. (Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku. Manuscript (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1972).

Introduction Professor Gadjin M. He humbly states that it is difficult to reach the inner alcove of Madhyamika and Yogacara thought. The Madhyamika thought of sunyatii was extended by the Yogacara by their system of the Three-nature theory that depended upon a logic of convertibility. he quickly realized that such a study would require competence in the elements of the Vijiianavada school. But in what way or manner did Professor Nagao reach such an insight? The best presentation of his thoughts on this matter is found in his own "Introduction" to his book Chukan to Yuishiki (Madhyamika and Yogacara). he . but what becomes evident in the papers presented here is his original thought on the logic of convertibility. he still attempts to complete the task. which results from understanding the Three-nature theory of Yogacara Buddhism. Professor Nagao was attracted to the study of the text. Professor Nagao begins his introduction by reflecting on his papers written during the last forty years. when he tried to make that study his thesis topic. Professor Nagao's contributions to the academic world are many. Therefore. I shall give an interpretation of the book's contents. the two traditions are not separate and independent but each augment the other. That is. The arti-cles presented in this volume have one thing in common. according to Professor Nagao. Each one is a step towards establishing the relational nature between Madhyamika and Yogacara. Nagao has devoted his life study to the investiga-tion of the development of Madhyamika and Yogacara Buddhism. Through-out these papers. The Awakening of Faith in Mahiiyiina. but in spite of the fact that he may not have the full capacity to argue for the synthesis between Madhyamika and Yogacara. However. He feels somewhat pretentious in giving his book the title Miidhyamika and Yogiiciira for that reason. While he was a student. Professor Nagao's constant effort is to synthesize the two systems. In haste. This manner of thinking. is soteriolog-ically the only method by which one can argue for a "systematic develop-ment" in Mahayana thought in India.

He completed and published his edition of the text in 1964. India. this was his first introduction to Yijfianavada thought. He then began his research on Asanga's Mahayana-saiJ1graha and on Tsong-kha-pa's Lam-rim-chen-mo si-multaneously in 1939. and as mentioned above. The latter study resulted in a Japanese translation and analysis of the "Vipasyana" chapter of the Lam-rim-chen-mo in 1954. and he thinks that he will probably continue to do so until he dies. Thus. in the interval. He began work on decipher-ing and editing for the first time an old Sanskrit manuscript of Vasubandhu's Madhyiintavibhaga-bhii~ya brought back from Tibet by the Reverend Rahula Sankrityayana. which was appended to the edition. Even though one of the players may seem to have an edge on the other. he not only had the chance to study the Madhyantavibhaga exten-sively but he also had the opportunity to compile the index to the text. He knew that he would have to go back to the Sanskrit language. which ultimately led him to the study of Tibetan Buddhism. Out of these studies. When watching the moves of the players in a game of chess. he was able to acquire considerable knowledge regarding Madhyamaka phi-losophy. Introduction . Professor Nagao's claim is that he has wandered in and out of the two schools. As a graduate student. Yamaguchi.2 INTRODUCTION began to read Sthiramati's Sanskrit text. also he saw the need to consult the Tibetan canon. an old manuscript that was deciphered and edited by ProfessorS. He then turned to a study of the Madhyantavibhaga. Nagao's interest was directed to a study of Lamaism in Mongolia. Tibetan-Sanskrit and Chinese-Sanskrit in 1961. which was stored in the K. part one. from 1939. This was natural and logical. he joined the publication workshop of Sthiramati's Madhyantavibhaga(ika. he began his study of the Mahayana-sa171graha in 1939 and brought it to a successful comple-tion by publishing volume one of the work in 1982 and volume two in 1987. Tri171sika. it is easy to observe that the players match strength with each other at every move. P Jayaswal Research In-stitute in Patna. Thus. his former study resulted in a two-volume publi-cation of Asanga's work. He devoted himself for several years to the study of the Mahayana-sutrii/aiJ1kara. However. In order to pursue his inquiry deeper into these schools of thought Professor Nagao knew that a knowledge of Classical Chinese alone was insufficient. Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese in 1958 and part two. These two volumes will certainly become the definitive study of Asanga's text in the years to come. This led to the realization that one would have to go back to Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka system. His study of the Mahayana-sutra/aiJ1kara finally crystalized with the compilation of the Index to the Mahayiina-sutra/aiJ1kara. He did not anticipate much with regard to Yogacara. Therefore he gives the title Chukan to Yuishiki (Madhyamika and Yogacara) to his book.

the locus of power seems to shift. Still. It seemed reasonable even from a historical perspective that the Yogacara developed and was systematized by succeeding and taking a stand on the Madhyamika philosophy of siinyata (emptiness). especially with regard to those papers he had written prior to World War I I. direct perception. he chose to include those pa-pers in his book because they contained the theories that were to become the basis for his later thoughts. Yamaguchi (1895-1976) who pub-lished his great work Bukkyo ni okeru U to Mu no Tairon (The Controversy Between Existence and Nonexistence in Buddhism). If it is possible to synthesize "existence" and "non-existence. the same scenery became manifest from a different perspective. The reexamination disclosed further that his discussions on Madhyamika was referenced by Yogacara (Vijnanavada) theories." then would it not follow that such a synthesis must have been already present in its evolution and growth? However. Professor Nagao found him-self feeling great pains of anxiety. He felt that there should be a limit to incapacitation. Vijnanavadins).when a play takes place. Professor Nagao was agonized by the question of "existence" and "non-existence. On the other hand. his study of the Madhyamika and Yogacara schools gave him the same challenges. One of Professor Na-gao's mentors was the late ProfessorS. In rereading some of his old manuscripts. if there were no controversy.e. he was touched by the vast scenery of the world of Enlightenment. he reexamined his old papers. there does not seem to be an end to the conflict between existence and non-existence. in spite of that. When he devoted himself to Madhyamaka studies. For Professor Nagao. however. it seemed to Professor Nagao that the rivalry between the thoroughness of the middle path. and praxis of the Yogacara was not only suggestive of but also disclosed the paradoxical nature of man that follows him into eternity. updated the language. Upon reading this book. this held just as true for Bhavaviveka as it did for Dharmapala. improved on their style." Which was the correct viewthe "non-~xistence" stand of the Madhyamika or the "existence" stand of the Yogacara? On what do they take their stand? How was it possible to synthesize the tactful and polished logic of the two schools that pressed on relentlessly. The realization that his thinking had not changed much since times of old and that the same thoughts occurred re-peatedly in his papers made him feel that little progress had been made. he was unable to view the Madhyamika school with the genuineness . might that not have been the degeneration of Buddhism? In short. and religiosity of the Madhyamika and the system-atization of the cognition theory. As in-adequate as that process might have seemed. When he ab-sorbed himself in the texts of the Yogacara (i. In other words. intellect. and collected them into his book. and Candrakirti.. modified them slightly.

and to that degree it is probable that something still "remains. If. ''What Remains in Sunyata'' argues for sunyatii on the basis of Yogacara (Vijilanavada) tenets regarding it and therefore it is different from that of the Madhyamika. The text examines the Bodhisattva career. seemed to ooze with the flavor of concrete religious experiences. it demonstrated expressions of penetrating wisdom." The article "On the theory of Buddha-Body (Buddha-kaya)" resulted from a lecture given by Professor Nagao on the occasion of his retirement from Kyoto University. the article "The Silence of the Buddha and Its Madhyamic Interpretation'' relates particularly to the Madhyamika. he understood it as his attempt to synthesize the two systems. Looking positively at this. Seven arti-cles. "The Bodhisattva Returns to this World. the author of this book was Asanga. In the present collection. that many of them have appeared previously in various journals and books. papers written later are considered in the light of this logic of convertibility." Introduction . indeed. however. a text attributed to Asanga. addresses questions about Buddha-body and Buddha-wisdom.4 INTRODUCTION with which Candrakirti and Bhavaviveka did. convertibility of the three natures. as a rare and towering religious and academic docu-ment seldom found in this world. deliberates on the issue of o of the Tathagata that Professor Nagao's interpretation of the Madhyamika was through Vijilanavada eyes. Needless to say. this text. he would have to be one who towered high above others and one in whom practice and wisdom were in accord. For Professor Nagao. Almost unawares." "Usage and Meanings of Paril)amana. In spite of its shortcoming (it was not totally systematic). unlike Yasubandhu's which demonstrated well-developed systematic theories. The outcome of the work is presented here as the sixteen articles mak-ing up the present volume. and the identity between "descent" and "ascent" with asraya-paravrtti (turn about of one's basis) as their mediatorkept storming his mind. he began to see the Mahiiyiina-sutriilaiJlkdra. It should be pointed out. but he also understood that this could be a point of criticism by pure Madhyamaka schol-ars. Asanga made com-plete use of Nagarjuna's thoughts on sunyatii even though he may not have accepted it in its entirety. the "ascent" from a world of convention and language to a world of higher principles and peace and "descent" its opposite. It probably raises many questions among bona fide Madhyamaka scholars. the revival of the conventional. The article "The Logic of Convertibility" examines the fundamentals of the Yogacara (Vijilanavada) through an understanding of the term pariivrtti (conversion or turn about). These articles brought to Professor Nagao's attention that the same old issues-that is." "Tranquil Flow of Mind: An Interpretation of Upek~a.

" "From Madhyamika to Yogacara. An Analysis of MMK. "Yogacara-A Reappraisal. therefore." and "Yogacara-A Reappraisal" do not appear in Chiikan to Yuishiki (Madhyamika and Yogacara). Consequently. The paper. 1. Many of Professor Nagao's articles have appeared in various books and journals and many of them are now out of print." "Ascent and Descent: Two-Directional Activity in Buddhist Thought. in a sense." has been included in this volume not only because it functions. they have been edited and compiled here together with the newly translated and edited papers. as a comprehensive concluding chapter for the present volume. .1-2. but also as it recapitulates and reveals the ideas presented by Professor Nagao in his various essays in a very succinct and clear manner. rather than write a conclud-ing chapter to this volume. this last essay has been included to serve that purpose. IS and MY. Some of these were written after the book appeared and some were newly translated for this volume. XXIV."Buddhist Ontology.


in the Jodo doctrine. transformed body (nirmiil)a-kiiya). The basis for this query lies in the fact that the main tenet of Buddhism is after all "non-self" (aniitman). in the socalled anthropology of Tsung-mi developed in On the Original Man. "True Man". or in view of the inner rela-tions within Buddhism as a whole. these introspective conceptions that express the religio-existential awareness of self could not have been reached. In this book. . the idea of human nature is cen-tered around a "common man" or a most degenerate "Sinful Man" who acquires the self-consciousness. because the "True Man" is a human being insofar as he is called the true man. indeed. in the total perspective of Buddhism. Although such terms as bodhisattva. the problem of Buddhist subjectivity must involve an investigation into the na-ture of Buddhahood as well as an examination of human nature. Through anthropological studies alone. In contrast. How should the problem of subjectivity be treated specifically in a Buddhist context? It is this question that I would like to consider in this paper. It is. Further. but. It would seem reasonable that something called "Buddhist subjectiv-ity" is understood within a Buddhist context. he comes to the conclusion that the true source of human nature is in the "True Mind" or Enlighten-ment. therefore. for example. Tsung-mi discusses the moral nature of man from the viewpoint of Hua-yen school in reference to Confucianism. Lin-chi's "True Man residing nowhere" is to be regarded as an expression of human exist-ence. he is Buddha.Chapter 1 Buddhist Subjectivity Subjectivity-in the sense in which the term is used in existential philosophy-presents us with an important religious problem. For Lin-chi the "True Man" is a "human being" and a "Buddha being" simultaneously. The idea of Buddhist subjectivity can be found. However. the idea of subjectivity has not been too readily affirmed. the subjectivity of the True Man is not only "human subjectivity" but it is also "Buddha's subjectivity. because he has realized Buddhahood or Enlightenment." Thus. the common man who is the "Real Guest" of Buddha's salvation. it must be asked whether.

8 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA and so forth refer to "existence as human beings" within Buddhism. though religious) would deviate from Buddhistic thinking.e. existential philosophy that follows the Western thought." it cannot do so if the subject. a problem that cannot be approached in the manner of Western existentialism." is placed within a doctrinal context of a "self. the term existence is used in a different sense. the "existential subject" originates interdependently. it cannot be denied that the problem of an existential subject is liable to be neglected therein. mere ex-istentialism (i. without religious concerns. be it in the sense of "Original Man" or "True Man. it will be argued that. this short paper will allude to an instance of a Buddhist way of thinking that is based on a Sanskrit text belonging to the Vijfianavada school. Notwithstanding the fact that those expressions stand for a "subject. 1 It must be noted. which implies "nonsubstantiveness because of dependent origination. the result will be a mere denial of the self in which religious subjectivity tends to get lost. even stron-ger. Non-self or the denial of self is expressed by Madhyamika teachers with the term "voidness" (siinyata). however." Thus Buddhism must establish religious subjectivity (i.. however. To state the conclusion in advance. brahmiitman). therefore. if Buddhism is to speak about an "existential subject. many elaborate discussions on atman are to be found. an existential subject) while de-nying the self totally. The term "iitman" did not imply merely an individual human existence U!vatman)." the doctrine of non-self (anatman) is fundamental and fixed in Buddhism. consequently. the Universal Soul (paramiitman. and consequently is distinct in connotation from that in Western philosophy. The reason is that the existential subject must be purely individual. In Buddhism. in Bud-dhism. exist-ence-that is religious subjectivity-is comprehended as something "de-pendently originating" and not as a substance or atman (self)." When this idea of "dependent origination" is applied to the question of subjectivity. It goes without saying that 'atman' was such an important concept in Indian philosophy that in its philosophical literature of old. that the awareness of self of the ancient Indians can hardly be identified with the so-called self-consciousness con-sidered by modern Western thinkers. thus. historBuddhist Subjectivity .e. and that "de-pendent origination" (pratltya-samutpada) is the ground or basis on which final deliverance takes place. but it implied. A distinguishing char-acteristic of Indian thought may be found here. Here lies a specifically Buddhist problem. On the other hand. If the doctrine of non-self is treated from merely its theoretical.. logical aspect. it can be safely asserted that the awareness of self was provoked in the Indian minds from the very ancient times. they are none other than a way of expressing the manifestation or the incarnation of Buddhahood. In addressing this problem.

it did not have the depth of absolute subjectivity implied in the "True Man" or of existential self-consciousness implied in the "Sinful Man. Being constructed on the foundation of the alayavijfiana (store-consciousness) theory." who is enslaved by carnal desires also. which was not so well-developed until then. Existence is opposite to essence. Mahayana Buddhism sought to establish the idea of Buddhist subjectivity. the Bodhisa-ttvas and Buddhist laymen in the Mahayana aim at moving out and descend-ing to the common or human level. more than in the Madhyamika. 2 It was in Vijnanavada thought. the Mahayana concep-tion of 'great self. Linchi's "True Man. individual existence due to the fact that the "self" was dissolved in the Universal. because the theory of a Universal Soul that prevailed before the Buddha's time left no room for establishing a real. anti-universal and antimetaphysical. Even though the atman-theory demonstrated a height in hu-man thought.'' As is generally known. and establishing the great self at other times. may gain reli-gious subjectivity only through the absolute denial of the self. The real awakening or the attainment of Buddhahood is explained as the annihilation of the "mean self" and the realization of "great self. Transmigration in this world is possible only on the basis of a non-self theory. undergoing transmigration from one state to another. but it is ever active in this world. The ideas of manas (mind or self-hood) or adana (seizing.' which once was initiated through the thought of non-self.ical and temporal. There have been groping endeavors to search for an existential sub-jectnegating the self some times. The "Sinful Man. for it is not a substantive self. the philo-sophical system of the Vijnana-vada is deeply tinged with idealistic or spir-itualistic notions regarding the view on an individual. a term which undoubtedly had affinity to the Universal Soul of atman-theory." However. In contrast to the Hlnayanic arhatship that aims at ascending and thus reaching sainthood. The existential subject must be. It was the Buddha's doctrine of "non-self" that laid the foundation for subjectivity within Buddhism. should be distinguished from that of brahmatman. is not a Universal that stands aloof from the world. the self is revived in Mahayana literature through the expression "great self" (mahatmya). It is in this sense that one can speak about the Buddha's doctrine of nonself as the foundation for an existential subject. though having affinity with the Universal in one sense. It does not engage merely in intellectual contemplation. actual." for example. and not universal and permanent. appropriating) presented in this . that the problem of subjectivity was discussed most distinctly. by nature. By replacing the secludedness of arhat by the bodhisattva ideal and by emphasizing the Buddhist practices of a layman instead of those of a monk.

daily subject. a . Their nonsubstantiveness was demonstrated through his sharp dialectics. thus. because of its immutability. The Yogacara school's consideration on the problem of subjectivity was developed by elucidating such concepts as 'great self. on the contrary. And how it appears (vathii khyati) is of the imaginary (kalpita). Close attention should be paid to the conception of the 'appearer. but Yasubandhu.' which is foundational in the three-nature theory. the result of the appearer's act of appearing. from trans-migrating existence to the great self of the Buddha. S. and so forth that refer to a relative. In the Trisvabhavanirde5a (Treatise On Three Natures). there is expressed the idea of "ap-pearer" (khyatr).' 'Buddha-body' (Buddha3 kava) and so forth. The no-_ tions of a "doer" and so forth along with those of "doing" (karman. the verb khya means "to be known" (pass. great self. Along with such terms as iitman. the consummated nature (parini$panna-svabhiiva) is realized. The second and third verses from Yasubandhu's Trisvabhavanirdesa (Treatise on Three Natures) mentioned above. and so forth which are related to the absolute or universal subject. used these agent nouns positively. and such words are called "agent nouns" in grammar." That which is of the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhava) is explained as the state of "how it appears" or the "appearance"-that is. which is none other than a "religiously oriented subject" at the turning point of going from defilement to enlightenment. phenomenal. Is to be comprehended as the consummated.) or "to make known" (caus. kriya) and of the "instrument of doing" (kara!Ja) and so forth were utterly rejected by Nagarjuna. reads as follows: That which appears (vat khyiiti) is of the other-dependent (paratantra). Yamaguchi. but the Yijnanavada came to these ideas through a more practice oriented method. As pointed out by Dr. And when the former is absolutely devoid of the latter. "to know" is a function of vijfiapti (knowing). And because the latter exists as imagination. Because the former originates in dependence on conditions.). "Yogacara" (Yoga prac-tice). These words are formed by adding "t(' to the verb root. ~ treatise of this school. The state where the "appearer" (khvatrl is devoid of "appearance" (vatha khyanam).10 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA school are similar to the 'T'or "ego" of Western thinkers. "goer" (gantr). we have in Sanskrit such words as "doer" (kartr). 4 That which is of the other-dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava) is herein explained as "that which appears" or is called the "appearer. this school is duly known by its other name. Further.

The aim of this removal. an act of the "knower" that is of the other-dependent nature. The appearer is not the universal but is the indi-vidual and at the same time. it could be said further that the subjectivity of the appearer or the "transactor of linguistic conventions" (vyavahiirtr) is the foundation on which the so-called religious existence or religious subjectivity stands.1a appears. If the above discussion be accepted. the world turns around with the otherdependent nature (paratantra) as the axis or mediator. And this ground itself is the appearer." "goer" and so forth all of which are wrongly assumed to have independent and absolute existence. is defined as the "other-dependent nature. was thus revived in the Vijnanavada treatise as a "subject. attains Buddhahood through the "turn around" from knowing to wisdom. Thus. According to the three-nature theory. As such. 5 The "-er" (-tr). the appearer is distinguished from the consummated nature." this is to say that it exists only in the manner of "dependent origination. the appearer functions as the mediator between the two and as such .1a could take place. The subject that is freed from ego-consciousness and is of the other-dependent nature can at-tain the perfect enlightenment. this knower produces a continuous ego-consciousness through the mediation of manas (self-hood) and on the other. that is the agent noun khyiitr. that the world crystallizes itself as an appearer and that human acts are none other than the function of this appearer. And since. It is a matter of course that in Buddhism defilements based upon ego-consciousness are to be removed. stands for the agent or the subject in the act of knowing. the subject of every act. it is distinguished from the imaginary nature. in the compound "vijnapti-matra·· (knowing only). because the former is the knower (paratantra) itself. a subjective existence. Both "appearing" and "transactional linguis-tic conventions" are aspects of "knowing"-that is. On the one hand. according to the Vijnanavada. all kinds of acts are represented by knowing. the appearer. this appearer. it might be said rather. the appearer is regarded as the subject of all kinds of acts. shows the fundamental tenet of the Vijnanavada. while the latter pre-supposes the dichotomized realities of a subject and an object. is to elucidate. which was totally denied in the Madhyamika treatise. Thus. In these verses. Although distinguished from the extremes of both the imagined and the consummated natures. the depen-dent nature of the "doer. as Nagarjuna had done. The other-dependent nature is the ground or the basis upon which the imaginary na-ture (parikalpita) or saf[lsiira turns about and the consummated nature (parini$panna) or nirvii1. however.Buddhist Subjecti1·it\' II term which." and not as an independently existent substance to which the act of appearing is attributed." an assumption without which there would be no possibilities for an existence wherein a "turning around" from defilement to nirvii1.

but he did not elucidate existentia fully. the appearer must undergo transmigration and is account-able for it. so to say. . and which is the mediator for the "turning around" that enables one to go from the infected status of safJlsiira to the absolute purity of nirvii(la. the appearer becomes aware of the fact of being phenomenal. It was the adherents of the Vijiiana-viida who clarified the position of religous subjectivity and opened the way for existential thinking. an instance of this was noted in the conception of the appearer. because what is of the other-dependent nature is. when through the awakening to Buddhahood. So far as it is captured by self-love (iitma-sneha) and selfattachment. But. phe-nomenal (sa1Jlskrta) and must never be confused with what is of the consummated nature.12 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA includes both in itself. after all. Nagiirjuna denied essentia. which is both individual and subjective. In this paper. this is to be called the "other-dependent existence" originating in the light of the con-summated.

to discuss again the concept of 'sa!Jlvrti." 5 "common sense. saiJlvrti refers to being conventional. I have already discussed these ideas elsewhere 1 together with the main tenets of Buddhism and con-cepts such as pratltyasamutpiida (dependent origination). tracing the various interpretations as they have appeared in Candraklrti. of the whole of Mahayana Buddhism. 1-ching ~ 7'¥ and Tz'u-en Vman." But ever since Pali sa!Jlmuti was rendered into the Sanskrit form sa!Jlvrti and many Mahayana authorities began to work out new ideas with this word. absolute." "permission" on the one 3 hand.' extracting from the above mentioned article with a few revisions. ffi su meaning "common." "selection" on the other." "gen-eral (popular) acceptance. the meaning as well as the root seems to have undergone a gradual change. profane. 14 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGAC . worldly. supermundane." "vulgar. however. "convention. Generally. The development of the idea of 'sa!Jlvrti' will be discussed. probably. and tathatii (suchness).Vman means "to consider (together)" or "to give consent to the same or common idea" as Dr. I wish here. expresses appropriately these meanings. and "choice.Chapter 2 An Interpretation of the Term '' Sarpvrti'' (Convention) in Buddhism The theory of the so-called Twofold Truth of paramiirtha (absolute) and saf!1vrti (convention) is one of the most important features of the Madhyamika philosophy and at the same time." in contrast with ~ ya which means "elegant." and so forth the Chinese equivalent of this word. mun-dane. Sthiramati. the root of which is 2 Sa1J1muti has the meanings of "consent." "refined. Unrai Bunshu Wogihara suggests. SaiJl. and is contrasted with paramiirtha. ~ ~rsl~. 4 and hence." "ordinary." "noble. which means being super-worldly. sitnyatii (void-ness). I The word sa!Jlvrti corresponds to the Pali saiJlmuti.

In Buddhist writings." and "to exist." and in this connection its nominal form saf(lvara means "election" and "choice." "to encounter. 6 This slight difference of -vrti and -vrtti may very well be assumed not to indicate a genuine differ-ence of word." "dissimulation. "to come into being." and then later. But both saf[l. referring to saf!lvrti as "phenomenalism" or "phenomenal reality" in general. general ignorance): sa1J1vrti is none other than tattviivacchiidana.Most Sanskrit texts of Buddhist siitras and sast for "convention. in Candrakirti's Prasannapadii. 9 In the first. sarpvrtil) sarpketo loka-vyavahara ity art hal). how-ever. it is 8 noted that saf!lvrtti is "often [a] wrong reading for saf!Ivrti." It is ex-plained that it is ajfliina (not knowing). 3. However." "to be. namely. both meanings and probable roots seem to have been employed. selecting one term or the other to circumscribe the precise meaning intended. or "the truth never revealing itself. production). "the truth concealed" for ordinary mankind." "obstruction. saf[l. two of the earliest meanings of saf[lvartate are "to turn or go towards. chapter XXIV. "con-vention'' is defined in these three ways: I." and so forth. Pro-fessor Theodore Stcherbatsky. samantad vara!}arp sarpvf!il). But at the same time. utpiida (origination. due to the very existence of funda-mental avidyii (that is. and Candrakirti obvi-ously adopts here the root Vvr in the sense of covering or concealing. First." The phrase samantiid varal)am indicates a kind of so-called popular or doctrinal etymology." "to be produced. saf!lvrti means first of all "covering. I believe it is quite possible to argue the point that the early philosophers used both roots.Yvr and "to exist" or "to come forth" from saf[l." but the form sarpvrtti with the same meaning is encoun-tered in Sthiramati 's Madhyiinta-vibhdga-!ikii." "conceal-ing.Yvr and saf(l. and from the evidence that will appear in the following pages." These meanings suggest an affinity between saf(lvrtti and pravrtti (coming forth). also gives as literal . 2.Vvr and saf(l. " "To cover" from saf[l. that is. verse 8. but to be 7 merely a copyist's error or his individual style. paraspara-sarpbhavanarp va sarpvf!il).Vvrt. From the other root Vvrt. sarrzvrti or "convention" is defined as "to cover universally" and "to be concealed universally (from the truth by hindrances)." the same meanings found in the Pali sarpmuti. there is an-other root Vvr that means "to choose.Vvrt do have "conventional" as their primary sense.V vrt are evidently unrelated meanings. From the root Vvr.

translations "cover-ing" or "the 'surface' covering the Absolute." 10 Accordingly
sarpvrti does not refer merely to being common or ordinary. as suggested by the

sarpmuti or the
be ignorant.
and absolute Reality. This dichotomy reminds us of Prince Shotoku's


(itt rs,
being," which is further explained as anyonya-samasrayel)a, that is, "with one
depending upon another." Being kept from the truth, "convention" must
necessarily originate and come into being in the sphere of sarpsara 11 (birth and
death). Here, however, the sense of covering has disappeared and the emphasis is
put rather on an interpretation by the root safJl- Ybhtl (to be or come together).
Here also, if we take it as doctrinal etymology, Candrakirti seems to adopt v'vrt as
the root. As a whole, expressions used here suggest the idea of pratltyasamutpada
(origination depending upon one another), which is explained usually by the
term, paraspara-apek$a (de-pending upon one another, being relational).
Thirdly, "conventional symbols" (safJlketa) and "worldly designa-tions"
(vyavahara) are called "sarpvrti." To be born in this world, or to originate
dependently in this world (the second definition of sarpvrti) means to manifest
oneself in some form of word, concept, idea, and so forth. Both vyavahara and
sa1Jlketa mean nothing more than prajfwpti (making known, notation), which has
in turn the same content as that of pratftyasamutpada. In this context it is stated that
sarpvrti is to fix or to determine through differentiation of abhidhana and abhidheya
(that which names and that which is named). 12

Thus, we can briefly characterize the three interpretations of sarpvrti by
Candrakirti as follows: (I) falsehood through ignorance, (2) contingent existence
without substance, and (3) conventional terminology, manner of speaking, and
Of these three interpretations, sarpvrti in the sense of "conventional
symbols" appears to be the most common. 13 It is understandable why sarpvrti in
the sense of "causing each other to come into being" is also often used, for it is
easily derived from "conventional symbols." That these two interpretations

should represent the most widely used meaning of sarpvrti is quite obvious:
sarpvrti. standing wholly in opposition to paramartha, is needed if there is to be a
world of creation and conditioning (sa1Jlskrta), i.e., pratityasamutpada or prajiiapti.
Paramartha of course is something unthinkable (acintya), inexpressible (anabhilapya),
and uncondi-tioned (asafJlskrta).

The rendering of sarpvrti in the sense of falsehood through covering or
hindrance (by ignorance-definition one above), is, however, more or less



unique among these three; and this particular one may prove to be the most
fundamental and important in the analysis of the word sarpv("ti for Candraklrti's
Madhyamic interpretation. When Candraklrti alludes to this term in his
Madhyamakiivatiira, chapter VI, verse 28, he simply defines it as "delusion"
(moha means folly), for it sets obstacles before true nature
(svabhiiviivaral,liit). In chapter VI, verse 23 of the same work, saf!lvrti-satya is
explained as the object of "false view" (mr$iidrs). 14 This line of inter-pretation
seems to have been transmitted long afterwards by Prasailgika followers.
Bodhicaryiivatiira, chapter IX, verse 2, 15
two above-mentioned verses.


the M
we have another exposition of "convention" or sarpvrtti. These texts, it should be
noted, belong to the Vijiianavada school, which later engaged the Madhyamikas
in constant controversy. First, sarpvrtti is defined here gener-ally as "vyavahara"
(verbal designation). This, in turn, is divided into three, which reflect
respectively the characteristics of the tri-svabhiiva, that is, the three natures. 17
The Vijiianavadins in this text assume tri-svabhava to be mula-tattva or "principal
truth," not the twofold truth of the Madhyamikas; these terms, namely, sarpvrtti
and paramartha, are used here merely for the purpose of elucidating tri-svabhava,
that is, miila-tattva.
The three aspects of sarpvrtti mentioned here are:


The first aspect, prajfiapti-sarpvrtti, is exactly the same as Candraklrti's third
definition "conventional symbols," and in this sarpvrtti, prajflapti set-tles and
determines various things (vyavasthiina) and confers names (niimiibhiliipa). This
may be the very meaning of what is called "vyavahara," verbal designations. In
spite of the actual non-existence of
the world (arthiibhiive), it "makes itself known" (prajfliipayatiprajflapti) to us, but only through appellations (abhidhiina-miitrel)a). In this
sense alone is the world sarpvrtti, "existing." Hsiian-tsang~ ~ translates the word
prajnapti {~1 "temporary," which suggests a concept close to that
of upaciira, while Chen-t i

(Paramartha) calls it 51.



An Interpretation

The term pratipatti of the second aspect, pratipatti-saf!1vrtti, refers to
human "action," "behavior," and "perception;" hence, as defined in the text, it is
none other than vikalpa, that is, "(wrong) discrimination." This means that by
this discrimination of the objective world, one adheres to the "made-known (or
revealed) world" as if it were real. Sthiramati puts it thus: "pratipatti is the
attachment to the outer object (arthabhinivesa), in spite of its being not real."
Hsiian-tsang translates pratipatti by the usual
fj, "going," "action" or "practice," Chen-ti bylj":Rfj , that is, "attachmentaction." On the other hand, vikalpa, which is identified here with this
attachment-action, is always considered in this school to be para-tantra, which,
in turn, is a cognate term of pratityasamutpada, both mean-ing "dependent
origination." In this context, therefore, this second aspect of saT)1Vftti is
roughly similar to Candraklrti 's second definition "one de-pending upon
The third aspect, udbhavana, does not, however, correspond to the first
definition "to cover universally" and "to be concealed universally"
given by Candraklrti; it rather stands opposed to it.
"manifestation," means to display (saf!ldar.Sana)
(saf!!sucana) absolute Reality, which from the beginning remains beyond
vikalpa. Saf!1vrtti is thus an utterance, attempting to express the inexpress-ible
Absolute. In this respect, saf!1vrtti is raised to a position higher than those of the
other two and placed closer to paramartha; it indeed seems to be about to replace
paramartha as the Absolute, 18 and seems to claim to have control over it. Such a
state of being may be appropriately compared with the notion of marga (the
way), which leads to the Absolute on the one hand, and which emerges from the
Absolute on the other. Thus, it is evi-dent that Candraklrti's definition of
"covering" the truth stands almost di-ametrically opposite to this interpretation.

As already stated above, these three distinctions are made for the pur-pose
of the elucidating the tri-svabhava (three natures), which is, unlike the trinibsvabhava (three non-substantialities), an explanation of the positive world of
ens. In accordance with this, all these interpretations of Saf!1vrtti have also a
positive side,-saf!1vrtti being not at all negated but in fact manifesting the
Absolute. Accordingly, it becomes clear that the root con-sidered here was

Yvrt. coming into being and manifesting or clarifying the truth. The root Vvr

on the other hand, covers and darkens the truth. The above-mentioned positive
side was also already foreseen when saT)1Vftti was
defined as vyavahara.
In this connection, Sthiramati goes on fur
of the second aspect of saf!1vrtti,
pratltyasamutpada, is the only true


most fundamental one, while

sarpvrtti designate uses of sarpvrtti that have derived or secondary meanings.
That is to say Sthiramati does not consider parikalpitasvabhiiva and parini$pannasvabhiiva as safJlvrtti in the true sense of the word.

Although Candrakirti and Sthiramati agree on most points, there is a very
marked contradiction between the former's idea of "covering" and the latter's idea
of "manifestation." This difference may be properly under-stood, therefore, only
when we conclude that they employed interchange-ably the roots v'vr or v'vrt.
thereby finally deriving vastly dissimilar usages. The Madhyamikas seem to
favor the root v'vr, the Vijfianavadins the root v' vrt. This is not to say, however,
that Candrakirti and the Madhyamika followers did not think at all of the
meanings of saiJl- v' vrt. On the contrary, they also used vyavahiira and other
terminology in the senses shown above. Further, Sthiramati and the other
Vijfianavadins, while not giving the definition "covering" as one of the meanings
of saiJlvrtti, could not have been entirely unconscious of the existence of this
particular meaning; they probably had no occasion to use it in this sense. Vikalpa,
moreover, is always considered by them as abhutaparikalpa, that is, "false
imaginings," as stated throughout the first chapter of the Madhyiintavibhiiga. Be it
that vikalpa is the highest21 and the most pene-trating discernment of accuracy,

yet, when contrasted with paramartha, the Absolute, it is no more than untrue
and false and deceiving, so long as it remains vikalpa. Hence, also in the case of
Sthiramati, sarpvrtti is, from the beginning, shut out and veiled from the truth.

Sarpvrtti then means convention by its existence, a meaning that is common
to both schools of Madhyamika and Vijfianavada; existence is a hindrance if
conceived of as covering the truth, but it is at the same time truth itself
manifested. Both interpretations, although standing at opposite extremes, could
have been arrived at by using either the root v'vr or v'vrt. which, confined not
merely to its etymological meaning, was extended even so far as to include an
opposite meaning.

That both roots were employed by either or both schools, and that the
meaning of convention often fluctuated over a wide range, from "cover-ing"
through "coming into existence" to "manifestation," may become more certain
when we refer to Chinese sources such as 1-ching's records
and Tz'u-en's writings.
1-ching ( ~ 1~ 635-713) translates safJlvrti-satya as ~ ~W

truth) or ~ ffi &fli (covered conventional truth).


He further adds

An Interpretation

old translation tit is, where no meaning of covering is included, does not
express completely the original meaning. Here he presents us with a con-crete
example of an interpretation of the word convention as derived solely
from the root Vvr. "to cover."
Tz'u-en (~}@/,Honorific title :XMi-'% given to K'uei-chi m¥
682), the eminent disciple of Hsi.ian-tsang, who founded the Vijfianavada school


in China, gives an Indian etymological analysis
claims it to be the othodox meaning as taught by the acarya


He describes saf!lvrti in the Chapter on the Twofold Truth

Commentary on the Vijiianamatra-siddhi.

of the word and

and again in the


is here called ~~ ~Uiff
truth," and the reasons for it are given as follows:


~iii'!~.~ l~.,


;tJt >~'fit o



ID Jti'J ~~J! :l'JG' 1'.\!! ~ tJI~ 'fit o

The world is concealment and cover, and means that which is destructible. The
conventional is manifestation, and means that which flows with the
currents of the world.

There are two definitions in this passage,
one defining tit and the other
defining is , but two subordinate meanings also play important roles in the
definition of the term saf!lvrti tit is .
(I) Tz'u-en 's first meaning of saf!!vrti is literally "concealment and cover,"
which is, in accordance with 1-ching's interpretation, evidently derived from the root saf!l- Vvr ~~ 11, and is replaced by 11 ~f in the version of
the Shu-chi (~
~f being avarm:m in Sanskrit, the meaning "hindrance" is emphasized here. At any rate, in both cases the interpretation is quite
close to the first definition given by Candraklrti. It should be noted that this
interpretation had its origin with Dharmapala, who, among the Vijfianavada
scholars, was one of the most outspoken critics of the Madhyamika tenets.


(2) Tz'u-en 's second meaning "destructible," however, does not seem to be
derived directly from saf!lvrti or saf!lvrtti. At first brush it may appear to mean "to
destroy (the truth)," especially if read from the first meaning of "covering (the
truth)." But this does not fit the case, for the character "6J seems rather to
denote the passive voice, hence "destructible."
I am inclined to believe, however, that there is little, if any, connection
between Tz'u-en's definitions, one and two. It appears that "destructibil-ity" as a
characteristic of saJllvfti had its origin elsewhere. In the Abhi-dharmakosa,

chapter VI, the Twofold Truth is explained. The name saf!lvrti is given here to
those things that are destructible, for example, a vase made of clay, which will
not remain in existence when it is broken (bheda), and to those things which are
analyzable (anyapoha), for example, water, which can be reduced to more
fundamental elements, such as form,



color. smell and so forth. Only when these things are still whole or unan-alyzed
are they called "saf!lvrti." Paramartha, on the other hand, is indi-visible; it does
not cease to exist. This type of positivistic interpretation belongs properly to preMahayanistic thinking, and it is the rule in all Abhidharma philosophy. Tz'u-en
probably referred to this concept in deriv-ing his destructibility.
Again, in this connection, we are reminded of the word loka, that is, the
world. The meaning "destruction" was attached to loka at some time in India, and
its use became popular also in Chinese Buddhism. The Ti-betan equivalent for it
similarly means "the abode of destruction." As the Chinese translation of loka
is always i:J:t , it is probable that this popular etymology of loka as
"destruction" was applied by extension to include
saf!!vrti also.
(3) In Tz'u-en 's third definition, ~UJ"e (literally "appearing" and
"manifesting,") may merely indicate the meaning of prajfzapti, saf!!keta and so
forth, given by Sthiramati as the first aspect of saf!lvrtti (that is, "things appear in
the world"). However, from the similarity of the two Chinese words, it is
probably more correct to understand it in the sense of udbhavana ~!! 7,
manifestation, (that is, the third aspect of saf!lvrtti given by Sthiramati) in which
case it means, as it were, that "paramartha man-ifests itself in this world" as
worldly things. It is a "coming down" or a "descent" of paramartha into this
conventional existence; the Absolute "appears" in the guise of convention, and
the one becomes many.
(4) Tz'u-en 's fourth definition, "To flow with worldly currents" indi-cates
the meaning nearest to that of the Chinese ffi, "conventional." But here also
llJ1I, "to flow with" or "to follow after," means that a higher being submits itself
to a lower one. It is not that worldliness complies with worldliness, but that
paramartha lowers itself and follows after loka-vyavahara, that is, "worldly
designations." Worldliness is stronger, as it were, than paramartha. Paramartha
abandons its sovereignty and is subject to saf!1vrti; otherwise, paramartha would
find itself entirely deprived of the means by which to manifest and express itself.
Therefore, "to flow with (worldly currents)" may be distinguished from mere
"worldly currents," that is, the everyday currents of birth and death that are
utterly uncon-scious of paramartha. If this conjecture is not too far amiss, saf!
lvrti here is not the mere life, but a life that indicates paramartha and mirrors
Reality. This meaning then agrees with Tz'u-en 's terms "appearing" and "manifesting" just mentioned above. In Tz' u-en 's understanding of both "appear-ing
and manifesting" and "to flow with world currents," it is evident that the root saf!
l- Yvrt was selected to designate this conventional world. Therefore in his
term~~~, we find both Candraklrti's "concealment" and Sthiramati 's
''manifestation'' synthesized.
An Interpretation

Or. With-out this world. where complex connotations have been added.IV These few instances of the various interpretations of the idea of saf!lvrti in India and China discussed here do not by any means exhaust the problem. saf!lvrti may be described as constantly moving away from paramartha." That is to say. it be-comes a thing of immeasurable worth. in which we are born and work and die. the world of saf!lvrtti. There is no other. If Candrakirti 's position is taken. that is to say. the most fundamental tenet of Mahayana. it is indeed the basis on which the entire ideal of the Bodhisattva-mdrga (the Way of the Bodhisattvas). what is perceived changes in that instant into saf!lvrti or "falsehood. we can summarize Tz'u-en 's position as one that follows after or is based upon Dharmapala's claim that "the covering of the truth is the manifesting of the truth." As such. It is Tz'u-en who finally draws the two ends together to elevate saf!lvrti to its full significance. Sthiramati. It is only in this world of paradox that the Bodhisattvas can effectively display their merits. Tibet. but ascent. There is still much to be done in tracing the development of this idea in China. affirms the value of saf!lvrti as the sole medium through which paramartha can manifest itself. more correctly. and Japan. When paramartha is brought into the ken of our perception. were this world negated. there is no affirmation. but it is only in this realm of contradiction that the Buddha and the sattvas have a common meeting ground. rests. speeding in the direction of the Ul-timate. on the contrary. if there is no negation. 31 Thus. These divergent views seem to have come about naturally through expansion of the germ of contradiction inherent in the term saf!lvrti. Candrakirti developed only one aspect and Sthiramati the other. from the foregoing discussion certain considerations are already suggested. However. paramartha would also become non-existent. 'saf!lvrti' for Candrakirti is a negative concept. descending forever into the bottomless chasm. Here there is no ascent unless there is descent. for paramartha can never be seen: to look at paramartha is not to see it at all. The history of the term saf!lvrti as traced briefly here gives us a faith- . while it is a positive one for Sthiramati. saf!lvrti is destined forever to remain in the dark abyss of depravity. it is saf!lvrti alone that can reflect the image of paramartha. Sthiramati would probably say with us that after all there is but one world. "Covering-manifesting" is certainly a par-adoxical expression. Having discussed Candrakirti and Sthiramati. There is then no more descent. Briefly. it is by means of covering the truth and only by that means that truth can be manifested.

sarnvrti first began with such ordinary meanings as "common sense. which. it took on the diverse meanings of "covering" and "manifesting." which expresses the paradoxical nature of the Mahayana. describes precisely the world in which the Great Compassion of the Bodhisattvas must find its meaning. for he "abides not in Nirval)a" (aprati$Jhitanirva1)a). But he also introduced here a new term. not in any other. sarnvrti-matra." and so forth. but it enjoys the warm rays of wisdom. Such a distinction is already anticipated in the Vijfianavada 's notion of paratantra. However. Candraklrti's sarnvrti seems at a glance to represent merely the samsaric parikalpita as-pect." and finally the combined meaning of "covering-manifesting. sarnvrti-only. . Later. But this in itself is his enlightenment or wisdom. his joy consists in his painstaking labors in this world. distinguishes itself from the samsaric parikalpita on the one hand and from the 33 nirvanic parini$panna on the other." "conven-tional. he comes back to this world and dwells in the very midst of defilement. 32 it should naturally be distinguished from the world of ordinary men. the relationship between these concepts. while very in-teresting. and 35 corresponds to the Bodhisattva-world. but it is the manifestation of the Perfect. It is a world of ignorance. being the axis on which the whole concept of 'tri-svabhava' revolves. Not abiding in Nirval)a. It is far from a perfect world. Derived from the Pali sarnmuti.22 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA ful indication of the parallel development of Mahayana Buddhism. It is here that the Bodhisattva works." "Coveringmanifesting. cannot be dealt with here."34 which is carefully distinguished from paramartha-satya as well as the sarnvrti-satya of human adherence. Although this Bodhisattva world filled with contradictions is itself sarnvrti. the crux of which is the Bodhisattva-marga.

. I shall focus my attention on two terms--aprati$!hita-nirviil. theirs was a saintly and serene but an inactive and indolent mo-nastic order. Dayal claimed that the Bodhisattva doctrine was promulgated as a protest against this coldness and aloofness of the Arhat. He had accomplished what was to be done. secluded. In short.Chapter 3 The Bodhisattva Returns to this World In his celebrated book. Har Dayal elucidated the fundamental differences between Hlnayana and Mahayana ideas. He was alone. were indif-ferent to 2 the duty of teaching and helping all human beings. master of himself. The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature. In de-veloping this theme. zealous. 1 However." but a Bodhisattva is reborn and returns to this world. as time went on.. He attained undefiled and final emancipation of mind and heart. "an Arhat . knew that he would not be reborn.. Har Dayal continues: They seemed to have cared only for their own liberation .la and saf!lcintyabhavopapattibecause these were scarcely noticed by Har Dayal.. In contrast to this. As quoted before. a Bodhisattva was one who criticized and condemned the spir-itual egoism of such an Arhat. which was written almost fifty years ago-which is still being used widely by scholars-Dayal summa-rized the notion of the Arhat as follows: An Arhat who was thus liberated. Although the differ-ences between Hinayana and Mahayana ideas can be pointed out in various ways. Accordingly. Buddhist monks began to neglect the important aspect of Arhatship and became overly self-centered. I will confine myself here to the idea that a Bodhisattva is one who refuses the liberation of nirval)a until all sentient beings are saved. In his work. knew that he would not be reborn..

4. IV.] aprati${hitaf!l nirvii(lam. the word nirval)a is considered to be qualified by the word aprati$thita which means "not dwelling in." As fruits of the Three Learnings (Sik$ii). it becomes the fourth nirval)a when the name 'nirvaiJa' (of the Mahiivyutpatti." and so on. or the highest goal for an Arhat. the former is no other than nirval)a (the suppression of defilements. the Sravaka's turbidities) are suppressed. The latter is the body acquired when jiieya-iivara(la (i. aprati$thita-nirvii(la. in this chapter of the Mahiiyiinasaf!lgraha. this aprati${hita-nirvii(la is the sole nirval)a to be acquired either by Bodhisattvas or by Tathagatas. is never neglected nor devalued by the Mahayanists.32. na nirvii(le prati$!hito bhavati na saf!!Siire. The two words aprati$thita and nirvii(la do not always form a com-pound. nirval)a is deemed also to be of the highest importance in the Mahayana. [Mahiiyiina-sutrii[af!lkiira (hereafter. sopadhife$a-nirvii(la and nirupadhife$a-nirvii(la.] aprati$!hito nirvii(le.. XVII. [Mahiivyutpatti. MSA). along with the Buddha-wisdom or the Buddha-body. Or. 1725) is regarded separately from these three nirval)as just mentioned and is considered to be "originally pure" (prakrti-visuddhi) as stated in 3 the Ch' eng wei shih fun (Vijiiapti-miitratii-siddhi by Hsiian-tsang). Va-subandhu's Trif!lsikii mentions two bodies: vimuktikiiya and dharmakiiya. In any case. which are none other than the three kinds of Buddha-body (kiiya). 406. it corresponds to the fruit of having obtained wisdom as explained in the Phala-jfiana chapter of the same text. phala-prahiitta) and the latter refers to Buddha-wisdom (phala-jiiiina). When this Mahayanic nirval)a. MV).. [MSA. it becomes the third nirval)a.24 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA I Although the Bodhisattva's way is different from that of an Arhat. it corresponds to the fruit of having suppressed defilements as explained in the Phala-prahaiJa chapter of the Mahiiyiinasaf!!graha." The last two chapters of Asanga's Mahiiyiinasaf!lgraha are named "Phalaprahal)a" and "Phala-jfiana.e. for we can find instances in which both have case endings.e. This is because the Bodhisattva practice is in itself a way of benefiting others by helping them obtain the ultimate "nirval)a.] The Bodhisattva Returns .] nirvii(le 'pi manana prali$!hitaf!l. the nirval)a. However. the Bodhisattva's turbidities) are suppressed. chiian 10. we find such phrases as I. [Madhyiintavibhiiga (hereafter. is considered separately from the two kinds of Hinayanic nirval)a.l2. The former is the body acquired when klesa-iivara(la (i. 2. XVII. For ex-ample.42. that is. V. 3.l (Sthiramati 's Tikii)." "not abiding in. Thus.

XVI1." "adhering to.] In spite of the fact that we most frequently encounter this expression in compound form.l4." But he also admits that the meaning of aprati$!hita is ambiguous and proposes twenty-one possible translations for this term. F.In most cases. "it [aprati$!hita-nirvii[la] is the Mahayanistic nirvaQa in which the Tathagata returns [in the capacity of a Bodhisattva] to 8 worldly life to save creatures ." From this latter defini-tion. not literal ones. and simply refers to J. The latter two translations." Although prati$!hii has the meanings of "to stay. -aprati$!hitatva. however. Takasake translates it as "not to stay fixedly in the NirvaQa. the Chinese and Tibetan translators seem to have understood the term to mean "being attached to. IV. etc. IX . Obermiller translate this term into English as "altruistic Nirval}a. 12cd.29 MSA. nirvii[la-aprati$!hita. VI. Il. the two words are combined to form a com-pound: I. IX. we sometimes find the word "saf!lsara" added. as for ex-ample in: 3." In my opinion.] -aprati$!hiina. it becomes clear that the word aprati$!hita-nirvii[!a denotes a Bodhi-sattva's resolution: "I shall not enter into final nirval}a before all beings have been liberated. etc..thita as "not permanently fixed" and adds.l. Edgerton gives a more proper explanation in his Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary when he defines the term aprati$. XIX. MSA. aprati$!hita-nirvii[la. Spey-er's paraphrase: "nirval}af!l yatra na 4 prati~~hlyate. J. [MV." "clinging to." "to dwell. saf!lsiira-nirvii[la-aprati$!hatii.." and sometimes as "non-dialectical NirvaQa. V.] There are also instances when even the word order is reversed." In his Vajracchedikii Edward Conze always translates prati$!hita as "support" and aprati$!hitaf!l cittaf!l as "unsupported thought. [MV. Eteinne Lamotte admits that a grammatical explanation of the com-pound aprati$!hita-nirvii[la would be difficult." or "the Unstable NirvaQa.45." "basis" and so forth when used as a noun. Among those.62." 5 even though he renders it as "le 6 NirvaQa instable." Theodore Stcherbatsky and E. and "ground. XVIII. 69." "to abide" and so forth when used as a verb. aprati$!hita-saf!lsiira-nirvii[la. are interpre-tative translations. as for example in: 2. however. .32. [MSA.

filled with tender-ness.42. This suggests a notion of "a nirval)a not clung to" derived from the Skt. 12 which delineates three levels of attach-ment and detachment that can be traced among the three types of human beings. mi gnas clinging). The Bodhisattvas dwell neither in safTisara nor in nirval)a and neither love nor become attached to them.26 MADHY AMIKA AND YOGA CAR A the meanings "not attached to" and "not clinging to" are enumerated. On the contrary." Va-subandhu makes it clear that the ways of the Bodhisattva. the Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas. aprati$!hita-nirvatza. and this can be understood to mean nirval)a to which he does not cling. Ordinary beings covet worldly joys as well as their own life. Further in Sthiramati's 10 commentary on the MSA.42. though freed from safTisaric things.thita-nirvatze "[a Bodhisattva] enters into a The two meanings of "not dwelling" and "not clinging" can be clearly seen in the MSA. because the first part of the two latter compounds clearly functions as an adjective. Vasubandhu's commentary states: With regard to the detachedness of [a Bodhisattva's] compassion. Thus." Also. XVII. 9 In the Chinese commentaries on the Vajracchedika. aprati$!hita is usually in-terpreted as "not abiding" as well as "not clinging. does not even dwell in [or cling to] the quiescence [of nirval)a]. 70 nivi$!atJ1. the Hinayanic The Bodhisattva Returns . is apparently considered as an adjective describing nirval)a. due to com-passion. By combining the meanings of "not dwelling" and "not clinging. XVII. the minds of Bodhisattvas do not dwell even in nirval)a. The two yanikas. How much less will their loving minds be attached to the two [sarpsara and nirval)a]? Here." Mi gnas pa (aprati$!hita). their minds dwell in [or cling to] nirval)a which is the quiescence of all pains. are still attached to nirval)a. in the Tibetan translation Mi gnas pa' i mya ngan las 'das pa ( aprati$!hita-nirvatza). three kinds of attitudes about love are presented. in we read: aprati$. IX. aprati$!hita can be interpreted Vasubandhu's commentary on the MSA." 11 is replaced by ma chags (not as "not clinging to. The use of aprati$. there is a verse which reads: The mind of compassionate beings [Bodhisattvas]. Although the loving minds of Sravakas and Pratyekabu-ddhas do not dwell in such things. How much less will his loving mind dwell in [or cling to] worldly happiness or his own life? The loving minds of all worldly beings dwell in worldly happiness and their own life.thita as an adjective is re-inforced when aprati$!hita-nirvatza is aligned with sopadhise$a-nirvatza and nirupadhise$a-nirvatza. both of which are safTisaric.

that is.e . he does not dwell in sarpsiira. it becomes clear that the term aprati~thitameans to exit from nirviiQa and to come down into saJTisiira. A Bodhisattva does not dwell in and does not cling to nirviiQa owing to his compassion. the Bodhisattva]. 13 From Vasubandhu's commentary. he who possesses compassion and the highest wisdom [i." This verse expounds the ten kinds of "attainment [of fruit]" (samudiigama) that results from the Bodhisattva's practice. and the ordinary beings are different. Y. he neither dwells in nor clings to saJTisiira owing to his great wisdom. Hence. "not turning back." and continues to explain it as follows: "Not dwelling in both sarpsiira and nirviiQa" is the "attainment [of fruit]" called the "gaining of the [Buddha's] prediction at the stage of non-turning around. and aprati~thata is mentioned here as the eighth kind of attain-ment. we find the qualification aprati$Jhita-saf!lsiira-nirvfu:w. These two activities of coming from nirviiQa and going to nirviiQa are to be understood to be operating simultaneously in the term "aprati~thita-nirviiQa. Yasubandhu says: Since he possesses compassion. The verse runs as follows: After realizing all sarpsiiric entities as painful and substanceless. aprati$Jhita-saf!lsiira-nirviit:zatva." because he [the Bodhisattva] is now not liable to turn back from either sarpsiira or nirviil)a. nirviiQa I. a Bodhisattva does not become agi-tated by sarpsiira nor feels weary of sarpsiira. Moreover. a Bodhisattva's activity includes the aspect of aprati~thita-SaJTisiira. is neither afflicted [by sarpsiira] nor bound by the faults [of sarpsiira]. Vasubandhu says that it means "not dwelling in both saJTisiira and nirviiQa. XYII. therefore. Again.29 aprati. for there are several others that are either separate in-terpretations or are derivatives of this term. therefore." The above does not exhaust all possible interpretations of the term aprati~thitanirviiQa..~Jhatii means avtntvartat:za. This term.saints. since he possesses the highest wisdom. in a very comprehensible and clear manner. he does not dwell in nirviiQa. he is not bound by the faults of sarpsiira. Commenting upon this verse. 14 Sthiramati clarifies this further in his commentary: .32. is expounded in the MSA. in the case of the Bo-dhisattva. In the MV.

Because the Bodhisattva dwells neither in SaJTlsara nor in nirval)a. Owing to his wisdom. "Equality Wisdom. and. for him there is no duality between sarrzskrta. the uncompounded. A similar explanation can be found in MSA. It is this non-duality that plays a salient role in the notion of the Bu-ddha's samatii-jfiiina. committing himself to sal]lsara.28 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA Perceiving the sentient beings. These two events are also mentioned in Vasubandhu's commentary on the MSA. Vasubandhu makes the statement: aprati$!hitanirviirte nivi$!arrz samatii-jfiiinarrz." In this verse Asm'lga explains iisraya-pariivrtti. owing to his compassion.70 explains "Equality Wisdom" with the compound: aprati$!hasamiivi$!a( -jfiiina). does not turn back from the way of sal]lsara because of his compassion and also does not turn back from the way toward nirvaQa because of his wisdom. "the Equality Wisdom is what had entered the not dwellThe Bodhisattva Returns .62. "evolving of non-duality." "evolving of duality. This "evolving of duality.14. means not only not turning back from the way to nirval)a but also not turning back from saf!1sara. XIX. the compounded. the tenet of Mahayana is elucidated. 19 XIX." in ten ways." which the MSA explains as the seventh evolution of basis. and. is in the ultimate sense advayii vrttib. like-wise in terms of ten items." however. "non-duality. the sixth is called "dvaya vrttil). where. he denies the uncompounded and does not enter nirvaQa either. aprati~thita means advaya. Of these. Sarna is another name for nirval)a. 16 Of these ten items." The MSA. The Tibetan translation. a Bodhisattva. and probably correspond respectively to the Phala-jnana (abhisarrzbodhi) and Phala-prahal)a (parinirviirta) in the Mahiiyiinasarrzgraha quoted above. understands this compound as aprati$Jhasamiivi$!a( -jfiiina) ( I mi-gnas zhi-bar zhugs-pa ni I mnyam-nyid ye-shes yin-par 'dod 1). IX. IX. 17 2. in his com-mentary. however. the seventh and the eighth items are commented upon by Va-subandhu as follows: The purification of the [Buddha]-land and not dwelling in nirvaQa are seen in the three stages of non-turning back. In MSA. a Bodhisattva relinquishes the compounded and does not enter saf!1sara. 15 These two commentaries make it clear that the term "not turning back. and asarrzskrta." which is another name for aprati~thata. 61-2." because by means of this evolution the Buddha Sakyamuni has manifested the two events of Enlightenment 18 (abhisarrzbodhi) at Bodhgaya and Parinirval)a at Kusinara. "evolution of basis.

" II Related to this aprati$!hita-nirviitta. is a miraculous one. there is no difference be-tween sarpsiira and nirviil_la. they are regarded to be of one taste (ekarasa). by implication it means to enter into samsara. a Bodhisattva voluntarily comes into the samsaric world. but takes place in the midst of siinyata. there is a term "saf!lcintyabhavopapatti. the term samcintya-bhavopapatti means "to take birth willingly. helping others. For example. it is possible to interpret aprati$!hita-nirviitta as "the nirvaQa in which the Bodhisattva does not turn back from either samsara or nirvaQa. It does not take place in an ordinary way. a gerund used as an adverb. There is neither arising nor extinction in ultimate reality. therefore. Sthiramati quotes in his commentary the Buddhabhiimi-siitra and says: When the not dwelling nirviiQa is realized. and making service to others that a Bodhisattva enters samsaric life. Thus. 21 Thus. one reads: Although there is in reality neither arising nor extinction.20 ing (or not clung to) nirvaQa. Such a birth. yet a Bodhisattva intends his birth owing to his deep compassion for sentient beings and his sublime wisdom of siinyata." Samcintya. Why does he volunteer? It is solely for the purpose of benefiting oth-ers. This he does from his unlimited com-passion. volitionally. even though nirvaQa is the highest bliss to which all aim and even though he is one capable of attaining it or one who does not stay in it depending upon his perspective. in the world of existence." We see here a kind of pun on the sama (equivalent to nirvaQa) and sama of samatiijniina." Bhavopapatti means "to be born into the world of existence. With these meanings in mind. we can say the meaning of aprati$!hita is related to the meanings of avinivartatta and advaya. purposely. means "intention-ally. . at least. His is a paradoxical birth because it is non-existent and yet existent." Thus. it is paradoxical. they [Bo-dhisattvas) 22 voluntarily take on births.'' and ''the nirvaQa in which the Bodhisattva realizes equanimity and the non-duality of samsara and nirvaQa. in the Vimalakirti-nirdesa-siitra." Since not to dwell in nirvaQa is to get away from nirvaQa.

27 Or. Of these karman is the cause for birth of a Bodhisattva who is in the stage of adhimukticaryabhiimi.9. like nirmiitza. as stated in the MSA. IY. This means that he is in a state similar to that of an ordinary being. karman is mentioned as the cause for his birth in accordance with the general rule of birth (although klda is not mentioned here). it is almost impossible to accomplish. Of these." 29 The MSA. in its commentary) repeatedly employ the expression safTlcintya-upapatti. 26 Here we see how severe and radical the Bodhisattva's rebirth is.30 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA To express the idea that a Bodhisattva takes birth in the saJTlsaric world. 6 7. But because it is by the force of karman that his birth has been determined according to his will (abhipreta). and (4) vibhutva. Categories pratzidhiina to vibhutva may be seen as saJTlcintya-bhavopapatti that is gen-uine. again. (2) pratzidhiina. even though his rebirth has been difficult and severe. the term safTlcintya. as follows: Wishing to benefit those lowly beings from a cm:ujala up to a dog. (3) samiidhi.25) and Ratnagotra-vibhiiga (1." which is common to all these expressions.liila up to that of a dog at will. his place of rebirth ranges throughout all of the six gatis. the causes of birth for ordinary beings are past deeds (kar-man) and defilements (klesa). a Bodhisattva takes any form from that of a cm:u. For example.30). In any case. 25 IY. the sutras and sastras use a variety of different words and phrases. or wishing to guide them. birth by the force of his vow (pratzidhiina) is related to the The Bodhisattva Returns . However. But it is the MSA that deals with the idea of the Bodhisattva's birth most fre-quently and comprehensively. a Bodhisattva who has not yet entered the Bodhisattva's first bhiimi. A typical birth of a Bodhisattva is explained in the Bodhisattvabhiimi. that is. "at will. But the Bodhisattva's birth is different in that it is caused purely by his will and purpose. While one finds the phrase saf!lcintya ca bhaviidiinam in the Abhisamayiilaf!lkiira.8 divides the cause for a Bodhisattva's birth into four kinds: (I) karman.68. even including the hells. 24 the sastras such as MSA (11. and accordingly. is the key word representing the central meaning of the idea. wishing to calm their calamity. he goes about it as if going through a joyful garden (udyiina-yiitrii). XI. it seems that safTlcintya-bhavopapatti was used as the standard form of expression. Generally. then. I. In the MSA. in concordance with the Buddha's teaching: "Every being is like miiyii. As his 'will' to be reborn gushes forth due to his limitless compassion.24-5. saf!lcintya-bhavapratikiink$1 and saf!lcintya-upapatti-parigraha are phrases that 23 appear in the Prajnaparamita-sutras. he looks upon it like a magical creation 28 (nirmiitza) (MSA. his birth by karman may be understood in the sense of SaJTlcintya-bhavopapatti. and so on. XX-XXI.

A bodhisattva enters such a painful life of safjlsara and yet does not embrace the thought of fear or disgust. or. nirmal)a. Because he is not contaminated by the defilements owing to the fact that he has stayed with the view of pratityasamutpiida for a long time. the last phrase. perhaps more accurately. In this discussion. for him. Birth by the force of superhuman power (vibhutva) or transformation. Then. refers to the one in the third to seventh bhumis. The Ch' eng wei shih fun (Vijiiaptimatratasiddhi). XVIII. "guarding of defile-ments. It can mean "guarding oneself against the con-tamination by defilements. 32 In the MSA." or. the characteristic of each of the eleven bhiimis is explained.4431 safjlcintya-bhavopapatti of a Bodhisattva can mean to be reborn as a cakravarti-raja and other digni-tary beings such as Indra and Brahma. he is not contaminated by the defilements of the safjlsaric world even if he has not abandoned them. and finally it is related to asarrzkle§a. according to the MSA. In his commentary Sthiramati says: A Bodhisattva is reborn. next it is related to safjlcintya-bhavo-papatti. And yet one so reborn is not contaminated by defilements of desire and so on. re-fers to the one in the other bhiimis. it is related to austerity du$karacarya in which the Bodhisattva is engaged. The the dhrti. All these activities are called the "Bodhisattva's firmness. "guarding or protection of defilements. reads: . "keeping the defilement" as a course for a Bodhisattva's compassionate activity."-'-' In spite of these commentaries. It is with regard to the sixth bhiimi that safjlcintya-bhavopapatti becomes an issue." The sixth bhiimi is characterized by the fact that there is the "guarding of defile-ments" when a Bodhisattva is reborn at will from having stayed with the view of pratltyasamutpada (dependent coorigination) for a long time.I2. of various ways of learning. that is. chiian 9. the eighth and so on. Such a rebirth naturally possesses the prosperity (sarrzpatti) of supreme body and supreme enjoyment. by which a Bodhisattva is reborn at will into safjlsara and does not abandon it (sarrzsaratyaga). fully mindful and conscious of whatever place where he chooses to be reborn. sarrzklesasyanurak$m:za. safjlsara is like a joyful garden." is not clear to me. there is the "guarding of defilements. XX-XXI.Bodhisattva who is already in the first and second bhiimis. it is not a place where he becomes agitated or is bound by its faults. there is a phrase." Or again. Birth by the force of samadhi. Thus. he does not suffer from its contamination.

we have found that the term included the two meanings of ''not dwelling in saJTisara" and "not dwelling in nirval)a. that is. those who have been born in Sukhavatl return immediately to this world. in that a Bodhisattva refuses even nirval)a so long as all sentient beings have not yet been saved. to go from this world. and so on. The Bo-dhisattva is. therefore. The doctrines of the six paramitas and the ten bhiimis belonging to the Bodhisattvamiirga are also the same. that is.32 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA J~l:i*Ji 'I'~ ~!! [A Bodhisattva] retains the obstacle of defilement (k/eidvaral)a) to sustain his vow to In view of summarizing the discussion thus far." aprati~thita-nirval)a III In both Mahayana and Hlnayana. In contrast to these. These terms were originally innovated by T'an-luan ( . they are all cultivated for the pur-pose of traversing the way leading to final liberation. dhyiina." "Not dwelling in saJTisara" meant not to indulge in saJTisara. According to the Pure Land Buddhist tradition.' For a Bodhisattva. and not to be stained by saJTisaric defile-ments. The Bodhisattm Returns . though they used two other terms: "going-thither" (f1 :ti=J) and "coming-hither" (:@ :t§). the term "going-thither" means to be reborn into Sukhavatl. To go from this saJTisaric world corresponds to the ascending direction. We also saw that this was accomplished through wisdom (prajftii).' However. This latter characteristic was represented by the term "saJTicintya-bhavopapatti. characterized by two activities: "going up" or "as-cending" and the other "coming down" or "descending. nirval)a has always been the ultimate aim gained by 'wisdom. and to return to this world corresponds to the descending direction. including SUa. we saw that "not dwelling in nirval)a" meant that saJTisara was accepted as a ''joyful garden'' and that this was owing to the Bodhisattva's deep compassion. This is to say that Bodhisattvas. the Mahayanic idea differs from that of the Hlnayanic. The term "coming-hither" means to return to this world." All Buddhist learnings and practices. the ascent of wisdom terminates at the point of nirval)a from whence the descent of compassion begins.1: It) in the sixth century in China and were made popular by Shinran (*Jt jl) in the thirteenth century in Ja-pan. The Sino-Japanese Pure Land traditions have expressed the same idea. belong to the "ascending" direction. the notions of aprati~thita-nirval)a and saJTicintyabhavopapatti represent the "descending" direction. refusing the bliss of nirval)a. come down to this world because of their 'compassion. On the other hand.

are seen in this world as the activities of a Bodhisattva. declares that he had already achieved it in countless ae-ons past. even the Bodhisattvas presented in the Jataka tales can be interpreted in this way. the term Bodhisattva itself is to be understood in two ways: the one is a Bodhisattva as a Buddha-to-be (ascending. who come down from the state of Buddhahood. begins from sunyata and takes place in the midst of it. more emphasis is placed on the real world of saf!lsara rather than on the ideal world of nirvat:ta. that is. from sattva to Bodhi) and the other is a Bodhisattva as a celestial being. It affirms Saf!lSara in its true character as sunyata. From the Mahayanic point of view. the ascending aspect is considered to be of central importance." The descent. Thus. the descend-ing direction being clearly seen in terms of "aprati~thita-nirvat:ta" and "saf!lcintya-bhavopapatti. on "sunyata. this is not the case. in the Saddharmapw:ujarika-sutra. to ascend means that one negates Saf!lsaric reality and as-pires for the nirvat:tic ideal. in the Mahayanic ideal. are one and the same. however. For instance. I.Therefore. and so on. and the Mahayana. the one and the same sunyata has these two aspects. 13 a theoretical basis for the identification of these two directions. in the final analysis. or the way of a Bodhisattva. and as a skillful means (upiiya) appeared here on this earth (descending activity) for the purpose of benefiting others in the guise of a human being. in Mahayana. Thus. According to this text. such as Avalokitesvara. 35 We see in the MV. the motivating power of the ascent is always based upon a negation. it is not that these two activities of ascent and descent are opposing each other. the two directions are regarded here as identical. In a like manner. Generally speaking. will not become a complete and total system without incorporating these two ac-tivities. That is to say. they." In other words. The activities of such celestial beings. Similarly. who achieved Enlightenment after a long period of practice (as-cending activity). or Bodhi-being. the term Bodhisattva is understood simply as the "Future Buddha" or the "Buddha-to-be. In many cases. Mafijusrl. while the de-scending direction is often obscured or neglected. Hence. these two activities complement each other. which is inactive and immovable. However. Non-existence refers to the upward movement (nega-tion of this world). sunyata is defined by two terms: "nonexistence" (abhiiva) and "existence of [this] non-existence" (abhiivasya bhiivab)." However. Existence of [this] non-existence refers to the downward movement (affirmation of this world). Buddha Sakyamuni himself. the establishment of the Mahayana can be understood as the outcome of the Madhyamika thought complemented by the Yogacara . in every religious or philosophical thought.

1. the whole concept of siinyata was made explicit by Asanga and other Yogacaras when they interpreted it to include the 'exist-ence of non-existence' (MV. it seems to me that a religious system worthy of its name should include these two key philosophical concepts. as it were. It seems that they should ap-pear also in other world religions. was established through the great achievement of Nagarjuna and the Madhyamikas. the ascending of wisdom.' which is a negation of this world. It is in the Yogacara interpreta-tion that we find the possibility of establishing the descending direction. above). Although it is true that the idea of 'siinyata. Fur-thermore.13. I would like to reemphasize the fact that the two activ-ities of ascending and descending are central to the Bodhisattva ideal. The Madhyamika thought represents. In concluding. and the Yogacara idea represents the descending of compassion. Could not the terms ''fana' '' and "baga' " found in Sufism be examples of the ascent and descent as under-stood in the Bodhisattva path? 36 .34 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA thought.

ist fi. However. Man kennt Buddha nicht. When the silence of the Buddha is discussed. are usually taken up. Zu den allervortrefflichsten Eigenschaften. Buddhism does not aim merely at the annihilation of this world or at the escape from it: the Mahayana viewpoint teaches the very opposite in asserting the reality of this das ganze Yerstiind-nis des Buddhismus von grosster Wichtigkeit. und Buddha selbst ist immer Meister in dieser Kunst gewesen. gehort das Schweigen. I wish here to discuss the significance of the enigmatic silence of the Buddha as seen from the Madhyamic position. are we to resolve this dilemma posed by these apparently antithetical viewpoints.iberragt. and since it declares that the world is full of pain and im-permanence. It . Beckh says: Es wurde immer noch einseitig sein. solange man ihn nur nach dem beurteilt. Beckh further explains the various aspects of the Buddha's silence. die im Sinne Buddhas ein Mensch haben oder sich anerz-iehen kann. Generally speaking. die Macht des Schweigens. the fourteen unanswered questions. then. as it is often pointed out. Sondern zu der Macht der Rede gesellt sich bei ihm eine andere. the silence (lU$tzimbhiiva) of the Buddha carries an important meaning in the domain of the Buddhist thought. With this as the central problem. was er gere-det hat. 1 In the following pages. die jene beinahe noch i.Chapter 4 The Silence of the Buddha and its Madhyamic Interpretation Buddhism has been described on more than one occasion as a pessi-mistic religion. H. bei der Wirkung Buddhas auf seine Zeitgenossen nur die Macht seines Wortes ins Auge zu fassen. this charge is not without foundation. und die Be-deutung dieses Schweigens richtig zu erfassen. the catvan avyiikrtavastuni. How.

which includes the so-called noble silence is also famous. however. however. There are many instances recorded in the sutras in which the Buddha remains silent as a sign of approval of a disciple's exposition of a certain 2 truth. fine. Then also there naturally oc-curred to me these verses unheard before: Through painful striving have I gained it. a vexation. either talk always about the Dharma." While this instruc-tion prohibits discussion of mundane topics it also affirms the value of si-lence. 4 Once the Buddha passed by a place where many bhik~us were gathered. It may be noted also that this same tendency manifested itself in Japan in the life-attitude known as "wabi" or "sabi. we find also an instance in which his silence means disagreement with 3 an opponent's questions and arguments. debating as to which of the two was richer. Here. however. profound. On the other hand. that there are different kinds of silence. this episode tells of the Buddha's reluctance to preach the newfound Dharma to his fellow creatures. Away with now proclaiming it: By those beset with lust and hate Not easily is this Doctrine learnt. or more powerful." 6 which developed under the influence of Zen discipline in combination with the ancient Japanese love of quietness. busily engaged in small talk. the Buddha loved the tranquil life. there are two things to be done." The In-dian custom of retiring into a lonely place in the forest (arat~ya) was adopted also by the Buddhist monks in practicing their yoga or dhyana. The Silence of the Buddha . This Doctrine. The Pali version of this moment immediately after his Enlightenment is as follows: But if I were to teach the Doctrine. As may be gathered from this story and from many others. and hard to see. It is related 5 in a sutta that the disciples constantly remind each other that "our master loves tranquility.36 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA should be noted. As recorded in many biographies 7 of both the Southern tradition and the Northern. They were discussing the two kings of that time. or keep the noble silence. against the stream. The story. The Buddha immediately stopped them and on this occasion taught: "When mendicants assemble. I should like to draw special attention to the Buddha's silence kept at the foot of the Bodhi tree at Gaya after his Great Enlighten-ment. it would be a weariness to me. and others did not understand it. the Bud-dha maintained silence for reasons other than that given for the catvari avyakrtavastuni. Subtle. and so forth. or of acknowledgement for his supplication.

lust-inflamed. Addressing Brahma he says: Open to them are the doors of the ImmortaL 0 Brahma.They will not see it. And only with great misgivings did he consent to be persuaded to launch on the difficult task of preaching the Dharma. characterized by . there is another silence that must be understood in a more metaphysical tone. Let them that have ears cast off their (old) beliefs. According to the suttas. this silence of the Buddha? Indeed. Thinking thus. Preach-ing the Doctrine would be nothing but fruitless exertion. presented one of the stimuli for the cultivation of the subsequent forms of Buddhism. consumed with skepticism about man's ability to grasp the real essence of his teaching. were already looking upon the Buddha's preaching with the concept of silence playing an important role. the god Brahma Sahampati appears and. That is to say. For us. Beneath the mass of darkness veiled. the authors of the Buddha's biographies. The often discussed silence of Vimalaklrti. H The subtlety and profundity of the Doctrine makes its dissemination among the uninitiated impracticable. but the solution to this problem is not within the scope of our present quest. may the Happy One (su-gata) teach the Doctrine. Now. the Buddha elects to remain silent and enter directly into Nirval)a. but as hesitating. It surpasses human conception and ex-pression. 9 Thereupon the Buddha scans the world with his Buddha-vision and sees the misery of man and relenting. which would straight-way plunge man into eternal wretchedness. the Buddha was pictured not as going forth immediately to preach his Doctrine. 10 There remains the question to what historical fact does such a parable refer. he repeatedly beseeches the Buddha to reconsider and expound the Dharma: May the reverend Lord teach the Doctrine. What is the significance of this hesitation. it is enough to know that since ancient times-at least since the time when the Buddha's biographies were being written-the deeper thinkers. in inserting this moment of hesitation between those of his Enlightenment and his momentous departure into the world. There are beings of little impurity that are falling away through not hearing the Doctrine. If cast into the mold of human language it only urges a contempt for the sacred Dharma and drives man into the sin of eradicating it. the poets. suspecting that the Dharma is about to vanish forever. agrees to begin his merciful mission.

Dr. in discussing the silence of the Buddha or the philosophical capac-ity of the Buddha. The monk asked again if atman. Watsuji." he substantially meant that it did not "lead to the highest knowledge (abhinfia). For instance.' " According to his interpretation. When one responds to such questions and abides on the same level as the questioner. it does not inspire true knowledge. I submit that the Buddha was not only a religionist. In a recent paper. invariably introduce the fourteen avyakrta-vastuni (things undetermined. then.38 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA a typical Mahayana dialectic. a monk named Vacchagotta once asked the Buddha if atman existed. "That the Buddha did not answer metaphysical questions of this kind does not immediately mean that the Buddha denied the validity of philosophical or systematic thinking.. To this the Buddha replied with silence. who has also made a study of the same topic. or unanswered). to full Enlightenment (swrzbodhiiya) . "atman exists. He concludes. in the course of his arguments. 13 Dr. did not exist. such as the effect of karman. Evidences show that in certain instances the Buddha's silence falls within this category. or existence after death. and so forth. The Silence of the Buddha . Later. The fourteen avyakrta-vastiini 12 are the fourteen metaphysical ques-tions that the Buddha refused to answer. he was also a philosopher. is such a one. a case can easily be defended in which such an attitude (of si-lence) constitutes the essential 5 characteristic of a philosophy. when the Buddha said that metaphysical speculation was "without profit (attha). It is stated in the Pali suttas as well as in the Sanskrit siitras. . or unelucidated. the Buddha explained to Ananda the reason for this si-lence. On the contrary. But beneath that compas-sion is to be found a highly analytical mind. at first glance the Buddha is seen as a misologist." 14 The selection of this single hypothesis makes his conclusion unsatisfactory. how-ever." then it would have meant that he agreed with the same doctrine of atman held by Vacchagotta.. after the monk had left. If he had made the affirmation. a few scholars. They consist of such questions as: "Is the universe eternal?" "Is the universe infinite?" "Are the soul and the body identical?" "Does the Tathagata existafter death?" and so forth. he inevitably falls into the difficulty of antinomy. but the reply was the same. says. for while he recognizes the Buddha as a great religionist. and this does not lead to the true knowledge that was the goal of the Buddha. that the Buddha did not answer questions relating to metaphysical topics. Organ gave an excellent discussion on the reasons behind the Buddha's silence regarding these questions. that the most acceptable explanation for the Buddha's silence is a pragmatic one: the Buddha considered metaphysical speculation to be "not only useless but harmful. Organ. 11 As mentioned at the beginning. T. for it would sidetrack him from his main goal. diminishes the Buddha's philosophical capabilities. T. Certainly. concerned with only the salvation of humankind. W." that is.

16 This shows that either reply. through verbal expression. the Buddha says the following: Accept not what you hear by report. Indeed. there is a passage showing the Buddha to be highly rational and critical. was not a philosopher in the narrower sense of the term of one devoted to the analysis of concepts through the use of lan-guage. Thus. but a kind of misleading Eternalism (§asvataviida). cutting and rubbing it (on a piece of touchstone). I do not reveal it to common men. be misled into the fallacy of atma- .. affirmative or negative. On the contrary." Indeed. In explaining the iidana-vijfiiina (i. Facing such an antinomy." Do not accept a statement on the ground that it is found in our books." then it would have meant that he accepted a non-atman theory. 19 The Buddha. which also involved a false stand. Tetsuro Watsuji concludes that the Buddha did not avoid philosophical problems merely for religious considerations. This conviction of the insufficiency of language appears again and again in the Mahayana texts. if the Buddha had merely replied. 20 Lest they imagine it to be iitman. but that ''he re-frained from answering them simply because they were not true philosoph-ical problems." nor because it is the saying of your teacher. As the wise test gold by burning.This is not the true doctrine of atman. "atman exists not. for every passage in the suttas suggesting the misological ten-dency of the Buddha. of course. nor on the supposition that "this is accept-able. Jx Or. iilaya-vijiiiina. accept not tradition: db not hastily conclude that "it must be so. Dr. the expression by language must remain impotent. that is.e. and is like a violent current. The reason the Buddha does not ''reveal it to common men'' is that they would. a Nihilism (uccheda-viida). inevitably agrees with the false assumptions that lay within the question. It is the All-seed-conscience (sarva-bijaka). 17 For example. So are you to accept my words after examining them and not merely out of regard for me. the store-consciousness). a gatha in the Saf!1dhinirmocana relates: Adiina-vijfliina is highly profound and subtle. he suspected the ability of language to express Truth.

defines suchness (tathatii) as "suchness without words significantly supplemented (f1X i§ ~ ~0 ). is described as inexpressible. he would miss Truth completely if he is engrossed in the word. the negation of language. is utterly inexpressible realm of Thus. furthermore. The Ultimate Truth is beyond the reach of verbal designation (pra-pafzca) or thought-construct (vikalpa). The silence of Vimalakirti is of the same significance. for the Buddha hides nothing from humankind. and while he agreed with all that was voiced by Maiijusrl. it serves only to alienate humans from the Truth. All of these Mahayana schools are founded upon the concept of 'slinyatil' (emptiness) that lies at the core of Nagarjuna's Madhyamic phi-losophy. Sunyata. Of course. but in the most extreme terms. speechless. inconceivable." Again. Zen thought insists ( q)( 5'1. The word is. besides other things. So long as a verbal expression is nothing but a means to communication. This fundamental attitude of Zen expresses the same view re-ferred to above concerning the inadequacy of language. who appears as the last in the series of Bodhisattvas attempting to describe Ultimate Real-ity. that is. there is an impenetrable wall always separating the two realms. the that the realm of reward. The Awakening of Faith. as it were. and on words. 22 therefore. 21 Finally it is Vimalaklrti's turn. of the Buddha Vairocana. The Silence of the Buddha . he expressed it by maintaining a complete silence. shows no signs. No matter how minutely the word is analyzed. which links it directly with the present problem of the silence of the Buddha. Not to reveal is here not esoterism. and so forth. it will not bring about a confrontation with the Truth. Not to reveal is nearer to Truth and more loyal to the dharma.40 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA vada. sunyata is not limited to the mere negation of language: it represents a much wider but consistent viewpoint that includes. utters these words: It is in all beings wordless. Just as a person would not see the moon by concentrating on the finger. Maiijusrl. The ineffability (anabhiliipyatva) and inconceivability (acintyatii) of the Truth are descriptions frequently encoun-tered in the Mahayana texts. merely a finger point-ing at the moon. At the end of the chapter "Advaya-dharma-dvara-pravesa" (Entering the Dharma Gate of Nonduality) of the Vimalakirti-nirdefanii-sutra. is not possible of cognizance. devoid of designations. and is above all questioning and answering.~lj {1).

and consequently it should be termed "paramartha" (the highest. that they do not possess "substantiality" and that they exist only in the manner of dependent origination (pratityasamutpiida).' Accord-ing to Dr. and even logic itself. Fur-ther that paramartha is to be described as "silent. the absolute). the supra-mundane being. and also of the Buddha's silence before his initial preaching. It is a logical viewpoint that proclaims logic as established only when it disappears and becomes sunya. Indeed. Nagarjuna. absolute negation. although its crystallization into a philosophy had to await for the genius of Nagarjuna. It is in checking any attempt to give substantiality to things through concep-tualization of language that siinyata bears the further definition of non-perceptibility. perceptions. is a logical viewpoint that sees a systematic negation of concepts. This same skepticism regarding the power of the word was integrated by Nagarjuna into a clear philosophical position and explained with the concept of 'siinyata. He interpreted as siinyata (emptiness) the very subjectivity of the Buddha from which emerged the silence with re-spect to the fourteen questions. Watsuji. Siinyata. (the language of) others (apara- . Things can not be known. Non-substantiality. then non-perceptibility can be under-stood as an epistemological one. about six or seven hundred years later. it was not merely a suspension of judgment or an utter lack of it. the Buddha's silence was an answer. The inadequacy of language must be regarded as an important key in understanding the problem of the fourteen unanswered questions. Furthermore. the "highest wisdom." as constituting the crown of Buddhism with the concept of siinyata as its essence. The Madhyamika school declares that its siinyata represents the very position of the Buddha. by grasping the contradictory character of words and logic. are not really reality in themselves. how-ever. The Buddha's silence indicates a clear philosophical position. or things. recognized prajftii. if stated in a few words. The Madhyamic philosophy. If nonsubstantiality can be understood as an ontological term. it means merely that beings. does not mean the non-existence of things as it is sometimes misun-derstood to mean. the Buddha refrained from answering the fourteen ques-tions because he wanted to reveal these as not being conducive to true knowledge. does not end up as a mere annihilation or negation." References to these points may be found in Nagarjuna's own words: That which cannot be known through pratvaya). however.Siinyata is originally defined as "non-substantiality" (ni/:zsvabhiiva-stlnya) or as "non-perceptibility" (anupalabdhi-sunya). that which had been termed "knowledge (sambodhi)" in the early suttas was now enriched and conceived of as siinyata.

all discrimination. No doors of verbal designation or logic leads to the paramartha.42 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA Tranquil. it remains incommunicable.e. even the Buddha's forty-five years of propagating the Doctrine is here wholly negated by the assertion that the Buddha preached not a word. it remains silent forever. What. It is Candraklrti. who identifies Reality with siinyata in his commentary on this verse. then." nor that "the Absolute does exist. "atman is" or "atman is not. then. Accordingly. Silence is beyond such acknowledge-ment. for whom the knowledge of the Absolute is accessible. Candraklrti also pronounces clearly: "(About) the Absolute the Saints remain silent." in silence there is neither affirmation nor negation. is the role of logic in this philosophy? On what is it es-tablished such that such propositions as "it is silent." does not mean either to maintain that "the Absolute exists not. does not end up in a mere negation. the siinyata school. cannot be designated verbally (apraparicita)." Just as the Buddha re-frained from answering. Siinyata.. the emptiness. for non-assertion 28 or non-maintenance of a position is the real meaning of siinyata. 25 Verse 24 of chapter XXV similarly states: Our bliss consists in the cessation of all thought. transcends all conceptualization or ratiocination. In the quiescence of Plurality (prapaiica). II cautions: The Silence of the Buddha . through this negation itself logic will find its release. which is inevitably relative in character." and so forth can be claimed? It is on this very same siinyata that logic finds its basis. for one whose point of departure is siinyata. To nobody and nowhere any doctrine (dharma) 26 By the Buddha has been preached. even the claim that all is siinyata is absurd. "the Absolute remains silent. As stated above. Cannot be differentiated (nirvikalpa). sunyatii) possesses. The proposition. For instance Mulamadhyamaka. And not diverse in meaning24 Such attributes Reality (i. Such a silence-a silence that nullifies the whole missionary life of the Buddha-is conceivable only under the name of the Absolute. in taking the stand of siinyata. k. chapter XXII (Tathagata). While logic is negated within siinyata-paramartha. all logic are meaningless from the supra-mundane point of view is the very nature of Buddhahood and of emptiness." 27 Even for the Saint. That all perception. Besides. the paramartha.

only in the recognition of the identity between nirval)a and sarpsara will there be any validity in language.(The Tathagata) should not be described as He is void. Indeed. can there be change and activity. It is because the Tathagata is believed to exist in this world substantively that it necessarily follows that he will cease to exist after death. he is non-void: Neither should he be termed Void and non-void simultaneously. while on the one hand. at this point. chapter XXV (Nirval)a). with particular reference to the fourteen unanswered question. is again affirmed. could not be active and undergo change. sarpsara and nirval)a stand as opposite poles in a rigid du-alism. saf!lsiira (birth and death) is not different from nirval)a." From this statement it is clear that the Madhyamic standpoint with regard to metaphysical questions is neither mere endless dialectical negation." and any question regarding life after death is nonsense. for a substantive being is understood to be an eternal. But he is spoken of just for the sake of designation. Similarly. Candraki'rti then goes further and argues: as the whole world is siinya. on the other. but seen through the eyes of siinyata or paramartha or "silence. Hence there can be no Buddha-dharma. An opponent charges: If everything is sOnya. Disappearance. Nagarjuna explains that an activity become possible only when the world is siinyata. It is inconceivable that an activity takes place in a sub-stantive being. lY Candraki'rti. Karika 17. The Tathagata is "siinya. and. and being and non-being are both inconceivable. This point is discussed thoroughly in chapter XXIV (Aryasatya) of the Mulamadhyamaka. nor mere temporary suspension of judg-ment. Nor not void and not non-void simultaneously. it gains increased vitality and emerges in all its brilliant glory. when siinyata is. which had been negated earlier. therefore. comments: "On account of that. that is. It is here. that logic. It is noted here that such a prob-lem arises only from views adhering to the idea of substantiality (sa-svabhiiva-w1da). it should not be asserted that the Tathagata exists after death or that he does not. Only when there is no substantiality. sarpsara is identical with nirval)a. . of the same book also takes up the 30 same problem of existence after death. language is negated and stripped of all its potency." the two become equated. Ordinarily. There can never be any appearance. or transformation. not from those faithful to the idea of non-substantiality (niftsvabhiiva-viida). im-mutable being.

