Attorneys For Defendant Ammon Bundy

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J. Morgan Philpot (Oregon Bar No. 144811)

Marcus R. Mumford (admitted pro hac vice)
405 South Main, Suite 975
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 428-2000
morgan@jmphilpot.com
mrm@mumfordpc.com
Attorneys for Defendant Ammon Bundy
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
AMMON BUNDY, et al,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:16-cr-00051-BR

TRIAL MEMORANDUM AND
OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENTS
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: ADVERSE
POSSESSION
The Honorable Anna J. Brown
In its trial brief and motion in limine, the government seeks to preclude Ammon Bundy
(and other defendants) from presenting evidence of his core defense his state of mind,
motivations, and the justifications underlying his alleged actions and leadership pertaining to the
January 2016 occupation of the Malhuer National Wildlife Refuge (Refuge). Its Motion In
Limine (Motion) is unfair, lacking in legal authority, and constitutionally impermissible in
seeking to exclude facts concerning Mr. Bundys claim of adverse possession over the Refuge.
Mr. Bundy has an unalienable right to present a complete defense to the pending charges,
including evidence that negates the willfulness of his allegedly criminal acts. See Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) ([T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S. 479, 485 (1984))). And courts cannot make rulings that undermine the doctrine of adverse
possession. Over 125 years ago, the Supreme Court reversed where the lower court had
Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession
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instructed the jury that [u]nless the defendant had a right to the possession of such lands when
he took possession of them, he has no right now; time never makes a wrong right because as
the Court recognized the right of adverse possession does not depend upon, and has no
necessary connection with, the validity of the claim under which that possession is held. Probst
v. Trustees of Bd. of Domestic Missions, 129 U.S. 182, 190 (1889); see also Buchanan v. United
States, 233 F. 257, 258-59 (8th Cir. 1916) (reversing defendants conspiracy convictions based
on the trial courts erroneous exclusion of evidence going to the defendants belief even though
their actions were indefensible regarding ownership of the property in question because [i]f
that belief was entertained in good faith, and the intent of [defendants] was but to aid [their
leader] in the assertion of his supposed title they did not violate the act of Congress (citing
United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 80 (1884)).
Mr. Bundys defense is simple. There is no significant dispute regarding his presence in
Oregon, and the government has marked exhibits showing some of the actions he took and
statements he made in January 2016, widely covered by traditional and social media. These
include his protests regarding the treatment of the Hammonds and the larger issues presented
i.e., the need to constrain the federal government to its constitutional limits regarding property
ownership, U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, clause 17, and the harm that comes to families and
communities when it does not respect those limits. The government now intends to put Mr.
Bundy, his brother, and codefendants on trial for allegedly conspiring to use unlawful force,
intimidation, and threats against government officers, and for allegedly intending to use
firearms in a federal facility in furtherance of that purported conspiracy. (Doc. 282 at 2, 4)
Much attention has been given to Mr. Bundys rights, under the First and Second
Amendment, to petition the government for redress and to speak out against mistreatment of its
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citizens, and the government has acknowledged those aspects of his defense. But Mr. Bundy has
also made repeated and consistent efforts to apprise the Court of his statutory and common law
rights to attempt adverse possession under the Color of Title Act, 43 U.S.C. 1068, as justifying
his and his fellow defendants presence on the Refuge. (See Docs. 527 and 892) The government
has not responded substantively until now, at the eleventh hour, with a motion in limine seeking
to exclude the entirety of Mr. Bundys defense in that respect. But even during the recent July 18
release hearing, where the court declined to consider the attempted adverse possession in
denying Mr. Bundys motion for release under the Bail Reform Act, the Court acknowledged
that a claimed attempt at adverse possession could be presented at trial to mitigate intent.
(7/18/2016 Tr. 63:10-13) To that, the government acknowledged it was a factual matter and
that perhaps the jury will decide maybe the government is wrong. (Id. at 20:14-17)
This issue is critical, not just because Mr. Bundys understandings regarding adverse
possession would mitigate [his] intent, but, more importantly, because Mr. Bundys attempted
adverse possession of the Refuge, with his fellow protestors, provides a complete defense to the
governments pending charges. In this respect, the governments trial brief and Motion miss the
central point of Mr. Bundys defense: regardless of whether Mr. Bundys attempted adverse
possession of the Refuge would have been successful it was unquestionably legal to try.1
Importantly, the government does not, and cannot, dispute the sufficiency of evidence showing
that Mr. Bundy was engaged in attempted adverse possession at the Refuge. Instead, the Motion
argues that: (1) government property is not subject to adverse possession; (2) any attempt at
adverse possession in this case would not have been in good faith, as the Color of Title Act
And even if the Court concludes that it was not legal, Mr. Bundys sincere belief regarding the
legality of his actions remains a central consideration for the jury, disproving the mens rea
element of charges that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Buchanan 233 F. at 259.
