Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 11-1476
CHUCKWUDI PERRY,
Plaintiff Appellant,
v.
DAVID KAPPOS, Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property and Director of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office,
Defendant Appellee,
and
GARY F. LOCKE, Secretary, United States Department of
Commerce, United States Patent and Trademark Office,
Agency,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:10-cv-00167-JCC-TCB)
Argued:
Decided:
On appeal, we
I.
A.
Perry suffers from vision problems.
He has no vision in
have
caused
lack
of
depth
Perrys
perception,
frequent
corrective
critical tasks.
even
feels
devices,
however,
J.A. 239.
Perry
is
able
to
perform
comfortable
traversing
certain
routes
at
night,
read
efficiently
with
straight-edge devices.
that
the
cumulative
the
Id.
use
of
magnifying
glasses
and
effects
of
his
conditions
frequently
Id.
Despite
the
position.
his
vision
essential
Id. 258.
problems,
functions
of
Perry
his
was
patent
able
to
examining
While
He sought
his
requests
supervisors
responded
to
his
in
meaningful
manner.
Soon after joining the USPTO, Perry became involved in a
dispute about his salary.
Irondi,
human-resources
to
begin
the
process
of
asserted that Irondi told him to leave immediately and close the
door
behind
him.
Irondi
later
complained
to
her
supervisor
Jeffrey
Pwu,
Perrys
incident
and
confronted
believed
that
Irondis
supervisor,
Perry.
and
Perry,
Pwus
learned
an
actions
about
African
were
the
the
American,
result
of
the
Irondi.
problem.
Nesbitt
directed
Perry
to
speak
with
problems with Ms. Irondi and [he did] not want to deal with her
any
more
[sic].
administrative
Id.
144.
grievance
if
He
also
threatened
employees
did
not
to
file
become
an
more
Rights
(OCR)
about
the
incident
with
Irondi.
On
at
the
USPTO,
scheduled
meeting
with
Perry
to
Perry met
with Dill and described his issues with Irondi and Pwu, alleging
that the actions of both were racially discriminatory.
Perry
on? and Perry informed him that he was trying to work through
the issues.
Id. 167.
In
Id.
thought
Pwu
was
pressuring
him
Id.
not
He explained why
to
file
formal
complaint:
It wasnt so much what he said.
It was what he did.
He was very--he was constantly wanting to talk with me
and get my--get my status or what was happening with
this. It wasnt from a standpoint of wanting to help,
or at least that, because he really didnt.
It was
just from the standpoint of wanting to know what was
going on and whether or not I was going to file
formal.
Id. 17677.
Complaint
on
15,
but
he
grievances.
elected
not
to
formalize
his
employment.
Jim
Ng,
director
of
the
Patent
Training
Ng
at
explained
the
that
expected
Perrys
rate,
performance
that
he
had
had
not
routinely
Id.
129.
B.
Perry
responded
to
his
termination
by
filing
second
informal complaint with the USPTOs OCR, alleging that the USPTO
had
discriminated
disability.
employment
the
second
He
against
him
subsequently
the
basis
formal
filed
discrimination--which
informal
on
repeated
complaint--with
the
the
of
race
complaint
charges
Equal
made
and
of
in
Employment
that
the
U.S.C.
USPTO
701
violated
et
seq.,
the
by
Rehabilitation
refusing
to
Act
grant
of
him
1973,
29
reasonable
basis
of
his
disability--i.e.,
monocular
vision
that
and
working.
Second,
Perry
alleged
that
the
USPTO
district
judgment.
court
granted
Kapposs
motion
for
summary
As for the Title VII claim, the court found that Perrys
filing
an
informal
complaint
was
mere
opposition
activity
II.
We review de novo the district courts grant of summary
judgment.
2011).
Civ.
evidence
P.
in
56(a).
support
The
of
mere
the
existence
plaintiffs
of
Fed.
scintilla
position
will
of
be
the nonmoving party must come forward with more than mere
speculation or the building of one inference upon another to
resist dismissal of the action.
F.3d 135, 140 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d
213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985)); see also Francis v. Booz, Allen &
Hamilton,
Inc.,
452
F.3d
299,
308
(4th
Cir.
2006)
(Mere
III.
Perry first challenges the district courts holding that he
does not suffer from a disability under the Rehabilitation
Act.
major
life
activity
of
seeing. 1
Because
Perrys
admissions
the
Rehabilitation
Act 2
for
discrimination
Appx
726,
728
(4th
Cir.
2004).
or
failure
to
successfully
show
physical
impairment
activity of seeing.
that
implicates
the
major
life
10
prong--whether
the
limitation
on
Perrys
vision
is
requirement
must
substantial. 3
The
be
Rehabilitation
interpreted
Toyota
Motor
Regulations
Acts
strictly
Mfg.
v.
substantiality
to
create
Williams,
accompanying
the
534
Act
demanding
U.S.
184,
provide
standard.
197
the
(2002).
following
claiming
disability
are
required
to
have
an
11
198.
regulations
exactingly,
substantiality
prong
is
we
have
intended
to
explained
preclude[]
that
the
coverage
of
Heiko,
434
F.3d
at
256
(internal
quotations
omitted).
We
must
take
into
account
mitigating
measures
when
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (concluding that plaintiffs, who
had 20/200 or worse vision in their right eye and 20/400 vision
or worse in their left eye but had 20/20 vision with the aid of
corrective lenses, were not disabled for statutory purposes).
Indeed, it impermissibly strains the text of the Rehabilitation
Act
to
posit
that
persons
are
to
be
evaluated
in
their
Id.
individualized,
point
to
concrete
impairment.
inquiry
is
disability
case-by-case
analysis,
evidence
their
of
own
on
important
monocularity,
in
when
as
which
plaintiffs
experience
with
an
Such a case-specific
an
individual
the
many
claims
variables
Albertsons,
Inc.
v.
Kirkingburg,
12
527
U.S.
555,
566
(1999).
his
case
limitation
on
of
monocularity
seeing.
Id.
at
amounts
to
56667.
substantial
Though
the
Court
substantial.
individuals
to
Id.
the
at
567.
burden
We
have
articulated
by
held
monocular
the
Court
in
F.
Appx
148,
153
(4th
Cir.
Foore v. City of
2001)
(unpublished)
(explaining that the court was not presented with the ordinary
case referenced in Albertsons).
Applying these principles to Perrys impairment, we find
that he has not demonstrated that he is substantially limited in
the major life activity of seeing.
at
the
proper
level
of
and
taking
into
establish
that
his
monocularity
prevents
or
severely
F.
Appx
at
153.
Indeed,
through
the
use
of
mitigating
Perry was
J.A. 239.
He admitted
that his vision problems did not preclude him from perform[ing]
the essential functions of his patent examining position.
258.
Although
Perry
suffered
fatigue
when
reading
for
Id.
long
ordinarily
definition of disability.
will
meet
the
Rehabilitation
Acts
But we
IV.
We turn next to Perrys Title VII retaliation claim.
The
an
informal
complaint
qualified
as
participation
or
Commrs, 673 F.3d 333, 337 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that
a circuit court may affirm on grounds different from those on
which the district court relied).
his
discharge,
we
conclude
that
he
has
not
raised
an
employee]
has
opposed
any
practice
made
an
unlawful
U.S.C.
model,
the
proceeding,
2000e-3(a).
plaintiff
retaliation.
or
hearing
Under
must
establish
subchapter.
familiar
burden-shifting
facie
prima
case
of
this
activity;
the
under
his
employer
took
adverse
employment
action
against him; and (3) there was a causal link between the two
events.
Id. at 40506.
for
situations
in
which
the
adverse
employment
Inc.,
193
(unpublished).
F.
Even
Appx
mere
229,
ten-week
233
(4th
Cir.
separation
2006)
between
the
Where
the
time
establish
causation
plaintiff
must
establish
causation,
between
based
present
solely
other
such
the
as
on
events
temporal
relevant
too
great
proximity,
evidence
continuing
is
retaliatory
to
a
to
conduct
the
14,
EEO
informal
specialist,
on
complaint,
more
February
than
three
2007
months
about
filing
before
he
an
was
that
him
any
or
supervisors
otherwise
at
the
retaliated
USPTO
against
displayed
him
in
animus
the
time
employment.
Perry
testified
that
Pwu
was
J.A. 176.
questions
about
the
attempting
to
convert
Pwus
18
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
AFFIRMED
19