There can never be any appearance. A similar exchange. Disappearance. With words that are essentially siinya and without substance. As you say. (And. I agree with you. no emancipation or salvation). of course. your charge of contradiction is only natural. But it is for that very reason that words are able. in verse I . an irrelevant argument to point out that if all is siinya. we declare absolute nonsubstantiality. We. is it possible to negate svabhava.44 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA Such as the Fourfold Truths. The second represents the Buddhist view that defends the position that "everything is dependently originated on account of its emptiness. no emancipation or salvation) 31 Nagarjuna answers the charge with the very same words: If everything is not sunya. the opponent charges: If everywhere everything is devoid of svabhiiva (own being) Your words (that proclaim nil)svabhava) are also without svabhava. not unable. Since you take the stand of the realist. Here. 32 The first verse depicts an attack by the Nihilists who take siinyata as mere nothingness. to declare the siinyata of everything. nihility. being exponents of siinyata. (And. then. or transformation. Your accusations issue simply from your false assumption that everything exists substantively. we can only suggest the fact that all is siinya and non-substantial. shows ( sasvabhiivawida). The Silence of the Buddha . and you presuppose that the word exists substantively as a universal agent that possesses the power to cause something existent to vanish into something non-existent. (since words do not exist)? 33 It is not. consequently. How. would run something like this: Yes. in effect. however. (ni/:lsvabhiivaviida). but now with reference to the logical capabili-ties of language. appears in the Vigrahavyiivartani of Nagarjuna. Hence there can be no Buddha-dharma. Nagarjuna's reply." Nihilism (niistika). consequently. Such as the Fourfold Truths. do not proclaim the substantiality of our words. then language itself is siinya and logical statement itself is vacuous. You under-stand siinyata to mean nothingness. my words are altogether void without any substance. my proposition.

defiled. the reestablished word. further. after it had been negated once by siinyata. that all can be spoken of-." Even though tathata (suchness) is by nature above all signs of designation. Again. it can rightly be equated with the middle path." "utterances. (in turn). translated iH ~~ (literally ever. chapter XXIV. and the whole world stands firm for the first time. Nagarjuna says: When emptiness (sunyatii) is established. When siinyatii is not (realized). is this: he evokes great fear by wielding a serpent-like object that is actually only a rope. 37 This. verse 18 of the same chapter says: Whatever originates dependently. "dependent origination.What Nagarjuna does." Al-though vyavahara is translated into the Chinese i§ ~}t (literally. in relation to this idea. and this should be realized inwardly by everyone. and not the original. The whole world will be established. ·'K The terms "language. it really includes both meanings of language and logic. we are reminded of the famous 34 phrase that appears in the Awakening of Faith: "words are denied by words. This emptiness. . Nagarjuna similarly concludes his Vigrahavyiivartanl with this statement: It is only when all is sunya." and so forth. is contingent existence. in such an absolute emptiness." In his Mulamadhyamaka. This firm-ness of language. stand firm as substance. Logic. language stands firm. as it were." "logic. refer to the Sanskrit "vyavahara. word and speech). logic stands firm. does not mean that language. Therefore. it is circumscribed unnaturally with the ap-pellation "tathata. We declare it to be emptiness. he uses an instrument that is in reality siinya. "Do not utter 35 any sound!" In any case. That is. and so forth." "words." This is comparable to preventing others from making noises by saying in a loud voice. It is absurd that the whole world is (real). however. and so forth. The term. and worldly language. is the middle path. but that they are of the nature of pratltyasamutpiida. which are used in this paper. 36 Also. verse 14.

It may then be correct to say that the Twofold Truth opens a channel by which language recovers itself in spite of its falsehood and ignorance. 43 The Madhyamic logic. that the discord between the two Madhyamika schools begins. The expression "Madhyamic logic" proba-bly bears a twofold significance: (I) pure reasoning or dialectics (nyiiya." it has no other means by which to reveal itself than by worldly and conven-tional expressions. however. which explains how vyavahara will be recovered while the world is sunya. from The Silence of the Buddha . As the "silence" of paramartha is true "Wisdom" (prajiiii). The Twofold Truth is composed of paramartha (superworldly or absolute) and saqwrti (worldly or conventional). It is here. These two lie sharply contrasted. mirror paramartha and emanate. incidentally. so to speak. that the later split within the Madhyamika school into the Svatantrikas and the Prasm'lgikas. Generally speaking. It should be noted. yukti). 41 Now. is akin to such terms as "nyaya. inferences. However. its conceptualizations." "pramal)a. the former as the real truth. When language once recovers itself." and espe-cially "anumana" (inference). They strive to arrange elaborate inferences. which characterizes the peculiar features of Madhyamika trea-tises. logic. and the latter as the truth forever concealed by the veil of falsehood and ignorance. though expressed in conventional language. which consists of the Twofold Truth. to establish a proposition "to be logical (for any-one)" means "to be deeply aware of (the meaning of) satya-dvaya-vibhaga" 39 (discriminating between the Twofold Truth). which was recovered and molded into the form of language. but the latter contains many problems that cannot be discussed at this time. was caused chiefly by the disagree-ment regarding the degree to which this kind of logic should be recognized as valid. although paramartha transcends vyavahara and is "silent. first one must recognize deeply and correctly the difference between the Twofold Truth. if one wishes to be logical in one's statement or proposition. are likewise justified. That is to say. is accordingly to be named a logic of Love-a skillful device of the Great Compassion-sup-ported by the Wisdom of sunyata. The former aspect was traced roughly in the lines above. according to Nagarjuna. prayoga). represents "Great Com-passion" (mahakaru(lii) of the Buddha toward the illusory world. 42 Such is the very core of the teaching of the Twofold Truth and the "discrimination" ( vibhiiga) of it. which." "yukti.46 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA again. there arose a controversy between Candraklrti and Bhavaviveka in regard to how the term 40 satya-dvaya-vibhaga was to be understood. and so forth. and (2) the actual form of reasoning or syllogism (anumiina. Bhavaviveka and other Svatantrika teachers seem to insist that there should be syllogisms and in-ferences that are unique to them and that are precise to the highest degree.

were syllogisms expressions of truth. is itself sunya. The Prasangika gained its name from the fact that by its logic of prasanga-apatti. it uses the logic of its own opponent-that is. the logic of "some other. Fur-ther. and other Prasangika teachers." 48 It makes its opponents realize the self-contradictory nature of their own logic. he merely adopted the ordinary man's logic. lacking his own weapons. If a syllogism is true and unique to Madhyamic philosophy. 45 Nagarjuna wrote his treatise. then it has already fallen into the error of aligning itself with the viewpoint of substantiality (svabhiiva). as the Svatantrikas claim. Great Compassion is expressed by means of a language belonging to "some other"-that is. belong in the final analysis to the sarpvrti (conventional) world. Accord-ing to them. possess their own selfsufficient arguments (svatantra-anumiina). Owing to the natural thrust of Buddha's Great Compassion. He employed the logic which was not his own. they remain forever false and are apt to lead man into delusion. on the con-trary. a thesis is not a thesis. that is. thus. the inferences and syllogisms. The true nature of the Buddha's Great Compassion is exhibited in his complete dedication to the mundane world-to the world of word and speech. Buddhapalita. and which. Any thesis is not one's own. If that logic can be used (even if) only to expose the contradiction47 that inevitably lurks in itself-if sunyata can be shown within the framework of the "other's" logic to be sunyata-then the task is completed. Madhyamic philosophy and logic-if at all allowed-must be the philosophy and logic of the Great . by the statement: "You may inevitably fall into absurdity if you proclaim so and so." 44 or why the Buddha dared to remain in silence when confronted with the fourteen questions." The Prasangika is like a man who. we would miss the point behind Nagarjuna's often said statement: "One who accepts sunyata does not present any pak$a (thesis. Candraklrti. In contrast to the paramartha of Buddha's silence. being devoid of any logical fallacies. being able to communicate the postulate of sunyata. the Mulamadhyamaka-siistra in the same manner." In short. And yet the Prasangikas speak by using conventional language and reason with the logic of the mundane world for the simple reason that there is no other means by which the Great Compassion can manifest itself. however accurate they may be. seem to keep themselves within the limit of the thesis that language. a language that is not paramartha but which is sarpvrti. proposition) as his own. that is he used the logic of "some other. inference and syllogism are used to elucidate sunyata by means of a language that is not of one's own (svatantra). kills his opponent with the opponent's sword. hence. it can be estab-lished only on the conventional level. 46 Logic can not be established on the absolute level. and in his utter negation of himself.

however. which is "suchness without words." It is Nagarjuna who must be credited with making clear that suchness (ex-pressed) in words is recovered and established only when siinyata. Rhys Davids. W. broke upon him with such force that it seemed to him impossible to go to his fellowcountrymen with a doc-trine . The Silence of the Buddha ." But at last "the religious side . his inner life.. As stated above.. Without presupposing this self-deniaL logic. and base itself upon it. That feeling of utter loneliness which is often the lot of the leaders of men .. and the philosophical system of the Madhyamikas..... to proclaim his doctrine to the world. made Gautama resolve . won the victory. The philosophical teachers of the later days. were ever developed. to a correct understanding of the Buddha's silence.. but also that they had grasped and elucidated the very essence of his teachings. how-ever precise it may be. siinyata. describes the Buddha's mood immediately after his Enlightenment as that of loneliness. leaving the blissful silence of his Enlightenment.. the super-structure of the philosophies of Asariga and Vasubandhu. T. those of T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen. such a "Logic of Love" must presuppose self-denial. A careful consideration of this likeness will lead. they are unequivocal in their contention not only that they did not misunderstand the Buddha's doc-trine. to a proper appreci-ation of the various philosophical systems of the Mahayana. At the same time.. "So did Gotama feel more and more intensely the immensity of the distance which separated him from the be-liefs of those about him . can never mirror the Truth.48 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA Compassion in this sense." But how is it possible to have "suchness (expressed) in words?" The Awakening of Faith does not clarify sufficiently how it is possible for "suchness (ex-pressed) in words" to be recovered from "suchness without words. and of many others." is presupposed." and his "love and pity for humanity . gracefully portraying the Bud-dha's inner struggles. The authors of the Buddha's biographies likewise believe that the Bud-dha undertook the difficult and seemingly futile task of preaching the Dharma. silent merely from pragma to understand how. because of his Love for 49 humanity.. on the one hand. Great Compassion must nec-essarily express itself in the parlance of humanity. and much later. the Awakening of Faith elucidates the "tathata (suchness) within words. how-ever. will not in itself activate Great Compassion. no matter how noble it may be. and on the other. Nay. all of which claim the Madhyamic phi had really rejected metaphysical and philosophical speculation. that is. were by no means going counter to the Buddha's commandments. on the foundation of Nagarjuna's siinyata. Mere silence.' ' 50 A striking similarity becomes apparent between the Buddha's career....

the reversion to worldly life is possible only through the negation of it once. the most profound Love towards humanity is born. From this consciousness of the utter powerlessness of man. all these issues must be wholly annihilated.Consequently. In both Gautama's turning of the Wheel of the Dharma and Nagarjuna's Madhyamic philosophy. There is never a mere naive trust in human powers of reasoning. and reduced to valueless-ness. This reaffirmation and reinstatement of life on the worldly plane is effected through Great Compassion. logic. and so forth. Only through this negation of the world will the parlance with fellow men be recovered. On the contrary. Nagiirjuna 's sunyata indeed may be considered to have unveiled the real purport of the Buddha's silence and to have given it a vital significance. All phi-losophies of later Buddhism must also have been established on the basis of and by presupposing such a self-negation. . negated.


when they elucidated features of yoga-praxis such as the six paramitas. and the "six perfections" (diina-Silak$iinti. and so on). the "five faculties" (Sraddhii-virya-smrti-samiidhi-prajiiii). The Yogacaras. embodying the other two. In this way. siinyata. the ten bhiimis. The "three doors to enlighten-ment" (trivimok$a-mukha). such as "impu-rity. and in the last two of the "three disciplines" (sila-samiidhi-prajiiii). as the name suggests. and. Among these three. and so on. From the very beginning." as its members." "respiration. were widely recommended as objects of prac-tice. Various things were adopted as objects of meditation. in Mahayana Buddhism. it has been gener-ally accepted that the higher reach of wisdom (prajiiii) is attained either through or accompanied by meditation (dhyiina." "the signless. "Emptiness has far-reaching consequences for the religious life. seems to have been . who. which comprehend "the empty." but later on. were greatly concerned with yoga-praxis. samiidhi. although emptiness is usually regarded as "non-existence." it is not merely an ontological or metaphysical concept. the concept seems to have been significant not only in a philosophical and logical context but also in a religio-practical sense. inherited the Nagarjunian notion of emptiness. Ex-amples of this idea can be seen in various formulas such as ''the pairing of quietude and insight" (Samatha-vipasyanii-yuganaddha)." as Richard Robinson has said. 1 It was Nagarjuna who established the concept of 'emptiness' with a highly philosophical shading. also called the "three concentrations" (tri-samiidhi).virya-dhyiina-prajiiii). but also a decidedly practical one. emptiness. or "emptiness." also came to be recognized as an object of this sort. but to him." and the "three dharma-marks. too." and "the wishless.Chapter 5 "What Remains" in SunyaHi: A Yogacara Interpretation of Emptiness Meditation has occupied a positiOn of cardinal importance in Bud-dhism throughout its history." the "fourfold truth. emptiness may be regarded as the most fundamen-tal.

including the highest stage of trance in the "formless world. Also. is his ultimate disturbance." 5 Thus. too. that is to say. his corporeal being." and yet. are grounded in this body itself. he is freed from every canker of "outflowing impurities" (iisava) and obtains Arhatship. saying: "I . when a monk practices meditation in a forest. which even the Arhat can never nullify. through abiding in [the concept of] empti-ness.52 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA the basis of their theories. the Lord Bhagavan expounds for Ananda the meditation on emptiness. In this final stage." That is." and he goes on to say that.. At every stage of the progress just described.. how-ever. the following statement is added: It is perceived that when something does not exist there. and attends only to one thing that is not empty and grounded in the percep-tion of the forest. 6 WhaT Remains in Sunyata . are important in the Yogacara school. The Yogacara treatises enumerate "ten kinds of mental distractions" (vik. and so forth" and yet. but the loneliness of the forest itself becomes for him a new disturbance. the latter [the place] is empty with regard to the former. that is to say the one thing [which is not empty but] grounded on the Order of monks. and so on. am now abiding in the fullness thereof. finally. Among the Agamas and Nikayas. the hall "is empty of elephants. the Cu/asunnata-sutta ("Lesser Discourse on Emptiness")4 invites our special attention.. conditioned by life." Likewise. Emptiness was not the monopoly of Mahayana. His mind being pleased with and freed in the quietness of the forest. one thing grounded in the perception of a forest.' however. he perceives no village. "the concentration of mind that is signless" (animittaf!l cetosamiidlzif!l). when the monks are gathered in a hall in which there is no elephant. cows.. many passages of the Prajniipiiramitii-siltra are introduced that act as antidotes to these 2 obstacles and that also convey the full meaning of sunyata. and yet there remains the disturbance (daratlza) of "the six sen-sory fields that. it is not difficult to find the word "empty" in the Nikayas and Agamas. the "sixteen kinds of emptiness.>epavikalpa) as obstacles to right meditation. he travels through a number of stages. "there is only this degree of disturbance. By recourse to such mediation and ne-gation. where the idea is elaborately 3 expatiated. no villager. In their interpretation of 'emptiness. In this sutta. there are many features peculiar to their own school. he comprehends thus: ''The disturbances that might arise from the perception of a village do not exist here .' he acquires freedom from the disturbances (daratha) of villages and villagers. by practicing 'emptiness. no cow." which were originally expounded in the Prajniipiiramitiisiltras. Further it is comprehended that something that remains there does exist as a real existent. which should be negated through further mediation." to reach. "there is only this that is not empty. for it appears in earlier Buddhism.

2. utterly pu-rified and incomparably sublime realization of [the concept of] emptiness. I. and again because of the existence [of the emptiness of the "unreal imagina-tion"]. Ananda. Emptiness includes both being and non-being. and attachment to. here. this comes to be for him a true. as the sutta goes on to say: Thus. griihya). It states that emptiness is nonbeing on the one hand but that there is." in spite of emptiness. not mistaken. because of the nonexistence [of the duality of the subject and object]. it exists here as a real existent. MV 1. the Madhyiinta-vibhiiga 8 expounds the relationship between the "unreal notion" (abhutaparikalpa} and "emptiness" (Sunyatii) in verse 1. The actualities of daily life are here summed up as "unreal notions. being reality. when any-thing does not exist in something. though indispensable for discrimination or conceptualization. therefore. This two-ness.The sutta repeats this sentence eight times in all. he states: Thus [in this verse] the characteristic of emptiness has been shown in an unperverted way as stated: "It is perceived as it really is that. two things-the subject grasping and the object grasped (griihaka. 7 The Cu/asufifiata-sutta does not seem to have attracted the attention of the Madhyamikas. cannot be negated. however. in this place.") At the same time. something remains. 10 When Vasubandhu comments on verse MV I. are neither exclusively empty nor exclusively non-empty. when. does not have any re-ality at all. This is the true definition of emptiness. but it is given a special significance in the treatises of the Yogacara school. This is so because of the existence [of the "unreal imagination"]." that is.1. on the other. unreal imagination again arises in emptiness. both negation and affirmation." (The adjective unreal is used to qualify the notions or imag-ination that singles out as existent things that are "non-reals. this "unreal imagination. First. something re-maining therein which. "empty. emptiness is found to belong to the "unreal notion" or "imagination." 11 ." which are a discrimination between. Hence. 9 This rather tortuous argument is repeated in the next verse. as well as the existence [of the "unreal imagination" as the locus of emptiness]. This whole schema is named the Middle Path. is constantly operative. from a slightly different perspective: All entities. the latter is empty with regard to the former. and further it is understood as it really is that.

'' Nagarjuna. In later Chinese Buddhism. nonexistence through and through. if this be the case. or as the recovery of existence from nonexistence. chapter XXIV.13. it is. is enig-matic indeed. expounds a definition of siinyata that says: Truly. one encounters the saying. the true meaning of siinyata is "nonexistence. the quotation has to be nothing other than the idea of the Ciifasuiiiiata-sutta. 14 Thus. negative in character. is said to have established the true significance of worldly phenomena in his Miila-madhyamakakiirikii." that is. MV 1. and the existence of [that] nonexistence. The idea of adding the concept of 'existence of nonexistence' was. for siinyata is generally accepted as non-being. Vasubandhu also observes that. he equates siinyata. presumably in keeping with the idea stated earlier. 13 The expression.54 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA The words "as stated" suggest that the passage enclosed in quotation marks is a quotation from some scriptural authority. for it opens up a new horizon of true existence in the wake of negativism of "form is emptiness. "something remains" (avasi$Ja). emptiness comprehends not only the "nonexistence" but also the "existence of nonexistence. too. however. however. Perhaps one should understand this as an ultimate reality that is never denied. however. the very empti-ness is form. for in-stance. to add 'existence of nonexistence' is not only superfluous but also absurd because of the resulting internal contradic-tion." (~ ~ tfj f[) which is to be understood as the identity of non-being and being. while something remains positively asserts the existence of some-thing. the similarity 12 between the sutta and this passage being quite clear. not even at the extremity of radical negation. with yet another What Remains in Sunyata . nor a repetition of the preceding passage. and it is true existence because it is found in negation. "Truly empty [hence l unfathomable existence. originally identi-cal with pratltyasamutpada ("dependent origination"). one reads: "Form is emptiness. negation and affirma-tion. emptiness can be "shown without perversion.' " 6 The passage "the very emptiness is form" is neither re-dundant and superfluous." which turns out to be a special feature of the Yogacara interpretation. and. It is affirmation found in the midst of negation. Actually. too. the characteristic of emptiness is the nonexistence of the duality [of subject and object]. in accordance with this sutta passage. in the Prajfiiipiiramitii-siitra." And the interpre-tation of emptiness by the Yogacaras seems actually to be in basic agree-ment with the point of view of this sutta. 17 Especially in verse eighteen. severely attacked by the later Madhyamikas: 15 according to them. similar to the situation in which one cannot negate the fact that one is negating.

The Yogacaras. "emptiness rightly understood" (sugrhftii siinyatii) is explained. as seen before). which. which was equally a target of attack on the part of the Madhyamikas. The passage in question appears also in the Abhidharma-samuccaya of Asmiga. the other-dependent.(or tathii-abhiiva-) siinyatii ("as thus-being" or "as not -thus-being"). 21 Here. Thus. on the other hand. On certain occasions. in their elucidation of the notions of being and non-being. hence empty. respectively. which is accepted as real in Abhidharma philosophy. and the consummated (parini$panna). though itself unfathomable. but there seems to be no essential difference between the ideas of these two treatises. often have recourse to the theory of trisvabhava (the three natures: the imagined. corre-sponds exactly to this idea of paratantra (thus-being but empty. The interpretation here is different from that of the Madhyiinta. which has been preserved in its entirety in Chinese and Tibetan but only in fragments in the original of the Bodhisattvabhiimi than to that the Abhidharmasamuccaya is quoting from the Bodhisattvabhiimi ('?). The basic idea is further exemplified by the term "riipa" ("form"). including religio-practical ones. tathii-bhiiva." mentioned earlier. and finally with the Middle Path. what is 56 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA . insofar as it is an entity con-structed by thought. the other-dependent (paratantra). In the Bodhisattvabhiimi of the Yogiiciirabhiimi. "Something remains. "emptiness" synthesizes all three na-tures (which together represent all states of entities without exception). and the three are then related to the imagined na-ture (parikalpi ta). is empty. has reality insofar as it provides a locus (iisraya) for the designation (prajflapti-viida) of riipa. The whole scheme of this verse looks like a of abhiitaparikalpa in the which all human endeavors. This similarity becomes obvious when the Tibetan (as well as Chinese) versions of these tion. namely. especially those of "non-being" and "being" in terms of parikalpita and paratantra. there occurs a passage almost iden-tical with the one quoted in the MV-a passage in which it is emphasized that the unperverted.notion. 19 siinyata is analyzed into three: abhiiva-siinyatii ("emptiness as nonbeing"). though there is no evidence of citation. 20 A statement similar to that of the Cii/asufuiata-sutta also appears in other Yogacara treatises. or not-thus-being. that of "upadaya prajfiapti~" ("designation having re-course to materials"). and the consum-mated). respectively. are duly affirmed. Riipa. But there is still something remaining. 22 true view of emptiness is taught. and prakrti-siinyatii ("essential emptiness").

just as not the Buddha's own and special dharmas have they been taught by the Tathagata. he employed the same idea of 'nonexistence and existence of siitras are very such as: The Buddha's own and special dharmas . and the process is again com-pletely identical with the idea of 'nonexistence and existence of nonexist-ence' in the Madhyiinta. and ayatanas-the categories maintained by Abhid-harma philosophy-yet therein there is the existence of non-existence-that is. Thus. The wording in this reasoning is very close to that of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. which survives only in Chinese. But it is already clear that the idea of 'som through these Yogacara treatises. the "twofold reasoning" (yukti) is explained in this way: (I) the two kinds of selfhood. in this connection. A most interesting exposition of siinyata. "Establishment of Emptiness. dhatus. but (2) the two kinds of non-self (nairiitmya) do exist. and yet something of it re-mainsthen the nonduality of emptiness is explained in accordance with twofold 25 reasoning. In the prose commentary." there is a verse that reads: ~~~•fl &~~Mfl n=a~~ m~m•= When [it is realized that] nothing exists here. back to may indicate that this particular sutta was very school. At the begin-ning of chapter 6." The process of the argument is identical with that of the "nonexistence and existence of nonexistence" in the Madhyiinta. The verse was most probably com most interesting feature is that. do not exist. although in this verse "something remaining" appears in a manner very similar to t is stated almost as if it were a thought originating with Asanga himself. is found in the Hsien-yang-sheng-chiao-lun (or *Aryadesanii-vikhyiipana) of Asanga.. emptiness is explained as neither eternally existing nor eternally nonexisting.and what remains as real is "anatmakatva" ("selflessness"). Therefore they are 2 called "the Buddha's own and special dharmas. that of person (pudgala-iitman) and that of things (dharma-atman). [the reality of] "selflessness. Although there does not exist anything substantive (iitmatva) within entities such as the skandhas. Vajracchedikii Prajniipiiramitii. When Asailga wrote a commentary.. not in Sanskrit or Tibetan." " What Remains in Siinyata .

though an object of controversy. The theory that the tathiigatagarbha is empty as well as nonempty is established on the authority of the SrTmiiliidevT. The tathiigatagarbha. has come from "what remains" as stated in the Cii/asuiiiiata. "buddhatva" ("Buddhahood''). there is no contamination to be removed from it.Or: That which is true perception. The passage under consideration appears in the prose commentary to verses 33 1. without any evidence as to whether or not it is a citation. but here the items negated . on the one hand. however.154-155 in which "the emptiness of the tathiigatagarbha" is explained. can be summarized in two points. in all the Yogiiciira treatises mentioned. substantial ism being rejected by all Mahiiyiinists. conveys the real meaning of siinyatii in this school and never im-plies any "realism" whatever. The tenets of the Ratnagotra are 32 regarded as rather close to those of the Yogiiciiras. its understanding of the passage concerned seems to be fairly different from that of the Yogiiciiras. that is indeed no true perception. Therefore the Tathagata teaches. the word "there-fore" is used even to connect the negation with its succeeding affirmation. the passage that 35 contains ''what remains" is introduced. what is first negated is next affirmed. and so on. which may also be called "tathiigata-dhiitu" ("element of the tathiigata"). What remains. therefore. Indeed. on the other. true perception. As stated in the Srfmaliidevf-siitra. The principle of 'nonexistence and existence of nonexistence' will be found to be a convenient and wholly suitable basis for interpreting these contra-dictory expressions. This point shall now be discussed. The differences between the Ratnagotra. but by no means empty in respect to the virtues of Buddha-hood. to the extent that the Ratnagotra is a treatise expounding the the-ory of "tathiigatagarbha" ("matrix of the tathiigata"). the tathiigatagarbha is empty in respect to contaminations. "true perception. 34 nor any purity to be added to it. of course. I . with regard to the understanding of this passage. And it may be said that the ad-dition of existence of nonexistence. 31 A different application of the passage containing the expression "something remains" occurs also in the Ratnagotra-vibhiiga. is perfectly pure in terms of its primary nature. which are inconceivable. After these statements. and far beyond the sands of the River Ganges in number.' ' 30 In these statements. and the Madhyanta and other Yogiiciira treatises. the idea of 'nonexist-ence' cum 'existence of nonexistence' is given as the basic principle for the interpretation of emptiness in this school.

These latter texts seem to suggest that defilement is very dif-ficult. In What Remains in Siinyata . far removed from the tathagatagarbha. one and the same entity (abhiitaparikalpa) is the subject of both "is not" and "is. eternally. in its aspect of 'nonbeing. one and the same thing possesses a kind of "double structure" of being and non-being. which are never empty. cannot be si-multaneously being and non-being-it is 'being' through and through. It is in this sphere of sunyata that abhutaparikalpa takes its shape anew. and that of "is" is Bud-dhahood. and absolutely." In such a case. hence." of both nonex-istence and existence. In the Ratnagotra and its authority. the subject of "is not" (negation) and the subject of "is" (affirmation) are different from each other. "existence of nonexistence. purely. hence. Buddhahood. In other words. and so on. and these virtues are by no means empty. And that very emptiness of what is empty is never negated. however. In the Madhyanta. which is characterized only by the high-est qualities. The duality of subject and object.' sunyata itself naturally becomes abhutaparikalpa. sunyata is. the essence of the tathagatagarbha. In this case. enlightenment is deepened only to reveal that disturbance cannot be banished even at the final stage. which is essential to abhutaparikalpa. to erase-it remains even after a sort of enlightenment is obtained. the Srlmiiliidevl.' the abhutaparikalpa necessarily turns out to be sunyata. 36 2. But such a double structure is not conceivable in the case of the tathagatagarbha. the strongest hindrance for human spiritual endeavors. the former being defilement and the latter virtue. This double structure will be seen both in abhutaparikalpa and in sunyata. The understanding of "what remains" in the Ratnagotra is also quite opposite to that of the Yogacara treatises. while in that of 'being. while the tathagatagarbha itself is never negated. But the essence of the tathagatagarbha comprises the immeasurable virtues of Buddhahood. Contaminations or defilements are always accidental or adventitious (iigantukaklesa). almost impossible. Both of these are mundane entities and disturbances (daratha). This is just the opposite from the Ciifasufifiata and the Madhyiinta and other treatises. and therefore to be counteracted by the practice of meditation. is negated. what remains is the "tathagatagarbha" in terms of the Buddha's virtues. be-cause in the Cii/asufifiata what remains is ultimately the corporeal being. there is no link between the glorious virtues of Buddha-hood and mundane defilements. which likewise represents the world of delusion. not essential to the tathagatagarbha. is never nonexistent. what remains necessarily becomes something remaining after ev-ery defilement is destroyed. the subject of "is not" is defilement. and in the Madhyiinta it is unreal imagination.58 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA are contaminations only. In the context of the Ra-tnagotra. that is.

But. emptiness . Considering that there is no evidence that this has been quoted from some other source. the "consum-mated" (parini$panna) be achieved." In short.. In the Ratnagotra." In the siinyata doctrine.e. the truth of tathagatagarbha will be realized as "what remains. what remains is literally understood simply as an arithmetical remainder. the situation is quite the reverse. what remains is encountered by a practitioner when one is awakened. it is accepted generally that the tathagatagarbha has always existed so that it is actually not what remains. After siinyata has been realized through the medium of abhiita-parikalpa. it claims that "defilement is empty. When consciousness is converted (i. the fact that after the annihilation of defilements there always remains a new defilement cannot be adequately explained. it actually emphasizes. This arithmetical subtraction 37 involves no error at all. in the asraya-pariivrtti) through training and truly becomes pure faith." it does not state explicitly that the tathagatagarbha is empty. however. but rather "what has existed from the beginning. one subtracts defilements from the tathagatagarbha and the remaining difference is Buddhahood. on the contrary. When one is left with this understanding. its "nonemptiness. one might put it in this way: although the Ratnagotra proposes to discuss "the emptiness of the tathagatagarbha. is not the passage misapplied? What was the purpose behind the Ratnagotra in-troducing this passage into its scheme? If its purpose was to prove "the emptiness of the tathagatagarbha.'' why. Owing only to its double character of being and non-being. originally dialectical. given this simple subtraction. however. which was." be traversed. abhiitaparikalpa itself is re-realized as hav-ing always existed in emptiness and again as remaining forever in that same emptiness. In such subtraction. or the "Middle Path. could it not be said that the passage repre-sents an independent ideal original to the author of the Ratnagotra commen-tary? If this is not the case and if its source is the Cufasunnata-sutta." According to the tathagatagarbha doctrine. that the tathagatagarbha has no qualities to be ne-gated. one cannot see the dialectical double character that is fundamentally the character of empti-ness. Only when such a realization and the re-realization of distur-bance are combined will Buddhahood become manifest. Or. the Ratnagotra seems rather optimistic about the possibility of annihilating defilements. did it maintain its 'being' in the final analysis? Generally speaking. one cannot but have doubts concerning the Ratnagotra' s usage of this expression. instead.contrast to this. it is natural to apply the model of arithmetical subtraction to the idea of emptiness." but at the same time. and whose basic meaning is expressed in the concept of emptiness. instead of stating the emptiness of the tathagatagarbha. Thus.

" This mind is defined as having two aspects: "the mind of suchness" and "the mind in sarpsara.a." but the text seems to put more emphasis on "the mind of suchness" and thereby equating the human mind with the tathagatagarbha. The double structure found in the relationship between abhiitaparikalpa and siinyata represents the identity or the nonduality between sarpsara and nirvat. If. "unreal imagination. in the Madhyiinta. This view of the Madhyiinta does not advocate a higher being such as the Tathiigata. and so equated with the tathagatagarbha. Unless the double structure of the world. the tathagatagarbha is found within the "ordinary human mind. which is characterized as "empty. in the doctrine of the tathagatagarbha too." However." is discussed only in its "essentially pure" aspect (citta-visuddhi. . The double character of abhiitaparikalpa and siinyata elucidated in the Madhyiinta is hardly conceiv-able in the doctrine of the tathagatagarbha. a view that was reached by means of envisaging the Cu/asuiiiiata-sutta as its standpoint." which in a sense is more debased than the ordinary human mind. While in the Ratnagotra the "mind. which is often re-garded as a supreme Being. this lucidity is realized only when the un-real imagination is negated as empty and is itself re-realized or recovered through this emptiness.a. cittaprakrti)." is apprehended. then it must follow that the tathagata-garbha. In contrast.60 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA can be the principle underlying those old Mahayanic sayings such as "Defilement is identical with bodhi." and so on." "Without destroying defilements one enters into the nirvat." "'Birth and death are equal to nirvat.a." and also that "defilement is the tathagatagarbha" in the manner that "sarpsara is identi-cal with nirvat. these Mahayanic sayings remain meaningless paradoxes. It is also characterized as being "essentially lucid. is "empty as well as nonempty.a." But such is not the case with the tathagatagarbha doc-trine. is taken up and defined as "empty as well as non39 empty" as stated above. these sayings are held to be 38 true. in the Awakening of Faith (a treatise that ap-peared later and extant only in the Chinese version by Paramartha).

can be comprehended within these three states of existence. It is also used to elucidate the so-called "three-nature theory" (trisvabhava) 1 that was expounded and elaborated by the Yogacara school of Mahayana Buddhism. I According to the Yogacaras. which appear to the audience and frighten them by pretending to attack. The three-nature theory was systematized by the Yogacara school to illustrate what it believed to be a similar feature in the world at large: the apparent reality of what is actually non-existent and empty (Sunya). In this essay. This should help to elucidate the Yogacara view of the world as it is explicated by this theory. or grass. stages. whether psychical or physical. the characteristics of each of the individual natures. and to examine several of the similes (upama) that have been used to illustrate it. and elsewhere. while devoid of substance. produces his illusions and conjures up fierce animals such as tigers or elephants. stone. a Weltanschauung of a sort peculiar to Buddhist philosophy. still appears clearly to the eyes of the audience.Chapter 6 The Buddhist World View as Elucidated in the Three-Nature Theory and Its Similes Magic shows. I would like to discuss briefly the main features of the threenature theory. all beings. have been popular in India since ancient times. by using some material such as wood. The magic show is cited to illustrate that a magically created form. The magic show appears in Buddhist texts as an illustration for the view that holds that worldly things are not real but only appear to be so. or by other devices. which in this . performed on roadsides. The magician. by casting magic spells. I hope to clarify the characteristics of the general theory. and the rela-tionship between the three.

Everything in the world possesses these three natures. and (3) "parini~panna-svabhava" or the consummated nature. stand as direct oppo-sites. Between them is the third nature." In contrast to this. therefore." which conveys this fact. even suggests attachment (Hsiian tsang's Chinese translation of the term by~ H fiff ¥A conveys this). Neither does it mean that there are three separate and different worlds. parikalpita.'' It exists. the hells. parikalpita. Therefore. seems preferable to a more direct interpretive rendering such as "truth" or "absolute. When one (falsely) imagines something and becomes attached to it. "imag-ined. the ordinary everyday world becomes real and true only when it has been consummated.' which means self-dependent. and the consummated on the other. appearing on different occasions to possess one of the three natures. While various different worlds exist. soteriological. Paratantra stands opposed to the idea of 'svatantra. which is real and existent. the world remains at all times one and the same. This implies that the world of reality and truth should not be imagined to exist independently in a transcendental manner outside this ordinary world. or the heavens. a translation such as "consummated." the "other-dependent. and hence absolute." or "the absolute. ontological." "real existence. The three-nature theory holds that the world is constituted of these three natures. Hence. (2) "paratantra-svabhava" or the other-dependent na-ture. according to the three-nature The Buddhist World View ." "truth. real. which is nonexistent. The three are: (I) "parikalpita-svabhava" or the imagined nature." The past participle form. independent. The word parikalpa means in Buddhist usage "imagination" with a common implication of falsity. This does not mean that the world is divided into three divi-sions or parts. is characterized by "unreality" and "total nonexistence. it may be better to explain first the general meanings and usages the three terms have. the re-ality and existence of the thing imagined are negated. The "imagined" na-ture. It is relative and characterized by relativity." The imagined nature on the one hand. and existent and connotes "reality. parini~panna or "consummated" means perfect. and so on. The names given to these categories seem to have been selected not from a single consistent viewpoint but rather from several different view-pointsepistemological. the world of animals. and so on. but only by depending on some other entity. called "paratantra. and that these three components make up the world. hence its cognate word. It is a reality com-pletely perfected or consummated by a practitioner through arduous prac-tice.62 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA context are called "natures. the world of human beings." svabhiiva in Sanskrit." It does not mean that this reality exists in an ontological sense or that it is to be perceived epistemologically. According to the three-nature theory.

which the Buddha declared to be full of suffering. It is in this sense that the one. and so on. This is the world that is dearest to us. The sages and enlightened ones also live in this one. then. the con-summated world is established anew by them. or dis-criminations. It must be emphasized that the world remains one and the same at all times. Now let me explain the three natures one by one in more detail. For them. The world in which they live their lives differs in no way from our world. defilement. discontent. those various other worlds do not exist from the first. just like the world with which a scientist deals as the object of his research. con-version. is the Buddha-land of Buddha Sakyamuni. because they are enlightened and are free of all false imagination and attachment. the world is no longer imagined and contaminated. summer is hot and winter is cold. It is not established indepen-dently outside of this world. and in which we are now living. not some other world outside and beyond it. It is consum-mated in the sense that it has assumed a nature of perfection owing to the long. People become attached to this contaminated or imagined world. or intellect. assiduous training of the enlightened sages. we are always projecting some kind of imagina-tion (which is always false imagination from the Buddhist point of view) onto the world that is originally neutral. it is an imagined world. This one unchanging world is originally neither contaminated nor purified. but rather neutral. thinking that it is the real world. however. It is always this world with which we are concerned. too. The imagined world. the world into which we are born. But. This attachment gives rise to all forms of human suffering. or turnabout of the world from a neutral. unchanging world is referred to as possessing a "consummated" nature. in which we are to die. it is pure and consummated. 2 Due to their deep insight and de-tachment. Through our cognitions. thoroughly transformed and purified. without reflection or self-consciousness-that is. uncontaminated state to an impure. willows are green and flowers are red. insofar as we are not yet enlightened to its reality but remain in a deluded statewe speak of this world as a world of the imagined nature. it is the very same world. insofar as our interaction with this world occurs directly or instinctively. this contaminated world to which people become attached is the world of sarpsara. only the pure and real world is manifested to them. Although the sahiilokadhiitu. In other words. contaminated state. pure. though we might believe otherwise. the world system in which we are born. In short. However. conflict. imagined.theory are understood and explained as the one unchanging world being converted into these various other worlds. for them. like an animal. appears upon the change. the imagined world does not appear. it appears to . unchanged world. This projection of false imagina-tion changes or contaminates the world.

can be transformed into the imagined world of the ordinary being or consummated by the enlightened being as the world of purity? It is the "otherdependent" nature as the constituent of this one unchanging world that makes both the transformation and the consummation possible. the one unchanging world mentioned above is relative and siinya. and later taught this principle on various occasions. His belief has great conviction for him. the imagined nature has become changed or con-verted into the consummated nature. it often happens that an ordinary person. The other-dependent world (the one unchanging world) is thus transformed into the imagined world. and denies all absolutes. a land whose purity is visible only to those with the eyes of a Buddha.64 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA us to be contaminated. as well as the belief to which he has become attached. however. or Isvara as an absolute god. This characteristic of pratityasamutpiida is to be found in the notion of the otherdependent nature. It is owing to this rela-tivity that the world. On this basis of the other-dependent. are nothing other than the figments of the false imagination referred to above. is beyond the scope of ordinary reasoning. wisdom and folly. being far from perfect. and the principle underlying its existence is "siinyata" itself. It connotes the idea of the "relativity" of all things. He believes his imaginary creation to be true. This consummated world is the world of nirva!)a. which. devoid of the absolute. brahman. Many scholars regard it as the basic principle of Buddhism. believes that he has grasped the paratantra world by the ordinary means of his human reasoning. The term paratantra (other-dependent) is very closely related to and conveys almost the same meaning as the term "pratityasamutpiida" (depen-dent coorigination). His attachment to his belief. and so forth. From the discussion above.) A world constituted of the other-dependent nature. Only when attachment and false imagination are removed is the one unchanging world thoroughly purified and consummated as the pure world. leads him to become attached to the absolute that he has grasped. The Buddhist World View . that is to say. and so on. According to tradition. the other-dependent nature can be under-stood to be the "basis" (asraya) 4 for the other two natures. it is the basis in its capacity as the essential relativity. (Thus. prakrti. It is realized only by a Buddha. the Buddha Siikyamuni ac-quired his Great Enlightenment by realizing the principle of dependent co-origination under the Bodhi-tree. and thus a world not easily realized. which. although neutral itself. as Niigarjuna revealed. with good and bad. But what is the constituent nature of such a world. living in the world of the imagined nature. this world system is now manifested as the Buddha's "Pure Land" in which all these differentiations disappear. is siinya (empty). the world of depen-dent 3 co-origination. and only as the result of his assiduous effort. as permanent entities. either atman. Nevertheless.

it is a crossing over from this imagined world to the consummated world yonder." or "conversion" in the previous discussion) is a remarkable and important feature of the three-nature theory. The principle of convertibility (expressed by words such as "change. The other-dependent nature functions as a "medium" or "mediator" 6 also in its capacity as the basis. there is neither an independent world of delusion of ordinary unenlightened people. A Buddhist's ultimate concern is enlightenment. the dualistic view-the dualism of the deluded world and the purified world-plays a great role in most religions. the other-dependent nature is the basis upon which the imagined nature and consummated nature both become possible. nor an independent world of purification of enlight-ened sages. It prevails in all the three natures and enables them to constitute one and the same world. on the same basis. It is because both the imagined and consummated natures are essentially transformations of the other-dependent nature that the imagined world can become the consummated world through the medium of the other-dependent. It mediates the relationship between the imagined world and the consummated world and thus it makes possible the leap from the former to the latter. and vice versa. only the imagined and consummated natures would seem to be the ultimate concern. the worlds of the imagined and the consummated natures are both relative and interrelated. being based upon and encompassed by the other-dependent nature. Therefore. Salvation. Thus. From the viewpoint of the three-nature theory." which describes the relationship between the three natures. which the ordinary person believes and becomes attached to as an absolute. a bridge that will link the two worlds. or transformations are possible only on the basis of the other-dependent nature. the consummated nature is realized. because the gap between the two worlds is so despairingly deep that no conceivable human effort would be sufficient to enable one to leap over . Through convertibility. it is possible for the world to be one and at the same time to possess the three natures. conversions. However. or into the consummated world. liberation." "transformation. and enlightenment refer to a "crossing over" from this shore to the other shore. a boat that will carry one across the ocean from this shore to the other. To this extent. or reaching the world of nirval)a by ridding oneself of the world of sa111sara. This notion of the basis of the other-dependent nature leads us to an idea of 5 "convertibility. These changes. the crossing over from this shore to the other shore. Actually. The other-dependent world converts itself into the imagined world. It is sometimes even said that such a link is entirely lacking in our world. On the other hand. by the enlightened. often remains as a prob-lem.the imagined nature presents itself on the one hand as false imagination.

in the history of Buddhism. wherein everything is false. They should never be confused or identified. it is in ordinary life always defiled and alThe Buddhist World View . the other-dependent nature is proposed by the Yogacaras as the logical basis not only for the other two natures but also for the identification postulated in the sayings mentioned above. without being mediated by something else. From a theoretical point of view. no longer exists. as the theory of "cognition-only" (see notes 16. But what is the fundamental principle that enables the bridge to be postulated? The three-nature theory. In these sayings two contradictory. they are enlighten-ment itself. It is in this way that the other-dependent nature functions as a me-diator. or in the consummated world. the other-dependent world is recovered in its original purity. Actually. where the problem of crossing over. The Yogacaras devoted much attention to the investigation of "cogni-tion" (vijniina). The abyssal gap that yawns between them is too deep and too wide. whereupon this recover/ of "pure relativity" itself turns out to be the consummated world. the crossing over to the consummated world occurs indirectly via the other-dependent nature. They are also known as the "Vijfiana-vada" or Cognition (-only) school. such a bridge has been postulated in various ways. It goes without saying that. And yet those enigmatic sayings flow out from the very fact of enlightenment. however. a bridge must exist. especially through the other-dependent nature that functions as the basis of and the mediator between the imagined and the consummated.66 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA the gap or to build a bridge across it. opposing situations are iden-tified directly. Crossing over is possible only in the world of the other-dependent na-ture." In the ordinary sense. having already been overcome. insofar as it is the Buddhist's concern to get to the other shore. one such instance is the Mahayana under-standing of "paramita" (perfection) as "param-ita" (reached to the other shore). 18) is one of the major themes. it is not possible either in the imagined world. cannot take place in a direct way. The jump from the imag-ined world to the consummated world. defile-ments (klda) are the very opposite of enlightenment (bodhi). According to the Yogacaras. salflsara can never be nirvarya. they have rarely substantiated their claims upon a firm logical basis. although cognition is essentially the otherdependent. In this manner. "salflsara is identical with nirvarya" or "defilements are themselves en-lightenment. at least from a purely theoretical point of view. they represent directly the deep insight and profound intuition of the enlightenment experience. supplies an answer to this question. through the elimination of the imagined world. There are in Buddhism some well-known old sayings such as. That is to say. The jump must be made indirectly via the other-dependent world. Although most religions believe or operate under the assumption that such a bridge exists.

of course. upama) are regarded as indispensable even for logical syllogisms (pramtitza. In this case. and imaginary. It can be analyzed into strands of hemp. Both snake and rope are negated to reach the final. He starts to run away but then decides to examine it more closely. But I shall return to that later. The quoting of similes to exem-plify abstract theories is a characteristic feature of Indian and Buddhist texts. again. He is enlightened to the fact that his situation of seeing a snake was illusory. Similes or examples (dr:f!tinta. what exists in reality is hemp or elements or atoms. In the first of these. At the same time. the "transmutation of the basis" (iiSraya-paravrtti) as they call it. . fire. they maintain that "this cognition is turned about to constitute the Buddha's wisdom" ( '!ii. the snake is. and becomes frightened. prayoga). and from the rope to hemp." "gold-ore. which is assumed to be the final form of existence. not rope. This turnabout. or further into elements such as earth. substantial reality. for the sake of convenience. A close inspection of the snake reveals that it is not a snake after all but a rope. there is no mention of ele-ments or atoms. they regard it as the "discrimination of the unreal" or "unreal imagination" (abhutaparikalpa). Thus. hemp. In the following. In this simile. the other-dependent nature (of the cognition) functions as the basis for the turnabout or trans-mutation. He realizes that the snake is illusory and does not exist. Even though it may be helpful for our understanding.ways appears in the guise of the imagined nature. water. in which. the rope with the other-dependent nature. We must be aware. what really exists is the rope. Its significance seems to be somewhat different from the Indian usage discussed above. to be equated with the imagined nature." and "magic show" similes. But he then perceives that the rope is also illusory and less than the final reality. Hence. This simile has also been very popular in SinoJapanese Buddhism. or even further. it does not necessarily convey the full meaning that the theory intends to clarify. snake-rope-hemp simile. I shall examine the "snake-rope-hemp. how-ever. is the final goal of the school. and the hemp with tilt consummated nature. that a simile is nothing more than that. The simile illustrates well the progressive steps from the imagined snake to the rope. however. let us examine several similes that appear in the Yogacara texts as illustration of the three-nature theory.Jlf~~ ). it is called simply the snake-rope-hemp simile. and wind. II Now. 8 a man encounters a snake lying on a road at twilight.

but it is cultivated and achieved through assiduous training pursued on an established path. the conversion from gold-ore (other-dependent) to clay (imagined). free of discrimination). another transformed state of gold-ore. from gold-ore (other-dependent) to gold (consummated).. for no gold is visible. is that the factor that actuates the conversion from clay to gold-that is. the clay. a path leading toward this non-discriminative wisdom will be found to open up naturally. From the same train of reasoning. materializes where both subject and object are abolished. three things are mentioned: the gold-ore. the characteristic of the other-dependent nature as the mediator becomes evi-dent. that is to say. or from clay (imagined) to gold (consummated). because gold-ore is the basis for both the clay and the obtaining of the gold. represents the imagined nature. the one world is transformed into the consummated world of the enlightened ones. insofar as the other-dependent world has not yet been burned away by the fire of "non-discriminative wisdom" 10 (nirvikalpajiiiina. the two factors of subject and object are assumed to be indispensable.68 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA In the "lump of clay containing gold" simile 9 (kiiiicana-garbhii-mrttikii. which is transformed state of gold-ore (i. other-dependent nature). in ordinary condition. and the consummated nature is fully manifested. Non-discriminative wisdom.e. which is characterized by "hardness" and which contains the "seed" of gold. When the clay is burned. How is this possible? When the two epistemological factors. The gold-ore represents the "earth-element" (prthivi-dhiitu). it disappears and gold becomes manifest. non-discriminative wisdom is designated as belonging to consum-mated nature. subject and object. the gold-bearing ore appears simply as clay. "clay as an embryo of gold" (called the "gold-ore" simile here for convenience). Usually. But when burned away by the fire of non-discriminative wis-dom. What becomes evident in this connection. The Buddhist World View . the non-discriminative wisdom that converts the world from the defiled state to the purified state-seems to stand apart from the three-nature theory. The gold. The manner in which the other-dependent nature functions as a basis is illustrated well by this simile. That is to say. The simile illustrates clearly also the convertibility of the three na-tures. In this simile. is the consummated nature. the whole world remains as the imagined world of ordi-nary beings. the logic of which seems to be somewhat different from that of the three-nature theory. Just as it was the case in the gold-ore simile. however. however.) literally. The clay. the highest wisdom. and the pure gold. Of course. are examined in the context of the three-nature theory. It is equated with the other-dependent nature.

An elephant form appears. . This belief. but also for the cultivation and perfection of this wisdom. it is used especially as a simile for the three-nature theory.even when subject and object are held to be originally of the other-dependent nature. will perforce be regarded as belonging to the imagined nature. connotes "deception. The words "an elephant form appears" stand for the other-dependent nature." "magic. Although the audience is frightened by the magically created elephant. but this magically created elephant is not real. then non-discriminative wisdom will establish itself with the consummated nature. and discernment that makes that discrimination. creates an elephant. because they believe that the elephant they are seeing really exists. tiger. however. what really exists is the wood or other material. The final simile is the one I referred to at the beginning of this paper." "phantom. "magically created elephant" stands for the imagined nature which is "not real". because he knows the truth about the magic and the skillful deception he is performing. The purport of this simile can be summarized as follows." or "apparition". and ''what really exists is the wood or other material'' stands for the other-dependent nature as well as the consummated nature. more specifically. and for the other-dependent nature in particular. But once the magic show is over. It is not difficult to see which of the three natures these three elements are intended to represent. It is called the "magic show" (miiyii) simile. 11 The word maya. the magician is not. incantations. He remains calm and unmoved throughout. the magician in a magic show takes pieces of wood or other materials. the three-nature theory becomes the basis not only for the con-version of the world through non-discriminative wisdom. and by employing chemical compounds. The audi-ence is astonished." Maya. or some other illusion. In Buddhism. it connotes "illusion." In a metaphorical sense. secondarily. on its pri-mary level of meaning. They believe and become attached to what they see on the stage." "unreality. even frightened. "magic show. The audience is frightened on seeing the magically created elephant. Thus. and so forth. as the "unreality" or "illusory image" of the universe. but the wood or other material that was hidden from the audience through-out the performance. As I stated before. is a term used widely in almost a technical sense in several Indian philosophical sys-tems. by the magically created form." "trick. what remains on the stage is not an elephant. If the cognition becomes free of this discrimination (and hence of the imagined nature) and recovers its other-dependent nature. the term maya usually denotes "illusion" and. being the cause of false imagination.

it is then the consummated nature.'' However. Vasubandhu states in his Trif!lsika: When the other-dependent nature obtains a state absolutely free of the imagined nature. is the "recovery" I mentioned above. It also implies that the consummated nature is to be realized indirectly via the otherdependent nature.70 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA attachment. and the whole process of making the elephant form appear from these materials. the appearance of the magically created elephant and the process by which it was made to appear on the basis of certain materials (both of the otherdependent nature) are events that occur to both unenlightened and enlightened onlookers alike. The recovery of the other-dependent nature. be-longs to the other-dependent nature. the other-dependent world recovers its original nature. The unenlightened ones look at the other-dependent world through colored glasses. is no easy task. Thus. For the enlightened ones. while the fact that what really exists is wood or other material refers to both the other-dependent nature and the consummated nature. Yet there is a difference. but tinged by the colored glass of imagination." equated here with the consummated nature. 12 "A state absolutely free. in the manner of dependent co-origination (pratltyasamutpada). no one would deny that an elephant form has appeared on the stage and that this elephant is seen by all. The wood and other materials the ma-gician employs. can also be understood to pertain to the other-dependent nature. In the magic show simile. For the unenlightened ones. The form of the elephant is magically created with these materials as its basis. which would be acceptable to ordinary people and enlightened people alike. and this means that the creative process at work has a nature of other-depending. as stated before. the magi-cally created elephant. the events that occur serve only to expand their imagined world. This undeniable fact. Removing the colored glasses. or imagination is called the "imagined nature. as it were. Explaining the notion of the consummated na-ture. illustrates the imagined nature." Because the audience believes that what is not real is real. This recovery of the other-dependent nature is none other than the realization of the consum-mated nature. thus means that what re-ally exists is manifested. but once it is achieved. be-cause they are the causes of their attachment to the world that is originally of the other-dependent nature. The consummated world thus becomes manifested by the recovery of the other-dependent nature. The Buddhist World View . like burning away the clay from the gold-ore by means of the non-discriminative wisdom. which is not real. the original other-dependent world appearing to them not as-it-is. such is not the case. the wood and so on. their belief is called ''imagination.

In the magic show simile, the consummated nature is understood also to be
the knowledge by which one becomes aware of the totality of events constituting
the magic show-in other words, of the whole ongoing process of the world. It is
the knowledge through which the world is seen simply as a magic show and
through which it is understood that there is no elephant, except as an apparition
whose nature is other-dependent. The Buddha, who is accomplished in this
knowledge of the consummated nature, is compared in the simile to the magician
(mayakara), because the magician, like the Buddha, differs from his audience in
that he is well aware of the magic show's hidden secrets.
The Tri1J1sika, however, goes on to state:
When this is not seen, that is not seen. 13

Here "this" refers to the consummated nature and "that" to the other-dependent
nature. The verse is in effect saying that so long as the consum-mated nature is
not realized, the other-dependent nature cannot be realized either. This is very
important in that it reveals that a direct intuitive knowl-edge of the truthEnlightenment-precedes everything. As quoted above, through the state of "being
free of" attachment, the other-dependent nature is recovered in its original state,
and through this recovery becomes equated with the consummated nature. This
indicates a direction from the other-dependent to the consummated. In the verse
above the direction is opposite, 14 from the consummated to the other-dependent.
Unless the con-summated nature is realized, the other-dependent nature cannot
be realized truly either, though the latter can be apprehended theoretically by
human intellect. It is clear from this that the realization of these two natures is
simultaneous. Theoretically speaking, or from a logical approach, the consummated nature may be accomplished indirectly, through the mediation of the
other-dependent nature. But the basic fact of the religious experience itself is an
essentially direct realization of the truth.
Therefore, the three natures are spoken of in Yogiiciira texts as being
"neither different from each other, nor identical to each other." 15 It should be
clear from the magic show simile that the difference between the otherdependent nature and the imagined nature is very subtle and delicate; the former
is compared to an elephant form and the latter to an attachment to that form. The
difference is established on the basis of whether "attach-ment" is operative or
not. The difference between the other-dependent and consummated natures is
likewise very subtle. When the other-dependent na-ture ceases to be the cause
for the delusory imagination to appear, it is identified with the consummated
nature. the difference being whether such a cause is operative or not. The three
natures, then, are neither different



from each other nor identical to each other; or, rather, they are both differ-ent and
identical at one and the same time.
Another significant feature of the magic show simile is that it can be used to
illustrate the thought of "cognition-only' " that is fundamental to the Yogacara
school. In the Yogacara school, the term "to appear" (pratibhiisate, khyiiti, etc.) a
word generally suggestive of the world of magic, is often used to elucidate the
term "cognition" or "to know." The MV., for instance, states:

When cognition (vijiiiina) functions, it appears as the outer world, individ-uality,
the self, and [various other] presentations.

Here, the term "cognition" signifies simply that something appears and is seen by
us; in this verse, four things, "the outer world," and so forth, appear and are seen.
In the case of the magic show, the form of the magi-cally conjured elephant
appears and is seen by the audience, though the real cause for its appearance is
unknown to them. What exists in the magic show is the "appearance-only," not
an elephant. An understanding of appearance-only can lead to an understanding
of cognition-only, though it may belong to a lower level. 18 The magic show
simile differs from the other two similes in that it combines thus the three-nature
theory with the notion of cognition-only.
Apart from the three similes explained above, there are several others used
also to illustrate the three-nature theory. The "crystal simile"
(spha{ika), for instance, is found in the Saf!ldhinirmocana-siitra. 19 When a
crystal, transparent and colorless, is placed together with things of various
colors, it takes on their colors. If placed with something yellow, it appears as a
precious golden stone; people seeing this are deceived and become attached to
what they assume to be gold. Here, the appearance and the attachment to the
appearance correspond to the imagined nature, the crystal itself to the otherdependent nature, and non-existence of the gold to the consummated nature. I
will not, however, explain these other similes in detail; they are, I think,
represented sufficiently by the magic show and gold-ore similes elucidated

Now. we notice that each of three similes discussed above possess cer-tain
implications of its own that may influence somewhat the way in which we
understand the characteristics of the three natures.
The gold-ore and magic show similes illustrate well the convertibility
The Buddhist World View

of the three natures. In the simile of the magic show, the very principle of magicthe fact that there is appearance-only with no real existence-is applied, equally
and consistently, to all three natures. Elimination of attach-ment to this
appearance (the imagined nature) reveals directly both the other-dependent
nature and the consummated nature. The fact that the one principle remains valid
for all three natures indicates most clearly the con-vertibility of the three natures.
Convertibility is also evident in the gold-ore simile, but there the otherdependent nature is more cogently exemplified as the basis or mediator for the
other two natures. Thus, although the gold-ore and magic show similes may
differ in emphasis, as aids to understanding the world in terms of the three-nature
theory, they both enable us to grasp the structure underlying the conversion of
the one world into three and the conversion of the three into one.
In the snake-rope-hemp simile, the principle of convertibility hardly
appears at all. It is perhaps possible to say that the relation between the rope and
snake is a case of conversion similar to that found in the magic show, but the
relation between the rope and hemp is entirely different. Hemp introduced to
illustrate the consummated nature, is in fact a third element totally unrelated to
the snake; it has no relation either to the snake delusion or to the elimination of
that delusion. The understanding of rope as hemp results not from conversion but
from an analysis that concludes that the rope is hemp, and further, elements and
atoms. The analytical knowledge of hemp as the consummated nature is far
removed from the Buddha's non-discriminative and yet all-embracing wisdom.
The process of understanding, which takes place in the realization that the
rope is a snake, is "conversion." The process of understanding which occurs in
the realization that rope is hemp. is "analysis." In the snake-rope-hemp simile.
then, the two wholly different principles of conversion and analysis are merely
fused together. The simile thus fails to convey the sense of a world supported and
encompassed by one dynamic principle. The world it illustrates is not one world
but a world of two or three sepa-rate parts fused together. The world view of a
practitioner. who relied solely on this simile, would possess no sense of
conversion, and conse-quently, any absolute world he postulated would have to
exist somewhere entirely apart from this world of delusion.
The merit of the snake-rope-hemp simile is. however. that it illustrates
"phases of spiritual advancement" or "stages" through which a practitio-ner
advances in the course of his training. First. the illusion of the snake is
eliminated by the perception of the rope: then. the rope is analyzed into hemp
and negated. These stages of negation and analysis help a practitioner proceed,
step by step, to the final stage of sunyata. absolute negation, which corresponds
to the consummated nature.



In this case. however, the other-dependent nature remains simply a stage or a
step that connects the imagined nature to the consummated na-ture. The rope is
analyzed into hemp, the hemp into elements, the elements into atoms, and so on. The
number of steps is indefinite, the analysis vir-tually endless. As a result, the world
comes to be conceived as being not of three but of many natures. The otherdependent nature can still be assumed to be a step mediating between other steps or
stages, but it loses its role as a "basis" from which to construe the steps above and
below it.
It may be said that the highest merit of the three-nature theory lies in its having
established a systematic and well organized world view, one which provides a
doctrinal foundation for yogic practice. As a simile for exemplifying this world view,
the magic show is perhaps the most appro-priate. The snake-rope-hemp simile, while
illustrating the path towards fi-nal liberation in terms of the three natures, fails to
clarify the organic working of this world view. To explicate the three-nature theory,
the Chi-nese Fa-hsiang school employed almost exclusively the snake-rope-hemp
simile. Since most Sino-Japanese interpretations of this theory follow the Fa-hsiang,
the world views they expound lack mostly the organic wholeness depicted in the
magic show simile; particularly rare are interpretations that demonstrate the
convertibility of the three natures, and the other-dependent nature's role as basis.

To recapitulate, in the three-nature theory a world view peculiar to Buddhism
was developed. The ancient notion of "dependent co-origination" was integrated into
the theory. It was called the "other-dependent nature," and was taken as the basis of
the world. The other-dependent nature thus occupies the central position in the
theory, the consummated nature does not, though sometimes it may be conceived to
do so. From this basis, the convertibility of the world, a characteristic of this world
view, is derived. This convertibility explains the world of delusion as a product of the
neutral and pure world of the other-dependent nature; it is also the principle that
enables the practitioner to make the leap from this shore to the other shore.

Other topics remain to be discussed, in particular the relationship be-tween this
theory and fundamental Mahayana standpoints such as siinyata and the Middle Way.
In this paper, however. my intention was simply to discuss the three-nature theory by
way of its similes. It is hoped that, through the discussions above, a general idea has
been given of the Bud-dhist world view revealed in this theory.

Chapter 7

Connotations of the Word Asraya (Basis)
in the
Mahayana -S iitralarpkara
The term iisraya, which may be rendered roughly into English as "ba-sis,"
"support," "substratum," and so forth is one of the most important terms in the
Yogacara Vijfiana-vada School of Mahayana Buddhism. The reason for its
importance lies in the close relationship it has with the terms "alaya-vijfiana" and
"paratantra-svabhava," both of which are ideas fun-damental to this school.
Moreover, it appears in the compound iiSraya-pariivrtti (turning about of the
basis), which is identified with "final deliverance." These ideas will be dealt with
later in this paper. The impor-tance of this word may be deduced from the fact
that the Mahiiyiina-siitriilaf!lkiira 1 (hereafter, MSA.) employs it in more than forty
passages, a frequency almost unmatched among terms of a purely technical

nature. In the present paper, I will examine briefly the use made of this term in

Dictionaries give various meanings for the term asraya, some of which
occur in the MSA; but they do not cover all the meanings found in this work.
Unrai Wogihara3 mentions "body" (i-shen in Chinese), a meaning which appears
also in Edgerton's Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary)4 where the meanings of
"alaya-vijfiana," "six organs," and so forth are also mentioned. In general, the
basic meanings of the word, especially in the Buddhist texts, are probably
"support," "body," and "recipient of states of consciousness," as put by A. Bareau.
I wish, however, to analyze in the following the meanings that appear in the
MSA., namely: (I) substratum, support, (2) basis, (3) seeking shelter, (4) origin,
source, (5) agent or sub-ject, in the grammatical sense, (6) physical body,
sometimes the six sense organs, (7) the total of (human) existence, (8) dharmadhiitu (sphere of dharma), (9) basis of existence (iisraya) which is to be turned
around (iisraya-pariivrtti). Of course, these meanings overlap each other and are
closely related to one another. The first six meanings (from substratum to



physical body) may be found also in general dictionaries, but the rest are more
or less peculiar to this text.
The meanings substratum, basis, and origin (the first, second and fourth
definitions of MSA) express the most fundamental sense of the word. Sir M.
Monier-Williams6 defines iisraya as "that to which anything is an-nexed or
closely connected or on which anything depends or rests." This definition is
derived from PiiQini and others. We cannot imagine a rider moving along

without an asraya (support, viz., that of the horse, MSA. XVIII, 84, 86): water
tastes differently in accordance with the difference of the rivers from which it is
taken (substratum, MSA. IX 82-85). The notion "basis," which is placed by
Edgerton at the top of his entry, sounds adequate. The Cosmical Body of the
Buddha, (the dharmakiiya) for in-stance, is the basis of the other two Bodies of
the Buddha (the saf!lbhoga and nirmiil)a kiiyas, MSA. IX. 60, 65).
I should like, in this connection, to mention a peculiar example that appears
in MSA. XI.3. Among the four reasons why a text is called "siitra" the first is that
a siitra is "related to an asraya." This asraya is explained as threefold, namely, the
place where (yatra dde), the expounder by whom (yena desitam), and the audience
to whom (yasmai dditam). According to Sthiramati a siitra is a siitra when it reads:
Thus have I heard. The Blessed One once stayed at Riijagrha together with
many bhik~us and bodhisattvas. 8

In this passage the Blessed One (the expounder), Rajagrha (the place), and the
assemblage of bhik~us and bodhisattvas (the audience) are all equally the asraya.
Such an explanation seems to fit the various meanings which will be analyzed
That which is a basis for something else, can, for that reason, be re-garded
also as the last refuge or shelter of that other being (third definition of MSA).
The last refuge, in our case, might be the Buddha or merely a good friend. When
it is said that a Bodhisattva should have recourse to a sat-puru~a or "true-man"
(MSA. XIII.lO), or that he relies upon the kalyiiQa-mitras for support (MSA. XX.29),
then iisraya means "depen-dence" or "help" as well as "refuge" or "shelter".

However, the meaning "basic element" is easily associated with the ideas of
"origin" and "source" (fourth definition of MSA). A passage in MSA. (XVIII. 7778) states that the pancopiidana skandha or the five ag-gregates are the "basis" for the
twofold misconception that a subjective person (pudgala) and an objective being
(dharma) exist in reality. The basis is, in this case, nothing else than the genetic
foundation of these miscon-ceptions. When the ''mind creative of Enlightenment"
(bodhicittotpiida) is

said to be the basis of the Buddhist practice (V.l ), this also means that the
creative mind is the cause and the origin that must necessarily precede all true
efforts (virya). 9 This signification of "basis" or "origin" seems to be the widest
and the most fundamental one, shading off into all the other meanings.
Let us examine the meaning of asraya as the agent or ''the subject to which
the predicate is annexed" (the fifth definition of MSA). It is said that a bodhisattva
is the asraya of charity (and of the remaining five paramitas, MSA. XVI.52-56).
Here he is meant not to be the object of almsgiving but to be the subject, that is,
the doer of the act of liberality. In his commentary on this passage, Vasubandhu
explains asraya as "one who offers" (yas ca dadiiti). And of the eight terms 10 of
the verse-asraya, vastu, nimitta, pariQamana, hetu, jiiana, k~etra, and nisraya-the
first seven are inter-preted by him to indicate the eight syntactic cases, with
asraya correspond-ing to the nominative case. 11
In connection with the meanings discussed above, the notion of asraya as
"body" (the sixth definition of MSA), will naturally arise; many exam-ples of this
occur in the MSA. The statement that one defends his asraya against poisons and
weapons (MSA. XV.4), and the fact that the twelve actions of Sakyamuni
Buddha's nirmii(la-kiiya (Transformation Body), be-ginning with his residence in
the Tu~ita-heavep, are called "asraya-nidarsana" or "manifestations of the Body"
(MSA XX-XXI.16) are likewise examples of this usage where asraya is meant to
be the physical body (translated into Tibetan as Ius). Asraya, in the sentence "the
asraya possessing the ability of understanding" (MSA VIII.8), is translated in
Sthiramati's commentary as Ius (body); 12 a similar expression, "the asraya
competent to undertake the right effort (virya)" (VIII.IO), is commented upon by
Sthiramati 13 as "the body devoid of any disease.' " 4
While asraya has the meaning of the "six sense organs" in most dictionaries. it is also quite usual that the body (deha) is equated to the six sense
organs, or that it is called the "body accompanied by the organs of the sense." 15
There is an example belonging to this category in XI.4, where the changing of a
sexual organ (vyafljana) into that of the opposite sex is called "asraya-paravrtti"
(the turning about of the asraya). 16 In these cases, asraya means, on the whole,
the body.
The ordinary body is physical and, in contrast to the invisible mind, visible.
But there may be another kind of body. which abides without any discrimination
between mental and physical elements. In this case asraya could properly be
translated as "the total of (human) existence" (the sev-enth definition of MSA).
For instance. the differences of virya (the energy of right practice) are directly
related to the differences in the asraya of prac-titioners of the three yiinas (MSA
XVI.69). Here asraya may mean "person-

is referred to as the common basis or the common ground of the three kinds of men seems to be due to the consideration that ultimately all three kinds of men aspire to attain Enlightenment. Now. are conditioned.66 it is stated that all the three BuddhaBodies are in reality homogeneous. even though their actual ways of practice (and hence the preconceived Enlightenment for which they aim) may be different.54). because the asraya-the dharma-dhatu in the 17 commentary-is one and the same.8. In IX. the dharmadhatu. According to the commentaries on it. the first bhiimi or stage of the bodhisattConnotations ." or "elements of mental objects" (the eighth definition of MSA). good or bad. but the total existence of the sentient being. The "recipient" mentioned in the dictionaries is close to this mean-ing." " 0 parivartana. the most predominant are "sphere" or "plane" on the one hand. which is to be understood as a basis or cause for the attainment of final deliverance. (the ninth definition of MSA) which occurs more than twelve times with the variations of " 0 parivrtti. so to speak. the sphere of the Buddha's Enlightenment. the asraya actually means a way of life attitude. it means neither the body nor the mind. In any case. is shown in the equating of asraya to dharmadhatu-"sphere of essences. 1 ~ However. In this example. but it should not be misunderstood merely as a passive "receptacle" of the objects perceived. undefiled and synonymous with emancipation. The asraya as the a storehouse being the receptacle of all which all future actions.78 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA ality'' rather than the physical "body". and which is twofold by reason of the existence or non-existence of hindrances to this goal." It implies various meanings such as emancipation (mok$a) and absolute independence (svatantra) (MSA XIX. And both of these implications approach the central meaning of asraya in the sense of basis or origin. among the various meanings of dhatu. of what is the dharmadhatu a basis? A term "sarva-traga-asraya" (universal asraya) appears in another passage (MSA XI. and bodhisattva. seemingly peculiar. sravaka. where the asraya is twofold: the first asraya leads a family life and is associated with hindrances. the most important usage of asraya in this text is probably that of asraya-paravrtti. pratyekabuddha." or "paravrtta 0 .l7-18). and "element" or "cause" (hetu) on the other. Another kind of meaning." because it is a basis common to the three kinds of men. perfection (parini$panna) (MSA Xl. which corresponds to the jana-asraya or pravukta-jana in the text."I') The asrayaparavrtti may be translated literally as "turning about of the support. the other asraya leads a home-less life and is without any hindrances. Another example of this kind can be seen in MSA Xl. religious or secular. But. That the dharmadhatu. it is rendered in the Chinese translation by )en (man).44). is called "sarvatraga-asraya.

are one and the same. however. it is perishable and lifeless and not fitted to constitute the true basis for mental processes which. on the other. nor the mere material basis. it is the "source" of all future phenomena. hence. alaya is a "basis" where the effects (vipiika) of all the past are stored and from which the future originates. the alaya is. 80MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA Thevijfiana or thealayavijfiana. the "receptacle" or the storehouse where all impressions ( viisanii) of past in-fluences are deposited and preserved. it implies also the attainment of the dharma-kaya or the Cosmical Body (MSA IX. However.9). and. the texts refer to the alaya-vijfiana. and. What was it that revolved to make the attainment of Supreme Enlightenment possible? The object of such a revolution could be neither the mere physical body as opposed to the mind. when ac-cepted. at the same time. which is akin to "pratityasamutpada" (dependent origination). All these interpretations convey something that stands for the highest and final aim of Buddhism. alaya is iisraya. that is to say.45) that culminates in the "bhavana-marga" or "the way of cultivation. Thus. The physical body is able to function as asraya only when it is conceived as a's career. The word alaya here has meanings quite similar to those of asraya. the past and the future. Such an explanation of asraya. because. leads one to the conclusion that the impressions and the seeds. the result of this turning about is called "emancipation" and "mastership" 22 (vibhutva). the mere corporeal body has no sense of alaya. The most appropriate interpretation of asraya in this case appears to be the total of (human) existence (the seventh comprises all other meanings mentioned above. according to the doctrine of this school. It is the field or plane where the state of contaminated existence has "revolved" to that of purity. and of course it could not be the grammatical subject. In the Mahiiyiinasarrzgraha. we cannot determine what the word asraya actually meant in these passages.whichis . A true alaya. However." Hence. and indicates the "refined aspect" of paratantra-svabhava. Definitions of asraya and asraya-paravrtti are. on the one hand. must be a vijfiana. found in other 21 treatises also.29). It is stated in the Trirrzsikii that asraya is "alaya-vijfiana" (the storeconsciousness) that has the characteristics of vipiika (maturation) and sarvabijaka (universality of seeds). plained as an "appellation of paratantra-svabhiiva" (other-dependent na-ture). but not the thing in itself. however. remains ab-stract because it indicates or describes a form of existence. Accordingly. or "consciousness". or a true asraya.60) and the Highest Wisdom (MSA Vl. the buddhabhiimi (MSA XIY.ana 23 and thus endowed with life. which usually is called the "darsana-marga-prapti" or "the en-tering into the way of illumination in truth" (MSA XIY. the impression itself acts also as bija or seed of future activities.

48). all of these terms convey the meaning of asrayaparavrtti. and (8) akasa-sarpjfia-p. (-of space-conception). are integral parts of asraya. (-of discrimination). In MSA IX. IX. the old basis having become extinct. we find." manasa/:1-p. as I have said earlier. the integral meanings of asraya seem to grow richer and richer. The turning about of the basis is really the annihilation of the basis itself. whether of the inner world or of the outer. "the total of (human) existence" should be taken to have Connotations deep logical and metaphysical meanings. although. all these types of "turning about" possess the meaning of asraya-paravrtti be-cause they all result equally in the "state of power" (vibhutva). which have been mentioned above. Now. (2) manasab-p. and deha 25 (body) become manifest (nirbhiisa). appear once more in the text and are described as the "states of power" (vasitii). thus the interpretation of alaya-vijfiana in the Trif!'lsikii is closely associated with that of paratantra in the Mahiiyiinasaf!'lgraha. a series of compounds of which the latter half is paravrtti and the former comprises various terms other than asraya. however. asraya is to be under-stood as the ultimate basis of all existences. takes place solely on the plane of the alaya-vijfiana or on that of the paratantra. Returning to the MSA. (3) artha-p.38-48 eight paravrttis are enumerated as fol-lows: (I) paficendriya-paravrtti (turning about of five sense organs). "the total of (human) existence. which is none other than iilayavijfliinapariivrtti (turning about of the store-consciousness according to Vasubandhu) takes place. beginning with pafice-ndriya. (4) udgraha-p. These three "turning abouts" denote aniisravadhiitu (sphere of purity) or vimukti (emancipation)." Or. The asraya of asraya-paravrtti is thus a basis that is neither merely the body nor merely the mind."'abhutaparikalpa. (-of the resting place). when. and therefore it is called a "great conversion. vijfliina converts itself into the so-called vijfliina). Thus. the translation.48. The other three 26 "turning abouts. we cannot find in this text a definition that refers directly to asrayaparavrtti. As confirmed by verse MSA. In short. or the conversion from contamination into purity.44-45. (-of carnal enjoyment). (-of taking up). Another similar series of paravrttis can be seen in MSA XI. As the things to be turned about are endless (MSA IX. . (6) prati~tha-p. it will be quite proper to assume that these eight terms. (-of minding)." (seventh definition of MSA) mentioned above seems to be the most appropriate meaning for asraya in this instance. When bija-pariivrtti (turning about of seeds). (7) maithuna-p. (5) vikalpap. and vikalpa-p." 24 and so forth is usually defined as "paratantrasvabhava". (-of the object). a new basis (though actually it should not be called a basis) emerges.. artha (object). Containing both of these. udgraha-p. But the expression. other cognitions (vijfliina) of pada (abode). the turning about of this asraya. In any case.

this notion of "basis" reflects the fundamental reality of the world. the root meaning is "basis" in its widest sense. the substructure of reality.and as lying in the deepest. . Especially when asraya is used by the masters of the Yogacara. Whenever this basis is overturned. The various meanings for the term asraya given in the dictionaries are often correlated with each other and offer definitions that apply to the var-ious and sundry uses of this Sanskrit word. the world of ordinary life changes into the dharma-dhatu or sphere of dharma (the eighth definition of MSA) and vijnana converts into the amala-vijnana. "unconscious" level of every consciousness. of the various meanings given for the term asraya. from human body and mind up to the dharma-dhatu or the sphere of the Buddha himself. However.Vijnanavada School. Such a basis covers a wide range of notions. I should like to sug-gest in conclusion that.


The verbal form paril)amayati. Likewise. because the meanings "to change. yongs su bsngo ba." as this root is interpreted "yid kyis mos pa byed pa. scholars usually do not follow the fundamental meanings that are given in dictionaries. often translated "merit-transference." "to develop. Instead." and so forth when used in an intransitive sense." "to desire. when paril)amayati is understood as a causative formed from paril)amati. paril)amita. they trans- . together with its derivatives paril)amayet. and so forth also appear. paril)amana is invariably translated by the Chinese characters hui hsiang ( ]. gyur. and so forth in Chinese translations. which mean "to change. and the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit form paril)amayati has the same sense. and so forth are widely used." are predominant in the root pari Yl)am. bsngo ba." or "smon 'dun byed pa. in Tibetan. is regarded by scholars to be the denominative form derived from paril)ama." But in its special doctrinal meaning. Concerning its verbal form.Chapter 8 Usages and Meanings of Paril)amana Parit:~iimanii is a very important idea not only in Pure Land Buddhism." "to change. but also in Mahayana Buddhism. probably means "to intend. the Ti-betan equivalents are 'gyur ba. it can function as a transitive verb as well and means ''to transfer. but the forms paril)ama-yati. Hui hsiang or eko literally means "to turn around and direct towards" and the Tibetan bsngo ba. paril)amayi-tavya." "to transform. nati. bsgyur ba. The root pari Yl)am means "to bend." is found in the siitras and sastras in various Sanskrit forms. The standard noun form is Paril)amana or 0 na. which is the causative formed from paril)amati. Sometimes paril)ama and its adjective form paril)amika are used. The term.® rPJ) or e-ko in Japanese and sngo ba. but paril)amana or 0 na and paril)ati. paril)ayamana. However.'' These words are somet imes transl ated pien chuan pien (ijli 2li£). the form paril)amati is yet to be seen." "to become ripe. especially Jodo Shin Shu (True Pure Land) Buddhism." In translating paril)amana into English.

the of hui-hsiang or eko. A bodhisattva engages in as the six paramitas on the ten bhumis and mous merits. Probably.. ! 57). etc. Paril)amana. and dharmata.]." "to turn [merit] towards or for. in a wholly different sense. The use of the term paril)amana in this sense of "benefiting others" probably occurs for the first time in the Mahayana texts. praQidhana. These translations are close to what the Chinese term hui hsiang intends to convey. does not adopt these translations and defines paril)amana "(fig. however. but this meaning is far removed from the sense of paril)amana as a bodhisattva's practice.'' "to direct." and regards paril)amayati as an intran-sitive verb. iv. it appears in a Pali Vinaya text (vin. paril)amana is used in a transitive sense and means a practice to be accomplished sage or a bodhisattva." "to turn over [merit] to. For a monk to take possession of property.) development. Although it is universally understood that one cannot reap what one has not sown. ripening. In Sino-Japanese Buddhism." "to apply. Thus. maturation. therefore. but prior to this. caus-ing to grow. That is." because it uses "sometimes yongs su (b)sngo ba." and use the word in its transitive sense with "merit" or "virtue" as its object. But he does not accumulate these merits for his own bene-fit but for the sake of fulfilling his ultimate aim. Although not rejecting them explicitly. can be said to represent the main purport of the Mahayana or the bodhisattva-marga. Some examples of the term paril)amana that appear in Mahayana texts are the following. This latter use of the term also involved a "transference" or a "change" of ownership. The A$Jasahasrikiiprajiiaparamita states: UsaReS and Meanings . the translators were influenced by the Chinese translation and thus diverged from the fundamental meanings that are given in dictionaries. is very popular one's own merit is transferred or turned toward others for the sake of fulfilling one's ultimate aim. He apparently was not aware of the Chinese translation hui-hsiang. is prohibited. the idea of paril)amana goes beyond this. of course." I disagree with him but more about this later." "to dedicate. siinyata. and it appears together with such notions as bodhicitta. virtue. because a bodhi-sattva finds his delight in having others enjoy what he has contributed. He also claims that the Tibetan translation is "somewhat confused. the merits are accumulated for the benefit of others and thus are directed toward others.84 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA late the term: "transfer [merit. There it is used in the sense of a monk taking possession of property donated to the saTJ1gha. Edgerton.

because the action (i. (awakening the thought of enlightenment). 337. The compound bodhi-pariQamana occurs several times in the Sik$ilsamuccaya (pp.e." which. anuttarayai samyaksaf(lbodhaye. (In English. akaf(lk$t1) of pariQamana more strongly. pra(lidhana (vow). The indirect object. The direct object of the verb pariQamayati is in most cases kusalamiila. in other examples. as for example. and so forth.. is the aim of or the point to be reached by pariQamana." pariQamana has almost the same meaning as cittotpada. in A$!asahasrika.) From this scheme. should be understood as being in the locative or dative case. puQya. samyaksaf(lbodhi (perfect enlightenment).Having thus rejoiced. and it is expressed in the locative case. found for example in the Dasabhumika quoted above.verb. the verb) of the agent (nominative) is directed towards its object (ac-cusative). that is. Nom. he utters the remark: "I turn over into full enlight-enment the meritorious work founded on jubilation. the form pariQamayati is used in a transitive sense. May it feed the full enlightenment [of myself and of all beings]!" 1 The Dasabhumika-sutra states: A bodhisattva turns over (or transfers) the roots of merit to the highest perfect 2 enlightenment. the sentence. 158) and in such cases. is constituted of four elements that appear in the following order: Nominat ive-accusat ive-locat i ve. 33. is replaced by the word "sattva" (sentient being). see later). the term bodhi.-loc. or even "sravaka" (aniyatagotra-sravaka. Whether it be a denominative of pariQama or whether it be a causative of pariQati.-verb-acc. it is clear that the verb is transitive. one's merits and virtues. "ku-laputra" (a son of a noble family). however. it can also be expressed in the dative case. The Madhyantavibhiiga also states: All the roots of merit should be transferred (or turned over) to the perfect enlightenment by a bodhisattva [who is desirous of obtaining enlighten-ment and who is freed from obstacles]. the former part of the compound.' Of these. When the word citta (mind) appears in the position of the accusative and becomes the direct object of "to direct towards. The agent of this verb is expressed by the word "bodhisattva. . The dative case expresses the degree of sincerity of the desire (prarthana.

