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REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
Facts:
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the
Commission on
Election ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for
the
position of the Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended
Petition to
Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako
Reyes,
the petitioner, on the ground that it contained material representations.On March
27,
2013, the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She filed
an
MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her MR.
However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013
Elections.
On June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and
Executory.
On the same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time,
as her
term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC
was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed
20
because pursuant to
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive
jurisdiction
to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of
the
House of Representative of Marinduque.
Held:
Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only
after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as
stated in
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member
of
the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1)
valid
proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not
assumed
office yet. Also, the 2
nd
requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath must
be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open
session.
Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication
that it
was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether
the
required oath of office was indeed complied.
Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
alleged and proved to exist. For an act to be struck down as having been done with
grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show
that
grave abuse of discretion exists

Antero J. Pobre v. Sen Miriam Defensor-SantiagoA.C. No. 7399 August 25,


2009TheJudicial and Bar Councilof thePhilippinesis aconstitutionally-createdbody
thatrecommends appointees for vacancies that may arise in the composition of theSupreme
Courtandother lower courts.The function of the Council is to recommend to the president of
possible appointees to theJudiciary.he person then chosen by the president then becomes a
member of the Judiciary, and is notanymore reviewed by theCommission on
Appointments.The Council is composed of a representative of the IntegratedBar,
aprofessoroflaw, aretired member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of theprivate
sector. They are the"regular" members, as opposed to theSecretary of Justiceand a
representative ofCongresswhoare theex officiomembers. The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court is theex officiochairman,[1]whilethe Clerk of the Supreme Court shall serve as theex
officiosecretaryVELASCO, JR.,J.:FACTS:1. The Judicial Bar Council sent public invitaons for
nominaons to the soon-to-be vacated posion ofChief Jusce. Senator Miriam Defensor
applied for the posion. However, the JBC then informed theapplicants that only incumbent
jusces of the Supreme Court could qualify for the posion. For notbeing qualied, Sen.
Miriam delivered this speech on the Senate Floor.x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am
foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I amhumiliated, debased, degraded.
And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middleyears in a country of this
nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief JusTce Artemio Panganibanand his cohorts
in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the posiTon [of Chief JusTce] if I wasto be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court
ofidiots x x x.2. In his sworn leer/complaint dated December 22, 2006, Antero J. Pobre
invites the Courts aenonto the excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Sanagos speech
delivered on the Senate oor. To Pobre,the foregoing statements reected a total disrespect
on the part of the speaker towards then Chie

Osmena vs Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)


Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests

FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as member of
the Special Committee created by House Resolution # 59. Specifically, petitioner asked for the
annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and asked
the member of the Special Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59,
requiring the petitioner to substantiate his charges against the President during his privilege speech
entitled A Message to Garcia wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the Presidents
administration selling pardons. For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of his allegations, Osmena
was suspended for 15 months for the serious disorderly behavior.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioners words constitute disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating the
speech and words of Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.
HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself as stated in the provision that xxx shall not be questioned in any other place.
2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not the
judiciary, because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House
knows best. Anything to the contrary will amount to encroachment of power.
3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted to the
suspension of the House Rules, which according to the standard parliamentary practice may be done
by unanimous consent.
4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured,
committed to prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

Case Digest: People vs Jalosjos


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS,
accused-appellant.

Facts:

The victim of rape in this case was a minor below twelve (12) years of age, who herself
narrated the shameful details of the dastardly act against her virtue. The victim was peddled
for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father. Because the
complainantwas a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several acts of
lasciviousness on distinctlyseparate occasions..The accused was then CongressmanRomeo
Jalosjoswho, inspite of his having been charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory
rape, was stillre-elected to his congressional office. On December 16, 1996, two (2)

informations for the crime ofstatutory rape and twelve (12) for acts of lasciviousness, were
filed against accused-appellant

The victim, Maria Rosilyn, grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care
of SimplicioDelantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old
homosexual whose ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and
accepting boarders at his house.He, however, was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.

Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of one of their boarders. They went tothe
Pasay City Police where she executed a sworn statement against SimplicioDelantar. Rosilynwas
thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD).The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which
eventually led to thefiling of criminal charges against accused-appellant He was also
convicted on six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.

Issue/s

1.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE


ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT,
CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANT INDICIA OF INCONSISTENCIES AND UNTRUTHS.

2.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

3.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE


SIGNIFICANCEOF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

4.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PRIVATECOMPLAINANT WAS A MINOR LESS THAN TWELVE YEARS OF AGE WHEN THECLAIMED
INCIDENTS ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE.

5.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RAPE
WASCOMMITTED AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC Makati with modification of penalty.

1.

TESTIMONY OF VICTIM; DOCTRINE OFFALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS; APPLICATION


THEREOF NOT AN ABSOLUTERULE OF LAW; CASE AT BAR. The contention is without
merit. Falsus in unofalsus inomnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely
applied in modernjurisprudence.Trier of facts are notbound to believe all that any witness
has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and reject other portions,
according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to be thetruth . . .
Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars,the jury are not required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony,
but may credit suchportions as they deem worthy of belief.

2.

CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED BY SOMEAMBIGUOUS ANSWERS ON WITNESS


STAND, WHICH REFERS TO MINOR ANDPERIPHERAL DETAILS; CASE AT BARA reading of the
pertinent transcript ofstenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in fact firm and consistent
on the fact of rape andlascivious conduct committed on her by accused-appellant. She
answered in clear, simple andnatural words customary of children of her age.

3.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED; DEFECT IN OUT-OF-COURT


IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED CAN BE CURED BY AN IDENTIFICATIONSUBSEQUENTLY MADE IN
COURT; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR.Contrary to thecontentions of accused-appellant, the
records reveal that Rosilyn positively and unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the
courtroom. Such identification during the trial cannot be
diminished by the fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accused-appellant as
her abuser based on the name she heard from the person to whom she was introduced and on
the name she saw and read in accused-appellant's office.

4.

AGE OF THE VICTIM IN RAPE CASES MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE; PRESENT INCASE AT BAR. It
is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be provedby the
presentation of her birth certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends that the
birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court because said
birthcertificate has already been ordered cancelled and expunged from the records by the
Regional TrialCourt of Manila, Branch 38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April 11,
1997. Even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there is sufficient and ample
proof of the complainant's age in the records. Rosilyn's Baptismal Certificate can likewise
serve as proofof her age. In People v. Liban, we ruled that the birth certificate, or in lieu
thereof.

5.

WHEN CONSUMMATED; SUFFICIENTLYESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. True, in People v.


Campuhan, we explained that thephrase, "the mere touching of the external genitalia by the
penis capable of consummating thesexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge.Theinevitable contact between accused-appellant's penis, and at the very least,
the labia of the pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt pain inside her vagina
when the "idiniin" part ofaccused-appellant's sex ritual was performed.

6.

STATUTORY RAPE; ELEMENTS; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. At the time of commission of


the crimes complained of herein in 1996, statutory rape was penalizedunder Section 11 of
R.A. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:When and how rape
is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a womanunder any of the
following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman isdeprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented