Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 08-4062
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Carmen D. Hernandez, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant. Jonathan C. Su, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
OPINION
KING, Circuit Judge:
By way of this interlocutory appeal, CAM, who was seventeen years old when he was charged as a delinquent and
arrested in 2005, seeks relief from the district courts transfer
order of December 2007, authorizing his prosecution as an
adult in the District of Maryland. See United States v. C.A.M.,
No. 8:05-cr-00401 (D. Md. Dec. 7, 2007) (the "Transfer
Order").1 In his appeal, CAM contends that the charging juvenile delinquency information contravenes the Constitution and
is otherwise legally insufficient, that the transfer proceedings
violated his procedural rights under the applicable statutes and
the Constitution, and that the court abused its discretion in
entering the Transfer Order. As explained below, we affirm in
part and dismiss in part.
I.
A.
The Transfer Order was entered by the district court pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
(the "Act"), specifically that part of the Act codified at 18
U.S.C. 5032 (" 5032"). As we have previously recognized,
the primary purpose of the Act is to "remove juveniles from
the ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of
1
The Act defines a "juvenile" as a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday or who committed an alleged offense prior to his eighteenth birthday, and who has not attained his twenty-first birthday prior to
the filing of the charging information. See 18 U.S.C. 5031.
3
In considering the prosecutions burden of proof in a transfer hearing,
we recognized in Juvenile Male # 1 that other courts characterize such
proceedings as civil in nature and thus apply the preponderance burden.
See 86 F.3d at 1322-23 (citing United States v. A.R., 38 F.3d 699, 703 (3d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992)).
Although our decision in Juvenile Male # 1 did not expressly conclude
that a transfer hearing is civil in nature, we nevertheless recognized that
the government must prove its case for transfer by a preponderance of the
evidence. Similarly, in previously recognizing that a juvenile is not entitled to a jury trial in a delinquency adjudication, we explained that "the
essential nature of the proceeding was the ascertainment of his status as
a juvenile delinquent rather than his conviction as a criminal." United
States v. Hill, 538 F.2d 1072, 1075 (4th Cir. 1976). As such, we agree with
the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits that a transfer hearing is civil in
nature. See United States v. T.F.F., 55 F.3d 1118, 1122 (6th Cir. 1995);
A.R., 38 F.3d at 703; Parker, 956 F.2d at 171.
tion"). The Initial Information charged CAM with delinquency on the basis of his involvement in a "conspiracy to
participate in a racketeering enterprise, which would have
been a crime in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(d), if he had been an adult." Pursuant to 5032, the
United States Attorney also filed a certification to proceed in
federal court, endeavoring to specify the jurisdictional predicate of the proceeding (the "Certification").
CAM provided authorities with two statements that potentially implicate him as being involved in criminal activity.
CAM made the first statement during an interview with federal agents on April 7, 2005, months before his arrest. The
second statement was provided on the day of his arrest, after
CAM had signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights. In
the August statement, CAM discussed his involvement with
a gang known as "MS-13." In addition to providing his statement, CAM assisted authorities in locating a firearm that had
been used in a homicide. CAM asserts that the August statement was made during a twelve-hour delay between his arrest
and his initial appearance, and that such delay contravened the
"forthwith" mandate of the Act. See 18 U.S.C. 5033
("Whenever a juvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act
of juvenile delinquency, . . . [he] shall be taken before a magistrate forthwith."). CAM also maintains that the April and
August statements were taken in violation of his Miranda
rights.5
On June 14, 2006, after weighing the statutory factors of
5032, the district court transferred CAM to adult prosecution. See United States v. C.A.M., No. 8:05-cr-00401 (D. Md.
June 14, 2006) (the "Initial Transfer").6 Invoking the
5
10
11
One of CAMs procedural challenges in this appeal relates to his unresolved Suppression Motion, yet pending in the district court. See supra
note 5. We possess jurisdiction over a very limited portion of that challenge that for purposes of the transfer issue, the court erred in considering CAMs two statements to federal agents without first ruling on the
Suppression Motion because that aspect of his appeal raises a procedural claim concerning the transfer proceeding. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
We do not, however, possess jurisdiction to consider other issues related
to the Suppression Motion.
12
13
This claim challenges the jurisdictional propriety of the certification. Because a proper certification, i.e., that the RICO
conspiracy offense affected interstate commerce, is a jurisdictional predicate to a juvenile transfer proceeding, that issue
satisfies the requirements of the collateral-order doctrine and
can thus be reviewed in this appeal. See United States v.
White, 139 F.3d 998, 999-1000 (4th Cir. 1998); United States
v. C.A.M., 251 F. Appx. 194, 195 (4th Cir. 2007).
III.
We turn now to the merits of the appellate contentions over
which we possess jurisdiction: that the Amended Information
is legally insufficient for failing to allege a substantial federal
interest, that the transfer proceedings violated the procedural
protections afforded CAM by the applicable statutes and the
Constitution, and that the district court abused its discretion
in entering the Transfer Order. As a general proposition, we
review for abuse of discretion a district courts decision to
transfer a juvenile to adult prosecution. See United States v.
Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 858 (4th Cir. 2005). "An abuse of
discretion occurs if the district court fails to make the required
factual findings, or if those factual findings are clearly erroneous." Id. (quoting United States v. Juvenile Male # 1, 47 F.3d
68, 71 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)). We review de novo the courts legal rulings, however both statutory and constitutional relating to the
entry of a transfer order. See United States v. SorianoJarquin, 492 F.3d 495, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Helem, 186 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999).
A.
First, CAM contends that the Amended Information is
legally insufficient in failing to allege a substantial federal
interest, i.e., that the RICO conspiracy offense affected interstate commerce. In assessing whether a "substantial federal
interest" has been properly certified, a court must decide
14
whether "the crime [is] of a sufficiently serious type that federal resources should be called upon, without regard to the
States willingness or ability to handle the matter." United
States v. Juvenile Male # 1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1320 (4th Cir.
1996). Indeed, "[o]ur prior cases . . . have placed importance
on the severity of the penalty prescribed for the offense and
the sense of urgency by Congress in deciding to federalize the
crime." United States v. T.M., 413 F.3d 420, 426 (4th Cir.
2005). In conducting such an assessment, however, we accord
substantial deference to the United States Attorney. See Juvenile Male # 1, 86 F.3d at 1319.
In this situation, the United States Attorney proceeded
under the third prong of the jurisdictional predicate of 5032,
and certified that CAM had committed a "crime of violence."
In the earlier Certification, filed in August 2005 in connection
with the Initial Transfer, the prosecutor certified that there
was a "substantial federal interest" in pursuing the delinquency proceeding against CAM "due to the severe nature of
the underlying acts in furtherance of [the] conspiracy and the
dangerous nature of the alleged enterprise." The Amended
Information plainly alleges that CAM violated the RICO conspiracy statute, and the twenty-year statutory maximum penalty for that offense underscores its severity. See T.M., 413
F.3d at 426. Moreover, the fact that "Congress intended RICO
to be a potent tool in halting the infiltration of organized
crime into the American economy," United States v. Baker,
617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980), demonstrates "the sense
of urgency and importance that Congress has placed" on combating criminal organizations, T.M., 413 F.3d at 426-27. In
this context, the prosecutions allegations as reflected in
the Amended Information, Certification, and Affidavit
demonstrate a substantial federal interest and thus satisfy the
mandate of 5032. CAMs challenge to the sufficiency of the
governments certification of a substantial federal interest
thus lacks merit.
15
B.
Next, CAM raises three procedural challenges to the transfer proceeding. We address these contentions in turn.
1.
In the first of his procedural challenges, CAM asserts that
the Act barred the United States Attorney from amending the
Initial Information (and thereby satisfying 5032) after our
2007 remand to the district court. In that appeal, we agreed
that the Initial Information was flawed but authorized the
prosecution to amend it. This defect was promptly cured on
remand by the filing of the Amended Information.14 CAM
contends, however, that the Act accords the United States
Attorney with only one opportunity to certify a juvenile for
transfer to adult prosecution. If an initial information is
legally insufficient, according to CAM, the Act bars any subsequent effort to cure the defect.
On its face, 5032 does not mandate any specific procedure for the required certification. Indeed, as we explained in
the earlier appeal, such a certification may be made in "either
the [juvenile] information or the [formal] certification."
United States v. C.A.M., 251 F. Appx 194, 195 (4th Cir.
2007). Furthermore, the terms of 5032 fail to support
CAMs position 5032 simply requires the certification of
a "crime of violence" and a "substantial federal interest."
CAMs contention thus borders on the frivolous, and we will
"refuse[ ] to allow jurisdiction to be defeated by a . . . ministerial act related to the certification requirement of 5032."
14
In addition to our mandate in the earlier appeal, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(e) independently authorizes the amendment of an information by providing that "[u]nless an additional or different offense is
charged or a substantial right of the defendant is prejudiced, the court may
permit an information to be amended at any time before the verdict or
finding."
16
United States v. White, 139 F.3d 998, 1001 (4th Cir. 1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted).15
2.
Next, CAM contends that the transfer proceedings violated
his statutory and constitutional rights. More specifically, he
maintains that the transfer proceedings were defective in three
ways: (1) that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses when he was not permitted to question the
agent who executed the Affidavit; (2) that the district court
erred in considering CAMs two statements of April and
August 2005 allegedly made in contravention of the "forthwith" requirement of 5033 and his Miranda rights for
purposes of the transfer proceeding; and (3) that a psychiatric
evaluation conducted at the courts direction and used in the
transfer proceedings violated the Fifth Amendment.
a.
First of all, CAMs challenge that he was not allowed to
cross-examine the agent is simply misplaced, in that a transfer
proceeding is civil in nature. As such, its purpose is not to
incriminate, but to select the proper forum for trial. See
United States v. A.R., 38 F.3d 699, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1994)
("The determination is not one of guilt or innocence, or even
of delinquency or non-delinquency, but rather concerns the
15
17
18
second 5032 factor, the nature of the offense. The court also
relied on the United States Attorneys allegations, which the
court was entitled to accept as true, and the other supporting
evidence presented to the court. Even without CAMs statements, however, the prosecutions allegations and other evidence warranted the courts finding that the nature of the
offense favored CAMs transfer. As a result, even if the court
somehow erred in considering these statements, no prejudice
could have resulted with respect to its entry of the Transfer
Order.16
c.
Similarly, the psychiatric evaluation of CAM conducted at
the district courts direction and used in connection with the
transfer proceeding, did not contravene the Fifth Amendment.17
Once again, any statement obtained from CAM during the
evaluation was not used to incriminate him. As we have
observed, the transfer proceedings were civil in nature and
CAMs Fifth Amendment rights did not attach in such a setting. See A.R., 38 F.3d at 703-04 ("The failure to administer
Miranda warnings to A.R. prior to [statements] did not
deprive him of his right against self-incrimination, because
the use of the [statements] at the transfer hearing did not
incriminate him.").18
16
To the extent CAM contends that his statements of April and August
2005 were obtained by the authorities in violation of his Miranda rights,
we lack jurisdiction to assess such a contention, which is yet pending in
the district court. See supra note 5.
17
CAM also maintains that the district court lacked the authority to
order his psychiatric evaluation. However, 18 U.S.C. 5037(e) specifically authorizes "observation and study by an appropriate agency" of an
"alleged or adjudicated delinquent."
18
We observe that the eighth unnumbered paragraph of 5032 provides
that statements made "during a transfer hearing," are not to "be admissible
at subsequent criminal prosecutions." See A.R., 38 F.3d at 703 & n.5 (citing 5032 limitation and observing that psychological reports will not
"bear on the ultimate substantive question of guilt or innocence" and serve
"limited, neutral purpose").
19
3.
CAM next contends that the Act does not authorize the
transfer of a juvenile on the basis of a conspiracy offense. For
this contention, he relies on decisions suggesting that the government may not prosecute an adult for a conspiracy offense
on the sole basis of his juvenile conduct. See United States v.
Spoone, 741 F.2d 680, 687 (4th Cir. 1984). The Spoone decision fails to support CAMs contention, however, because
unlike Spoone CAM was first charged as a juvenile. The
Act was designed to permit the transfer of juveniles to adult
prosecution. Where the 5032 transfer mechanism has been
properly invoked, a juvenile charged with a conspiracy
offense may therefore be transferred to adult prosecution. See
United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
("[T]he [Act] authorizes certain juveniles to be transferred to
adult status where they may be tried for conspiracy crimes in
adult court.").19
C.
Finally, we turn to CAMs contention that the district court
abused its discretion in entering the Transfer Order. In that
regard, the court concluded, by adopting and incorporating the
substantive analysis of the Initial Transfer, that two of the
5032 factors weighed in favor of CAMs transfer, one
weighed against such a transfer, and the other three factors
were neutral. As explained below, the court did not abuse its
discretion in entering the Transfer Order.
19
20
1.
In analyzing the first factor, the district court concluded
that CAMs chronological age "favors transfer," and that his
social background "also supports transfer, albeit minimally."
Initial Transfer 9-10. A juveniles age toward the higher end
of the spectrum (eighteen), or the lower end (fifteen), is to be
weighed either for or against transfer. Here, we agree that
CAMs chronological age (seventeen years and nine months)
supports his transfer. With respect to CAMs social background, the record is mixed. The district court found that
CAM had been raised in "a loving and intact family," and saw
nothing in his "social background that would suggest to [him]
that gang activity was acceptable behavior." Initial Transfer
11. In contrast to his family situation, however, CAMs life
outside the home was not stable. He joined MS-13 around the
age of fourteen, and dropped out of school during the ninth
grade when his grades and behavior deteriorated. CAM began
abusing alcohol at the age of fifteen or sixteen and started
using cocaine and marijuana shortly thereafter. Such behavior
indicates a lack of structure and support, and accordingly
weighs against his transfer. In these circumstances, the district
court did not clearly err in concluding that CAMs social
background "minimally" favored his transfer to adult prosecution.
After considering the second factor, the court found that the
"nature of the alleged offense strongly supports [CAMs]
transfer." Initial Transfer 14. CAM allegedly participated in a
criminal organization that had been involved in repeated acts
of violence. And, in weighing the statutory factors, the nature
of the offense is significant. See Robinson, 404 F.3d at 859.
Accordingly, the courts conclusion that this factor weighed
heavily in favor of transfer was not clearly erroneous.
With respect to the third factor, CAM has no prior criminal
record. The district court thus concluded that such a clean
record weighed against his transfer to adult prosecution. CAM
21
does not take issue with this conclusion, and the court did not
err in this respect.
On the fourth 5032 factor, the district court found that
CAMs intellectual development and psychological maturity
constituted a neutral factor. Two psychiatric evaluations show
CAM to be in the "low-average range" of intellectual development. CAMs intellectual development at school was hampered by the fact that English is his second language and his
parents have limited education. His abuse of drugs demonstrated a low psychological maturity, but such abuse is offset
by the responsibility he accepted at home. Although some of
CAMs conduct indicated immaturity, the court recognized
that he had shown glimpses of maturity. In such circumstances, the courts decision to treat this factor as neutral was
not clearly erroneous.
Regarding the fifth factor, the district court concluded that
an analysis of past efforts to treat CAM was also neutral. This
assessment was predicated primarily on the fact that he had
not been enrolled in any formal treatment program. Finally, in
disposing of the sixth factor, the court compared the treatment
programs at federal juvenile facilities to those maintained by
Maryland. It determined this factor to be neutral, because
those jurisdictions make similar substance-abuse and gangcounseling programs available. Put simply, the court did not
clearly err in determining these final factors to be neutral.
2.
After analyzing these statutory factors, the district court
concluded that "the safety of the community requires that
CAM be transferred to adult criminal prosecution." Initial
Transfer 21. Having separately reviewed the courts findings
on the statutory factors for clear error, we examine its ultimate transfer ruling for abuse of discretion. See Robinson,
404 F.3d at 858. In so doing, we conclude that the court
appropriately evaluated and weighed those factors. As a
22