In his Ta-ch' eng i-chang (chiian 9). and the latter is for the sake of engaging in the work of benefiting others by returning to this world of sentient beings. 27).. through mastering the development (ripening) of enlightenment. by being born in the Pure Land. which explains the seventh bhumi of the bodhi-sattva-marga.. that is. The latter means that the same merit is transferred to return to this world from the Pure Land. Edgerton. it connotes an aspiration to be born in Sukhavatl: that is. not to the aspect of coming back. the term paril)amana connotes an action di-rected towards full enlightenment (samyaksaf!1bodhi) or mahiibodhi. maintaining his definition of paril)amana as "development" or "ripening. In the above examples. owing to the force of merit-transference (or directing one's merit) toward the enlightenment. the word paril)amana appears in several places (5. Both are a bodhisattva's practice.18-19) in the following way: all depravities and impurities foreign to the Bodhisattva-course are to be recognized. klesakalma~aJ:! . indicates that all bhumis beginning from the first up to the seventh are "freed from depravities and impurities" simply because a bodhisattva directs all of his merits towards enlightenment." (intransitive) translates the Dasabhumika passage (p. 4 But I would recommend the following interpretation: all bodhisattva-courses should be recognized as freed from depravities and impurities. 8. Edgerton's interpretation results also from reading the passage "sarvaJ:! ." 6 A milestone in the history of Buddhism occurred when T'an-luan (476-542) divided paril)amana into two kinds: (I) paril)amana in the aspect of going forth <i:f. tEl~ [lij) and (2) paril)amana in the aspect of coming back (~tEl~ [lij). pratyetavyaJ:!" when he should have read it "sarva bodhisattvacarya . Hui-yiian of Ching-ying-ssu (523-592) divided hui hsiang into three kinds: paril)amana diUsaf!. . it connotes action in the direction or aspect of going forth. .es and Meanings . In the Sukhiivativyuha-sutra. 5 which is attested by the Tibetan translation. 58. it refers to the as-pect of going forth. about a half century after T'an-luan. pratyetavya. not in the direc-tion or aspect of coming back. because the former is for the sake of acquiring mahiibodhi (great enlightenment) and not a sravaka's parinirval)a. The former means that one transfers one's merit to go forth from this world and to be born in the Pure Land. but in all these cases. This passage.86 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA In this context.

or bhutakori. When a bodhisattm. how can they be transferred to saf!lsiira and become the cause for [being born into] saf!lsiira? Answer: For example.amana directed towards sentient beings is an example of using the term in the sense of aiming at a lower world with an intention of benefiting others. but the practice of the 37 aids to enlightenment which is embraced by great compassion becomes the cause for being born once again in saf!lsiira. By means of paril)amana. . a bodhisattva can voluntarily choose to be reborn into this world and to engage in the work of benefiting others. The first instance is found in Mahayana-sutrala!Jlkara. Do we have. it is stated that he transfers [the 37 aids to enlightenment] to . In the same way. those 37 aids to enlightenment become non-contrary to saf!lsiira and become the cause for coming face to face (abhimukha) with sar. that is bodhi. then. he transfers the [37] aids to enlightenment to sa111sara. I have encountered only two instances of this kind in the San-skrit texts. and (3) towards chih chi. poison which is not properly administered (lit. XX-XXI verse II. or sentient beings. 7 And Sthiramati's commentary on this reads as follows: Question: If the 37 aids to enlightenment become the cause for liberation from saf!lsiira. In his Vyakhya. it becomes clear that what was orig-inally the cause for nirval). because he practices them for the sake of benefit-ting sentient beings by virtue of his compassion. the first (p'u-t'i) and the third (chih chi) refer more or less to the aspect of going forth. (2) towards chung sheng. paril). taken over by upiiya) is the cause for death. but poison which is properly administered (lit. through compassion. Vasubandhu comments on this verse as follows: On the 4th stage. taken over by upiiya) becomes medicine. This is bodhisattva's upaya. although [a bodhisattva] dwells frequently in the [37] aids to enlightenment.nsiira: thus." Among them. an example in the Indian Mahayana texts wherein the term paril).a is transformed and becomes the cause for sa111sara.Wf!lsiira. the "extremity of reality.rected (})towards p'u-t'i. which is constituted of com-passion. The second one (chung sheng).amana connotes the "aspect of returning?" To date. or skillful means. prac-tices such 37 aids to enlightenment that are contrary and adverse (vimukha) to saf!lsiira. where the characteristic of the fourth stage (bhumi) of the bodhisattva-marga is explained. Still it does not cover directly the meaning of "returning" to this world. the practice of the 37 aids to enlight-enment which is not embraced (parigrhrta) by the upiiya of compassion is a cause for liberation. From this commentary by Sthiramati.

Engaged in the work of benefiting others with this body. and so on.88 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA The second instance is found in Mahayanasiltriilal!lkiira. hence. it becomes the cause for existence. does not eliminate klesas for the purpose of remaining in sarpsiira." and that explains how a sravaka turns his mind from Hinayana to Mahayana and becomes a bodhisattva. but when it is transformed or transferred. they will enjoy the Mahayana teachings just as the bodhisattvas. for the sravakas who have been trained to always aspire for nirviii. not entering into nirviii. When they become converted. 8 One of the reasons that the Buddha established the doctrine of ekayiina was to attract and to convert to Mahayana those sravakas who were not yet fully settled as sravakas (aniyatagotra). there is no way to be reborn in this world." as the verse states. the phrase can be interpreted Usages and Meanings . the length of his life. thus." However. therefore.~a (aprati~!hita nirviitza). he is able to trans-form at will his body.. The words "those two" in the verse refers to "sriivakas. a sravaka who has trained himself in accordance with the sravakayiina. however.56. This means that they must "transfer the holy path . has already eliminated kidas.. The word paril)amikl here is usually translated "transformation" ( ~ ~ pien-i)." Differing from the ordinary birth of sentient be-ings into this world. This verse number fifty six is one of seven verses that explicates the doctrine of ekayana. the word paril)amikl can be understood also to mean "transference". this birth is said to be "a birth inconceivably transformed. Xl. A bodhisattva. that is. I provisionally translated the phrase "a birth inconceivably trans-formed (or incarnated). within the context of this verse. because they transfer the holy path that they have obtained to [the world of] existence. means that a sravaka must be reborn in the world again and pursue the bodhisattva-practice. How this phrase is to be understood is problematic.~a. "one vehicle. To become a bodhi-sattva. and it raises other issues that require further investigation. the cause for rebirth in this world. like the previously mentioned 37 aids to enlight-enment that are adverse and opposed to the world of existence (bhava). Now. however. and his compassion is nothing but a sort of a klesa retained by him. that is. the practice of benefiting oth-ers. to existence. this birth is a birth into a realm outside of this world by a mighty bodhisattva who is endowed with a supreme and subtle body. The verse reads: Those two [who have realized the truth] will be endowed with a birth inconceivably transformed (or incarnated)." "The holy path" obtained by them is. Therefore. The compound acintyapari(liimiki-upapatti in this verse is a problem-atic phrase that appears also in texts such as the Srimiiliidevi-siltra and Ratnagotravibhiiga. except by means of paritziimana.

9 In the two instances discussed above. it was mentioned that paril)amana was closely related to other no-tions such as "wish" and "desire" (prarthana. or that the mundane was directed to-ward the supra-mundane and vice versa. If the two meanings of "transformation" and "to direct toward'' can be represented by the Chinese characters hui. hence [the birth is] acintyaparil:uimikf. that their holy path is transferred (or dedi-cated) to a birth. indeed." Vasubandhu's Vyakhya reads: It is inconceivable. paril)amana was used in the sense of "to direct toward." Com-menting on the term acintya. or what was originally the cause for one's own benefit is transformed into a cause for the benefit of others." not "a birth by transformation.e. used the word huihsiang ( . we have seen that the word paril)amana had several meanings. we saw that. "inconceivableness.." To summarize. Secondly. what is transferred inconceivably. are dedicated to and are transformed into the cause for the ultimate enlightenment. the two meanings mentioned above are seen in most cases mixed and conjoined. it meant that something of one's own was directed towards or given to others. Of course. the meaning ''transformation'' predominated in both its transitive and intransitive senses and that the meaning "transformation" was used to indicate that what was originally not a cause is transformed into a cause. In this context." a sense that seemed to have been the focus when the term was translated into Chinese. In this context. the translator of this text into Chinese." In his transla-tion Prabhakaramitra." and so forth. we saw that the aids to enlightenment or the holy path (both supra-mundane) were directed towards sarpsaric mean "a birth constituted by inconceivable transference. (tlg!l and hsiang (rPJ). To have either sarpsara or existence as the indirect object clearly indicates that paril)amana in these two cases refers to "the aspect of returning to this world. the indirect object of paril)amana is either "sarpsara" or "existence" (bhava) instead of the usual "supreme enlightenment. which are declared to be nothing but sunya in the Prajnaparamitasiitra. The term hui-hsiang means "a birth [acquired] by transference.i® rPJ) instead of pien-i ( ~ ~). kusalamiila or the root of virtue and other human efforts. First. Used in this sense. i. then the Chinese translation would seem to be a good one. with respect to this word. Further. . pratikarrzk$ati) and that it was almost equal to even ideas such as "aspirating for enlightenment" or "awakening to the thought [of enlightenment]" (cittotpada) and "vow" (pral)idhana).

in Jodo Shin Shu (True Pure Land) Buddhism. pari!)amana is said to be wholly an attribute of the power of Amida's Vow. in other words. I shall leave that investigation up to specialists of Jodo Shin Shu Buddhism. whether it should be understood in a totally different way. . But. the explanations given above convey the general meanings of pari!)amanii. including the work of Dharmakara. Whether Amida's activity of pari!)iimana should be understood in the meanings mentioned above. should originate from the power of Amida's Vow-all of these. there can be no pari!)amana on the part of ordinary sentient beings." are questions worthy of further investigation. or whether a bodhisattva's practice in general. including the doctrinal interpretations of Amida's pari!)iimana "in the aspect of returning to this world.90 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA Now.

will be used throughout this paper as the English equivalent." that is. to per-ceive" and then "to overlook. too. In contrast to this. IV. to be negated or prohibited. and the Tibetan equivalent as btang snyoms (to abandon and equalize). XYIII. to be indifferent to the happiness of other beings (MSA. means to be interested neither in happiness nor in suffering. not as defiled or neutral. In Buddhism. IV. The term upek~ii appears in various Buddhist texts with different con-notations.Chapter 9 Tranquil Flow of Mind: An Interpretation of Upek~a We find in Buddhism a religious term called "upek$d" often translated as "indifference. disregard. however. For a religion." It is one of the mental factors (caitasika) found in human beings and is classified as morally good (kusala). 17." and so on. the ultimate concern is usually considered the attainment of a state of highest bliss or salvation from all sufferings. of course. . neglect. apathy. The Tibetan translation for upek~ii changes from the usual btang snyoms to yal bar 'dar ba (to diminish and abandon). Thus upek\iii as a Buddhist term is usually rendered into English by such words as "abandonment. The word indifference. XVIII. and so forth." getting rid of both love and hatred.27. its root Vlk\i means primarily "to look at. 8).4). Upek\iii is an object of religious practice and also a virtue that can even be attributed to Bodhisattvas and Buddhas. Ac-cording to dictionaries. "indifference.l3) or "to abandon moral precepts" (MSA. when used in such passages as: "to abandon living beings. neither in pleasure nor in sorrow. It seems to be rather particular to Buddhism that such a mental state is ap-plauded as "good" and as a higher virtue. I. This kind of upek~ii is. how-ever. The original Sanskrit for indifference is upek\iii (upekkha in Piili). liberation (vimukti) or enlightenment (bodhi) is often assumed to be such a state. to spurn). It is used for example in a secular or literal meaning: "It is un-reasonable to think that the Buddha remains indifferent to a future calamity of his Doctrine" (MSA. abandon." "* The Chinese equivalent is always given as she (to abandon. indifference.

tranquil flow (prasa{hatii) of the mind. and rejoicing (muditii). Also it will be noticed here that a mental factor (caitasika) means a mentality.92 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA A sensation neither painful nor pleasing is also called "upek~a. The Visuddhimagga. His definition reads as follows: Upek~a is equilibrium (samatii) of the mind. The upek~a belonging to the category of the four infinitudes stated above is regarded in some cases2 as different from the upek~a that I will discuss in this paper. and end are respectively illustrated. I shall confine myself to an examination of the upek~ii that is classified as one of the morally good mental factors. the Yogacara definition by Sthiramati in his Trimsikii may be the most advanced one. also called "brahmic states" (brahma-vihiira). and effortlessness (aniibhogatii) of the mind. Although various teachers have given definitions of 3 upek~a. is unique in that it means infinite indifference. There are still other categories in which upek~a is included as a mem-ber. this anxiety is nullified." But this is a subdivision of the category "sensation" (vedanii). Or we can say the first three virtues are ethical ones more applicable to the social realm. however. Here. in this stage. middle. [as for prasa{hatii. mentions ten kinds. the mind is still followed by the anxiety of mental depression and exaltation.] without volitional effort and without special exertion. Upon extinction of this inequality. After that. And this has the function of giving a foundation for not allowing the space where all principal and secondary defilements arise. one first attains equilibrium of the mind. The other three infinitudes are that of friendliness (maitri). being free from both love and hate towards living be-ings. and this is the tran-quil flow of the mind. inequality of the mind is either mental depression (laya) or mental exaltation (auddhatya). the stage of effortlessness of the mind is reached by one for whom there is no need to make any effort to obtain remedies for mental depression and mental exaltation. while upek~a is a more religious one concerned with the realm of meditation. compassion (karu(lii). Here. Upek~a. These four are all re-garded as the highest virtues. the concentrated and even mind takes place in due order. 1 and the "seven members of enlightenment" (bodhymiga) is one of them. for example. which is one of the mental factors (caitasika). Then. and is distinguished from this separate men-tal factor called upek\iii that we are discussing here. the stages of indifference at the beginning. By three words. Then. a possibility common to every living being. I since the meditational exercise reaches higher and higher degrees and its adver-saries [such as diversity of the mind] become farther and farther away. A very famous upek~a is one of the four "infinitudes" (apramii(la). However. with indifference (upek$ii) as the fourth. because it has not been cultivated for a long period of time. 4 Tranquil Flow of Mind . [as for aniibhogatii.

a similar meaning is stated: "it (styana) means the mind lacking in readiness or workability (akarmm)yatii). As far as I know. which is sometimes defined by using a term such as linaf[l cittam (despir-ited mind). In the Yogacara or epistemological approach. In our discussion of the samata aspect of upek~a. and effortlessness. both being classified as secondary de-filements in the list of mental factors. or of all sentient be-ings.29). tranquil flow. Antic-ipating this definition. p. The word karmaQyata.In this definition of upek~a. equality or equilib-rium of the mind is an extinction of the inequality that is called ''mental depression" (laya) on the one hand and "mental exaltation" (auddhatya) on the other. where he dis-cusses the equality or siinyata of all entities in order to demonstrate the character of universal nonproduction (dharma-anutpiida-samatii). (2) prasathata. it is a part of delusion" (AS. and probably its prototype. Auddhatya and styana or laya are serious hindrances on the course of a monk's yogic practice." It is a mental state able to respond quickly at any critical moment. capability. the first paragraph gives the gen-eral characteristic of upek~a. Outside these lists. samatii is philosophically a very important term with varied connotations. Of these three key terms. the word laya is replaced by styiina (Pali thina. 17. In most lists of the mental factors. but it has also been used with the mean-ing of "equality. It is a free action without hesitation or doubt. these texts are the first incidences of the three key terms appearing together with more or less similar wordings. or the equality of all dharmas. equality of existence and non-existence is stated as the fundamental standpoint. are other definitions in the Sriivakabhumi (SrBh) of the Yogiiciirabhumi and in Asaitga's Abhidhar-masamuccaya (AS) accompanied by Jinaputra's Bhiisya. Numerous siitras ex-pound the equality of various aspects of reality such as self and other. there are three key terms that I shall ex-amine in particular: (I) samata. In the case of upek~a we are using the trans-lation "equilibrium" for samata. same thing since the both. not an instinctive . described by the three key terms: equilibrium. In the above definition by Sthiramati. Of these. we always encounter laya alone." In the Madhyamic or metaphysical approach. equality of perceiving and nonper-ceiving represents another fundamental standpoint. laya means "mental inactivity" (MW). chapter 6. sa111sara and nirvaQa. or agility. which appears in this definition with a neg-ative prefix. as far as I know. The second paragraph explains the function of upek~a. alert-ness. has important connotations of "workability. and (3) anabhogata. The Dasabhumikasutra mentions ten kinds of equality that were quoted by Candrakirti in his Madhyamakiivatiira. In the definition of styana.

Both auddhatya and laya are classified as secondary defilements. It is a state in which the mind becomes ambitious. one concentrates uninterruptedly on things which call forth disgust (ud-vega) [at the sa111saric existence] or on similar things-this is the mark of calming (famathanimitta). When the mind is depressed (laya) or feared to be depressed. To this Sthiramati adds the explanation (Trirnsika. the Sarndhinirmocana. what was formerly laughed at. in conformity with one's desire. and by negating them a third. Auddhatya and laya. and because an infinite number of them attain it. insensitive.23): "styana is a motionless state (staimitya). the mind be-comes dull. and ebullient. and upek:iii-nimitta? [Answer:] When the mind is exalted (auddhatya) or feared to be exalted. transcends these two and constitutes their negation." Styana is lan '('~ ~'t means are to attain they are all continually attaining it. and consequently one's mind is . .j1j! ~means the the mind is proud. chapter VIII. and cannot perceive the object [of meditation]. you need not be dep X. being united with this.. p. saying (Trirnsika.27): "Samatha is the remedy for it. upek~a. buoyant. As a result of the negation of the two extremes of laya and aud-dhatya. To begin with. as negative values. and (3) the mark of indifference (upek$d). II brings to life the depressed On the other hand.. unsteady. The former two must be rejected and thereby upek~a is realized. but an action of the illuminated mind freed from all concern. one concentrates on things that call forth delight (abhiriima) Tranquil Flow of Mind . Thus. Related to these three terms is another set called the "three marks" (nimitta) which include: (I) the mark of calming (Samatha). is at-tained. thus." however.30). One remembers. excited. Laya is the absence of this enlightened responsiveness or karmal)yata. Upek~a "indifference. auddhatya. and upek~a correspond to a set of notions combined in a dynamic process where the first two members are contradictory to each other. p. and enjoyed. p. Sthiramati adds another explanation to that of AS. and lacking seriousness. auddhatya "mental exaltation" is laya and is defined as the mind "restless" or "not stilled" (avyupasama) (AS. loved. stand in opposition: the former moves in an upward direction and the latter moves downward. pragraha-nimitta. upek~a can be seen as the middle. 3!.l7. (2) the mark of uplifting (pragraha). 3!. (These two terms may resemble in some ways the modern psychologist's definition of manic depression). laya. reads as follows: What are famatha-nimitta.94 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA one.

65. XIV. The three marks are also adopted by Vasubandhu in his Bhiisya on the Mahiiyiina-sutriilaiJlkiira. In the Sriivakabhumi (Wayman. it is also remarkable that. When the depressed mind is thus eliminated by means of intuitive discernment (vipasyana) and the exalted r. one's mind is not defiled by the two defilements mentioned above. This is the mark of upek$ii. Also it is obvious that pragraha is synonymous with vipasyana. no difference in principle seems to exist between the system of the three marks and that of the four. incite." But it is now clear that in the present context it means "to activate. K This is a clear exposition concerning the relationship between the three marks. mental depression will be removed.49. When the mind is exalted. This is the mark of samatha (tranquility)." and so on. mental exaltation will be removed. In Sthiramati's exposition. The mind being elevated (or uplifted) thereby. The mind being calmed thereby. vipasyana-nimitta (mark of intuitive discernment) being added as the second mark. or the pair combined together (yuganaddha). the word pragraha (its verbal form is pragrhiJati) literally means "to hold. cheer up. Whether practicing only the path of calming (Sa-matha). age. and XVIII. stimulate. the mind occurs spontaneously and concen-trates effortlessly-this is called the mark of indifference (upek$iinimitta). But. in-stead of three. XVIII. in the state of upek~a. XVIII. one should meditate on the activities and other virtues of the Buddha. because any concentration on them will mean a failure of the equilibrium of the mind. he now concentrates neither on the mark of samatha nor on the mark of vipasyana. Usu-ally translated into Chinese by chii (~to lift up). This is the mark of pragraha (uplifting). one should me-ditate on the faults of sarpsiira such as birth.53.and one reflects on one's delighted mind-this is the mark of uplifting (pragrahanimitta). however. as pragraha in this context is synonymous with vipasyanii. 7-10. on the other hand. one should not concentrate even on the mark of samatha or on the . or only the path of intuitive discernment (vipasyana). 7 p. encourage. 6 it uses these three terms as one set. we see four terms. Sthiramati's subcommentary in these places can be roughly summed up in the following way: When the mind is depressed. 391-94). Shukla. p." and I put it as "uplifting. seize. 116-7.5 When the Bodhisattvabhumi expounds meditational exercise (bhiivanii) and vigor (virya). The glosses explaining these four terms are much richer in the SrBh than in other texts. and death.~ind elimi-nated by means of making it tranquil (samatha). a practitioner attains equilibrium (samata) of the mind and dwells immovably in indifference (upek$ii).

This word is accompanied by the phrases "without volitional effort" (anabhisarrzskiiret:~a) and "without spe-cial exertion" (aprayatnena) and is synonymous with "the concentrated and even mind. as is upeksii. only when it works correctly. are the highest means of training. is it a remedy for exaltation (auddhatya). prasathatii is a difficult and curious word. consequently. and their synthesis yuganaddha." It is a balanced state of the mind and originates from the negation of laya and auddhatya. samatha and vipasyanii. is equal to depression (laya). From the above discussion. in transcending samatha and vipasyanii. therefore. If wrongly applied. if applied wrongly. Upekl)ii can also be interpreted as a dialectical synthesis of samatha and vipasyanii and. According to dictionaries. the first definition of upekl)ii is "equilibrium. which are used in traditional forms of practice. Likewise. both sa-matha and vipasyanii become obstacles for attaining the equilibrium of upekl)ii. Thus. and only right vipasyanii (or pragraha) is a remedy for laya. These relationships may be represented in the following way: (mutually complementary) The second definition of upekl)ii given by Sthiramati in the Trirrzsikii is "tranquil flow" (prasathatii) of the mind.96 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA mark of vipasyanii. von Otto Bohtlingk. we can see a certain relationship between upekl)ii and yuganaddha. Yuganaddha is a synthesis of samatha and vipasyanii. vipasyanii (or pra-graha). if applied wrongly. is nothing other than auddhatya. But the sense given by the text is: samatha.'' Among these various terms. which remains closer to its original sense of a combination of samatha and vipasyanii. We can easily understand that samatha and vipasyanii tend to be-come hindrances if people cling to them. letzte . boshaft" Fassung. a sublation of the two. Of course. it maintains a stronger sense of negation than yuganaddha. (Sanskrit-worterbuch in Kurzerer prasatha means "sehr falsch. with the difference that upekl)ii originally arose from negation of laya and auddhatya and.

9 He translates its Tibetan equivalents: rna! du 'bab pa or rna! du 'dug pa (elsewhere." Based upon these. is found in two or three versions. it is not clear as can be seen in Levi's translation above. Hsi. S. Apart from the Tril'flsika. preserved in Sanskrit and in Chinese translations. To begin with. 362)." These meanings. upek~a is defined in the AS by the same word "cittaprasathata" as in Sthiramati's Tril'flsika." he does not refer to Levi's etymological theory nor pro-pose one of his own. p. which vary according to the texts. I would like. Here in this paper.ian-tsang translates it as "cor-rectness 'l'!t ) (TaishO. which Sylvain Levi refers to in his French translation of TriYflsikii. p. because the inequalities of laya and auddhatya have been eliminated.Tranquil Flow of Mind Nachtrage. All three texts are trans-lated by Hsi. of which we have no Chinese translation. 664b). en quasi-somnolence" and its Chinese equivalent hsiang chii hsiang 1\1¥ ~tf . I shall examine mainly the Chinese translations of prasa{ha. 117 n. activity). Prasatha is listed in the Mvy as No. In his edition of the SrBh.() iE@ . however. Although Edgerton refers to Mvy in his dictionary and translates the Tibetan equivalent as "entrance into tranquillity. XXXI. however. This translation is also adopted in texts and straightness of the mind" (hsin cheng chih hsing. 12 the Ti-betan translations and some of Chinese translations can be helpful in under-standing the most relevant meaning of the word. 2101. Actually we have a cognate word sii{hya as one of the defiled mental factors and it means "guile. obviously cannot be applied to the present case. his translation of prasatha is "remission" (remission. forgiving).f§ as "abaisser les caracteres. 10 Walpola Rahula translates the word as "Ia passivite" and its root sath as "etre paresseux" in his 11 translation of AS. deceit. The Chinese translation found in the Mvy is not a good one. Wayman refers to Levi's note and Edgerton's dictionary and then translates prasatha as "repose.ian-tsang and the MV is also available in Paramartha's transla-tion. hereafter T. . there are at least three texts. (We do not find the word prasafha in the Mahayana-sutralal'flkara and Abhidharmakosa). He also suggests that prasatha may be a Prakrit form of the Sanskrit prasratha (from root Ysranth) "relikhement" (or relaxation). to pro-pose "tranquil flow" as a translation for prasatha." Herman Jacobi translates it "Regsamkeit" (agility.. however. Madhyantavibhaga (including its bha.ian-tsang's translation of prasa{ha. Such a translation is understandable since upek~a means the attainment of a mental state that is correct or un-deviating and not curved or uneven. or "very false or wicked" (MW). Although its etymology in Sanskrit seems to be problematic. Hsi. the reason for which will follow presently.vya) and Abhidharma-samuccaya. rna! du 'jug pa also ap-pears) as "etre en repos. where the word prasatha appears: Sravaka-bhumi.

ifit fl (in prose) (T 1599. p." It is "tranquil.. and inexertion). p. XXXI. Abhidharmavatiira (T 1554).5 explicates the fourfold supernatural power (rddhi-piida) and mentions as its basis the mental factor "agility" (karma~yatii). 394). ~ffi tbrg erh liu. ff )I f~H1) (T 1579. prasatha-svarasaviihitii is the word used to define upek~a. In this case Hsiian-tsang translates prasatha as "balanced. In Hinayanic Abhidharma treatises such as Abhidharma-kosa. Thus. depression-exaltation. 117. fang may mean either "to let . she "abandoned" or "spurned. 849a). Yogacaras most probably introduced prasatha into the understanding of upek$ii. but relaxed and in repose. m Based upon all these meanings and also considering the Tibetan rna! du 'jug pa. and hsiang hsii seems to correspond to the Sanskrit viihita or vahana (flowing. p.. These are all Yogacara trea-tises and may be assumed to be somewhat Abhidharmic in their way of defining upek~a. it is not Tranquil Flow of Mind ." or "to make free". XXX. p. sloth. or coursing in one's own path") as "spontane-ously occurring" (jen yiin chuan hsing. a very important notion to which I referred to above. p. and "being conveyed. when laya and auddhatya are made tranquil. overexertion. 456b). to let flow".e. 30b). Therefore. XXXI. Paficaskandha-prakarm:za by Vasubandhu (T 1612. must have the same context as the prose and mean "to let go.. 471 b). Commenting on this type of upek~a.. IV. p." In any case. 48lc). p. flowing.98 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGA. p. The Madhyantavibhaga. I am not quite sure how to understand these phrases. 458c). Agility is explained here as a result of the "eightfold relinquishing activity" (prahii~a-sa!Jlskiira) that relinquishes the five faults (do$a) (i. Shukla. Paramartha's translations corresponding to these are fang she ttl. XXXI. XXXI. there is in this case cheng chih. I have translated prasatha as "tranquil flow. and so forth. conveying) that form a com-pound where prasatha is the first member. Further. the word prasatha does not appear in the definitions of upek~a. Vasubandhu states: " . Upek~a is the eighth of this relinquishing activity. * lE 00: )." not depressed nor exalted. In the Sriivakabhumi (Wayman. Jf ~ ffif ifit and its abbreviated form in the verse as teng liu ~ ifit (T 1600. but provisionally I shall translate them respectively as "freely abandoned" and "freely flowing in succession. XXXI. liu "flowing" is used in common with Hsiian-tsang. and Ch' engwei-shih-lun (T 1585.. Hsiiantsang includes the four characters for prasatha in the eight that he selects to represent clearly the nature of upek~a.* (in verse) and fang liu hsiang hsii ttl. in-attentiveness." directly suggesting the nature of upek~a.CARA such as: Hsien-yang-sheng-chiao-lun by Asanga (T !602.

This time. of course.28. These objects are ar-ranged in twelve categories. V. Hsiian-tsang translates it as yiin . the teachings as established in the scriptures. Thus. T XXXI.J1 (in the prose). V. Prasa~ha. we read the phrase: "without volitional effort (anabhisaf!lskiire~w) and without special exertion (aprayatnena). 463b). and so on. and eleventh Buddha stage. and (2) dharmadhiitu. is called "supreme object" (prakar$a-iilambana) and is studied on the ninth. we may assume that it is upek~a that is indicated by prasathatva since we find this term only in conjunction with upek~a. It is also explained by Vasubandhu that only the first two items. the former includes the six perfections (piiramitiis).. it is a state that one has reached after a long assiduous effort." is more positive than the supposed Skt. but at this point effort is no longer needed. The twelfth object. 477a). there is no need to make any effort for the purpose of obtaining remedies for mental depression and exaltation." Paramartha translates it a little differently as sheng 1: "to bear. it is ready to move. Thus the same dharma and dharmadhatu are studied from a special angle.static." "To con-vey" probably alludes to the same meaning as "flowing" in the phrase above. Although the term upek~a does not appear in the explanations involved here." The text goes on to say: ''." Prasa~ha appears again in the Madhyiintavibhiiga. The first two. In the previous discus-sion on prasathata. that of upek~a. p. p. The subject of MV. and others. the highest one. This effortlessness. dharma and dharmadhiitu. upek~a or the "tranquil flow"(of the mind) is a fairly high object. the last but one. while accumulating deep inner energy. in the course of the Bodhisattva's path. those of the ten stages. are enumerated. does not mean a negation of effort.. the fourfold noble truth (iiryasatya). however. on the eighth bhumi that is characterized as "effortlessness. translated as "tranquil flow. "flowing in equilibrium.28 is the various objects of learning in Mahayana practice or the Bodhisattva Path (bodhisattva-miirga)." . the objects of the three kinds of wisdom. are: (I) dharma. the fundamental objects of learn-ing. "Tranquil flow" (prasarhatva) is mentioned as the eleventh object and is said to be studied on the eighth stage (bhumi) of the Bodhisattvamarga." The third definition of upeksa in the Trif!lsikii is "effortlessness" (aniibhogatii) of the mind.11 (an abbreviated form in the verse) and teng yiin ~ . which may mean respectively "to convey" and "to convey in equilibrium. etymology prasratha which means "relaxation. to bring forth" (T XXXI. tenth. Dharma-realm. are the real objects to be studied throughout the whole path under different names according to the different kinds of wis-dom acquired or the different stages of advancement. that is. but calmly "flowing". Next. and the latter is equated with suchness (tathatii).

and consequently freedom of the mind. one must devote total attention to following exactly what the instructor taught. XX-XXI. But. XX-XXI. To give an example from everyday life. when a Bodhisattva realizes the universality of the Dharma-realm (dharmadhiitu-sarvatragiirtha) (MV. 19-20). the Bodhisattva on attaining the eighth bhumi is called "one who is indifferent" (upek$aka) (MSA. etc. 14 We can compare this situation with the effortlessness of Tranquil Flow of Mind . in the situation where attainment needs no more effort. MSA. MV. But. when one has fully mastered the technique. one who shares the virtue of upek~a with the Buddha. The seventh bhumi. even forgetting the "marks" of instruction. a Bodhisattva will understand the insight he attained by means of the marks (nimitta) (of the teachings) and exercise every effort in deepening that insight.14) or the ultimate siinyata (MSA.lO). and in truth sunya. The words saiJ1skiira and abhisaiJ1skiira [both can be translated as volitional effort] here convey almost the same meaning as iibhoga (effort). One who is interested in and is clinging to something will naturally endeavor to attain it. etc. one will be able to drive a car correctly and safely without any effort or special attention on one's part. these marks are abolished at this stage and the practitioner realizes that reality has no mark. 11. or that what is attained by effort is not yet the ultimate reality. Detachment. is an effect of the ef-fortlessness of upek~a. after receiving training and practicing repeatedly. nirnimittavihiira.14. the eighth bhiimi is defined as "without mark and without volitional effort" (animitta-anabhisaiJ1skiira) (MSA. clinging to nothing. The Visuddhimagga states that it is like a well-trained thoroughbred that a skilled rider allows to follow its own course. The "path of cultivation" (bhiivanii-mfirga) starts immediately after the moment of this insight. is characterized by the word "marklessness" (nirnimittatii. although the virtues of the Buddha are not limited to upek~a only. [There is a situation where reality manifests itself only when every effort has been abandoned. XX-XXI. Further. one is indifferent.I5. 11. that it is markless or formless (iinimitta). but with volitional effort" (animitta-sasaf! 1skiira). XX-XXI. however. but also This means that reality is beyond [human] effort.).. Upek~a is such effortlessness. from the first to the sixth bhiimi. while the seventh bhiimi is defined as ''without mark.] Thus.15). First. that is. when one is learning how to drive a car.100 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA We often encounter in the siitras and sastras a statement that effortless-ness (aniibhoga) is the characteristic of the eighth stage (bhumi) of the ten stages on the Bodhisattva Path. this realization is called the "entrance into the first bhiimi" or the "path of insight" (darsana-miirga). In this path. Thus.

17 . he [a Bodhisattva] dwells anywhere he wishes as a supreme being. because in so far as effort is needed the truth cannot manifest itself. Daisetz T. To in-struct Yagyii Tajima in the art and way of swordsmanship. As a final instance of upek~a. When this happens you use the hands when they are needed. which are elucidated in MSA. and no time or no extra energy will be wasted. in a letter to his student. let it flow throughout the totality of your being. and yet at any critical moment. calm and balanced. a seventeenth century Zen master. to convey the subtle aspect of upek~a.upek~a. Prajfia Immovable is this mind capable of infinite movements. we can see that upek~a constitutes the elimination of mental depression and exaltation. a quick and apt response arises freely and spontaneously. To recapitulate what has been stated above. it is an equilibrium. Takuan used Prajfia. to every one of the ten quarters. which is the Buddha's nondiscriminative knowledge. who was a sword-master serving the Shogun. Iyemitsu. again: The thing is not to try to localize the mind anywhere but to let it fill up the whole body. 16 In these words of Takuan we can find the ancient idea of upek~a. Yagyii Tajima no Kami.61 which reads: Through upek$d. the last member of the seven. 15 Or. because of abiding in [the twofold wisdom of] nondiscrimination and its sequels. interest. but ef-fortlessness in the end is more important. It is transcendental wisdom flowing through the relativity of things] and it remains immovable. The same idea is also expressed by Takuan. or attachment disappears. you use the legs or the eyes when they are needed. and knows no hin-drances in any direction. is explained in the XVIII. we turn to the "seven members of enlightenment" (bodhyanga). though this does not mean the immovability or insen-sibility of such objects as a piece of wood or rock. Suzuki has paraphrased it in the following manner: [Prajna is possessed by all Buddhas and also by all sentient beings. It is the mind itself endowed with infinite motilities: it moves forward and backward. Upek~a. effort of "volitional effort" (abhisaf!Jskara) is important. a state of "tranquil flow" in which every effort. to the left and to the right.

he sets up his dwelling without effort. upek~a is expounded and equated with nondiscriminative knowledge. the positive. He goes on to say: "Because of abiding in subsequent [wisdom] (tat-pr$Jha-labdhena vihiiretza). transcending. I believe upek~a is such a high virtue that it should not escape our attention. he obtains other [virtues and bhumis] and [faults] vanish. the mind that knows no-stopping. 20 . when upek~a appears in the same way as the last member of the seven members of enlightenment. the foundation. ethical three members-friendliness. as it were. it is equated with nondiscriminative knowledge. 18 Although in Ch' eng-wei-shih-lun. which in its turn is equated with karmatzyatti (agil-ity). Ancient Indian teachers were aware of this subtle faculty and. Because of abiding in nondiscrim-inative [wisdom] (nirvikalpena vihiiretza). and upek$ii (indifference)-are regarded as the highest attainment in which all defilements are nullified. Takuan called it "the mind that is no-mind. and rejoicing. upek~a is associated with a high mental factor such as pras-rabdhi (alleviated-ness). Upek~a comes last as the fourth member in the four infinitudes. compassion. Further. In the system of the seven members of enlightenment. 19 upek~a is explained as a nominal. we can assume that upek~a represents a rather high mental state. and it is also regarded as the characteristic of an advanced stage such as the eighth bhiimi." and that. delving into this subtle state of mind." It is remarkable that. Prasrabdhi is the condition of this nullification. having this upek~a. a Bodhisattva can dwell or stay anywhere he wishes. or the mind abandoned and yet not abandoned . In conclusion. And finally. samiidhi (concentration). and upek~a. provisional entity. All these facts indicate the del-icate and profound quality of upek~a. the nullification itself. in referring to the Buddha's highest wisdom..102 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA Vasubandhu comments on this verse saying that "upek~a is nondiscriminative wisdom... the last three members-prasrabdhi (alleviated-ness). it is mentioned as one of the eleven mental factors (not a large number) characterized as morally good. As we have seen. samadhi.

above all. They may present interesting problems in comparison with the concept of deities in Brahmanism and Hinduism of India. it may be easily discerned that a greater emphasis is put on wisdom. I would like to confine myself to reviewing some aspects of the theory of Buddha-body formulated in Indian Mahayanism. which means "an awakened one" or "an enlightened one. All his disciples. Different from a so-called deity. the absolute. or with the theo-logical concepts in Christianity and other religions. however. From the name Buddha (an awakened one). It is needless to say that the word Buddha. Of these. wisdom (prajiiii) and benevolence (karul)ii). showed infinite respect for Gautama Bud-dha. Gautama Buddha's (the historical Buddha. godhead." is an epithet of respect for Gautama Sakyamuni. but . Here. and a word such as bodhi (enlighten-ment). viewing them from within Buddhism. none other than a way a hu-man being should be. the intellect that penetrates human life and the love for all living beings. the founder of Buddhism. the Buddha is.Chapter 10 On the Theory of Buddha-Body (Buddha-kaya) I How to conceive the true significance of the concept Buddha has been one of the most important themes discussed among Buddhist disciples and followers ever since the religion originated in India. are said to be the two principal pillars. and so forth. The attributes and virtues attached to the Buddha came to be variously readjusted in later years. a transcendent being. or with the concept of god. Sakyamuni) breaking the bonds of transmigration and entering nirval)a signifies the perfection of this wisdom. in religious studies in general. Theories concerning the Buddha-body (buddha-kiiya) underwent various developments during the course of a history ranging from India to Japan and from Ceylon to Mongolia. of course. But this was not the awe-inspiring reverence such as for a deity.

such as the leader of a religious order. an omniscient and omnipotent god as the creator of the universe. the Prajfiiipiiramitii. those who see me will see the dharma. To the disciples. This can be understood from the following words of the Buddha uttered on his deathbed in answer to the Venerable Ananda.RA respect for a great elder and forerunner. The Buddha once said: "Those who see 'dependent origination' (pratityasamutpiida) will see the dharma. and in early Mahayana siitras. decided first of all to confirm in themselves the Buddha's teachings and then to compile them in order to transmit them to future gen-erations. To them the Buddha was a great elder and teacher. and is also "existences" that are formed by the laws and that shoulder the laws. which could not be seen with the naked eye. while the dharma-kaya is the Buddha's personality seen in the dharma or dharma-nature. those who see the dharma will see 'dependent origination. the dharma itself was the teacher. or a god that governed and punished human beings.CA. They did not place much impor-tance in a transcendental god. the theories of the twofold and threefold body of the Buddha were gradually systematized. had asked whom he should revere as teacher when the Buddha had passed away: "Let the self be a lamp.' " 2 He also said: "Those who see the dharma will see me. Though the Buddha's body had perished." And also: "After I am gone the dharma (teaching) and the vinaya (discipline) which I have expounded will 1 be your teacher. just as the Buddha had instructed on his deathbed. the dharma he had left behind was imperishable. even though they did not necessarily repudiate such concepts." But later this Buddha came to be super-humanized and was made di-vine.104 MA. quite bewildered at the loss of their teacher. was conceived in addition to the Buddha's earthly form which the disciples still vividly remembered. The word dharma has many meanings. The teacher to whom they should address their questions lived in the dharma. The disciples. The riipa-kaya is the Buddha seen in a human body. and even a highly theistic conception finally materialized. let the dharma (truth) be a lamp. but neither a prophet nor even an authority. as will be described. (l) the Dharma-body (dharma-kiiya) and (2) the Physical-body (rupa-kiiya). the Saddharmapu(l(iarika." 3 In this way the concept of 'dharma-kaya' occurred. it is also the "law" that lies at the basis of things.DHY AMIKA AND YOGA. until. In this sense. overcome with grief. but it has as its original meaning the idea of "essence" that makes a thing what it is. who. BeOn the Theory of Buddha-Body . Not only does it signify the "teachings" that the Buddha expounded. let the dharma be a refuge. The theory of the twofold body of the Buddha advocates that the Bud-dha had two bodies. let the self be a refuge. and so forth. the sayings which the teacher had left behind-the expounded dharma-were now their only lamp. The Buddha as dharmakiiya in eternal aspect. This theory became stabilized in a variety of earlier siitras.

and also ''religion'' itself. the word dharmatii (dharma-nature) came to be also used to represent the essence itself of this dharma. they found it inconceivable that this great event had been brought about through the dis-cipline of one short lifespan. 4 Later in the advanced stages of Mahayana Buddhism. to which the doctrine of the Buddha's body is closely related. the universe is none other than the "dharma-dhatu" (dharma-realm). Furthermore. Gautama must have accumulated from time without beginning a great stock of merit in innumerable past lives. a deer. There were and will be innumerable seekers of truth in the past and in the . and finally. but when it manifests itself as the dharma-dhatu. a well-established concept of the 'bo-dhisattva. It may be said to have developed from investigations that were made concerning Buddha (-hood). the dharma-kaya is the body of the dharma-nature as well. however. however. the monkey. came into existence quite early. His long career as a seeker of truth (bodhisattva) finally perfected the "human Buddha. that is. un-heard of in the history of humankind. the dharma-dhatu is identified with dharmata or tathata (suchness) and even with siinyata (emp-tiness). Again. The concept of a bodhisattva as a seeker after enlightenment." In this way. Being the true way of the universe. and so forth. As a seeker of truth. Dharma-dhatu extends over the two realms of enlightenment and of deluded human beings. The rabbit. this must have born fruit in the marvelous event of his enlightenment. In former lives. The fact that Gautama realized the highest enlightenment in human flesh. The word thus included religious and ethical as well as philosophical and metaphysical meanings. in this life. or as a wealthy man. together with these metaphysical views of the universe. Such beliefs gave rise to the many narratives of Gautama Buddha's former lives. people seem to have understood it with these different meanings in mind. or indepen-dently and in parallel with them. When the dharma-kaya as the dharma itself was discussed in relation to the Buddha. Therefore. and others were all Gautama himself. there is. with the defilements of joy and sor-row. Gautama accumulated merits by performing good deeds as a rabbit. the Buddha was made to be more and more superhuman and fi-nally culminated in becoming absolute. the seeker of truth. is not to be limited to Gautama alone. Such is a rough sketch of the Mahayana development of the doctrine of Buddha-body. which is purified of all human delusions. In Mahayana Buddhism. it is then called the "Buddha." The seeker of truth.' which may be said to constitute the core of Mahayanism. dharma designates "religious rites" as well. a minister of state. was regarded by his disciples as an extremely marvelous event. a monkey. on the other hand. the Jiitaka tales. a seeker after truth. a king. when the universe is conceived in the dimen-sion of such dharma.side these meanings.

The vow and disciplines of Gautama. mentioned above. Here appeared the third concept. as there are also at the present time. Amida Buddha signifies both unlimited wisdom (Amitiibha) and unlimited benevolence (Amitiiyus). It may be said that in this way all the materials (or the elements) for the later theory of the Buddha's threefold body had made their appearance: the elements of the Dharma-body and the Physical-body plus the elements of the Reward-body. His vow (praf)idhiina) is a pledge intrinsic to a bodhisattva. then all Buddhas. which he fulfilled in a long period of discipline. It is probably in Mahayana si. see footnote 11) of the 5 Buddha. all living beings essentially have the potentiality of becoming seekers of truth. too. The Reward-body is the body of the Buddha in which the fulfillment of his above-described vows and disciplines has been rewarded.' apart from the Dharma-body and Physical-body. According to the Larger Sukhiivatfvyiiha.106 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA future. But generally speaking.itra and the time of Nagarjuna who developed the Miidhyamika philosophy based on the On the Theon of Buddha-Bod\' . discipline was represented by the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra. Inquiry into the essential meaning of the one called a bodhisattva or seeker of truth brings forth the subject of the bodhisattva's vow and disci-pline. until he became Amida Buddha. be-ing restricted by historical circumstances. The dharma-dhatu may be regarded as being filled with such bodhisattvas.itras. in so far as they have fulfilled their vows and disciplines. his dis-cipline (pratipatti) designates all the practices he performs to fulfill this vow. the Pure Land si. Pure wisdom and indefatigable practice are re-quired for the realization of this aim. 6 Until the time of the Prajfiaparamita Si. The way such as that of Amida Buddha came to be understood by the name Reward-body (probably sa!Jlbhoga-kiiya in Sanskrit. and wisdom was con-cretized in the Bodhisattva Mafijusri. which arise from profound love and benevolence. that the above-mentioned careers of bodhisattvas are most typically expounded. In some sense. the Bodhisattva Dharmakara made forty-eight primal vows. the Reward-body is not limited to Amida Buddha. An innumerable number of such bodhisattvas have been conceived in Mahayana: benevolence was especially emphasized and personified in the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara. espe-cially. Therefore. The bodhisattva ideal necessarily in-dicates the way of the Buddha as Reward-body which is in accord with his vows and disciplines.itras such as the Avata!Jlsaka and. the 'Reward-body. If it were the case that the fulfilling of one's vows and disciplines was the reason and principle for becoming a Buddha. the vows of a bodhisattva. aim at the deliverance and emancipa-tion of all living beings. were accordingly various and in-dividual. must be Reward Buddhas. such as the Sukhiivatfvyiiha. There are different vows and disciplines in accordance with the way of each individual bodhisattva.

It was thought that Gautama Buddha was not the only Buddha. the first of the three bodies. it is incognizable. it can be the foundation and basis for the two other bodies. the three Buddha-bodies were called. it transcends human understanding and speculation. such as Vairocana.bhogika- . dharma-dhatu (dharma-realm). The ideas and faiths that became the materials for the three-body theory must have been established in various forms before that time. It was the Yogacara-vijflana school that organized the three-body (trikaya) theory by synthesizing these conceptions of the Buddha. the safJ'lbhogika-kaya (Enjoyment-body) and the nairma(lika-kaya (Transformation-body). and that actually there existed innumerable Buddhas in the innumerable Buddha-lands in the ten directions. which Nagarjuna once rejected. that there had been many Buddhas in the past. Amitabha. tathata (suchness). It exists all over the world with the dharma-dhatu as its own being. Amitayus. an eternal body of the Enlightened One. inconceivable. Being absolute. and there would be many Buddhas in the future. is called the Essence-body in view of the fact that dharmata (dharma-nature). Each of the three bodies is an effusion of the dharma-dhatu and can be taken as a "aris-ing" (vrtti) of the dharma-dhatu Hl [in this sense they are all Dharma-bodies]. invisible. Thus. and is the basis." and "nairmal)ika-kaya. It was in the philosophy of the Yogacara school (or the Vijflana-vada school) represented by Asailga and Vasubandhu that the two-body theory developed until it was consummated into a three-body theory. invisible. is used here to mean the Buddha's enlightenment which is one with the absolute. The word svabhava (own being).sutra." "sarp. Moreover.bhogika-kaya. Bhai~ajya-guru. There was already a tendency toward the universalization of the concept of Buddha. Ak~obhya. in particular. free from the agonies of life and death of the world of relativity. as it makes the dharma-dhatu its own being. names of Buddhas." which can be 8 said to be more theoretic names than those mentioned in the last section. without color or form. the svabhavika-kaya. The svabhavika-kaya (Essence-body). or sunyata (emptiness) is itself the Bud-dha's real essence. "svabhavika-kaya. II In the tri-kaya theory of the Buddha brought to perfection by the Yogacaravijflana school. however. it is an immovable wisdom. In contrast to the fact that the svabhavika-kaya is immovable. the sarp. succes-sively. and countless others had already been conceived. only the twofold body of Dharma-body and Physical-bod/ was con-ceived as a theory of the Buddha's body. cor9 responds to the dharma-kaya (Dharma-body) described above.

the siif!lbhogika-kiiya and the On the Theurv of Buddha-Bodv . among the three Buddha-bodies. The Buddha's biography tells us that after he attained his enlightenment under the bodhi-tree. From this enjoyment of the Pure Land. But this "for one's own enjoyment" (EJ '5f:. transforms itself to appear temporarily in the form of a physical human body. there is the view that it is not limited only to the case of Gautama Buddha but extends to also the cases of the rabbit. This is the sharing of one's own dharma-delight with others. while it remains as a principle. the second Buddha-body. is the same as the Rewardbody described above. with apprecia-tion. and are dependent on the svabhavika-kaya. and so forth of the Jiitaka tales. is not only equally visible but is truly a physical body of a corporal human being. This was none other than a Buddha-body that appeared temporarily as an actual historic being. but in the latter cases of the rabbit and other beings. we see that the Reward-body is closely connected with the Pure Land teaching. the sviibhiivika-kiiya is the foundation of the other two Buddha-bodies. the Buddha spent.108 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA kaya and the nairmal)ika-kaya are movable. But to the siif! lbhogika-kiiya. changeable. The reason that this is called a Transformation-body is that the dharma-dhatu. as well). it cannot immediately be known whether it is a bodhisattva or a Buddha in his former lives. nairmii(lika-kiiya (Transformation-body). the monkey. As regards the Transformation-body. with serene delight. in the sense that human beings can understand it intellectually (and emotion-ally. might have looked back. it is clear to everyone that the Transformation-body is the Buddha. as it were. Now. The third Buddha-body. In the former case of Gautama. limiting itself. This is none other than a Buddha-body that is visible. at the winding road of suffering he had just climbed. This is called "the Buddha's (EJ ~ ffl i:k ~ ). that is. abstract and invisible. the preaching of the dharma to others. The siif!lbhogika-kiiya. the sarpbhogika-kaya is said to be the "Buddha-body seen at an assembly for sermons"-a gathering of people who wish to hear the Bud-dha's preaching. several weeks pondering over the dharma that he himself had realized. In contrast to this. the enjoyment of the dharma is of prime importance. Having finally standing on the top of the mountain. fflJ later developed into "for the enjoyment of others" (it!!~ ffl ). or to other beings such as nirmita (transformed) and upapiiduka (self-produced). Queen Maya and one who possessed human sufferings and who conformed to the physical law of life and death. 11 Saf!lbhoga means "enjoyment. The Buddha Sakyamuni is its best example: he was a being born from the womb of his mother." It is un-derstood that one can enjoy the Pure Land and the dharma as a result of the fulfillment of one's vow and discipline. visible. There-fore.

The saf!1bhogika-kaya is. In contrast. transcending history and the Buddha as a human being. nairmal)ika-kaya was the Buddha from whom. a higher universality and divine nature are attributed to the Saf!1bhogika-kaya. Various differences. those of the Saf!1bhogika-kaya are said to be steady and indestructible. and some that are abstract and almost impossible to represent in sculpture and painting. face to face. But the trikaya theory's peculiarity can be seen in the point that such transcendency of the Reward-body cannot immediately be regarded in the same light with the dharma-kaya or the svabhavika-kaya.lika-kaya are concrete and visible-they are Physical-bodies belong-ing to the phenomenal world. 14 Putting these points together. Sakyamuni's teaching of the dharma occurred in the context of the saf!lbhogika-kaya. however. a fleshy protuberance on the crown of the head. the saf!lbhogikakaya is the Buddha-body that can be seen only by bodhisattvas in the Buddhaland and not by ordinary unenlightened men. we know that all the superhuman ele-ments found in Gautama Buddha became the elements which constituted the saf! lbhogika-kaya. 13 who shed tears when he saw the newborn Gautama and foretold of his fortune. the saf!1bhogika-kaya is transcendental to human beings. what he saw was not a physical body but.nairmiif. The trikaya theories of later ages tell about these marks of the Buddha only in relation to the saf! 1bhogika-kaya. one that enjoys the dharma. In contrast to the . the universal Buddha. and so forth. Although sculptors of Bud-dhist images have made efforts to represent these marks. An accumulation of innumerable virtues in the past lives of Gautama Buddha. according to the trikaya theory of Mahayana. are found be-tween the saf!1bhogika-kaya and the nairmal)ika-kaya. if this point is carried through to its logical end. 12 It is well known that the Buddha-body has thirty-two physical marks characteristic of a great man.lika-kiiya. in reality. it follows that. above all. was conceived and this concept served as a model for the idea of the Reward-body as fulfill-ment of a vow and discipline. his disciples were able to hear the teachings. Again. as for the Buddha's acts. However. the seer. transcending the eighty years of his human life. it can be said that in the story of Asita. This body is. In view of this fact. They are. while those of the nairmal)ika-kaya are temporary and unsteady. That is to say. it is said to be the Buddha who preaches to the assembly of bodhisattvas. a white hair between the eyebrows emitting light. the saf!lbhogika-kaya. therefore. Furthermore. In the first place. webbed fingers. there are some among them that are conceptual and impossible to visualize. this Saf! 1bhogika-kaya is connected with the way of the Reward-body. and do not recognize them in the nairmal)ika-kaya. In this sense. to mention some of them. compared with the nairmaf.

In order to enjoy the dharma.Sunyatii or dharma-dhiitu. above all. we know that the sarpbhogika-kaya is composed of a twofold character. and enter into the realm of mutability-where the Buddha-land is to be established through the act of purification. Contrary to this. which is immovable. is as it were. the human concretization of the absolute. 18 When the historical Buddha is contrasted with the super-historic Buddha. even if we might call it "a myth. nothing is said here about the enjoyment of the dharma. which is entirely abstract. which has the dharma as its essence. . and at once historic and super-historic. Therefore. not in the svabhavika-kaya. is the 15 kiiya. the sarpbhogika-kaya. the sarpbhogika-kaya is. It is owing to this character of sarpbhogika-kaya that such things as the thirty-two physical marks of the Buddha are attributed to the sarpbhogika-kaya and that the Buddha-land is expressed as a Pure Land in the context of sarpbhogika-kaya. the so-called original enlightenment ( contrast to this. The Great Compassion crystallizes itself into the preaching-a form in which the dharma-dhatu manifests itself. the sarpbhogika-kaya.§}). that is. signifying the Physical-body and the Dharma-body. It must come down from the seat of immutable . (~fj Jt). Thus. theoretic.110 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA svabhavika-kaya. The story of Amida Buddha as the Reward-body is not something like a myth of a stage before history. '' That there is no such thing as the svabhavika-kaya lightenment or enjoying the dharma is probably because it was originally the enlightenment itself. . It is improbable that stirring of "enjoyment" should be found in the svabhavika-kaya. urged by the Great Compassion." it was produced by the association of history with super-history. one that enjoys the dharma. or where the Reward-body will be realized as a result of the cause. the sarpbhogikakaya has the two aspects of being at once transcendental and phenomenal. Ni$yanda means outflow. the bodhisattva's vow and discipline. The sarpbhogika-kaya as the concretization of the svabhavika-kaya is also called "ni~yanda-kaya" (~it. abiding in which the sviibhiivika would attain enlightenment . Although the svabhavika-kaya is dharma-kaya. it is commonly done in the light of the two-body theory. The same double nature of the sarpbhogika-kaya also has been de- . the sviibhiivika-kiiya. the outflowing of the Buddha-body from the 17 dharma-dhatu. Therefore. the sviibhavika-kiiya must become concrete and relative by descending a step from the seat of the absolute. In Human deliverance can be established in the sarpbhogika-kaya. is a temporal and spatial presentation of the absolute dharma-nature. while modelling it-self after the historical Buddha. Sthiramati even said. 16 * jt). and absolutely immovable. "the kiiya.

Therefore. and to be the sole basis and principle of all Buddha-bodies. through this double character. without any universal meaning. this abstract dharmakaya must have gained universal reality-the reality that claimed equal realness with the corporal body. In the trikaya theory. The historical Buddha then existed with the physical-body. became shadowy and was slighted as a transient existence under the name of '' nairmdt:zika-kdya. the svabhavika-kaya is ." transcending both ego-centeredness and altruism. the sdiJ1bhogika-kdva shouldered a temporary meaning while being a true reality. Gautama was the only Buddha. But later with the discovery of the dharma-kdya concept. the dharma-kaya alone. lies between the svabhavika-kaya and the nairmal)ika-kaya.. the two-body theory was formed. if this were the case one might think that both svabhavika-kaya and nairmal)ika-kaya are superfluous and unnecessary and that the one Buddha-body of sa111bhogikakaya is sufficient." Historicity came to be regarded as illusionary. to the contrary. and regained its historic nature while transcending history. with less reality than his corporal body. the enjoyment or the preaching of the dharma by the sa111bhogika-kaya is explained to be a perfectly altruis-tic deed. and it might have been supported especially from the standpoint of religious monotheistic demands. whether in his past or present lives. the soteriology in Buddhism re-volves around the axis of this double character of the sa111bhogika-kaya. which had been a reality in the sphere of historical time. It . however. The sa111bhogikakaya was discovered here as something that would fill the gap.. The sa111bhogika-kaya. Later on. and serves as a link between the two. But that's not all! Sa111bhogika-kaya occupies the central position in the triplebody doctrine. were all altru-istic [i. But the special characteristic of the Mahayanic doc-trine of Buddha-body lies in the persistent maintenance of the triangular position of the three Buddha-bodies. here the Physical-body. In the simple one-body theory." But.e. is regarded really to exist. the sa111bhogika-kaya can be called the "Buddha par excel-lence. so to speak." Gautama Buddha's acts. however.On the Theon of Buddha-Body Ill scribed from the aspect of "benefit for oneself" and "benefit for others. Such a claim is possible. The dharma-kaya in this stage. Compared with this. At this stage. however. benefit for others]." that is. sa111bhogika-kaya is rather egocentric in that it is a body that has been accomplished by virtue of "selfperfection. indifferent. In this sense. was the dharma-kaya of Gautama himself. and in particular. On the other hand. under the name of svdbhdvika-kdya. Against this. For in that respect there is something fundamentally different from either the one-body or the two-body theory. and his Dharma-body was something abstract. In comparison with this. there was nothing that could reconcile the two realities of dharma-kaya and rupa-kaya. by virtue of perfecting each one of the Bu-ddha's own merits (buddhadharma-paripdka).

and a four-body and other many-body theories would be plethoric in principle. But the Reward-body in which one's vow and discipline have been rewarded as described above is especially Buddhistic and seems to be quite removed from the Christian idea. We find rather something more familiar than Christianity in the same author when he compares the view of the Hindu deities with the tri-kaya. 19 the two-body theory would be insufficient. Coomaraswamy says that the saiJ1bhogika-kaya. Similarly. A. As it is impossible to describe them here one by one. and his acts (buddha-karman) especially in regard to nairma(lika-kaya. is akin to the concept of the Trinity in Christianity. I will not go into these problems here. and nairma(lika-kaya correspond respectively to the Fa-ther. or for what reason the Buddha is said to be everlasting and always abiding." But at . and other two beings Isvara (Siva.112 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA can be said that with the birth of this scunbhogika-kam. the SafTibhogikakaya represents "the concept of God par excellence. According to him. All the attributes and virtues of the Buddha were also clarified in the system of the trikaya. Chatterjee also observes that among the trikaya. the SafTibhoga-kaya is realized in the forms of Isvara. "the Dharma-kaya is the Brahman. I shall give only a few examples: the Buddha's wisdom was regarded as an attribute belonging especially to svabhdvika-kaya. has been attempted through the system of the trikaya. timeless and unconditioned. he is the first of the triad (trimurti) of Hindu gods. the doctrine of "Buddhakaya' reached a stage of perfection in the trikaya theory." When Brahma (the creator god) is re-garded as a personification of the Brahman (the Absolute). these virtues are also considered transferable to each other. A. and the visible Jesus. the destroyer) and Vi~l)U (the preserver). the 20 figure of Christ in Glory. For example. these problems would not likely be answered thoroughly without the trikaya theory. the Nirmal)akaya in every avatar. as described in the last chapter. since the three Buddha-bodies are not independent of each other but are related in the manner of a basis and a thing based on it. the elucidation of such questions as whether there is only one Buddha or other Buddhas numerous in number. But at the same time. The theoretic perfection of the doctrine of Buddha-body lies in the triangular concept of the three Buddha-bodies. in short. III It may be possible to say that the structure of the tri-kaya. K. but I would say that. K. and so forth. vow) was treated especially in regard to Sd1J1bhogika-kaya. his will (asaya.

"actually takes birth as man. on the other hand. is not abiding in sa111sara. Mahayana Buddhism expounds a specific in nirval)a" (side by side with non-abiding in the usual ideas of nirval)a. Furthermore. insofar as its function never ceases. He cannot. or rather does not." but there is no implication of a theistic personality in the svabhavika-kaya or dharma-kaya." But in Mahayana Buddhism one does not care to remain on the absolute and transcendental "other shore." are sunyata. dharma or dharmata itself is consid-ered as the Buddha-body or Buddha's being. as Chatterjee states... it corre-sponds to absolute nirval)a. Chatterjee further continues: "To Isvara are ascribed the cosmic functions as well. on the other hand. The word "body" of Buddha-body may correspond to "personality." The Buddha. his training for realizing the truth being conducted from below. The Tathagata is merely a spiritual preceptor. Indeed in all Buddhism. because of its being wisdom. though phenomenal. . But. this notion of a god is vehemently opposed . freed from every obstacle of defilement. do not "exist" in an absolute sense. If an expression such as "a personal God" were to be applied within Buddhism.. ( iPX nirodha) in Chinese. the dharma-kaya is "non-interruption" or "eternalness. without entering nirval)a-this is the ideal of non-abiding in nirval)a (aprati$!hita-nirval)a). although this may depend on one's interpretation. and is equal to the "Emancipated Body" (vimukti-kaya)." but persistently puts oneself in the world of transmigration." it . interfere with other cosmic functions. unlike the Brahman as the principle. in him the truth was concretized and personified. but transcending "existent" and "nonexistent. Nirval)a is the ultimate aim of practitioners and the sravakas (disciples). . He is the creator and the sustainer of the world . together with the svabhavika-kaya and dharma-dhatu." 21 Chatterjee's opinion mentioned above can be accepted overall..On the Theon· of Buddha-Bodv the same time he explains important differences between the Buddha and Yedantic Isvara. yet acts always from above. when this dharmata or dharmata-dhatu is thought about within the context of siinyata or absolute emptiness the peculiar Buddhistic doctrine of Buddha-body can be seen. The reason is that within the context of svabhavika-kaya. the closest equivalent would be sal'flbhogika-kaya or the Reward-body. a realm of absolute calmness and quietness on "the other shore. The svabhavika-kaya. The ultimate object here was the attain-ment of Buddhahood by all humankind as an ideal of the phenomenal world." as historic human being. Namely. The Buddha. It may be said that the structure of the trikaya doctrine also follows this idea. "lsvara. but some additional comments may be acceptable.

was born on the horizon of history as a child of man by emptying (kenosis) divine attributes. but. too. Later on the Buddha-body theory made a further development. On the Theorv of Buddha-Body . For example. without being confined to the life of Gautama Buddha. which in their turn became ever more firmly solidified by having recourse to the trikaya doctrine. but I shall not treat each of them here. at the same time. this is. and so forth. 26 Many other theories of Buddha-bodies were formed by introduc-ing various concepts. in a bodhisattva) for the living beings that are af-flicted in the whirl of safTlsara. there is the term. in the Abhisamaya-iilarnkiiriiloka. establishing the fundamental principle of the doctrine insofar as the ways of Buddha-body are concerned. the trikiiya theory may be regarded as a consummated theory. the Buddhabody called "jflana-dharma-kaya" (Wisdom-dharma Body) is given. Such a power to be reborn "at will" may be said to originate by nature from sunyata. which is characteristic of svabhavika-kaya. Therefore. In parallel with this. however. For. hence delusion. The trikaya doctrine developed as a system with a background of these Mahayana concepts.114 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA does not remain in nirval)a but positively returns to this shore of the phenomenal world as safTlbhogika-kaya and nairmaQika-kaya on account of its 22 benevolence. we must say that the trikaya doctrine is fairly different from the Trinity of Christianity or the trimurti of Hinduism. Furthermore. not an ordinary physical result of his it is due to his own "delusion" that he has purposely with the intention of entering into sarnsiiric existence. They may present characteristic developments both in doctrine and in spiritual history. forming the four Buddha-bodies. Resultmaturation Body (vipiika-kiiya). to take birth "in SafTlsara" is solely due to his great compassion (which is attach-ment. which means that a bodhisattva volunteers to be born into a life of 23 suffering. {f {L well-known that the Buddha-bhumi-siistra and the Ch' eng-wei-shih-lun ex-pound a theory of four Buddha-bodies by dividing the Enjoyment Body into the Own25 enjoyment Body and Other's-enjoyment Body. "intentional birth" (sarncintya- bhavopapatti). such as the Emancipation Body ( vimukti-kiiya). as stated above. Outflowing Body (ni~yanda-kiiya). It is understood that Jesus Christ. in addition to the three Buddha-bodies. placed in the second place among them. giving rise to four-body and other theories. Hui-ytian of Ching-ying-ssu temple says that the Lmikiivatiira Sutra enumerates the following four Buddhas: Jj. In Buddhism a similar idea has been universalized as a way of the bodhisattva. A Bodhisattva appears in this world of transmigration.

Gautama would have been a divine existence from the beginning. but then. it must be asked: In what way is it possible for a common living being to become a Buddha? IV The possibility of all living beings attaining Buddhahood is a problem that seems to have been answered from two sides. there is the possibility of the same basic structure coming to life again by being illuminated with a new light. The other is the introduction of the concept of 'asraya-paravrtti' (the revolving of the basis). then the asraya-paravrtti would be the flow of this magnetic field in the opposite direction from its usual flow. There is the anxiety of one's foothold being fundamentally challenged-the anx-iety that it might collapse and disappear. it is spe-cifically said that all living things are expected to attain Buddhahood. But through this death. which is a part of oneself. But if it were ow-ing only to that. as the word indicates. This is not simply the renova-tion of the mind. It is true that by this trikaya theory the nature of the Buddha and all his virtues and functions has been delineated. Also the matter of purification in human beings is not the . How can a leap from the relative world to the absolute world be made? Since Gautama was an exceptional person. it would not explain anything about the existence of all the Buddhas in the ten directions. Let me take up the latter first. the ground itself on which one stands. or simply the one's disappearance and becoming non-existent: it is the conversion and the transmutation of one's whole existence. For example. revealing a new world. as his disciples thought. the basis on which one relies. was able to become a Buddha possessing virtues equal to those of a divine being. it does not mean that because of this. In Mahayana Buddhism. that would be a unique case involving Gautama alone. Asraya-paravrtti means. if we were to imagine a magnetic field flowing through man's being. almost nothing has been said in these theories. and not a human being. revolves. every problem has been completely solved. The concept of asraya-paravrtti is frequently used by the Yogacara-vijnana school that consummated the trikaya doctrine. One's acts are based upon and determined by such a magnetic flow. it might have been possible for him to become a Buddha owing to his innumerable virtuous deeds accumulated in the past. overturns. But as for how Gautama. meaning death. illuminated by a new light.However. One is the idea that all living beings possess Buddha-nature-the idea that is mainly advocated by the tathagatagarbha (tathiigata-matrix) theory. or that of the body. Moreover. a human being. and turns into a different basis (or non-basis).

is now realized to be something unreal and polluted. and this world of relative nature has been turned around into a polluted condition to form the world of imagined nature. when the light permeates into one's whole system. This theory explains the system of the world by means of the true way of the world or by its three aspects or natures. "Cognition is revolved dom is none other than the essence of the threefold body Thus. the world appears in its imagined. being covered with fundamen-tal ignorance (avidya)-with something called "original sin or radical evil. and (3) the consummated nature (parini$pannasvabhava). For one thing. In the Yogacara-vijfiana school. on the other. The principle that makes this revolution pos-sible can be found in the fact that the world is essentially of the nature of relativity or of "dependent origination" (pratityasamutpada). originally "dependent-on-other" in character). (2) the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhiiva). it receives light in a new scene. The Buddha-body is described as a result of this ''revolving of the basis. to the saints. with its structure unchanged. namely: (I) the relative nature (paratantra-svabhtiva or other-dependent nature). the idea of asraya-paravrtti had al-ready been prepared in the school's unique theory of the "Threefold na-ture" (trisvabhava). it appears as the consummated and purified nature (parini$panna-svabhava). and. the world of imagined nature) revolves its basis to become a state of purity. Through this self-realization one's foothold re-volves and becomes purified. and is like a positive picture that appears on the negative itself under certain light con-ditions. including the a/aya-vijiiiina (store-cognition). and pol-luted character (parikalpita-svabhava) to the ordinary man on the one hand. become four kinds of Buddha's wisdom. the eight vijiianas (cognition or consciousness. the revolving of one's own foundation means that on the field of relative nature.e. the man way On the Theon of Buddha-Bod\' . whereby the same existence that has been in darkness begins to shine brilliantly. A de-tailed explanation of these three natures is not possible in the space allotted here. but is none other than the backward flow of man's mechanism or magnetic field. it has been turned around. The magnetic field spoken about above may be conceived as related to the other-dependent nature." in religious terms.116 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA removal of something filthy. the state of being polluted with delusions (i.'' which can be explained in various ways. hitherto believed to be firm and unshakable. in the same way. In short. One's foothold. On the basis of the relative nature of the world (paratantrasvabhava). A nega-tive film may look like a positive picture when the light shines on it from different angles. unreal. a world of consummated nature. by revolving their own foundations.

various interpretations appeared in later ages. The relative importance of this concept within Buddhism gradually increased as time advanced. It is believed that this idea of Buddha-nature or tathagata-garbha ap-peared fairly early in Indian Buddhism.' the idea that all beings have Buddha-nature. and gave birth to it. And the direction of this revolution. especially in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. what is descendent is the concept of 'tathagata-garbha. all living beings are filled with the Buddha-nature. Just as the birds fly freely in the air. But viewed from the ulti-mate standpoint. one cannot escape from the dharma-dhatu. It is because all living beings store such Buddhanature concealed within themselves that they are regarded as the germ that produces the Buddha. can be said to be ascendent. if common beings already possess Buddhanature equal to the dharma-body. It is true that human beings are steeped in the world of suffering. many new difficulties have arisen." Buddhism made great advancement with this discovery of Buddhanature within ordinary living beings. As this was almost the same with Tibetan Bud-dhism as well." No living being can exist outside the world of the ab-solute called "tathata" or "siinyata". As for the problem of the possibility of attaining Buddhahood by com-mon beings. the essence of the human mind is transparently luminous. why is it that they are still sunk in the depths of transmigration? Why is it that the essen-tially undefiled minds of the common beings are still roots of delusions? . his basis. the true mind or Buddha-nature becomes apparent-this is the "asraya-paravrtti. Contrary to this. or the dharma-dhatu or the dharma-body. therefore.Buddha's way of being. To say that a sentient being is a tathagata-garbha means that one possesses Buddha-lineage and is a member of the Buddha family (gotra) and that one possesses Buddha-essence or Buddha-nature by birth. For example. it is strongly advocated that the human mind is essentially identical with the tathagata. But at the same time. it can be said that an answer has been tentatively given by means of the idea that all beings possess Buddha-nature. in parallel with the philosophy of "cognition-only" or "mind-only. it can be inferred that this concept had probably become the core of Buddhist thought in the last stages of Indian Buddhism. Just as all things are filled with air. basic concept. and are far removed from the world of the Buddha. but its original meaning seems to have been that it was the embryo that conceived the tathagata. According to the tathagata-garbha theory. every living being is said to be a "tathagatagarbha" (tathagata-matrix). Therefore. all sentient beings breathe in the Buddha-nature. or realizes the Buddha's body. When the adventitious defilement has been re-moved. nurtured it. where it became the central. As for the term tathagata-garbha. it has lost its light only because of its being covered with adventitious de-filement (iigantuka-kle§a).

the ordinary mind of living beings is called the "tathagata-garbha" on the basis that the ordinary mind is presupposed to be the dharma-body or dharma-realm. On the Theorr of Buddha-Bod\' . unnecessary. But at the same time. intuitive attitude can be seen in many siitras. it is probably natural that Indian Buddhist phi-losophers were not able to fully theorize and systematize the idea of the tathiigata-garbha. the substance of this religious intuition. such as mountains and rivers. and their efforts toward enlightenment will not be fruit-less. efforts to attain it will be. Above all. which must have been products of mystical experience. however. and it is filled with beautiful expressions and fig-ures of speech of praise to the Buddha. the dharma-body or dharma-realm is first set up. they are the descriptions of the tathiigata-garbha or Buddhanature when seen from the Buddha's viewpoint and not from the viewpoint of ordinary beings. is not necessarily clari-fied. if they already possess the dharma-body. and then flowing out from the dharma-body. The theo-retic structure between the three bodies. philosophical book. for it was some-thing whose nature could not apply to human logic and logical categories. can also be surmised from the tendency of this theory of tathiigata-garbha. or at least possess it in its potential form. The characteristic of the doctrine of tathiigata-garbha lies not so much in theory as in its religious poignancy and literary beauty. that is. in effect. Contrary to the theories of 'trikaya' and 'asraya-paravrtti' of the Yogiiciiravijftana school that can be described as an ascent. The book. the Ratnagotra-vibhiiga is a literary work. which is regarded as the real basis. The theory of the threefold body of the Buddha is also adopted in this book and more pages are devoted to it than even the treatises belonging to the Yogacara-vijftana school. mystical. revealing religious faith. Ratnagotra-vibhiiga. It is a "sastra" that one expects to be theoretical in nature.118 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA The declaration that all beings are tathiigata-garbha is sure to encourage them greatly. In Japan this literary mystery was further enhanced by advocating that not only sentient beings but also insen-tient beings. all possessed Buddha-nature and the possibility of attaining Buddhahood. The reason is that if some-thing is to be declared by ordinary beings when they envisage truth. This religious. But the descriptions in siitras can be said to be derived from the standpoint of the Buddha who has already attained enlightenment. it must be always a confession of sin or of delusion and impurity. as I have already said. but rather than being a theoretic. seems almost the only treatise extant that has attempted a systematization of the theory of tathiigata-garbha. not of possessing Buddha-nature. the fact that the theory of tathiigata-garbha is descendent. Therefore. This book seems rather to focus on the idea of twofold body rather than on the theory of the threefold bod/ 8a fact that might indicate that this book is more religious than philosophical. trees and grasses.

Reflections are further extended even to beings who are completely devoid of any "possi-bilities of getting into nirval)a. and .the world of ordinary beings manifests itself. 31 We see here the forerunner of the theory of the 'five distinct gotras' (including agotra). and some do the same when confronted with robbers and rascals. the existence that might re-volt against its god and become the subject of eviL has been ignored. because of their characteristics of being adventitious and nonessential. In such a way. Such essentially negative aspects of inherited nature can hardly be seen in the Ratnagotra-vibhiiga. An excellent study on this treatise has 32 recently been introduced to the academic world. not the lineage. the delusions (k/e§a). which later met with severe criticisms from the advocates of the doctrine of the tathagata-garbha. foreign. the theory of tathagata-garbha also treats the human being and human mind. A bodhisattva is a bodhisattva because he belongs to the Buddha's lineage and is endowed with the Buddha-nature. it is insufficient to simply neglect and discard the faults. the idea of 'Miraya-paravrtti' (or -parivrtti) in the tathagata-garbha theory is likewise not a rotation upward from below. which bring forth every human ugliness. This. the delusion. where only beautiful words of praise to Buddha's virtues can be seen. the actual problem of the ugly minds of human beings cannot but be left be-hind. And it seems that the delusions are believed not to be serious but rather to be easily dispelled. According to it." the so-called beings without any (Buddha) lineage (agotra). and thereby pave the way for the turning around (pariivrtti) of passion into enlightenment. The "Buddha's lineage" (gotra) mentioned above has been discussed also by the Yogacara-vijfiana school in the Mahiiyiina-siitriilaf{lkiira and other treatises. However. Instead. But at the same time a bodhisattva is here described as an existence that is tortured with excessive delusions in spite of its lineage. Some bodhisattvas. are forced even to commit 30 murder. but if this ratnagotra is the source of all beings' deliverances. is the exact opposite to the asraya-paravrtti of the Yogacara-vijfiana school. This is so probably because the Ratnagotra-vibhiiga discusses only the ratnagotra (gem-lineage) or Buddha-nature and takes no account of human nature (gotra) in general. because of it. While the mind is believed here to be pure and luminous in its original nature. but is a self-manifestation of the dharmadhatu existing above. It can be said that such unfolding from above is the basic point of view of the theory of tathagata-garbha. in truth. the unrestricted and independent human existence. are apt to be regarded simply as something accidental. and nonessential. being king's vassals. one should reflect deeply on human passions (k/e§a). but since the mind 29 is first grasped as something sublime that flows out from above. investigate them. or its realization into the human world below. is their grave concern in the actual world. forgotten. To these bodhisattvas.

whose basis is always the basis for transmi-gration. the Mahiiyiina-sa!Jlgraha expounds that the paratantra converts itself sometimes into the parikalpita and at other times into the parini~panna. that is to say. when every human iisraya (basis equals cognitions) is negated. Contrary to the case of the theory of tathagata-garbha discussed above. revolves itself and realizes the Buddha-body. As the whole of one's existence is none other than an existence of paratantra nature. nor of any divine beings. this revolving takes place on the plane of paratantra. from the On the Theon of Buddha-Body . and re-volved. in accordance with this. as already described. in the case of asraya-paravrtti. the understanding of its structure is more philo-sophical and theoretical. the Buddha-body is understood in an ascent direction. at any rate. polluted world revolves itself into the con-summated world. with re-spect to asraya-paravrtti. We may say. it is not from above. It is at this moment and only at this moment that the mind can be pure and luminous. Whereas with respect to the theory of tathagata-garbha. Thus. that when the imagined. the paratantra being the basis for everything that exists. in the way they recognize. be products of the dharma-dhatu. in the Yogacara-vijflana school. the logical meaning of the asraya-paravrtti is also sought in the structure of vijflanas-that is. but. and not affirmed as in the case of the tathagatagarbha theory. the problem of the eight vijflanas became the focus of its extensive investigation and analysis. however. and so on. Now. negated. the asraya-paravrtti of the Yogacara-vijflana school is functional within sa111sara through and through. This is the reason that. the understanding of the Buddha-body is religious and intuitive. The term "tathagata-garbha" is also familiar in a treatise of the Yogacaravijflana school 34 and yet another text explains that the mind is essentially pure 35 and luminous in accord with the tathagata-garbha theory. discriminate. the mind can be so explained because siinyata (absolute negativity) is found right in the midst of discrimination (abhiita-parikalpa) itself. vijflanas. From where do human evils come? They cannot. not outside itthe mind being siinya. judge. turned over. siinyatii is none other than another name for the dharma-realm or dharma-nature. within the structure of human cognition.120 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA what is optimistically emphasized is only the fact that common human be-ings are endowed with the tathagata-garbha. In the latter case. the aforesaid revolving means 33 the revolving of the paratantra. It is a fact that the mind is essentially pure and luminous. In contrast to this. it is also a fact that the human mind actually gives rise to evil acts. These ways of revolv-ing should all be sought thoroughly within the sphere of human existence. which should be realized later in the asraya-paravf(ti. and the structure of the vijflanas is reflected in the asrayaparavrtti. that is. imagine. contrary to this. and the whole of one's existence.

which include iitma-cogitation (manas).'' because the system of the vijfianas is regarded as having been brought into and reflected in the under-standing of the Buddha-world. With this mirror-wisdom-the wisdom that reflects the reality of everything like a transpar-ent mirror-as their basis. sarpsara. albeit conversely. which is like a mirror that reflects everything without discrimination. the fact that the Essence-body is the basis for the other two Buddha-bodies can be interpreted as reflecting or corresponding to the structure of the eight vijfianas. as it was the case with nirval)a. the other three wisdoms-the samata-jfiana. were originally beyond human thought and beyond speech. the Buddha is said further to have a wisdom called "the wisdom acquired suc-ceedingly" (pr$ {halabdha-jfziina). Again. With this wisdom as the basis. In this sense. through whose contradiction and self-negation the evil can be elevated to the level of the dharma-nature. albeit conversely. are the basis for the mundane world. even the Yogacara-vijfiana school that consummated the trikaya theory of the Buddha could not directly make it an object of . the origin of human evil should not be sought outside of human existence." be-cause the former is in an ascending direction. and five other vijfianas. the four wisdoms of the Buddha. Probably. mind-consciousness (manovijfziina). In the discussion of the Buddha-body following the theory of 'trikaya. Among these eight vijfianas.' the dharma-realm and the Essence-body are described as a "basis. although the direction is "converse. Accord-ingly.the mirror (iidarsa-jfziina) and the other three wisdomsmanifest themselves (see note 27). it is never the basis for human transmigration. but only within the structure of cognitions.pure dharma-realm. which agrees with the mundane actuality. the iilaya-vijfziina (store-cognition) becomes the basis for the other seven working cognitions. which are paratantra in nature and have the alayavijfiana at their foundation. The analysis of the cognitions thus becomes a clue to the research of the Buddha-body. That the mirror-wisdom (or the non-differentiated wisdom) becomes the ba-sis for all other wisdoms parallels the fact that in the Buddha-body theory the Essence-body becomes the basis for the other Buddha-bodies. I have said "to correspond. while the latter is in a descending direction. to the fact that the system of the eight vijfianas. or the basis from which the true and pure dharma-preaching flows out. the fact that the Essence-body becomes the basis for the other Bud-dha bodies seems to correspond. such issues as the manner of Buddha's existence. that evil flows down. and so on-arise on the mirror." But it is the basis for the other Buddha-bodies such as the Enjoyment-body and Transformation-body. Therefore. When these eight cognitions re-volve. which is the goal of the asraya-paravrtti. The mirror-wisdom itself is called ''non-differentiated wisdom" (nirvikalpa-jfziina).

any attribute that transcended and was invisible to human beings might be ascribed to the Buddha. In a case of a strong religious demand. studied. Gautama the his-toric Buddha has been expelled in many cases from the most important position. in which a strong contrast between the relative and the absolute was predominant. might not have been felt as necessarily exi-gent.122 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA theoretic consideration. beyond my present capacity. It is impossible to refer to each of these Buddha-body theories now. which is highly theoretic in character. rather. however. If it were so. They are what correspond. then a path from the relative to the absolute and from the absolute to the relative would be opened naturally. In radical terms. however. albeit conversely" in connection with the Buddha-body. the relation between the Buddha-body theory and the concept of god or the absolute in religions other than Buddhism would be another interesting area of investigation. The Buddha-body theory made complicated and variegated development later on in the various Bud-dhist sects in China and Japan. might have sufficed. the search for enlightenment by common beings or their deliverance by the Buddha would become impossible or meaningless. the Buddha would simply be a transcendental. But if it is correct to conceive of a "correspondence. Generally speaking. Furthermore. and the so-called celestial Buddhas or Dhyani-buddhas have come to the fore. however. albeit conversely. But these at-tributes are not merely transcendental and do not exist high above as iso-lated existences. the two-body system. . and developed by most of these sects. something unrelated to human beings. to the structure of the vijiianas by virtue of the revolving of the structure of vijiianas. If the Buddha-body were not thus conceived as that which has been turned over from below. They could at most represent it only in a negative or paradoxical way. the triad system. isolated existence. The triad concept of the trikaya theory has been generally accepted. but it is one which is. I have merely introduced the theories of Buddha-body in India and touched upon several questions relating to them. It seems that there also developed a tendency toward a one-body theory that treated the absolute dharma-body solely.

that the difference that existed was not one of mutual contradiction and separation. "dependent origination is itself emptiness. Although they can be summed up as Buddhist logic. but also it must be admitted that the Yogacaras who focused their discussion on vijnana (cognition) were to that extent different from the Madhyamikas. The Madhyamika logic expounded in the Prajna-paramita literature and system-atized by Nagarjuna and Aryadeva is believed to be accepted in full by Asanga and Vasubandhu. to the uni-versal there was added the particular." while in the twofold truth. Sunyata principle. the abstract. its salient feature can be 2 summed up in two principles: sunyata and the twofold truth. the founders of the Yogacara school. the individual. That is to say. 1 The speculative thinking of the Madhyamika and the logic of the Yogacara are both linked to Mahayanic thought move-ments that must include the bodhisattva doctrine whose final goal lies in liberation and nirval)a and in the path of practice that leads to the goal. there is some difference between them. ·'the ultimate truth always transcends the conventional truth. D. It should be pointed out." which can be interpreted in various ways such as. this means that. The fact that Asanga and Vasubandhu demonstrated a specific Vijnanavada standpoint does not mean that they took a stand op-posite from that of Nagarjuna. Suzuki expressed these two principles in the one expression: "identity-difference. and thereby the con-crete seen in yogic practices emerged on the stage on sunyata. Dr. the Yogacaras newly established the truth concerning internal and mental activities of human beings. In so far as the Madhyamika logic is concerned. on the ground of Madhyamika sunyata. but one which indicated a develop-ment in the Mahayana. . We should surmise that differences in direction and in depth reflected by dif-ferent authors become naturally manifested as historical developments with the transition of eras. T. however. states." Sunyata reflects a principle of unity and continuity: the twofold truth a principle of disunity and non-continuity.Chapter 11 Logic of Convertibility It is a well known fact that the logic behind the Yogacara School is different from that of the Madhyamaka School. In short.