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requires; and (3) Mr. Bundy and others are not entitled to a misunderstanding defense. But, as
demonstrated below, if Mr. Bundy and his colleagues were intentionally engaged in a statutorily
protected attempt at adverse possession as part of their lawful protest regardless of the merits
of their attempt, and regardless of the actual outcome they were not engaged in an illegal
conspiracy to do something else. And because their presence at the Refuge was in furtherance of
their statutory rights of adverse possession, the government cannot argue that Mr. Bundy and the
other defendants cannot avail themselves of their rights under the First and Second Amendments.
I.
Adverse Possession Claims, Generally.
The Court and prosecutors in this case have, at times, expressed significant levels of
incredulity regarding Defendants actions at the Refuge in January 2016, which has also seeped
into media coverage of these proceedings. Commentators in and out of court seemingly boast in
their professed inability to understand how Mr. Bundy could possibly justify his actions at the
Refuge as being within the bounds of law. And yet, with its Motion and trial brief, the
government is seeking to prevent Mr. Bundy from doing exactly that: explaining how the law
allows for him and others to have attempted adverse possession of the Refuge in connection with
their First Amendment protest regarding the federal governments treatment of the Hammonds
and its violations of the limits that the Constitution places on federal power.
It is beyond ironic that the government bases its Motion on an argument as flimsy as no
controlling legal authority. (Doc. 959 at 4) The Court may recall that argument was popularized
in 1997 by then-Vice President Al Gore in defense of his conduct soliciting campaign donations
from the White House, for which he was never prosecuted.2 And only a month ago, the
See Alison Mitchell, Gore Says He Did Nothing Illegal In Soliciting From White House, NY
Times, March 4, 1997, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/04/us/gore-says-he-didnothing-illegal-in-soliciting-from-white-house.html.
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Department of Justice used the same argument to justify its decision not to bring criminal
charges against a former secretary of state and current presidential nominee:
In looking back at our investigations into the mishandling or removal of
classified information, Mr. Comey said, we cannot find a case that would
support bringing criminal charges on these facts.3
And yet, in this case, the Department of Justice uses the argument to try and preclude a
defendant from being able to present evidence in support of his defense. Voluntary dismissal of
its case against Mr. Bundy on those grounds would be more appropriate.4
The Courts prior statements concerning Mr. Bundys defense in this case seem to treat
adverse possession as some kind of anachronism. In response: First, Mr. Bundy would point out
how rights recognized by federal statute to assert adverse possession are no more anachronistic
than the statute that the government is using to prosecute him for an alleged conspiracy, 18
U.S.C. 372. As Defendants have previously shown, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. 372 in July
1861, three months into the Civil War, after secession, and following widely publicized events
like those in St. Joseph, Missouri, where President Lincolns newly-appointed postmaster had
been chased from his post at gunpoint by Confederate sympathizers for refusing to take down the
union flag. (See Docs. 474 at 4-5; 1007 at 4-5) Pointedly, the government has no basis to accuse
Mr. Bundy of chasing any government official from his or her post at gunpoint. As his brother,
Ryan Bundy, testified at a recent hearing on their joint motion for release:
[T]hese charges relate directly to our right to assert the constitutional fact that the
federal government cannot own land within a state, except for specific purposes
outlined in the Constitution, and to attempt adverse possession, to return return
it to the rightful owners, including under the Color of Title Act.
3
Mark Landler & Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Director James Comey Recommends No Charges for
Hillary Clinton on Email, NY Times, July 5, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/06/us/politics/hillary-clinton-fbi-email-comey.html?_r=0.
4
See United States Attorneys Manual 9-2.031, available at https://www.justice.gov/usam/
usam-9-2000-authority-us-attorney-criminal-division-mattersprior-approvals#9-2.031; Doc. 881
at 9-10 (arguing that the DOJs Petite Policy, USAM 9-2.031, requires dismissal).
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I want to just focus on one particular piece of the law. The refuge the refuge
was empty when we got there on January 2nd. We made sure of that. The main
buildings were unlocked. We checked all of the buildings and surrounding
property because we did not want any confrontation or violence. Once we verified
that the buildings were empty and that there was no one in the surrounding
property, we staked our claim. Some have mocked our efforts. Some have
criticized that some of us had firearms in our possession, though we never used
them for threats or violence.
That is what we set out to do. We did it openly, notoriously, and hostilely.
[But] we did not use violences [sic], and we caused no harm to anyone.
The only bullets that were fired were by the government, and the only force that
was threatened and the only guns that were brandished were by the government.
(7/18/2016 Hrg. 74:13-76:18) The government did not challenge that account with any evidence.
The history of 18 U.S.C. 372 raises another point that weighs against the governments
Motion and trial brief. When introduced in 1861, the law included provisions criminalizing a
conspiracy to overthrow, or to put down, or to destroy by force the government of the United
States, or to levy war against the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any
property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof Those provisions criminalizing
seditious conspiracy have since been moved to 18 U.S.C. 2384, which is not charged in this
case. And even if the government had charged a violation of 2384, i.e., a conspiracy to seize,
take or possess [by force] any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, the
defendants would still be able to present their adverse possession defense, showing that, far from
being contrary to the authority thereof, their actions were authorized by the Color of Title Act.