Absolute non-continuity becomes manifest only through another principle-the ultimate truth is never the conventional truth and always transcends the latter." because "convert-ibility" represents the most remarkable feature of the three-nature theory of the school. Only when these practices are penetrated by the realiza-tion of sunyata. and this is accomplished in the Yogacara school through the three-nature theory. usually begin with a discussion on vijflana. To systematize the vijiianas and to clarify the processes of mental functions are not the only concerns of this school. the six paramitas and the ten bodhisattva stages are the main target of practice. However. Thus. that the theory of 'vijiiana' or of 'vijiiaptimatra' is founded on the three-nature theory and is meaning-less without its backing will be shown later. then discuss the three natures. Identity cannot in itself be difference or non-continuity. To be significant as a Buddhist theory. the expression "identity-difference" does not mean that difference is per-ceived immediately in identity. hence that of the Mahayana. the situation is similar with the above." "identity in dif-ference. This theory will be discussed here from the viewpoint of the logic of "convertibility. Some may claim that the systematization of vijiiana (cognition) or the theory of vijiiapti-matra (representation only) are more appropriate expres-sions of this school. the Vijiiana-vada. and thereafter. Although these express the standpoint of this school well. they become one." "identity of difference. salient feature of this school (the Yogacara). it needs to be founded on the three-nature theory. but the school goes further and tries to theorize such mystical elements. To say that "dependent origination is itself empti-ness" means that non-existence is originally included in existence: it does not mean that through identity. includes various contemplations and meditations. explain Logic of Convertibility . do they become really Buddhistic. or through mystical intuition. The various treatises of Yogacara-vijflanavada. In the Mahayana.124 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA "identical as well as different. With regard to the yogic practice. This can be said to repre-sent the essence of the Madhyamika." and so forth." it would have no Buddhistic significance. A mystical intuition is of course admitted in the Yogacara school in terms of nirvikalpa-jniina (non-discriminative wisdom). however." "identity is difference. Others may claim yoga practices as the unassailable. The joining together of identity with dif-ference is nothing more than a mystical intuition. the Madhyamaka standpoint always establishes itself on the basis of these two principles that compliment each other. Unless the theory of cognition goes hand in hand with the the-ory of practice in which there is the clarification of how ''the vijiianas are converted and jiiana (wisdom) is acquired. which Buddhism shares with other non-Buddhist schools. Yoga. for the joining together of identity with dif-ference is itself another form of identity and thus cannot subsume difference that is absolutely non-continuous.

" the issue is addressed from the view of "logical sequence. claim that what evolves and is differentiated by karma should be the internal mental func-tions instead of outer material substances (see Vasubandhu's Vimsatikii. ~ j@)." by beginning our investiga-tion from the theory of 'vijfianas." The so-called dependent origination as fruition of karma ( ~ J1X.' I Convertibility will be examined first in view of the phrase "evolving of cognition'' ( vijniina-paril)iima). the theory of dependent origination (pratitya-samutpiida) as interpreted by the earlier sectarian Buddhism. not only does it give quality of convertibility to all the "dharmas. unlike the SaJTlkhya that talks about paril)ama as the evo-lution of substantial existence (avasthita-dravya). k. the idea of evolution is often understood in relation to "karma. The term "paril)ama" is an important term that has been used by many different philosophical schools in India. . The term "evolving" means to convert into something other by under-going a change in form.5 Within the Buddhist tradition. We shall now begin our examination of the logic of convertibility in accordance with the "sequence of exposition. on the basis of which the theory of vijfianas will be properly developed and yogic practices also will be established. the present world is determined and estab-lished.6). Karmic action is an accepted principle within the way of thinking of the people of India. It is well-known that the term appears within the SaJTlkhya system. corporeal. If. the term evolution of cognition. the Vijfiana-vada rejects such an idea and explains paril)ama as an evolution of cognition (vijniina-paril)iima).e. however. however. material existence of sentient beings) evolves and is differentiated by means of karma." the three-nature theory with its logic of convertibility should come first. Yogacaras.3 the practices and their fruits. seems to be established on the basis of an idea that everything evolves and is differentiated by means of karma. in Buddhism too.." but it is also the driving force that functions in the consummation of the fruit through converting cognition (vijfu1na) into wisdom (jiiiina). Sthiramati has commented upon this term by using the terms "becoming different" (anyathiitva) and "to be different from the previous state" 4 (purviivasthiito 'nyathiibhiiva}:z). The three-nature theory has within itself the intermediary "place" where the catalytic function occurs and takes one from the theory of vijfianas to the yogic practice and attainment of its fruit. it is believed that on the basis of the past karmic actions. it is stated that the continuity of existence (i. In a similar way. in contrast to such a "sequence of expo-sition. hence.

the Sanskrit terms for cause and effect are karal)a and karya respectively and not the usual hetu and phala.'' The two divisions refers to the seeing division (darsana-bhtiga) and the form division (nimitta-bhiiga). The evolution of cognition does not depend on the categories of time and space. the category of time found in cognition is negated. however. but. In this case. On the other hand. and is different in nature from [the status of] the cause at the moment [of change) (kiiraJJa-k$a!Ja vilak$a!Ja). all exist-ences appear with the limitation of time and space on the basis of that evolving cognition. at the same time. this does not mean that only the category of space is affirmed. when cognition is said to transform or evolve from the cause to the effect. it should be considered in view of time-lessness that precedes time. thus. "evolving means that cognition evolves and appears as two divisions. 2. However. the explanation given here cannot be considered to be a satisfactory understanding of evolution. becoming different and evolving is simultaneous. its temporal aspect must be considered. In this context. Karal)a Logic of Convertibility . However. on the basis of the evolution of the iilaya-vijiliina).126 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA Now then. That is. the statement shows the dichotomizing process of cognition into subject (griihaka) and object (griihya). he goes on to state: "Evolving" means the acquisition of the totality of effect (kiiryasya iitma-/iibha/:1). Sthiramati explained evolution as "becoming different" (anyathiitva) and having done so. however. evolving means evolution of cause to an effect. In other words. Consequently. The consideration that the "evolving cognition" is at the basis for time and space lies in the fact that evolution means conversion from cause to effect.. it is significant that the "evolution of cognition" is said to be "simultaneous." By this simultaneity. Cognition (vijiliina) refers to the process of discriminating a perceptual object and thus is spatial but not temporal. here. that is. time and space are produced on the basis of the evolving cognition (viz. the reverse holds true that is. 6 The essential points of this very short explanation are as follows: I. how is the idea of 'vijnana-paril)ama' to be understood'? The Ch' eng-wei-shih-lun explains it with the statement. which takes place in the same moment with that of the extinction of its cause (kiiraJJak$ana-nirodha-samakiila). the instantaneous evolution of cognition should be considered as that which constitutes the basis for time and space. As stated above.

" and at the same time. that karmic action would also have to have mentalistic or conscious qualities. For an action to possess the responsibilities of its own doing within itself. becomes the seed (bfja) and phenomenal appear-ances occur as the phala of the seed. this means that. This is the basic idea of 'evolving. It is also in accordance with the chain in the SinoJapanese Buddhist tradition that "de-pendent origination as the fruition of karma. 7 The hetu-evolution means that cognition evolves and becomes hetu or seed and the phala-evolution means that cognition evolves and becomes phala or phenomenal appearances. owing to its having a different form. the outcome (kiirya) is understood as different from activity (kiirafJ. the cognition. His explanation of them can be summarized roughly as follows. the phenomenal appearances (which are originally phala) are the karal)a. was given greater significance in the Mahayana tradition when it was understood as the "dependent ongmation as the function of alaya-vijiiana (~iif fJ! If~~~). Hetu always precedes phala and the reverse never holds true of them. kiirya is the made or what is to be acted upon and has a passive sense." This is also the reason for defining the evolving of cog-nition as "different in form. An action that is expressed outwardly is without a doubt a kind of karmic action. with regard to a certain activity (seeing. Sthiramati alludes to the theory of a "twofold evolving" of cognition-hetu-evolution and phalaevolution (phala-parit~iima). that is. con-versely. but it does not subsume its own outcome within itself. While hetu and phala are fixed notions as far as they denote cause and effect respectively. karal)a is "cause" and karya is "effect" but in the next moment karya can be the cause to produce another kiiral)a as effect." referred to above.means the act of doing or making and has an active sense. This was the theory put forth by Vasubandhu in his Vif!lsatikii.ll) itself. heard. When the evolution of cognition is considered to be the basis for all dharmas. etc. hearing. as "the simultaneity" of karal)a and karya. as the hetu for all phenomenal appearances.' Such an evolving is probably possible only in the evolving of cogni-tion. the seed is karal)a. hetu-evolution. However. In his Trif!lsikii-bhii~ya. an activity is realized simultaneously with its outcome (what is seen.). and the seed (which is always the hetu) is the karya. there is no oc-currence in which phala can be understood as a cause and hetu as an effect. but there can never be phala without hetu. As Sthiramati stated. etc. and .). Whenever there is hetu. there is phala. karal)a and karya can be used in a reverse way. specifically the alayacognition. In the former evolution. This point can be understood most clearly when it is seen in the context of a theory in which the "evolution" is divided into two kinds. although. that of hetu and that of phala. the phala-evolution. in the latter evolution.

such an evolving is called "perfuming" (the seed or the impression being perfumed in the alaya-cognition). there is the saying: Three dharmas are simultaneous." The significance of the pro-ducing and the impressing or perfuming-that is. the cause (either seed or phenomena) and the effect (either Logic of Convertibility . In this passage. "impressing. in their capacity either as seed or phenomenal appearances. this interpretation can be classified as a kind of emanation theory.-the three events that arise from the two dynamics. i! 1m 4iii ~ ~ [PJ R~). then it is said that the three world systems are nothing but "mind. Contrarily." and of "phenomena impress seeds. phenomenon. If cognition [equals seed equals hetu) is established as "cognizer" and the object of cognition [equals phe-nomena equals phala] is the "cognizable" [what is cognized) and these two are contrasted in opposition as subject and as object and if it were the case that the evolution of cognitions is understood as a unidirectional flow from such a subject (equals 8 hetu) to such an object (equals phala). When the world is understood to be constituted through the mutual simultaneity of producing and perfuming. the evolving of cognition puts emphasis on the mutual simultaneity of karal)a (as seed and as phenomena) and karya (as phenomena and as seed). as defined above. specifically alaya-cognition." that is. karal)a and karya evolv-ing simultaneously as stated above-is important and can be found not only in Sthiramati 's commentary but also in the Fa-hsiang school. If causality is taken simply as moving from hetu to phala.128 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA the phenomenal appearances are karya. mutually be-ing cause and effect ( :::=:. when karal)a is phenomena as phala that constitutes the seven functioning cognitions (pravrtti-vijfu1na) and karya is the seed or impression (vasana-impression impressed on the alaya-cognition by the phenomena). In that school. or from seed to phenomena. then it would be unidirectional. Through this convertibility between karal)a and karya. "three dharmas" refer to seed. of "seed produces phenomena. In these evolutions. In contrast." In these two dynamics." that is. such an evolving is called "producing" (phenomena being produced from the seed). just like prakrti or pradhana of the Safllkhya or brahma-atman in the Upanishads. including alaya-cognition. But the phrase "the triple world is nothing but [evolving of] cognition" probably does not acknowl-edge such an idea. "produc-ing. karal)a and karya are convertible and have the characteristics that they are simulta-neous but different in form. When karal)a is the seed (deposited in the alaya-cognition) as hetu and karya is phenomena as its phala. the twofold evolution elucidates that all the en-tities in the triple world are cognitions-cognitions. cognition. would become the first primordial cause for everything. then in that case there would be no sense of "mutual dependence" as expressed in pratltya-samutpada. and seed.

It is on such an evolving that the whole world is based and established. that is the producing of phenomena. phenomena duly appear in time and space. the two movements in opposite directions. time and space originate on the basis of the evolving of cognition. But that is not the case. the reason for the Fa-hsiang school mentioning the three dharmas and for its inclusion of the reverse direction therein is not necessarily clear. Things cannot go beyond the moment and become eternal. Producing and impressing should constitute the real contents of the "evolving of cognition". Accordingly. Hsiian-tsang always translates the Sanskrit paril)iima (evolving) as neng-pien (fj~ ~) "what evolves. it is the simultaneity of the evolving of cognition that becomes the source of time and space. Consequently. When the evolving of cognition is defined in terms of "cognition as the evolver. respectively. in spite of its saying. The two movements in opposite directions are synthesized into one single evolving of cognition." 9 that is. the agent. Therefore. everything is evanescent and impermanent . however.phenomena or seed) are simultaneous. simultaneity is contextually related to the Buddhist idea of "momentariness" (k$Qftikatva). and does not include the meaning of impressing. and this always within the context of the simultaneity of kiiral)a and kiirya. not hetu and phala." of which neng yields the meaning of an "agent. the above saying must signify the movement of the three dharmas from seed to phenomena and from phenomena to seed. It represents nearly the "one-way" of producing and does not represent the "reverse-way" of impressing. and there is no reversing of direction. because as stated earlier. one might think that time has been compressed into a single time moment and thus time is completely nonexistent. one may think that all phenomena would appear in a single moment. for in it. in the Ch' eng-wei-shih-lun. Fur-ther." then the movement is naturally toward "what is evolved. Everything comes into being momentarily and perishes momentarily in that instant. 126). Such a definition of evolving con-notes at best the producing. Being born with that evolving as their basis. the cause and the ef-fect in the expression above must be kiiral)a and kiirya. evolver or transformer) stands in con-trast to so-pien (JilT ~what is evolved. transformed). the evolving of cognition is explained by the phrase "cognition evolves and appears as the two divisions" of seeing and of form (or subject and object) as discussed earlier (p." Neng-pien (evolving agent. time and space are not nonexistent. Further. phenomena. When evolving is understood to be simultaneity and when that simultaneity is understood as the three dharmas evolving simultaneously as kiiral)a and kiirya. there is a tendency to separate evolving of cognition from producing and impressing. However.

on the other hand. and the consummated nature (parini$panna-svabhiiva). all beings are not eternal because of their momentariness. Saq1tana is closely related to momentariness. the functional ones as well as the alaya. It is the three-nature (tri-svabhiiva) theory that responds to that idea. The idea of saq1tana is applicable to various concepts such as saq1sara.f!HJG) or continuity-series refers to such a state. and others. The idea of 'saq1tana' (. The world is born every moment and dies every moment. The fact that the ·world is transient yet continues as an uninterrupted flow parallels the fact that all cognitions always evolve as continuity-series on the basis of the simultaneity of karal)a and karya. However.' because cognition affirms something being cognized. and this is to say that all cognitions. consequently. Three natures are: I. Momentariness does not mean total ex-tinction of the world. Nothing exists sub-stantively but whatever is is a continuous flow. On the one hand. there is a great difference between them. every-thing that is is momentary.130 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA (anitya). And. II The evolving of cognition discussed above affords us with a basic and necessary component in the logic of convertibility. insofar as the theory is concerned with 'being. the theory elucidates the structure of the world. By making these three concepts into a system. and vice versa. karman. that convertibility to be real must carry the meaning of conversion from being to nonbeing. but. evolve in continuity-series. This means.' it can be said not to differ much from the cognition theory. without any move-ment or function or action. it is more commonly used in refer-ence to citta-saq1tana or vijfiana-saq1tana (continuity-series of mind or of cognition). they are not merely instantaneous because they are comprised of continuity-series. the world is established when there is the evolving and con-vertibility of karal)a and karya instantaneously. however. To be more than momentary means to be still. 3. It cannot be denied. The three-nature theory holds or sugLogic of Convertibility . however. hence a continuity-series. 2. it is the way by which the world establishes itself as full of life and spirit. on the contrary. the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhiiva). But in such stillness the world cannot exist. But this convertibility is thought of and developed solely in the realm of 'being. the other-dependent nature (paratantra-svabhiiva).

' because. Thus. There needs to be a conversion of the imagined nature of the world into the consummated nature. entirely different from each other. Still it is not that the world of the enlightened ones exists at a place entirely different from the world of ordinary people. but it also involves in it the ''three-non-nature the-ory" (trini/:lsvabhiiva) and gives birth to it. the three-nature theory accounts for the structure of this world and sets forth the ground on which these conversions occur. It is the world itself that converts. it is a theory that upholds the principle or prepares the ground for Buddhistic practice. the three natures are wholly different from each other. it may be said there are the two worlds of confusion and illumination. it differs greatly from the cognition theory that is rather theoretical. there is no hell and no heaven separate from this world. Moreover. The other-dependent na-ture connotes the idea of "dependent origination" (pratitya-samutpiida). the third nature. and it is in such a conversion that there is the possibility for the ordinary. are to be found in this world. It has been discussed in view of its material contents. it serves as the bridge that links one to one's religious prac-tice. The three-nature theory has been widely discussed in various texts from various angles. however. not else-where. In this sense. not only does the three-nature theory explicate 'being' in terms of real ex-istence or nonexistence. where can this possibility of enlightenment be conceived? It is again in this one and the same world that is characterized as "otherdependent" (paratantra). therefore. Of course. and likewise the heaven. Our world remains one and the same all of the time. consciously or unconsciously. . The world. But. Although the three-nature theory is also a theory. unenlightened people to get enlight-ened. the fact that the world is constituted of three natures does not mean that there are three worlds or three different realities side by side. anticipated by the cognition theory. Hell. The world is considered to be constituted of these three natures that are also called three "characteristics" (lak$m)a). must remain at all times one and the same. In this respect. Thus. the "imagined" nature (parikalpita) that characterizes our worldly existence is totally opposite to the "consum-mated" nature (parini$panna) that denotes the world of enlightened ones. too. It is in this world of dependent origination that we make our continual rounds of birth and death and it is therein that we become liberated from safJlsara. it means that there is a world that is convertible from one nature to another.gests that 'being' itself always and directly points to 'non-being. it can be said that the cognition theory together with its logic of convertibility constituted in the evolving of cognition in the simultaneity of karaQa and karya is perfected on the basis of the three-nature theory which was.

" "succession. meamng which is most frequently encountered in the Buddhist texts. in order to clarify the meaning of "convertibility" found in the threenature system.vaya (synonym)-a term that is very useful and convenient for the purpose of showing the structure of convertibility 11 found in the three-nature system. One of its standard exposition reads: What is the "imagined nature" of what does not exist in reality refers to discrimination through dichotomy of subject and object: when this discrimination occurs in accordance with various conditions. it is said that the Buddha taught his doctrine through 84. language. the compound dharma-paryiiya (or simply paryaya) has been translated into Chinese as "dharma-gate" (ja-men ~! F~ ).'" Aside from these usages. logic and so on. we shall turn to a discussion on the word par. Sthiramati defines paryaya as "different name" (niimantara) and he says: "paryaya makes known that a thing (artha) has different appellations 2 (sabda)." "revolv-ing. and so forth. The five or six "superknowledges" (abhijflii) of the Buddhas and bo13 dhisattvas include the "superknowledge of another's mind. such as the state of passionate attach-ment or that of being emancipated. The various states of mind Logic of ConvertibilitY . Dharma-gate means that the doctrine or teaching is introduced through many gates. completely devoid of the dis-criminations of the "imagined" nature." The word is also defined as "a convertible term" or "synonym. its oneness and otherness." and so on." "lapse of time. In its instrumental form paryaye(la. This also shows that one reality can be understood differently or that one reality can be taught "alternately" in various ways.132 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA its linguistic meanings.000 dharma-gates." This means that through his Buddha-eye a Buddha has the superknowledge about vari-ous states of mind of other people. To elucidate a certain idea through the use of many synonyms is a very effec-tive way of explanation. 10 Now." Hsiian-tsang's translation < ~ r~. through various gates." "repetition. Thus. the manner in which paryaya is used here is not different in use from that of synonym. The reason that the teaching is so varied and many is that the Buddha taught in accordance with the variety of the listener's understanding. and so on. its similes. The term paryaya is found in the dictionary under the verb root Yi (to go) and is defined as "going or winding round. it has the meanings "successively" and "alternately. its meaning in view of practice. it is defined as the "other-dependent" nature: and the "consummated" nature refers to the very same "other-dependent" nature.

and R. Il. we find. Schopfung." and so forth. In the Mahiiyiina-sa1J1graha. synonym." . the same [other-dependent] is the consum-mated (parini~panna). There." which will be discussed presently. within the above context." While the one reality is convertible to be of the other-dependent nature on a certain "occasion." a translation that intends the meaning "convertibility. together with their Sanskrit equivalents. In fact.l7 (Lamotte's edition). the same [other-dependent] is the imagined (parika/pita). 16 What becomes obvious from the above passage is the fact that if the term paryaya were limited to meanings such as "synonym" or "gate" ex-plained above. It is not difficult to see that these meanings are derived and developed from the fundamental meanings mentioned above and are associated more or less to each other with the meaning "synonym" in their centre. nirmii. additional meanings of paryaya explained as follows: "Art und Weise. manner): "Gelegenheit. In a discussion on whether the three natures are one or different. From another perspective (paryiiye(la). they are neither different nor not different. 15 At any rate. The other-dependent nature (paratantra) is other-dependent from one perspective (parwiye(la).~:ta" (forming. From still an-other perspective (paryiiye(la)." 14 Several other usages of the term paryaya are found in Bohtlingk's San-skrit Worterbuch. the term encompasses a wide range of meanings including such meanings as "mode. avasara" (occasion): "Bildung. we find the following pas-sage: ngo bo nyid gsum po 'di dag gi tshul ci tha dad pa zhig gam I 'on te tha dad pa rna yin zhe na I tha dad pa rna yin pa I tha dad pa rna yin pa yang rna yin par brjod par bya'o I I gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid ni rnam grangs kyis na gzhan gyi dbang ngo I I rnam grangs kyis na de nyid kun brtags pa'o I I rnam grangs kyis na de nyid yongs su grub pa'o Are the manners in which these three natures exist different from each other or not different? It should be said. such meanings would limit and be very unsatisfactory in the context of the above passage. the three-nature theory is structured around the word paryaya. it should be clear now that the term paryaya is closely aligned with the mean-ing "convertibility. mode. prakara" (sort. Sakaki (in his edition Mahavyutpatti) interprets this paryaya as "the mind's functions succession. Having the complex of these meanings in mind. paryayel)a has been translated as "from one aspect." " "cetab-paryaya" in Sanskrit." "kind. transformation).

other-dependent = the imagined. It is well-known that the Mahtiyana-saf! lgraha expounds the other-dependent nature as having "two-divisions" c: fr ftX f{g )-the two divisions of impurity and purity. however. Lo{?ic of ConvertibilitY . .. because a difference is seen between them. Another point we noticed in this statement is that there are three conversions that relate the four terms: other-dependent = the other-dependent. In contrast to this. and other-dependent = the consummated. and death. "other-dependent is the other-dependent . although. In contrast to the two divisions or two aspects. which was originally taught by the Buddha.. Of the two. through the more concrete interpretation manifested in the so-called twelvefold causation. the first other-dependent represents ultimate reality. Other-dependent is mentioned first and occupies the central and prominent position (a prominent position always occupied by the other-dependent throughout the Mahayana-saf!lgraha). by the formula: "this existing." the two are identified." or "alternately. on the other. Here. this exists .. the interpretation on the one hand." However.RA or "from a perspective. how is one to differentiate between the two "other-dependents?" In the phrase. it is the otherdependent or the dependently originated. beginning with ignorance and ending with birth. that is." and so on. . The relationship be-tween these two other-dependents may be regarded to be similar to the two interpretations of pratltya-samutpada. The ultimate reality limits itself and reveals itself as the reality of this world. hence. "other-dependent is the other-dependent. age...CA.134 MA. The term "division" does not simply mean "part" such that the otherdependent is constituted by the coming together of the two parts. it is better understood as "aspect" that reveals itself in the conversion(s) of the otherdependent. and. because "depen-dent origination" (pratitya-samutpada). the total and single reality. or rather. the three divisions or the three conversions of the other-dependent seems to have been advocated in the statement above that begins with the phrase. Still it is called other-dependent.DHYAMIKA AND YOGA. The impure divi-sion of the other-dependent is seen as the imagined and the pure division as the consummated.." the same other-dependent simi-larly becomes the imagined or the consummated. the convertibility of the other-dependent is encountered already. is considered to represent the ultimate reality and the other-dependent is none other than this pratltya-samutpada. the second otherdependent is conceived in a more concrete sense. which transcends all expressions and cannot even be called other-dependent.

" That is to say. Thus. In these cases also the convertibility is indicated by the same expression paryayel)a. from that perspective it is neither the other-dependent nor the consummated. dependently originating. II. In such a manner the two other-dependents will be distin-guished. Or. when the world is the consummated. the statement: "dharmata is dharma" (Reality is actuality). Just as the otherdependent was a total and single world. Convertibility is not in reference to only one part of the whole. there is no other-dependent or no consummated. we may understand the relationship between the two other-dependents in the following manner. the meaning that reality is one and different at the same time-has been clearly explained as follows in the Mahdyana-saf[lgraha. from that perspective it is neither the imagined nor the other-dependent. these two other-dependents are considered to be in the relationship of being both different and not different at the same time. Similarly. it is natural that the two other-dependent are combined with a copula. they are not different. and therein there is neither the other-dependent nor the imagined. The convertibility of paryaya-that is. In any event. so too in the case of the imagined world. from one perspective.When it is said that "the other-dependent from one perspective is the otherdependent. then how can the three natures be differentiated? [An-swer:) When from the one perspective [something is defined) as the other dependent. then it is completely perfected. When from the one perspective [something is defined) as the consummated. insofar as both of them are. This relationship of not one and not different is the logic introduced by the word paryaya and here we are attempting to understand it as convertibility. 17 . while the second otherdependent functions as the predicate (dharma) of the subject and is regarded to limit the subject. The three natures are thus not lateral in their relationship but are convertible realities. in some sense or another.23: [Question:) If the other-dependent nature. and therein. When from the one perspective [something is defined) as the imagined. hence. the world is completely the imagined. can be the three natures. the first otherdependent limits itself to become the second other-dependent. The first other-dependent functions as the subject of the sentence (dharmin) and is regarded as the real (dharmata). The other-dependent world so far discussed becomes or converts to the imagined (parikalpita) from one perspective and becomes or converts to the consummated (parini$panna) from another perspective. from that perspective it is neither the imagined nor the con-summated. but." the expression paryayetza "from one perspective" or "in a certain aspect" can be understood to express a "limitation.

discrimination or cognition in general is modified as the "un-real. by this the meaning of the word is fully expressed. Conse-quently. and not pure. 19 Here. what is the contents that comprise these various perspectives? Here. in Chinese translations (in those of Paramiirtha as well). not to the imagined nature. and the like are to be understood as dependently originating. into the world of defilement and confusion or into the world of purity and enlightenment. a past passive participle of the former. and all of them belong to the other-dependent nature. it is not true. discrimination. as Paramiirtha has done.SU ). and so forth.136 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA This means that the world that is one and the same as the original otherdependent converts into other modes of the world. this constitutes the imagined nature. It refers to the world of error. the relationship between the three natures has been explained in terms of convertibility through a discussion on the term paryaya. the question of how and why the other-dependent converts in its entirety to the imagined world will be discussed. imagined is parikalpita. Therefore. hence they are of the other-dependent nature." It is not that a specific discrimination is singled out from the many and labelled unreal. it is clear that cognition. So far. cognition is discussed in the context of "unreal discrimination" (abhuta-parikalpa). that is. that to be dependently originating and thus to be the other-dependent does not mean to be the consummated na-ture. and this past passive sense is expressed by so-chih (with attachment). not tranquil. falls short of the mark as there is no sense of the past passive or of attachment therein. the word "discrimination" usually stands for the Sanskrit vikalpa. Hsiian-tsang translated parikalpita with the compound pien-chi-so-chih (~ ~t jiJT ~universally calculated with attachment). parikalpa (pien-chi ~ ~t . And a cognition that dependently originates is known by the term "transformation. however. discrimination). What is the motive behind paryiiya? In other words. However. When one clings to calcula-tion or discrimination as true.' " 8 From this statement. In the first chapter of the Madhyiinta-vibhaga. to say unreal does not mean to say that there Lot. Sthiramati states: It should be admitted that cognition (vijiiiina) exists in reality because of its nature of dependently originating. It is needless to say. parikalpa. calculation. though the past passive form does not necessarily have the sense of attachment. which are the functions of "cognition" (vijflana).ic of Convertibilitv . problems still remain. to translate parikalpita simply by the term "discrimination" (jen-pieh ft . Moreover. Unreal dis-crimination is so called because it is a discrimination (parikalpa) but it always results in unreality (abhuta)-that is.

one colored by the attach-ment to its own judgment as true (or false) and this means that one clings to the fruit of one's judgment as true (or false).wva).is a mistake that occurred in a judgment of our conventional life. To use Sanskrit words. in this case. it is quite normal for the other-dependent world to always and instantly convert in its entirety to the imag-ined world that is permeated by basic ignorance and clinging. these two worlds are not two worlds having different material ingredients. they simply reflect the conversion of the basic ignorance and clinging. A judgment that has its basis in this ignorance is. still it is unreal from the per-spective of the ultimate truth. The sa111saric world. for example. or as "what is imagined by discrimination" (11.20-21. the world converts to the imagined nature without any effort on our part. however. we can see the possi-bility of the other-dependent converting into the consummated nature that exists in the other-dependent.3). kk. This corresponds to the conventional truth (sarrzvrti-satya) of the Madhyamikas in that the conventional. Actually we encounter expressions in the treatises that seem to sup-port such an interpretation. In the Mahavana-sarrzgraha. even if no error is involved therein. while the other-dependent (paratantra) refers to the cognizer (cognition as an agent). In the fact that the other-dependent is at once real and unreal. That is. or the imagined world. discrimination and the like. In contrast. from the same fact. Insofar as discrimination is other-dependent. The otherdependent world always and instantly becomes the imagined world at this point. the inclination for one's life to fall and convert to the imagined nature is primal in our ordinary mundane existence. in contrast to the consummated nature. There is an interpretation among scholars that the imagined (parika-lpita) refers to what is perceived (vi.17). though a truth. This may be indeed the characteristic of cognition. Even if a discrimination or a judgment is correct and without mistake. Further. owing to that very ignorance. con-ceals and covers (sarrzvrti) the ultimate truth (paramartha-satya). Further. In this case. although discrimination arises depending-on-others. the imagined is explained as "what appears as object (artha)" (11. has its beginning here. it is real. or the object of cognition. that is. one could say that abhutaparikalpa (which is other-dependent) undergoes conversion to become the past passive parikalpita (the imagined). one will require ardu-ous practice and effort to have the conversion take place. we find that the imagined is referred to as "the thing which is . Of course. insofar as such circumstances are examples of the otherdependent nature that has not yet converted to the consummated. we can see the momentum by which the other-dependent converts to the imagined nature. in the Trirrzsika. Thus. it is still said to be unreal. it arises as the unreal so long as the darkness of the basic ignorance (avidya) is not removed.

and neither is the consummated nor the imagined.) Both the active (cognizer) and the passive (object cognized) can be understood as "the other-dependent" from one perspective and also as "the imagined" from another. and both the subject and object are of the imagined nature. The reason is as follows. hence. so long as two things-cognizer and cognized. this procedure is in itself of the other-dependent nature. why is the imagined nature expressed by the words "the thing which is discriminated" (vikalpya-vastu)? This is self-evident if we take into account the structure. When the subject and the object are confronting each other in their pure and genuine form. just as the subject can never convert into the object. Then. but in the latter. the other-dependent cannot convert into the imagined. then the relationship between the other-dependent and the imagined would be of the other-dependent. (The identification of subject and object can take place only on a level quite apart from that of the mundane world.RA discriminated" (yad vastu vikalpyate) and the other-dependent as "that which discriminates'' ( vikalpa). Accordingly.e. So long as one assumes that the cognizer or subject is the other-dependent and the cognized or object is the imagined and thus fixes them and adheres to them as substantive existences. and that the evolving refers to the mutual relationship between karal). and this would make no sense. it has already been pointed out (see notes 18 and 19 above) that the other-dependent refers to the evolving of cognition or of unreal discrim-ination. then it follows that one does not see the possibility of converting the other-dependent into the imagined but see them. both subject and object belong to the evolving of cognition.a and karya (p.CA. of the three natures. as two separate worlds side by side. Therefore. if it were firmly fixed that the cog-nizer was the other-dependent and the cognized was the imagined. However. However. 126 above). To distinguish between (i. that is. to the other-dependent. But. When subject and object are fixed.138 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGA. we have an example of convertibility. that is. it will be difficult to comprehend. because when the other-dependent and the imagined are fixed. the defiled. stabilized. or cognition and its object-are thought to formulate a pair. to perceive from different perspectives) the other-dependent and the imagined is quite a different matter than to contrast the ideas of the active (cognizer) and the passive (object cognized). we don't. if we do not. and adhered Logic of Convertibility . 127 above) in the function of which cognition appears with the two divisions of subject and object (p. when the same confrontation of substance or of "l-ness" and imagined.. instead. In the former case. such a confrontation signifies the other-dependent. both of them are the other-dependent. the cognizer stands in opposition to the cognized and the former never converts into the latter. the convertibility.

the point here is to clarify that when the evolving of cognition. 11." This is not a contradiction.. It is also clear by this summary that the other-dependent becomes the object of cognition (parikalpya). the imagined nature (parikalpita).. the other-dependent was previously (p." When what discriminates (parikalpa) is confronted with what is to be dis-criminated (parikalpya). In the former discussion. How are these to be understood? The text goes on to explain the three no-tions one by one and the gist of the discussion can be summed up as follows: The minding-cognition ( as substantive existences. a flow of the other-dependent." That is. what is to be discriminated. that is. parikalpya. "a thing" in this context refers to both the subject and object which. "a thing . what is discriminated and is attached to. what discriminates." The other-dependent refers to "what is to be discriminated. but that all objects turn out to be the imagined. "what is discrimi-nated" was the imagined. through being discriminated. there arises what one discriminates and what one becomes attached to. through a discussion on the convertibility of the other-dependent to the imagined. becomes suspended and stabilized. and parikalpita. This proce-dure of conversion is referred to in the Trif{lsikii by the phrase. Although reality or unreality of things or objects of cognition are discussed in various ways in the history of this school. but now it is referred to as the other-dependent. become fixed and are adhered to. we have discussed and criticized the claim that the imagined is the object of cognition. is discriminated.. consciousness) refers to "what discriminates. the same subject and object of the other-dependent nature convert themselves into the imagined nature. It is understandable when the three natures are seen . viz. Further. So far. 20 How the imagined nature (parikalpita) arises is thus clearly explicated. the world of the imagined nature is estab-lished. even a view contrary to that claim can be seen in the Mahiiyiina-saf{lgraha. 138) thought to be "that which dis-criminates. it is probably more accurate to say that it is not that the imagined is the object of cognition. the imag-ined.16. The text enumer-ates three notions: parikalpa. every "thing" thus suspended and stabilized comes to the fore as the object of discrimination and that owing to this process. Therefore." but here it is explained as "what is to be discriminated.

as its object. read: rnam pa gang du gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid Ia kun tu brtag pa de ni de Ia kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid do I yenakareQa paratantra-svabhave parikalpital) sa tatra parikalpita-svabhaval) I The text goes on to explain: The words "with some specific form" means "in some such form." I rnam pa gang du zhes bya ba ni ji !tar na zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go I yenakareQeti yathety arthal) I When the mind-cognition takes the world of other-dependence. . The Tibetan version of this passage and my restoration of its Sanskrit equivalents.. 21 III The conversion of the other-dependent into the consummated is properly called "the turning around of the basis" (iisraya-paravrtti). the pure and genuine world. It is di-rectly opposite to the conversion of the other-dependent to the imagined. and not parallel to each other. a passage follows that explains well the feature of convertibility. That is. Even though both the object of judgment and judgment itself are the other-dependent. LoKic of ConvertibilitY . "some specific form" and "some such form" are directly related contextually to the word paryiiyef)a (from one perspective) explained earlier. and conceives and discriminates it. Convertibility means that discrimination that sets off the subject from the object converts from its other-dependent existence to its imagined existence. as is elucidated by the text in its latter passage. the "specific form" thus created is no other than the imagined. the other-dependent is conceived and is attached to with some specific form and this specific form is of the imagined nature. and are accordingly pure and not defiled. No matter how the other-dependent is conceived by the minding-cognition. when what discriminates equals minding-cognition and what is to be discriminated equals the other-dependent. what is already judged and discriminated is of the imagined nature..140 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA as convertible. the "form" thus conceived and discriminated is of the imagined nature. It is needless to repeat that the expressions. Just after the last sentence of this explanation.

The imagined. what is nonexistent is the imag-ined. "What is the paryaya concerning the consummated?" the text explains: "It is that things are absolutely non-existent in a manner they are conceived and imagined." or "to be free of.But both conversions are based on the same idea of paryaya. "perfected" (parini$patti). or it means that a thing appears as if a real object while there is no object at all. Mahiiyiina-sa1Jlgraha 11. however. He further adds: "Separated-ness" (rahitatii) is no other than dharmata. the consummated is most appropriately expressed by the word "rahitata. this is the consummated Sthiramati comments on this verse as follows: When the other-dependent is at all times absolutely free of the subject I object 23 dichotomy. when asked. this is the consummated. Among such descrip-tions. and so forth are referred to as the consummated hints at the theory of "non-substantiality in the ultimate sense" (paramiirtha-ni/:lsvabhiiva) that is an-other name that denotes the essence of the consummated. it refers to things discriminated. non-existence (atyantiibhiivatva)." that is. Vasubandhu states in Tri1J1sikii. According to Vasubandhu 's Trisvabhiiva-nirdesa. the reality.l7. as ex-plained above. Now. the same convertibility of the other-dependent. ananyathii-bhiiva). the imagined is defined as "the way how something appears" (vathii khyiiti) or simply "the appearance" (khyiina) .21: When it [the other-dependent) is always devoid of (or separated from) the 22 former [the imagined)." It seems to suggest well the essential logical process of how the consummated is to be acquired. "devoidness. (of the otherdependent)." The fact that these notions of separated-ness. is in some way "existent" because."which means "separated-ness. "the highest being" (agriirtha). dharmata. and so forth. When the consummated is of concern." In Il. In accord with descriptions of the imagined and the other-dependent. k. in contrast to the otherdependent that is defined as "what appears" (vat khyiiti) or "the agent who appears" (khyiitr). "to get rid of." hence. the consummated nature is referred to by a variety of names such as "non-changing" (avikiira.4 defines the consummated "the other-dependent that is absolutely free of (atyantiibhiivatva) the form of sense-object.

such an appearance is merely an appearance and is not true and real "existence. Again. But." It is simply an imagined existence to which one is attached as real. when one speaks of ''from the perspective of non-existence. When the other-dependent nature is regarded as the basis for the convertibility of the three natures.20) states explicitly that whatever is discriminated and clung to "does not exist" (na . it degenerates to form a world of the imagined. the consummated. the structure thus built up.'' Therefore. if the otherdependent were thought to be nothing more than the starting point in the process of one's Logic of Convertibility . if that were the case. and in negating this.26) states: "It is 24 taught by various synonyms (paryaya) of non-existence. This means that the world of the consummated is not established positively at some remote place apart from the world of the imagined. one may claim that. and is neither the consummated nor the other-dependent.. from an-other perspective." such a meaning is included. what is meant is the nonexist-ence of the imagined nature that is absolutely nonexistent. In this appearance." This means that siitra passages that explicate non-existence are passages that ac-tually refer to the imagined nature. the consummated world is acquired. vidyate). when the other-dependent is rid of the subject I object dichotomy (which is of the imagined nature). in response to the question: "In what manner is the imagined nature referred to in the various Mahayana siitras?" the Muhtiyana-sarngraha (ll. is made up by constructing and grasping what does not really exist.. 25 The nonexistence of the imagined is itself the consummated. as a saying such as "klesa (affliction) is itself bodhi (enlightenment)" might suggest. This simply returns us to a mystic intuition of nonexistence or mystic "unification" or "identification" of two contradictory components. a world of existence is built up. but the building. as really "existent. but this does not mean that the imagined becomes directly the consummated. the Trirnsika (k. Not only that. must be negated in its entirety. admit-ting it as the third member of the three natures. It is ''nothing. what appears as existent in the case of the imagined is in reality nonexistent. the object of cognition. then it is. However." Through this grasping or clinging. We exist and our world really exists here and now.142 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA itself. When the consummated nature is explained as "being got rid of" (rahitata) or the non-existence of something. Although from one perspective (paryayet~a) the other-dependent converts to the imagined. but such an appearance produced by the imagined is far removed from this real existence. we would be unable to fully understand why the other-dependent nature would be necessary as the third member of the three-nature theory. In fine. that is. though exten-sive and variegated. or what does not exist as it appears. Indeed. but that the nonexistence of the imagined is itself synonymous (paryaya) with the existence of the consum-mated. in the imagined.

both the mind and the body constitute the basis that undergoes the turning around. but it has a wider meaning than just that. only in the iilaya-vijfliina. and so forth. Such a conversion is called the "turning around of the basis" pariivrtti). the other-dependent drops down and becomes the consummated. the human body is given the name "body with its organs" (sendriya-kiiya) and is often referred to as the "basis" (asraya). as the mediator from the imagined to the consummated. This is the meaning of the statement: "From still another perspective. However. Sthiramati states: The basis [for the turning around] is the iilayavijiiiina which is the seed for everything. for in this case. almighty (vibhutva). when a cognition (vijftiina) is regarded as alaya (store. "turning around of the basis" plays various roles at such times as when one enters into the faith. the conversion is only pursued on the basis of and as the function of the other-dependent. what is the basis that turns around? As a matter of common sense. ultimately and truly. it could not function as the basic intermediary existence. throughout one's personal career of spiritual development. It normally refers to the "moment that a bodhisattva penetrates the path of insight" miirga). In short. The turning around of the basis is explained as the "acquisition of liberation (vimok$a)." which is possible only through the ''diamond-like sam ad hi'' ( vajropama-samiidhi). it is so named in the sense that it is the "basis" from which everything in the three world systems arise. when one attains realization. In his commentary to the Trif!lsikii. 141). in our everyday life. the other-dependent is the consummated" referred to above (p. In the manner "the body I mind drops down" (as put by Dogen). dharma-body. that is. can be also a basis. It takes place even when one is still on the path preceding the path of insight. 133)." and so on. In the Buddhist texts. the conversion from the imagined to the consummated is itself the conversion of the other-dependent to the consummated. both sentient beings and the world as a container are found. realization would not necessarily have to involve the meaning of the other-dependent. The world as a container (bhiijana-loka). As all of these point to the apex of the Buddhist path.realization. Consequently. p. omniscience (sa-rvajftatva). which is the foundation and circumstance for sentient beings. However. (The term "drop down" reminds us of rahitatii-referred to above. it also refers to the "final attainment of dharma-body. depository) and when this is said to have been dhatu 26 (cause) from time immemorial. . the "turning around" indicates the ultimate meaning. Now in this turning around of the basis. nonabiding in the nirvaiJa (aprati$!hita-nirviil)a) of the bodhi-sattva.

28 We find a similar expression as this in Sutra[a!Jlkara.l3: It is the basis for confusion (bhrante/:1 saf!!nisraya/:1). the maturation of body which comes about as the fruit of past karma ripens into the dharma-body. In short. when the antidote for it arises. Sthiramati amplified the meaning further and gives in detail an interpretation of the word in his Tri!Jlsika-bhasya as follows: In overcoming the gross turbidities of the two kinds of hindrances. the turning around of the basis is attained.l) states: The basis refers to the other-dependent which has two divisions [of the defiled (imagined) and the pure (consummated) ]27 Further. how is the term "turning around" (paravrtti) explained? The Mahayana-Sa!Jlgraha (IX. and knowledge which comprises the subject I object dichot-omy transforms into non-discriminating wisdom. The "gross turbidity" (dau${hulva) means that the basis (i.l) explains it as follows: The turning around [of the basis] means that.e. the meaning that the other-dependent is the basis is also found in an explanation in the Mahayana-sa!Jlgraha (at the end of 11.e. the impure division of the other-dependent becomes annihilated and the pure division comes to the fore. is attained. freed of contaminations.. lacks the power of agility or dexterity karmm:zyata). the contami-nated impurity is eliminated and a state of purity. the personal mind I body existence) lacks the power to function freely (i. the gross turbidity changes into agility.2) as follows: The other-dependent is the basis for the confusion which is non-existent to appear. 30 Lof?ic of Convertibility . 29 Hsiian-tsang has translated into Chinese the term "becomes annihilated" with the word chiian-she (fi ~turn and reject) and the term "comes to the fore" with the word chiian-te (fi f~turn and acquire).144 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA The Mahayana-sa!Jlgraha (IX. Xl. intel-lectual and afflictional. thus conveying well the meaning of turning around. When there occurs the turning around of the basis.. Then.

" the alaya-cognition. However. If this were the case. and this refers to the convertibility of the other-dependent. . Cause and effect belong to the world of the otherdependent. Second." in this sense. or the otherdependent nature. the consummated would never be consummated. because the unconditioned always tran-scends the conditioned world. The "basis" (asraya) is mediator. root substratum. too. the basis means cause (hetu). it cannot become the consummated. and thereby constructs a "self" (iitman).I)a can be considered. On the other hand. the origin of all errors. the turning around of the basis does not mean that the imagined converts directly into the consummated on this foundation of the other-dependent. Therefore. As stated above (n. such as the Buddhanature theory and the tathagata-garbha (tathagata-womb) theory should be reconsidered in this light of the other-dependent. it is foundation.26). as it would be on the dimension of the other-dependent and would be limited by the latter in the same way as the imag-ined is.In such a "turning around of the basis.I)a. means not to stand still even for an instant but to evolve or turn around itself continuously. the other-dependent. If the world of other-dependent. the other-dependent becomes the consummated" may indicate the same meaning that the other-dependent is the cause (hetu. how-ever. it is "baseless. both sarpsara and nirvii. it is also true that there is no cause directly for the consum-mated. while the minding-cognition (mano-vijniina. the Buddha-nature to be found in all sentient beings. 31 The statement: "From one perspective (paryiiyel)a). That is. could never be really an intermediary foundation. should be of the other-dependent nature and not of the consummated. the sixth cognition) brings this flow to a halt. stabilizes it in time and space. that is. Based on this foundation. Later developments. to be originating depending on others. First. The same holds true for the un-afflicted seeds b[ja). it always encompasses a tendency of falling into the error of the imagined. When the other-dependent is spoken about as comprising causes and conditions. is its basis. To be dependent on others. from the perspective of two meanings: foundation and cause. as such. the turning around of the basis must refer to the fact that the very foundation of the other-dependent itself turns around. not to that of the consummated which is character-ized as "unconditioned" (asaiJ1skrta). too. and so on. hetu) is understood as the basis for both sarpsara and nirvii. This is because the evolving from cause to effect does not stand still even momentarily. owing to its instantaneous nature (k$al)ikatva). would become stabilized as a foundation. nimitta) for the con-summated. as it always would fall into the level of the imagined. However. but flows continu-ously. the other-dependent or the pratftya-samutpiida. the dhiitu (which means cause.

It means that the two kinds of attachments to subject and object are wiped out and purity reigns. because purity simply means that the other-dependent has been purified. It means that the other-dependent simply stops to be the basis for confusion. n. Such a stabilization represents nothing but the imagined nature. Also the fact that the "representationonly" (vijiiaptimiitratii) is. and the butterfly would be the consum-mated. it is not a cause directly for the consummated. This leads us to consider the popular saying. Only when such a basis. nor does the turning around or change take place directly between them. the third principle. accordingly.28). The fact that the otherdependent (dharma) and the consummated (dharmatii) are neither one nor different has been discussed in the Tri!Jlsikii." which conveys a similar meaning. which provides the "place" for the turning around of the two. the basis for confusion. consequently the other-dependent is the "dharma" of the consummated world and represents actual existences. when it drops down and the consummated world presents itself. the cognition (vijniina) evolves from cause to effect and from effect to cause. The otherdependent nature is represented by cognition that is always moving and flowing. there is the other-dependent. when "body I mind drops down" (p. however. In the three nature theory. When we say that the basis that is other-dependent in nature turns around and the consummated is realized. k. the other-dependent is said to be the "ba-sis for confusion''. the consummated is the "dharmata" (real reality) of the other-dependent. The contamination possessed impurity is eliminated and there occurs purity. such a turning around does not take place in a manner that a chrysalis becomes a butterfly. In this saying. affliction and enlightenment are intuitionally and di-rectly identified.22. Instead. the tendency to fall into the imagined. turns around. for these two are tran-scendentally separated. The turning around or conversion thus takes place from the imag-ined to the consummated. or bewilderment. the status of the otherdependent does not become extinguished. "Affliction is itself enlightenment. As stated before. what drops down is no other than the affliction of the imagined nature. I mean that it is not that the otherdependent is first stabilized as something real (chrysalis of the metaphor). in the final analysis. apart from the imagined and the consum-mated.146 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA As stated before (see. the imagined and the consummated cannot be identified in that manner. Therefore. simul-taneously and instantaneously. 143) in terms of the other-dependent. not the other-dependent. not the other-dependent. In this Logic of Convertibility . the principle of convertibility. Consequently the chrysalis would be the imagined. the consummated is realized. and then it turns about into the consummated (butterfly). As we saw earlier. equated with the consummated suggests the same existential relationship.

must exist and operate therein. although both terms are other-dependent and are translated as "cog-nition" or consciousness (shih ~ ) in Chinese. The steps involved here go in a zigzag fashion and thus a zigzag logic must intervene. The idea of . the cognition as its cognizer also does not exist. in spite of that. in such a claim there is no need for the abnegation of cognition itself. the name Fa-hsiang in China for this school). (asallak$m:w-anupravesa-upiiya-lak$m:w) From the viewpoint of 'being." In order for the cognition system to incorporate this abnegation. hence. the world is realized as "representation-only" (vijiiiaptimiitratii). the result of the turning around of the basis. What is negated in this case is vijflana while what is affirmed as the final representationonly is vijflapti. If it is claimed that the representation-only (equals the 33 consummated nature) is consummated solely by means of the cognition theory. When the logic of convertibility. What exists is cognition only and the object of cognition (the outer world) does not exist. only then is there established the scheme of the "means for entering non-existence. I cannot discuss in detail the logic involved here. and thereby it may clarify the theory of 'cognition-only' while re-jecting the existence of the outer world. it would have to have the logic of convertibility operating from its inception. the logic of convertibility. schemati-cally and in steps as follows. The idea of the so-called means for entering into non-existence 32 is related to this discussion. "the cognition also does not which is centered around the other-dependent and which is the logic for the practice of turning around of the basis. the term vijiiapti should be distinguished from vijflana that always has a tendency to fall into the imag-ined nature. the same cognition the-ory could not account for the abnegation of the cognition itself and could not make the claim. the logic of the three nature theory.'' IV Statements such as "Affliction is itself enlightenment" or "birth-and-death (sa!Jlsiira) is at once nirval)a" are accepted generally in Mahayana Buddhism as its universal axioms that well describe the scenery of ultimate emancipation. is applied to and actualized on the realm of cognition. which is taken as other-dependent.' the cognition theory may afford us with the categorization of mental factors (caitta) and various characteristics of things (dharma-lak$m:w. It clarifies the orderly sequence of the turning around of the basis. but it is likely that this logic is not simply a product of the cognition theory. finally. but if the cognized does not exist. However.

as indicative of the profound meaning of the dharma-kiiya. the synonyms applica-ble to the three natures were the logical foundation for establishing the idea of the "turning around of the basis" on the one hand and. Such convertibility can be logically understood only on the basis of pratltyasamutpiida or of the other-dependent. must be of the kind that we have called the "logic of con-vertibility. especially of the idea of the other-dependent nature." the same text (11. especially. k. In a similar vein.2l. the phrase "birth-and-death is at once nirval)a" is explained.28. for instance. there are many discussions from various perspectives in the history of Buddhism. of the Yogacara school. on the other hand. and the identity of the two should be understood in the light of the three natures-the imagined. we even find an exposition that saf!1sara. This clearly shows that the axiom stated above is assumed to have the logic of convertibility as its framework." It is the logic that was the undercurrent of Sakyamuni's insight known as pratitya-samutpiida and that continued until the development of the three nature theory. So far we have discussed this convertibility in the light of evolving (pari(liima). Loxic of Convertibilitv .3. But a mysticism or any form of intuition can hardly be accepted as a logical investigation. does not see nirval)a. In the Mahiiyiina-saiJlgraha. and the turn-ing around of the basis (iiSraya-pariivrtti). such as the "logic of identity. IX. converts into and becomes the seed (bija. cause) for the attainment of nirviil)a or for the release from Saf!1siira. as for the problems of how and why two contradictory events like affliction and enlightenment. and the other-dependent. in the Buddhism of China and Japan.'' "interpenetration. nirval)a. However. in several places throughout the text (VIII. Because one confronts many difficulties in such an investigation." and so forth expressed therein is regarded as the Mahayana principle. This tendency seemed to increase in later times and.148 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA complete "identity. Therein. however.30). as mystical or intuitive. or saf!1sara and nirval)a. I would now like to add a few more points. its actual structure was understood in view of the dynamics of "evolving of cognition. Thus. "the tathagata does not see saf! 1sara. Espe-cially.28) elucidates the "non-distinction between saf!1Sara and nirval)a" (sa1Jlsiira-nirvii(la-nirvise$a) by employing the import of the three-nature theory. there is a tendency to explain the idea of "identity" or of "at once" or "is itself" in these sayings. synonym or "from one perspective" (paryiiya).). the consummated.l2." In relation to the idea of this evolving or convert-ibility. that is absolutely separated from nirval)a. etc. which reads. could possibly be united or identified. respectively (11. commenting on a passage from the Brahma-pariprcchii-sutra. X. or as suggestive of non-discriminative wisdom. A logic." that underlies and explicates as well such an axiom. affliction.

it is difficult to encounter the meaning of "to re-direct. from cause to effect. and so forth. too. One can grant such a possibility only on the explicit claim that. "self and others are not two. "hui-hsiang toward bodhi" (merit-transference toward enlighten-ment). These interpretations are closely aligned to the idea of redirecting." But such a response may be consid- . Accordingly. the merits accumulated by sentient being are transferred toward the 36 bodhi. That being the case. how is it possible that one's merits can be transferred or directed to others? The question is a perennial one that concerns the relationship between karma and its fruits or between cause and effect in general. we can find only the sense of "evolve" for the term paril)ama and its cognate words." But the meaning to re-direct can be observed in the usage of this term throughout the Buddhist texts. but are equal. Thus." and hsiang as "to direct toward. when considered from the idea of sunyata. not elsewhere.In the later development of Buddhism. therein there is an effect. fixed (determined) on to Buddhahood." "paril)ati. the Buddha's merits accumulated by his vows and practices are transferred and directed toward sentient beings. it is given in the Tibetan 34 transla-tion." began to play an important role in texts such as T'an-luan 's Ch' ing-t' u-lun-chu (l~ ±~WI U ). However. Sthiramati terpreted this term (pari(lati) as follows: 35 has in- [By the function of paril)ati] the good roots are yoked to mahiibodhi. In the San-skrit dictionaries.)." According to the Chinese tradition. because its Sanskrit equivalent is "paril)amana. usually translated "merit-transference. The term hui-hsiang is actually the same word as "evolving" discussed above. it is in the idiom. Or conversely. hui is ex-plained as meaning "to turn around. but it is explained further as "to re-direct" one's merit from oneself to another. and thus wherein goodness has been accumulated. therein there will be fruits of that goodness. from phenomenon (shih $) to principle (li JJI!. In the Sanskrit tradition. or from oneself to other beings. the term hui-hsiang ( J@ rPJ ). how is it possible "to transfer" or "to re-direct" one's merit? It is natural that wherein there is a cause. in this meaning." This means that the good roots and virtues of one's own religious practices are turned around and directed to where one wishes. that the term appears most frequently. or paritwti means that one intends to have the good roots." and other words that are cognates of "paril)ama.

another usage of it in the phrase. without which neither emancipation nor salva-tion would be possible." it must be submerged in the background of the logic of convertibility clarified in the light of the three-nature theory developed in the Yogacara philosophy. In such a transference (evolving). paril)amiki corresponds to pien-i ( f£ ~) "transformation. however." evolving. pien-i is explained by the statement. even though it is only on such a claim that one can grant such a possibility." In most cases. parinamikl in this phrase is understood as "transformation'· (pien-i). at once. together with its possibility. samsaric and corporal." the one that is of concern here. it can be pointed out that. that plays such an important role in Yogacara philosophy. And for the term paril)amana to have the meanings. The first is known as "birth-anddeath with limitations and divisions" and the second is known as "birth-anddeath through transformation (paril)amiki). the term "paril)ama. it is a birth that "resulted from the un-contaminated and resolute vow and has magnificent powers beyond measure. It is also named 38 "manomayakaya." I feel dubious. can be interpreted properly only within the structure of convert-ibility. In any case. but as it is a cognate word of paril)amana. cases. In this connection. "transference" and "redirecting. is scarcely mentioned in connec-tion with siinyata by the Madhymikas.'5t ~if£ ~ j: fE ) which means • 'birth-and-death through inconceiv-able transformation." and here. the phrase is translated (::f ." The second one is called "inconceivable" because." When the Ch' eng-wei-shih-lun (chiian 8) interprets this phrase. actually. "a former bodily existence is turned over to a better life of later time. In birth and death that are the pratyeka-buddhas. Of these the first one refers to the ordinary birth and death. both on the part of the sentient beings and on the part of the Buddha.150 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA ered to be an insufficient explanation. because while the Buddha may direct his virtues toward sentient beings. the merit-transference must be a fact." There are two kinds of birth-and-death. as explained in the Ch' eng-wei-shih-lun. when seen from the soteriological point of view. which is constituted in various divisions and is limited in many ways. it can be interpreted in the meaning of "meritLogic of ConvertibilitY . about the fact that paril)amikl has been translated as pien-i and interpreted as •'trans-formation. Apart from the fact that terms "evolving" and "merit-transference" share the same Sanskrit paril)ama. affliction can be. bodhi. Merit-transference. ordinary people have nothing but afflictions that can be directed towards enlightenment. and the powerful bodhisattvas." "body produced by mind.

in such a birth. The Chinese transla-tion of the phrase here reads: the persons of the two vehicles take "'the birth of inconceivable merittransference. transfer the path of sages they have acquired toward all existences. In his commentary to this phrase (MSA." The sage who should have already attained emancipation from birth-anddeath also takes birth in sarpsara through "transformation" (actually . The phrase acintya-parit:u:imikl-upapatti appears also in the Mahayanasiitralaf(lkara. The entrance into or conversion to the Mahayana is accomplished on their behalf only by being born into sarpsara and thereby conferring benefits to others. who are not finally determined as members of the two vehicles. that is. who have already penetrated into truth. the path of sages acquired by them-toward the world of beings.'' 39 In their subcommentaries on this portion. "'birth which is incon-ceivable merit -transference." This also supports the interpretation merit-transference for paril)amikl. to the samsaric world.'' It does not interpret paril)amikl as "transformation.transference'' and I believe this is preferable." Truly. The Ch' eng-wei-shih-lun does not overlook this point either as it explains that "one transforms one's bodily existence through the power of compassion and the vow. Therefore. There the phrase is discussed in relation to the idea that those sravakas and pratyeka-buddhas. Vasubandhu states: Because the two persons [sriivaka and pratyekabuddha]. and thereby they take birth among the sentient beings and exert themselves in the practices of benefiting oth-ers. the path of the sages itself can become the cause of sarpsara and one takes birth on account of great compassion. Xl.56." This refers to the so called doctrine of the "conversion to the Mahayana" of the persons of the two vehicles. XI. differing from the ordinary birth that is a result of past karma and afflic-tions. even those of the two vehicles can transfer their merits-that is. it is called. The following example will support this argument. they are said to possess ''birth which is the inconceivable merittransference. this transference of the path of sages toward their birth is inconceivable. can attain the enlightenment in the Mahayana by means of the single vehicle (ekayana). both Sthiramati and Asvabhava emphasize the point." but as "merit-transference. The reason why such a birth is called "inconceivable" is that. That is to say. "on account of great compassion they take birth in 40 sarpsara. having been converted to the Mahayana.56).

the practices are spurred on by the attitude of great compassion of benefiting others. exchange. if pien-i referred simply to a matter of transfor-mation.Sriivaka. Nonabiding in nirviiQa and taking birth in sarpsara. also in the Srlmiiliidevl-siltra and in the Ratnagotravibhiiga. Moreover." which was closely related to the bodhisattva's "not abiding in nirviiQa" and "taking birth in this world willingly" (sal'f'lcintya-bhava-upapatti). The Chinese term pien-i (transformation) can also encompass the logic of convertibility." In its ascending direc-tion we saw that cognition turned around and became wisdom and in its descending direction we discussed it in terms of "merit-transference. although it is needless to say that for the sages of the two-vehicle path. to understand why it is called "inconceivable." without which meaning it would be difficult. a bodhisattva can be said to abide in a "state of merit-transference.152 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA through merit-transference) and puts great compassion into practice. not the three (of . and bodhisattva). As a matter of fact." To summa-rize. or conversion from birth to death and from death to birth." and its real features were found in the theory of three natures. pratyeka-buddha. However. though it is far from the perfected and immovable state of the Bud-dha." It can be seen that the "logic of convertibility" includes the two as-pects or the two directions of "ascending" and "descending. in the final analysis. This shows that this merit-transference is in some sense or other the one in a descending direction that comes down to the samsaric world. the logic of convertibility was first examined in terms of the "evolving of cognition. it is stated that the one who takes the inconceivably transformed birth is not only the sage of two-vehicle path but also the great powerful bodhisattva. It is a state in which a bodhisattva transfers his merits toward fellow beings unceasingly and untiringly forever. centering around the otherdependent nature. Only when such practices are actualized. Therefore. pien-i must bear the meaning of "merit-transference. 41 Logic of Convertibility . it is the merittransference in an ascending direction. Conse-quently. then such a "transformation" could not refer to the birth and death of the powerful bodhisattva or of the sage who has entered the one vehicle of Buddha-yana. can it be said that the vehicle is one (eka-yiina)." as it were. this "descending" merittransference is closely linked to the bodhisattva's attitude of "non-abiding in nirviiQa" (aprati$!hita-nirviit:ta). We then exam-ined it in view of the "turning around of the basis.

this paper contains many shortcomings. I chose to include it in this volume as the idea of "convertibility" influences my understanding of Buddhism to this date and because most of my papers that have appeared hence are. more or less. In spite of that. based upon that idea. . Being written about 35 years ago. ''The Buddhist World-View as Elucidated in the Three-Nature Theory and Its Similes" in-cluded in this volume. consult in particular my essay. in 1952. For a fuller exposition on the doctrinal system of the three-nature theory.Postscript.


However. and so on. Ontology represents a theoretical principle by which one investigates existence as 'existence' itself. I shall discuss it specifically. has been the object of discussion. and thus. and it is understood as having the same meaning as metaphysics or. what does ontology signify? It goes without saying that the terms "ontology" and "metaphysics" are technical terms developed in Western scholarship and philosophy. Ontology is. and mainly. Now. that is." In these cases. existence. ontol-ogy has concerned itself with question of the existence of God.Chapter 12 Ontology in Mahayana Buddhism I Buddhism and Ontology Ontology within a Buddhism context is naturally related directly to the most fundamental tenet of Buddhism. Therefore. For exam-ple. in the question above on the proof of God's existence. it developed along theological lines insofar as it attempts to prove God's existence. especially substantial or intrinsic existence. as "philosophia prima. the atomic principles. what has been known from ancient times. the question of God's existence as the highest existence. their dynamics. it should be discussed in reference to all of Buddhist thought and doctrines. but one must question whether these terms can be applied to or even found in Buddhist thinking in the same manner. a thing that is the absolute and perfect cannot be a thing that has something lacking. closely related to cosmology that investigates the origin and make up of the uni-verse and to the philosophy of nature that investigates the laws of nature. and it . from the perspective of Mahayana ideas. On the other hand. on the one hand. in what fol-lows. there seems to be a positive evaluation for existence and a negative value for nonexistence. therefore. ontology has a very strong tendency towards the logic of meta-physics and is to that degree different from philosophies based upon empir-icism or psychology. Seen from the perspective of ontology. and it was investi-gated in view of questions such as: "What is the fundamental principal underlying existence?" or "What is the first cause of existence?" or "What is true reality?" and so on.

with no distinguishing sign. ontology and realism were necessarily destined to meet with and to confront various kinds of nihilism. but when from the perspective of ontology. the Creation Hymn (Nasadiya) found in the !Jg-veda. states: There was neither non-existence nor existence then. But in Eastern thought. That one breathed. one can find the philosophy of the philosopher sage. or. There was no distinguishing sign of night nor of day. Also. to its bitter end. something flawed. windless. mere existence does not imply absolute reality right offhand. The life force that was covered with emptiness. However. the basis for its ontology was no different. at times.156 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA is in this respect that the absolute and perfect God is said to be truly exis-tent and a real reality. as a malice. especially when their claims of nihilism are compared with the Eastern idea of 'non-existence' or the Buddhist thought of sunyata. Of course.C. what does not exist is considered to be something lacking perfec-tion. who pursued existence or 'being' (sat) as the source for the cosmos. Even when nihilism came to the fore. or a flaw. In the history of philosophy in the West. even in those systems of ni-hilism. 1 How are such ideas of "existence" and "non-existence" related to each other ontologically? Non-existence is a great problem even in Western philosophy. In the Upa-nishads. Uddalaka AruQi Gautama (c.). it is more often the case that nonexistence or nihility becomes the principle underlying ontology. that one arose through the power of heat. there was neither the realm of space nor the sky which is beyond. Other than that there was nothing beyond. it can be said that the strong tendency towards existence was not overcome. all this was water. Ontology. Darkness was hidden by darkness in the beginning. but one also finds older ideas which take "non-being" as the principle behind the creation of the world. What stirred? Where? In whose protection? Was there water there. bottomlessly deep? There was neither death nor immortality then. but there it has been considered in most cases as a deficiency of existence. even the source of evil. by its own impulse. the quest for real reality is pursued it seems that existence is accepted as if it were one of God's virtues. Non-being (wu) of the Taoists and emptiness (sunyata) of the Buddhists are examples. In contrast. 700 B. Buddhist Ontologv . because God does not lack the quality of existence. is based upon existence as a positive value.

Sumeru. given the import of ontol-ogy. On the basis of the theory of dharmas. it must include nihilism within its fold.That being the case. There is a cosmological theory that was formulated on the basis of the mythical Mt. The question of whether . However. this form of ontology is not an ontology that positively gives credit to existence. there still remain the problem of whether an ontology can be truly established within Buddhism. Conze refers to this as "the new ontology. it is not difficult to find various ontological expressions and explications in the siitras and treatises. however. and so forth that are akin to the ideas of the absolute and true reality. such as the dharma-realm (dharma-dhiitu). nor did Bud-dhism try to establish a theoretical philosophy. in which all existences (dharma) are divided into the two groups of the conditioned (saf!lskrta) and the unconditioned (asaf!lskrta). he is probably referring to "new" in contrast to the Hinayanic ontology. but it can be said equally in regard to ontology in Western philosophy that focuses on the existent. even a metaphysical study is developed in Sino-Japanese Buddhism under the name "reality characteris-tic theory" (~ :tEJ ~Wi). Conze: In Aristotelian metaphysics the principle of contradiction governs all that is (to on). also there are world views of the cosmos in which the world is divided into three levels. it is evident that Buddhism cannot be gauged directly on the basis of Aristotelian ontology or can such an ontology be found therein. According to E. 2 In view of this statement. Quite different is the supreme and unchallenged principle of Buddhist ontology. suchness (tathatii) emptiness (sunyatii). Be-cause such an ontology refers to the middle path that is beyond the ex-tremes 3 of existence and non-existence. on the contrary. if one is to deal with Buddhist ontology. In contrast. the Truth-finder teaches Dharma by the middle way. However. when viewed from a Buddhistic standpoint. it must make the Eastern thoughts of 'non-being' and 'emptiness' its object of investigation. the new ontology. because ontology is not at all the primary aim of Buddhism. it is an ontology that gives credit to non-being and the empty as the positive principle. It states that the truth "lies in the middle" be-tween "it is" and "it is not. which is common to all schools and has been formu-lated on many occasions. it cannot begin and end with realism." Not approaching either of these dead ends. or in which various kinds of aeons are systematized into the categories of the three times. it is highly questionable whether Buddhism that expounds aniitman (non-self) and sunyatii (emptiness) can be considered to deal with ontology? On the other hand. Buddhism can be seen as providing new and unique materials. however. When viewed from a standpoint of ontology in Western philosophy. There are other thoughts." When Conze says. Furthermore.

can-not be totally negated within Buddhism. The completion of a moral life on the worldly level and the observance of ethical codes of conduct are included in these methods of Buddhist practices but central to them are yoga and med-itation (dhyiina). That ontology should be established in a milieu Buddhist Ontology . Seeing that a Buddhist ontology flows out of Buddha-Wisdom. Scattered knowledge. Buddhism is a religion that is strongly colored by philosophy. the wisdom that is characterized as non-discriminative. China. indeed. it must have the quality of actualization (or realization) that results from the practice of yoga by which that height is reached. and it is difficult to think of Buddhism as one or the other. or Japan. disordered knowledge. However. True wisdom is different not only from the ordinary em-pirical knowledge of perception but also from the knowledge that pursues reason and rationality. and also the traversing of the path that leads one to those objectives.!58 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA Buddhism is a religion or a philosophy is a problem discussed by scholars after Buddhism was introduced to the Western world. The former ones refer to the realization of Buddha's Wisdom. That Buddhism has the two aspects of philosophy and religion can be known from the fact that wisdom and expedient actions or wisdom and prac-tice exhibit the kernel of Buddhist teachings. Ideas that concur exactly with them cannot be found in India. it must rise high above the conventional world on the one hand. the Buddhistic practices become established. Also. But. Simply stated. to a high degree intellectual and philosophical. Rather. proper wisdom implies and presupposes this yogic practice. Thus. in accomplishing the traversing of the path. Buddhism is. it is generally thought that Buddhism does not conflict with philoso-phy or science and is on intimate terms with them. the thoughts and ideas that form the nuclei of Buddhism are the products of intuitive insight that are highly religious in character rather than philosophical. Religion and philos-ophy are the brainchild of Western thinking and are assumed to be in op-position to each other. philosophy and religion are bound as one. In any event. the position that this yogic practice of contemplation and medi-tation occupies is relatively more important in Indian thought and Buddhist thought. that is not involved in meditation is neither true knowledge nor Buddha-Wisdom. an ontology of the middle path that transcends the two extremes of existence and non-existence. and on the other hand. Buddhism cannot be synchronized with Western philosophical ideas directly and it is also somewhat distanced from the ways of Western reli-gions. it is also true that Buddhist ontology. What symbolizes Buddhism more than anything else is liberation and nirviiQa. it is the product of meditation. in India. In every case. it is clear that ontology that is accepted by most in such a sense has no place within Buddhism. Compared to other philosophies and religions throughout the world.

as the "sentient-being-world" (sattva-loka) and the "receptacleworld" (bhtijana-loka). at the same time. while keeping in mind Buddhist ontology as discussed above. and the "receptacle-world" is the environment that surrounds the "1. ." To state it another way. The general rule in Buddhism is that the "I" is referred to by the terms "atman" (self) or "sattva" (sentient being). that is." but it has nothing to do with theories of defending theology or with discussions of moral practice. II The Problem of Subjectivity and Objectivity Owing to some circumstances I exist and the world exists. however. the "I". must be established on the basis that it is the object of "wisdom" and. when these two are known as "self" and "what is possessed by the self" respectively. while the world that is external to the self is referred to by the term "dharma. The fact that the Buddhists understand this as a "Middle Path" and not simply the "Middle" gives this practical philosophy its meaning." This means that a sentient being who dwells in the material environment is nothing more than a constituent part of the world. In the discussion to follow. the world is external. It can be called "practical philosophy. various problems will arise. that is. the contraposition of the "I" and the "world" is viewed from various perspectives in Buddhism." In such an ontology. I am "subject" insofar as I am what knows. converts itself crosswise into Buddha's wisdom through yogic meditation (dhyana). The word practical here refers to the application of Yogic-practice. a sentient being. if ever there is to be one. Thus. There will arise questions such as: "Of what kind of structure is our world of existence-that is. To deal with those problems and to clarify them is no simple matter. one can anticipate many difficult problems in regard to it. oc-cupies the central position of the world and the peripheral outer world is what belongs to that sentient being. When these two are re-ferred to. the "I" as a sentient being is what ex-ists within a receptacle. If it should be acceptable to understand Buddhist ontology in the manner stated above. the outer world.where human reason. something owned by the sen-tient being. I am internal. respectively. the world of bewilderment-wherein the dichotomy of subjecUobject always prevails?" or "How is this world of bewilderment related to and linked to the world of enlightenment?"and so on. the contents of meditative "practice. a Buddhist ontology. the world is "object" insofar as it is what is known. Thus. though rooted in humanity. or the practice of the Middle Path that results from the practice of dhyana. Or again. I will investigate various ontological topics from a Mahayanic standpoint.

humanistic demand and aspiration lurking within its depth. But a religious question differs from this. One could find there all kinds of theoretical as well as practical philoso-phies. Now. There were the extremes of materialism and complete negation of morality or ethics alongside spiritualism in which one devoted one's life to yogic meditation. Keiji Nishitani provides two ontological queries. The world of Indian thought that was advanced by great Upanishadic scholars had reached the height of discussing brahman and iitman. Here one finds senti-ments that praised asceticism or its opposite.160 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA In his book Shuky6 to wa Nanika (What is Religion?). This is not knowledge with re-gard to some object nor is it a concern that is outwardly directed. To ask. and it was accepted by almost all thinkers as the fun-damental way of thinking. Moreover. In the first one he asks. "What purpose does religion have for me?'' is not a religious question. However. However. with regard to the matters of the practical life of the people. there must have been such a religious. sentiments that were closely intertwined with the lives of the people and that sought after property and sensuous pleasures or their opposite. He must have thought that. "How is it that I exist?" or "From whence do I come and to where do I go?" or "For what purpose do I exist?'' In that sense. religion has its beginnings when one's own existence is challenged with a great big question mark. "For what purpose do I exist?" 4 To ask what significance or purpose each and every existence has for me is a cul-tural question. hedonism. This aniitman (non-self) doctrine has a very strong theoretical and philosophical flavor. as with respect to things cultural one can ask such a ques-tion. but was because it was nourished by the breath of religion. What stand did the Buddha take when he confronted these various thoughts? In regard to theoretical and philosophical thinking. Buddhist Onto/oR_\' . rather than negating them flatly from the beginning. "What is the significance of each and every existence to me?" In the second one. The doctrine of 'karman' was also firmly rooted there. Reli-gion is what begins from earnestly questioning. It is a question that comes from within with regard to one's own subjectivity. we shall turn for a moment to the ambience of opinions that surrounded Buddhism at the time of its establishment. it was better to elevate them to higher levels. but a cultural one. he seemed to have accepted them widely and even made compromises. seclusion. people thought that the practice of yoga was necessary for all kinds of refined thoughts. When primitive Buddhism took aniitman (non-self) as its foundation on the basis of questioning the iitman (self). the fact that it captured the fancy of so many people's minds and charmed them is not owing to the theoretical and philosophical flavor. he asks the very opposite question. he seemed to have attacked them at times with sharp criticisms.

Brahman (prayer), as the principle underlying the universe, had its or-Igtn
in the religious prayers of the Vedas and was theorized as the first principle of all
existences. There was not one intellectual of the time that questioned that
principle. Brahman was purity itself, was sacred, was the prayer that came from
the depth of people's hearts, was the principle that created the world and me, was
the absolute principle to which gods and men submitted and paid honour.
Irregardless of how people may have thought of its mystical quality, it cannot be
denied that the Brahman was representative of the truth and was the name of
everything truly true.
In its footsteps, followed the term atman (self). Usually, atman is understood to have meant, originally, "breath," but gradually it took on the quality
of individual existence or "soul" as the genesis of life. Although the atman is the
cognizing subject, it is never cognized nor objectified; it is the absolute subject,
the absolute self. In contrast to brahman, which was a notion signifying the
essence of the macrocosm and was deemed the primal source for the universe,
atman signified concrete microcosm within which that macrocosm was wholly
reflected. As the microcosm overlaps with the macrocosm, both can be called the
"universe." When the atman takes the macrocosmic brahman as its own and is
united and becomes one with it, there is the final liberation for humanity. This is
known through the state-ment, "brahman and iitman are one" and atman
becomes fulfilled in being united with brahman. It can be said that the
philosophy and religion of the Upanishads reached their summit in this unity
expressed in the statement, "brahman and atman are one." What must be noted
here is this: in contrast to brahman, which is cosmical, objectified, and
ontological, the iitman is subjective, epistemological, and practical. While
keeping the abstract qual-ity of brahman within itself, the atman appeared on the
scene as a more definite and concrete principle. It was the absolute existence that
resembled the existence of god or Isvara (lord, the Supreme being).
This means that the notion of atman was accepted by the intellects of the
time as having, along with brahman, dominating authority or as even surpassing
the authority of the latter. The search for atman, or the search for the self, was the
first maxim to be observed by all people. The existence of this iitman that
underlies all cognition and behavior as their subject was beyond questioning.
Nevertheless, it was Buddha's message of atman that negated the existence of
such an atman (self). This was encountered by the people of the time as an earth
shaking, astounding event that went against tradition.

It cannot be determined whether this anatman doctrine attributed to the
Buddha was indeed taught by him or, even if he should be credited with such a
doctrine, it cannot be determined with what intention he might have taught such
a doctrine. There are some scholars who claim that Buddha did



not expound anatman, but merely stated, "this is not atman." However, there is no
evidence that the Buddha taught an atman theory either. If this is not atman and that
is not atman and everything else is not atman, then it follows that atman can be found
nowhere within our world. In any event, the doctrine of anatman, has been claimed
by the Buddha's disciples as one of the dharma-seals of Buddhism. The source for
that must go back to the Buddha himself, because it is unreasonable to think that
Buddha's disciples credited him with a doctrine of anatman that could not be traced
back to him. Now then, with what intention did he explain such a doctrine?
In all probabilities, the Buddha explained, on many occasions, the re-ligious and
moral significance of rejecting attachment to the self and of overcoming egoism,
because these activities, more than anything else, can give peace of mind in human
life. Buddha's personality and behavior also must have been seen by his disciples as
unselfish and not avaricious. What charmed his disciples was, indeed, the Buddha's
personality of having abol-ished selfishness. The doctrine of anatman must have been
recollected, first of all, through the memory of this quality. However, the doctrine of
anatman is directly related to ontology, because the term atman has been accepted as
a concept expressing reality. Consequently, to claim ''non-self'' or "unselfishness" is
not only to negate self and what is possessed by the self, but is also to negate a
subjective entity such as a "soul," and it is thus linked to the negation of a substantive
state of reality.
As pointed out above, atman is tied closely to the idea of a substantive state of
reality and it is likely that the ontological aspect of that substantive reality was also of
concern to the disciples of the Buddha. There are many ways to connote a "self" and,
in Buddhism, too, many terms (such as puru$a, pudgala, prthagjana, arya, etc.) are
widely used to connote the ordinary, everyday personality or the personality of
religious practitioners. However, as the term iitman was a special target of criticism,
the Buddhist gave various definitions to that term. Among them, the definitions
"being permanent," "one," and "almighty" are the most widely employed ones. That
is to say, atman is a permanent or eternal being; atman is one and unique or one
whole; atman rules over others, is not controlled by others, is not dependent on
others, and is self-dependent and almighty. Such defini-tions of the atman reminds us
of the almighty god or Isvara as the absolute existence. In our daily life, we stealthily
conceal within our "self" (atman) a similar arrogance of absolutism. that is. an
arrogance of permanence, oneness, and sovereignty over others. The teaching of
anatman is there to point out that the self could not and should not be such a thing.

The doctrine of the five psycho-physical constituents (panca-skandha) is one
of the theories that leads one to the negation of the self. The five psycho-physical
constituents of color/form, feeling, perception, volitional
Buddhist Ontologv

effort, and cognition tentatively constitutes an individual existence and it is not as
though there exists a nucleus of a self therein. The reality of the first noble truth,
that all is pain, is also closely related to this idea of anatman. If it were the case
that a permanent, one, almighty atman existed, then there could be no pain.
Similarly, impermanence (i.e., not permanent) also expresses a negation of the
atman, because impermanence is defined as "whatever is composite will become
extinguished" or is understood as "all things momentarily come into existence
and become extinct." If the "mo-mentariness" (k$af.likatva), the synonym for
impermanence, was realized even with regard to rocks and other stable matter,
we must admit that the intellectual climate of that time was highly intuitive in
order to achieve such a realization. Also we see therein a penetrating insight by
which the total negation of the substantive reality was realized. Like the doctrine
of aniitman, interdependent origination (pratitya-samutpada), which is considered to be at the foundation of Buddha's teaching, is also a doctrine that negates
the concept of a substantive reality insofar as it is a doctrine of mutual
dependence and mutual cooperation. Interdependent co-origination does not
simply signify a causal chain of movement from a cause to an effect.

These are the doctrines in which the logical side of the Buddha's teachings
were systematized. However, what actually manifested aniitman was Buddha's
life and his activities. They not only proclaimed a theoretical negation of iitman,
but they also manifested, in practice, the "agentless-ness" or negation of an
acting-subject and the nonclinging to the self. Here, like the incomparable clear
moon, there shines through the breaks in the clouds a real subjectivity that is
totally free and not captured by the ghost of egoism. The negation of self that
comprised the absolute freedom of the Buddha's subjectivity is what charmed the
people the most. That the iitman, which was accepted by everyone since the
beginning of the Upa-nishads, was negated must have created quite a stir, still the
charm it held was the force that drove everyone to Buddhism. They must have
celebrated this negation of iitman, established by a mere monk, this which was so
different and which was against a tradition governed by the Brahmans and
the K~atriyas.

III Abhidharmic Philosophy
That which followed after the teaching of anatman, the teaching that
comprised the intellectual experience that reverberated with life, was its
theorization. At least, some generations of the disciples put forth their ef-forts
toward this goal. Already, the canonical works known as the "agama"



were strongly characterized by an intention of transmitting rather than conveying the religious experience. It cannot be denied, however. that so long as this
doctrinal theorizing advanced. damage was done to the rich religious contents.
Abhidharmic philosophy, an analytical philosophy in regard to the characteristics
of dharmas, did not escape from that trend. This abhid-harmic philosophy,
especially its analysis of the dharma-characteristics rep-resented by teachers of
the Vaibha~ika and the Sarvastivada, a philosophy called "dharma-theory" (as put
forth by Otto Rosenberg) was clearly full of ontological tendencies. The phrase,
"self is empty but things (dharmas) exist" conveys its standpoint. It can be said
that, at the expense of estab-lishing the negation of atman, so to speak, a
tendency towards the affirma-tion of realism arose.
The explanation of anatman is, first of all, based on the logic of the five
skandhas (five psycho-physical constituents) stated above. According to it, atman

that is assumed to be something like a "soul" does not exist; what exists is
simply the five skandhas made up of psychological and phys-ical elements. It is
nothing but an aggregate or bundle of these elements that is fancied as an entity
and is called provisionally the "atman" or "1." The atman as such, although it
may be thought to be a substantive entity, is nothing more than an attachment to
a fabricated misrepresen-tation. What really exists is not the atman, but these
elements. The theory of the five skandhas explains that every individual being
exists as a "bun-dle'' of elements, a dynamic flow, in which are included even the
elements of epistemological processes such as the twelve ayatana (spheres of
cogni-tion) and the eighteen dhatu (bases of cognition). Here, the common expression, "I see something" is replaced by the expression, "something is seen by
means of a cognitive organ called 'eye' "; thus, the subject "I" is negated and
made unnecessary. Each one of the five skandhas is called ''dharma.''

The term dharma is packed with meanings-it can mean the teaching of
Buddha; it can refer to Buddhism itself; or it can refer to the laws gov-erning or
causes of worldly things. However, in the abhidharmic dharma theory, dharma is
defined as something that ''keeps hold of its own essential qualities" (sva-lak$m)a-dhara~atva)-something governed by such
laws. Such a dharma, thought of as "elemental being" or "categorical being." can
be translated simply as "existence." By analyzing things and by selecting out the
elemental qualities of them, many dharmas were estab-lished as existences.
There are mental dharmas and material dharmas and dharmas not related to
either. They are all the "conditioned" (saf!!skrta) dharmas-existences that are
compounded and destined to change. Apart
from these. there are the "unconditioned"

dharmas. unchang-

Buddhist Onto/Of?-"

ing and immovable. While the conditioned dharmas are limited, being controlled by the cause and effect relationship, the unconditioned dharmas are not
limited at all.
With regard to the material dharmas, there is the analysis of the ele-ments
into various kinds such as into the categories of earth and so on, and there is also
the recognition of atoms (paramiit:zu). But the analysis of the mental dharmas,
their characteristics, and their function occupies far greater space. Perhaps this is
owing to the fact that great importance was placed upon the mental functions in
reference to yoga praxis. Sensation, memory, and so forth, were thought to be
individual, independent dharmas, as were faith, nonbelief, anger, hatred,
remorse, volition and so forth thought to be dharmas as elemental existences.
Moreover, acquisition and nonacquisition, birth and death, and so forth that did
not belong to either the material or mental dharmas were also considered to be
independent dharmas. These various dharmas were classified, at times, into a
group of seventy-five dharmas and, at other times, into a group of one hundred
In this dharma-theory it is remarkable that things are analyzed from the
standpoint of psycho-epistemology, or functionalism as stated above. Dharmas
represent the laws of universal order, as it were, but not those of the divine order.
Further, the dharma-theory can be characterized as truly realistic as well as
pluralistic. Each and every dharma is seen as real, sub-stantive, and existent; not
only the conditioned dharmas, but also the non-conditioned dharmas such as
annihilation (nirodha equals nirviit:za) are regarded as existent in reality.
The name of the Sarvastivada (literally the school that claims ''all ex-ists")
originates from this tendency towards realism, and within this school, the
dharma was claimed to exist throughout the three periods of time, past, present,
and future. However, this claim contained many subtle problems and it was the
object of many criticisms levied against it from other schools ever since those
days. The Sarvastivada's claim that some-thing existed throughout the three
periods of time was none other than a way of fusing the idea of time, abstracted
and notional, to the idea of real existence found in the dharmas. Here, we see a
kind of idealism in that something notional or conceptual is thought to exist in
reality. Together with the notions of "acquisition," "birth," and so forth set up as
dharmas and regarded as real existences, the realism, "existence throughout three
periods of time," can be called an "idealistic realism." Opposing this
Sarvastivada idealistic realism, the Sautrantika claimed that reality is found only
in the present and not in past or in the future; however, the Sautrantika itself can
be seen as a realist school.



The teaching of anatman was a negation of the substantive view of existence as
explained above. The doctrine that things "became extin-guished at the very moment
of birth"-that is, impermance (anityatii)-is at the very foundation of the Sarvastivada
teaching; it probably follows the tenet of aniitman, the negation of substantive reality.
But, seen in its total-ity, this dharma-theory is a kind of pluralistic realism and one
may well wonder whether it can be in agreement with the anatman ideal. If it is the
case that acquisition, birth, or life can be established as dharmas having real existence
idealistically, then it would necessarily follow that the atman is also, idealistically, an
independent dharma. Was not the establishment of a kind of subject (pudgala) by the
Vatsiputriya also depended upon such circumstances? Although the five skandhas
were thought of as dharmas. having real existences in order to prove anatman, was it
not more likely that they contributed to the collapse of the very standpoint of
anatman? In any event, is it not for these reasons that the Mahayanic view "self
(iitman or pudgala) as well as dharmas exist" rather than the view "Self is empty but
dharmas exist" came to the fore?

IV Sunyata in Mahayana Scripture
True ontology can be said to have begun with the advent of Mahayana or with
the appearance of Nagarjuna. However, that ontology was not an ontology that
affirmed existence, but was an ontology that had negation as its principle.
It has been said that Mahayana has its roots in the Prajiia-paramita-siitras. In
summary, the Prajiia-paramita-siitras expound siinyata (empti-ness) and praise the
wisdom of prajiia by which emptiness is seen. More than anything else, siinyata
refers to non-existence or no-thing and is a ne-gation; however, it is not that it lacks
the meaning of affirmation. In the later period of Chinese Buddhism, there is an
expression, "truly empty, [hence] unfathomable existence" (~ ~tl'Jl:fD. It conveys the
meaning of negation and affirmation simultaneously, or thereby that negation is itself
affirmation or emptiness (Sunyatii) is itself existence. However, as this af-firmation is
affirmation that acknowledges negation or is established by passing through negation,
it cannot be a direct affirmation. At the same time, because it is an affirmation that
acknowledges negation, it signifies that it can be an absolute affirmation. Such being
the case, emptiness (Sunyatii) is strongly charged with the quality of negation, more
than anything else. It is this form of negation that is expounded in the Prajiiaparamitasiitra and that is at the foundation of Mahayanic thought.

How did the spirit of negation,

that is, the Mahayanic spirit, arise

Buddhist Ontologv

around the turn of the Christian era? The background for this can be thought
about in various ways. For one thing, one can think about the social condition of
the community (smigha) of the time and its deterioration. The deterioration of the
sangha does not necessarily result from the evil cus-toms dating back several
centuries, but it could occur at any time once a community was formed. In the
siitras, the Jives of several delinquent monks (Srama~as) are explained. We find, for
example, fewer truly genuine sramal)as than the many who dress like a sramal)a, who
put on an outer airs of a sramal)a and fool the people, or who become a sramal)a
merely for the purpose of seeking fame and gain (Kasyapa-parivarta, § 121 f.). In an
older text, we find examples of bhik~us, who are addicted to the pleasures of life, who
ornamented themselves with trinkets, who slept in luxurious, extrava-gant beds, who
hoarded their money earned by fortunetelling, or who com-mitted robbery, and
murder, and even swindled (Samafzfza-phala-sutta §45). Those people who were
sincere must have felt a desperate feeling of nihility when they saw such
circumstances. The fact that such corruptions have been recorded in the Buddhist
scriptures indicates, on the one hand, that such incidents did occur, and on the other
hand, the deep reflections on the part of the compilers of the texts as well as their
counterattack against these evil doers. Even among the direct disciples of the Buddha,
there were the group of six Bhik~us, who were always reprimanded for daring to do
inappropriate actions. There are also records of those disciples who were overjoyed
with the thought that they were no longer bound to Sakyamuni's instructions upon
hearing about the teacher's death. The Jives of such feeble spirited ones and fools can
be found in every period of hu-man history.

In spite of these fools, the Vinayas or rules of the monk's community were
generally upheld by its members, although the rules for the deport-ment of bhik~us
were already suffering from formality, a kind of manner-ism. However, beyond
that, the mannerism with respect to the doctrine was probably something very
difficult to endure by sharp witted monks. That mannerism was seen particularly
in the Abhidharmic dharma-theory. Therein, side by side with the formality and
fixing of the Vinaya rules, each word and sentence of the Buddha's teachings was
fixed and settled. This tendency of fixing and settling was innate to the dharmatheory from its beginning.
As stated earlier, the realistic dharma-theory, that was devised for the sake
of proving anatman, had within it a sense of setting back the anatman doctrine.
The fixing and settling of teachings such as the five skandhas, the twelve
ayatanas (spheres of cognition), the eighteen dhtitus (bases of cog-nition), and
pratftya-samutpada (dependent co-origination) with its twelve limbs as an
interpretation of SGIJlSiira, literally and according to the words,

which were ex-pressed by words that moved everyone deeply? Was it for the sake of establishing a system of an intertwining "net of dogma" as an unchange-able creed? Was not the true spirit of non-self and impermanence to be found elsewhere? Such questions. however. they were aware that the truth was no longer to be found in the teach-ings and practices of the mannerisms of those professional bhik~us.'' 5 Buddhist Ontologv . Subhuti. and yet. on the surface. someone who has set out in the Bodhisattva-vehicle should produce a thought in this manner: "all beings I must lead to Nirvana. To establish the pluralistic dharmas as existence meant that the people's aspirations for the monastic ultimately became tan-gled and caught in the net of dogma. probably.168 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA must have consolidated the teachings in an exact way. into that Realm of Nirvana which leaves nothing behind. freedom of thought was crushed. but at the same time. if the corruption of the professional bhik~u was unendurable even to ordinary eyes. non-self (anatman). What was the significance behind the Buddha's teachings of imperma-nence (anitya). on the other hand. the emptiness that is expounded in the Prajfiaparmita literature is not always expressed by the term siinya. The Lord replied: Here. when the doctrines were fixed into something like creeds or articles of faith.. In the Vajracchedikaprajnaparamita-sutra. However. expounded. Central to the Mahayana movement was a spirit of negation that broke through the dharma-theory according to which the term "emptiness" was selected. One must look for the true intention of the Buddha by breaking through the dharma-theory to its depth." what is basically negated is none other than one's clinging to the physical material existence (rupa) as a substantive entity (dharma) by virtue of becoming fixed on the concept of riipa (color/form)." Although this expression may seem to indicate. However. for instance. and suffering (du/:lkha). How-ever. no being at all has been led to Nirvana. then it can be assumed that this Mahayana movement was augmented by the ideas of ordinary people. This break-through is what developed into the Mahayana movement. that "things in particular are empty and are negated.. the term "siinya" is not to be found. The ordinary lay persons never lost touch with their respect for the bhik~us. al-though such a fact is not clearly evident in the scriptures. wherein one finds the expression. arose in the context of the fix-ation of dogma and mannerism stated above. The representative texts in which the term siinyata can be found is the genre of Buddhist literature known as the Prajfia-paramita. "Matter is emptiness and the very emptiness is mat-ter" (rupal!l sunyata sunyataiva rupal!l). after beings have thus been led to Nirvana. we do encounter sentences such as: . in the theory of paficaskandha.

that contains the multitude of things in its vacuity and that is left unmarked by the flight of a bird through it. the ornaments of the Buddha Lands. the Thirty-two Marks of a Buddha." and also. we also find the following statements: 6 Great. no being at all has been led to Nirvana. Moreover." that emptiness seems to be much akin to mystical nothingness. we find that the textual style is to expound first. Or sunyata may have been understood by comparing it to "tranquility. Or again. the Characteris-tics of Reality. in the context of the various possible meanings of sunyata.. even though the word may differ. that emp-tiness is also thought to be intuitive and mystical. or the Perfections. apral)ihita as a negated wish. animitta is explained as a non-existent sign. it is a form commonly found in all of the Prajfia-paramita literature. sunya has been considered to be seen in samadhi or to be the object of visualization in the practice of dhyana. would that heap of merit be' And why? Because the Tathagata spoke of the "heap of merit" as a non-heap. The negation that transpires through this process of emptiness (Siinya) has been considered variously." is the sense in which siinyatii is expressed here. When these are expounded in the slitras. These are all negated strongly first and then affirmed through the process of negation. That is why they are called "the dharmas special to the Buddhas. and sunyata as a negation of existence. sunyata may have been considered in relationship to open-space (iikiisa)." Here. When it is stated that "there is a sign through the signless. then to negate them. for example. However. are said to be three doors of deliverance. . This is not typical of the Vajracchedikii alone." or likewise." The bhiksus were advised to practice meditation (dhyiina) in a quiet spot such as in the forest. 0 Lord. For example. bears the meaning of infinity and absoluteness. That is how the Tathagata speaks of "heap of merit. the heap of merits or the special dharmas. . Be-cause the sutras are what reflect directly the mystical experience. the Tathagata has taught that the dharmas special to the Buddhas are just not a Buddha's special dharmas. and then to affirm them once more on the basis of the negation.". because openspace. . The same textual style is used repeatedly in the discussions on the Buddha-bodies. 0 Well-Gone.. Sunyata. "there is existence through emptiness. here. the term will be considered from the .The negation that appears in the phrase. together with the "signless" (animitta) and the "wish-less" (apra(lihita). great.

Originally. but the positive oriented expression.'' However. refers to the non-existence of both "self" and "substance. the anatman is the negation of the fundamental atman that includes the spirit of ethical non-selfishness and im-partial self-denial. In each one of these cases. are combined into one in a fashion of a paradox. Siinyata is actually a revival of the teaching of anatman." as the negation of substantive existence. siinyata will be consid-ered first from the aspect of the negation of substance and secondly from the aspect of the negation of attachments. these two paradoxical viewpoints are paradoxically linked to each other. the formula is not "self (iitman) is empty but things (dharmas) exist" (p. in the Prajfiaparamita-siitras." The expression emptiness is matter is not merely the reverse of the expression matter is emptiness. an expression of its true meaning. the negatively oriented expression. consequently. The meaning of atman. 164). in that sense. originally based on the view of an individual characterized by egoism and self-interest. as explained above. negative and positive." but we also find the expression "emptiness is matter. The expression matter is emptiness is negatively oriented. whereas the expression emptiness is matter is positively oriented. it became an expres-sion of the emptiness of whole world. we should understand that the two orientations. Consequently. the anatman was first an expression of the negation of a self and then by going through the stage of the anatman of the universalself." The phrase. In one sense. is substi-tuted (by the Chinese Masters) for the term siinyata. the atman refers to a substantive existence. That is. the teaching of aniHman was an expression of the negation of substance. In this context." These are understood in the same manner even in the context of siinyata.170 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA point of negation in view of two aspects. hence. the expression "matter is emptiness. "the selflessness of person and things" (pudgala-dharmanairiitmya). Anatman. "the emptiness of both person and things" (an idiom found mainly and usually in Chinese Buddhism) is expressed in the Sanskrit texts by phrase. Substantive ex-istence in this context refers to what is negated by pratitya-samutpiida (inter-dependent origination) and is. Here we see that the term "nairatmya. It is the "substance" or "essence" of whatever exists. was expanded to include the reality of a fundamental and universal atman. In this manner. Further. Such a contradictory and paradoxical preposition is spelled out in the Prajfiaparamita-siitras as originating from their author's direct yogic and inBuddhist Ontologv . what is absolute exist-ence. That is. especially in the case of the universalself. not only do we find the expression "matter is emptiness. but is "self and things are both empty" or "the empti-ness of both person (pudgala) and things. matter is emptiness involves a paradox. "the very non-existent emptiness exists as matter" is more paradoxical than the former.

In this manner. The negative orientation of siinyata is not. the negation of substance is no other than the negation of attachments to substance. The domain of the world yet not the domain of the passions. when it is said that the multitude of things is empty and at the same time. In contrast to the negative orientation of siinyatii. while the statement. "That is why they are called. Just as in the case where both the negative and positive orientations are expressed." (p. herein. . such is the domain of the bodhisattva. Where one realizes nirviil)a. there is. 7 The domain of the bodhisattva does not lie somewhere halfway between the ordinary individual and the saint nor does it not lie somewhere between saf! lsiira and nirviil)a. affirmative orientation. the Vajracchedika quoted above. such is the domain of the bodhisattva. in this connection. merely an existen-tial negation. paryudasaprati$edha). 'dharmas special to the Buddhas' " is a positively oriented expression. the mind should be produced. so too in the case when only the nega-tive orientation is expressed.. also a positive. but affirms inwardly. "dharmas special to the Buddhas are not dharmas special to the Bud-dhas .' it negates outwardly. [hence] unfathomable exist-ence. there is the domain of the bodhisattva. a negation always includes within it an affirmation. emptiness is the multitude of things. yet does not enter final and complete nirviil)a. negation and affirmation do not move from one to the other. "To go beyond" or "to transcend" does not mean to transcend and to go out externally only.Sa-sutra: Not the domain of the ordinary individual and not the domain of the saint. Even if that be the case. this means that emptiness is beyond or transcends both negation and affirmation.. "truly empty. By this I mean siinyatii is both transcendent and immanent at the same time. it is beyond these. it is immanent therein. in an alternative way. Because it is transcendent. it does not mean that when something is negated there follows some-thing that is affirmed (the so-called relative negation. it also means to transcend and to go in internally. 166) can also be understood in this context as moving through negation to affirmation. it should be understood that therein the posi-tive orientation is also included.tU!tJve insights. Therefore. The statement. and thus. It is as the domain of the bodhi-sattva explained in the Vimalakfrtinirde. the state-ment. its actual contents is the negation of attachments held by or-dinary individuals. For example." is a negatively oriented expression. In this sense. to quote a passage from the Chinese translation of the Vajracchedika-sutra: Without dwelling anywhere. however. It would be appropriate.

he gives "not fixed on." "not rest on." "to dwell." and others. This is the very essence of siinyata that can be reached by virtue of eliminating clinging. of the Vimalakirtinirde§a mentioned above-is none other than "non-dwelling nirval)a. as is evident from the Chi-nese translation above. ''. to state: "The mind should be produced without clinging (i. The mind is always clinging to something." "not attached to." but also means "to stick to." "not abide in. . we can assume that prati~thita also has the meaning "clinging" implicitly. and Buddhist Ontology . so long as the mind is produced. a-prati~thita. The term non-dwelling nirval)a does not mean only that one does not enter and remain in nirval)a but it also means that one is not attached to nirval)a. he should not produce a mind attached to something.. suggests as many as twenty possible meanings for it and in enumerating those meanings. "to think without the affliction of clinging" is not meant to be understood in an ethical sense. as an adjective. means "standing." "not cling to. "One should think without thinking. the mean-ing "attachment" for prati~thita is also admitted by him. The domain of the bodhisattva-that is. Therefore." "to adhere to" because the word chu is given as a definition for the word "cho" (~) which means "cling-ing. The term "aprati~thita" reminds one of the term "aprati~thita nirval)a. the Sanskrit text reads: A great bodhisattva should produce a mind freed from attachments." But this is the paradox that is emphasized in the Prajfiaparamita-sfitras. It reflects a movement from mind to no-mind and no-mind to mind. "chu" ({:£. the Sanskrit term prati$!hita (cognate to pratisthii). Therefore." non-dwelling nirval)a.) means not only "to live. without dwelling anywhere)" is itself a contradiction. I translated its negative form. The Chinese term. it is directed to some ob-ject. dwells in that object. but he." and so forth. Thus. and naturally adheres to what it has grasped.. and the dictionaries do not explicitly give the meanings of "clinging. However." A bodhisattva does not dwell in the world of safTisara owing to his wisdom and does not remain in nirval)a owing to his compassion. The statement. as "freed from attachments. ." "abiding.172 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA However." On the other hand. on the other hand. does not enter final and complete mrval)a . and thereby transcends both mind and no-mind. It is equal to saying.e." However.." "fixed. 8 and this passage is followed by: That is." "adhering." elsewhere)." and "to abide." "es-tablished." Conze translates this aprati~thita as "unsupported" (and as "not established.

the practitioner ob-tains tranquility of mind.E. Nirva1.1a originates in siinyata. Its counterposition was the so-called realist position that affirmed a future life. Or again. ex-erted its influence not only on Buddhism but also on all of the Indian sys-tems in various ways. Nagarjuna's philosophy contributed to an unique Buddhistic development that came to be known as the "Madhyamika school. enforcing the Mahayanic idea. Both are ethical oriented and have little ontological significance. To this extent. his philosophy was rejected by outsiders as a form of nihilism. For example." V Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka Philosophy.11t was owing to him that Mahayana Buddhism got a firm philosophical foundation and almost all forms of Mahayana schools of later times regard and accept him as their founder( Taking its stand on the negation of siinyata. At times. Ni-hilism in the Indian context. as one of the noncomposite dharmas. referred to the negation of a future life as the fruition of ethical and religious good acts. pleasure and pain-are siinya (empty).!' This school. lt was Nagarjuna who consolidated such ideas of siinyata found in the sutras into a philosophical system. and they have had a strong influence on the lives of the practitioners.that is because mrvm. siinyata is based on the baseless. even that nirva1. wealth and happiness. Even from the viewpoint of the world's history of ideas. Because everything is siinya. However. This heightened state of the mental tranquility comes forth from the basic principle of siinyata that is none other than the negation of substantive existence.. was made into a concrete substantive reality according to the Sarvastivadin 's realism. having realized that all things mundane-honor and fame. there is no thing that can serve as a basis. Nagarjuna linked this idea of siinyata to the idea of dependent origina-tion (pratltya-samutpada) that had been the core of Buddhism since its be- . This is to say. There are many other ways of understanding the meaning of siinyata than those discussed above. In realizing siinyata. the practitioner is unmoved by them. however. combined with the view of imper-manence. Nagarjuna's unique contribution should not go unnoticed in that the underlying principle of his philosophy was a thoroughgoing negativism.1a or cessation (nirodha).1a is siinyata.~agarjuna who lived around the second or third c. one stands in a bottomless void.. was a great philosopher and a monk-scholar second only to the Buddha. the above-mentioned aprati~thita means "not dwelling anywhere" or "no abode in which to dwell. love and hate. it educated the practitioner in the futility and emptiness of life.

in actuality. the best among all teach-ers. as pointed out above.. it was successful in expounding its philosoph-ical structure and its delicate minutiae. it essentially referred to "dependent origination as qualified by emptiness. Niigiirjuna's system of negation was directed mainly to the realist view of the Abhidharma philos-ophy. his philosophy of negation did not end up being a nihilism that negated the religious efforts of humankind nor did it deviate from Buddhism. The term "dependent origination" (pratitya-samutpiida). Moreover. it has a tendency even to negate logic itself. As the words "originate through dependency" indicate. At the beginning of his work. the four-fold phrase beginning with "This being that exists .174 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA ginning. the Miilamadhyamakakiirikii (Fundamen-tal Verses on the Middle). 9 Here. Who expounded the dependent origination that is beyond frivolous talk and is tranquil and blissful [as having the characteristics of] Neither extinct nor arising. 10 From this. Neither one nor many. As this eight-fold negation eventually came to signify siinya. the Miidhyamika school is later divided into two schools: the Sviitantrika that affirmed logical reasoning and the Priisangika that negated it. but even the middle path is treated the same.." shows. Niigiirjuna expounds on the eightfold negation thus: I pay homage to the perfectly enlightened one. depen-dent origination.) However. neither having end nor eternal. but on account of its logicality of thoroughgoing negation. in so far as it established the system of the two truths (satya-dvaya). and the middle path as synonymous. it can be known that not only are emptiness and dependent origination treated as synonyms. Its exposition is very logical. The fact that everything is relative to every other thing." The same idea appears at the end of Nagiirjuna's Vigrahavyiivartani (Averting the Controversy): I pay respect to that Incomparable Buddha who taught emptiness. (In fact. Niigiirjuna has taken up the old idea of pratltya-samutpiida and has described it to have the eight-fold negation as its characteristic. neither coming nor going. refers to the fundamental thought of the Buddha. means that Buddhist Ontologv . and also as the definition-that is. be it in regard to cognition or to how things exist. "dependent origination" makes manifest the relative and conditional status regarding all existing things. and on account of that.

And yet. Although it speaks of "relatedness" of substantive existences. because that dependent origination is equivalent to emptiness. which means "no self-nature" is itself equal to emptiness. what one believes to be a self-nature comes into existence only as object of one's attac~ment!f" . If this and that are taken as substantive existences and then they are combined as being relative to each other. it does not mean that first there are a substantive "this" and a substantive "that. the Buddha ex-pounded in various manner the principle of interdependent origination that was beyond speculation. In view of the abovementioned phrase." the fact of "that exists" is dependent upon and conditioned by the fact of "this being". therefore. or to a substantive being.there is nothing "absolute" anywhere.. this relationship can not be a "uni-versal relativity" or an "absolute relativity·~ Universal relativity manifested by dependent origination always points to the non-substantiveness of all things./ As a rule. Nagarjuna has expressed this fact by the term "nii)svabhiiva" (no self-nature). This is why Nagiirjuna has described pratltya-samutpiida as emptiness in his Mulamadhyamakakiirikii by means of the eight-fold ne-gation and made emptiness. refers to the inherent essence of a thing.. hence emptiness. The term "self-nature" (svabhiiva) is defined by Nagarjuna as "that which cannot be artificially produced (akrtrima) or that which is not depen-dent (nirapek$a) on others." To accept such a selfnature is to go against the idea of dependent origina-tion. then this is none other than a realist's claim. dependent origination. are rela-tive and dependently originating. fundamentally. that is." Accordingly. unchanging and immovable. Or again. dependent origination. sunyatii (emptiness) means "nii)svabhava" (no self-nature). "This being that ex-ists . Or to state it another way. emptiness of sunyatii of everything sim-ply means that all entities have "no self-nature" and accordingly. it is "blissful and beyond frivolous talk". it is an "absolute existence." and thereafter. it is beyond speculation. When this pure relationship is "clung to" or "grasped" in daily life as a "this" or a "that. when it is stated that "this" or "that" are relative to each other. the two are mutually "relative" to each other." 11 Self-nature." then it is concretized and not seen for what-it-is. Emptiness is usually expressed as "no self-nature. . Furthermore. and the middle path synonymous in his Vigahavyiivartani quoted above. an inherent. substantive nature of its own. >True reality is." No self-nature exists originally." Niigiirjuna skillfully gave expression to the paradoxical view of . thus. things have no nature of their own. he was considered to be "the best among the teachers. it is not owing to the fact that "that" has its own self-nature. In other words. This means that one becomes attached to reality in the belief that "this is real" or "that is real. to what exists in and of itself. relative relationship itself.

he states that even though dependent origination is beyond all concepts and all categories and is itself emptiness. appears as the first part of a compound." it means that such existence and such non-existence. The statement "dependent origination is itself emptiness. at the same time.176 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA the Prajiiaparamita-siitra that linked negation (i.. death. There is a term "idarppratyayata" that means "a state of having this as its cause or condition" (for conve-nience sake. and the fact that dependent origination was explained by the twelve limbs to show the human situation of sarpsara clearly manifests that. Buddha's teaching) when.. it seems to be related more to the aforementioned phrase beginning with "This being that exists . the term "conditionedness" appears as an in-terpretation of the twelve limbs of dependent origination. In contrast. it can be said that the principle unBuddhist Ontologv .. the other term often being pratltya-samutpada. a world of confusion. points to enlightenment or the realization in which one sees no self-nature-that is. but. emptiness in the midst of a world which exists as originating dependently. Since early times. Dependently originating things have "no self-nature.e . Consequently." Nagarjuna detected the meanings not only of the sarpsaric status of humankind (and liberation from it). it cannot be denied that dependent origi-nation has an "exists" aspect." which expresses Nagiirjuna's basic stand-point.e. Beginning with ignorance and ending with a mass of pains such as birth.· However. in the Mahayana treatises.." hence they are empty." and to convey the meaning of "universal relativity" discussed above. the Buddha has dared to take the trouble of expounding it. In the terms "dependent origination" and "conditionedness. old age. or confusion and enlightenment. but also of the more fundamental principle of universal relativity and. has been orga-nized into a twelve limbed chain of causation. It explains the actuality called "sarpsara" in which one goes from one life to the next one through a cycle of births and deaths. the negation of the absolute. in his salutation to the Buddha. I shall refer to it simply as "conditionedness") and which. having almost the same meaning as dependent origination. He combined this kind of dependent origination with the idea of sunyata and inserted nii:Jsvabhava (no self-nature) between them as a medium. the idea of dependent origination. through it. sunyatii tends more towards "negativ-ity" and "non-existence" and refers to none other than the world of en-lightenment as seen through the eyes of a yogin's experience: When it is stated that "dependent origination is itself emptiness. emptiness) to affirma-tion (i. Nagarjuna also adopted this kind of interpretation of dependent origination. 12 In the pre-Mahayana siitras. the twelve limbs have been understood as a system of causation that explains the ac-tuality of the present human world. are tied together directly as being one and the same.

are linked and mediated by no selfnature. That emptiness affirms the middle paFh." 14 However. bewilderment and not enlightenment and that enlightenment is never bewilder-ment. no self-nature must intervene-that is. Nagarjuna and later Madhyamikas in particular have discussed a theory . it is also true that bewilderment is." or "when the bodhisattva follows the wrong way. dependent origination and emptiness. However. Tne term "identical" in the maxim does not mean that two opposite and contradic-tory things are directly./These two. Dependent origination is the fundamental principle of the Buddha's teachings and. means that both sarpsara and nirvaQa are empty~ and as discussed earlier in the context of "not dwelling in nirvaQa. in every respect. At best. Bewilderment and enlightenment are absolutely worlds apart." one becomes freed from attachments to both sarpsara and nirvaQa by real-izing thisiBoth sarpsara and nirvaQa.'Yin the realization that sarpsara is empty and that nirvaQa is also empty.. In other words. they might be accepted as particular expressions of mystical intuition. re-leased in liberation without 13 abandoning afflictions . Ex-pressions like these that link together opposites seem to be illogical and meaningless or seem even to speak blasphemous of the superiority of nirvaQa and enlightenment. intuitively. Emptiness. the fact that affliction is liberation or that birth-and-death is identical to nirvaQa is not so clearly evident to us. the two become identical. in order to be identical. at the same time.derlying the statement."' The same ideas are expressed in the Vima/akirtinirdesa-sutra as · ·." The term "iden-tical" indicates the realization of emptiness as detected in the context of dependent origination.. the logic of sunyata must function as their media-tor. that is. or immediately (without intermediary) identical. "dependent origination is emptiness. he follows the way to attain the quali-ties of the Buddha. on the other hand. It would be wrong to force theses two into one. it is a theory that explains the real aspects of the world of bewilderment and afflictions." are empty. enlightenment. "dependent origination is itself emptiness" is the model and principle for maxims such as "bewilderment/affliction is itself the awakened state" or "birth-and-death (saf!lsiira) is identical to nirvaQa. They are identical only because they are mediated by no self-nature. becauseboth have no self-nature. the maxim "sarpsara is identical to nirva!)a" is modeled after the statement.. is the principle of negation (negating both affliction and liberation) that affirms the middle path through negation. Nagarjuna attempted to give these maxims a logical foundation on the basis of his realization of emptiness in dependent origination.." Therefore. In relationship to this idea. referred to in the maxim "sarpsara is identical to nirvaQa. It means that they are identical because their essential nature is the same in that both are characterized as having "no self-nature.

but also that conventional truth can never become the ultimate truth and that the ulti-mate truth always transcends the conventional truth. a truth of a lower degree. dependent origination was itself seen as emptiness ("dependently originating hence emptiness"). The motive for setting up the Twofold truth seems to have been mainly to emphasize this absolute separation and noncontinuity. it must be said to be false. It is truth that is "inexpressible" through ordinary language and that is "in-conceivable" by ordinary logic. common. it is a truth with limita-tions. To that degree. and in the final analysis. no matter how high conventional truth may ascend. The fact that Vimalaklrti held a "noble silence" without speaking a word in regard to the ultimate truth is understandable when viewed from the standpoint of the Twofold truth. it remains always within the boundary of the conventional and the ultimate truth is always one step removed. their relationship was understood in terms of continuity. to the ultimate truth." and so forth show a kind of agnosticism in denoting the ul-timate truth in such a manner. it can never become the ultimate truth. it will never reach the world of the ultimate truth. Therefore. the Twofold truth was established not as an ontological theory in which existence was classified as belonging to the conventional truth and emptiness. In other words. its negation. The two truths refer to the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. false and true. we cannot reach its true essence from such an inference. there is no continuity between them and they are completely severed from each other." "in-conceivable. in contrast. Ultimate truth refers to truth that is revealed when the logic and concept of the ordinary. we observed that. In our earlier discus-sion on dependent origination and emptiness. "unattainable. no matter how much we may stack up or elevate our conventional world or our samsaric and cyclic existence. but seen from the perspective of this ultimate truth. Buddhist Onto/Of?-" . However. belongs to the world of existence that is at the basis of bewilderment and affliction. Whatever it may be that is graspea and conceptualized as the real. Conventional truth is truth no doubt. Conventional truth. we can understand the Twofold truth as being more logical than ontological. Although we can infer logically and conceptually what the en-lightenment of the Buddha was. mundane. in the context of the two truths. The unique characteristic of the two truths is not only that they are opposite to each other as perverted and correct. it is traditionally understood to be established with regard to elucidating the Buddha's teach-ing. Conventional truth refers to ordinary truth estab-lished by the logic and concept common in the mundane and public world. The terms. and public world has been transcended. In contrast.178 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA known as the Twofold truth. in spite of the fact that an opposition of affirmation and negation was implied between them. the ultimate truth negates ordinary concepts and logic and is closely aligned to emptiness.

or from both itself and other. for example. Nagarjuna points out by means of the tetralemma that "origination" cannot be established if one takes the standpoint of re-alism. "the dialectic of emptiness. Emptiness. or without a cause. or from something other. birth-and-death cannot be. there is no other possibility. Herein lies the complex problems of the relationship between logic and enlightenment and between our consciousness or will and the ultimate nirval)a." "does not exist. "exists.'' Nagarjuna clarified the logic of nif:zsvabhiiva (no self-nature) of all things that functioned in the previous discussion as a mediator for making opposites "identical.originally intuitively experienced." "both exists and does not exist. Catu~koti consists of any four alternative propositions such as." The process of his reasoning is exemplified by the so-called catu~koti (tetra/emma." It was owing to the direct perception of the yoga practitioner that the enlightenment that ''birth-and-death is identical nirval)a'' was uncovered. and this can be called. Through this examination. by which he directed his negation to the earlier Abhidharmic realism. nirval)a. "Origination" is a quality of existence." then something different like fire would originate from something other like water. if it is claimed that something originates from "itself. In the first chapter of the Mulamadhyamaka-kiirikii. all things would arise from all other things." that is. The theory of the Twofold truth reveals this absolute separation and suggest a response to how one might or might not overcome such a separation. dialectically speaking. at once. . or otherwise. "to originate" means that something originates from itself." It is observed that the existence of all things is summed up and represented by these four propositions and that. however. is formulated logically by him." this would result in a contradiction of antinomy. This can be understood from the view that the cause and its result are either the same or different. there would be no need for it to originate as it already exists. That is. it must be empty. Nagarjuna's argument consists of probing into whether each proposition can stand on its own." that is. because when something originates from itself.The result of this is that it is not possible to claim "birth-and-death is identical to nirval)a. four alternative propositions). a thing would be continuously originating without end. Nagarjuna's introduction of the logic of negation served to solve these problems. in so far as that enlightenment is drawn back into our own logical thinking. If something is said to originate from "something other. or otherwise. he attempts to point out that if a proposition is stated with a belief in a "self-nature. In brief. Therefore he concludes that if a proposition is to be established." and "neither exists nor does not exist. it nec-essarily falls into a contradiction of antinomy and cannot stand on its own. if it is based on a substantive realistic view. it must have "no self-nature. in a broad sense.

Thus. in response to his opponents criticism that "if everything is empty. this may seem strange. then logic. through the realization of emptiness and the ulti-mate truth. must be empty.(}' . but the fact that. but his logic is one that melts and dissolves into emptiness. he does not take his stand on logic. Thus. when it has "no self-nature. Recovery of the conventional means that. the realistic way of thinking was negated by Nagarjuna. For those who are versed in realism and in logic. directs his discussion in the Mulamadhyamakakiirikii to the negation of the conventional he addresses the recovery of the conventional particularly in chapter XXIV when. or prove something by means of log-ical propositions. can be understood as a position only in so far as even the assertion of emptiness vanishes. on the con-trary. is not the fact of origination. in the Madhyamika where everything including logic is seen as empty one cannot make a case for the substantiation of a logical claim . The Madhyamika position. however. the conventional is revived and becomes meaningful just-as-it-is." it cannot originate from itself or from something other. so long as "origination" is claimed as a re-ality having its own "self-nature. In his Vigrahavyiivartanf. be it the tetralemma or for that matter any other form." then the difficulties involved in the above cases would only be compounded. Rather. It is not that emptiness could be reached through logic. the logic of emptiness is not to be grasped as a real-ity having a nature of its own. the logic that leads one to emptiness. in the manner mentioned above.' " He does not attempt to assert. if one may speak of such. preceding this logic and hidden deep within it are his direct perception and experience of emptiness. logic flowed out from that emptiness." that is. Buddhist Onto/of. when the belief in a substantive "self" is negated and all is empty-then every in-stance of origination is established just-as-it-is. however. Although Nagarjuna. However. Although Nagarjuna argues freely using the tetralemma and other forms of logic. The reason that Nagarjuna fully employed such a logic was to lead us to the horizon of our world as empty.180 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA If something originates from "both itself and something other. If something originates "without a cause. Logic belongs to the domain of conventions and the ultimate reality is alWays beyond that. Consequently. it can be seen that the origination of a thing cannot be established on the basis of any one of the four propositions. claim. for the most part.. This is said to be the recovery of the conventional. It is a position of no po!!ition that has wiped out all basis and that transcends both logic and notion~~ But it is owing to such a position on emptiness and it is only within such a context that language can be revived and become truly logical." then everything would originate at all times and everywhere. Instead. Nagarjuna clearly states: "I 5 have no position. Logic is empty and only in so far as it is empty can it be established. What is negated here.

the ultimate truth was absolutely separate from the conventional and was transcendent. the path becomes truly practiced for the first time. In contrast to praxis. This did not mean simply that the thoughts of this school were heightened but it also meant that the philoso-phy of Mahayana Buddhism was brought to completion. This is why it is said "truly empty. VI The Three-Nature Theory of the Yogiiciira School It was the Yogacara-Vijnanavada School that advanced this recovery of the conventional (or the tendency towards saf!lvrti-miitra of the Madhya-maka) even further." On the one hand. they gained the name Yogacara."" Even the Buddha's teachings such as the five psycho-physical constituents (paiica-skandha). it may . unique reality. In the negation of the path as a path. and its func~ion. In the later Madhyamika school. probably because of Yogacara vijnapti-matra influence. It is from the perspective of the first theory that. but on the other hand. through it the conventional finds it raison d't~tre in its manner of existence. the four noble truths. they also had a highly developed system of theoretical investigation and they main-tained two theoriesnamely. and practice are truly possible because they are emptf Sunya (empty) is not simply a refutation or negation. It seems that. however. by elaborating the theory of cognition. the term "sarp.teaching. teaching. This School inherited Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka thought and reached its peak around the fourth to fifth centuries with the advent of Asanga and Vasubandhu. admitted. the more one becomes aware that the world that remains is "nothing but convention. as they attached special importance to Buddhist praxis.vrti-matra" (con-vention only or nothing but convention) came to be used. the principle of "representation-only" (vijiiapti-miitra) is established and consequently this school is also called the • 'Cognition School" When the question of ontology is at issue." he answers that logic. The same can be said of the path of practice. its meaning. and practice would become meaningless." One real-izes that it is "a world full of deception and nothing but falsehood. it was for that very reason that the conventional could remain as the con-ventional. the cognition theory and the three-nature the-ory. [hence] unfathomable existence. and so forth cannot constitute a true teaching so long as they are thought to have a nature of their own and to be realistiO'. Although in the context of the Twofold truth. The deeper one's realization that only the ultimate truth is the highest. and given a place in its own right. the Twofold truth theory points to the severance from and the noncontinuity with the ultimate truth. it is the hori-zon on which the conventional is recovered.

for it is intertwined with a theory of cognition or percep-tion on the one hand." this description is made from an epistemological standpoint. Understood from this perspective. When the world is described as "(falsely) imagined.182 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA seem that the central theme of this school would be the theory of representationonly (or cognition-only) wherein only cognition exists and the external world is non-existent. that very same flower materializes in a world of a consummated flower. the object of mediation and. and as a "consummated" world at still another time. as an "other-dependent" existence at another time. it is the object of contemplation. the theory of yogic praxis. the discus-sion to follow will focus on the three-nature theory rather than on the theory of cognition. The three-nature theory. the "other dependent" (paratantra) nature. but the world is something that is to be consummated by praxis. it is natural that this school showed great interest in the investigation and accomplishment of a theory of cognition. on the other. These three do not represent three distinct territories of the world. The three natures refer to the "imagined or conceptualized" (parikalpita) nature. This consummation is the Buddhist Ontologv . in contrast. This theory of cognition became the object of yogic introspection for a yogin when he contemplated on his mind and consciousness. This is just like the case of siinyata in which siinyata was. Consequently. and there is the world of the "other-dependent'' that mediates between the two. As the foundation for the theory of cognition. The consummated world. but when seen by a sage. It is not that the consummated world lies dormant somewhere from the beginning. the world of enlightenment. on the one hand. the latter one. and on the other. does not represent only a purely ontological theory. The world of bewilderment/affliction is a world filled with igno-rance and error in regard to the recognition of the truth. They refer to the fact that the world is characterized as being completely "imagined" at one time. The three-nature theory demonstrates that the world has three natures (trisvabhiiva) or three aspects or three characteristics. A beautifully blooming flower may be misunderstood and falsely imagined in many ways by the ordinary person. a principle of logic developed by Nagarjuna. has carried on the tradi-tion of the siinyata thought of the earlier period. this school has the three-nature theory that is much closer to ontological thought and which. and the "consummated" (parini$panna) nature. however. but such an ontological idea belongs rather to a little later period. The former situation constitutes the world of bewildermenUaffliction. that is. because it is a prescription based on human knowledge or recognition that always contain an element of error. refers to a "world that becomes manifest" as a result of a yogin's perfection of his yoga praxis. though original to this school.

When the coloring is wiped away. "Cognition" (vijfliina) explained in the theory of cognition. just as a carriage on the peak of a hill will naturally roll down. human's cognitive functions do not remain long on the peak of a purely dependently originating world. the seer and the seen. that is a falsified world. In this manner. and it is possible for ordinary beings to obtain it. has the nature of being other-dependent and it represents a "dependently originat-ing" world. exist in an "depen-dently originating" way. so too. the seeing self attributes the quality of the absolute upon itself and the thing seen is seen as something absolute. the other-dependent world is recovered and this recovery is at once the establishment of the . was colored by false imagination. This other-dependent world signifies none other than the world of dependent origi-nation taught by the Buddha. The conversion becomes possible because the other-dependent nature intervenes and functions as its mediator. becomes established with the gen-uine dependently originating world as its basis. the imagined world. the foundation for the imagined world." In contrast to these two-the cognitive world and the practical-the "otherdependent" is said to be "ontological." because things exist solely by virtue of "depending on others" and not substantively. Here the imagined world makes its appearance. the consummated world would be revealed. However. Indeed. everything. by virtue of clinging to what is imagined as the substantive real. Just as dependent origination is the logical foundation for Buddha's teaching. The world as the imag-ined and the consummated are two worlds that come into view on the basis of the an imagined the one hand and on the other hand." That bewilderment cannot become an awakened state immediately and di-rectly is akin to the case that affliction cannot become bodhi immediately and directly as stated above. too. so. That is. a conversion to the awakened state has to exist in some way or another. Here. The imagined and bewildered world came into being originally when the other-dependent world. it converts into the world of en-lightenment. the convertibility from bewildermenUaffliction to an awakened state becomes actualized on the basis of the "other-dependent. That is.objective for which Buddhism aims and since it is perfected through yoga praxis it is said to be very "practical. and the otherdependent were revived in its pure "other-dependent" state. the cognitive functions are inclined to fall astray in that they have a tendency to attribute the quality of the absolute upon themselves. then it would be a pure world. If this belief of taking the world as substantively real were wiped out. but. the other-dependent is central to and at the foundation of the three-nature theory. it exists. Thus. In spite of that.

that is. It is in this revival of the other-dependent-that is.'' Nondiscriminative wisdom. consciousness-only also cannot become the ultimate truth of representation-only. essen-tially is of the nature of the "other-dependent. The conversion of bewildermenUaffliction to the awakened state is none other than the conversion of the other-dependent to the consummated. there is a difference between the significance of the Buddha's wisdom and the three-nature theory." When the entire world is regarded to be represented by this vijfiana.184 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA consummated world. the conversion from the other-dependent to the imagined reflects. is not yet the ultimate truth. However. the conversion in which the consummated converts back to the other-dependent. Because it was the other-dependent nature that func-tioned as a mediator. The "consciousness-only" referred to above." Consciousness. that is. Cognition. cognition or consciousness. at the same time. the other-dependent mediates between bewildermenUaffliction and the awakened state and it is the place in which the meaning of identical in the phrase ''bewildermenUaffliction is itself the awakened state" can be established. it is immovable. Likewise. This wisdom is a discriminative but genuine (or pure) wis-dom that is acquired subsequently to nondiscriminative knowledge and that can be characterized as the other-dependent but not as the consummated or as the imagined. The wisdom that functions as the Buddha's activity-Buddha's wisdom that functions in this world-is the "wisdom acquired subsequently" (pmha-labdha-jniina). because it is not unusual that the other-dependent becomes an object of even the imagining cognition of ordinary people and the other-dependent cannot be truly the other-dependent without penetrating into the consummate and returning from it. in the wisdom acquired subsequently-that "consciousness-only" is truly established in terms of "representation-only" (vijflapti-miitratii). the cognition of the "consummated" nature. lies in the fact that cognition has the structure of the other-dependent nature and that everything is ''consciousness-only. however. is inclined always to turn into false imagination. however. The ultimate truth of representation-only does not become manifest simply by eliminating false imagination. just like the other-dependent nature has a tendency to fall down into the imagined nature. as stated above. In this manner. The other-dependent nature is the basis Buddhist Ontology . without penetrating into nondiscriminative wisdom. This fact exhibits a case of a different kind of con-version. does not act. This structure of the three-nature theory will be considered in relation to vijfiana. it can be said that ''the triple worlds are consciousness-only. The possibility for remov-ing the cognition of the imagined nature and for the presence of the funda-mental nondiscriminative wisdom (nirvikalpa-jfliina) of the Buddha. a conversion from the other-dependent to the consummated.

The three natures are not only affirmative and existential. emptiness which is ever present manifests itself. "dependent-origination is identical to emptiness" corresponds to what is meant by "non-nature in reference to origination'' in the three-nature theory that can be paraphrased as the other dependent is empty in respect to its origination. First. From the discussion above. This means that all is empty. Schematically speaking.1 ). but. the three-nature theory has the theory of "three nonnatures" in its immediate background and it is therein that emptiness can be seen. is of the nature of other-dependent and serves as the foundation for both de-lusion and enlightenment. there is "non-nature in an ultimate sense" (paramiirtha-ni/:zsvabhiiva). The three-nature theory goes on to explain each one of the three na-tures in terms of "non-nature. it may seem as if the three-nature theory is closely aligned with "existence" rather than with emptiness. with regard to the "imagined" nature. Nagarjuna's statement. vijiiana. as everything is dependent upon every other thing. This is what the three-nature theory explicates. with re-gard to the "consummated" nature. because. nifzsvabhiiva. they are said to have "no self-nature" and to be empty and nonexistent. as a cognitive function of human beings. In contrast. for the entire world. consequently. nothing can originate on its own accord nor exist in and of itself. with regard to the "other-dependent" nature. be-cause the Buddha's wisdom is no longer oriented towards the imagined world. Lastly. it should now be clear that in order for the theory of cognition to be completed it is necessary for it to be supported by the three-nature theory. it is explained that emptiness is seen in the context of cognition and that in emptiness. that appeared in the previous discussion on Nagarjuna and that was translated "no self-nature" in that context. However. But this does not mean that the Buddha's wisdom that is acquired subsequently to nondiscriminative wisdom is likewise the basis for all things in the world. because they are products of imagination. characteristics. At the beginning of the Madhyiintavibhiiga (1. and accordingly. this same logic can be . Marks. forms. Nagarjuna started out from this teaching of dependent-origination and saw "emptiness" (sunyatii) therein. In contrast. there is "non-nature in reference to marks" (lak$m:za-ni/:zsvabhiiva). it serves as a mediator between be-wilderment and the awakened state.for all the three natures. the same cognition is revived and seen. there is "non-nature in reference to origination" (utpatti-ni/:zsvabhiiva). and so forth are discriminated there. That the three-nature theory had the other-dependent at its center and that this referred to the Buddha's teaching of "dependent origination" have been expressed repeatedly. This means that by negating the imag-ined world." The term "non-nature" is a translation for the term. but are also negative and empty. Sec-ondly.

The "consummated" is both existent and nonexistent in an ultimate sense. 16 Seen in this light. and other kinds of investigations were carried out by this school. what corresponds to them are the "imagined" and the "consummated" natures and dependent origination. and wisdom. the imagined and the con-summated formulate a "triadic system. This is a very advanced ontological theory that combines both the dharma-theory of the Abhidharmic philosophy and the Madhyamika philosophy of emptiness. the three-nature theory is a theory of ontology only in the sense expressed above. Thus. The text goes on to ex-plain the viewpoint of existence and nonexistence as follows: The "imagined nature" is always non-existent. the tension between dependent origination and emptiness continues and is regarded as an axis around which the imag-ined world and the consummated world revolve and develop.186 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA applied to the structure of the three-nature theory. This ontology is not promulgated from an interest in ontology per se. because for Nagarjuna the two poles are bewilderment/affliction and enlightenment (which roughly stand for dependent origination and emptiness. To that degree. intervenes between the two as the "other-dependent" nature. In contrast." The fact that the other-dependent . the three-nature theory can be said to be an onto-logical theory. but is an ontology that brings about the perfection of yogic practices. It is an ontology for the sake of actu-alizing the awakened state. the three-nature theory had the role of providing a logical basis for theoretical developments on the one hand. while in the three-nature theory. Motivated mainly by the three-nature theory. concentration. but not as real reality. and on the other. Consequently. dependent origination or the other-dependent nature in the three-nature theory may be slightly different from dependent origination ex-pressed as one of the poles in Nagarjuna's thought. discussions concerning nirvana and liberation. the Yogacara school shed new light on and gave new meaning to prob-lems of perennial principles such as dependent origination and the theory of cause and effect or to problems of yogic praxis such as the three learn-ings of morality. By the same principle. The special characteristic of this ontology is that the three natures comprise a triadic system. it served as the object of meditation for the yoga practitioner. which can be equated to emptiness. In this other-dependent nature. Together with the other dependent that functions as their axis. respectively). The "other-dependent" is existent. systematic explications on the Buddhabodies. a bi-polar system is seen in Nagarjuna's theory wherein ontology was established from the perspective of a tension between the two poles of dependent origination and emptiness.

" is a phrase that describes one's atti-tude in interacting with the world. In later times.nossesses the two aspects of defilement and purity also shows Buddhist Ontology that. the outer world obstructed yogic practice. the organic structure of this three-nature theory as well as the principle of convertibility between the three natures seemed to be soon forgotten though their concepts re-mained and became synonyms for delusion and the awakened state. With the passing of the Asanga. but. the phrase. It cannot be denied that scholarly achievements in epistemology. Therefore. . This horizon reached by Nagarjuna was accepted by the Yogaciiras and thereby they took their stand on the middle path.Vasubandhu era. then it would have to be based. and logic. Later Vijiianavadins put their efforts into explaining the theory of cognition rather than explicating the three-nature theory. is it not the case that such a realism of mind-only that annihilates all other things is a derailment from the Buddhist standpoint? A negation of the outer world stands in sharp contrast to the Abhi-dharmic realism of the dharmas. in the movement toward siinyatii. in accordance with the change in scholarly interest and in the demands of the time." An expression similar to that can be found in the earlier Yogiiciira treatises. as an object of passion. It would seem. ontology in a Buddhism context is not an ontology of 'being. it is not a phrase that intends to prove or to determine objectively an absolute and ultimate existence. The result of this was a much more reinforced ontological theory whose claim was that ''Only cognition exists. the outer world was taken into consideration as a problem only when it obstructed yogic prac-tices. Nagarjuna was able to reach the new horizon of siinyatii. the Vijiiiinavadins endeavored mainly to develop their cognition theory and to maintain an ontological view that claimed that only cognition is the unique and ultimate existence. not on an ontology of 'being'-that is. polemics. By transcending both negation and real-ism. external reality does not exist. When. only then did the Yogiiciiras show their concern regarding it and deal with it. but its contents is understood differently by the earlier Yogaciiras and the later Vijiianavadins. however. ontology. In other words. but this did not mean that they simply struck a balance between the "existence" of cognition and the "non-existence" of the outer world.' but that of siinyatii. "The triple world is representation only (vijiiapti-matra). therefore. The Yogiiciiras were hardly concerned with the problem of whether an external world existed or not in so far as they considered the question of an external reality to be a problem of the realist's ontology. the Yogiiciiras did not show an interest in it as an object of ontological or metaphysical investigation. as the third factor in the triad. that if an ontology of a Buddhist kind is to be considered seriously. but on transcending both existence and non-existence-that is. not in an ontic sense. the other dependent mediates between the two and becomes a basis for them. In other words. were greatly advanced by their efforts.


is believed to be wholly inherited by Maitreyanatha. The Prajfiaparamita sutras are equally revered as authentic by both schools. although both schools advocated the doctrines . this development necessarily involved a degree of change.18 and MV. in the history of Western philosophy.Chapter 13 From Madhyamika to Yogacara: An Analysis of MMK. (2) it elucidated the three yanas side by side without being confined to the Bodhisattvayana. 1. the Madhyamika and YogacaraVijfianavada tenets have been understood to be both parallel and opposite to each other. which began with Nagarjuna. in so far as there was a development. Of course. the Madhyamaka philosophy. the Vijfianavada. was regarded as realistic or an Existence School. the latter was considered to be semi-Mahayana for three basic reasons: ( 1) the Vijfianavada remained realistic like the Abhidharma School. and other Yogacaras. While the former was characterized as Mahayana due to its doctrine of emptiness. the doctrine of emptiness occupies an important position even in the Yogacara school. and the Fa-hsiang-tsung. especially Yogacara Buddhism. even though a faithful transmission of a teaching without any changes was Jintended. Asanga. the Chinese version of the Madhyamika. was such that it developed its doctrines in a fairly different pattern from that of West-ern philosophy. These traditional but erroneous views have now been revised by modern scholars. the situation in Buddhism. and (3) it did not emphasize the doctrine of Buddha-nature. The Yogacaras developed their doctrines by inheriting the entire body of thought of their former masters. Presently. The San-lun-tsung. XXIV. Therefore. was regarded as nihilistic or as Emptiness School. While. it was deemed necessary for a newcomer to negate and transcend previous philosophies through crit-icism. and further.1-2 In the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition.

l8 of MMK. because the two verses together not only represent the basic tenet contained in the first chapter of MV. however. he refers to MMK. sunyata is accepted. I would like to examine all three verses in the hope that I can trace an aspect of the development of Buddhist philosophy from Madhyamika to Yogacara.l8. At the outset.l8. MMK) 1 has been famous in the Sino-Japanese tradition since the T'ien. After pointing out that the Abhidharmic systems interpreted pratitya-samutpada (originating co-dependently) incorrectly and arguing that the Madhyamika system was a reinterpretation of it as sunyata. but also the fundamental point of view that the treatise is attempting to express.yya) has been attributed to Vasubandhu.l8 of Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamaka-karika (hereaf-ter.1 as the Vijfianavada formula.1-2. 3 It seems that T. In accordance with the divergent views held by the schools as they grew in India and in China. 1. there is a treatise of the Yogacaras named "Madhyiintavibhdga" (hereafter. The verse XXIV." On the other hand. but with a modification. have included MV. 4 In this verse we see four key terms: "pratltya-samutpada" (originating codependently)' "siinyata" (emptiness). R.' the manner in which they interpreted the meaning of this term has been different. GenerFrom Miidhyamika to Yogiiciira . MV. The verse in Sanskrit is as follows: yai) pratityasamutpadai) sunyata111 tii111 pracak~mahe I sa prajiiaptir upadaya pratipat saiva madhyama I I This can be rendered in English as follows: What is originating co-dependently.2 closely resemble those in verse XXIV. there has been a difference in how they worded the doctrine and in how they logically developed it. 1. It is a designation based upon (some material). we call emptiness. The verse concludes with the term "madhyama pratipat" (Middle Path). "In the Vijfianavada. The features of the first two verses. XXIV. The root verses of this text have been ascribed to Maitreyanatha or Asanga and the prose commentary (bhii. "upadaya-prajfiapti" (designation based on some material). let us examine in detail MMK. XXIV.2 in the formula. and "madhyama pratipat" (Middle Path). Only this is the Middle Path. He then explains the Vijfianavada position by saying.190 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA of 'siinyata. V. 1. MV). Murti was also aware of this similarity. and hence the treatise was named "Madhyamaka-ktirika.t'ai school elaborated the doctrine called "Threefold Truth" and took this verse as one of its bases. He should." and quotes MV. In this paper.

a reinterpretation of pratftya-samutptida in contradistinction to the Abhidharmic interpretation. and negative." or "a designation based upon (some material)." In this case. and the middle (chung). were taken by the T'ien-t'ai school to constitute the so-called Threefold Truth: the truth of the empty (k' ung) the 6 provisional (chia). these four are associated with each other and in some way considered equal. In order to give a logical rationale for this process." 7 Here. the verse states that siinyata in this context is "upadaya-prajnapti." Although the compound upadayaprajnapti is problematic. pratftya-samutptida). the last three (omitting the first. however. According to Candrakirti 's I believe this something can be called the author's "logic. 5 synonyms) of pratltya-samutpada." "ap-propriating" and therefore. which had been conceived of in terms of some-thing real. Candraklrti (as well as Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka) introduced the phrase: "Because it is devoid of self-being (nibsvabhtiva) it is empty. these three or four terms are regarded as reciprocally identical and simul-taneous. Especially in the T'ien-t'ai doc-trine. upadaya (an absolutive) literally means: "having taken to one-self." which is an interpretation also substantiated by the Tibetan translation brten nas (de- . being linked to each other through a process of reasoning. but neither is it permitted to rearrange them and state them in reverse order. which understands it from a realistic viewpoint. Next. as Murti puts it. the ultimate and perfect identity of the three is emphasized. This reinterpretation is revolutionary. there must be something that led the author to select the four terms and mention them in this particular sequence. upadaya-prajnapti and madhyama-pratipad are considered to be "different names" (vise~a sa!Jljfu1. I have translated it "based upon. existence and nonexistence or affirmation and negation are combined into one. taking it to be existent. to begin with. It is true that there is no chronological sequence of the four terms. and scholars have interpreted it differently. upadana means: "material as cause". but not in chronological sequence. This indicates the dynamism or paradox spoken about in Mahayana texts. nonexist-ent." and consequently the four terms are in logical order. codependent origination is characterized by emptiness. It differs from the static idea of the Abhidharmic systems and corresponds to what the Prajnaparamita-siitras expounded in the formula: "riipam eva siinyata" (this very matter is the essence of emptiness). all interpretations are in agreement with the fact that what is originating co-dependently is empty. 8 it is safe 9 to assume that it can be interpreted as: "upadanam upadaya prajnapti. Now. This is. because pratltya-samutpada. As the context of the verse and Candraklrti's "vise~a-sarpjfia" suggest. In other words. Of these four terms. siinyata. or nonexistent. existent and affirmative is now declared to be empty.

. But. is also conveyed by upadaya-prajnapti. being free from [the wrong views of] eternalism and nihilism. Being thus desigFrom Mddhvamika to Yogdcdra . its upadana. after equating "siinyata equals upadayaprajflapti. and as His upadana. being opposite to paramartha. and also seem to disre-gard the positive role played by upadaya-prajnapti as the third key term. derived name. the conventional and the ultimate.. and being given the name upiidiiya12 prajnapti. "the [meaning of] relativity." although he does not clarify how and from what the name is derived." Jaques May translates the compound upadaya-prajnapti as "designa-tion metaphorique" (he seems to prefer this translation to L. metaphorically taking the names siinyata or madhyama-pratipad.. Candraklrti states: "[Those foolish people] do not see the truth of pratftya-samutpiida which has the most profound meaning. upadaya-prajnapti occupies an important stage. are conventional. Venkata Ramanan translates upadaya-prajflapti as "derived name. rather it expresses a logical process starting from the Buddha's pratltya-samutpada and concluding with the Buddha's Middle Path. As he explains. these explanations seem not to coincide with the two equations mentioned by him. 13 the word upiidiina (material cause) means "hetu-pratyaya" (cause and condition): a sprout is so named based upon a seed. the phrase as a whole means: "a designation based upon (some material). the four convictions. they are not on the level of ultimate truth and cannot represent the ultimate re-ality. and. any concepts. I be-lieve. which remains silent (tU$flliJ1-bhiiva). names or designations.." he gives the following explanation: "La siinyata est designation metaphorique de Ia realite absolue. conditionedness (partltya-samutpada) . beyond all grasping (anupalab-dhi. Prajnapti (Tib. This is the truth revealed by Nararjuna in terms of the Twofold Truth (satya-dvaya). In a passage." 11 It is my contention that upadaya-prajnapti is another name for pratltyasamutpada." And also equating "siinyata equals madhyama-pratipad" in regard to the fourth pada. Thus. however. which is supra-mundane. he gives a similar interpretation: "Madhyama pratipad est aussi une designation metaphorique de Ia realite absolue . the present verse is not intended to discuss the Twofold Truth." synonymous.. de La Vallee Poussin's "designation en raison de"). gdags pa) or "designation" is of a worldly or conventional character. Tathagata is so designated based upon the virtues such as the ten powers. If this be the case. He states. In this process. This indicates that upadaya-prajfiapti and pratltya-samutpada are According to Avalokitavrata's explanation of the phrase upadanam upadaya prajfiaptil:I. anabhiliipya). and beyond any conceptualizations.'' 10 His interpretations would indicate that absolute reality manifests itself on the level of conventional truth.192 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA pending on).

in so far as it has been negated or has a negative aspect (first and second padas)." Because it comes after the negation of siinyata.nated as based upon causes and conditions. Thus upadaya-prajflapti means "a designation based upon some material. ter-minologies used to designate conventional truth. Without this aliveness or the revival from siinyata. It can also involve the Buddha's laukika-pr$Jhalabdha-jfzana (con-ventional knowledge functioning after nondiscriminative knowledge is obtained). To recapitulate. The first order pratltya-samutpada is said to be "direct. the first order pratltya-samutpada as expounded in the first pacta of the verse. worldly life necessarily . in the second pada. In this sense. and therefore. or bases itself upon (upadaya) something else. depends upon. I do not intend "Hinayanic" to refer to Theravada). In other words. Such a revived pratitya-samutpada is a "designation" (prajfzapti) for it appropriates. should still be different from it for the reason that." because it has not yet been denied and represents the ordinary worldly life that is not yet negated as siinyata. devoid of self-being. In spite of its death. the compound upadaya-prajflapti. in contrast to this. and The second order pratltya-samutpada (equals upadaya-prajflapti) as expounded in the third pada. not only the sprout but also Tathagata is empty. upadaya-prajflapti is pratltya-samutpada revived from within siinyata after having been once negated. in spite of this negation. it is a knowledge gained by a sort of bodhi enlight-enment. pratltya-samutpada has been negated and declared as siinyata. pratltya-samutpada is twofold: l. to use the later Yogacara terminology. This pratltya-samutpada dies in the second pada. In the third pacta. In other words. although similar to pratltyasamutpada of the first pacta. even madhyama pratipat could not be established. It is clear that Avalokitravrata interprets upadaya-prajflapti with the meaning of pratltya-samutpada. people are living it without any awareness of its true nature as siinyata. But. However. pratltya-samutpada is operative and functioning in the sa~psaric world. The Middle Path is a dynamic path and not a mere cessation or extinction as expressed by the "Hinayanic" nirviil)a (of course. in so far as the ultimate reality does not cease to manifest itself as upadaya-prajflapti (third pada). still alive. 2. or some kind of material (upadana). is siinyata. or its negation. it is synonymous with sarrzketa (conventional symbol) and loka-vyavahara (common practice). One of the meanings of "Mahayanic" nirviil)a is the Bodhisattva's aprati$Jhita-nirv[u:za (not dwelling in nirviil)a). the world of pratltya-samutpada.

It is dialectical." the second order is a reaffirmed pratltya-samutpiida that corre-sponds to the word riipa of "siinyataiva riipam" (this very essence of emp-tiness is matter). but now it is accompanied by a kind of siinya consciousness. the fourth pada states: "Only this is the Middle Path. This second order or revived pratltya-samutpada is said to be "indi-rect. there still is a need for "a life" in which people can strive to live a moral life or can make every effort to exert themselves in religious practices. Finally." The Middle is always revealed by being freed from two extremes. the four terms explained above can be equated in a straight line: pratltya-samutpada = siinyata upadaya-prajfiapti = madhyama-pratipad = But from the above discussion and from the dialectical character of the whole process. The dynamic move-ment from the first order pratitya-samutpada of the first pada.) To conclude this section. I would rather equate them in the following way: pratitya-samutpada (affirmative) madhyama-pratipad lsiinyata =] upadaya-prajiiapti (affirmative) From Miidhyamika to Yogiiciira . and which corresponds to the word riipa of "riipam eva siinyata. (The Middle can be found even in the extremes in so far as affirmation is negation and negation is affirmation. The Middle is not a point between two extremes and cannot be found at a certain point. dynamic. Although the first order pratltyasamutpada must be negated. and dialectical. in which the second order pratitya-samutpada is revived. or affirmation and negation. The third pada represents this stage. because the path is a total process. to its negation (stlnyatd) in the second pada. moving from affir-mation to negation and again to affirmation." because it has come through siinyata and consequently was not de-rived directly from the first order. and further to its revival as the sec-ond order pratitya-samutpada (equals upadaya-prajiiapti) in the third pada is the Middle Path (madhyamii-pratipad). such as exist-ence and nonexistence.194 MADHY AMIKA AND YOGACARA continues. In contrast to the first order. which must be negated.

"Duality" (dvaya) means the duality of subject and object. madhyama pratipac ca sa I 1. This negation o:!:' duality. employing the term siinyata: "Empti- . the cognitive functions or thought of ordi-nary people is always stained by ignorance. cognition necessarily im-plies a dichotomy. neither the object grasped nor the grasping subject has substantive exist-ence.1-2 read as follows: abhiitaparikalpo 'sti. (1. hence the word "unreal" (abhuta). "duality does not exist therein" (the second pada). Basically speaking. I 1 na siinyarp napi casiinyarp tasmat sarvarp vidhiyate I sattvad asattvat sattvac ca.18. dvayarp tatra na vidyate I siinyata vidyate tv atra. that is. is restated in the third pada. Any one of these terms can be equated with madhyama-pratipad.2 I This can be rendered in English as follows: There exists unreal imagination. which in turn is characterized by the Yogacaras as "dependent-on-other" (paratantra). (1. on the one hand. It simply describes the fact that all the common features of daily life are constituted by cognitive func-tions. Therefore.2) 14 The word"imagination" (parikalpa) generally refers to cognitive func-tions or consciousness (vijfiiina). and again because of existence. Although. XXIV.The equation of pratltya-samutpada equals siinyata is the most basic: all others are derived from it. and madhyama-pratipad. And this is the Middle Path. duality does not exist as substantial reality to be found in unreal imagina-tion. I) Therefore it is stated that all entities are neither empty nor nonempty Because of existence. or the absence of cognition with regard to duality. siinyata. duality does not exist therein Emptiness. we are now in a position to analyze the two verses of MV that elucidate the notions of abhiita-parikalpa. and also the former exists in the later. from the viewpoint of ultimate truth. however. however. on the other hand. exists in it. but only through the whole process of negation and affirmation as discussed above. that is. tasyam api sa vidyate I I. does not mean that existence (of the imagination) is proclaimed or insisted in a metaphysical or ontological sense. In Sanskrit. because of non-existence. The phrase "there exists unreal imagination" (the first pada). verses 1. Having examined MMK. Thus. pratitya-samutpiida. the fact that "unreal imagination exists" is the beginning point of the Yogacara's Weltanschauung.

In the fourth pada. "because of non-existence. and d. was orig-inally written to elucidate the Middle Path and to exemplify that very fact by discussing the emptiness of unreal imagination. in unreal imagination). I would like to devote the remainder of this paper to a com-parative study of the similarities and differences between the MMK verse and the two verses of MV The corresponding padas of these verses and the relationship of them can be diagrammed as follows (the four padas are in-dicated by the letters: a.e. the first phrase. exists in it (i. As stated previously. 18 of the MMK with these two verse of MV. "nor non-empty." In this sense. "neither empty. "This is the Middle Path. Next. The reason why Murti should have given both verses as the Yogacara formula should also be clear. therefore. And one can see that the Yogacaras." The third phrase. unreal imagination is negated and. "because of existence" means "be-cause unreal imagination exists." meaning "because empti-ness exists in unreal imagination and unreal imagination exists in empti-ness. indeed. all entities are neither empty nor nonempty. When one compares verse XXIV. the similarity between them should now become obvious. in accordance with the above statement. inherited the ideas of emptiness and the Middle Path from Nagarjuna. whose title was originally 15 "Madhya-vibhdga" (instead of Madhydnta-vibhdga).196 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA ness. Thus far. these two verses of MV are key verses of this text and convey the fundamental idea of the Yogacara school. Now that we have discussed the MMK verse and the two verses of MV individually. c. verse 1." Because siinyata is found in unreal imagination. the two verses clearly indicate that the MV.apti of the MMK." The verse concludes with the statement.." The phrase is important in that it means the revival of unreal imagination (or pratitya-samutpada) and corresponds to upadaya-prajfi. however. elaborated and expanded Nagarjuna's verse. "again because of existence. respectively): . however. It is almost as if Maitreya-natha or Asanga imitated.2 reads: "Therefore ." refers to the statement." meaning "be-cause duality does not exist.. the opposite is also true: "the former [unreal imagination} exists in the latter [in emptiness}. the verse conveys a meaning similar to the equation pratitya-samutpada equals siinyata in the MMK. equal to siinyata itself.." refers to the statement. An analysis of these two verses will not only help us to under-stand Buddhist thought." According to Vasubandhu's Bhd$ya. but will also demonstrate how these ideas pro-gressed in the development of Buddhist thought from Madhyamika to Yogacara. "neither empty." The reason for this is explained by three phrases beginning with "because of. b." The second phrase." and refers to the statement.

in so far as it is of paratantra nature and is taken as the starting point or the primary object of investigation. which is essentially vijiiana. whereas MV. as stated before.MMK. Ther~fore. But. MMK. because it also has the nature of paratantra (dependent-on-other). gamana (going) and so on. XXIV. XXIV. XX1Y. and abhutaparikalpa (unreal imagination).l8a begins its discussion with pratitya-samutpiida. Whereas MMK. even though abhiita-parikalpa is a term deeply associated with a monk's yogic practices. abhiitaparikalpa. abhiitaparikalpa does not differ from pratltya-samutpada. I. and related to everyday life situations. without elaborating its logical process. which are more concrete. dealing with such notions as pratityasamutpiida. vijniina (consciousness). while the discus-sions found in the MMK are always metaphysical and abstract.l8 a: pratfn·asamutpada (co-dependent origination) b: sunvatii (emptiness) c: upudiivaprajiiapti (designation based upon) d: madhyamii pratipat (middle path) As the figure suggests. the point of departure for the two schools dif-fers. is not contextually dif-ferent from pratltya-samutpada. .l a begins its discussion with abhutaparikalpa. where the Madhyamikas begin their investigation. practical. MV. utpatti (arising).I8b simply and directly informs us that pratltyasamutpada is siinyata. the author of MV replaced these notions with ones such as citta (mind). The different topics with which the two texts begin reflect the fact that.

2 as the diagram indicates. 1.I. I gives a fuller explanation and develops its view round a more compli-cated logical process. The discussion ex-tends its logical argument into MV. Here siinyata is discussed from two points of view: nonexistence (of duality) and existence (of siinyata). At first. .

however. The later Vijiianavada is sometimes referred to as a school in which the outer world (object) is negated (bahyarthabhava) and only the existence of inner consciousness (subject) is maintained (vijiianamatra). to be different from the first. 1. "again because of existence. Siinyata was originally characterized by negation and nonbeing. the three reasons beginning with "because of existence" are reasons expounding different levels." and to the Miidhyamika equation of the whole world (prati'tya-samutpada) with siinyata. The third reason. it should be noticed that not only the ob-ject but also the subject is negated. As I have shown in my previous discus-sion. Siinyata is thus simultaneously nonexistent as well as existent. therefore. This siinyata is not a mere negation. the Madhyamaka polemicist. aware of this contradiction.13). and existence. The Yoga-cara teachers. 1.198 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA the siinyata established by negating the "duality" of subject and object may seem far removed from the "emptiness" of the MMK. however. which is characterized as "pratltya-samutpada" and is the most logical and natural place to begin one's reflection in yogic practice. 16 But this is not the case here. however. By the negation of both subject and object the siinyata of the whole world is intended. pratltyasamutpada is once negated as siinyata. This is parallel to the statement often found in the Mahayana siitras. XXIV. MMK (XXII. dared to define siinyata as "non-existence of the duality and existence of [that] non-existence" (MV. it transcends both existence and nonexistence. nor non-empty. On the foun-dation of such a paradoxical statement. that the author of the MV wanted to demonstrate the siinyata of abhiitaparikalpa. in spite of the fact that the first and the third reasons are worded in the same way. "all entities are empty. As for the "existence of unreal imagination. II) states: "one should not pro-claim something as empty. but revived again in the term upadayaprajfiapti (MMK." MV. "because of exist-ence" and "because of non-existence" that are obviously paradoxical and on the same level represent affirmation and negation respectively. it is not unusual to find that the author of MV chose to negate the "duality" of subject and object. The mean-ing of existence in the third reason is twofold: (I) it includes the existence of siinyata and (2) the existence of unreal imagination. The first two. gives us a more elaborate explanation." it corresponds to the second order pratltya-samutpada. Consequently. When one considers. There-fore the "existence of siinyata" is itself a contradiction and this has been the focus of attack by Bhavaviveka. It first states that ''all entities are neither empty nor nonempty" and then continues to explain this statement on the basis of three reasons: existence." must be understood to transcend the former two and. 18c). the MV finally develops its thought into the Middle Path. Moreover. But MV does not stop with From Madhmmika to Yogacara . Undoubtedly. nonexistence.2.

It may be true that the Yogacaras inherited in general the Madhyamika thought concerning siinyata. very subtle problems remain. is it proper to speak of the logical process involved in establishing siinyata as the same in both schools? Isn't it that. It is in a sense a redeemed and justified abhiitaparikalpa. which develops its thought through the steps of affir-mation (pratftya-samutpiida) to negation (sunyatii) and further to affirma-tion again (upiidiiya-prajiiapti) is followed exactly by the author of the MV.18." and so on. one can assume that there is. readers are referred to my discussion in another paper. using a little different wording. adds the logical basis for this dynamic process with statements such as ''because of existence. XXIV. it is now clear that the zigzagging logic found in the MMK. the difference. it goes on further to say that unreal imagination exists in emptiness: "also the former exists in the latter" (tasyiim api sa vidyate). or to the different tenets particular to the schools. Even if there is such a difference. as the second order abhiitaparikalpa. This re-vived abhiitaparikalpa is to be understood as contextually the same as "designation based upon (some material)" (upiidiiya-prajiiapti). is it due to natural development during the course of time. (For details about this point. a considerable differ-ence between the two schools concerning their idea of siinyata. In conclusion then. Both texts agree with each other in so far as they arrive ultimately at the same Middle Path through that vital and dialectical process. the Middle Path. That is to say. in which the former two are tran-scended. with the exception that the latter. and co-dependent origination? . or to the differences in texts upon which they establish themselves? Or. although the name siinyata is shared by both. what is intended by this name is entirely different in the two schools? For one thing. while the Yogacara starts from abhiita-parikalpa.) 17 Due to these dif-ferences. after its duality is ne-gated. Another remarkable difference is that the Yogacara speaks of the "existence of non-existence" when defining siinyata. abhiita-parikalpa (as para-tantra is equal to pratltya-samutpada) is revived in the midst of emptiness. their points of depar-ture differ: the Madhyamika starts from pratltya-samutpada. if any. rather are we to say that in spite of these questions. We must also pay attention to the fact that. is negligible when contrasted to the vast universality and ultimacy of ideas such as siinyata. But. or could be. so to speak. By zigzagging logic I mean a paradoxical and dia-lectical logical process that evidences a dynamism continually moving from being to non-being and again to being.the statement that emptiness exists in unreal imagination. Although I have attempted to show that these texts are similar in their schemes of developing the Middle path. the Yogacaras also place importance on the Cufasuiiiiata-sutta of the Majjihima-nikaya. although both the Madhyamikas and the Yogacaras are thought to base their idea of siinyata on the Prajfiaparamita-siitras. however.


that most of these doctrines contain within them two oppo-site tendencies." commonly encoun-tered in the Prajfiaparamita and other Mahayana siitras." or "coming down. or from this human personal existence to the imper-sonal dharmadhiitu. Buddhists have formulated doctrines around various key terms such as pratitya-samutpiida. I would like to consider. the world of dharmatii. . many more topics remain to be discussed. it is this two directional activity. in fact." The two activities for the sake of convenience can be named simply "ascent" and "descent." "purified and yet not purified. one of "going forth" or "going up-ward. or personality in human existence. however. It will be found upon examina-tion. so they tend to be par-adoxical. But. or activities. aniitman. By this I mean that in the structure of Buddhist thought as well as in the way that it is expounded are found two activities or movements. however. At the first Conference. or directions. sunyatii. even contradictory. and tathatii. it is revival and affirmation of humanity. Of course. frequently encountered in Mahayanic ideas. at times illogical.Chapter 14 Ascent and Descent Two-Directional Activity in Buddhist Thought It is an honor and a privilege to have been selected as President of the Sixth Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies and to be invited to address you on this auspicious occasion. Today. are polar opposites. Descent is the reverse." Ascent can be understood as an activity or movement from this world to the world yonder. These two activities function in opposite directions. I dis-cussed several topics relating to Buddhist studies. held at Columbia University in 1978. an idea that I cherish in my own study of Bud-dhist thought. with your kind permission. Paradoxes. such as "being and yet non-being. all of them conveying the fundamental standpoint of Buddhism. that consti-tutes the characteristic feature of the Mahayana." the other of "coming back.

Nirviil)a is the highest virtue to which a Buddhist aspires.202 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA But the two-directional activity differs from ordinary paradox. The idea of including the coming back into this world within the con-text of fulfilling one's purpose is a unique one. but according to Mahayanic belief. but. While the ideas of ascent and descent are to be found throughout Mahayana Buddhism. As the incarnation of God.fEj). even after the parinirval)a. this is the "merit-transference in the aspect of coming-back. a follower of the Pure land teaching transfers the merit he has obtained in two ways: first." Second he transfers his merits towards his return to this world of suffering for the purpose of benefiting others. while coming back from the Pure Land refers to descent. his earthly life ends and he ascends to Heaven. in his commentary on Vasubandhu's Upadesa of Sukhavatf-vyuha. because it is by descend-ing once again to this world that one fulfills his act of benefiting others. it was a text of Pure Land School that influenced me most in formulating the idea. He established this unique idea of two-directional activity as early as the sixth century. The Buddhist notion of ascent and descent is the reverse of this. descends to the world to engage in missionary work. I know of no Sanskrit term that corresponds to the idea of the twodirectional activity as it is found in the later Chinese text. or as Son of God. According to him." Being born in or going forth to the Pure Land refers to ascent. T'an luan (476-542). he transfers his merits toward his birth in the Pure Land. The search for paradise is a concept common to all religious quests. After the crucifixion and resurrection. Gau-tama Siddhartha. It is through it that the dynamic movement of Mahayana thought reveals itself. the message comes down. the basic connotation was already developed rather elaborately in In-dian Mahayana.fEI) and "aspect of coming back" (:)i. as we shall see. ascends to the throne of mahiibodhi. The notion of ascent and descent is found also in Christianity. it seems that the aspect of descent comes prior to the aspect of ascent. designated the two-directional activity with the terms "aspect of going forth" ( fi . The general pattern of two-directional activity in Buddhism is this: the ascent to enlightenment comes first and from there. and T'an-luan 's case is perhaps one of the few exceptions. after living as a human being on the earth. as a Buddha. because it is by ascending to the Pure Land that one obtains the great enlightenment. there is no difference in this regard between the earlier and later forms of Buddhism. and thereafter. this is called the "merit-transference in the aspect of going forth. Jesus Christ descends from Heaven to earth and brings his Father's message. Ascent and Descent . his activities on earth as a Buddha continue forever. But the concept of seeking ear-nestly to return to one's original abode of suffering is rarely seen. He enters parinirviil)a at the end of his life. There. however.

Now. What is the characteristic of this summit? Such a summit can be seen in the career of Gautama Buddha. he devotes himself to the works of benefiting others. It is. he reached nirval)a. or admonish people to ascend to their final aims. The pivotal point or summit has a double character of being simultaneously negative and affirmative." that is. a bodhisattva refrains from entering nirval)a so long as his fellow beings are not saved. But which are doctrines that represent the direction of descent? In addition to the doctrine of Compassion just mentioned. All prac-tices and learnings likewise belong to the category. . it goes without saying that the siitras and sastras are filled with examples that teach." However. Another virtue. We are apt to consider the eighty years of his life as a single. the indispensable constit-uents of enlightenment. because benefiting others is the bodhisattva's primal concern. Thus. while the forty-five years of his mission that followed represent the direction of descent.' which means "not dwelling in nirval)a.The attainment of nirval)a is the result of the activities directed toward as-cent. continuous ascent to parinirval)a. Compas-sion is an activity directed toward descent. This great event marks a summit in his life. for a bodhisattva. rejecting entry into nirval)a. there is the doctrine of 'aprati~thita-nirval)a. urge. They are compared to the two wheels of a cart or the two wings of a bird. no less important than wisdom. When he advanced to vajriisana and realized mahiibodhi at Bodhgaya. This double character is due to and corresponds to the two directions of ascent and descent. is Compassion (karuf)ii). knowledge or wisdom (prajiiii) also belongs to the same line of ascent. naturally it follows that there exists a summit where the ascent ends and from which the descent begins. thus representing opposite directions. which means "willingly to take rebirth in this world. as I have dis1 cussed these doctrines elsewhere. because nirval)a is realized only through the elimination of avidya. ignorance of non-knowing. divided by the summit that constitutes the pivotal point where ascent turns to de-scent and where the life of acquiring self-benefit becomes a life of benefit-ing others. Another term that indicates the direc-tion of descent more positively than this is samcintyabhavopapatti. Wisdom and Compassion. I shall refrain from going into them in detail here. stand side by side as the two cardinal Buddhist virtues. But his life is better seen as consisting of two periods. Rejecting even the exquisite pleasure of nirval)a. to which a Buddhist aspires. the fundamental defilement (kle§a). Owing to his deep compassion. however. encourage. In consideration of these two directions. The thirty-five years previous to this event belong to the ascent.

it is non-dual and non-discriminative and represents the ultimate enlightenment in this school. because once the ultimate enlightenment-nondiscrim-inative knowledge-is obtained there would be no need for it. It is knowledge practiced in the direction of ascent. Knowledge acquired subsequently (tatis obtained and arises from the nondiscriminative knowledge. Of these. on the other hand. it differs from ordinary human knowledge belonging to the preparatory state. The three knowledges are: (I) knowledge held in the stage of preparatory practice (priiyogika-jniina). As activity in the direction of descent. The term "agama" literally means "coming Ascent and Descent . Ascent is always nihilistic in character-through selfnegating practice. a bodhisattva's primary concern is the practice of benefiting others. with gam or "to go" as their common root. in the direction of compassion. The for-mulation of the system of three knowledges by adding the third stage was one of the great achievements accomplished by the Yogacaras. It is in this sense that the world is affirmed in the process of the descent. nondiscriminative knowledge is knowledge in which every form of duality of subject and ob-ject has been abolished. there would be no place for a bodhisattva to fulfill his obligation of helping others. Two words.204 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA The ascent implies a negative movement. It is discriminative and worldly but differs from the first kind of knowledge in that its activity is directed in the direction of descent. that is. and it oc-cupies the position of the summit in the sense stated above. He must once deny the sarpsaric world. because to aspire to some-thing higher implies a negation of the present state of existence in anticipa-tion of a higher one in the future. naturally implies an affirmative move-ment. a practitioner finally reaches the summit of negation. and one might ques-tion the need for it. but if it should then be totally forsaken." Descent. (2) non-discriminative knowledge (nirvikalpa-jfiiina). The structure of two-directional activity with its summit is clearly seen in the Yogacara theory of the three knowledges. It is a pure form of knowledge because it flows out from nondiscriminative knowledge. which may be called "siinyata. It is realized on the path of intuitive sight (darsana-miirga) through arduous practice. is itself discriminative but aims for nondiscriminative knowledge. it differs also from the nirval)ic silence that is essentially nondiscriminative knowledge. are often contrasted. The two-directional activity is observable also in various other cases. Knowledge belonging to the preparatory stage of practice (priiyogika-jfiiina)." "negated-ness" or "zero-ness. This kind of knowledge might seem superfluous. agama and adhigama. But it is this knowledge that an enlightened one must employ as he descends from the dharmadhatu to work in this world. hence. and (3) knowledge acquired subsequently (tat-pr$fhalabdha-jfliina). As stated before.

are further claimed to be one and the same activity. called the "middle path.hither" and is widely used to denote doctrines. "adhigama" means "acquisition. ascent is descent and descent is ascent. Interpreting these two meanings in accor-dance with the scheme stated above. the logic will be understood easily." that is. even as they are opposite and contradictory. and sacred works. that is. thereby fully synthesizing the two direction. This zigzagging logic defies straightfor-ward reasoning and understanding. it is possible to interpret thus-gone as representing the Buddha's wisdom that denotes ascent. In opposition to this. and the identification of siinyata with designation based upon some material (which designation. it indicates the movement "com-ing down from above. especially in Buddhism. it is equated not only with siinyata. hence. the two terms connote salvation from above and self-realization from below. In the same way. But. The two-direction activity can be observed even in a single term. the two meanings of siinyata. The final situation. The Mulamadhyamaka-kiirikii. for instance. 2 These two directions. and the middle path (madhyamii-pratipad)." and. is another name for dependent co-origination) is the activity in the direction of descent. Further. but if we apply the idea of the two-directional activity. in which dependent co-origination (pratltya-samutpiida) is identified with the three notions of emptiness (sunyatii). the term bodhisattva also can be understood in two ways: (l) "a sattva who aspires for bodhi" (ascent) and (2) "a sattva who has incarnated from bodhi" (descent). presents a zigzagging logic." synthesizes the two directions and is itself the summit between them. I think. the summit." which implies an upward movement or ascent.1) on the other. The term tathagata. 13)-such as identity will become comprehensible. which is them identified with what exists. IS. "spiritual realization. XXIV. That is to say. designation based upon some ma-terial (upiidiiya-prajiiapti). how is this identity of contrary directions possible? If we properly understand the double character of the summit men-tioned above. precepts. descent. including Buddhist canonical texts. has two meanings of "thus-gone" (tathii-gata) and "thuscome" (tathii-iigata). but also with depen-dent co-origination and designation. however. The identification of dependent co-orgination with siinyata is the activity in the direction of ascent. while thus-come can be interpreted as Buddha's compassion that denotes descent. siinyata occupies the position of summit as stated above. and "existence of that non-existence" (abhiivasya bhiiva/. It is zigzagging because what exists is identified with what does not exist. "non-existence" (abhiiva) on the one hand. as defined by the Madhyiintavibhiiga (1. such an identification can be illustrated by the English word . Thus.

" When we say "realization of truth." meaning "to make real. and "the witness of faith" in the direction of ascent. Sunyata. is reached. descent is different from ascent. sunyata is the fountainhead from which the Buddha's compas-sionate activity flows out. the summit. "To be aware" is our understanding-it belongs to ourselves. cannot be realized without agama. in the single word realization both directions of ascent and descent have been combined and unified." has two different senses: (I) "to understand clearly. or enlightenment. At the end of this path. The two aspects of this realization. or actualizes itself. But sunyata is not a mere nihilism that engulfs all entities in its universal darkness. but if it is a real understanding. the teaching." The verb "to realize. one meets the Buddha and his great compassion. in our awareness." Through the witness of faith. are simultaneously identical and not identical. become one and the same activity. Ascent and Descent ." "to conceive vividly as real. abolishing all differences and particularities. Within a religious context. we can say that the two directions." Here. a single realization. adhigama.. a single realization. the "selfrealization" of the truth. However. while the latter.. which always illuminates the path of adhi-gama from above. Sunyata is the meeting place where adhigama meets agama and becomes identi-fied with it. differentiation and discrimination occurs again. our understanding or realization. Therefore. it is consummated only through the actu-alization of the truth itself. there is a sphere or a field where adhigama and agama become identical. They are "really one. "the actualization of the Buddha's great compassion" is in the direc-tion of descent. but in the next moment. at the same time. So much for the identity of ascent and descent." denotes the direction of ascent. notwithstand-ing the identity accomplished by sunyata." and (2) "to bring into concrete existence. denotes descent. it is equally true that ascent is not descent. The former.206 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA "realization. it is a realization even of the identity between the Buddha and ordinary beings. are comparable to the two words adhigama and agama referred to earlier." we mean that we are aware of the truth and. adhigama is deepened to the depth of agama and agama becomes our own adhigama. the understanding constituting our "selfrealization. Thus." As Nishitani Keiji puts it: " ." "to actualize. Realization of such a sphere in which ascent is descent and descent is ascent is called "satori" or "enlightenment" in Zen Buddhism and "salvation" or "faith in Pure Land Buddhism. we mean that the truth realizes itself. ascent and descent. the actualization of the Buddha's Great Compassion and the witness of faith by 3 sentient beings are seen to be really one. That is to say. On the contrary.

unless a religion contains the "aspect of return. It should be used as a touchstone to aid us as we study and reexamine the various aspects of Buddhist doctrine. the ultimate goal of religion cannot be fulfilled. Unless concern is directed to the world once more. the "as-pect of going forth" and "being born in the Pure Land." But." it is still incomplete and imper-fect. It is my belief that the concept of two-directional activity is indispensable for judging the au-thenticity of a religious teaching.The emphasis is often placed on the upward direction alone. ." T'an-luan made a great contribution to Bu-ddhist thought when he clarified the concept of return.


It rather indicates an af-firmative absolute being. a negation of relativity. I Etymology and Definition The Sanskrit siinya seems to derive from the root svi "to swell. but Mahayana Buddhism. sky) took on this deeply philosophical meaning when it was used for the Sanskrit sunya of Indian Buddhism. hole. One of them. the Cu/asuiiiiata-sutta (Lesser Discourse on Empti-ness) reads: . in the period of Hlnayana Buddhism. and Japan. From that time on. Likewise. almost all forms of Buddhism. In India." This set the stage for the later Buddhist notion of emptiness. China." the connection apparently being that something which looks swollen from the outside is hollow inside. the term siinya appears quite early. it has at the same time the positive connotation of ultimate reality. that all experienced phenomena are empty (sunya) and vain.Chapter 15 Emptiness The phrase "all things are empty" means that everything is nonexist-ent. Such an absolute was already recognized in the philosophy of the Upanishads in the negation expressed as "Qeti. But this negation is not mere nothingness. 1 Indian mathematicians called the zero. which arose later at about the time of Christ. which they had invented. The Chinese word k' ung ~ (hollow. and thus that all objects and qualities are negated in both an ontological and ethical sense. have taken emptiness as their most important basic idea. There are discussions on the meaning of emptiness even in early Hlnayanic texts such as the Pali Nikayas and Sanskrit Agamas. Korea. including those transmitted into Tibet. while the Buddhist use of the term expresses strong negation. neti. "siinya. freed from objectifications and qualifications. vacant. for it indicates immediate insight into an absolute through an affir-mation that has passed through negation. made this notion of emptiness its fundamental stand-point." but "siinya in this usage did not merely sig-nify non-being.


It is seen that when something does not exist somewhere, that place is empty
with regard to the former. And yet it is to be understood that when something
remains somewhere it does exist as reality.

This teaches that emptiness signifies non-being and privation, but that at the
same time an ultimate reality can be discovered within emptiness. This passage
is often quoted in later Yogacara texts as a true definition of emp-tiness. The
character of emptiness as both negative and affirmative led some Chinese
thinkers to equate it with the term li .f.f., principle, rather than with k'ung, empty.
This same point is stressed when it is rendered into English as "absolute" rather
than "emptiness."

II Emptiness as Seen in the Scriptures
But the primary negative meaning of the term emptiness is clear from its
general usage. There are many source passages in the early texts where
emptiness means simply nonexistence; that was its significance in the Abhidharma philosophies. For example, when the truth of suffering of the Fourfold
Truths is interpreted in these early scriptures, suffering is usually defined using
four words: "impermanence, suffering, empty, and no-self." Empty here indicates
the non-being of "I" and "mine," a significance more or less synonymous with
the fourth definition of no-self. Further-more, the "three doors of emptiness,"
emptiness (the non-being of beings), formlessness (the absence of images or
symbols of beings), and desireless-ness (freedom from desire), were conceived at
an early date as a single path or door to liberation. Here in each case the basic
connotation is clearly negative. But in each of these examples the purpose was
not an ontological investigation, for as a Buddhist teaching, emptiness is a
mediative object for the practitioner to aid him in the abandonment of desire and
In the first Mahayana texts, the Prajnaparamita scriptures, prajiia indi-cates
wisdom, specifically the wisdom that gains insight into emptiness. In these
scriptures, meditation on the above-mentioned three doors to libera-tion is
heavily emphasized, with the first, meditation on emptiness, stand-ing for all
three. The phrase, "all beings are empty" (rupam eva sunyata) is the basic theme
of the Prajnaparamita scriptures, which go on to say that "emptiness just as it is is
being" (sunyataiva rupafJl). The notion of emp-tiness is not necessarily expressed
only in terms of emptiness. Various Prajnaparamita-siitras and texts such as the
Vimalaklrti Sutra, which are faithful to the Prajnaparamita teaching, express the
meaning of emptiness through contradictory, paradoxical, and seemingly absurd
expressions. In these texts we read, for example, that "a bodhisattva is not a

and that is why there is a bodhisattva." Here the first negation, "is not,"
corresponds to the emptiness of beings, while the second affirmation, "there is,"
indicates that emptiness just as it is is being. Since emptiness is always absolute
negation, emptiness itself must be negated. The two themes of transcending the
being of things through negation and of suggest-ing true reality in that
transcendence, correspond to negation and the nega-tion of negation,
In various scriptures, emptiness is examined from many aspects and
classed into several varieties. The most fundamental classification offers a
twofold division: the emptiness of individual subjectivity (of personhood,
pudgala) and of external beings (dharma). In addition, schemas of three, four,
six, seven, ten, eleven, and thirteen kinds of emptiness are found. Particularly
famous are the schemas of sixteen, eighteen, and twenty kinds of emptiness.
Such a variety comes about not from any difference in emp-tiness itself but from
the difference of the objects that are to be negated as empty: there is no
multiplicity in emptiness, because it is an absolute nega-tion without limitation.
As it appears in the scriptures, emptiness is generally expressed in
enigmatic, intuitive maxims, with hardly any logical analysis or systematic
organization. The nameless religious sages, who compiled the Prajnaparamita
and other Mahayana scriptures, acted boldly through their own experimental
grasp of the emptiness of self and beings, but they ap-parently had no interest in
rationalizing that experience.
But philosophical inquiry was a concern of the Mahayana scholar monks of
Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, who wrote in the second or third cen-tury, and Asanga
and Vasubandhu, who wrote in the fifth. Madhyamika thought developed
through the efforts of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, while Yogacara- Vijnaptimatra
thought was created by Asanga and Vasubandhu. All subsequent Indian
Mahayana philosophy developed in reference to these two schools of Buddhist

III Emptiness in the Madhyamika School
Nagarjuna formulated the philosophy of emptiness upon the basis of the
Prajnaparamita scriptures. In the Stanzas on the Middle (Miila-madhyamakakiirikii), his principal work, he bases his criticism of philo.sophical systems in the experience of emptiness, and develops together with it
his dialectic focussed on disclosing the inevitability of logical error (prasmiga).
He states that "inasmuch as beings dependently co-arise they are said to be
empty." and he explains co-arising as "neither passing away nor arising, neither
terminated nor eternal, neither one nor many, neither



coming or going." 3 Dependent co-arising is the basic truth of Buddhism; it is the
substance of Gautama Buddha's awakening. But it was Nagarjuna who first
related it directly to emptiness. Dependent co-arising, described as "if this exists,
then that exists; if this arises, then that arises," 4 is the becoming of beings in
dependence on others, the relativity of all beings to each other. For example, the
notion of left depends on the notion of right; they are relative one to the other.
Thus, they do not exist independently and are not realities with their own
essences (svabhiiva). The negation and ab-sence of such essence (ni}:lsvabhiiva) is
identical with emptiness. These ne-gations include not only the essence of
beings, but also all descriptions of dependent co-arising, such as arising and
passing away.
Philosophy in general begins from the premise that essence is self-evident.
Nagarjuna, however, explains essence (svabhiiva) as absolute be-ing, defining it

as "being neither created nor relative to others,'' that is, unchanging (no arising
of being from non-being) and not dependent on oth-ers. Hence, the definition of
essence by Candrakirti as "a nature inhering in itself" (svo bhiiva}:l). Yet such
essences are not particularly evident in our present world where everything
exists in relation to something else and where everything changes. For example,
a flame exists in dependence on a match and after being lit, goes out. All
meanings expressed in words are real only in this sense and to assume essences
in them is unreasonable, for they are not real entities. Thus, Nagarjuna defines
emptiness by stating that "all things are empty because they have no essences."
It is nevertheless true that in the deepest level of our consciousness we want
to postulate some real "existence"; and we find that fact reflected in terms such
as "dharmata and dharma-dhatu," which seem to signify es-sence. But, although
these terms indicate reality, they are equated at the same time with emptiness and
are said to be beyond our cognition. Thus, another definition of emptiness that is
widely accepted (especially in Chi-nese Buddhism) states that "all things are
empty because they exist beyond our cognition" (literally, "unobtainable
[anupalabdhi], hence empty"), this in contrast to Nagarjuna's "absence of essence
(ni}:lsvabhiiva), hence empty."

Although the Madhyamika masters negated words and ideas that they
thought might presuppose the existence of essences, they themselves em-ployed
ordinary words and logic and developed a dialectical reasoning but they asserted
it was solely for the purpose of awakening people to the truth of emptiness. It
was partly for this reason that Nagarjuna introduced the central teaching of the
"two truths," ultimate meaning (the highest truth, the content of the immediate
insight of wisdom) and worldly convention (truth in the world). The ultimate
truth or the truth of ultimate meaning, which always transcends conventional
truth, is beyond thought and ianEmptiness

guage. This is why the Buddha always remained in his "(noble) silence" when he
was questioned on metaphysical matters, and why, although he preached for
forty-five years, he could assert that during that time he had never preached a
single syllable.
Yet the truth of ultimate meaning cannot be expressed unless it relies on
conventional truth: it must be expressed in words. In this sense the preaching of
Sakyamuni and the dialectical reasoning of Nagarjuna are both conventional
truth. The distinguishing characteristics of the twofold truth are "transcendence"
and the fact that the conventional can never be the ultimate, while the notion of
emptiness is a natural outcome of the notion of dependently co-arising. This
notion of emptiness, which is not necessar-ily equated with the transcendent
ultimate, holds valid for both the ultimate and conventional truths: in the
conventional truth everything dependently co-arising is without essence and
empty, and in the ultimate truth every duality is negated and empty.
The dialectic of Nagarjuna is formulated in various ways, the most wellknown being the tetralemma: being, non-being, both being and non-being,
neither being nor non-being, a formulation meant to include all pos-sible cases.
Through analysis and critique of these four possibilities, all propositions are
revealed to be inherently contradictory insofar as they are formulated in a
context of essences. This deconstructive (priismigika) rea-soning points to the
emptiness of beings.
In the final analysis, the tetralemma can be reduced to a final dilemma of
being or non-being. The Middle Path is manifested in the overcoming of such a
dilemma. This is the sense in which emptiness, the absence of es-sence in
dependently co-arising beings, is synonymous with the Middle Path preached by
the Buddha. Nagarjuna and his followers, the advocates of
insight into
Nagarjuna's main work was titled Stanzas on the Middle [Path] r:p fm'j.
Deconstructive dialectics were applied to all relative relationships such
as cause and result, motion and change, substance and properties, I and mine,
whole and part. The notion of emptiness was applied not only to the Hlnayanic
realism of the Abhidharma teachings on such themes as the five aggregates
(skandha), but also to the highest principles of Buddhism, such as the tathiigata
and nirviitza. It not only offered a critique of the Abhi-dharma pluralistic realism;
it criticized metaphysics in general. It even lev-eled criticism against its own
teaching. Therefore, in the eyes of the Madhyamika thinkers, there was no
Madhyamika position. According to them a self-assertion of emptiness is "an
(erroneous) view (dr$!i Jf.) of emptiness" ; it cannot be "(true) insight WI.
into emptiness." According to Nagarjuna, the dialectic of emptiness is presented
simply to make beings



aware of emptiness, which is originally present prior to theorizations, through
the use of conventional language and reasoning. Since all reasoning involves
conventional truth, and there is no reasoning specific to Madhyamika or
consequent upon its notion of emptiness, emptiness has no standpoint of its own;
its standpoint is the standpoint of no standpoint, so to speak. Or rather, its
standpoint is the middle path. Since being and non-being are transcended in the
emptiness of the Middle Path, being as such is non-being. Likewise, since the
life-death cycle is not an essential life-death cycle and cessation (nirvaQa) is not
an essential cessation, the life-death cycle is itself cessation (smpsara is
The height to which Nagarjuna's philosophy developed the negative
reasoning of emptiness is unparalleled in the history of philosophy. His in-tent,
however, was not merely to construct a philosophical and metaphysical system,
but to offer a model for religious practice. This concern is evident from his
identification of emptiness with the Middle Path, the path of prac-titioners. The
Prajfiaparamita-siitra itself teaches the purity of giving as the tripartite emptiness
of giver, gift, and recipient of the gift. Emptiness, which in the Prajfiaparamita
scriptures is a matter of direct religious insight was systematically elaborated by
Nagarjuna as an object of meditation for the practitioner.

IV Emptiness in the Yogacara School
As stated above, true "insight" into emptiness differs from "(errone-ous)
views about emptiness," which are merely mistaken clinging to emp-tiness. Even
during the time of Nagarjuna, Buddhist thinkers were aware of the danger
inherent in emptiness, of people mistaking it for a nihilistic view (nasti-vada) that

would negate all human work and effort. In a siitra it was proclaimed that
"emptiness is severance and freedom from all views, but it is very difficult to
save those who engender views about emptiness (cf. n. 6) and cling to them."
Nagarjuna himself warned that "a mistaken view of emptiness will destroy an
unwise person, as surely as an ineptly handled poisonous snake."
It is generally believed that the Yogacara thinkers evolved their ideas in
response (or in reaction) to this danger inherent in the doctrine of emp-tiness.
Actually, they taught consciousness (vijnana) as the sole ultimate existence
(hence, they are also called "Vijfiana-vada") and departed from the "no-essence"
(nil;zsvabhava) theory of the Madhyamika by advocating the theory of the "three
natures" (tri-svabhava) in which the nature, as-pect, or characteristic of the world
was explained as the imagined, other-dependent, and consummated. If
Madhyamika is to be called the school of

emptiness or non-being. then Yogacara- Yijnanavada can be called the '"school
of being."
But Yogacara does not merely advocate the realism of consciousness
against the insight into emptiness. As their name would imply, the Yogacara
thinkers put central emphasis on the practice of yogic meditation, and, in that
context, they were entirely faithful to the teaching of emptiness. They
often attacked mistaken ideas about emptiness
'"wrongly-grasped emptiness") and put importance on a true understanding of
emptiness (sugrhita-sunyatii, "well-grasped emptiness") Early Yogacaras seem to
have been aware that they were both a complement to and a development of the
Nevertheless, the Yogacara interpretation of emptiness is not entirely
identical with that of Madhyamika. The restoration of an affirmative aspect that
has passed through negation or emptiness is present in Nagarjuna. But the
Yogacara, as is evident especially in Maitreya's Analysis of the Middle and

Extremes (Madhyiinta-vibhiiga) went a step further. Maitreya's text be-gins with a
consideration of the process of knowing (or everyday conscious-ness, vijniina) in

its dependently co-arising character, proceeds to deny the dichotomy of subject
and object that always appears within that process, and then expresses the
meaning of emptiness through this negation. Further it points out that in the
midst oTthat emptiness, the activity of conscious-ness nevertheless undeniably
exists. This whole process (from the affirma-tion of dependent co-arising to the
negation of dichotomy and on to the recovering or reaffirmation of consciousness
as reality) is called the "Mid-dle Path." This interpretation given in the Analysis
of the Middle and Ex-tremes is close to Nagarjuna's equation of dependent coarising first with emptiness and then with the Middle Path. But it goes further
and defines emptiness as "the non-being of subject and object and the being of
that non-being." 10 This follows logically from the above explanation. The assertion that emptiness is not merely "non-being" but also the "being of non-being"
became the salient feature of the Yogacara school.
The insistence that emptiness has both negative and affirmative dimen-sions
is related to the definition of emptiness quoted above from the Cufasunnata-sutta,
a text never quoted in Madhyamaka. Yet this ''being of non-being" was criticized
by later Madhyamika followers as a contradiction in terms and an erroneous
interpretation of emptiness; together with the ideas of consciousness-only and the
three-nature theory, it became an object of censure. But the Yogacara teachers
were fully aware of this contradic-tion, and insisted on the said interpretation of
emptiness. They equated emptiness with notions such as suchness (tathatii),
reality-limit (bhuta-ko{i), ultimate truth (paramiirtha), and dharma-realm
(dharma-dhiitu), all affir-mative expressions. In accordance with the usual
differentiation between



existence (dharma) and reality (dharmata)-"things (dharma) are empty, and this is
the real nature (dharmata) of things"-they very likely distin-guished between
what is empty (§unya) and emptiness (sunyata) itself, un-derstanding the former
as negative emptiness and the latter affirmatively as an absolute. This distinction
does not seem to be clearly stated in the Prajfiiipiiramita literature or in
The notion of emptiness remained central in Indian Buddhism to its last
days, but from about the seventh century it developed in the direction of
Tantrism. After Buddhism was introduced into Tibet, the notion also played a
central role in Tibetan Buddhism.

V China and Japan
In China, Indian Madhyamika was represented by the San-tun (Three
Treatise) school, while Yogiicara was in the main represented by the Fa-hsiang
(Dharma-characteristics) school. Elucidation of the philosophy of emptiness was
carried on chiefly by the San-lun school. But even in the Fa-hsiang school,
which is more realistic than the Yogacara, its counterpart in India, the themes of
true or absolute emptiness (chen-k'ung ~ ~) and wondrous being (miao-yu 9!1>

fi) appear.
Since Prajfiaparamita scriptures were translated into Chinese as early as the
second or third century, many Chinese literati and monk-scholars were familiar
with the notion of emptiness. But they tended to interpret this foreign concept in
terms of "nothingness" (wu ~ ), a notion that was fa-miliar to them from the
native Taoist thought of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. No less than six different
interpretations of emptiness are said to have ap-peared in the early period of
Chinese Buddhism. But all of them repre-sented compromises with Taoist
thought and did not reflect the true significance of the original Buddhist concept.
The introduction of authentic Indian Buddhism into China began with
Kumiirajlva (ca. 350-409) in the early fifth century. Kumarajlva came to China
from the city of Kucha in Central Asia, having studied Madhyamika both in his
native city and in India. After arriving in Ch'ang-an, he trans-lated many
scriptures and commentaries, including the Prajfiaparamita-siitras (four different
versions) and the "three treatises" of the San-lun school: Nagarjuna's Stanzas on
the Middle (Mula-madhyamaka-karikii) and Treatise in Twelve Gates (*Dvadasadvara), and Aryadeva's Treatise in a Hundred Stanzas (*Sataka), as well as the
Commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom (*Mahd-prajnaparamita-upade§a). He had
many learned disciples, whose teachings prospered and later formed the basis of the
San-lun school.

Sanron (the Japanese pronunciation of San-lun) doctrine became the standard thought for Japanese students studying Buddhism. together with the notion of dependent co-arising.Chih-i ~ l'iJl (538-597) based the doctrines of his T'ien-t'ai upon Nagarjuna's Stanzas on the Middle (XXIV. A waka poem by the Dharma master Jitsu-i ~ fj} . in-cluding those of the Pure Land school and the idea that Buddhahood is found in all sentient beings. In the San-tun school. The Ch'an principle of "not relying upon words" can be seen as a Chinese development of emptiness. equating dependent coarising (called "provisional. shih $). was there-fore held in special veneration from the very beginning of Japanese Bu-ddhism. Chih-i's contemporary Chi-ts'ang aMi (549-623)." chia f~1. the "insight into true emptiness" seems also to play a central doctrinal role in the key Hua-yen notion of the "Dharma-realm of Ultimate Truth" (li-fa-chieh fJil.I8). again exceeding any mode of being found in the Hlnayana. attempted to consolidate all the teachings on emptiness that had appeared since Kumarajlva. lifJil. the early Prajfiaparamita scriptures were revered. Emptiness. "True emptiness. It underlies the theme of the "Dharma-realm of the Interpenetration of the Ultimate and the Phenomenal" (the unity of basic principle. the negation (che-ch' ien jJft ~) of emptiness is called "the ref-utation of falsehood" (p' o-hsieh ~ :!f~ ). reads: "We speak about mind. awaken-ing itself is said to be empty. . ~ !# ). In almost all the doctrines of the various Chinese Buddhist sects. when enlightenment comes. is at the same time equalled with "wondrous being" on a higher level. that is. included in Further Collection of Waka Old and New (Shoku kokin wakashu). Ch'an ifr~. The notion of emptiness. who is regarded as the reviver of the San-lun school. with phenomena. what is one enlightened to?" Not only is the mind declared to be nonexistent. but there is no mind. there is a philosophical interplay between what is empty and what is not empty." which is said to surpass the Hlnayanic understanding of emptiness. The same "insight" also seems to establish the notion of "identity" or "mutual interpenetration. In the Hua-yen school. regarded as the highest point in Chinese doc-trinal development.. and the theme of the "Dharma-realm of the Interpenetration between Phenomenon and Phe-nomenon" (the unified non-dual realm representing original truth). The first Buddhism introduced into Japan was that of the Chinese San-tun school. and the Mid-dle Path. In what was culturally the most Chinese school. by Chih-i). the criticism of other teachings. This refutation of falsehood is in itself the "manifestation of truth" (hsien-cheng ~Ji iE) or the elucidation of the true teaching." which is at the core of the Hua-yen doctrine.

In painting. the abbreviated haiku form appeared. The perception of reality in the vacant spaces between the black lines of a Zen painting also has its roots in the original notion of emptiness. and the aesthetic ideals of wabi and sabi. and can be seen reflected in the native Japanese love of simplicity. It seems rather to have permeated the Japanese sensibility itself as a feeling of transience. In literature. .218 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA But the notion of emptiness does not seem to have undergone much philosophical or doctrinal development in Japan. this same tendency to spare-ness is seen in the preference for simple Indiaink drawings. the taste for elegant simplicity.

Many religious geniuses. or at least an oversimplification of the tenets of these two schools. who cherished or experienced with devotion the Mahayana ideas. as the founder of the Mahayana philosophy. The Mahayana developed in these siitras was further adorned with Nagarjuna's philosophy of siinyata. the one-vehicle and the idea of eternal Buddha-hood in the Saddharma-pw:u.Jarika. Such an assumption is apparently a mis-understanding. are assumed to be mutually antagonistic to each other in that the former advocates the teaching of non-being or sunyatii. it cannot be negated that he gave a firm foundation for the establishment of the Mahayana.D. the bodhisattva career in the Dasabhumika. He was. There is also the highly dramatic and literary Vimalakirtinirdesa. by synthe-sizing those Mahayana texts along with the iigamas and the nikiiyas. a great genius who. During the course of several centuries. Although it is not certain whether Nagarjuna was acquainted with all of these siitras. In this way. including those mentioned above. I believe. the fundamental bodhisattva vows and praxis in the Avata1J1saka. developed and nourished various ideas that finally constituted many doctrines peculiar to the Mahayana. are established on the foundation of the thought of Junyatii. both representing the apex of Mahayana philosophy. produced many texts and expounded in them various aspects of the Mahayana. represented by the Fa-hsiangtsung. the teaching of being or existence. Mahayana Buddhism around the first to fifth century A. the Madhyamika school. and the Yijfianavada. formu-lated a Mahayana philosophy centering around siinyata. the Mahayana siitras. however. these two schools. in which both the idea of siinyata and the bodhisattva path are explicated. the YogacaraYijfianavada does not take a position opposed to the siinyavada. while the latter. and topics such as the pro-found philosophy of siinyata in the Prajfiaparamita-siitra. without which the . flourished and expanded its utmost brilliancy. its different themes.Chapter 16 Yogacara-A Reappraisal In the Sino-Japanese Buddhism of old. represented by San-lun-tsung. and the highest bliss of the Pure Land in the Sukhiivativyuha.

his works did not cover all of the de-tails involved in Mahayana thought. who followed about one or two centuries later. His philosophy had to be complemented by Asariga. the indispensable constituents of liberation and enlightenment. representing two opposite directions. prajfia and karul)a. the returning back to this world. so long as his fellow beings have not yet been saved. Liberation and enlightenment are attained by means of prajfia owing to its power to eliminate avidyd (igno-rance). Owing to his deep compassion. Asa~'lga and Vasubandhu." respec-tively. while the teachings taught by the Buddha in order to save sentient beings is in the descending line. The Mahayana that was started by Nagarjuna became fully accomplished by the Yogacara-Vijfianavada and this can be fully understood if we look into such terms as "aprati~~hita-nirval)a" and "nirvikalpa-jfiana" used in Yogacara texts. In the texts. therefore he "comes down" into the world of his fellow beings." Thus. a bodhisattva refrains from entering into nirval)a or from ob-taining liberation. and other Yogacaras who deepened it in various aspects and details. Vasubandhu." The practices and learnings that support and nourish prajfia belong to this category also. established this principle as a concrete praxis." For the sake of convenience. a bodhisattva devotes himself to the work of benefiting others. But before doing that. so to speak. they are com-pared to two wheels of a cart or the two wings of a bird. the two-directional movements of ascent and descent are represented most properly by the terms "prajfia" (wisdom) and "karul)a" (compassion). and the descent means the reverse. In the Mahayana Buddhist literature. Rejecting even the exquisite pleasures of nirval)a. is an activity moving towards the "descent. It is my contention that we can find in Buddhism two opposite direc-tional tendencies or movements or activities: one is "going upward" or "going thither. To benefit others is a bodhisattva's primal concern." and the other is "coming down" or "coming hither. although he established the philosophy of 'sunyata' for the first time in history as the fundamental principle of Mahayana. I call these two "ascent" and "descent. compas-sion. it seems that. Inheriting the entire philosophy of sunyata. Yogacara-A Reappraisal . This activity of karul)a. stand side by side to each other as the two cardinal virtues. therefore prajfia belongs to the level of "ascent. The ascent refers to transcending this world and going yonder. However. I must clarify my view on two opposite directional ten-dencies of Buddhism. He established the principle but whether he expounded clearly the application of that principle is another thing. For exam-ple.220 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA Mahayana could not have been founded. they accomplished the other phase of Mahayana about which Nagarjuna did not seem to expound in detail. our aspiration to obtain liberation (vimukti) or enlightenment (bodhi) is in the ascending line.

The two-direction movement is not confined to the discussion on prajna and karuQa alone. In fact. The Yogacaras were able to accomplish this by their methods of investigating what we. In a bodhisattva's career. That is. Thus. compared to the Madhyamikas. for the most part. the Yogacaras were more in the direction of descent. svabhiiva (self-nature). Propositions of the Madhyamikas. and so forth. They represent the goal of prajna. siinyata. such a summit is "siinyata" or "dharmadhatu. one may assume the system of the five margas as of ." because these are reached by the cultivation of prajna." that included the path of accumulation (sambhiira-miirga) at the beginning and the path of perfection (ni$! hii-miirga) or the Buddha-stage (buddha-bhumi) at the end. gamana (movement). the summit. then they can be assumed to be the move-ment of ascent and descent. By dealing with rather abstract notions such as pratyaya (causes). which was not sufficiently clarified by the Madhyamikas. today. and by establishing a new world-view on the basis of their threenature theory (trisvabhiiva). reached through the ascent movement and they belong to the supra-mundane world. It was the Yogacaras that can be credited for having systematized a path of Buddhist practice. known as the "five margas. In contrast to this. the eighth cognition. naturally. and so on. If I am allowed to generalize the tendencies of the Madhyamikas and the Yogacaras. begins from this point. The great compassion of the Buddhas. by establishing a systematic presentation of mind by their elaborate divisions of six cognitions (pravrtti-vijfliina). a problem that was of great concern to any practitioner." Of course. These sys-tems and analysis show that the Yogacaras tended towards the direction of "descent. iidana-vijfliina or iilaya-vijfliina. manas. term the "subconscious" in the ordinary human mind.The utmost end of ascent may be called a "summit" and the descent. flows out from the summit of siinyata and is directed towards the mundane world. and set up a path system. a theory developed by applying the Madhyamika siinyata to their Weltan-schauung. mahiikarw:zii. they elucidate a way of realizing ultimate reality. and so forth or metaphys-ical concepts such as iitman (soul). the seventh. respectively. the ten bhumis. the six piiramitiis. mentioned above-and are propositions supporting the direction of ascent. the summit. the Yogacara focused on the problem of "mind" in terms of vijnana (cognition). they analyzed and rearranged the practice of the nirvedha-bhiigfva. their name Yogacara derives from their utmost atten-tion directed deeply towards yoga-praxis as a means of realizing enlighten-ment. aim at the real-ization of siinyata-the summit. It is a flowing down from dharmadhatu as a movement of descent. To this degree. simultaneously combines and divides as the locus for the ascent of prajna and the descent of karuQa.

because it aims at the final Buddhahood. That is.nsara. In the Yogacara. the commentary states: Since he possesses compassion (karu(likatval. Yogacara-A Reappraisal .1a (or with vimukti liberation). and nirupadhise$a. The two doctrines are the doctrine of "aprati~~hita-nirval)a" and "nirvikalpa-jfiana" together with "tat-pr~~ha-labdha-jfiana. Of the various doctrines promulgated by the Yogacaras. which means "nirval)a that is not dwelled in" or simply "not dwelling in nirval)a. the prakrti-visuddha-nirvii(IQ and aprati$!hita-nirvii(la.222 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA an ascending character. aprati~~hita appears also in the Prajfiaparamita. "aprati~~hita SaJTisara-nirval)a" occurs in the commentary to the Mahii.1a" or "a nirva1." appears in. a bodhisattva does not dwell in nirval)a but comes out of it and enters into the life of saf!1Sara. Asailga's Mahiiyiina-saf[lgraha as the subject matter of its ninth chapter. aprati~~hita-nirva1. In other words. he does not dwell in nin•a(w. however. two doctrines that specifi-cally suggest the direction of descent will be mentioned. he does not dwell in sw. aprati~~hita-nirval)a. sopadhise$a. Asailga specifies nirval)a as aprati~~hita-nirval)a and this means that a bodhisattva does not enter into final nirva1. Again.1a means "not clinging to nirva1. therefore. it is the perspective of descent found in the Yogacara that complements the Madhyamika. and it is regarded as the highest virtue.1a not clung to. Nirval)a is the ultimate goal to which everyone should aspire. But. The ninth chapter of the Mahiiyiina-saf[lgraha is entitled. a bodhisattva does not be-come agitated by sa1!7sara or does not feel weary of sm. therefore." two doctrines that are hardly seen in the Madhyamaka system. here. he is not bound by the faults of sal!lsara. In con-trast. it seems to mean not only "not dwelling" but also "not clinging to. "phala-prahal)a.1a before all beings have been liberated from saf!1sara." "Elimination (prahii(la) [of all defilements (klda)] as the fruit (phala) [of Buddhahood that results from the three learnings]. and this means a bodhisattva neither dwells in nor clings to ei-ther saf!1sara or nirval)a." From this perspective.nsara. the Yogacaras added two others. since he possesses the highest wisdom. to the usual Hlnayanic nirvii(las. Prakrti-visuddha-nirval)a refers to the idea that ''beings are in nirval)a originally pure'' and this form is seen expounded in various Mahayana Siitras. common to both Hlnayana and Mahayana. nirval)a is divided into four. among other Yogacara texts. The word. In regard to this expression. But the descending feature involved in it will be clarified later in this paper.32)." Another expression.viina-sutriilaf[lkiira (XVII." The elimi-nation of defilements is generally equated with nirva1. Although the two-direction movements of ascent and descent can be found throughout the many Yogacara treatises. and there.

in the world of existence. further at this time. is obtained from and arises from non-discriminative knowledge. prayogika and tat-pr~~halabdha." that is. subsequent knowledge. aprati~~hita-nirval)a. is discriminative and belongs to this mundane world. pafifia. volitionally. Asanga divides this non-discriminative wisdom further into three kinds: l. But." In any event.I shall refrain from explaining the term. because it is a knowledge that aims for and is destined to obtain nondiscriminative knowledge. there is a difference between them. too. . knowledge acquired subsequent to that. the compound word consisting of both aprati~~hita and nirval)a is. It is also re-ferred to as "suddha-laukika-jfiana. knowledge held on the stage of preparatory practice. an innovation by the Yogacaras around the time of Asanga or by Asanga himself in his Mahiiyiina-saf(lgraha. The latter knowledge. therefore. although the term aprati~~hita is found in the Prajfia-paramitas as mentioned above. (3). It is noteworthy that. samiidhi. it is included in the category of non-discriminative wisdom. because it is a pure form of knowledge that flows out of non-discriminative knowledge. it is itself discriminatory and not non-discriminative. paiiiiii). 3. The second Yogacara doctrine mentioned above was the doctrine of 'tatpr~~halabdha-jfiana' that appears in the eighth chapter of the Mahiiyiina-saf(lgraha. Following the older pattern of the three learnings (sila. 2. that is. that is. Although both knowledges. and tat-pmhalabdha-jiiiina." as nirvikalpajiiiina (non-discriminative wisdom). the knowledge acquired subsequently. therefore. because I have already discussed it at length elsewhere together with the notion of 'saTjlcintya-bhavopapatti' which means "to take birth will-ingly. in all probability. that is. which he refers to as "adhiprajfia. is in the direction of "descent" as it results from the funda-mental wisdom. prayogika-jfiana belongs to the preparatory stage of practice and to the mundane world. Asanga explains the third one. it. It is included in the category of non-discriminative wisdom. Of these. non-discriminative wisdom or knowledge that is often called "fundamental wisdom" in the Sino-Japanese Bud-dhist traditions. are discriminative. preparatory knowledge is in the direction of "ascent" as it aims towards the fundamental wisdom. Knowledge (1). these ideas show the direction of descent that embodies the sublime thought of return-ing to this world of existence for the purpose of benefiting others. purified mundane knowledge. priiyogika-jiiiina. nirvikalpa-jiiiina. the fundamental wisdom.

the subsequent knowledge. The non-discriminative wisdom is realized on the path of intuitive in-sight (darsana-marga) after going through arduous practice on the prepara-tory stages (prayoga-miirga). therefore. second to tenth bhumi) as the descent. non-discriminative wisdom results from the ascent of the preparatory knowledge and functions as the cause for the descent of the subsequent knowledge. arises in the next moment. the discrimination between being and non-being.224 MADHYAMIKA AND YOGACARA In contrast to these two. The term. (3). Thus. All of the Buddha's preaching is constituted of this knowledge. but. it is non-dual and non-discriminative. the truly non-discriminative knowledge is nirvikalpa-jfliina. That is." This system of the three knowledges exhibits the pattern of "ascent" and "descent" with the "summit" in between. It is a knowledge in which every form of the subject I object duality. "[this wisdom] is no-knowledge and is not noknowledge at the same time" or as the Vimalaklrtinirdesa puts it. the path of cultivation and the subsequent knowledge share the same direction of descent from the summit. not jfliina (wisdom). its ex-planation ends up in paradoxical language such as the explanation. But it is exactly this knowledge that the Enlightened One must employ as the "descent" from the dharmadhiitu and that is made to work in this world for the purpose of benefiting others.£?iicdra-A Reappraisal . "non-discriminative knowledge" poses a paradox. It rep-resents the ultimate enlightenment in the Yogiiciira school. However. which is a mundane discriminative knowledge. that is as an activity in the di-rection of "descent. consequently. What is of utmost importance here is the fact that the subsequent knowledge. Therefore. is established as a result of the non-discriminative wisdom. it combines both knowledges in itself as the summit to which one ascends and from which one descends. as it is instantaneous and momentary. be-cause once the ultimate enlightenment-non-discriminative wisdom-has been realized there would be no need for it." it differs from the ordinary human knowledge. Consequently. The same pattern is visible in the system of the five paths. the knowledge that func-tions on the path of cultivation must be the knowledge that flows out sub-sequently from the fundamental wisdom. which Yo. and the bhiivanii-miirga (path of cultivation. have been abolished. is abolished. the dar5ana-miirga (the path of insight) as the summit (the dharmadhiitu being realized on the first bhumi. As an activity of compassion. "it sees [tathiigata] without seeing. for knowledge originally implies a discrimination of some kind. and so on. especially in the relationship between the prayoga-marga (the preparatory stage) as the ascent. as it is self-contradictory. the Yogiiciiras use this term to express the highest wisdom (prajflii) in which vijfliina (cognition). The knowledge that results from nondiscriminative wisdom may seem superfluous and unnecessary.

languages. that the term "nirvikalpa-jfiana. It also differs from the nirval)ic silence that is essentially non-discriminative wisdom. The final goal is reached at the end of the path of cultivation through the subsequent knowledge. was a term innovated by the Yogacaras around the time of Asanga. it should now be clear from the above discussion that the path of cultivation. we encoun-ter the negation of discrimination by terms such as "akalpa." "nirvikalpa. the Yogacaras can be said to have complemented the Madhyamika's general tenets. in Buddhism. As I state before. In this sense. However. the highest stage." "avikalpa. human languages. subsequent knowl-edge. which precedes the path of cultivation. concepts. the compound in which the term "nirvikalpa" is combined directly with the term "jfiana" is generally scarcely seen except in the Yogacara texts. Ascent is descent. the true Buddhahood is accomplished. In any case. because prajfia and karul)a are conjoined into the one taste of enlightenment. It is true that the system of the five margas ends with ni$Jha-miirga. the Bu-ddha stage. again. Ordinary human thinking. concepts. was another great achievement accomplished by the Yogacaras. or by the Madhyamika siinyata. subsequent knowledge. even on the path of cultivation. this process of the five margas might be regarded as operating in the direction of ascent. However. In this final goal. from the viewpoint of ultimate reality. 1 By adding the discursive and belongs to the preparatory stages. is in the descending direction. . where the subsequent knowledge functions. and descent is ascent. are negated. coming after the path of insight. consequently. the formulation of the system of the three (non-discriminative) knowledges by adding the third state. but it must be different from the mere realization of siinyata or dharma-dhatu acquired on the path of insight. could be revived in their own rights and could become the con-stituents of the activities of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. logic." and so on found throughout Buddhist literature. that were once negated by nondiscriminative knowledge. to descend means to ascend to the final goal. This seems to indicate. In accord with this fact of the Buddha bhiimi. too." notwithstanding the apparent contradiction involved. and thereby brought the Mahayana thought to its full scope and completion. there is no difference between the ascent and the descent. This means that by descending to this world with karul)a and by perfecting the benefits for others (pariirtha).


Fujitani trans. I. 3. Presented in Honour of Professor Susumu Yamaguchi on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday. 1978). pp. vol. S. 16. Edited and revised by L. Edited and revised by L. pp. Kanzaki and M. "The Buddhist World. Nagao and J. new series.Appendix Sources of Essays For the sources of the essays. 66-82. 550-61. pp. Katsura for inclusion in Chiikan to Yuishiki. 37. (Kyoto: Hozokan. 257-262. 1954). S. "An Interpretation of the term "Saqwrti" (Convention) in Buddhism. SR Supplements: 10 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. G. "Buddhist Subjectivity. 1968. 5. Kawamura. "The Bodhisattva Returns to this World" in The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism." First appeared (in English) in Silver Jubilee Volume of the Zinbun-KagakuKenkyusyo (Kyoto: Kyoto University. Hattori. by the Japanese Association for Religious Studies (To-kyo: Maruzen. This article resulted as an enlargement and revision of the Jap-anese work "Amareru mono" (given the English subtitle. 6. July 1952. ed. 16 no. vol. M. Nozawa eds. vol. S. 430. vol. Y. Robinson. by D. 1955. by M. 1 no. ed. Furthermore. in Reli-gious Studies in Japan. A translation of the Japanese original which appeared in Tetsugaku-kenkyu (Journal of Philosophical Studies). ed. 1955). 1. pp. "The Term 'avisi~ta' in Yogiiciira Philosophy"). Spring 1983. A translation of the Japanese original which appeared in Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies. Y. . Kiyota (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. the following people are to be credited for the English translations: I. 137-151. 8. Translated into Japanese by S. no. the following journals or books are to be acknowledged. no. pp. L. In Memory of Richard H. Translated into Japanese by S. pp. 1959). "The Silence of the Buddha and its Madhyamic Interpretation" in Studies in Indology and Buddhology. 4." The Eastern Buddhist. Kawamura. 1981). Kawamura. Katsura for inclusion in Chukan to Yuishiki. 2. "What Remains in Siinyatii" in Mahayana Buddhist Meditation." trans. Fujitani trans. 2 March. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies. 497-501. 61-79.View as Elucidated in the Three-Nature Theory and Its Simile.

Louvain-la-neuve: lnstitut Orientaliste. .228 SOURCES OF ESSAYS pp. trans." Ms. no. I. U. In The Eastern Buddhist.12. held in Kyoto. First appeared in Toho Gakuho (Kyoto). 6. 1978)." L. Georgia (November 21-25. Given as a Presidential Address for the Sixth Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (lABS) held in Tokyo. Sep-tember. no. 14 . 7.7). 1974). 25-53. First appeared in M. I. lndianisme et Bouddhisme. Sai-gusa ed. First appeared in Japanese in Buritanika Kokusai Dai Hyakka-jiten (Britannica International Encyclopedia) vol. 176-183. 29-43. Kawamura. no. Michele Martin and L. nos. Yogacara-A Reappraisal. 1983. vol. Melanges offerts a Mgr Etienne Lamotte." First appeared in Publications de I'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain. 9. 405 (vol. pp. Katsura for inclusion in Chukan to Yuishiki. pp. vol. Ascent and Descent: Two-Directional Activity in Buddhist Thought. 10. vol. vol. "Emptiness. 6. 3). "Tenkan no Ronri. S. Published in The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies. pp. "Ascent and Descent: Two-Directional Activity in Buddhist Thought" given as the Presidential Address for the Sixth Conference of lABS.18 and MY. 147-155. "The Logic of Convertibility. 1973. 1983. in November 1982. "From Madhyamika to Yogacara. Kawamura. S. S. 13. Ms. trans. A transla-tion of the Japanese original which appeared in Tetsugaku-kenkyu (Journal of Philo-sophical Studies). "The Tranquil Flow of Mind: An Interpretation of Upek~a. it was written for the "general intellectuals" of Japan. 521 (vol. Koza Bukky6 Shis6. Kawamura. Hirano trans. no. Revised by L. no. "On the Theory of Buddha-Body (Buddha-kaya). 45. 35. Translation into English was assisted by Ms. II. An Analysis of MMK. XXIY. 1984. 1-18. "Usage and Meaning of PariQamana. 1971. March. Nagao. trans. 8. 15." L." L.. Canada. Kawamura. specifically from the perspective of applying the western or modern philosophical ideas of ontology to Buddhism. II. Kawamura." L. 5. 3-4. 1. 1952. by K. Translated into Japanese by S. Revised by Norman Waddell and G. This paper was meant neither for general readers nor for academic specialists. Presented at the First Conference of the International Association of Shin Buddhist Studies. I (Tokyo: Risosha." First appeared in Sino-Indian Studies. vol. 1941. May 1973. no." Reprinted in Chukan to Yuishiki (Tokyo: lwanami Shoten. pp. 4.. 12. ed. This paper was first read at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion held in Atlanta. 1986) and is based upon the paper. 7. 23. S. 2. ''Connotations of the Word Asraya (Basis) in the Mahayana-sutralaipkara. S. 237-265. 1958 (Lie-benthal Festschrift). "Buddhist Ontology. S. new series. S. vol. Michele Martin and L. pp. Japanese original first appeared in Tetsugaku Kenkyu (Journal of Philosophical Studies). 55-94. I. Included in the author's Chukan to Yuishiki. pp. M. Kawamura's advice and help in rendering this paper into English is gratefully acknowledged. Kawamura trans. trans." John Keenan. 16. Roy. pp." This paper first appeared in The Journal of the International Associa-tion of Buddhist Studies. 1979. no. English translation delivered as a lecture at the University of Calgary. 245-258. under the title.. Japan. 1980.

R. vol. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 194. pp. Stephen Anaker. Editor's note: This note has been added anew. Hajime Nakamura. Trisvabhiiva. L. 15 p. L. 121-130. Reprinted in Yamaguchi Susumu Bukkyogaku Bun-shu (Tokyo: Shunjusha. Skt. pp. Susumu Yamaguchi: "'Trisvabhavanirdesa of Vasubandhu. Tetsugaku-teki Shisaku no lndo-teki Tenkai (Development of Philosophical Thinking in India) (Tokyo: 1949). Religion of Asia Series. The second article. 1972). pp. text and Japanese translation with annotation. M. 2c vol. Kochumuttom.. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1982). see pp." Melanges chinois et bouddhiques. "'The Bodhisattva Returns to This World" in this book. 247-259. See the chapter. 5. 186-207.Notes Chapter 1: Buddhist Subjectivity I. 1932-33. 3. 1931. 1984). For a study of the text. 2." Journal of Religious Studies. where the imagined nature and the other-dependent nature are respectively called . Editor's note: The last two books mentioned here were not available to the author when he wrote this paper. Thomas A. see pp. Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin: "'Le petit traite de Vasubandhu-Nagarjuna sur les trois natures. That the subjective expression "appearer" corresponds to the other-dependent nature is clear also from verse twenty three of the Trisvabhiiva-nirdesa. 90-126 and for a translation into English. Nagao's Japanese translation in Seshin Ronshu (Works of Va-subandhu) in series Daij6 Butten [Mahayana Scriptures] (Tokyo: Chii6 Koran Sha 1976). kk. 4. 2-3: yat khyati paratantro 'asau yatha khyati sa kalpitai) I pratyayiidhina-vrttitvat kalpana-matra-bhavatai) I I 2 I I tasya khyatur yathakhyanaiTJ yasada 'vidyamanata I jiieyai) sa pariniwannai) svabhavo 'nanyathatvatai) I I 3 I I See also G. no. Shastri eds. 147-161. 4. 8. Editor's note: The ideas of "'ascent" and "'descent" are ideas that appear in the author's (Professor Nagao's) more recent writings. Seven Works of Vasubandhu-The Buddhist Psychological Doctor. Lancaster and J. New Series no. 287-297.

pp. This usage is aiso adopted in Sthiramati's Commentary (Peking edition Mdo-'grel. chap. 41. Sthira-mati. XLVII. Wogihara. The word nirvrti. 9. N. Tsi. II. Wogihara. 1116. p. Bibilotheca Buddhica. Louis de la Vallee Poussin. no. maintains that sa!J1. p. . lines 10-12. 7. Mii/amadhyamaka-karikas (St. Madhvamakiivatiira par Candrakirti (St-Petersbourg: 1912. Reprint Tokyo. Wogihara) (Tokyo: 1938). IV). pp. p. The word smnvrti in the Mahiiyiina-siitralarpkiira.. 36a-b. Bibliotheca Buddhica IX). Therefore. F. 2. G. fol. Reproduced in Chiikan to Yuishiki. and smnvrti is here equated with sarpsiira and used in its stead. S. Theodere Stcherbatsky. Sir M. p. F. sa!J1Vvr. 14. (Tokyo: lwanami Shoten. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvci!Ja (Leningrad: 1927). lines 3-5. ed. but this apparently is claimed as a precedent. (See also note 12). Edgerton. 49. 983). 1978).. Madhyiintavibhiiga-{ikii (hereafter. pp.. Wogihara Unrai Bunshii (Collected Works of Dr. 541. !07 and 102. Sthiramati.230 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 1-2 "transacting itself" (vyavahdra-citman) and "transactor" (vyavahartr-atmaka). ed. p. 16). S.. M. U. 436 4. 12. 19471948. Bendall. Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford: 1899). Piili-English Dictionary (London: 1875). Monier-Williams. XVI. Chapter 2: An Interpretation of the Term "SaQJvfti" I. had alreacty been equated with nirvii!Ja not only in Buddhist writings but also in pure Sanskrit. and the consummated nature is explained as the "cutting off of transacting from trans-actor'' (vyavahcira-samuccheda). lines 7-8: sa!J1vrti = ncimadheva. 5. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (New Haven: 1953). 353.Vman is the proper and correct root for "convention. 15. 3. sa!J1keta. ed. "The Fundamental Standpoint of the Miidhyamika Philoso-phy" (in Japanese). cit. Other examples of variations in spelling are: satva for sattva. Bodhicarycivatcira of Siintideva (Calcutta: 1901) (Bibliotheca Indica.-Petersbourg: 1913. Childers. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary. Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin. is trans-lated into Tibetan by 'khor-ba ( = sarpsiira) and not by the usual kun-rdzob. nos. U. p. 1966). R. 366-371.. 492. the equation of nirvrti and nirvci!Ja here is not unusual. which also appears in this verse. 361. 6. Bibliotheca Buddhica. 784. Bodhisattvabhiimi (Tokyo: 1930). op. ed. 8. vol. 257. upiiyya for upciya. Tetsugaku Kenkyii (Journal of Philosophical Studies. 232. prajiiapti. Yamaguchi. vol 109. ed . p. 1934. p. 13. U. 10. C. Edgerton. 1). Nagao." and that the meaning "covering (or concealing)" (to be discussed later) is derived from another root. Kyoto. Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin. 134. Nagoya: Libraire Hajinkaku. Reprint.-Petersbourg: 1897-1902. C. Siksiisamuccaya (St.

m . Furthermore. 28. L'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu (Paris: 1934). especially in his view of tathya-sal?lvrti. OfUJj~ ~~ ~ ~c p. p. using accurate syllogism (larka). Yamaguchi. 24. It is this translation that Tz'u-en claims as his authority. 23. Srhiramati. Yamaguchi. His original work. The meaning here is this: Even when a vikalpa functions with the utmost logical precision. Taish6. 19. . On this point." there is doubt as to why sal?lvrri has the right to be said to "mani-fest" the truth. p. Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin. who was the foremost disciple of Hsiian-tsang and thus probably well-versed in the Sanskrit language. especially in the Miidhyamika tradition. This curious method of translating a Sanskrit word using two or more characters and then analyzing them separately as if it were a compound in the orig-inal is not unusual in Chinese Buddhist scholarship. Mt~m. In the system of the latter. p. )rt~~iif f[_i¥~{§{~~ ed. p. if sal?l~-rti can approach the Absolute of paramiirtha by virtue of being "manifested. JJX. 27. J. the VijJ!aptimiitratd-siddhi. 22. Dharmapiila (Hu-fa ~~ i! 530-61) was the aciirya at Niilanda in the mid-dle of the sixth century and is revered by the Hoss6 (Fa-hsiang) Sect as its highest authority. 124. Kyokuga Saeki ( fir:{E!. lines 24-25. 22. ~ i~ ffl. but it is claimed that Hsiian-tsang translated it into Chinese. 125. 25. 26. that is. A Record of the Buddhist Religion by 1-tsing (Oxford: 1896). p. but why Tz'u-en. vol. 1¥J ifiJ ~ ~$ pg i! fW. an expression found often. may be rather closer to the Vijniina-viidins. who claims sal?lvrri strictly as "covering" or "hindrance. on the other hand. 228b. p. 287c. **i!n~tt~. the "true convention.h!:!~ ). Bhiivaviveka. -t~. 21. XLV. udbhiivanii-sal?lvrrryii parini~panna/:z sal?lvrtti-satyam.on others = other-dep perfect 18. [(I) and (3) are] established from the viewpoint of variable situations.. p. Sal?lvrrri-satm is here almost equal to the Absolute. literally. 334. Sthira-mari. [T9 ~. This reminds us of the fact that paramiirtha is equated with tii~!Jil?lbhiiva (being silent). Takakusu." 20. ~ ffl . it is still "false" and "untrue" insofar as it remains a vika/pa and is contrasted with paramiirtha {editor's note]. 243c. =aw~. lOb. 168. 232 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 2-3 . line 1: avasara-smJlgraha-vyavasthiinam. vol. there appears to be a controversy even within the circle of Miidhyamika philosophy between Bhiivaviveka as Sviitantrika and Candraklrti as Priisa~1gika. vol. should have adopted such a method is quite puzzling. LIV. and so on. Rev. is not extant." then there is likely to take place a misleading confusion of the Twofold Truth. This means that paramiirtha is atarkagocara beyond logical reason-ing) or beyond vikalpa.

R. 28). 174. The expression is found in Wogihara. p. A Study on the Ratnagotravibhiiga (Uttaratantra). by Paramartha in his translation of Vasubandhu's com-mentary on the Mahiiyiinasaf!lgraha." In this case. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionarv. that is. 90. "Being covered" is nothing other than the "Truth. 10: "Without recourse to verbal designations (of saf!!vrti). line 6 and in P. 1966). pp." that is. 84. Tsong-kha-pa quotes this passage in his !. that is. 8. and paramiirtha. See note 32 below. ed. 108 (ad VI. Asanga. 204. vol. (Chukan to Yuishiki. 154. p. The term saf!!vrti-miitra (kun-rdzob-tsam) appears in Candrakirti's Madhyamakiivatiira. 34 ff. 48. II (New Haven: Yale University Press. paramiirtha is ineffable. p. 35. Edgerton. XXXIII (Roma: lstituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. Eteinne Lamotte. Obermiller. Yasomitra. Nirviil)a. 7.29. p. See my article "Fundamental Standpoint of Madhyamika Philosophy. E. Th. F. siif!lvrta. Vruj)." 32. pp. 5. We have the term "siimvrta" by Candrakirti. on Jneyalak$al) chen-mo. 368-369. XXIV." the root of which is Vluj (Skt. 9 (!931). no. 104. Prad-han. first time in Chinese texts. Abhidharmakoshabha$ya of Vasubandhu (Patna: 1967). 318a (Peking popular edition). which means "covered. 47*. See also Wogihara Bunshu. Stcherbatsky. Serie Ori-entale Roma. As Nagarjuna also declares in his Mulamadhyamaka-kiirikii. Another suggestion may be added here. sunyatii. "The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation. 106). 204. fol. pp. pp. Mahiiyiinasaf!lgraha. Mahiivyutpatti. 'jig-pas na 'jig-rten. Notes to Chapter 3 . Takasaki. 3. pp. p. "being saf!!vrti" is. La somme du grand vehicule d'Asanga (Mahiiyiina-saf! lgraha) Tome II (Louvain: Bureaux du Museon. 5. Har Motila 2. Theodere Stcherbatsky. Sakaki. 6. where the word is elucidated as follows: loka is origi-nally u-loka: this is later understood from Pali loga (Skt.. raga). 31.. 185. Ibid." Acta Orientalia. as expressed in Bodhicaryiivatiira-pafijikii. J. Cf. 1953). 1927. 3061: lujyata iti lokab. chap. 370. 30. 34. saf!lvriyate etad iti siimvrta/:1. the vulgar world. chap. that is. 4. 1938) p. 263a. Ch' e 1930) chiian 10." Tetsugaku Kenkyu. 33. almost equated with pratitya-samutpiida. 162. 23. according to Stcherbatsky. Chapter 3: The Bodhisattva Returns to this World (Delhi: I. line 16. p. Priikrtako /oka/:1. The Conception of Buddhist Nirviil)a (Leningrad: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR. p. 801. 156. "breaking up.

95. 'phags pa nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnams 'jig rten gyi bde ba dang srog Ia chags pa med kyang sdug bsngal thams cad spangs pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa Ia chags pas mya ngan las 'das pa Ia gnas pa'o I I byang chub sems dpa' rnams ni nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnams kyi zhi ba phyogs gcig pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa 'jig rten gyi bya ba thams cad kyi phul du phyin pa de Ia yang rna chags mi gnas te I 'dis ni mya ngan las 'das pa Ia mi gnas pa bstan to I I 13. expose de Ia doctrine du grand vehicule. 74-75: avaikalyapratik~epo 'vik~epas ca prapiiraf)a I samutpado nirii<. Asatiga.. Sylvain Levi. I. 109 (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tripitaka Research Institute. 12. (Paris: 1907).. D. Edward Conze. (Roma: lstituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. selon le systeme yogiicara (Hereafter MSA). 32: aprati~!hitasal]lsiiranirvaf)atve slokal) I vijnaya sal]lsiiragatal]l samagral]l dul)khatmakal]l caiva niratmakal]l ca I nodvegam ayati na capi do~ail) prabadhyate karuf)iko 'grabuddhil) I I 32 I I sarval]l sal]lsiiral]l yathabhiital]l parijnaya bodhisattva nodvegam ayati kiiruf)ikatvat I na do~air badhyate 'grabuddhitvat I eval]l [na] nirviif)e prati~!hito bhavati na sal]lsiire yathakramal]l I 14. pp. M. T. 2nd. 18 below.1. 34. p. Madhyiintm·ibhiiga-Bha~m: A Buddhist Philosophical Trea-tise. Pe-king edition (hereafter TTP). Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation. 1964). ed. vol. Suzuki. G. vol. 12 below.lhis ca karmaf)yatvaprati~!hita I niravaraf)ata tasya 'prasrabdhisamudagamal) I I 29 I I . 10.5. See n. edited for the first time from a Sanskrit Manuscript (hereafter MV. Mahiiyiina-sutriilaf!lkiira. Tibetan Tripitaka. XIII. 1974). p. ed. XVII. XVII.1: . Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Serie Orientale Roma. 1957).9.42: karuf)iinil)sangatayiiiP slokal) I avi~taniiiP krpaya na ti~thati manal) same krpaliiniiiP I kuta eva lokasaukhye svajivite vii bhavet snehal) I I 42 I I sarvasya hi lokasya laukike saukhye svajivite ca snehal) I tatrapi ca nil)snehaniiiP sravakapratyekabuddhaniiiP sarvadul)khopasame nirviif)e prati~!hitaq1 manal) I bodhisattvaniiiP tu karuf)iivi~tatvan nirviif)e 'pi mano na prati~!hital]l I kuta eva tayol) sneho bhavi~yati I See also Sthiramati's commentary on it. MSA. Nagao. See n.635.. II.

23.. 1967). Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajfziipiiramitii Literature (To-kyo: Suzuki Research Foundation.Irtinirdesa) translated by Sara Boin (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1976).. 395. p. 62 commentary: k~etraparisodhanam aprati~thitanirval)iiiJ1 cavinivartaniyayiiiJ1 bhiimau trividhayiiiJ1 I 18. . 62 Commentary: sre~tha bodhir cabhisai]1bodhimahaparinirviil)aSai]1darsanaveditavya I . sai]1siiranirviiQiiprati~thata avinivartaniyabhiimivyiikaral)alabhasamuda-gamal) I saiJ1siiranirviiQiibhyam avinivartanat I I 15. p. MSA. MSA. 263. E. Conze. . 24. 70: sattve~u samatajiianaiJ1 bhavanasuddhito matai]1 I aprati~thasamavi~taiJ1 samatajiianam i~yate I I 70 I I yad bodhisatvenabhisamayak. E. XIX. XIX. sangs rgyas kyi sar mi gnas pa'i mya ngan las 'das par zhugs nas I 'khor ba dang mya ngan las 'das pa gnyis ka Ia tha dad pa med cing ro gcig par dmigs pa ni mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes yin par 'dod do zhes bya ba'i don to I I de bas na sangs rgyas kyi sa'i mdo las kyang I .. IX.1-2: . Notes tu Chapter 3 . reprint. 25..ale sattve~u samatjiianaiJ1 pratilabdhaiJ1 tad bhavanasuddhito bodhipraptasyaprati~!hitanirval)e nivi~taiJ1 samatajiianam i~yate I 21. 182 v. MSA. 1966). S. 103. 19. ed. 22.rantir eva ca I I 61 I I satvaniiiJ1 paripakas ca k~etrasya ca visodhana I aprati~thitanirval)aiJ1 bodhil) sre~tha ca darsana I I 62 I I 17. 61-62: MahayanasaiJ1grahavibhage dvau slokau I gotraiJ1 dharmiidhimuktis ca cittasyotpadana tatha I danadipratipattis ca nyamavak. Sthiramati: Madhyiintavibhiiga{fkii (Nagoya: Libraire Hajinkak.. 1932-35). 1934. XIX. IX.. ed. buddhabhiimau I tatraiva 20. Johnston. Abhisamayii/af!lkiir' iilokii Prajfziipiiramitiivyiikhyii (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko..u.2. Ratnagotravibhiiga Mahiiyiinottaratantra-siistra (Patna: Bihar Res~arch Society. Lamotte. MSA. 108. The Teaching of Vima/akfrti (Yimalak.. 257. 16. 47. ed. p. E. p. 14: pravrttir udvrttir avrttir asrayo nivrttir avrttir atho dvayadvaya I sama visi~ta api sarvagatmika tathagataniiiJ1 parivrttir i~yate I I 14 I I . 1950). 13. MSA.. abhisai]1bodhiparinirval)adarsanavf(tya dvaya vrttil) I saiJ1siiranirval)iiprati~~hitatvat SaiJ1skftasai]1skftatvenadvaya vrttil) I . TTP vol. Tokyo. Unrai Wogihara. p.234 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 . H. Yamaguchi. p.

IV.. XVIII. 24-25: cittavyavrttau slokau I mayopamanvlk~ya sa sarvadharman udyanayatram iva copapattil:t I klesac ca dul)khac ca bibheti nasau saJTipattikale 'tha vipatti-kale I I 24 I I svaka gul)al) satvahitac ca modal) saJTicintyajanma rddhivikurvllaJTI ca I vibhu~al)aJTI bhojanam agrabhumil:t krl9aratir nitya krpatmakanaJTI I I 25 I I . XVIII. n irmal)opamal) saJTicintyabha vopapatti parigrahe 'saJTikli~!asarvakriya prayogatvat I 29.. Bodhisattmbhtimi (Tokyo: 1930-36: Reprinted Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store. MSA. 8: upapattivibhage slokal) I karmal)as cadhipatyena pral)idhanasya capara I samadhes ca vibhutvasya cotpattir dhlmataJTI mata I I 8 I I caturvidha bodhisatvanam upapattil:t karmadhipatyena yadhimukticaryabhumi sthitaniiJTI karmavasenabhipretasthanopapattil) I pral)idhanavasena ya bhumipravi~ !iinaJTI sarvasatvaparipacanarthaJTI triyagadihlnasthanopapattil) I samadhyadhipatyena ya dhyanani vyavartya kamadhatav upapattil) I vibhutvadhipatyena ya nirmal)ais tu~itabhavanadyupapattisaJTidarsanat I 30. p. MSA. 1971 ). XI. U.. 28. saJTicintyopapattir udyanabhumil:t I . commentary: . I vineyadurvinayatve kayacintye jinasaya ca I du~kare~u vicitre~u SaJTisiiratyaga eva ca I I 20 I I nil)saJTiklese ca tatraiva dhrtir dhlrasya jayate I ebhis tribhil) slokair dhrtiprabhedaJTI darsayati I . a cai)Qalanam a sunaJTI sabhagatayam upapadyate I 27. Wogihara.. ed.26. MSA. I punar du~karacaryatal) I saJTicintyabhavopattital) I tadasaJTiklesato 'pi prabhedal) I 31. 19-21: dhrtivibhage sapta slokal) . MSA. 226: saJTicintya cai)Qala 'ntanam a sunam arthaJTI kartukama upadravaJTI SaJTisamitukamo vinayitukama.. XX-XXI. MSA. 44. commentary: . 30.

. In his Introduction. sarpcintyabhavopapattau cakravartyadibhiitasya sarppattau tadasarpklesatal) I visi~!akaya vedanadi 32. 129. The following may suggest their subtle flavor: solitude. MSA. Shindo Edition.8-4. cf. These words actually defy translation." Chapter 4: Silence of the Buddha and its Madhyamic Interpretation I. sa~!hyiirp bhavopapattau tatra sarpklesasyanurak~ana I . Notes to Chapter 4 . 427-35) such Sufi ideas as fana' (passing away) and baqa' (continuously remaining) and su'iid (ascending) and nuziil (descending). 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. He compares and equates them with such Buddhist concepts as "goingthither" and "coming hither. poverty. 12: upapattau ca sarpcintya sarpklesasyanurak~al)ii I .. p. 2. Buddhismus (Sammlung Goschen). 4. Izutsu. 5. ch 35.3. the translator. I . XX-XXI.b I I dvayagrahyagrahakasyabhaval) I tasya cabhavasya bhaval) siinyataya lak~al)am ity abhavasvabhavalak~al)atvarp siinyatayiil) paridipitarp bhavati I 36." Philosophy East and West (Honolulu: 1954). I. 6. 33.2: dran pa dang shes bzhin rna nyams par gang nas gang du skye bade dang der I 'di dang 'dir skye bar bya'o zhes shes bzhin du skye bas na I bsams bzhin du skye ba na yang rten cing 'brei te 'byung ba bsgom pa na mang du gnas pas nyon mongs pas mi gos pa'i phyir kun nas nyong mongs pa rjes su srung ba zhes bya'o I I 34. I. Islam Classics. Troy Wilson Organ. where we find frequent reference to tU$1Jff!lbhdvenddhiviisayati sma. patina. For instance. trans. 13: dvayabhavo hy abhavasya bhaval) siinyasya lak~al)arp I I 13 a. S.. See Toshihiko Izutsu. and predilection. 113-4.. "The Silence of the Buddha. p. discusses (pp. vol." "returning to the origin and arising from it. IV. retirement. Rumf Goroku. Dfgha-N. I. 114." and "ascending and descending.tJhapiida-s). no. 3. Beckh. Ch' eng wei shih fun. 179 (Po. Purvayoga-parivarta. liking. 109. Saddharmapw:ujarfka. 1978). II. voluntary exile from the world. p. p. l. Udiina.236 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 3-4 katham utpattital). H. July. This is a Japanese translation of the Kitdb Fr-hi Md Fr-hi of Jalal al-Din Riimi. MY. 2. TTP.

16. 12. 4. avec Ia Prasannapadii Commentaire de Crandrakfrti. Cinq chapitres de Ia Prasannapadii (Paris: 1949). 191 (p. 29.. XXXIII. 8.. XLV. III..Lal. publiee par Louis de La Vallee Poussin (Bibliotheca Buddhica. Anguttara-N. Prasannapadii. p. p. p. II. 400 !f." 12. 477a. p. sutta 72 (Vacchagotta). Ibid.. Miilamadhvamaka-kiirikiis (Miidhyamikasiitras) de Niigiirjuna. Taisho. Lamotte. III. 642).. vol. 65. Saf!lyutta-N.). 265). 15.). The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux (Calcutta: 1935) p. Sa. Cf.. 25. op. 29. 129. Radhakrishnan. 953). XIX. p. 13. XVIII Atma-parfk$ii. pp. Mahiivagga. p. Ibid. J.7. 23. G. 603): the Sanskrit original of the latter. p. 138. Jennings. 36-38. no. by S. Stcherbatsky. Majjhima-N. 189). 17. k. p. Saf!!yutta-N. p. sutta 38 (I. quotes the giithii Jiiiinasiirasamuccaya. Vinaya. Genshi Bukkyo no Jissen-tetsugaku (Practical Philosophy of Primitive Buddhism) (Tokyo: 1927). 27. Author's translation. p. p. 22. 534. These questions are enumerated in several suttas. xxix (Piisiidika). de Jong.itavistara. W. J. op. 550-556: §§ "Unanswered Questions. 137-8. cf. IV. Jennings. etc. 10. 491. See also J." 18. Cf.: Dfgha-N. 538: Theodore Stcherbatsky. p. See note 44. 576a. 31. xl. 57. IV. cf. p. 10. p. cit. E. 208. 23. IX (Po!fhapiida). vol. p. Tetsur6 Watsuji. "Rationalism. Cf. and tr. 189 (Taisho. Prasannapadii. as quoted in S. The Vediintic Buddhism of the Buddha (London: 1948). Majjhima-N. XVI. p. The following may be mentioned among others: Piili-tipitaka.g. no. 1935. no. I. 24. it is k. XXXII. p. Hua-yen Wu-chiao-chang.. cit.. The Dhammapada (London: 1950). Realism. ed. "Jiiiinasiirasamuccaya. 26. Jennings.. p. vol. . Organ. Taisho. 186-7. Ibid. pp. op. sutta 63 (Miilunkyiiputta). Organ. p. Ibid. Prasannapadii). XIV. p. 805). from Tattvasaf!lgraha-paiijikii (Gaekwad Oriental series ed. 55lc. cit. vol." "Meta-physics repudiated. 444. 3537. Chinese translations. Thomas. Yamaguchi.. 290 (p. Early Buddhist Scriptures. Ibid. p." Otani Gakuho.. p. 66). 25. ibid. p. 9. (see S. 392. pp. In the Tattvasaf!lgraha (Bauddha Bharati series ed. About Piili texts. 24. 31.. p. Ibid. 475. Taisho no. 3 (1. lines 7-8.. 20. TaishcJ. vol. 21. 372 (chap. 28. 187 (p. e. Taisho. 692c: E. op. St-Petersbourg. p. cit. ed. Radhakrishnan. 139. 9). The same giithii is also quoted in S. 14. 19. p. Prasannapadii. Lefmann. p. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (Leningrad: 1927). Mookerjee. Organ.. 1902. (Hereafter. p. 1913). 556.. 30. 133-4. p. p.dhinirmocana-siitra (Lou vain: 1935).

Buddhism [Non-Christian Religious Systems] (Lon-don: 1887). line 3: prasangaviparltena carthena parasyaiva Sal!1bandho. 576a. p. 50. Notes to Chapter 5 . 604c. W. 370. . Prasannapadii. . karul)ayii paravabodhiirthal!1 sastrapral)ayanal!1 . 500. Ibid. p. 2-3. k. 492 (XXIV. H. ." First appeared in Silver Jubilee Volume of the Zinbun-Kagaku-Kenkyusyo (Kyoto: Kyoto University. 40.. 49.. 183 and 186. op. Prasannapada. III. pp. XXV (Nirviil)a). 57. pp. 151: svayam adhigantavya anaya disa ki111cic chakya111 vacenopade~(um iti I 39. pp. 35. 33. Ibid . See also Prasannapada. 44. pp. cit. XXIY. A Study of Tibetan Buddhism. k. The purport of the words "discriminating between the Twofold Truth" appears in Nagarjuna's own gatha (the Mulamadhyamakakarika. see his Chukan Bukkyo Ronko or Miidhyamika Buddhism Miscellanies (Tokyo: 1944). (As for the Yamaguchi's Japanese version of the latter. p. 46. Ibid.. . 45. and Stcherbatsky. Candrakirti. . 495 line 9. advayajfianala111krtal11 mahakarur:topayapural)saral11 prathamacittotpiida111 tathiigatajfiiinotpattihetum iidi111 krtvii yiiviid iiciiryaryanagiirjunasya viditiiviparltaprajfiaparamitanltel) . by E. 50. In the T'ien-t'ai school it is called :=iliff f~ or the "verse of Threefold Truth. Johnston and A.. TaishO. p. line I.238 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 32. pp. into English by G. 521. 69 line I. are altogether without substance. The chap. For instance. where Nagarjuna claims that both voices. Ibid. Nagao. are found in Nagao. p. 39-42. Taish6. 24. Nyiiya-~a~!ika. p. T. 43. where Prasannapadii. 953a. XXXII. but with a slight difference in meaning. k. prohibitive and prohibited. VigrahavyavartanL p. p. 100. k. niismiikal!1. The same phraseology by Aryadeva. Baroda. p. Translation of text into French by S. IX. 550-561. line 9. Nagao. svapratijfiaya abhavat. "An Interpretation of the Term "'Sa111vrti" (Convention) in Buddhism. Yamaguchi UA. 1951. 23. pp. 22 ff. pp. Tucci (Pre-Ditinaga Buddhist texts on Logic. and into Japanese by Yamaguchi (Mikky6 Bunka 1949-50. vol. 47. p. 503.9) for which see Prasannapadii. See note 43. "Chiikan-tetsugaku no Komponteki Tachiba. 29-30. 494 and for Candrakirti's restatement of it. no. Revised and reprinted in the present volume. A Studr of Tibetan Buddhism. 1929). 41.. and p. p. 519. Kunst. pp. "VigrahavyavartanL" ed. 1929). p. Vigrahavviivartanf. l and 2 stand in a similar relation of question and answer: see ibid. 48. 34." Tetsugaku-kenkyu. p. Gadjin M. vol. 8). line 7: tathii caciiryo bhiiyasa prasangiipatti-mukhenaiva parapak~a111 nirakaroti sma. 74. p. Melanges chi-nois et bouddhiques. 92 ff. is read also in the Vigrahavyavartanl. Prasannapadii. vol. 505-6. A similar analogy. See. 42. 279 ff. 3 and k.. See also Nagao. . Reprinted in Chukan to Yuishiki pp. 36. . 25. 34-36 and others are interpreted. 37. incomplete). p. see ibid. for instance. 158. 264. Rhys Davids. Nagao." 38. et al. 235. A Study of Tibetan Buddhism (Tokyo: 1954). p. 1954).

pp. Tucci Madhyiintavibhiigasutrabhii$ya!lkii of Sthiramati. 24. T. Madhyiintavibhiiga-flkii.. edited by B. 319 !f. and R. 121. 141' vv. II. 121) is discussed by Ruegg in connection with the idea of the tathiigatagarbha. Some of the texts to be discussed later are also referred to extensively in this study. sutta no. The Latikiivatiira-sutra. ed. 5 . 3. Etienne Lamotte.. L. pp. B. imam eva kayaiP pa~icca sa!ayatanikaiP jivitapaccaya. 1938). Madhyiintavibhiiga-bhii$ya (hereafter. sutta no. pp. ed. Compare the Sanskrit original with the Pali text. Dignaga. There must have existed a version of the Cu/asuniiiita-sutta in Sanskrit. Stcherbatsky. Part I (London: Luzac. Nagao. 1923). Prajfziipiiramitiipil)(iiirthasaf!lgraha.aise d'extreme-orient. 1969). Pandeya. 1966). V. Madhyiintavibhiiga-siistra (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 147 ff. p. See I. 24-26. tasyam api 10..2: vidhiyate I sattvad asattvat sattvac ca. The Cu!asunnata sutta (Majjhimanikiiya. pp. and trans. English Translations have been published by F. 53. 1932).). 6. of which the author of the Lankiivatiira-sutra had knowledge. 77. sein Werk und seine Entwicklung. Sylvain Levi. taiP santaiP idam atthiti pajanati 7. 1934. "Dignaga. Other editions of the Madhyiintavibhiiga besides the author's (note 3) are: Susumu Yamaguchi.. vol. See David Seyfort Reugg. p. 1964). 13. Bhattacharya and G. 141-43. Horner. Champion. and by D. Sthiramati: Madhyiintavibhiigatlkii (Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku. Calcutta Oriental Series no. Richard Robinson. 8. C. "Madhyiintavibhiigasutra. Madhyiintavibhiiga 1. p.. in E. 9.. La theorie du Tathiigatagarbha et du gotra (Paris: Ecole fran<. Mahiiytmasutriilaf!lkiira (Paris: H. 1907). (To-kyo: Suzuki Research Foundation.. 1970). vol. dvayaiP tatra na vidyate I sunyata vidyate tv atra. vv. Gadjin M." Wiener Zeitscrift fiir die Kunde Siid-und Ostasiens III (1959). 1971). ed. Middle Length Sayings." Bibliotheca Buddhica XXX (1936)." p.1: abhlitaparikalpo 'sti. reprinted Tokyo. 19-54. 8-18. The Buddhist Religion (California: Dickenson. 115-18. Iti yaiP hi kho tattha na hoti. evaiP ''yad yatra nasti tat tena sunyam iti yathabhutaiP samanupasyati yat punar atravasi~~am bhavati tat sad ihastlti yathabhutaiP prajanati" ty aviparitaiP sunyatalak~al)am udbhavitam bhavati. Friedmann. Frauwallner. madhyama pratipac ca sa I ll. 76. "Dignaga. La somme du grand vehicule d'Asatiga (Mahiiyiinasaf!lgraha) (Louvain: Bureaux du Museon. tena taiP suiiiiaiP samanupassati. III. expounds itaretara-sunyatii (mutual emptiness) as follows: . Majjhima Nikiiya. The translation from the Madhyiintavibhiiga is the author's. Sthiramati. 4. 2. yaiP pana tattha avasinhaiP hoti. Nanjio (Kyoto: Otani University Press. XI. 75. 12. The translation of quotations from this sutta as it appears in this essay is the author's.Chapter 5: What Remains in Sunyatil 1. Analysis of the Middle Path and the Extremes (Utrecht: 1937). Madhyiintavibhiiga 1. MV. pp. Frauwallner. ed.

no. Ruegg. yat punar atravasi~!arp bhavati. vol. p. p 133-2. Chibetto Bukkyo Kenkyu (Tokyo: lwanami. Jayaswal Institute. ed. tat tena siinyam iti samanupasyati. Ruegg. In quoting Candraklrti's Prasannapadii. Cf. pp. 172-1-6. pp. Abhidharma Samuccava of Asanga (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati. 321. declares the siinyata taught in the Cufasunnata-sutta (or the itaretara-sunyata. 675a. 1966). Bhavaviveka's attack is found in his Madhyamaka-hrdaya. 494.7. Mahiiyiinasutriilaf!!kiira XIV. 6001). 166-181. P. 34.. 840. 1958). p." iyam ucyate siinyatavakrantir yathabhiita aviparfta.. Tsong-kha-pa argues to this effect in his Lam-rim chen-mo (Peking reprint edition. Also cf. N. 111.. author's Japanese translation.. N. XXXI.. S. 19. as the Latikiivatiira-sutra calls it) to be of inferior character. Candraklrti. no. Pralhad Pradhan. (VI. 720c. 178-210 and Appendix. Candrakfrti criticizes the notion of paratantra in his Madhyamakiivatiira. 321 f. p. 16. which ex-pounds the doctrines of both the Yogacara and the tathiigata-garbha. 11-13). 152. U. n.. 1959). ed. Cf. vv. 5550. 1912). "Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asarpga. La theorie. 5555. line 17. 325. As for the term upiidiiya prajnaptib. vol. siinyataiva riiparp. vol. n. 237-38." Journal of the Bombay Branch. 31. pp. line 21. p. Notes to Chapter 5 . 112. 1950). Tibetan versions: Peking reprint edition no. see note 24.240 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 itaretara-Siinyata punar mahamate katama. For instance. 32. Tibetan Sanscrit Works Series vol. ed. 22. 1954). 18. 14. Edward Conze. 17. Gokhale. vol. p. 47-48. Buddhist Wisdom Books (London: George Allen and Un-win. 40. pp.-Petersbourg: Biblioteca Buddhica IX. Ruegg. The Lwikiivatiira-sutra. pp. 252-31. at least the sentence enclosed within single quotation marks is the same as the first part of the passage quoted in the Madhyantavibhaga. 1605. Bukkyo ni okeru Mu to U tono Tairon (Controversy between the Theories of Nonbeing and Being in Buddhism) (Tokyo-Kyoto: K6bund6-shob6. tat sad ihastfti yathabhiitarp prajanati. p. 23 ( 1947). In Sanskrit. no. 161. pp. Chinese versions: TaishO no. For instance. dvayabhavo hy abhavasya bhaval) siinyasya lak~al)am. Cf. Prasannapadii Madhyamakavrtti (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve. pp. V. Louis de La Vallee Poussin. 1606. yad uta yad yatra nasti tat lena siinyarp" ity ucyate . sa ( = prasiida) ca tail) I ( = hastigavaiQakadi) I siinya ity ucyate . 81: riiparp siinyata. La theorie. p. pp. Dutt. 1930-1936). Cf. yatas ca "yad yatra na bhavati. (St. 322 !f. 6-8. 20. La theorie.3. see Jacques May. p. asiinyarp ca bhik~ubhir iti bha~itarp maya. 113. Wogihara. Bodhisattvabhiimi (Tokyo: Seigo Kenkyukai. vol. while the Yogacaras evaluate it as an "unperverted" interpretation. ed. VII.. Bodhisattvabhumi (Patna: K. vol. Royal Asiatic Society. 15. pp. Susumu Ya-maguchi. V. etc. 21. 1941). 10-16 (Peking reprint edition. 96. chapter V. 72-83). 23. Madhyiintavibhiigabhii$ya III. For the Tibetan translation. This passage seems to include some quotations from the Cufasunnata-sutta. 124 ff.

.. 34. 76 (14a). ad VI. p. de Vimalakirti (Louvain: Bibliotheque du Museon. p.24. Ibid. ed. but this is intro-duced by Candrakirti to demonstrate the position of the rival Vijiiiina school. the Realism of vijiziina (knowing) or of paratantra. the passage in question appears here with en-tirely different features and must be revised thoroughly. 99. Minor Buddhist Texts. that the opponent here attacked by Candrakirti is the later Vijiiiinaviida (as distinguished from the earlier Yogiiciiras). 553b. vol. 1957)." that is. and also his ignorance about the relationship between the texts mentioned earlier.57). As this portion is lacking in the original Sanskrit published by Gokhale. 1602. Serie Orientale Roma XIII (Roma: lstituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. TaishO no." tena sunyam means "is sunya with regard to duality. Pradhan tried in his book to fill in the lacunae by his "retranslation. 1962). The Tibetan versions are as follows: (Bodhisattvabhumi) gang gi phyir "gang Ia gang med pa de ni des stong par yang dag par mthong Ia I 'di Ia !hag rna gang yin pa de ni 'di na yang dag par yod do zhes yang dag pa ji Ita ba bzhin du rab tu shes pa" de ni stong pa nyid Ia yang dag pa ji Ita ba bzhin du phyin ci rna log par zhugs pa zhes bya ste I (Abhidharmascamuccaya) "gang Ia gang med pa de ni des stong par yang dag par rjes su mthong ba ste I 'di Ia !hag rna gang yin pa de ni 'dir yod pa'o I I zhes yang dag pa ji Ita ba bzhin du rab tu shes so" I I 'di ni stong pa nyid Ia 'jug pa yang dag pa ji Ita ba ste I phyin ci rna log pa zhes bya'o I 25. 29. XXXI. vol. Vajracchedikii Prajiziipiiramitii. Serie Orientale Roma IX. Jayanada also comments that the passage is used to introduce the testimony of the Agamas (suttas)." yan niisti [what does not exist] means "the duality of subject and object does not. 242 . We can notice in this commentary that the interpretation is fairly different from that of the treatises mentioned above. 51. p. p. vol. p. 147-5): yatra [in something whatsoever] means "in the paratantra. XXV. This passage is close to one found in the Bodhisattvabhumi. 15 (TaishO no. which holds a view of "Idealistic Realism. Jayiinanda comments on this passage as follows (Peking reprint edition." avasi~taiTl bhavati [what remains] means "knowl-edge which is sunya with regard to duality" (gzung ba dang 'dzin pas stong pa'i shes pa). 139. 31. p. The passage that includes "what remains" also appears in the Madhyamakiivatiira (Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin. G. 30. in the Tibetan tradition. For one thing. 1513. probably the sakiiraviida." tat means "the paratantra. 70 (8). Tucci. vol. the authorship is ascribed to Maitreyaniitha. 32. 26. p. part I (Roma: 46 and the commentary on v. 877a). See Edward Conze." But because of his misunderstanding of the passage. the founder of the Yogiiciira school. and trans.

1974). 39. 38-41. 319 if. 310 (48). vol. La theorie. Alex Wayman and Hideko Wayman trans.l3. p.. or to possess the "double structure" of abhuta-parikalpa = siinyata. Cf. Mahiiyiinasutriilaf!!kiira.. it is difficult for the tathiigatagarbha to include within itself elements of contamination as entities to be negated. The term "three-nature" is sometimes replaced by "three-characteristic" (trilak$Qfza). The willows and flowers in this saying are not those belonging to the imagined world. XII. pp. that is. 677a. Ratnagotravibhiiga. 3. Serie Orientale Roma. . Trif!!sikii. IX. or other "Absolute Being. Seen.). 1966). Nyoraikei Kyoten (Tokyo: Chii6-k6ronsha. If this is the case. While there is a difference of di-mension between the ordinary..l: . 353. 2. 13 below. 221c. ed. Madhyiintavibhiiga 1. no. 34. or to possess the "double structure" of abhutaentities to be negated. but those viewed by the enlightened ones. and the supramundane. Lamotte. Mahayanasaf!!f?raha. La theorie." in Brahmanical philosophy. p.22. The "itaretara-siinyata" of the Laizkiivatiira-sutra (note 13 above) and the idea of "gzhan-stong" in the Jo-nang-pa school have been studied minutely by Ruegg. 1940) p. 703a if. (Patna: Bihar Ratnagotravibhiiga. E. Zokanwa Sanyaku Gappeki Shomankyo Hogatsudoji-shomon-kyo {H6d6kai. etc. Taisho no. Chapter 6: The Buddhist World View as Elucidate in the Three-nature Theory and Its Similes I.. In this sense. . pp. Xl. Jikido Takasaki. 35. chapter III. the implication remains virtually the same. Madhyiintavibhiiga (hereafter MV }. The Lion's Roar of Queen Srimiilii. Ruegg. Though I am not quite sure of these ideas. kk. evarp "yad yatra nasti tat tena siinyam iti samanupasyati I yat punar atravasi~~arp bhavati tat sad ihastiti yathabhiitam prajanati'' I 36. Tri-svabhiiva. "Willows are green and flowers are red" is a popular Zen saying which denotes the Zen enlightenment or Satori. it is realized only upon realization of the consummat?d world. p. XI. XXXIII (Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. line 3 . it is not strictly identical with the world dealt with by a scientist. vol.33.. H. The tathiigatagarbha seems to me to occupy a supreme position-a posi-tion akin to that of Brahman or Atman. p. 99. 110. Yogiiciirabhumi-viniscaya-saf!lgrahmJi (Taisho XXX. paramarthatal) sarpsara eva nirviiQam ity uktam. E. chapters VI-VII. chiian 8-9. Kenryii Tsukinowa. 300-302. 325 ff. Notes to Chapter 6 4. those of the consummated nature. 1975) p. what I have tried to suggest with the phrase "arithmetical subtraction" seems to be applicable to these ideas. 337. 35. (New York and London: Columbia University Press. p.. mundane level. pp. 132. flowers remain flowers. 37. 38. Ch' eng-wei-shih-lun. still willows remain willows. 20-24. Main sources for the theory are: Saf!ldhinirmocanasutra. Johnston.

a Sanskrit equivalent is not readily available. are often used as a simile for delusion in other schools such as the Madhyamika. transforma-tion" (vikara. originally meaning "turning round. 143a).de Ia 'khor bani gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid de kun nas nyon mongs pa'i char gtogs pa'o I I mya ngan las 'das pa ni de nyid rnam par byang ba'i char gtogs pa'o I I gnas ni de nyid gnyi ga'i char gtogs paste I gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid do I Sarnsara refers to the other-dependent nature in its aspect of defile-ment. see the author's article. 8. .29 (Taisho. the term paryaye[la ("on occasion") indicates simply what the author has called "convertibility." "convertible term. it is. Convertibility may include various notions. "Convertibility" is the author's translation. With regard to the "twofold aspect ( =two division) of the other-dependent na-ture. but the third factor. "change. The basis refers to the twofold aspect of the same." The simile appears by name in Mvy 7650. where the simile is introduced to illustrate the famous theory of "the other-dependent nature having two divisions ( =twofold aspect). revolution.I7 reads: gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid ni rnam grangs kyis na ( = paryayei:Ja) gzhan gyi dbang ngo I I rnam grangs kyis na ( = paryayei:Ja) de nyid kun brtags pa'o I I rnam grangs kyis na ( = paryayei:Ja) de nyid yongs su grub pa'o I I "The other-dependent nature is on occasion the other-dependent. one of the most important notions of the Yogacara school. Special attention may be drawn to the term paryaya which. "turnabout. "Logic of Convertibility.8 (Taisho. and the notion of "recovery. occasion. 11. Nirvai:Ja refers to the same in its aspect of purity. snake and rope. 9 below for the locus of its first appearance." see n. Mahdyanasaf!lf?raha." see below. and the rest.'' 6. II. transmutation" ( paravrtti)." Mahdyanasaf!!graha. Mahavanasaf!lf?raha. The first two factors in the simile. With regard to the notion of crossing over to the consummated world in-directly via the other-dependent world. 9. and on occasion the same is the consummated. anyathdbhava). "Medium" "mediator. p." For more details. are pecu-liar to this simile. on occasion the same is the imagined." and so on. While the term non-discriminative or non-dichotomizing wisdom rarely appears in the Madhyamika texts. p. hemp. 7. XXXI. 111. parit~dma." Here. the other-dependent nature. together with its counterpart "the mundane (discriminative) wisdom obtained after [the non-discriminative wisdom is accomplished]" (pr${halabdha-laukikajiiana). opportunity." It is not a translation of a Sanskrit term. XXXI. 5. is generally used in the meaning of "synonym. manner. 140c). way." and the like are also notions obtained by extend-ing the function of the "basis. and so forth. 10.

the acquisition of nonduality.. "discrimination-only" (vikalpa-matra).244 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 II. artha-sattviitma-vijiiapti-pratibhiisam prajiiyate I vijiiiinam . VI. is referred to variously as "mind-only" (citta-matra). Trif!!sika. In these texts. kk.. IS. Trif!!sika. k. It is Notes to Chapters 6-7 . For the simile's special assoc1at10n with the three-nature theory. one realizes the acquisition of the non-distinction of the two. 17. with regard to the higher level "cognition-only. From the non-acquisition of that. 2Sd and fol-lowing. "Cognition-only" established once but negated can be said to belong to a lower level. The En-glish is a free translation. the Trif!lsika of Vasubandhu is one of the fundamental texts of the Yogiiciira-vijiiiinaviida. 22d. and so forth. kk.graha. Trisvabhava. kk.. also suggests remarkable Buddhist features such as: a bodhisattva's return from the nirviiryic world to the sarpsiiric world. from the consummated to the other-dependent. 14. and expositions similar to the one quoted here are found in: Mahayanasiitralaf!lkara. the ob-jects and the subject. It seems that there are different types of "cognition-only" according to the situations under which it is expounded.) or more properly. p. ni~pannas tasya purve1.. Trisvabhava. 1. Vasubandhu defines the consummated naliJre as the state of cognition-only. The term "cognition-only" (vijiiana-matra.6-7. 7-8. 1. k." Asanga declares in his Mahayiinasaf!lgraha. Cf. The opposite direction. Trisvabhava. the "cognition-only" is once established as a realization of truth of a sort. but it is negated the next moment to lead one to a higher position. "presentation-only" (vijiiapti-matra). one realizes the non-acquisition of all objects. see: Mahayanasiitralaf!lkara. 26-30.' that is. k. Yamaguchi. ed. Mahayanasa.. 12. (Author's translation) This is the so-called 'means for entering into the characteristic of non-existence' (asallak$at. descending from Buddhahood to bodhisattva-hood. and so on. the ultimate truth. one realizes the non-acquisition of even cognition-only. one realizes the acquisition of the cognition-only. The simile of maya is widely used not only in the Yogiiciira but also in other schools for the purpose of illustrating the delusive character of the world. Apart from this. from the non-discriminative wisdom to the mundane discriminative but pure wisdom. in his Trif!lsika. IX.7-10) reads: Having acquired [the illusiveness of the conceptual discrimination). 17.lanupravesopaya) or the 'aid for penetration' (nirvedhabhaglya). which is expressed in the above quotation as 'the acquisition of the non-distinction of the two.1a sadii rahitatii tu yii. MV. From the non-acquisition of all objects. cognition-only is never negated. that to realize cognition-only means the realization of the three natures. Although a short treatise of only thirty verses. 13. Having acquired the cognition-only. 21cd. 22ab. 35-37. In these expositions. the objects and the subject. itself being the highest reality. kk. 1. 11. 16. the term "cognition-only" will be used here. but for conve-nience.18-29. Trif!lsika. 18.7 (section number given by S. MV.3. chapter III. Further. Dharmadharmata-vibhaga.17. 18-21. Nozawa. XI. niidr~!e 'smin sa drsyate.

XXXXI. of pujanii or sevanii. vol. Bareau. Edgerton. p. Reprinted Peking . vol. 4. 1. Chapter 7: Connotation of the Word Asraya (Basis) in the Mahiiyiina-sii. U. Lamotte. 108. and samiidhi. p.4. "Index of Vif!lsatikii & Trif!lsikii of Vasubandhu". seat) and the vijfiiinas or ideation that depend upon the former. however. 2 (Tokyo 1956). p. 3. The Buddha is meant to be the iisraya of pujanii in one place. And in both cases. Peking ed. 5.likely that the cognition-only of the lower level is referred to by terms such as "vijflaptimiitra" or "cittamiitra. Sir M. 7. (New Haven: 1953). no. p. 19. p. 110.. 8. Sthiramati's commentary to the MSA. Peking ed. manaskiira.5 and 9. which appeared in the Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies. 2. the meaning of iisraya seems to be different. Saf!ldhinirmocana-sutra. A. 107b. 3 (Poona: 1953). Derge Tanjur. 61-62. 158. Monier-Williams.triilamkiira I.29. III. in MSA XVII. 216. E. 79 (Mi. 693b). respectively.8 (ed. 4. vol. Tanjur. signify seven (excluding the vocative) syntactic cases. This simile (text. 2. p. Paris. 9. The sense organs as the iisraya will be discussed under (6). Sems tsams 3. 47. vol. 12. Tanjur.12. the Mdo sde rgyan gyi 'grel bshad (Sutriilaf!lkiira-vrtti-bhiirva). Taisho." while the cognition-only of the higher and ulti-mate level is named always "vijflaptimiitratii. XVI. F. Mi. MSA. 5531. II. p. where. and the ten sorts of virtuous men are enumerated as the iisraya of sevanii in another place. I am. p. vol.. line 15) is analogous to the relationship between the sense organs ( =support. 270. 1907. pp. See author's paper "The Terminologies of the Mahiiyiina-sutriilaf!lkiira" (in Japanese). This simile serves to prove and to establish the "momentariness" of the world. 157b). The last term nisraya means "resource" of liberality in three kinds: adhimukti. iisraya to k$etra. VI. Other passages which belong to the same category are: MSA. 6. The seven terms. the nominative to locative. the Mdo sde rgyan gyi 'grel bshad (Sutriilaf!lkiira-vrtti-bhii$ya). vol. Vak no. com-pleted and reprinted in 1979). 152. edited by Sylvain Levi. Reprinted Peking edition." with a "-tii" affixed. Sanskrit-Japanese Dictionary (Tokyo: 1940-1948. these iisrayas seem to be the object.. Tokyo University edition. 10. Sthiramati's commentary to the MSA. Mi. The author refers in this paper to the number of chapters in Roman symbols and verses in Arabic numbers. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. and in relation between. not the subject. inclined to think that through this passage the notion of the Budhist pratltyasamutpiida (dependent origination) was to be elucidated in terms of. the iisraya (the basis) and the iisrita (the dependent). A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. 176a. 108. however. Wogihara. This group of eight terms is found elsewhere. vol.

15.l.. Nagao. the outer world surrounding human beings. Notes to Chapters 8-9 . IX. M. 243. E. IX.l2. "Abode" here means "bhiijana-loka" or receptacle-world. Madhvantavibhagabha$ya l. 42. ed. but also of the and pratyeka-buddhas. IX. Concerning this idea see. basis not only of the bodhisattvas. thus. and t•ikalpa (imagination. 18. 19. See the quotation from the TriiJlsikii in note 15. Tril!lsika. 1.9. 13. 21. and the msitd or mastery. 19: upiidiina = upagamana = ekayogak~ematva. 16. p. no.47. undefiled base) to aniisravadhiitu (dhiitu without any impurity). These three represent the noetic aspect (grahaka) of the iilamvijnana. the revolving of grlihaka. The Buddha is the matrix. S. Reprinted Peking edition.. Tokyo University edition. for instance. Sthiramati's commentary on the Tril!lsikii (ed. Sems tsams 3. vol.. no. H. 27. Vl. and XVI. ed . G. 24. we have examples of this expression in the commentaries on the following verses: MSA. while the afore-mentioned three. E.246 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 edition. where citta-visuddhi. emanate. The expression "asraya-paravrtti" is considered separately under the ninth definition given in MSA.56-57. or thought construct) refer to the seventh "manas." the five cognitions. 77. will be seen in MSA. The ultimate enlightenment. 14. p. respectively. 5531. p. 47 (Mi.67. and the sixth cognition (mano-vijniina). The interpretations by as above. Besides those which will be enumerated below. 5. Yamaguchi). Sthiramati. udgraha (perception or taking up). 109a. but another one may be possible here. p. the Ratna-gotra-vibhiiga. vol. vol. 108. p. Of these. Peking ed. Ibid. consists of the anasrava-dhatu. is proclaimed to be the basis of all defilements. 25. 96a). the re-volving of grlihya. 23. 20. 17. XX-XXI. Madhyiintavibhiigaflkii (ed. 33. 5531. 4. which actually means the dharma-dhiitu. Dehal) sendriyam sarlram. p.. Other examples are: MSA.l. 94b).. Johnston.l2-17. the mind in purity. that is. 22. Ibid. Derge Tanjur. suggests of the Buddha) is thought of. discrimination. 243.3.l2. false discrimination and so on. Tokyo University edition.50. Derge Tanjur. XI. Manas (the mind or minding). Lamotte. vol. II. 26. a noteworthy explanation of this term is found in MSA. "abode" and so forth represent the noematic aspect (grahm). respectively. mean and defiled. 48. Mi. Mahiiviinasal!lgraha IX. Sylvain Levi). ed. p. 108.. In the translations and commentaries of Chen-ti or Paramiirtha. 47 (Mi. from which all worldly things. "Object" and "body" refer to six sense-objects and six senseorgans. 19 gives a similar expression: asraya atmabhiival) siidhi~!hiinam indriya-riipai)l nama ca. 16!. Sems tsams 3. vol. VIII. A similar equating of amala-iisraya (or ama/a-pada. X.

. Wogihara ed . Lamotte. pp. M. VIII.. cit. . pp. E.. 1964). p. p. J. Nagao. [sa bodhisattval:t] . prahii)iivaral)ena sarviil)i kusalamiiliini anuttariiyiiJTI samyaksaJTibodhau paril)iimayitavyiini I 4. 632. 4. Dasabhumika-stitra.. 1935). yid ches par bya ste I 6. op. Chapter 9: Tranquil Flow of Mind: An Interpretation of Upeksii I. Radher.. right column. 328-9: evam anumodya "anumoda-niisahagatafTI pul)yakriyiivastu anuttariiyiifTI samyaksambodhau paril)iimayiimi"-iti viicafTI bhii~eta "anuttariiyiil:t samyaksambodher iihiirakaJTI bhavatav" iti I Translation by Edward Conze. Ibid . byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa thams cad byang chub yongs su bsngos pa'i dbang gis nyon mongs pa'i rnyog pa dang bra! bar . II. p..Chapter 8: Usages and Meanings of Pari11iimanii I. 5. XXV. Pali Bukky6 o Chushin toshita Bukkyo no Shinshiki-ron (Mind and Mental Factors in Buddhist Philosophy. tasmiid acintyaparil)iimiki. 7. Trif!!sika. p. p. 286-1-2: .. 323. 2. Saf!!dhinirmocana Surra. 32: [bodhipriiptu-kiimena . (I VV). p. 2.. 27.6: upek~ii cittasamatii cittaprasa(hatii cittiiniibhogatii I ebhis tribhil:t padair upek~iiyii iidimadhyiivasiiniivasthii dyotita I tatra laya auddhatyaJTI vii cetaso vai~amyafTI I tasyiibhiiviid iidau cittasamatii I tato 'nabhisaJTiskiirel)iiprayatnena samiihitacetaso yathii[bhi]yogafTI samasyaiva yii pravrttil:t bhiivitviit I iibhogam akurvato 'niibhogiivasthii cittasyiinii-bhogatii I iyafTI ca sarvaklesopaklesiinavakiisasafTinisrayadiinakarmikii I 5. 97: Taisho 676. U. J. 630-31.18-19: sarvii bodhisattviicaryiipagataklesakalmii~ii bodhiparil)iimaniidhipatyena pratyetavyii(J:t). on the basis of Piili Buddhism) (Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin. 3. ed .29-28. p.. Mahiiyanasutra/af!lkiira XX-XXI. Madhyantavibhagabharva. Vvakhya: caturthyiiJTI bodhipak~a bahulavihiiril)o 'pi bodhipak~iil)iifTI safTisiire paril)iimanii I 8. p. Translation by Franklin Edgerton. 20.. Kogen Mizuno. Mahayanasutra/af!!kara XX-XXI. . TTP. 58. II: tau ca labdhiiryamiirgasya bhave~u paril)iimaniit I acintyaparil)iimikyii upapattyii samanvitau I I 9. A~rasahasrika.18. 119. ed. G. Radher. See Abbreviations. bodhisattvena .. Vyakhva on the above: acintyo hi tasyiiryamiirgasya paril)iima upapattau.4). Both editions of Dasabhumika. Rahder and Ryiiko Kondo (p. have pratyetavva that Edgerton wrongly emends and reads as pratyetavya/:1. tiini ca kusalamiiliiny anuttariiyiiJTI samyaksambodhau paril)iimayati I 3. Buddhist Hybrid-Sanskrit Dictionary. L' explication des mysteres (Louvain-Paris. layauddhatyapratipak~animitte~v . XVI. vol. 699b.

Herman Jacobi. pp. It states that upek$d is an entity provi-sionally named as such based upon the four substantial entities (dharmas): alobha. Visuddhimagga. p.8: tasya layauddhatyasyopasantau satyarp prasa~ha-vahita cittasyopek~a. 1971). real existence). ed. 97. cit. It ensues that the other eight mental factors are "dravya-sat" (substantial. vol. XXXI.. 59. 109. 1929)... p. The substance and function of upek$d are reduced to and only seen in these four dharmas. mit Bhd$ya des Acarya Sthiramati (Stuttgart: Verlag von W. 10. however. and virya. 147. 55-1-5 f. TTP. p. it is a state that cannot be expressed by alobha and the other three alone. 9.7-9 and p. Suzuki. Zen and Japanese Culture. cit. Le compendium de Ia super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'AsQ/iga (Paris: Ecole Fran9aise d'extreme-orient. p. but he believes that on the basis of these four mental factors combined. Nalinaksha Dutt. adve$a. and ahif!lsa-are "saf!!vrti-sat" (conventional.1-2 and p. p. Later. p. 12.) emphasizes a nominal. 109. 15. 13. Once Wogihara suggested a relationship between prasa{ha and prasanta on the basis of its Tibetan equivalents in his Bukkyo Jiten [ = Mvy] (Tokyo: Heigo Shuppansha. Unrai Wogihara ed. p. rev. 108. p. p. Ibid. 1966). Tibetan Sanskrit Works series VII (Patna: K. op. op. 141. 1965). 7. TTP 5539. Daisetz T. 1930-36).19. n.23-25. vol. Materiaux pour /'etude du systeme Vijilaptimatra (Paris: 1932). (as quoted by Mizuno. Walpola Rahula.. vol. The author is not sure how to under-stand this saf!lvrti-sat. Upek$d is no other than a name given to an aspect or special state of alobha and the others and does not exist apart from these four. p. Ch' eng-wei-shih-lun (Taisho 1585.. XVlll. 107. p. 22. 14. 19. 319-1-5 f. ed. 110. 466 f. p. Notes to Chapters 9-10 . Suzuki. S.. 31. p. II. MV. XXX.248 NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 6. 8. 53-5-4 f. upek$d. 89. 17. 3la. 602b. he simply says "meaning uncertain" in his dictionary Bon-wa Dai-jiten (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation. 9. I. Jayaswal Research Institute. p. temporary existence of upek$d. 205. See Abbreviations. p. p. Kohlhammer. vol. n. This theory of ''provisional existence'' of upek$d seems to originate from the Viniscaya-saf!lgrahat~i section of Yogacarabhumi (Taish6 1579. 61-2-1 f.. 259-4). a higher mental state such as upek$d is established on a new horizon.. 1971 ). amoha. Trif!lsikavijilapti des Vasubandhu. p. 52. 1932). 83. Bollingen series LXIV (Princeton: Princeton University Press. MSA. Sylvain Levi. 30b. 638).61: upek~aya yathakamarp sarvatra viharaty asau I Pf~~ha1abdhavikalpena viharel)a sadottama~ I 18. vol. 875. 16. provisional existence). 146. where it is stated that the last three members of the eleven good mental factors--apramada. Bodhisattvabhumi (Tokyo: Taish6 Daigaku.15-18. P. pp.

. or dharma-kiiya. Dutt. Dlghanikiiya. Among the vari-ous systems of enumerating the three bodies. p. this dharma-kiiya can be interpreted as a gathering of the dharma. I. 6. 2. has the five attributes of moral conditions (sfla). p. 250 . vol. Saf!lyutta-nikiiya (Samyutta 22. They will be explained in the following section. 3. 190-l. Narain and L. Aronson discussing upek$ii arrived (A. In the Chinese translations there are various names given for the three bodies. wisdom (prajnii). which probably underwent historical development. 100). 154). since the struc-ture and basis of his argument are quite different from those of the author. as far as the three bodies are grouped into a doctrinal system. Although some subtle differences in ideas can be seen between these groups. Zwilling ed. Shan-tao of T'ang China clearly designated Amida-Buddha as Reward- Body (or Assumed-Body). and the awareness of emancipation (vimukti-jniina-darsana). I (do. R. 26. the general view is that they are the actualized stages of self-cultivation. Also see fn. the following three bodies are given: Essence-body (sviibhiiv ika-kii ya Enjoyment-body (sii f!lbhogika-kii ya '5f: ffl . and Transformation-body (nairmiitzika-kiiya ~ f~ .!!it). 4. 6. the content is not as dispar-ate as it first appears to be. which afford various interpretations. Majjhima-nikiiya (Sutta 28). the Satyasiddhisiistra. it is doubtful whether it can be regarded as being directly identical with dharma-kiiya as a way of manifesting the Buddha. B. 1979. the most popular are the following two: (I) a (2) a ( f~ . However. K. 87).!!it). 2. Cf. 3. p. The same idea can be seen in such works as the abhidharmakosasiistra. p. 120.!!it). Aspects of Mahiiyiina Buddhism. XXXVII. 108). as for the five attributes. Stud-ies in Piili and Budhism. This variety is largely due to the different terms used in different texts and to the different translations given to them by different translators. However. pp. Kuan Wu-liang-shou ching shu <ft ~ ~ ~ *~ chiian I (TaishO. p. xvi (Mahiiparinibbiina-sutta). Unfortunately it reached him too late for use in this paper. 1-18). vol. Moreover. Besides the dharma-kiiya in this sense. H. vol. Nagiirjuna has also referred to this idea (N.20. meditation (samiidhi). in a system that appeared a little later. 5. Milindapanha. there is one called "pafica-dharmakiiya" of Sarvastiviida. Delhi: B. When the author had almost finished wntmg this paper. emancipation (vimukti). Again. it did not seem out of place to publish this paper as well. Publishing Corporation. and Visuddhimagga. which says that the Buddha. pp. 250b). 8. 2. Chapter 10: On the Theory of Buddha-body (Buddha-kiiya) I. (vol. therefore.

k ~ otte. "essential nature . there are delicate differences in nuance in the manner of descrip-tion in sastras. chtlan 10. p. there is "nisnmda" ( ~ ?Jit . corresponds to the dharma-kil. However." and so forth. pp. 'sub-stance' ( 'dependence' ( -f1X )." the trikcim is explained in detail (II. and nairmii!tika-kciya.." "group. (dharma/a-kava). in the Ralllagotra-vibluiga. Edgerton. p. 216). 325b)." In this dharma-kclra can be recognized the three Buddha-bodies of sviibhavikakaya. . literally. 1-2). An Introduction * to Buddhist Studies.XXYI. combine to make the word kava ( . probably "foundation . "basis" ( -(1X _ll: . literally.I. In the Yogacara-vijiiana school studies were made on the meaning of the word kaya. the svabhavika-kaya. especially. p. in the word kclya. free from "the barrier of delusions. The original word for the Reward-body ( ¥a. and as "The Meaning of its Revolution.!O I))! ." "collection. 10. That the dharmadlultu." most of these meanings can be traced in a dictionary. rid of "the barrier of the known. and so forth. ripening. The Ch' en?. 9. which is essentially immovable. Notes to Chapter 10 .!§} ) was generally understood to be the sci1_nhhogika-kam.. dhanna-kavas. ) in later ages. fruition) been considered as the original for the Reward-body. Books in which the word dharma-kaya seems to have been used both in the broad and the narrow senses as here described are the Mahayanasw." These G three meanings are further annotated to mean respec-tively. ). (Cf. 177-8). dharma-kara is not necessarily identical with Sl'clbhavika-kara in all instances. vol. which will be interpreted to mean "to enjoy (sw. 253 ). 38-61). "totality. The Mahavanasutralwnk£1ra (hereafter referred to as MSA) expounds the significance of the purification of the Dharma-dhcitu in chapter IX (56-59). the word 1·ipiika or l'llipakika ( ~ ~~ . consequently.PrajJiaparamitopad~sa ( -. Thus.ngraha. (cf.-wei-shih-lun ( ffX: rifE~ ~iii .ijl. Similarly. ~ ). says: "The meanings. Of these. sciJnbho?. and in its last section named "The Meaning of its Arising" (1'[/tv-artha) it treats of the trikava. Yamaguchi Susumu and others. in the sastras the concept of the old 'rupa-kara· (Physical-body) hardly became an issue: all Buddha-bodies were. Shindo ed . emancipated bodies (vimukti-kara). we can sur-mise various meanings such as "body" (not only physical body but also essential body). as explained in the following note 17. With the exception of "dependence" or "basis. flowing down) has Again.m. II. f~ q~ }¥. p. ( '1'11:). Ch' eng-wei-shih-lun. 278a. Le Traite. Abhisamaralwnkclra. However. for Buddha's virtues). following the view of the Buddhabhtlmr-upade5a ( f~ ft!! *J." and on the other hand. various meanings of the word "asraya-pariv~tti" ( f! -{1X revolving of the basis) are given (II. and "accumulation of 1K merits" ( f!E. Bt ~iii nate the 'body". starts revolving and manifests itself in some way has something in common with the concept of ·'the absolute in the phenomenal relativity" ( iffit t. ~5?.!§} G ).nbhoga) the result as a reward for the vow which is its source" ( E§ lJj! ¥a jljffi ). Buddhist Hvbrid Sanskrit Dictionary. p.ika-kara. on the one hand. and 'assemblage' ( ~ ).. 513). ~iii ) by Bandhuprabha and others (Taishci. That is.

. Laizkiivatiira Sutra. K. at the same time.49) explains siif!lbhogika-kiiya as "the outflow of the great compassion" (karut~ii . cf. Sthiramati: Madhyiintavibhiiga!fkii. Was there no bodhisattva listening to Guatama's preaching? If both the sriivakas and bodhisattvas were admitted to have attended the same assembly. In the Mahayana siitras. 56-7. Susumu. there also appeared siitras that advocated sermons by the dharma-kiiya. later this idea was elevated to the point that even the rupa-kiiya was understood as the siif!lbhogika-kiiya and these characteristics were said to be visible only to the bodhisattvas. * ~liJ ~ ). p. are borrowed from examples in the Mahiiyiina-sraddhotpiida siistra and others. and the siif!lbhogika-kiiya preached to bodhi-sattvas. . 17. XXXI. p. in which capacity. holding the baby Gautama in his arms. ni$yanda-buddha. but who. pp. vol. The thirty-two physical marks are said to belong exclusively to either a cakravartin (a king who has conquered the whole world) or the Buddha. It has been traditionally interpreted that the physical body of the Buddha preached to sriivakas or his disciples. ni$yanda). while the latter is the enlightenment realized when the defilement is removed. 18. Gautama Buddha actually preached at Benares and then at various places for forty-five long years. shed tears because he was too old to be able to hear the Buddha's sermons. at the same time. 16.12. In the Laizkiivatiira Sutra we find the words. investigations into them might offer suggetions with regard to what true sermons should be. who and where were the sriivakas and bodhisattvas? Was Queen Vaidehi in the Amitiiyur-dhyiina Sutra really an ordinary sinful woman. In a later period. The former is the enlightenment as one's Buddha-nature found amidst defile-ment. The word "ni$yanda-kiiya" can be seen in the Mahiiyiina-saf!lgraha (Taisho. those sermons by Gautama (nairmiit~ika-kiiya) were totally annihilated in the Prajiiiipiiramitii sutras. 15lc line 26). 1962). dharmatii-ni$yanda-buddha (Nanjio. The Yogiiciira Idealism (Varanasi: Motilal. It is clear that they were thought in reference to the physical body so long as they were char-acteristics possessed by a worldly king. an ascetic. the siif! lbhogika or the nairmiit~ika kiiya. p. TaishO. kayab" Tib. 226: "Though He ( = Tathiigata) is in phenomena and is Himself but phenomenal. noticed the thirty-two marks and predicted that the child would become a Buddha. Mahiiyiina-saf!lgraha-bhii$ya ( ~l j( tion. Ratnagotra-vibhiiga (ll. p. it is told that both sriivakas and bodhisa-ttvas joined the same asembly and listened to the same sermons. however. .: "ngo bo nyid kyi sku ste I sku gang Ia bzhugs nas mngon par rdzogs par byang chub ste 14. All Buddha's biog-raphies record the incident of Asita. did the Buddha teach? In such a case. Yamaguchi. who. ( ~fj Jlt ). "svabhaviko yasmi111 kaye vyavasthite 'bhisambudhyate . Chatterjee.. The . 13. not a bodhisattva? Although these questions are not easily answered.. But. ed. 15. ¥G f~ . A. these translations may be connected with the idea of the Reward-body. however.

pp. of the two-body theory composed of the True body and the Assumed-body. 140b line 29). some people adopted a method called 00 iiit i'JIf! : the True body ( iiit . and is expounded in the Mahavanasutralaf!lkara (XI. 20.44. and (Japanese trans. XLIV. lines Tib. p. to these two. special mention may be S. On the other hand. adopted the method of Assumed-body added. 21. conversely. Taisho. But at the same time it may be said that this ambiguity is what serves to manifest the significance and the double character of the saf!lbhogika-kaya or the Reward-body. the Assumed-body ( If!. XVIII. K. 22. there is some conceptual indistinctness in their spheres.EG'. 239. the same author quotes from the MSA. Taisho. cit.!l ): therefore. XXX. there is transcendence of it. K. op.§} ) is divided (unfolded) into the Dharma-body and the Reward-body. Some others. Various sastras can be referred to with regard to the idea abiding in nirvana.) = p. '3f: ~ or i'f!(.. As has been Assumed-body. pp. p. '3f: ~ in Chinese) appears in various sutras. p. According to the former.252 NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 he yet knows that true nature of phenomena and therefore transcends it at the same time. 267 lines 12-16 (in Skt.38. vol.ff. A. three Buddha-bodies. p. p. In the Notes to Chapter 10 . vol. the said Assumed-body is almost the same as the Reward-body of the former in content. it seems that in Indian sastras. the Mahayana-saf!lgraha (TaishO. ple. Chatterjee. The interpretation through the Chinese terms "augmenting" ( i'J)and "unfolding" ( 00 ) adds to the ambiguity regarding the meaning of the triangular concept that differs in principle from the meaning of the two-body theory that simply treats of diametric bodies. they precisely took the position. 'the non-abiding in saf!lsara' ( ~ {i ~ ~ ). in short. and so forth. XXXI.I2). however. 230. Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism (Bombay: 1956). but according to the latter. But. vol.§}) is added to form the three bodies. p.30. 19. Sthiramati MadhyantavibhagaJika. This gatha expounds the two kinds of saf!lbhara (equipment): "The equipment of merits" promises an existence in this world like that of a god or of a cakravartin (Emperor as a conqueror)." Among them. the Bodhisattvabhumi (p. these ways of thinking only figured out the three Buddha-bodies by dividing either the True body ( the Assumed-body ( ff! . Yamaguchi ed. In order to set up a system of the three bodies and clarify the distinctions between them. the system of the triangular concept of the three Buddha-bodies has been established by instituting the saf!lbhogika-kaya. 576b). Hui-yuan." In connection with these two aspects. restored). The word i'f!{f!E. (Cf. the Reward-body is different from the Assumed-body. chiian 19. A. "the equipment of knowledge" signifies that in spite of the above. 68. 187 lines 14-22. 414. Ta-ch'eng-i-chang. This can be regarded as describing the two aspects of. 839a-840c). Coomaraswamy. 23. XVIII.. because underlying them were the principles of "augmenting" ( i'J ) and "unfold-ing" ( 00 ). XX-XXI.

XXX p. ranging from a theory of one body to that of ten bodies. correspond to the one word tathatiijfliina-buddha (Suchness-wisdom Buddha). p.It~ (detaining the obstacles of defilement. instead. 34). p.. It should be noted that "siii'J'Ibhogika-kiiya" has been scarcely use in the Lankiivatiira. p." Shind6 ed. The commentator Haribhadra also states that there are different views. chiian 9. According to this. Hui-yiian seems to refer to the 'Four chiian Lankiivatiira' ( 1!9 ~ tfl i1JID. He himself seems to favour the theory of fourfold body (the sviibhiivika-kiiya. Siii'J'Ibhogika-kiiya. His book was. 28. or as far down as among dogs. Buddhas or Bodies.95 in the Skt. written by Ayurvardhana or Jigme . 326a). 670. Lankiivatiira Sutra. some advo-cating the threefold body and some the fourfold body. Since the siil'!lbhogika-kiiya is especially the source of the Buddha's merits. In this siitra.. Buddhabhumy-upade5a ( fiJt ±f. XVI. -. The Wisdom Buddha (the second) and the Suchness Buddha (the first). Hui-yiian gives here many four-body theories other than the one described above. the Reward Buddha. not four. 482b lines 17-19). Cf." for the purpose of benefiting others. chiian 7 (TaishO.49 and 11. and VIII. This last one. but at the same time. Nanjio. the third of the four Buddhas mentioned by Hui-yiian. 532b). 226. 24. probably conveying the same meaning. In mentioning these four Buddhas. pp.I of the Abhisamayiilal'!lkiira. 481b lines 8-9 and p. 31 line 10). the second one. p." These passages correspond respectively to the gathas 11. originally devoted to the enumeration of almost all the Buddha-body theories. (Tokyo: 1935). original (B. Again. translated by Gul)abhadra of the Liu-Sung dynasty (TaishO. Among these four kiiyas." ibid. the Incarnation Buddha. however. which is trans-lated in other Chinese versions of the vipiikastha. I shall not go into Lankiivatiira into ~[J ~ detail here. Ch' eng-wei-shih-lun ( 26.Bodhisattvabhumi (p. the tathatiijfliina-buddha. the bodhisattva is said "to let himself be born even among the car:u. In the phrases. Judging from these points. which corresponds exactly to the Chinese translation fiJt or ~ ~[J ~ ~ fiJt . 670. in fact. vol. it is questionable whether this one word can be divided into two to make a total four Buddhas. no. one takes birth in accordance with his vow. is probably equal to the dharma-kiiya or sviibhiivika-kiiya. namely. TaishO vol. are found: just intentionally. 841b). it reminds us of the name jfliina-dharma-kiiya (Wisdom-dharma Body) which appears in the Abhisamaya-iilal'!lkiiraloka (see note 28). and the Merit Buddha (the third) reads vipiikaja or ¥fi ~ fiJt (Buddha born as a result or as a reward). Hui-yiian must have called it the "Merit Buddha. dharma-kiiya.!! *I~ ). and the Suchness-wisdom Buddha. the Merit Buddha. taken together. and the nairmiitzikakiiya). the Incarnation Buddha (the fourth) reads nairmiitzika (buddha). does not appear. the names "Reward Buddha" ( ¥fi fiJt ) or "Rewardingly- born Buddha" (¥fi ~ fiJt) can be seen. p. is specified and called "jiiana-dharma-kaya" (Wisdom-dharma Body) in the Hor chos 'byung (The Buddhist History of Mongolia. because it might be that the siitra originally gave only three. dharma-kiiya. 25.lala (outcasts). The Ta-ch' eng-i-chang ( 7:.

I2 (Peking ed.. p. though views on it are not necessarily the same..67-74. as for the relationship of the eight vijiiiinas and the four wisdoms. (Its Tibetan translation differs from it. pratyavek$d-jiidna. IX. krtyiinu$. and the threefold body (dharma-kiiya. p.) In the Chinese translation of the MSA. the four wisdoms (ddar5a-jiidna. 438A). the same can also be seen in the commentary by Asvabhiiva on the Mahiiyiina-saf!lgraha. trans-lated by Hslian-chuang (TaishO vol. which can be graphed as follows: Trikiiya dharma-kdya sdf!lbhogika-kdya nairmd!Jika-kdya Of these. there exist a number of phrases that are not contained in the Sanskrit text. The Ch' eng-wei-shihlun has adopted this Chinese translation of the MSA as it is.254 NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 Rigpi-dorje). samatd-jiidna. 261-1 to -2) that describes at a single place the relationship between the above three. p. It is Sthiramati's commentary on the Mahaydnasiitrdlaf!lkiira (MSA). but the relationship between the four wis-doms and the trikiiya is different: the iidarsa-jiiiina and the samatii-jiiiina are appor-tioned to the sviibhiivika-kiiya: the pratyavek$a-jiiiina to the siif! lbhogika-kiiya. but refer to the relationship be-tween the eight vijiiiinas.. the five primary vijiidnas). Peking reprint ed. nairmdl)ika-kdva) came to be clearly recognized and consolidated. and for the relationship with the trikaya. 10.60 (Tibetan Tripitaka. sdf!lbhogika-kdya. 108. it . and the krtviillU$/hiina-jiiiina to the nairmiil)ika-kiiya. relating to the eight vijiiiinas and the four wisdoms (Shind6 ed . vol. kli$!a-manas. 15). views same as the above can also be seen in the general explanation of asrayapariivrtti in Sthiramati's commentary on MSA. p. IX. ibid. IX.thdna-jiidna). XXXI. the four wisdoms and the trikiiya. mano-vijiidna. According to them the relationship between the eight vijiiiinas and the four wisdoms is the same with Sthiramati's interpretation given above. 27. 251-3. The tradition of this specification was probably created in Tibet and has been widely accepted in Tibetan Buddhism.. It seems to be quite late in history that the mutual relationship between the eight vtjiidnas (d/aya-vtjiidna.

the object of learning. Obermiller introduces what is called "Candragomin 's theory. 1960). Of these two theories. severe debates took place between them. E. In this school. includes indistinct points (E. Obermiller. The author has many other treatises.61 and 11. we see. (Tokyo: lwanami Shoten. 1. but the limits between the three bodies are not clearly shown so far as the virtues attributed to them are con-cerned. Madhyantavibhaga. and fruit (pha/a). 2. 32. Tetsugaku Kenkyu. Nagao. all doctrinal statements are divided into three categories: object (viwva. By this I mean that Asmiga and Vasubandhu did not intend to establish a new school in opposition to the Madhyamaka idea. La somme du grand vehicu/e (Louvain: Bureau du Museon. 366-371 ( 1947-1948).68. XXXI. p. 1.149-152 and 11. mostly following the three-body system. vol. Similarly in 11. it is also a well-known fact that after the Miidhyamika and the Yogiiciira were established as two indepen-dent schools. Theories on the Buddha-body. 139b. Even in Yasubandhu's Trismhhiivanirdesa... 111.7. See G. vols. See note 21 above. II. 26). tome II. p. discussions are carried on in the form of a mutual confrontation involv-ing the twofold body. In Ill. among which see "Asrayaparivrtti and A~rayaparavrtti" (Nippon Bukkyo Gakkai Nempo. The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle-to Salvation. such as the Body of Ultimate Truth and the Body of Conven-tional Truth. 1938). 34.37. 101). a view close to Sthiramati's interpretation (Shind6 ed. 30. MSA. Notes to Chapters 10-11 however. A Study on the Ratnagotra-vibhaga (Uttaratantra). I and the rest. III. 110 (11. Lamotte. MSA. XXXIII (Roma: Instituto Italiano Per I I Medio Ed Estremo Ori-ente. Ibid. 1978). practice (pratipatti).17). 28.22c. 3. in Vasubandhu's Trif!!sika. 1966). Serie Orientale Roma. 31. especially." whose description. 35. Takasaki Jikido. p. TaishO. are expounded in the Ratnagotra. especially in its Sthiramati's commentary. Vijiianas and the three natures are the two main theories of this school and correspond to the first category. a kind of "sequence of exposition" in that the the-ory of vijiianas is first expounded extensively and then the three-nature theory is explained briefly. However. 25. there is a tendency rather to pull back the concept of the three-fold body to that of the twofold body. 29. 33. Reprinted in Chukan to Yuishiki (Miidhyamika and Yijfiiinaviida). IX.38-41. Chapter 11: Logic of Convertibility I. M. which takes the three-nature . "The Fundamental Standpoint of the Madhyamaka Philosophy" (in Japanese). in the above book see III "Keypoint in the Discourse" of the Introduction. a practitioner's object of learning). The same sequence can be found also in Asailga's Mahayana-saf!!graha. In this regard the idea is somewhat closer to Hinduism. 10.

theory as its main theme.36.1 and p. the sequence of exposition is the same. . S. Levi's ed . 4..11. Trif!!sikii-bha$va. Sthiramati. 16. p.

II. nos. we see only the one-directional movement from cause to effect. However. It is possible to interpret Hsiian-tsang's transla-tion in that way. Of "evolving" in a reverse direction.21 are summarized. See below and note 9.20. (vol. See note 8. no. Trif!lsikii-kiirikii." Such an understanding seems to be largely influenced by the special liking (commonly found in China) to apply notions of neng ( ~~ active. tome I. 421 (Hsiian-tsang's translation. M. it is an "evolver" because from the seed all eight cognitions evolve and come into being. pp 63-64). hatred. Sylvain Levi ed.35 (Sylvain Levied. But. 13. 654. In the Mahiiyiina-sutrii/af!lkiira. TriiJ1sika-bhii~va. p. "On the word Paryiiya" ( 1940). we see the term paryiiyef)a used in the following manner: "It is really mind that ap-pears in various ways as greed. Mahiivyutpatti. The "twofold evolving" is discussed also in the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun. 148. Sakaki edition. Nagao. 206. The "twofold evolving" in the Ch' eng-wei-shih-/un is translated by Hsiian-tsang ( :m: ~~ f£ phala-parif)iima)." and so on are discussed. 8. not the reverse di-rection. Hsiian-tsang's translation of parif)iima (evolv-ing) as neng-pien ( ~~f£ evolver) is on the same line. it also appears in various modes (citriikiiram) such as faith. the general understanding of the "two-fold evolver" in the Fa-hsiang school is as follows. his discussion is focused on simply the nature of "evolving. La Somme du Grand Yehicu/e. according to the occasion (paryiiyef)a). 6. Lamotte. TaishO vol. ed. and so on. pp. p.. they are also referred to as "evolvers" in that they evolve into the two divisions of subject and object. ad Xl. 406-412. It evolver. 12. doer) and so ( jiJT passive. where the terms "sarruiina. G. They thereby represent all phenomenal appearances.3 and 49. reprinted in Chukan to Yuishiki (1978). In such an interpretation.3.256 NOTES TO CHAPTER II 5. Note's to Chapta II . however. text appended to his Japanese translation of the Mahiiyiina-saf!lgraha. Yasomitra. Wogi-hara ed. 32. p. Kuo (pha/a) refers to these eight cognitions that are the fruits of the seed. Trif!lsikii-bhii~ya. Pradhan ed. I) P. p. on the same page. See also Abhidharmakosa-bhii~ya.. Yin (hetu) refers to seed. Sthiramati. The confrontation with the SiiJTikhya is a great concern not only in the Vijiiiina-viida but also in Buddhism in general. 204. 1558) and Yasomitra's commentary on it. 76.1. XXIX.46. 15. at the same time. See Yasomitra's commentary on the Abhidharma-kosa. R. 10. also explains the term "paryiiya" in the meanings of vise~a and krama." "parif)iima. 9. p. See author's paper. and so on... p.19. There is a tendency in the Fa-hsiang school to understand the word "cog-nition" in terms of "cognizer" which is contrasted to the term "cognizable. done) to many verbal stems (forms)." 7. 16.. Wogihara edition. kk. as it seems that as the dichot-omy is essential in cognition. Sylvain Levi ed. Sthiramati does not mention here the dichotomy of subject and object." 16. 14. but its explanation seems to be fairly different from that of Sthiramati. E. English translation is the author's.

Sylvain Levi ed .. 21. p.27: ni~pannas tasya piirvel)a sadii rahitatii tu yii. 36: G.18). ibid . see. tome I.37: Nagao. Etienne Lamotte understands it to be katham Ui /tar na). Sthiramati's Madhyiinta-vibhiiga-(ika. La Somme du Grand vehicule.. 1935). especially S. that is. p.39. It is further explained to mean "in some such form" (yathii). Lamotte. 75.7] rahitatii ca dharmatii. p. tome I. Etienne Lamotte also gives iikiira here. I) p. The author's interpretation of the passage discussed above differs greatly from that of Dr. though other-dependent in nature. (vol. it differs from both the imagined and the consummated (11. Levied. 83: I gal te rnam grangs kyis gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid ngo bo nyid gsum du zin na I 'o na ji !tar ngo bo nyid gsum bye brag med parmi 'gyur zhe na I rnam grangs gang gis gzhan gyi dbang yin pa des kun brtags pa rna yin I yongs su grub pa rna yin no I I rnam grangs gang gis kun [tu] brtags pa yin pa des gzhan gyi dbang rna yin I yongs su grub pa rna yin no I I rnam grangs gang gis yongs su grub pa yin pa des gzhan gyi dbang rna yin I kun brtags pa rna yin no I I 18. See E.I) 17. see. (iikiira) corresponds Gupta has translated it as ~ ~ yin-yiian and Paramiirtha as \Z9 might have been nimitta rather than iikiira. H. [40. 40. With regard to the notion of the "consummated" (parin~panna). does not agree with ~0 ju in the three Chinese translations. For this and the following statement by Sthiramati. La Somme du Grand Vehicule. 86: sangs rgyas bcom !dan 'das rnams kyis I theg pa chen po shin tu rgyas pa bstan pa gang yin pa'i bstan pa der kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid ji !tar rig par bya zhe na I med pa'i rnam grangs bstan pas rig par bya'o I 25. but on the basis of Tibetan rnam pa and Yasubandhu's commentary." By this I mean that the "consum-mated" means to be perfected and accomplished only through practice. It does not .2): it goes on to say that the other-dependent establishes itself neither as defilement nor as purity. 16. Etienne Lamotte.32. E. p. 20. however.I) p. 23. Lamotte. 13 f The Mahiiyiina-saiJlgraha also equates cognition with abhuta-parikalpa which. p. (vol. the author has adopted iikiira. Ui seen in his Studies of the Mah_viina-saiJlgraha (Tokyo: !wanami Shoten.4-5] lena griihya-griihakel)a paratantrasya sadii sarvakiilafTl atyantarahitatii yii sa pariniwanna-svabhiival:J. p. 24. M. Instead of yathii.4-5 and 40. it should be noticed that it is closely related to "practice. is the basis for the "unreal" appearances (11. Yamaguchi ed . p. La Somme du Grand vehicle.7 respectively: [40. tome I. 22. Nagao (vol. For an extensive treatment of abhuta-parikalpa. which.. p. Tril!lsikii-bht'i$ya..16. Na-gao. 19.

however. I) from the Abhidharma-mahiiyiina-siitra and is explained as a synonym of iilaya-ri)tiiina and as the basis/cause for both saf!Jsiira and nirvii! Ja." see note 25. tome I.81. La Somme du Grande Vehicule. tome I. The word pari?1iima or pari?uimallli is translated into Tibetan. tome I. 81 d. p. 33. 81. 35. as 'gyur.56. Sthiramati. 29. and so forth that have the meaning "evolving.9-10 and pp. For the specific meaning of the term "consummated" as closely related to "practice. 11. The same term.6-7. The merit-transference is explicated in Madhyiinta-vibhiiga 11.!!. wmgssu-bsngo-ba. All of them give cyuti (death) instead of upapatti (birth). 101: gnas ni de nyid gnyi ga'i char gtogs paste I gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid do. 0 pari!l£ll/lil1i-cruri. 34. 28. The term "aniidikiiliko dhiitu/:1" (dhiitu from time immemorial) is found in a verse quoted in the Mahiiyiina-saf!Jgraha (l.13. Sylvain Levi. Nagao. XI.44 7-13 the contents of which are here summarized." probably from the meaning "ele-ment. Trif!Jsikii-bhiirva. 59.2) p. According to the Sanskrit text of the latter. 26. p.52. Notes to Chapters 11-12 .2) p. 36. p. when the San-skrit term is used in the meaning of "transference. 0 parioati-cruti. 25. The "means" (upiiya) here refers to the means for acquiring "realization" (abhisamava). and in Mahiiviina-siimilw!J/aira Y.10. XX-XXI. Madhviinta-vibhiiga. Etienne Lamotte. S. is understood to mean the tathiigata-garbha in the Ratnagotravibhiiga (Johnston ed. Nagao. region. Yamaguchi. La Somme du Grande Whicu/e. It is to be established each and every time and consummated by everyone through practice alone.9. p. unrelated to and prior to practice. Etienne Lamotte. XYI. The phrase also appears in other texts such as the Srlmiiliidn·l and the Lwikavatdra with some modifications. !. 30. Y. The Tibetan translation of the Srimaladevi suggests that the same Sanskrit form as that in the Lmikiil'(ltt/ra has been used in it." But. p. but the meaning does not change on account of that. 101: gzhan gyur pa ni gang gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid de nyid kyi gnyen po skyes na gang kun nas nyon mongs pa'i cha ldog cing rnam par byang ba'i char gyur pa'o. 32. 37. and so forth. it is defined as hetu "cause. Nagao (vol. 72) that quotes the same verse. Y.3. Etienne Lamotte. 86-87. (vol I) p. (vol.6. p." 27. which is equal to entering the path of insight (darsanamiirga) or the first blulmi. yod pa rna yin pa dang I nor ba'i don snang ba'i gnas ( = asadbhranty-artha-pratibhasaasraya) gang yin pa 'di ni gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid do. existing. or world" as in the case of lokadhiitu.258 NOTES TO CHAPTER II signify an absolute being. it appears in various forms: acintm-pari!1iima-C\'llli. usually. bsgyur. Very often in Buddhist texts. This Sanskrit form is taken from the Mahiiwina-stltrdlanlkdra. 31. Madhwinta-l·ibhiiga-{lkii.'' the Tibetans have translated it as bsngo-ba. and so forth. Dhatu means esentially "element" although it is also widely used in the meanings of "sphere. La Somme du Grande Whicule..

41. what is the motive of that production or "transformation" in the phrase. p.) comment on this word extensively. 1956). "transformation. Conze. 3. Mahayana-sutralaf!lkiira. 162. p. Ibid .. First translated 1981. See. Conze. Conze. Ibid . For a discussion on the Bodhisattva's practice of "not abiding in nirviil)a" and "taking birth in this world willingly." The phrase "by mind" must suggest a special intention. 69.. E. (New York: Penguin Books. Louis Renou ed. For Asvabhava's commentary. such a body is not be specified as "inconceivable. the great being. The translation above is the author's. . How-ever. . 5. p. "body produced by mind?" It is natural that a body is produced or created by previous karman. The Holr TeachinR of' Vimalakrrti (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. F. bodhisattvena mahasattvenaivam aprati~!hitafTl cittam utpiidayitavyafTl yan na kvacitprati~!hitafTl cittam utpiidayitavyam. 219. pp. Buddhist ThouRht in India (Woking and London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 7. p.. p. p.. E. 47 for an earlier trans-lation of this verse. Buddhist Wisdom Books. 1961 ). Both Kenryu Tsukinowa (in his edition of the Srimaltidevi. the essence of which is cetanii." instead of as "merit-transference. p. 47-48. Chapter 12: Ontology in Mahayana Buddhism I. p. Keiji Nishitani. Therefore. notes I and 2) and Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin (in his Siddhi. Hinduism. "trans-formation. 1962). 2. to transfer merit. Hindu Myths.. They understand it in accordance with the Chinese pien-i. p. 3536: . The author has modified the last sentence of Thurman's translation. (New York: Washington Square Press. see Tibetan Tripitaka.' p. it is not satisfactory to understand manomaya-kaya simply through the interpretation of pari(lamiki as pien-i. should thus produce an unsupported thought. 4-5. the will of mind. 8.. the intention to be born with a body into the sam-saric world. Conze's translation reads: . he should produce a thought which is no-where supported by form. 25. The word manomaya-kaya is an old term that appears in the Agamas and Nikiiyas.38.4 and for Sthiramati's commentary. Vajracchedika Praj1iaparamita (Roma: lsMEO. Reprinted 1983)." 39. 40 for the following statement." However. 1 4. 6.5. p. vol 108. Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty trans. that is. Peking edition (To-kyoKyoto: reprint edition). 39. 40. 81. 1981 ). and this intention or motive is none other than pari(lamana. 57. p.. ibid. E. Thurman. See also. Shuky(i to wa Nanika (What is Religion' ) (Tokyo: Sobunsha. Robert A. . 1974)." refer to the author's paper.. the Bodhisattva. 288. and p. 219. 503 ff. "The Bodhi-sattva Returns to This World" included in this volume. Sylvain Levi. p.

Takausu. A Translation of his Miilamadhyamakakarika with an Introductory Essay (Tokyo: Hokuseido-shoten. Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin. Streng. 4.22:tathagata-bha~ital) siitriintiil) . Gadjin M. Of the triple truth. Bibliotheca Buddhica IV (St. AI. 129: "Therefore. Here the text is paraphrased. we have the triple truth. 1978). XY. 1." 7. ''The Vigrahavyavartanf of Niigiirjuna with the author's Commentary. XXIV. Ibid.p. p. 213. Candrakirti. K. p. Third ed. R.. we have the triple knowledge. 500. 503. op. 17-18. E. p. p. MMK. p. pratipadarp ca I ekiirtharp nijagiida prar:tamiimi K. Bhattacharya. Mulamadhvamakakarikas de Nagarjuna. MU/amadhyamakakarikas (madhyamikasutras) de Nagarjuna. The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu: Office Appliance Co. cit. 6. p. Y.). p. its auto-commentary: na mama kiicid asti pratijfiii. Madhyantavibhaga-bha$ya. Miilamadhyamaka-karika. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 64.. which is at the same time the Void.303. Prasannapada Madhyamakavrtti (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve. Notes to Chapters 13-14 . Frederick J.15. pp. p. J. 1955).14. Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville & New York: Abingdon Press. U. 24.. Inada. pp.23 (English translation) and p. avec Ia Prasannapada Commentaire de Candrikirti. Thurman. A Buddhist Philosophi-cal Treatise Edited for the First Time from a Sanskrit Manuscript (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation. The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna (Vigrahavyavartani) (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Other translations by modern scholars are available in: Jacques May. p. the temporary is at the same time the middle.3. 1964). 1970). Nagarjuna. lll.Bodhisattva-bhumi. H. 2. T.. 3. ume: 1948-1951. 29: niisti ca mama pratijfiii." Melanges chinois et bouddhiques.l8 and MV. Cf. 1959). 12. Murti. 5. Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin. the Void is at the same time the temporary. p. Petersbourg: 1903-13). Chapter 13: From Miidhyamika to Yogiicara An Analysis of MMK. objectively. 7-8. MMK. and subjectively. Johnston and Arnold Kunst. 504. Kenneth K. 148.. Madhyantavibhaga. p. Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin. Nagao ed. Vigrahavyavartani. p. 237.2.. 14. 3 and p..260 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 12-13 9. 1967). Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin. II: anirodham anutpiidam anucchedam asasvatarp I anekiirtham ananartham aniigamam anirgamarp desayam asa sarpbuddhas tal)1 vande vadatarp vararp J 10.1-2 I. siinyata pratisarpyuktiil) idarppratyayatii-pratftyasamutpiidiinulomiil) I 13. p. See also Bhattacharya.Wogihara. 16. 15. 29 (Sanskrit text).

An Analysis of MMK. K. 15. But at the same time it is stated that perceiving the truth of cognition-only. May. Cf. and when an outer object is not perceived. p. too. 161. XXIV. 339a. 840. 145 (s. 443-454. "The Bodhisattva Returns to This World. 1975).1-2 and then in verses V. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (New Haven: Yale University Press. Upiidiiya)." Reproduced in the present volume. n. Religion and Nothingness. May. 16.v.8. Bhavaviveka interprets upiidiiya-prajflapti as "nye bar len pa dag Ia brten nas gdags pa" in his Prajfliipradipa-mulamadhyamakavrtti. 2. Madhyiintavibhiiga. the cognition-only that is different from the first one and equal to tathatii (suchness). 24.23-24. 1978). 12. Actually. reprinted in the present volume. and in which impressions of both subject and ob-ject (griihadvyaviisanii) are extinguished. Stcherbatsky. F.. Chapter 14: Ascent and Descent Two-Directional Activity in Buddhist Thought I. . D.6. 1936). by Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: University of California Press. or parini$panna-svabhiiva (consummated nature). Prajflii-pradipa-!ikii.1-2" reproduced in the present volume. its discussion on the Middle appears initially in verses 1. 1953). p. Avalokitavrata." Therefore. 66-82. For these discussions. in Chukan to Yuishiki (Madhyamika and Vijfianavada: A Collection of papers on the Mahayana Philosophy) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. 214-215. 16. ed. 3. T. we can find the affirmation of the non-being of outer things and being of cognition-only. 237. the non-being of outer things is perceived. Madhyiinta-vibhanga. "Elucidation of the Middle and Extremes. G.6). it can be interpreted to be more a "Madhyamaka-sastra" than that of Nagarjuna. please refer to the author's article: ''From Madhyamika to Yogacara. 10. 9. the perceiving subject likewise is not perceived (MV. 227-3. pp. Suzuki. is re-attained.. After the realization of such sunyatii. Nagarjuna's Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarasi-dass. 27. Edgerton. 14. 13. "Elucidation of the Middle. p. Keiji Nishitani. pp. 1982). Louis de Ia Vallee Poussin." is generally used. 1. See the author's article "On the Title Madhyiinta-vibhiiga" (in Japanese). 1. In the earlier Yogacara. Bibliotheca Buddhica XXX (Moscow: Academy of Sciences of USSR Press. M. 238. 494. Candrakirti. p. pp. trans. 97. p. Venkata Ramanan. 95. n. "What Remains in Siinyata" in Mahiiyiina Buddhist Meditation. p. 17. p. II. Th. n. The Tibetan Tripi!aka (Peking edition). Minoru Kiyota (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii. but the author himself states that the treatise was originally called Madhya-vibhiiga. ed. The following is an abridged translation. p. 1978). 247-1-2.l8 and MV. The title. Nagao. p. 840. Tibetan Tripi!aka (Peking edition).

2. 9. However. xv. respectively. there was no mention of a knowledge that corresponds to the "knowledge acquired subsequently. Chapter 16: Yogacara-A Reappraisal I. Herein lies the difference between the three kinds of non-discriminative knowledge (of the Mahavanasar.2. xiii. 7. 3. . 5.l3. xxiv. Buddhism (New York: Philosophical Library. The other two. Edward Conze. 4. Kasyapa-parimrta. p. This division is probably a commonly accepted one.1-2. 10. MMK.262 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 15-16 Chapter 15: Emptiness I. there was no explanation of how knowledge through intuition worked upon the world. knowledge through intuition.d. Phrases in the invocational salutation stanzas of the Stanzas on the Middle. and (3) knowl-edge through intuition. sutta no. I once heard a lecture in which knowledge was divided into three kinds: (I) knowledge through the senses. (2) knowledge through reason. Intuition was mentioned.l30. That is.8: sunyata-dr$/i. represent the ordinary way of thinking and they can be seen as corresponding to pratvak$a (direct perception) and to anumana (reasoning). The third one. MMK.ll. 121. This idiomatic phrase that expresses the essence of dependent co-arising is often followed by the formula of the twelve members dependently co-arising. n. 8. 6. MV 1. is concerned especially with religious real-ization and corresponds to "nondiscriminative wisdom"in Buddhism. See Stanzas on the Middle. Analvsis of the Middle and Extremes. Stanzas on the Middle.nRraha) and the three kinds of knowledges explained by the lecturer. in that lecture.J." which is characterized as being both discrim-inative and non-discriminative or as the unity of reason and intuition. the three kinds of knowledges explained by the lecturer do not ac-count for the direction of ''descent" that follows from the summit of non-discriminative intuitive knowledge. section 65. but we wonder how it functions in the next mo-ment. Stanzas on the Middle. Ana/vsis of the Middle and Extremes. MMK. MV l. Majjhima Nikaya. Moreover.

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" Journal of Religious Studies. - "The Terminologies of the Mahiiyiina-siitriilarpkiira" (in Japanese). nos. 1934. Fundamental Standpoint of Madhyamika Philosophy. Poona: 1953." Melanges chinois et bouddhiques. 3. New York: SUNY Press. Tokyo: 1956." Weiner Zeit-scrift fur die Kunde Siid-und Ostasiens Ill. La Vallee Poussin.. Skt. . "Le petit traite de Vasubandhu-Niigiirjuna sur Ies trois natures. 1989. E. 1959. Johnston. Frauwallner.. ed. H.. Kyoto: 1947-1948. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies. 2• vol. - Chukan Bukkyo Ronk6 (Madhyamika Buddhism Miscellanies). A eds. Nagao. sein Werk und seine Entwicklung. - "Trisvabhiivanirdesa of Vasubandhu. Reprint Tokyo. 1972. 8." Tetsugaku (Journal of Philosophical Stud-ies). pp. consult "Appendix-Sources of Essays" on page 227. Gadjin. For a complete list of articles used in the publication of this book. Sthiramati. new series No. 1972). 1931. A. Kyoto: Kyoto University. 1941. 1932-33. V. Journal Articles Bareau. John Keenan trans. Neuvieme volume 1948-1951. 121-130. V. 1947. 1954. Tokyo-Kyoto: K6bund6-shob0.268 BIBLIOGRAPHY - Bukkyo ni okeru Mu to U tono Tairon (Controversy between the Theories of Nonbeing and Being in Buddhism). B. E. 1966. pp. "Digniiga. N. - ed. text and Japanese translation with annotation. Royal Asiatic Society." Silver Jubilee Volume of the Zinbun-Kagaku-Kenkyusyo. M. "Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asarpga. Gokhale. 147-161. Tokyo: Sunjusha.S. - ''Chukan-tetsugaku no Komponteki Tachiba (The Fundamental Standpoint of the Miidhyamika Philosophy). Louis de. - "An Interpretation of the Term "Sarpvf(i" (Convention) in Buddhism. and Kunst. 23. Madhyantavibhaga-Tfka." Vak no." Melanges chinois et bouddhiques. "The Vigrahavyiivartani of Niigiirjuna with the author's Commentary." Journal of the Bombay Branch. Reprinted in Chukan to Yuishiki. 4. 2. Reprinted in Yamaguchi Susumu Bukkyogaku Bunshu (Tokyo: Shunjusha. Nagoya: Libraire Hajinkaku. "Index of Vil'flsatika & Tril'flsika of Vasubandhu. ---Yamaguchi Susumu Bukkyogaku Bunshu. Tokyo: 1944. vol. 366-371. 186-207.

1966. VII. Tokyo: Sankibo Bud-dhist Book Store. ed. XXIX. vol. E. Bodhisattvabhiimi. 4. Dutt. First published in 1936. 65. 1971. "Asrayaparivrtti and Asrayapariivrtti. Chinese I Pali I Sanskrit I Tibetan Texts Abhidharmakosa-bha$ya of Vasubandhu. 121. Anguttara Nikiiya. iii. Nara: Shosogaku Seiten Kankokai. Wogihara. Troy Wilson. La Vallee Poussin. no_ 1558. Buddhabhumyupadesa. Prahlad ed. IV." Nippon Bukkyo Gakkai Nempo. See also. Derge Tanjur. Shindo Edition. XXX. See also. Ryiiko. 1954." French translation. 1585. TaishO. vol. ed. TaishO vol. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati. See also. sutta no.269 Organ. Cu/asufifiata sutta. Taisho. Taisho no. --. Bodhicaryiivatiirapanjikii. 2.. U. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko. Nalinaksa. . Jayaswal Institute. Bibliotheca Indica. July.S. Susumu. Kondo. Ch' eng wei shi lun. 1932-35. 1929. ed. ed. ed. Louis de. XXVI. no." Philosophy East and West. Two Parts. 9. "Jfiiinasiirasamuccaya. P. vol. Patna: K. Unrai.. Abhidharma-kosa-vyiikyii. 1960." Otani Gakuho.. Unrai Wogihara. XIX. Yamaguchi. "The Silence of the Buddha. Pralhad. ed. vol. Majjhimanikiiya. Pradhan. ed. Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga. Unrai. Patna: 1967. Honolulu: University of Hawaii. J. Radher. Tokyo: Seigo Kenkyukai. N. Tokyo University edition. 1931. Prajniikaramati' s Commentary to the Bodhicaryiivatiira of Siintideva. Wogihara."Vigrahavyiivartani. Bodhisattvabhumi. 3. Dasabhumika-sutra. Obermiller. C. ed. Pradhan. A${asiihasrikii." Acta Ori-entalia. Calcutta: 1901-1914. "The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation. Takazaki. Abhisamayiilaf!lkiiriilokii Prajfiiipiiramitavyiikhyii. Tibetan Sanscrit Works Series. Wogihara. Bodhisattvabhumi. ed. 983. XXXI. 1930. JA. 1950. 25. Jikiko. 1930-1936.

152. sutta 28: sutta 38: sutta 63 (Maluilkyaputta): sutta 72 (Vaccha-gotta): sutta 121. 1902-08. Sakaki.m). Nishio. 1971. S . Yamaguchi. xvi (mahaparinibbana-sutta): xxix (pasadika). 6001. 96. Madhvdntavibhdgaszitrabhdsvatika of Sthiramati. Part I. Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku.. B . Sylvain Levi. Laliravistara. ed. Reprinted Peking edition. Y. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.-Petersbourg: 1912.. TTP Larikavatdra-siitra. XXXI. Nagao. 1916. Pandeya.{ (The Buddhist Historr of Mongolia). ix (Ponhapada-sutta). vol. Derge Tanjur. S. La Vallee Poussin. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foun-dation. S . TaisM. La somme du grand ~'~'hicule. no. vol. ed. 1867. Mahiiviinasutriilarrzkara. 1923. Gadjin M. XVI. vol. Mahdmgga. Taishi5. Majjhima-nikdva. Written by Ayurvardhana or Kasyapa-parivarra a Mahaw'inasutra of the Ramakzita Class. Mahaviinasamgraha in E. Kyoto: lsseido Publishing Co . Madhvamakdvatiira. Lefmann. K. Lammote.. Madhyiintavibhiiga-siistra. 1938. G. no. von Stael-Holstein. London: Luzac. vol. Tokyo University edition. Peking edition.270 BIBLIOGRAPHY Dif. vol. Mahiiviina-sm.. Baron A. 1964. and Tucci.. XLV. C. R. Madhyiintavibhdgafikd. Calcutta Oriental Series no. 5531. re-printed Tokyo. 186. nos. 1926. Halle A. Shanghai: Commercial Press. --. 24. St. R. Kyoto: Otani University Press. 1932. 1966. ed.{ha-Nikara. Tanjur.Four chiian Lankavatara. ed. Sems tsams 3.nJ?raha-bhiisva. Nanjio. Champion. Louvain: Bureau du Museon. 1907. no. Mahiiparinibbdna-sutta. Madhyiinravibhiiga-bhiisya. Mdo sde rgmn gri 'grel bshad (Scltralarrzki'ira-l'rtti-bhds. ed. ed. Tais/u). Paris: H. vol. Jigme Rigpi-dorje. See also. Louis de. XXXVII. Madhvamaka-hrdava.. 187. Bibliography . vol. Hua-ren Wu-chiao-chang. Mi. 1934. Bhattacharya. Mahdvyutpatti. Lam-rim chen-mo. eds. A Tibetan Index to the Mahiivvutpatti. III. 670. ed. Kuan Wu-liang-shou ching shu. vol. Tsong-kha-pa. Hor chos 'bvunf. TTP vol. 108. ed. TaisM. 1941. no. Kyoto: Shingonshu Kyoto Daigaku. Taishi5 vol.

Sphu{iirthii Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii. Skt. Prajniipiiramitii-pif:ujartha-saf!lgraha in E. XXV. Ratniivali. 1971 reprint. La Vallee Poussin. First published in 1936. Paris: 1932. Prasannapadii. eds. text and Japanese translation with annotation. Yasomitra. C. Ratnagotravibhiiga Mahiiyiinottaratantra-siistra. 1950. ed. "Dignaga. and Watanabe. Pali-tipi{aka. 1903-13. 1927. See also La Vallee . Tokyo: Sank-ibo Buddhist Book Store. Prajnii-pradipa-miilamadhyamaka-vrtti. L' explication des mysteres. Tatt\'aSaf!lgraha-panjikii. I. ed. Prajnii-piiramitopadesa. Taisho. 8. pp. Frauwallner. Levi. Gaekwad Oriental series edition and Bauddha Bharati se-ries edition. Saf!ldhinirmocana Siitra. Takakusu. See Miilamadhyamakakiirikiis above. Louis de. 121-130.. xxii. TaishO Shinshu Daizokvo. Yamaguchi's Japanese translation in Chiikan bukkyo Ronko (Miidhyamika Buddhism Miscellanies). Saf!lyutta-nikiiya. St. 186-207. Saddharmapur.l(iarika.Miilamadhyamakakiirikiis (miidhyamikasiitras) de Niigiirjuna. ed. Bibliotheca Buddhica IV. 1931. Unrai. ed. new series no. XLIV. iv. avec Ia Prasannapadii Commentaire de Candrakfrti. ed. sein Werk und seine Entwicklung. Louvain-Paris: 1935. Ta-ch' eng-i-chang. Bendall. 1959. Piirvayoga-pari varta. Taisho. "Trisvabhavanirdesa of Vasubandhu. Sik~iisamuccaya. Nviiva-~a~tika. Tokyo: Taisho lssai-kyo Kanko Kwai. Prajna-pradipa-tika. ed. Tokyo: 1944. Sylvain. Trisl'Obhiivanirdda in Yamaguchi Susumu. vol." Wiener Zeitscrift fur die Kunde Sud-und Ostasiens III.. E.-Petersbourg: 1897-1902." Journal of Religious Studies. Saf!ldhinirmocana Siitra in Lamotte. TTP. vol. lxxxvii. ed.. St. TTP. Patna: Bihar Research Society.-Petersbourg. Wogihara. Johnston E. J. Trif!lsikii in Materiaux pour /'etude du s\'sthne Vijnaptimiitra. xxxiii. Bibilotheca Buddhica. H. K.

. See also. 1978. 1579. of Nagarjuna with the author's Commentary. Udiina I. vol. pp.272 BIBLIOGRAPHY Poussin. 110. (Vigrahavyiivartani). 2e vol. 1949-50. S G. vol. "Le petit traite de Vasubandhu-Nagarjuna sur les trois natures. Visuddhimagga." Melanges chinois et bouddhiques. vol. XXXI. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. TaishO no.. vol. Tucci. Paris: Librairie Orientalisle Paul Geuthner. Bhattacharya. 1930. Vajracchedikii Vigrahavyiivartani' in Johnston. 1585. Vijnaptimiitratiisiddhi in Vijnaptimiitratiisiddhi-La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang. Baroda: 1929. 147-161. 1932-33. TTP no. Taisho no. 1948-1951. IX. XXX. Vini§caya-saf!!grahani'-Yogdciirabhumi. English translation Pre-Diriniiga Buddhist texts on Logic.' Melanges chinois et bouddhiques. 5539. Louis de. Sh6s6gaku Seiten Kankokai.

216. emptiness. 41. pluralistic realism. 163. 45. 117 affliction: is itself enlightenment. emptiness (chenk'ung) and wondrous being (miaoyu). 20. 10. Reality. 192 ab ys s of de pr av ity . 216. negation. 186. realism. 213 Abhidharmic: dharmatheory. 174. 91 Abhidharma : philosoph y. 73. 17. 147. 56.Index of Terms A abandon moral precepts. 13 adventitious defilement (agantukaklesa). is it self bod hi . 167. 187 absolute: as universal subject. 211. 156. critique of. 21 ac ce pt an ce : ge ne ral (p op ul ar ). 55. 164. 179. 113. philosophy. IS.

244 all entities. 142 affir mati on: of this worl d. 73. 71 appearance: as khyana. of bewilderment/affli ction. 80. imagined nature as. 53. 69. II. of Buddha's threefold body. 10. 183. 33 agent: nouns. 39 almsgiving. 212 allseedconscience: (sarva-bijaka). II . are empty. of thi s wo rld . 228 appari tion. 175. functions as the mediator. 35 Ameri can Acade my of Religi on. 142.(enli ghte nme nt). 59. as occur-rence. 72 appearanceonly. 209. as the "transactor of linguistic conventions ''. 44. 73 appearer: 1012. as subject in the act of knowing . 141. 10. of def ile me nts . 70. of magical cre-ations. II aid for penetration: (nirvedhabhiigi ya). 43. 106. 93. 77 annih ilat ion : of the bas is. 72.

A r h a t s h i p . 2 3 . 236. Hinaya-nic Arhat's aim. in terms of five margas. as merit transfer. 5 2 a r i t h m e t i c a l r e m a i n d e r . 3234. 202 ascent: and descent. 32-34. to the Pure Land. 205. 20106. 222. 157 ascending: a Bodhisattva as a Buddha to be. 5 9 Aristotelian metaphys ics: the principle of contradic tion. as aspiration to maintain libera-tion. xii. 152. 220. iisrayaparavrtti as. from world of convention . as one of two directional tendencies. 220-25. and descent are the one and same. 9. as a way to interpret the teaching. 118. 120. 9 .

notion of ascent and descent found also in Christianity. 21. 1 7 attainme nt: of Budd hahoo d. 7 0 a t t a c h m e n t a c t i o n . 202 attach ed: to the absolu te. 5. 113. 27 iitman-theory. 1 6 5 a u s t e r i t y . 4. motivating power of. m ) . to the w o r l d . 9.and language. of fruit. 64 attach ment: being free of. 33. 71. 9 a t o m s : ( p a r a m i i r .

85 awareness of self. 196. 198. 145. 34 basic principle: of Buddhism. as . 24547.. 243. 103 B bag-a'. 3 1 awakening: initial. 64 basic: iisraya. the thought of enlightenme nt. 121. 195. 76. 79-80. 206 awakened one. 251. 8. 250. 64. 7. iilayavijiiana as.

77. 22S benefitting others. 140. 31. 2S8. 121 becoming different: (anyathatva). IS2. 202-04. 251 bliss. 43. ISO biographies: of Buddha. inten-tional. IS2. 78. as fault of sal]lsara. 77. 177. in accordance with vow. 223. of siil]lbhogika-kiiya. other-dependent as. see also evolution. 2S3. 223. to take willingly. 106. root meaning of. 10708. 207. 32 . re-cording the incident of Asita. 12S. is equal to nirviil)a. 114 bewildermenUaffliction: and enlightenment are absolutely worlds apart. 33. 126 being and non-being: both inconceivable. 64-71.274 agent. 176. 142. 111-12. 166. itself an awakened state. sys-tem of eight vijfiana as. 29. 7S. 60. with limitations and divi-sions. 119 benefit: for oneself. into Buddha family. by the force of superhuman power. of nirviil)a. 219. is identical to nirviil)a. 30. 113. 11. 91. 14S. 2S2. in the Pure Land. 183. 29. ISO. one of two kinds of birth-anddeath. cycle of. 31. (upapatti). of twelvefold causation. 117. 147. Ill. lSI birth and death (safTisiira). IS. 37. 20. 88. 48. 184 bhik~us and bodhisattvas: assemblage of. 224 benevolence. IIS-21. 144. 148. 43 beings without any (Buddha) lineage (agotra). 42. for confusion. 114. for others (parartha). IS2. 146. by the force of samadhi. 103. 81. 202. 76 birth. 16S. 177. by kar- man. lSI. incon-ceivably transformed (or incarnated). 2SI. 220. 30. of Bodhisattva-marga. as cause (hetu). as body. 112. 2S8. 89. 2S7. evolution of (-paravrtti: trans-formation of). 86. 60. vibhutva. one of two kinds of birth-and-death. svabhavika-kaya as. determined according to one's INDEX OF TERMS will (abhipreta). 86-88. constituted by inconceivable transference. 29. 134. 28. 14348. of Buddha as man. 30. is at once nirviil)a. by the force of vow. 131. 24. 2S. 9S. through inconceivable transformation (paril)amiki). 74. 150. which is the inconceivable merittransference. 177-79. II. 21. prati-~\ha as.

172. 108. 60 bodhi-being. as a Buddha-to-be. 143. 30. as seeker of truth. 9. 2SI. 38. 33. 210. 108. 119. practice of. 76. 99. understood in two ways. body/mind drops down (as put by Dogen). 77. 2S9. 106. enlightenment. 86. awakened state. 36. identical with defilement. 244. 28-32. 119. career of. ideal. 9. 38. 77. 185. 87. 134. 176. IS2. and philosophical thinking. 222. 109. 26. 192. 2S3. 193. follows the wrong way. 161 brahmic states (brahmavihara): friendliness (maitri). Queen Vaidehi as. 163. and equanimity or tranquil flow (upek~a). benefitting of others. as a celestial be-ing. 48 Bodhgaya. 36 body: accompanied by the organs of the sense. as a great religionist. 177. devotes himself to the work of benefitting others. 259. at Gaya. 20S. belongs to Buddha's lineage. 24S. rebirth of. as a compassionate being. 183. rejoicing (mudita). 91. 24. 71. final goal of. 64. 8487. stages of. 28 bodhi: as descent. path of (bodhisattva-marga). compassion (karul)ii). 92 Buddha. 23. and doctrine of dependent origination (pratltya-samutpada). as the asraya of charity. dwells anywhere and as anything he wishes. 142. 168. 203-S. activity of. realizes universality of Dharmarealm. 17S. 246. 168. 27. vehicle of. 78. 171-72. is not a bodhisattva. and doctrine of non-self (anatman). i-shen in Chinese. 161-63. 219. 34. refrains from entering into and does not dwell in nirviil)a. vow of. 22. assembly of. 114. in the Jiitaka tales. sravaka becomes a. birth of. 173. 103. domain of. 160. 246. 66. 112 brahman and atman: are one. 220. doctrine. 33. . "body produced by mind". 247. 37. 31. ISO. 7S. 251. 183. IOS-06. 123. not agi-tated with sal]lsara. 33. 202. as a misologist. 21. 110 bodhi-tree. 220.blissful silence: of Enlightenment. 84. 225. 249. 102. 4. IS. 100. ISO. 30. 90. "body with its organs" (sendriyakaya). 30. 33 bodhisattva. 88. 143 Brahma. enters and committed to sal)lsiiric life.

94. 73. 99. 181. 222. 159-63. 35. 20. 163. reluctant to preach the new-found Dharma. 67. own and special dharmas of. 122. 193. 13. Pure Land (Jodo Shin Shu). 100. 132 Buddha-land. marks of. 37 Buddha-wisdom. 147. 118. 64: cannot be syn-chronized with Western philosophical ideas. 237. 166. 181. 209-18: establishment of. 177.Index of Terms being. 189. 219. Pure Land of. Primitive. 158. stage of. 216. 203. 56. 4. 7. 88. II. 12. 90. 108. 149. 125. divided into two Mahayana schools. 101-02. and medi-tation. 256. 217. 163. 115. 7. 220-23. 221. 42. 113. 132. Gautama. Ill. 148. 213. 169 Buddha-nature. xi. 170. 164. 117 Buddha-to-be. 205-06. 205-06. Pali. Tibetan. wisdom of. 189. 61. 124: basic principle of. 33 Buddha-vision. emptiness in. 16769. body of. 115. own merits (buddha-dharma-paripaka) of. 205 Buddha-body (Buddha-kaya). earlier sectarian. 57-59. 81. 155-87. 169. highest principle of. 103-22. 36. 164. 77. pessimistic religion. has two aspects of philosophy and religion. 152 Buddhahood. 117. 160. 244 Buddhism. 117-119. 105. 35-49. 219: negation in. 186. 145. Middle Path of. 225. 83. 255 Buddha-dharma. 11314. 109. dharma as. 201. 74. 7. Sino-Japanese. 94. 251. soteriology in. 251. 91. 64. 91. 39. superknowledges (abhijiia) of. 120. 252. 95. Ill. Sakyamuni. 237. reli-gion strongly colored by philosophy. 33. 249. 159. qualities of. 173. 9. 225. 9. 110. Yogacara School of. 220. 213. 108. 24 Buddha-yana. 66. 202. 4. 251. subjec-tivity of. 183. dharma-delight of. Mahayana. 13. two directional move-ments in. 28. 79. possessed by all beings. 115. various teachings (dharma) of. 63. 115. 54. 117. and non-Buddhist Schools. 178. 158. 224. silence of. Ill. compassion of. as an ascent activity. former lives of. 42. 76. Vedantic. !57. 22. 63. Chinese Buddhism (of China). 84. career of. 212. not a philosopher. 250. 254. 24. 43. 103. 117. enlight-enment (awakening) of. 184. established ekayiina. vir-tue of. world view of. aim of. family of (gotra). 41. 67. salvation by. 158. 44 Buddha-eye. 158. 56. the-ory of. 51. 212: confrontation with Sarnkhya. fundamental standpoint of. opposes notion of god. propagator of the Doctrine (dharma). cultivation of. self (atman) in. 86. 63. 69. sphere of. par excellence. 7. stored by all living beings. 247. ontology of. 37. (phala-jiiana). 75 . 7.

52 cause: for attachment to the world. commentary on the Vijfziinamiitra-siddhi. siitras and sastras. 54. 23. 246. 130. 87. 19 chrysalis: becomes a buttterfly. as process of discrim-ination. 246. 36. 80. 120. 170. 2. 122 characteristic: of the two truths. revolving of eight as ba-sis for the mundane world. 70. 63. 8. for death. 256. 87. 87. for sarnsara. 126: explained in the theory of cognition. 183. 20. necessarily implies a dichotomy. 195. monks. 178 Chinese: Buddhism. 256. 146 cognition: (vijiiana) as discriminating a perceptual object. 30 celestial: beings. 74. 14. 216. 221. 80 . continuity-series (sarntana) of. 221. Buddhas or Dhyani-buddhas. way of thinking. ix. 128: vijiiana as. eight cognition or consciousness become four Buddha Wis-doms. 153 Buddhistic thinking. for liberation from sarnsara. 121. 87. 8 c canker: (asava) of "out-flowing impu-rities". asraya as. evolves and appears as two divisions. 66. 116. triple world as. for nirval)a. theory and the three-nature theory.Buddhist: logic. 120. 126. seven working. 228. worldview. four kinds for a Bodhisattva's birth. ontol-ogy. 33. 128. 121. 123. 183. classical language of. as subject/object dichotomy. 121. 130. 5. 61. 166. 157-159. 136. 212. 181. divi-sions of.

164. 92. 214. 242. 110. 92. 231. 195 commandments: of the Buddha. 62. 48 coming down. 178 conversion: (paravrtti) as convertibility. 6366. 220-22. 13-16. 58 contingent existence: (upadiiya-prajiiapti). from cause to effect. 80. 178. 65. 130. 257. 7. 88. 39. 130 convention: to be concealed. 164 conditionedness. 34. 126. as a turn-about. 68. ma-terial existence of sentient beings. 20. 212 conventional: existence. 70. 4. 212. 244. 242. 45 contradictory expressions: ( vyatyastapada). 243 contaminated world. 193. 130-38. 7 consciousnessonly. 244. of Buddhas and sa-ttvas. 56 continuity of existence: i. xi. 181. 46-49. 229-30 consummated world. 13. 72. theory of. 87.e.. 21. from contamination to purity. 66. 147 cognitive functions: thoughts of ordinary people. 20. 67-74. 180 conventional truth: definition of. 116. 184-86. 182-83. 205. 63 contaminations or defilements. 26-30. 146. meeting ground. 143 compassion: descends to sa111siira. 13. as representation-only (vijiiapti). 114. 125 continuity-series. 4. 102 compounded. karu!Jii. 176 Confucianism. 52 conditioned: (sa111skrta) dharmas. 201. 55. 238. 245. 184. 182. 10-12. 32 common: as ordinary or vulgar. 220 coming-hither. man. of bodhisattva. recovery of. of buddha. to cover universally. 215 consummated nature (parini~pannasvabhiiva). 32. 151-52. one of the four brahmaviharas. 224. 32. 22. terminology. established once but negated. 117. corporeal. 1820. 244. 28. see also upek~a. 14048. 59. 120. 22. of one's . sense.276 cognition-only: as mindonly. 15. from being to non-being. refers to ordinary truth. INDEX OF TERMS 142. 203-06. 180 concentration: of a mind that is signless (animitta111 cetosamiidhif11). denotes the world of enlightened ones. defined. 172.

152. procedure of. 124. 137. 135. 65 crucifixion and resurrection. found in the three-nature system. 18 covering: the Absolute. 72-74. 76. 132. 152. 22 Creation Hymn: (Niisadiya) of 8g-veda. xi. structure of. as sequence of exposition. to the Mahayana of the per-sons of the two vehicles. 150 converting cognition (vijiiana): into wisdom (jiiiina). 19 covering-manifesting. 156 crossing over. of three natures. 140-48. 102. body. principle of. . 68. 243. of the otherdependent to the imagined. 131-32. 115. of the world through nondiscriminative wisdom. 60. of the world. 136. of the imagined nature of the world into the consummated nature. logic of. 134. as translation of prayiiya. 29. 243. 157 covered truth. 4. from this shore to the other shore. 68. indicated by expression paryaye!Ja. as obstacle of (klesavara!Ja). 131. 24. 202 crystal: (spha!ika) simile of. of the other-dependent to the other-dependent. 140-48. 59. 181 deep compassion. of the other-dependent. I.whole existence. as the turning around of the basis. from bewilderment/ affliction to an awakened state. illustrated by similes. 58. 134. 135. 65. II. 130. 68-73. 79 Cosmological theory: of Buddhism. 52. the truth. 32. 69. 30. 183. 21. 151 convertibility: as evolving of cognition. 183. 138-42. see also vijiiiina-pari!Jiima. parinamaki (merit-transfer). 137. 203. 14. 66. 72 D deception. between kara! Ja and kiirya. xi. to an awakened state. 146. 131. 243. similes of. includes various notions. 123-53. 97 Cosmical Body: of the Buddha. 139. 128. 125 corporeal: being. 65. 69. 152. 220 defilement: (klesa). 187. 66. 125. 243. 184. 147-48. idea of. 140-48. iisrayapariivrtti. 125. 32. accidental or adventitious (agantuka-klesa). 79 correctness and straightness: of mind. of the other-dependent into the consummated.

246. 123. 10. 211. 8 dependent co-origination. 13. 104. Ill. unconditioned. IS7. 112 dharma-gate: fa-men. 146. 132 dharmapreaching: flows out. 65. 159. 40. 186 descent: and ascent. 110. 66. 118. 42-44. elimination of. 174-78. 134. 99. as Brahman. sphere of dharma. wheel of. basis of. as basis. 132. 10. 102. 17. 31. Abhi-dharmic theory of. 225. 64. 187' 243 denial of self. 186. as external beings. 220-2S. 217. enjoyment of. 51. 166. gate of non-duality. 32-34. 32. 205 dependent origination: (pratitya-samutpiida). 252. 107. 45. primary and secondary. 65 delusion. is identical with bodhi. lOS. 165 dharma-body: (dharma-kiiya). 31. 18S. 216. 123-25. 164-68. 36.Index of Terms 58. as lamp and refuge. 49. 4. of three nature theory different from Niigiirjuna's. 122. realm of enlightenment and delusion. 186. 41. as predicate. 92-94 deluded world. 20 dharma: about to vanish forever. 5. 224. of desire. 183. 176. 222. 48. 167. 201. 147. 254. 166. 170. 14344. 186 dharmas: special to the Buddhas. II. marks of. 135. equivalent to "emptiness". 169. as things or entities. 19 destruction. 120. 99. 3 7. of paramiirtha. 249. realization of. itself emptiness. of the sarnsiiric world. 31. 104. is ascent. siinyatii as. 7S. 121. as otherdependent. 170. 114. 20-21 designation: (prajiiapti) having recourse to materials. as a kind of pluralistic realism. 8. 16. 175. 185. 93. 56. 104-07. 31. 143 . 225. 164. 81. 100 dharma-theory: 164. dialectical reasoning: of Niigiirjuna. 171 dialectics. 2SO. 253. 212. 58. 121 dharma-realm: (dharma-dhiitu). 60. 70. 167. 250. sphere of essence. 199. of compassion. 55. 193. 246. 117. 201-07. of the Abhidharmic philosophy. 78. 186. 60. 131. universality of. 20S. 119. 21S. 54. 73. 127. 213. first order pratltya-samutpiida is said to be "direct". selfhood of things. 79. 166. defined. 74. 157. 193 destroy: the truth. 74. as doctrine. object of study. the doctrine. equal to enlightenment. 117-118. 229. 46. 116. 47. of Ultimate Truth (li-fa-chieh). 213 diamondlike samiidhi: (vajropamasamiidhi). is the tathiigatagarbha. guarding of. 191.

42. 42. 60. 116. 40. 53. 207. 167. 36-37. 38. 244. II. between the Twofold Truth. 138. of Sanron school. 71. 217. 204. of tathiigata-garbha. turn-about of. 225. 58. 38. 246. of atman held by Vaccha-gotta. 77. 136. 140. 60.l90-9l. practice (pratipatti). 132.189 doctrinal statements: the three categories of: object of learning (vi~aya). 48. 139. of the unreal (abhiita-parikalpa). lOS. 92 efforts: (virya). of impermanency (anityii). 72 discrimination: (vikalpa). negation of. 46. between abhiita-parikalpita and siinyatii. 77 . 33 duality: (dvaya) defined. object of. of Chinese Buddhist texts. of non-self (aniitman). to be free of. 111-15.difference: between the other-dependent and consummated natures. 241 E effortlessness: (aniibhogatii) of the mind. of Buddha-body. 7-9. of tat-pr~!ha-labdha-jfiiina. 160. of compassion. 203. 197. 166. be-tween subject and object. 256 double structure: of being and non-being. 119. of iisraya-pariivrtti. 223. of subject and object. of T'ien-tai threefoldtruth. 68-69. as translation of vibhiiga. 120. 23. 46 different and identical: at one and the same time. in Zen. of ekayiina. 137. 17 doctrine: (dharma). designates reli-gious rites and religion itself. of aprati~!hita-nirviil)a. 195. 132. wrong. 136. 39. -only (vikalpa-miitra). 195. 217. 79.ofYogiiciira. and fruit (phala). of karma. 91. 203. of bodhisattva. of atman. Buddhist. 161-63. 58. 195. 59. 206. 10. 67. 255 doer. 224. 222. 242 downward movement. 88. in Chinese translations. 80.

224 enlightened ones. as summit. 204. as Buddha's real essence. 107. 55. 55. dialectic of. 186. danger inherent in. of giver. 169. 210. 114. gift. 151. 206. 249 enlightened one. 174. as qualifier of dependent origination. is multitude of things. 173. 209-18. 63. 179. 70. rightly under-stood. 214. of both person and things. equal to dependent-origination. of the tathiigatagarbha. erroneous view (df~!i) of.156-57. 23. 113. 107. 78 elegant: "noble" and "refined". 174. of individual subjectivity or personhood (pudgala). difference in Yogaciira and Madhyamaka. itself must be negated. 11 ego con sci ous nes s. 171. 167 eightfold: negation. 68. 180. 105. 210. concept of. 13 emanation theory. 57 elements: of mental objects. as nonmaintenance of a position. 103. not necessarily equated with the transcendent. is "form". affliction and. 41. 128 Emancipated Body. 214. as nonbeing. 177-78. 80. 193. 189. as dharma-dhatu. as affirmation and negation. 210. 123-24. not mere negation. 78. relinquishing activity (prahal)asal]1skiira). 199. 142. 54. 185. aids to. as seen in the Scriptures. is "matter". 121. 103. 71. 66. two meanings of. 33. 108 Enjoyment-body. 87-88. 191. characteristic of. 178. and recipient of the gift. in the Yogiiciira School. 214. 94. 190. in the Miidhyamika School. 198. negation of substantive ex-istence. 44. 58. 242 enlightenment: (bodhi). 205: what remains in.278 ego . 249 emptiness: (siinyata). 195-96. 213. as a cross- . 54. 42. 5160 enjoyment: of the Pure Land. 175. 57. 211. as "no selfnature" or nonsubstantiality (nil)svabhiiva). 213. 150. 211. 170. 147. 40. 91. process of. 11 eighteen dhatus: bases of cognition. as meditative object for the practitioner. 211. has no standpoint of its own. 168. 22. 220. 113 emancipation. 53. 214. 53. 176. 10. 166. 170. INDEX OF TERMS definition of. 174. 98 element: of the tathiigata. 45. 146-48. 107. 214. 131. school of. clinging to. 106. 59.

preconceived. ultimate. 176. 64. 249 essentia. 131. 51. 55. 19598. 186. 78. one taste of. 66. of cognition (vijiiana-paril)ama). going from defilement to. realized when defilement removed. 55 equality: of perceiving and non-perceiving. of the basis. 126 evolving: of duality. bewilderment/affliction and. 65. 224. 225. 182-83. 252. 149-50. 175 entity: constructed by thought. 28. 212. 3. 89. supreme (abhisal]1bodhi). Zen. 27. realm of. 221. as one's Buddha-nature found amidst defilement. 242 entering: into the characteristic of nonexistence. turn passion into. 206. 185. perfect. delusion and. 92. constituents of. 125. o f m e r i t s . Buddha's. 2 5 2 e s o t e r i s m . 53. 121. 126. 178. awakening to the thought of or mind creative of (bodhicittotpiida). 125. 64. 93. 48. 175. 203. 20 evolution: of over. II. 101-02. 38. 56. are neither empty nor non-empty. 105. as "perfuming" when karal)a is phenomena and karya is seed (alaya- . 251. 110. 86. in the meaning of converting into something other. 107. original in contrast to initial awakening. 196. 10. 4 0 Essence-body: see also sviibhiivika-kiiya. 244. silence of. 92. have "no self-nature". 118. possibility of. merit transference to-wards. 58. superiority of. into the way of illumina-tion in truth. 251. 85. 10708. 79. 93 Equality Wisdom. 36-37. 246. 7. great. 248. 128. 159. 79 entities. development of. 204. 119. 28. 95 Equipment: (sal]1bhiira) of knowledge. 55 everyday currents: of birth and death. 202. two aspects of. seven members of (bodhy-ailga). 206. 28 equilibrium: (samata) of the mind. experience. means of attaining. world of. 198. 251. 76. 242. 28. 177. effort towards. true mind as. 136. three doors to. 12 essential emptiness.

128 exclusively non-empty. 53 .cognition) and karya is phenomena.

mundane. 201. of funda-mental avidya. individual. tran-scendental. ultimate. of god. 14. 46. 29. 150. negation of. or six "superknowledges" (abhijiia) of the Buddhas. 144. of unreal imagination. 54 formless: (animitta) 100. present state of. 164. 33-34. transformation of. 52 four Buddhas: 114. Gautama as divine. 186. super-natural power (rddhi-pada). 217. 171. 7. 34 faults of sarnsara. bodhisattva's torment. 204. 294. 41 forty-eight primal vows. with-out substance. as human beings. conven-tional. unanswered questions. 253. 119. ideas of. 179. as real throughout three times. transient. in catu~koti. 165. 18 false view. 124. 8. equal to non-existence. 163. material. through ig-norance. 221. 78. 81. 157. personal. 137. 27. 79 finger pointing: at the moon. 15. to come to it logi-cally. 98. unfathomable. 61. Ill. question of. 15. 198. margas. contingent. 92 fourfold: noble truth (iirya-satya). 69. after death 38. 168. of Bu-ddha. form of. 16 falsehood. 43: as extreme view. 44. as hinder-ance. 219. 156. 155. 244. 95. 253 four infinitudes: (apramal)a). 18. 125. 181. in three-nature theory. 214. 45. 173. 98 fourteen: (avyiikrta-vastiini) metaphysical questions. 120. 166. 64 experience: of emptiness. interpretation of four is question-able. psycho-physical constituents (paiica-skandha). world. world of (bhava). 7-12. 40 firmness: of a Bodhisattva. 205. three states of. cyclic. 54. 225. 35. 170. 216. 3. 162. 132. in Buddhist subjectivity. 80. 7. 195-99. 56-58. 8 eyes: of a Buddha. 93. subject. paratantra as intermediary. as asraya (basis). 89. 252. according to Hui-yiian. 7-9 existentialism. 191. 20. 12 existential philosophy. 31 five: distinct gotras (including agotra). of cognition. bodily. 119. 116. of sentient beings. 131. 15 fan-a'. school of. 75. 106 .Index of Terms existence. 88. 248. 122. 169. 164. 222 final aim: of Buddhism. 115. 210. 62. faults (do~a). 121. 187. 184. 63-65. 178. of non-existence. 223 existentia. 38. 79. 166. 161. figments of. 21. 64 false imaginings. substantive. 167. 180 F false imagination. 181 form: is emptiness. dharma as. 99.

169 heavens. 86. 62 helping others. 10 gross turbidity: (dau~thulya). 222. 38 Future Buddha. 110. of the Pure Land in the Sukhiivatfvyuha. 33 G God: existence of. 36. 221. 31 H Happy One. 79.freed from depravities and impurities. 29. 112 going-thither. 67. 32. 68. 219. 30. 22. 29. 236 gold-ore: simile of. perfect enlight-enment. 114. 27. 151. 72. 155. 204 highest: bliss. 64. par excellence. 202 great self: (miihatmya). 224 . 92. 173 fundamental: bodhisattva vows and praxis in the Avataf!lsaka. 62 hells. 9. 41. 102. stage of trance. 86 freedom: of the mind. 144 guarding: of d~filements. 85. 37 hate. 68. flows out of the summit of siinyatii. 221 Great Enlightenment. (maitrl) see also upek~a. ignorance (avidyii). 46-49. 206. wisdom. 87. 251. 52. 219. 184 full enlightenment: (sal]lbodhaya). 100 friendliness. 73 Great Compassion: (mahiikarul)ii). non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpa-jiiana). 173 heap: of merits. 92 fruition: of man's ethical and religious good acts. 116. 70. 219. 152.

is difference. 35. 67 imagination. 257. subjectivity." 17. 124 identification: of subject and object. 209. 222 hindrance. 246-49. false. acts. ) (iii. 142. 62. 123 ignorance: (avidyii). of difference. 182. 222 Hinayiina Buddhism. 23. 190. 69. 231-36. 46. 217. 26. 134. 184. parikalpita. 88. 222. 195. 7: suffering. 231. 61. vikalpa. as cognitive functions. 63-66. 64-65. 231 human: "action. 124. 192. 185. 203. 147' 184. II.280 INDEX OF TERMS Hinayiina." and "perception. 15. 53. 79. 63 I idea: of human nature. 146. 136-40. 168 . kalpita. 71. 14. 193. of nonbeing and be-ing. 195. 58. 15. 116. 137' 176. )(i. 86. 132. 68. 124. 97' 98. 258. 140. 212. 241 illuminated mind: freed from all concern. 157. products of. 130." "behaviour. parikalpita. 217. conflict. 9. 69. 14. 28. discontent. 185. 67-74. 186. 24. 220. 157 Hfnayiinic nirvana. nonself (aniitman). 4. 238-40. 205. 22. 116. 133. 10. 242 impermanence (anityii). 124. 94 illusion. passions (klesa). 209. 64. snake. 32. 73 illusory world. 193. 7 identical as well as different. 246 imagined e)(istence: to which one is attached as real. 37. defile-ment. 251. 183. 32. 144. 54 identity-difference: interpreted in various ways. ontology. sopadhise~a and nirupadhise~a. 10. in reality nonexistent. 142 imagined nature. 88. delusory.lkha): Buddha's teaching of. nature. 23. 46 imaginary: creation. 185. 63. 10. 24. 19. 138 identity: between "descent" and "ascent". and suffering (dul. 62-65. existence total of-see also iisraya. 55. 242. in difference. 125. 126. 142. II. 119. 33. language. 260 Hinayiinic: arhatship. 135-37. 9. 18. 229 imagined world. 15. 55. 70.

207 joyful garden. 209. 216. 158. 178 infinitudes: (apramiina) see brahmic states initial awakening. 102 indifferent: to the happiness of other beings. 158. 216. 117. 218. Miidhyamika represented by the Sanlun (Three Treatise School). 122. 251 insentient beings: possessed of Buddha-nature. 79. of subject and object (griiha-dvaya-viisanii) are e)(tinguished when cognition-only reattained. 84. 163. 3. 61. 175 intuitive discernment: (vipasyanii). 128. 175. 216. 118 insight: into emptiness. 253. 201. of Buddha-hood. 125. love of quietness. 9. 210. 178. 261 incarnation: Buddha as one of four Buddhas of Lankavatiira. 92 inexpressible. 46. 103 intentional birth. 209. 163 interdependent origination. I. 117. 224 J Japanese: Buddhism. 71. beyond speculation. 17 inference. 63. 95. 215 intellect. 67. 17. 163. xi. philosophy. 40 independent world: of purification. 157. xi. 92. 20. 95 International Association of Buddhist Studies. 190. 65 India. 228 International Association of Shin Buddhist Studies. 259 Indian: Buddhism. 91 individual: existence. 8 indifference: see also upek~ii. 114 interdependent co-origination. 103. 8 ineffability. 114. 15. 47. 161. 91. 30-32 . 2. 219. Absolute.impression. 40 inequality: of the mind. (darsana-miirga) path of. 7 inconceivability. 217. 94. 36 judging: authenticity of a religious teach-ing. human existence (jfviitman). 228 intuitive insight: highly religious in character as nucleus of Buddhism. 40. 21.

173. 41. 238. 13. 38. 260: acquired subsequently. 33. 198. 222. 47. 255. 71. 189. conventional. 123. 179. consummate na-ture as. 221. 19. 28 L Lamaism: in Mongolia. 52 love: towards humanity. of metaphysics. 71. of the Yogacara School different from Madhyamaka School. 30 lucidity: of mind. xi. 30 . 61. 10. 123 logical fallacies. 31 kenosis. human. non-discriminative. 240. 180. 199. 74 magical creation: (nirmaQa). 261 magic show. 73. 144. 60 lust and hate. 112. 114 knowledge. 186. 160. 46. xii. 115 locus: (asraya). 119 living beings: attaining Buddhahood. 8. 224-25. 243. of Love. 223. 41' 46. 160. 41 Kusinara. 124. 67. 219. 255. high-est (abhiiiiia). 255. 173. of absolute. 106. 148. 114. 193. 124. simile of. 204. reli-gious. philosophy. xi. transformed. 214 lineage: (gotra) of the Buddha. in the stage of preparatory practice. of the mundane world. 261. 2. 182. 181. disordered. 252. 220 life-death cycle: is itself cessation (sarpsara is nirviiQa). 2-4.211- 16. 2 languor or torpor: see also styana. 190. 123. 225. 101-02. 38. 47 Lord Bhagavan. sambodhi. 158. 155. 190. 211. 49 lowly beings. non-discriminating. 174. 216. 34. 1-5. 47-49 Madhyamika. 230-32. 30. 48. 181. 204. 18. analytical. 196. 173. II. 55 logic: of identity. 91. 261 Madhyamic: logic. 40. 204. philosophy.Index of Terms K karman. 260. 130. 184. 94 last refuge or shelter. of nil)svabhava (no self-nature). equipment (sarpbhara) of. 46. 252. 259 keeping the defilement. 76 liberation: (vimukti). 42. 9. 222. 72. 198. 36 M Madhyamaka. 69-74.

magically created: elephant. 242. 69 magician. 215. in an ascending direction. topics. 114. 151' 155. 233. 198. 100 mastership. 32. 119. 75. dharmas. 245. 79 matter: is emptiness. exaltation (auddhatya). 124. 165. 95. 95 medium or mediator: otherdependent nature as. 217 mark: of pragraha (uplifting). 14852. 232. 91-93. 147' 148. 249. 4. 258. 214. 84. of upek~a. 137' 139. speculation was "without profit (attha)". 21-24. of samatha. 83. 92. form. 65 mental: depression. 253 merit-transference. of truth (hsiencheng). 94 manifestation: of the Perfect. 9. analysis of. 210. 247. 186. 93. 61. 225. 101. 168. 209. 38. xii. 114. emptiness is mat-ter. 95. 38. 39. 99. 252. 95. 92-95. 251. 202 merits and virtues. 87' 88. 182. factors. 83. 248. nirnimittavihara). xiii. 141' 142. 48. of the tathagata. 109. 168 matrix. 113-15. 58. 57 maturation. 74. 166. 94. 95 marklessness: (nirnimittata. 169. 79. 84. 170. 202. 181. 102. 40. 95. 38 metaphysics. 211. 254-59. 69-71 Mahayana. 176. 219. 97. 28. 134. 210. 29 manic depression. 92. 86. 147. 144. 2. 127' 133. 202. 61. 259. 222. I. inactivity. 38. 223. 70. 35. 52. 97. 189. 261 meditational exercise: (bhavana). 33. 194 . 61' 66. 104-06. 22. 43. xi. 249. 220. 152. 261 making service: to others. 99. 93 Merit Buddha: as one of four Buddhas of Larikiivatiira. 13. 201. 229-30. 158-60. 191. 52. 173. 144 meditation. 51. in the aspect of going forth. 155 middle: always revealed by being freed from two extremes. 51. 85 metaphysical: questions.

92 motive: for setting up the twofold truth. yogin contemplates on. human. 102. tranquil flow of. 7. 53. 221. 38. 130 moral nature: of man. 217. essentially pure and luminous. 115. 259. 7 morally good. 78-79. 60. 23 monk. 177. 52. 60. 214. 55. see upek~a. renovation of. 192-99. 74. 175. eman-cipation of. 182 minding-cognition: (mano-vijiiana) as consciousness. 93. 146. 174. function of. 187. of compassionate beings. 92. 26. appears in various ways. 76. "restless" or "not stilled" (avyupasama). expressions of. in saqJsiira. 128. 132. 93. 9. ordinary. 177. 60. consciousness. Sumeru. essentially identical with the tathiigata. 120. knowl-edge of another's. will of. 58 mystical intuition. aspect of. 94. 190. body produced by (manomayakaya). as no-mind. 23. 85. 171-72. taking possession of property. 216. 7. 119. 117. 205. creative of Enlightenment. 118. 239 middle way. 163. 121 INDEX OF TERMS misleadi ng Eternalis m. 52. 81. citta. 3. invisible. 84 momentariness: does not mean total extinction of the world. of suchness. body and. 42 . continuity-series of. 39 missionary life: of the Buddha. -only. true. 139 mirrorwisdom. 157-59. 167. 77. 157 mind: a loving. as siinyata. 9. 120. 91. 130. 39 misological tendency: of the Buddha. 91-102. 117. 215. 173. 244. drops down. 246. 197. 213. 217. 84. nothing but. 59. of a monk. produced without dwelling. 26. peace of. 162. tranquility of. 177 N nature: of Buddhahood. 45. 157 mundane defilements. 178 Mt. 143. 124. 256. 187. 173. 37 monastic order. 197. problem of. 42 mold: of human language.282 middle path. 121. 133. manas. mental factors. 102. 150. non-existence of. lacking in readiness or workability (akarmal)yata).

194-99. 34. 173.negation: and the negation of negation. 223. 155-58. 119. 206 nihility: the principle underlying Buddhist ontology. 185. 186. 156. 33. 64-66. 166. 143. 244. 93. 211. 165 non-dialectical Nirval)a. 121' 123. does not act. silence. 78. of the duality [of subject and object]. 222. 74 new ontology: Conze's expression of Buddhist ontology. 244. 225 noble silence. 185. 173. divided into three kinds. of the world (arthabhave). 156. 33. 68-70. 184 non-existence: (abhava). 214. 87' 88. 22325. 171-73. 41. 223 nirvii. 157. 152 non-atman: theory of. 124. 53 neutral and pure world: of the otherdependent nature. 210. 36. 124. and existence of nonexistence. of outer things and being of cognition-only in earlier Yogacara. 60. 205. 186. 152. a great problem even in Western philosophy. 192. 210. 261 non-conditioned dharmas: such as annihila-tion (nirodha). 103. 121. 170. 3. 39. 12. of concepts.Qic: parini~panna. 142. 147. 203. 157 nihilism. 33. ~iinyata. 193 negative reasoning: of emptiness. 213. 41. 177. 184. 148. 131. exclusively empty nor exclusively nonempty. 214 neither: arising nor extinction. 202. 22. reference in . 158. 246 noetic aspect: (grahaka) of the alaya-vijiiana. 29. 54. 204. 193. 32. 176. 72. 246 non-abiding: in nirval)a (aprati~! hita nirval)a). 220. 191. 16. 213 noematic aspect: (grahya) of alayavijiiana. 56. in reference to marks (lak~al)a-nil)svabhava). 145. 148. 187. 102. 142. 178. 56. 43. 185. xiii. 39 non-being: of"!" and "mine". 16 non-nature: in an ultimate sense (paramarthanil)svabhava). 25 nondifferentiated wisdom: (nirvikalpajiiana). 113. 22-29. of this world. 34. II. 141. 147. of the imag-ined is itself the consummated. 44. 174. 156 nirval)a.

as the basis for the imag-ined world to convert to the consummated. 8. 32. 183. not primary aim of Buddhism. in saljlsara. 15. 62. 166. 145 . 44. 222. 155. 41. 118. for the sake of actualizing the awakened state. from the way to nirval)a. 175. 43 not dwelling: in nirval)a. 141 non-substantiveness. 53 non-self: (anatman). of learning. 137. 27. 251 originally pure: (prakrti-visuddhi). of defilement (klesavaral)a). 214. itself turns around. 185 nonperceptibility. 68. 122 one vehicle: (ekayana). converts to the consummated nature. 134. 203. 195. 216 0 object: grasped. 243. of visualization in the practice of dhyana. 56 non-substantiality. 160 ontology: a theoretical principle. 88. 41. in a Buddhism con-text. 32 one-body theory. 28 nothingness: (wu). not an ontology that affirmed existence. 158. 28. 116. 257. 52 ordinary: beings. ordinary everyday world. 183. 157. 99. 51. 152. 175 non-void. 75 original enlightenment. the denial of self. 51. 151. basis for confusion. 206. 8. 231. 60. 28. 141. converts to the imagined nature. 169.Index of Terms to origination (utpatti-nil)svabhava). 187 ontological: term. Ill. to be negated as empty. is the other-dependent. 186. 221 origin: see asraya. 7. 63. 211 obstacle. of meditation. Bud-dhist. 137. 55. in Western philosophy. 64-74. 30. human mind. 79. of all things. 119. 24 other-dependent. of religious practice. 152. 53. 62. 193. 182-86. 144. 29 only cognition exists: external reality does not exist. 4 one unchanging world. 26. two kinds of. 91. 41 non-reals. 10. 32 not turning back: from saljlsara. 64 one who is indifferent: (upek~aka). 100 one taste: (ekarasa). 244. 157 order of monks. an ontology of the middle path. 10-12. versus three-vehicles. 43. 130-48. in the ultimate sense. of Buddha-yana. 177. two queries provided by Keiji Nishitani.

250. 183. 152. 64-74. see asraya. 145. 172. 100. 79. 108. 22 parinirval)a. as a mediator. 184. towards fi-nal liberation. 48. the Dharma. 62. 62. 243 own being. 202. 145. 64-74. 37 paradox: emphasized in the Prajiiaparamita-siitras. 142. of insight (dar§anamarga). 90 powerlessness: of man. 146. 203 path: of cultivation (bhavana-marga).other-dependent nature. nature of the Mahayana. 37. 58 preaching: Buddha's. reality. 133139. II. 184. 184. 224. 186. such as "being and yet non-being". 130. 109. 85 personality and behaviour: of Buddha. 79. 108. (samslqta). 31 pair combined together: (yuganaddha). 51 Pali suttas. 130. 148. 45. 115 power: of Amida's Vow. 95 pairing: of quietude and insight. 142. 146. 44. 107 p painful life: of saljlsara. 162 pessimistic religion. 183. 12 phenomenalism. 251. 152. 201 paradoxical: expression. recovery of. 74 perfect enlightenment. 10-12. 116. 69 phenomenal: accommodation. of the Buddha preached to sravakas or his disciples' 251 plurality: (prapaiica). 28. 86. 75-77. 79. 100. 37 . 38 physical body. 35 phantom. the Doctrine. 21. 14. 116. 186. 148. 42 possibility of all living beings attaining Bud-dhahood: answered from two sides. 243. 49 practice: of meditation. 38 parable. 14 philosophical capacity: of the Buddha. 13339. 37. 10-12.

absolute. 180. 54. of sunyatiithe sum-mit. !75. 45 psychoepistem ology. !57. 28. 2!8. 202. 46 purification: of the [Buddha]-!and. 31 provisio nal appellat ion. 187. 63 realism. Bud-dhist tradition. aspects of. 123 production. highest. 20. 173. 157 realitylimit: (bhutako(i). !21. 57. 163. 206. 165. 32. 146. (prayoga-marga). !4. 244. attri-butes of. !32-33. 215 reality. ! 79. ! 6 principle: of dependent co-origination. !57. of consciousness. 221 . markless. 221. 241. the focus of Madhyamaka. 202. perception of. 17. ultimate. 213. found in the present. 180. of this world. 42. 209-10. 165 Pure Land. of first noble truth. 44. Buddhism. 33. 41. School. 14. consciousness as. 61.284 INDEX OF TERMS preparatory stages. phenomenal. true. of "great self". 76. !68 proof: of God's existence. 64. 215 realization: meaning of. 29. 8!. 64. 166. 83. 164-66. 9. 2!7 pure reasoning or dialectics: (nyaya·. 124. 192. 224 primitive Buddhism: takes anatman (nonself) as its foundation. of sunyata. 7 real world. 67. 225. of selflessness. 155 projection: of false imagination. !60 principal truth. 2!5. 250 purified world. dharmata. ! 41. negation of substantive. 35. substantive state of. 237. universal. 63. of disunity and noncontinuity. !5. apparent. 56. 135. Ill reality characteristic theory: of SinoJapanese Buddhism. yukti). 134. 2 !5. 259 professional bhik~u. of unity and con-tinuity. 53. 206. of everything. of the Buddha. !55. 93. of de-filements. 211. of the dharma-dhatu. 65 R Real Guest: of Buddha's salvation. 93. !62. 100. of Buddhist ontology. 173. sa!]1saric. characteristic theory of. !23. !56. 216. 33. the one. ! 57.

93. 192. 10 relativity. 159. 206. 121' 130. 172. 66. 7 religion: begins when one's own existence challenged. 92 relatedness of substantive existences: not "absolute relativity" nor "universal rela-tivity". 64. 79. the four wisdoms and trikaya. !46 respect: ordinary peoples' for the bhik~us. 131' 145. prayers of the Vedas. 107. 250 religio-existential awareness of self. 168 return to this world: from the Pure Land. 60. 70 refutation: of falsehood (p'o-hsieh). 12. of being both different and not different. 8. 246 receptacle-world. II. 4 Rewardbody. 152. 175 relationship: between the eight vijiianas. 113. 214. 176. 88. 147' 148. daily subject. 2!7 rejoicing: (mudita) see upek~a. 87 revival: of the conventional. 10!. !50. 89 roots: of merit. 31-33. 151. 44. 222 . !2 religiously oriented subject. 87. 63 sainthood. 78. 62. 10 remedies: for mental depression and exaltation. 15. 85 rounds: of birth and death. 30 receptacle. phenomenal. 95. 167. 63. 212. 161. 255 sa!]1sara. 180. 131 s sacred Dharma. 9. original word for. 7. 250. 159 recovery: of the conventional defined. 250. 177. 114. 9 salvation. 43. 249. Amida as the Reward-body. 160 religious: existence. 86 returning: to this world. 171. 213 rebirth: throughout the six gatis. 106. 110 root: of virtue. subjectivity. 91. 175. 1!. 116. 205. II. 254. 209. 89. 37 sages and enlightened ones. of the otherdependent nature. 176. 2529.reasoning: deconstructive (prasailgika). 65. 135 relative. 65. 120. 99 representation-only: (vijiiaptimatrata) equated with consummated-nature. 38. 232. 66.

49. entities. 77. 36. 73. 219. 128. 63 self-hood. 45 seven: functioning cognitions (pravrtti-vijiiana). II. 36. 117. 84. sensory fields. parikalpita. 9 self: (iitman or pudgala) as wells as dharmas exist. 75 sehr falsch. 124. 67. 221. as a sign of ap-proval. of maya. ways to con-note in Buddhism. 67-74. 84.Index of Terms salJisiiric: defilements. 231 . 38. siltras in. 77 silence: til~l)lf!lbhava. 42. 194 seed: (kiiral)a). 54 sculptors: of Buddhist images. 52 skepticism. 32. 125. 118. 164. see also San-lung-tsung Sanskrit language. is empty but things (dharmas) exist. 29-32. 86-88. see also chung sheng serpent-like object. 47-49. 137. two kinds of. 2. 102 sexual organ (vyaiijana). 101. 37. 41 . 72-74. 35. (paramita) perfections. 40 simile: (upama). 101. 193. 40-41. of clay containing gold. who were always reprimanded. 170 self-love. 74 simultaneity: contextually related to momentariness (k~al)ikatva). members of enlightenment. 90. 149-51. 75. 35. of future activities. 143. 189 six: Bhik~us. 127. 109 second order pratitya-samutpiida: = upiidiiya-prajiiapti. 22 San-lun school. as sign of disagreement. 243-45. 165 scriptural authority. 129 Sino-Japanese: Buddhism. 166. 217. 216. 28. the imagined world. 47 sentient-being-world. 93. 137. 99. 244. 67. 96 seizing: appropriating. 56 selflessness: of person and things (pudgaladharma-nairatmya). world. 52 sixteen kinds of emptiness. boshaft. 145. 170. 23 self-consciousness. 167. 221. 27. 127. 121 self-sufficient arguments (svatantra-anumiina). 32. 236. of the Buddha. 153. Pure Land traditions. 12 self-negation. sense organs. 9. 166. 132. of Vimalaklrti. 36. 67. 51. 32. 157. 206. 217. 242. cognitions (pravrtti-vijiiiina). 38 Sarviistiviida: as a school originating from tendency towards realism. different kinds of. 36. 159 sentient beings: 23. 61. 92. 79 seeking: shelter see iisraya. of "snake-rope-hemp". 29. 220. 4. 162 self-centered. 32. in dharma-theory of Sarviistiviida.

73 state: of power. 40. 160. 159. 87 something remaining: (avasi~ta). 219 summit: where the ascent ends and from which the descent begins. 36. 167. 253. 40. 33. 83. of essences.skillful means. 13 super-worldly. 53 subjectivity. 13. 86. 105. and objectivity. 55. 39. 114. 239. 157. 31. 53. 26. 203 silnyata school. 14. 59. 41. 40. 79. 8 substantive self. 89 siltras and sastras. 151 stage of adhimukticaryabhilmi. 80 store-consciousness. 30 stage: of non-turning around. 34 Sukhavatl. 78. 42 superknowledges: (abhijiia) of the Buddhas. 209. 215. 41 supreme: body. Enlight-enment. of purity. 163. problem of. 215. 60. 132 supermundane. 107. 159 sublime wisdom: of silnyatii. 24 supramundane being. 23 sravakas and pratyekabuddhas. 47 . 261. 80 struggles: Buddha's inner. 202 soteriology: in Buddhism. 100. 52-56. 27. 240. 9. 48 Sufism. 203 sutta. Ill sphere. 30. 56. 80 spiritual egoism. 45. 99. 54. 31: enjoyment. 202. 199. 46 suppression: of defilements (phala-prahal)a). through which a practitioner advances. 60. 78. 58 Son of God: Jesus Christ descends from Heaven to earth. 237. expressed in words. 9 suchness. 79. 29 substance: atman (self). 211. 7-12. 106. 48 subject grasping: (grahaka) and the object grasped (grahya). without words. 48. 13. 48. 249 syllogisms: expressions of truth. 32.

animitta. of representation-only (or cognition-only). paiiiia). 9. various names for. and indifference. 118. 223. 124. 248. 88 thirty-two marks: of a Buddha. 84. and the wishless. 4. 213 theory: of Buddha-Body. 186. 185 ten: bhiimis. 119. 59. 112. 191 three knowledges: exhibits the pattern of "ascent" and "descent". and apral)ihita). 108. theory of. 254.286 INDEX OF TERMS syntactic cases: eight. mental distractions. 52 tetra-lemma: four alternative propositions. as mutu-ally cause and effect. uplifting. 104. 172 37 aids to enlightenment. 169 threefold reality of T'ientai: k'ung (empty). 60. 116. 163. 103. 249. theory. 224 three learnings: (sila. 222. 120 teaching: of the Buddha. 183. refer to seed. 134 three dharma-marks. 106. 30. 249 three concentrations: (trisamiidhi) the empty. 107. 57. 131 three conversions: in the Mahtiyiinasaf!lgrahasiistra. 250. 51. concentration. 32. 176. and seed. 169 thoughtconstruct. 252. bodhisattva stages. Ill. 128 three doors: to enlightenment (trivimok~a mukha). of practice. chung (middle). samiidhi. of morality. 210. 51 three character istics: (lak~al)a) threenature theory. of tathagatagarbha. 40 three Buddha-Bodies. 114. and wisdom. 24. 77 system: of the two truths (satya-dvaya). chia (provisional). 78. of "provisional existence" of upek~ii. 174 T tathiigatagarbha: doctrine. 51. of emptiness. 94 . 186 three marks: (nimitta) of calming. 87. 179. 4. 253. 128. 178. the signless. as threefold body. 124. 117. 182. of deliv-erance (siinyatii. 51 three dharmas: are simultaneous. of Universal Soul. 221. of vijiiaptimiitra (representation only ). phenomenon. 124 think: without thinking.

II. 17. present. 124. 4. 133. 121. 80 three-vehicles: (yiina). 139. 9 . 109. 6 7 t r i c k . 4. 130. 173. II transcendental wisdom. 88. 255 three-non-nature theory: (tri-nif:tsvabhava). 186. xi. 255. 112. 149 touchstone. 7. explicates "being" in terms of real ex-istence or nonexistence. 64. 125 three natures. 189 three world systems: as nothing but mind. 61. 152. 249 transformed body: (nirmal)a-kaya). 244. structure of. an ontological theory. 165 to go beyond: or to transcend-meanings of. 4. 10.three-nature theory. and fu-ture according to Sarvastivada. 133. 243. 36 tranquil flow of mind: (prasathatii). 125. 77. 10. !53. 131. 148. 187 true: doctrine of atman. 185 three nonsubstantialities. 122. 55. 130. 184. 69. theory of. as interpretation of upek~ii. 68. 114. 136. 72-74. 18187' 215. 109 Trinity: in Christianity. 214. 91-102. 17 three "turning abouts". 43. 101 transformation: 31. 128 throne: of mahiibodhi. 124. 202 time: three periods of past. 148. 116. 131. 44. knowledge. 138. 182. 10 transmutation: of the basis (asrayap a r a v r t t i ) . 77. life. 121. 135. 95. 247 tranquility: of mind. 131. 62. 221' 242. 62. 244. with its logic of convertibility. !50. I. 89. 113115. 65. 158. 41. 249. 108. 39. 115. 92. man. 65-69. structured around the word paryaya. 6 9 trikaya: doctrine of. 16. 150-152. 7 transmigrating existence. 107. theo-ries of later ages. I I transactor: of linguistic conventions. 121' 133. 136. 63. 142. 38. Ill. 36 transactional linguistic conventions. 133. 185-187. 112 triple world: is representation only (vijiiapti-matra). 142. 207 tranquil: (samatha). 108. Buddha's love of. 71-74. 39. 259 Transformation-body. 65. 171 to transfer: or to re-direct one's merit. 131.

161. 213.Index of Terms truly empty [hence] unfathomable existence. 152. ultimate. 179. triple. 186. 79. 75. 168. 101. truths . of the basis as the conversion of the other-dependent into the consum-mated. 13. 255 !ruthlessness. 67. 77 turn around. 123. 256. 13. 157. seeker of. realization of. 244. 19. 140. dharma. 152 twelve spheres of cognition: (iiyatanas). 124. 143-145. 56. 238 u ultimate: enlightenment. principal (milla-tattva). alienate from the. and ex-pedient actions. 231. 184. 213. 231. 88. 40. 215. 113. 178. yiinikasthe sraviikas and pratyekabuddhas.hetu and phala. 54. 123. fourfold. 261. evolving of cognition . entering into. 63. 232. reality and. 14. 46. 16. of suffering. 243 turning about: of seeds. cannot be expressed. 202. 19. 28. of the storeconsciousness. 24 Tu~ita-heaven. 16. 80 turning around. 134. 18. 182. 143-148. 246. covering the. 163. first noble. 193. 176 two activities: of ascending and descend-ing. of realization or enlighten-ment. II. "other-dependent". meaning. 178. 192. 12. 206 two Buddha-body theory. 148. 46. 17. 204. of cognition-only. 260. 62. 151. 138. 135. 252. 238. discussed in the Ch' engwei-shih-lun. 205 two-directional movements: of "ascent" and "descent". 210. 252 two divisions: of subject and object. 80. 71. 149 turnabout. realities of dharma-kiiya and riipa-kiiya. 127. 158. 119. 83. concealed. a Trirrrsika theory. reasoning. basic. 110-112. meaning of. 51. recognition of. 89. 181. representative of. opposite direc-tional tendencies. 39. 181. II. 166 Truth. Ill. 140. 190-91. 195. 206. 212. truth.the conventional and the ulti-mate. 105-06. 220 two: events of Enlightenment. 179. 167 twelve limbed chain of causation. 147. 178. 80. of the basis. two-fold. 107. 256.g. 126 two-direction activity: differs from ordinary paradox. 104. 192. 34 two aspects: (dvaya-arnsa) of defilement and purity. observed even in a single term (e. threefold. 220. 99. IS turbidities: of a sriivaka. 21. tathiigata or bodhisattva). 27. 26 twofold: body of the Buddha. 104. 214. 137. conventional. of seeing division and form division. 145. 224. 212 .

16. 58. 106 unreal: (abhiita). 93 Universal Soul: (paramiitman. compassion. discrimination (abhiita-parikalpa). 181. 145 uncompounded. 95 vijiiiinas: are converted and jiiiina (wisdom) is acquired. thought. 60. 145. 53. 259 v value: of silence. IS. 9 . 100. 136. see also Index of San-skrit terms vijiiiinaviida. 205 Unstable Nirviina. 69. 112. 131 unity: of basic principle (li) with phenomena (shih). refers to truth that is revealed when the logic of ordinary world is transcended. 139 upward movement. 124. 217 universal: non-production (dharma-anutpiida-samatii). 39. 8. 79 unlimited: benevolence (amitiiyus). 178 un-afflicted seeds: (aniisrava-blja). 25 unsupported: thought. of iitmantheory 9 universality: of Dharma-realm (dharmadhiitu-sarvatragiirtha). 80 unenlightened people. 164. 19. 28 unconditioned: (a-sarnskrta-dharma). brahmiitman) 8. 62. 29. 67. 36 verbal: designation. 241. 261. 81. 195-199 unreality. 65. wisdom (amitiibha). 165 undefiled consciousness. 40. 123. 1-4. 136. 40 vigour: (vlrya).ultimate truth (paramiirtha): always tran-scends the conventional truth. 33. school. 25. 16. 195. is be-yond the reach of prapaiica. imagination. 157. 106. expression. of seeds. 244.

106. 253 world: as a container (bhiijana-loka). prajiiii. 112. 116. 32 w warm rays: of wisdom. 13. 106. 27. warm rays of. of the Buddha. of siinyatii. 184. highest. way of think-ing. 73. 173. 195. 121. jiiiina. 121. 41. mun-dane. sviibhiivika-kiiya as. of . 119. Buddha-. 24344. 103. 67. in siinyatii. 113. 39 virtues: of the Buddha. 210. ! 58. 260 voidness: see emptiness and siinyatii vow: (pral)idhiina). 185. 254. 203. 124. four. 90. ascent of. 184. of a bodhisattva. acquired subsequently (pmha-labdha-jiiana). 96 wisdom. 96 without volitional effort: (anabhisaf1lskiirel)a). 32. 166. 79. to be reborn. 28. 148. 8. 58. 73. 215 Weltanschauung. 46. 43. 114 Wisdom-dharma Body. 44. 61. 102. 250 void. 172. 144. 222. 223-25.288 INDEX OF TERMS violent current: in reference to iidana-vijiiiina. 101. 22 Wisdom Buddha: one of four Buddhas of Lalikiivatiira. of Amida. 32. 158. 125. 8 what remains: according to Madhyamakiivatiira. 34. 24. 51. 249. 106. unlimited (amitabha). 212. non-discriminative. 152. 143. 241. 253. 169 wellgrasped emptiness. 221 Western: existentialism. immovable. 107: implies and presupposes yogic "practice". two-fold. 238 without special exertion: (aprayatnena). of a bodhisattva. immediate insight of. 22 WellGone. II. 114. 68-70. 262. 29. 220.

241. 255. paradoxical and dialectical logical. 186. 206: discipline. 63. of human beings. 65. 165. 182. 205. 64. 206. remains one and the same. 218. 165.animals. of delusion. 22: of paradox. 36. 192 wronglygrasped emptiness. 124. 244. 36. xi. 182. xi Yogiiciira Vijiiiina-viida: as a School. yoga practice. as school of being. joys. of dependent co-origination. a reappraisal. 36. Weltanschauung of. 131. 119. 233. 195. 33. 64. 221 z Zen. theory of the three knowledges. 139. Bud-dhism. 10. 40 zigzagging logic. 63. 1-5. 26. 10 Yogaciira theories: of consciousness-only. 215 Yogiiciira vijiiaptimiitra. 251. 260. 243. 159 yoga-praxis. 20. 248. 26. 160. 64. 26 wrong views: of eternalism and nihilism. 242. 33. of three-nature. 74 worldly: beings. 51. 62. 51. of ordinary men.\8. 40. 247 Yogiiciira. 178. 158. 58. in MMK. happiness. 63. 62. 101. of higher principles and peace. 22. of ordinary beings. of bewilderment/affliction defined. 204. 21. 215 y yoga. 199. 221. 250. of the imagined nature. 219. 199. thought. religions. 182. 73. 199 . 18 Yogicpractice: practice of the Middle Path. XXIV. 74. 65. 75. currents. 62. of ignorance. 34 world-view: of Buddhism. of nirviil)a. of sarpsiira. 240. of reality and truth. 4. 65. 183.

28 btang snyoms: to abandon and equalize.Index of Tibetan Terms 'gyur ba. gyur. 97 . see upek~a. 83 mnyam nuyid ye shes. 98 rna! du 'dug pa. rna! du 'jug pa. 97. gdags pa (prajiiapti). 91 brten nas (upadaya). bsgyur ba. 83 bsngo ba.

40. 87 Eko: [J] to turn around and direct towards. 217. 128. 216. 7. 216. xi. philosophy of. 95 chiian pien: to change. 74. 13. 89. 86 hun ch'en: dark and depressed (sunken). 40. 93 1-ching. 48. 98 Jodo Shin Shu [J]. 172 chii: to lift up. school. 237. 84. 256 fen-pieh: Paramartha 's translation of parika-lpita (discrimination). 97 Hua-yen (Kegon [J]) 7. 217 chih chi: extremity of reality (bhiitakoti). transform. 149. see mental depression and elation. 83. 83. 90 Ch'an. merit-transference (paril)iima). Fahsiang school. 84. divided into three kinds. 148. 86. 83 chu: to live. to dwell.Index of Chinese and [J]apanese Terms jen yiin chuan hsing: spontaneously occur-ing. to transfer merits. 172 chung sheng: sentient beings. not by transformation. 18. 136 Hsin cheng chih hsing: see correctness of mind. 219: Dharmacharacteristics school. 217 Hui-hsiang: birth [acquired] by transference. 129. 87 cho: clinging. 149. 83 Fa-hsiang Fa-hsiang-tsung. 19 . 270. toward bo-dhi. 189. 149. 94.

vacant. 209 li: principle. 88. 94 t'iao-jou cheng-chih: balanced. 40 k'ung: hollow. 129 pien-chi-so-chih. 48. 217. 190. upek~a. hole. 217 . 152. avaral)a. 217 tiao-chii: mind "unsettled and uplifted". 191. 189. Sanron in Japanese Buddhism. 98 T'ient'ai. 98 sabi [J]. flexible. 217 satori: [J] enlightenment in Zen Buddhism. correct. 9: Hsiiantsang's translation for paril)iima. 129. the taste for elegant simplicity. sky. Iyemitsu [J]. 7.Kegon [J]. 36. and straight. 218 waka: (Japanese poem) by the Dharma mas-ter Jitsu-i. 259 p'ing teng erh liu: flowing in equilibrium. 189. 89. 136 pien-i. nt. 9 neng-pien. 10 I Shoku kokin wakashu [J] (Further Collection of Waka Old and New). 218 wabi and sabi: [J] taste for elegant simplic-ity. 150. 210 Lin-chi. 206 She: see Skt. Chinese version of the Madhyamaka. 19 Shogun. 218. 36. 91 Shu-chi: see Skt. 218 San-lun-tsung. 238 wabi [J]. 256.


88. 144 a c i n t y a . lack of agility or dex-terity. 141 advay a . 30 . 206. 151 ajiiiina: not knowing. 2 8 . 2 9 a d v a y ii vr tti ~ . 205 adhiprajiiii: prajiiii which is nirvikalpa-jiiiina. 93. 223 adhimukticaryii-bhilmi.). 2 8 adhigama. "birth of inconceivable meritA transference'' MSA Xl. 206. 14 atyantiibhiivata: absolutely free [of sense-object]. definition of. 4 0 acintya-paril)amiki: as what is transferred inconceivably.Index of Sanskrit Terms akarmal)yatii. 8 9 a c i n t y a t i i . 1 5 . 89 acintya-paril)iimikiupapatti.56 (Chin. as one aspect of "realization" or enlightenment.

as negation of fundamental iitman. 88 aniy atagotr asriiv aka. 160. 169 animittaljl cetosamiidhiiJl: as concentra-tion of mind that is signless. 168. 100 animittaanabhisal jlskiira. 40 anabhisa ljlskiira. 168 aniyatagotra: those not yet settled as sriivak as. 80 animitta: non-existent sign. 162 aniibhoga: effortlessness. I00 anityatii: as foundation of Sarviistiviida teaching. manifested through Buddha's life and his activities. 100 aniibhoga: effortlessness. 163. 192 ana bhiliipya tva. 93. as non-self. 85 anuttariiyai samyaksaljlbodhaye. 145 aniisrava-dhiitu: sphere of purity.anabhiliipya. 100 aniibhogatii. 164. 85 anupalabdhi: in the sense of "beyond our . ultimate reality beyond grasping. one of three doors of deliverance. 15. 100 aniitmak atva. 168. 92 aniisrava-bija. one of the dharma-seals of Buddhism. 56 aniitman: as a teaching in which the belief that existence has an inherent nature is negated. 96. see also upek~ii. 99. foundation for Primitive Buddhism's questioning iitman. 130. 166 anityii: impermanence. explanation of. 99. 7. 52 animittasasa! Jlskiira. 170. 166.

32.cognition". 172. 169 aprati~\hita. 143. 1 5 a p a r a p r a t y a y a . Mahiiyiinic nirviil)a. suggests direc-tion of descent in Yogiiciira. 203. 33. 4 1 apral)ihita: negated wish. 222. not entering nirviil)a. 192 anupalabdhi-silnya: non-perceptibility. 212. 22. 25. 125 anyonyasamiisrayel)a: with one depending u p o n a n o t h e r . 222 . 29. one of three doors of deliverance. abides not in Nirvana. various English translations of. 23-27. 27. 28. ultimate reality beyond grasping. 88. as expression of iisraya-pariivrtti. 41 anumiina. 24. 46: actual form of reasoning or syllogism. 222. 172 -nirvana. 46 anyathiitva: as definition of paril)iima.

54 avasthita-dravya: meaning of paril)ama in Sal)lkhya. 80 arthabhave: nonexistence of the world. 10 I . 15 abhi dhe ya. 38 abhijiia: superknowledges of the Buddha. a Yogacara notion. 80 arhat. 28 abhi sal)l skar abhiita: unreality resulting from discrimina-tion. 197. as essentially vijiiana.b. 27 . 9. 16 arthabhinivesa: attachment to outer ob-ject. 55 abhavasya bhava)J. 99 abhava-siinyata: emptiness as nonbeing. dvayal)l tatra na vidyate: see MV.1 a. converts into parikalpita (the imagined). 137. 197.sal)lsara-nirviil)atva.sal)lsiira-nirval)a. 137. 55. 53. 81 amitab ha. 25 aprati~thital)l nirviil)am. 132 abhidhana. 94 abhi sal)l bod hi. 24. it is not contextually different from pratitya-samutpada. as the foundation for the sa~aric world. 80. 28 aprap aiicit a. 87 abhi ram a. 25 aprati~!hita-nirval)e niviHalJ1. 203.samaviHa(-jiiana). 116: as basic ignorance. 195 amalavijiian a. 96. 25. 107 aral)ya . false imaginings. 36 artha.294 INDEX OF SANSKRIT TERMS a. 23. 67. 106. 30 abhi muk ha. 2 . 106. 136. 15 abhi pret a. general . 18 abhiitaparikalpo 'sti. as fundamental klesa. 58-60. xi abhinna. 267 aprati~thita-nirviil)e nivi~talJ1 samata- j iianal )l. 42 apray atnen a. 136 abhiita-parikalpa. 52 avasi~ta: ~omething remains. 24: Bodhisa- ttva's resolution.sal)lsara. 80. 125 avidya. 107 amitay us. 27 . 132: object. 1. 17 art haparavrtti . 28 aprati~thital)l cittal)l: unsupported thought.

169 iikasa-sa! pjiiaparavrtti. 80 i i k i i i P k ~ a . 94 asal)1kle8a. 28. 8 5 a k r t r i m a . 31 asarnskrta.ignorance. 164. 157. 147 asallak~al)iinuprave8a-upayalak~al)a: the means for entering into the character-istic of non-existence. 220 aviniv artal)a . 15. 14. characterization of parini~panna. 1 7 5 . 224 A akasa. 27. 145 asallak~al)iinupravesopaya: means for enter- ing into non-existence. removed by prajiia. 38 avyupasama: mind not stilled. 29 avyiik [tavastiin i.

in re-gard to Eternalism and Nihilism. as abhiitaparika1pita. 219. 80. 56 atma-atmiyatva: selfhood and possession. 161. as the basis for time/space. 162. 9 adanavijiiana. 143. signifies the concrete micro-cosm within the macrocosm. 39. store-consciousness theory. 116.iigantuka-klesa: accidental or adventitious defilements. 121. 159. 161. 117 agama: and nikiiya. 164 aryasatya. as the origin of all errors. 221. s o u l . 204 aciirya. 39' 221 ayatana. 52. 55 a t m a s n e h a . 209. 56. and five vijiiana. 43' 99 alaya. 9. as basis for atma-cogitation. as one aspect of "realization" or enlightenment. original meaning "breath". as a term refer-ring to "I". 145. 58. 206. 9 alayavijiiana-paravrtti. 19 atmatva: something substantive. 8. 79 must be vijiiana. 39. 80 . depository). definition of. 79 a1ayavijiiana. 80. 3 9 atman: as an absolute. 126. self. 2 2 1 a d a n a . mind-consciousness. 38. vijiiana (cognition) regarded as a1aya (store. 64. 79 receptacle and source. 1 2 a t m a v a d a . definitions of. 75.

in contrast to tathagata-garbha the-ory. 78-80. as locus. a-vada. as a vijiiana. upekkha. as mediator. support. as refuge or shelter. 112 asraya. 67 paravrtt upadaya prajiiaptil. interpreted by manifestation. 64. subtle aspect of. 197 utpatti-nil.Index of Sanskrit Terms asaya: vow. 77. 95 utpatti: a Madyamaka notion. Ramanan 's trans-lation "derived name". V. 102. 192 upadanam updaya prajiiaptil.J: i. 31 a. equal to hetu-pratyaya. 92. 10 I upek~a-nimitta. 248. synonymous with pratltya-samutpada.Jsvabhava: one of three "nonnature". 80 Bhavaviveka. 261. as turning about of the basis. 87 upek~aka. as the turning around of the basis. as response to the question of Buddha-nature. as the moment when mind is pure and luminous. as nominative case. dharma-body. 100 upek~a: characteristic of. 45. 14 ud ya I na idal)lpratyayata: ya definition of. etc. 4. as middle. as equivalent to dharma-dhatu. subdivision of vedana. 67. indif-ference. as media-tor. 64 30 ud ve ga ucched . Tibetans as nye bar len pa dag 20 udbhavanaIa brten nas gdags pa. 80. 115. substratum. 75 asava: canker of "out-flowing impurities". as acquisition of liberation. 79 asraya-paravrtti. 59. 79: as agent. as prasathatva (tranquil flow). 52 metaphorique". 192. as body. u . 28. see also three marks. an entity pro-visionally named. 76. 120. 108 aupama. 79. 4. sal)lvrtti. as alaya-vijiiana. 145. Isvara. 17: pradipa. 192 upadana: according to Avalokitavrata. 78.. relationship between. 148. the meaning of. 33. 75. 96. 93. 99. 176 tr lndra. in Prajniiudbhavana.J: Avalokitavra-ta's explanation. 5. 16 contigent existence. 185 utpada: origination. 32. 120. 94. 115. 94. 61. 75. 77. 77. as the turn about of one's basis. and yuganaddha. 77. turn-ing about of the basis. production. 192 upaya. 192. as conver-sion of consciousness. 77. in Pali. 143. as basis. 94 39 upapaduka: selfudgrah produced beings. 91. 94.

192. 98. 103. 191. 30 karman: in relation to pariQiima. 55. 92-94.designation based on some material. 190. 261. de Ia Vallee Poussin 's translation "designation en raison de". one who makes. 126 karaQa-k~aQa vilak~aQa: different in na-ture from cause. another name for pratHya-samutpada. 203. 250 karaQa: and karya. in the context of MMK. ie. desig-nation having recourse to materials.l8. 29 AU auddhatya. agility. meaning of. 24. Jaques May's translation "designation rddhi-pada. 220 kartr: doer. 10 kalyiiQamitra. 68 kaya. 10. 10 kalpita. 96 K karma. interpreted as upadanam upadaya prajiiapti. 125 karmaQyata. XXIV. in-terpretation in Prajniipradipa. 151 ekarasa. 126 . in contrast to hetu and phala. 205. 102 karuQii. 76 kaiicanagarbhamrttika. activity directed towards descent. as the descent aspect. 92. 193. 98 E ekayana: one vehicle. 192. 88.

77 KH khyati: to appear. the agent. 53. II khyana: the imagined as "the appearance". is itself bo-dhi (enlightenment). sravaka 's turbidities. 48. cause for rebirth in this world. 10. k r i y i i . Ill. 115. 163 k~etra. 49. 261 . 36 gotra. 142. 203. 72 khyatr: other-dependent as "agent who ap-pears". 129. 32. 141 G 9 1 k u s a l a m i l l a . 202. 222. 126: noetic aspect of the alayavijfiana. 8 5 k u s a l a . 122. 1 0 klesa: defilement. 221: a Madhyamaka notion. 246 graha-dvaya-vasanii: impressions of both subject and object (extinquished when cognition-only reattained). 10 gamana.J: as definition of paril)iima. 126 kiirul)ikatva. 203. 24 k~al)ikatva. 88 klesa-iivaral)a: obstacle of defilement. 197 Gaya. the appearer. 114. elimination of. 145. 30. 8 gantr: goer. see also Gotama in General Index grahaka. 103. 222 kiiryasya iitma-liibhal. 141.296 INDEX OF SANSKRIT TERMS 5 kiirl)a-k~ana-nirodha-samakiila: extinction of cause at the moment of acquisition of effect. 117 Gautama. fundamental defilement. 251. 105-09. 156. 126 k u l a p u t r a . 212.

148. 113. 56. 36 citta. 85. 57. 31 cal ) (lii la. 42. awakening to the thought of enlightenment. 30 catu~koti: example of. 25. 192. 40. 179 catvari avyakt(avastilni. 147 J janiisraya. 133 caitasika. 157. . 117-120. third division of nirvikalpajfiana. 60 citta-saflltiina: continuity series of mind. 92 caitta. 48 tathagata. 45. 215. 60. 107. 99. 130 cittotpada. 115. 105. 43. 53. 145. 24 T tat-pr~tha-labdha-jfiiina: as one of three knowledges. 89 cetal. 77 jfiiinadharma-kaya. 246 CA cak rav arti raj a. existence after death?. as spiritual preceptor. 179: tetralemma. a Yogacara notion. 105 jlviitman: individual human existence. 204. 222. 114 jfieyaavaral)a. four alternative propositions. suchness within words. 13. 107.J-paryaya: various states of mind. suchness. 38. 35. 8 jfiana. equated with siinyata. 197 cittaprakrti: mind in its essentially pure aspect. 102 tathata: Buddha's real essence. 97 citta-visuddhi: mind in its essentially pure aspect. 193. 78 jataka: narratives of former lives.grahya. 85. 91. 126: noematic aspect alayavijfiana. 60 citta-prasathatii: as definition of upek~a. 213. suggests descent direc-tion in Yogiicara. 223 tat-pr~tha-labdhena viharel)a: abiding in subsequent [wisdom]. 59. 205. 224. 113.

118. 117: as theory of descent. all be-ings have Buddha-nature. 43. returns to this world. matrix of the Tathagata. is siinyata. 205 tatha-agata: as the descent of the twodirection activity. 115 tathagata-dhatu. 57. 4. 57 .38. 25 tatha-gata: as the ascent of the twodirection activity. 205 tathagata-garbha. 58. 57. 60. theory advocat-ing all beings possess Buddha-nature.

teaching as established by scripture. 51 tri-svabhiiva. 104. 56 dharma-kiiya. objective being. as forerunner of iisraya-pariivrtti theory. 55 tattviivacchiidana: truth concealed. compared to Trinity and Hindu deities. 216. Ill dharmatii. 58. 112. 107. as intuitive insight. 164: as lamp and refuge. as real na-ture of things. 22. real existence. 159 dharma-iitman.(or tathii-abhiiva-) siinyatii: emptiness as thusbeing (or not-thus-being). 126 darsana-miirga. 114. 131 trimiirti: triad of Hindu gods. bud-dha's personality seen in the dharma. 114 tri-nil)svabhiiva. 112. 112 trivimok~a-mukha: three doors to enlightenment. 104. 761. 52 darsana-bhiiga: see two divisions. contrast to pudgala. 135. different from Trinity of Christianity. 204. without universal meaning. 76: repre-sents laws of universal order. 61-74 D daratha: disturbance. 182. 24. 224 darsana-miirga-priipti. as the basis for a new world view. and the wish-less. three-nature theory explained through sim-ilies. 77: body. the three do not represent three distinct worlds. 144 dvayii vrttil). 135 . doctrine. not divine order. 99. 105. 67 deha: equated with six sense organs. 100. distinguished from dharmatii.Index of Sanskrit Terms tathii-bhiiva. 116. 51 tri-samiidhi: three concentrations on the empty. dharma-nature. 14 tu~ita. different from trimurti of Hinduism. the signless. Buddha's real essence. 224. 215 du~karacaryii. 216. 105. cosmical body of the buddha. 221. 80 dosa. 107. 79 diina-Sila-k~iinti-virya-dhyiina-prajfiii: the six perfections. 212. 16. 84. 104. 143. 211: indicating a predicate that limits a subject. 42: external be-ing. 31 dul)kha. term referring to a world external to an "I". 28 DH dharma: all existences. 164. appellation of each of the five skandhas. 17. as the moment of iisrayapariivrtti. 79. 77 tii~l)IIJl-bhiiva: ultimate reality which remains silent. 51 durgrhita-siinyatii. the real. 165. 55. mean-ings of. 192 tri-kiiya. 98 daus!hulya: mind/body lacks agility or dex-terity. 157. freedom from. 168 dr~tiinta.

as Transformation-body. 107. Buddha's real essence. as a category of reality maintained by Abhidharma philosophy. 132 dharma-lak~al)a: as basis for the name Fa-hsiang in China. equivalent to iisraya. self-manifestation of. 147 dharmiinutpiida-samatii. 119. sphere of Buddha's Enlightenment. 81. 214 nil)svabhiiva. 175. 132 niistika. 93 dharmin: subject of a sentence. XYII. 36. 1. 100 dharma-paryiiya. 31 N na nirviil)e pratis!hito bhavati na sal)1siire (MSA. as the basis for both sal)1siira and nirviil)a. 44 niisti-viida. 32. 108. 212: as medium between siinyatii and pratityasamutpiida. 122 dhrti. 51. 24 na siinyal)1 niipi ciisiinyal)1 tasmiit sarvaiJl vidhiyate (MV. 16 niimiintara. equated with siinyatii. 212. 56 dhyiina.dharma-dhiitu.b). 78 dharmadhiitu-sarvatragiirtha. 99. 135 dhiitu: as "basis" from which everything in the three world system arise. 195 niimiibhiliipa. 145. 169 dhyiini-buddhas: celestial Buddhas. 78.32). 176: de-void of self-being. 215. 78. 143.2 a. 105-107. 19 . 157.

170 nairmiiQika-kiiya. 184. 121. 126 nirapek~a. 124. 175 ni~y and a. nirupadhise~anirviil)a. 181 . 102. 165 nirbhasa. 24 nirvikalpa. 42 nirvikalpa-jiiiina. 113. 203 nirviil)a-aprati~thita. 43. 43. basis for "wisdom acquired succeedingly". 224. 209 nairatmya.298 INDEX OF SANSKRIT TERMS ga. I 10 neti. 18 ni~\ hiimiir Body. 185. 221. 108 nirviil)a. equals nirviil)a. 204. 94 nimitta-bhiiga: see two divisions. nt. 100. 223. 108 saq~bhogika-kiiya nyiiya. 102 nirvedha-bhaglya. 221 ni~svabhava-siinya: non- substantiality. as a noncomposite dharma. suggests descent direction in Yogacara. 26 nirodha. fundamental wisdom. Buddha from whom disciples heard the dharma. three marks. 222 nirvikalpena vihiireQa: sbiding in nondiscriminative [wisdom]. does not act. 110 ni~yanda-kiiya: Outflowing ni~svabhava-vada. 223. 47 paiic askan dha. 184. 107. aid for penetration. 148. 30. 31 nirmiil)akiiya. 108. neti: negation in Upanishads. as concretized sviibhiivika-kaya. 114. 7. 223-225. 244. realized through elimination of avidyii. second division of nirvikalpa-jiiiina. 68-70. divided into three kinds. as one of three knowledges. 46 p pak~a . 80 nirnimittata: marklessness. 60. 77. 100 nirnimitta-vihara: marklessness. 112. 77 nirmita: transformed beings. 93. 100 nirmiil)a. 24. physical body in human form. 173. 202. 109. 56. 41 44 nimitta. 25 nirviil)e 'pi mano na prati~thitaq1.

21. 195 parikalpita. 62. 136. 64. 165 paramii tman. 80 paratantra. 17. 10. superworldly.l. 13. 18. 116 paramii Qu: atoms. imagination. 195. 22. 119 parikalpa: imagination generally refers to cognitive function. 8 paramiirtha. 62. 120. third of triad with parikalpa and parikalpya. manifests itself in this world. imagined. II. 22. 139. 75. 195. imagination. 141. 130 parikalpya: second of triad with parikalpa and parikalpita. refers to vijiiiina. 76 pada: abode. 47.paiicendriya. 10. 130. 215. 139 pari grh Ha. first of the triad with parikalpya and parikalpita. as basis for the imagined and consummated nature. refers to vijiiiina. object of cognition. 136. in the sense of the "world". 139. subject to saq~vrti. equated to siinyatii. 17. generally refers to cog-nitive function. 137 paraspara-apek~ii: depending upon one an-other. 137 paratantra-svabhiiva: other-dependent nature. 15 paraspara-saq~bhavanaq~ vii saq~vrtil. 20. 62. what is to be disc rim inat ed. 139 parikalpita-svabhiiva. cognition as agent. 41-43. other-dependent. Hsiiantsang's translation pien-chi different from parikalpita. 46. Paramiirtha translates it as "discrimination" (fen-pieh). cognition. 18. II. 80 paiicopiidi ina skandha. 55. con-verts to parikalpita and into parini~panna. 136. 87 . as vikalpa. 80. what is discriminated and clung to. discrimination that results in unreality. 64. 79. 20. 185 paramiirtha-satya. 62. 137. ultimate and absolute reality. 136. 15. absolute. Hsuan-tsang translates it pienchi-so-chih.lsvabhiiva: denotes es-sence of the consummated. 139. of Buddha's silence. 55. 80 paiicendri yaparavrtti. one of three "non-nature". refers to vi~aya. ultimate truth is concealed by saq~vrttisatya. 15 paramiirthanil. 14 paravrtti: turning around of passion into en-lightenment. 20.

two aspects of going forth and coming back. used in a transitive sense. 222 prakrti-sunyatii: essential emptiness. 51. tempo-rary. 89. 125 pflhagjana. high-est Wisdom. see three marks. 86 parini~panna. 128 prakrti-visuddhi. 203. 150 pariniimita. 149 parinamati. 88. 85 pudgala. 101. 16 prajiiapti-vada. benefitting others. 148. 94. 84 pariniimana. 78 paryaya: defined as "a convertible term" or "synonym". 84. 94. 62. 86 pariniimayitavya. II. 142 paryudasa-prati~edha: relative negation. 133 paryayena: from one perspective (ie. in Sarpkhya. 64. 83. 83 parinirviil)a. definitions of. usage of term according to Bohtlingk's Sanskrit Worterbuch. 95 prajiiapti. 55. making known. to direct towards. merit transference. 16 prajiiapti-sarpvrtti. 90. true 'Wisdom'. 129. 95 pragraha-nimitta. of parini~panna (the consummated). 24 prakrti-visuddha-nirvana: Mahayanic nirvana. 89. aspiration to be born in Sukhavati. 125. Sthiramati defined as "different name" (namantara). 132. 211. as the ascent movement. 68 pr~!ha-labdha-jiiana. 76 pudgala-atman. 77. 66 punya. 15. 224. 202. subjective person. 220. action in direction of going forth. 162. of Sarpkhya. 151. Wisdom. 83: intention to have good roots fixed on Buddhahood. second of the two kinds of birth-and-death. 83 parinamyanmana. 78 parini~panna-svabhava. 59. 86.." but no sense of "to re-direct". reached the other shore (param ita). sriivaka's. represents one of eight syntactic cases. 55 pragraha: one of three nimittas. a sense of "evolve. 55.Index of Sanskrit Terms parinati. 99. 166. 149 pariniimana: as Amida's Vow. but no jiiana. belongs to activity of descent. 86. synonymous with vipa-syana. 85-87. 171 paramita: perfection. 162 purvavasthato 'nyatha-bhaval): see also anyathatva. 83 pariniimikl. 56 pudgala-dharma-nairatmya. 83 pariniima. 99 prakrti. as synonym). 162 prthivl-dhatu. in Skt. a kind of subject estab-lished by Vatslputrlya. 41 . Hsiian-tsang translates as neng-pien. 83. 59. 203. 16. 132. 141. II. 46 . 62. 103. 170 puru~a. 184 prakar~a-alambana. 83 pariniimika. possessed by all bud-dhas. 55 prajiia: as abolishment of vijiiana. 94.

and karunii conjoined into one taste of Enlightenment. 104. 211. 17. XXIY. 191' 199. 56. 201. 176. 191.I8. 106 pratipatti-sarpvrtti. as the world that converts. support. 134. 13. 225 Prajiia-paramita-sutra. de-pendent origination. 193. 52. 30. 205. 15. 85. dependent coorigination.prajiiiipayati: makes itself known. represents ultimate reality and the other-dependent nature. 46. 84. 41. 221 pratyekabuddha. 173. 16 Prajiia-paramita. 45. 216. 104. 128 prapaiica. 70. two interpretations of. 216 pranidhana. 167. 30. 67 . 17. 25 prati~!ha-paravrtti. 16 pratibhasate: to appear. 54. 72 prati~!hita: meanings of.I8). 168. 30. 64. 78 pradhana: of Sarpkhya. 190. 54. 106. 217. 210. 174. 134 pratyaya. 40. 42 pramiil)a. 168. 199. 172. 170. 106 pratikarpk~ati. 131. 54. 176. 52. XXIY. twofold order of (in interpreting MMK. 89. 8. 214. 80 pratltyasamutpada. characteristic of. 170. 214. origination depend-ing upon another. 56. 79. logical syllogism. 89 pratipatti. 31. in the context of MMK. 189.

57 budd hadhar ma. 102 prasanga. 98 prasathata. 89 PHA phala: as Buddhahood that results from three learnings. 97. prakrit form of Skt. 85. 93.300 INDEX OF SANSKRIT TERMS Buddha's parinirval)a. 198 bija. 47. one of two Madhyamaka Schools. 121 budd hatva . 211 prasangika: deconstructive reasoning. as definition of upek~a. 223 prarthana . 103. 97. 127 bij aparavrtti . 24. six cognitions. as corresponding to Buddha's abhisaf! lbodhi. 96. 221 . 46. tranquil flow. 99 prasatha-svarasa-vahita. 99. 128. 28 phala-paril)ama: see twofold evolv-ing. 79. 28 prayoga: actual form of reasoning or syllo-gism. as goal of asraya-paravrtti. logical syllogism. 98 prasrabdhi: alleviatedness. 98 prayogika-jiiana. 43 buddha-dharmaparipaka. alaya-cognition as hetu. 204. 224 prayukta-jana. 14 pravrtti-vijiiana: seven functioning cog-nitions. 78 pravrtti: coming forth. first division of nirvika lpajiiana. 112 buddha-kaya. 99. 24. 10. 80 buddhakarman. 231 prahal)a-saf!lskara. as corresponding to B bahyarthabhava claim of Later Yijiianavada. 221 prasatha. 213. 79. 92 prasathatva. 127 phala-prahal)a. prasratha. 46. 67 prayoga-marga: preparatory stage. 148. 222 phala-jiiana. Ill buddhabhiimi. see upek~a. affliction as blja (seed) for attain-ment of nirval)a.

bodhi. as the ascent of the two-direction activity. 79. 167 bhiita-ko!i. 9. 84. 100 bha~ya. 87. who are addicted to pleasures. 221. 64. almacogitation. in the Upanishads. 161. 203 bodhyanga. as prayer. 31. 76 bodhi-paril)amana. 144 M madhyama pratipat. 55 bodhisattva-marga. 84 bodhicittotpada: mind creative of Enlightenment. 190. essence of the universe. signifies move from pratityasamutpada through siinyata to upadayaprajiiapti. world of existence. description of. 99. 9. 100 bhrantel) saf!lnisrayal): see basis for confu-sion. 95 bhavanamarga. 87. creator god. 139 . 112 BH bhava: existence. 190 bhik~u. in the context of MMK. 86. 88 bhavopapatti. 128 brahman. 21. the 4th stage. 84. minding-cognition. 66. 194.18. 87. 119 bodhisattvabhiimi: of Yogacarabhumi. the Absolute. 29 bhajana-loka. 123 manas. 91. 30. 78. the 8th stage. 215 bhiimi. 92 brahma. 205 bodhicitta. 89. the sixth cogni-tion. "!" as a sentient being in outer world and the outer world. 189 bodhgaya: Gautama realized mahabodhi. refers to parikalpa (what discriminates). 8. 36. 22. 205. 80 mano-vijiiana: mindconsciousness. 121 manasal)paravrtti. 99 bodhisattva-yiina. 159 bhavana. 112 brahmatman. 145. equated with siinyata. XXIY. 86. 121. 85 bodhisattva. 161. 92. 32. 139. 101 brahma-vihara. 143.

76 riipa. 96 yena desitam: expounder by whom siitra is expounded. 10. 203 miiyii. 17 miihiitmya. 191. 138 yas ca dadiiti: one who offers. Ill. xi. 96 . 55 riipa!Jl siinyatii siinyataiva riipa!Jl. 92 maithuna-pariivrtti. XXIV. 80 mok~a. 76 yathii khyiiti (yathiikhyiiti): how it appears. the imagined as "the way how some-thing appears". 104 L lak~aQa-nil)svabhiiva: one of three "nonnature". 141 yathii khyiinam (yathiikhyiinam): appear-ance. 69 miiyiikiira: magician. 142: equal to dharmatii. 76 yal) pratityasamutpiidal) siinyata!Jl tii!Jl pracak~mahe: see MMK. xi. 150 mahii-karuQii.l8. 9 muditii. synthesis. 141: most appropriate expression for parini~panna. 46: twofold reasoning. 94-94. 46 mahii-bodhi. the other-dependent as "what appears". kk. 10 yad vastu vikalpyate: see Tri'!lsikii. 104. 210 riipa-kiiya. 10. 76 yogiiciira: yoga practice. 16 y yat khyiiti (yatkhyiiti): that which appears. 20-21. 71 miirga. as consciousness-only theory. as three-nature theory. see also "Index of terms" R rahitatii: consummated nature as "being got rid of". 30. 77 yasmai desitam: the audience to whom a siitra is expounded. 16 maitri. 78 moha. 141 yatra dese: place where siitra is expounded. 16 mr~adrs. 46 yuganaddha. 185 laya. 168 riipam eva siinyatii. 190 yukti. 95. 141 riijagrha.Index of Sanskrit Terms mano-mayakiiya: reference to the sec-ond of two kinds of birthand-death. 10. buddha seen in the human body. all beings are empty. 86. 92 miila-tattva.

66. wrong discrimination. 143 vastu. 81. 193 laukika-pr~thalabdha-jiiiina. 40. 183: its relation to three-nature theory. 79 viihitii.Hna!Jl cittam: despirited mind. 125 vijiiiina-miitra: claim maintained by later Vijiiiina-viida. consciousness. 77 vahana. 147. 80 vak~epa-vikalpa. converted into wisdom Uiiiina). 93 loka. 221 vijiiiina-pariQiima: as convertibility. 79. II. explained in theory of cognition. 136. 20. 166 viisanii. 17 vikalpa-pariivrtti. ten kinds. everyday consciousness. con-verts into amala-vijiiana. 80. cognition. 98 vikalpa. 10 vijiiapti-miitra. 98 Viitsiputriya. 125. synonym of prajiiapti. knowing. 79. 18. 20 loka-vyavahiira: worldy designation. a Yogiiciira notion. 193 v vajriisana. 72. mental distractions. 203 vajropama-samiidhi. 52 vijiiapti: distinguished from vijiiiina. 184. 197. 17. 215. 187 vijiiiina. 198 . 184: mind as focus of Yogiiciira.

95 vipaka. II siithya: a mental factor. 46 vyavahiirtr: transactor of linguistic conven-tions. 15. 143 vise~asarnji\a. 77 v r t t i . 91. 94 samathavipasyanii: obstacles for equilibrium of upek~ii. 87 vimok~a: as iisrayaparavrtti. 46 vibhutva. 9 2 Vaibha~ika. 51 siisvataviida. 143. right effort. 95. 16 vyavahiira. 181 viji\iina-sarntana: continuity-series of cognition. 95. 94. 80. 77 vyatyastapada. 96 samatha-vipasyaniiyuganaddha. 79. 1 0 7 v e d a n i i . 130 vinaya. 80 vimukti: liberation. synthesis of. 167 vipasyanii: intuitive discernment. energy of right practice. 94 samathanimitta. 95: see three marks. 222 vimukti-kiiya. 77. emancipation b od y. 32 . 113. 104. 132 sama: = nirviil)a. state of power. 79 vipiika-kiiya: Resultmaturation Body. 18. 24. 164 vyai\jana: sexual organ.302 INDEX OF SANSKRIT TERMS viji\iina-viida: Cognition School estab-lished on viji\apti-miitra. 96 vipasy anii-nimitta. 220. 97 sabda. 29 samatha. 77. mastership. (or pragraha) if applied wrongly is auddhatya as only correct vipasyanii is remedy for laya. as iisrayaparavrtti. 30. 56 vyavasthiina. 114 vibhiiga. 24 Slla. 96. 191 vlrya. 11 4 vi m uk ha . 16. 45. 39 sik~ii (tril)i sik~iil)i): (three) learnings.

100. ana) lyzed into three. Buddha's real 6 essence. I. 1 Lie. . 215. summit of praji\a 7 (ascent) and karul)ii 8 (descent). 44. 73. k simultaneously nona existent as well as existent. 195 siinyataiva riiparn: sa praji\aptir upiidiiya emptiness just as it is pratipat saiva is being.s r a 175-77. the place . established by 7 negating the "duality" of subject and object. 5 1 40-49.l8cd. . i v one of three doors of a deliverance. 107. 61. a 216. r XXIV. 221. in s the context of MMK. 169. 198. 89. 84. 41. 173. 168. 205. vlrya-smrti-samiidhi-praji\ii: 190 the five s . 198. 41.l8.d). 210 madhyamii: see siinyavada. based on s the baseless. 100. 64 f a c u l t i e s . 225. 187. 182. 93. 74. etymol-ogy and definition. 181. 201. 206. 55. as nona substantiality. 64. 54 sriivaka-yiina. 169. 209. 43. 209 tasyiim api sa vidyate: (MV. true 8 meaning of. 221. 88 siinyata-paramartha. 204-06. 42 svi: to swell. not simply a refutation or negation. 198. 213 sraddhaMMK. negation of i existence. verb root for siinya. seen in Samadhi. 220. 185. 219.siinya. XXIV. term not found in Varjracchedika-prajflaparamita-siitra. 209. l absolute negation. siinyatii vidyate tv atra. mathematic zero. 51-60. world devoid of the absolute. 232. 45. 73. I c. Bhiivaviveka attack on MV. 210. 190m 99. where adhigama and 8 agama meet.

to go towards. conceals and covers ultimate truth. 47 sarnvnimiitra. 14 sarnvartate: to turn. 181 . 47. 22. conventional world. 137.sarnvara: election_ choice. 14 sarnvrti.

possesses transcendental and phe-nomenal aspects. 14 samantiid varal)af!l samvniiJ. 157. sentient beings. II. 110. 164. 29 samcintya-upapatti.. choice.Index of Sanskrit Terms samvrti-satya. 30 samcintya-upapatti-parigraha. 21. 51. conventional.d. a negative concept. 232 siimbhogika-kiiya. 63 samvrta: according to Candrakirti. Buddha-body at an assembly for sermon. 152. 16-22. 19. 86 sa-svabhiivaviida. preached . 31. 44 sahiilokadhiitu. 31 samsaranirviil)a-aprati~thatii. 143 sarvatraga-asraya: universal iisraya. 169. as the descent aspect of the two-direction activity. 14 samyaksambodhi. 130 samdarsanii: display. 203 samcintya-bhava-pratikiiilk~I. 15 samketa. (Pali) election. 76 satya-dvaya. 30 samcintya-bhava-upapatti. 205. 87. 60. 43. madhyamii pratipac ca sii: see MV 1. 159. 31 sambodhiiya. 110. 84. 12. pratyetavyiiiJ. 107. 38 sambodhi (knowledge). 13. 41 sambhiira-miirga. 112. 192 satya-dvaya-vibhiiga. 86 sarva-jfiatva: as explanation of iisraya-paravrtti. "cov-ered". 108. Buddha-body seen only in bodhisattvas.. 195 sat-puru~a. 21. 27 samputti. 14 samiidhi. 114. 17 sama: interpretation of. 18 samvrtil:l samketo loka-vyavahiira ity arthaiJ. 30 samcintya ca bhaviidiinam. 221 sambhoga-kiiya. for Sthiramati. 14 samvrti. a positive concept. idea of. 29-33. 16. pratyetavyii. covered truth. 17 samskfta. 14. 95 see upek~ii. concealing.. klesakalmii~iil:l .. 15. 46 samtiina: continuity-series. 78 sarva-bijaka: all-seedconscience. 86 sarviistivada: a philosophy called "dharmatheory". 85. 93 samsiiriityiiga. 30. realism of. concentration. 15. 28 samantiid varal)am. 22. 30 sattva: as a term referring to "I". in samatiijfiiina. synonym of prajfiapti. in India and China. 23. corresponds to abhiita-parikalpita. 28. 193 samklesasyiinurak~al)ii. 29 samatii. 164. 25 samsiira-nirviil)a-nirvisesa. for Candrakirti. 109. 137. 85 sattva-loka: the world of "I". covering. 106 sammuti. 43. 13-15. 92 samatii-jfiiina. 79 sarva bodhisattvacaryii . 46. 102 samudiigama.2 c. 174. 148 sa~iicanii: to point to. 31 samgha... 21 samsiira. 39. 159 sattviid asattviit sattviic ca. 167 samcintya. 93. 173 sarviilJ . conditioning.

76 sendriya-kiiya: body with its organs as the basis (asraya). 37 sugrhita-siinyatii. 47. 165 skandha. 72 svatantra. 24. 212. substantiality. 98 sva-lak~al)a-dhiiral)atva: definition of dharma. 212. 109 Sukhavati. definition of. 221. 44. 26 Sautriintika: claim of reality as opposed to Sarvastivada's three periods of time. 56. 78. 108. transcendental divine nature. 202. 47 svabhava. 16 sva-rasa-vahita. same as Reward-body. 62 svatantra-anumiina. 164 . 143 sopadhise~a-nirviil) bodhi-sattvas. 55. 213 styana: (Pali thlna) sluggishness. 215 siitra: as iisraya. 251. defined as akrtrima or nirapek~a by Niigiirjuna. 94 sphatika. 86. 93 styiina: is a motionless state (staimitya). in contrast to para-tantra. 62. 47 svabhiivavaral)i\1. 106. 175. 219 Sugata. 32.

110. 231. 47. 78 hetu-pariQiima: see twofold evolving. 77. 107. 127 hetu-pratyaya. 127 . foundation of other two Buddha-bodies. 46. 174 sviibhiivika-kiiya. 212 INDEX OF SANSKRIT TERMS H hetu. 192 hetu-phala: in contrast to kiiraQa and kiirya. is dharma-kiiya. one of two divisions of Madhyamaka. 108.304 Sviitantrika. 110 svo bhiival:I.

"Important technical terms used in the Mahayana textual tradition . The height of his philosophical achievement may be glimpsed in the chapter entitled: The Logic of Con vertibility. the doctrine of sunyata . making the book indispensable to scholars of Buddhist studies . A volume in the SUNY series in Buddhist Studies Kenneth lnada .MADHY AMIKA AND YOGACARA A Study of Mahayana Philosophies Gadjin M." -David J.ars appreciated them .3 .Kenn eth In ada. also published by SUNY Press . Japan. He is the author of Th e Foundational Standpoint of Madhyamika Philosophy . His detailed treatment of each of the themes combined with a careful linguistic analysis of Buddhist philosophical concepts sheds much light on Buddhist doctrines." . especially in Yogacara . This offers a complete picture of his novel deliberations . State University of New York. showing a first-rate thinker at work . Leslie S . Berkeley . translator "It ties together for the first time the two primary schools of Indian Mahayana tradition . California Gadjin M. Kawamura. Canada . Kalupahana. Institute of Buddhist Studies. are skillfully presented. editor State University of New York Press ISBN 0 -7914 -0186. Kawamu ra is Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Calgary . Buffalo "Professor Nagao is one of the most respected scholars in Buddhism. whose exact understanding is imperative for the study of Mahayana Buddhism .the path of the Bodhisattva . Nagao is Professor Em eritus of Buddhist Studies at Kyoto University. Alberta . which explicates the dia lectical structure underlying the Madhyamika and Yogacara systems . University of Hawaii "Nagao invariably focuses on the core of Mahayana Buddhism . Nagao: Leslie S. Nagao's insights have been valued by Japanese scholars all along and only recently have Western schol . "The author's strength in philological discipline and knowledge is manifest." - Shohei /chimura. and the system of Trisvabhava are explained .