One of the few reported cases under 2384 helps illustrate why it does not apply here. In Phipps
v. United States, 251 F. 879, 880 (4th Cir. 1918), the court affirmed a 2384 conviction based on
plenary evidence that the defendant conspired with others to recruit and pledg[e] men under
oath, to attack a military base plans included blowing up bridges to take by violence the
arms and ammunitions of the government in other words, the defendant offered no evidence
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to justify his actions under the authority of federal law, as Mr. Bundy has done here.
Mr. Bundys defense rests on basic and long-established principles of property law.
While some of these principles may be foreign to citizens in modern times (including
prosecutors, judges and potential jurors), they are familiar to those who, like Mr. Bundy and
some of the other defendants, rely on the land in the Western United States for their livelihood,
be it ranching, farming, or other vocations. On these topics, Mr. Bundy has been a well-known
and public advocate. His lectures, teaching, and public speeches (both before and during the
occupation of the Refuge) include plain and direct discussions of these matters including the
doctrine of adverse possession. In fact, the governments arrest of Mr. Bundy came as a direct
consequence of how effective his ideas were proving to be on January 26, authorities
demanded Mr. Bundys arrest in order to stop the virus [that he] was spreading those
demands leading, tragically, to the shooting death of LaVoy Finnicum.5
The governments Motion ignores the facts of the case and basics of adverse possession
law as applied, and instead asks the Court without any direct authority to exclude Mr.
Bundys defense. Undersigned counsel can understand the perverse allure underlying the
governments argument. If the court would also chain Michael Phelps to the wall of the
swimming pool, we might be able to beat him in a 100m butterfly. But the Constitution
guarantees that Mr. Bundy be given a meaningful opportunity to present [his] complete
defense. Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Bundy and others engaged in a conspiracy, knowing of its illegal object and intending to
help accomplish that illegal object. It makes reason stare to try and argue that Mr. Bundy should
not be able to argue that his actions in protest to the federal governments actions were in pursuit
5
KOIN 6 News Staff, Militia at Malheur: Virus was spreading, January 29, 2016,
http://koin.com/2016/01/29/militia-at-malheur-virus-was-spreading (last visited July 13, 2016).
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of a legal object, i.e., a lawful attempt at adverse possession. That protest garnered national
attention, including a response from Oregons congressional delegation, and increased public
scrutiny of the governments claims to own and control the majority of land in the Western
United States. We anticipate that the jury in this case will be asking, among other things, why the
protestors changed the sign at the Refuge, why they changed its name, why they tried to assume
the utilities and have mail delivered there, and why did they put their efforts into improvements
at the Refuge? Did Mr. Bundy and others do those things, and others, to somehow intimidate
federal officers from discharging their official duties? No. But if the Motion is granted, the jury
will never hear the central truth of this case concerning Mr. Bundys intent. The answer to all of
those questions, and others, is that Mr. Bundy and others took the actions they did, understanding
that they would be factors in assessing what they hoped would be a successful attempt at adverse
possession. The Court should not preclude Defendants ability to tell the jury, in the well-known
words of radio commentator Paul Harvey, the rest of the story.
II.
The Contours Of Adverse Possession.
The governments Motion does not address the substance of what an adverse
possession defense would look like at trial. It seeks to exclude it without any such discussion.
But the Court must recognize that the lawful use of adverse possession has a long and wellestablished legal tradition in the United States, at common law and by way of state and federal
statute. See, e.g., Ewing's Lessee v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 52 (1837) (affirming the sufficiency of
evidence to establish a claim for adverse possession where one enters the land of another under
claim and color of right [thus constituting] an ouster, otherwise, it is a mere trespass); NAC Tex
Hotel Co. v. Greak, 2015 WL 7019738, at *3 (Tex. App. Nov. 12, 2015) (describing adverse
possession as a harsh doctrine, which requires that the parties intentions be very clear).
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Unquestionably, the actions of claiming or holding property by way of adverse possession are
lawful. In Ewings Lessee, 36 U.S. at 54, the Supreme Court rejected a property owners
challenge to a jurys verdict on grounds that adverse possession was not fair and honest.
[O]ne who seeks to set up an adverse possession need not have a good title, or in fact
any title, except a possession adverse and hostile to that of the true owner under a pretense or
claim. 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession 11 (1986). While a discussion of adverse possession
ordinarily centers on real property, the same principle has been applied to the acquisition of title
to personal property. Id. at 12. The hostility requirement does not require ill will or malice,
but an assertion of ownership adverse to that of the true owner and all others whether by
mistake or willfully. Id. at 43. [T]he intention with which possession is taken and maintained
is the controlling factor. Id. at 45. If the possessor intends to hold the land only until or
unless the true owner claims the premises ... there is no claim of right under adverse possession,
but it is not necessary that the possessors use or claim is legally justified because [a]dverse
possession does not depend on whether the motivation is guilty or innocent. Id.
The governments Motion admits that federal law recognizes a statutory right to perfect
title obtained by way of adverse possession. See Beaver v. United States, 350 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir.
1965) (recognizing that possession, to be adverse, must still constitute color of title [and] be
actual, open and notorious to satisfy the Color of Title Act). In its trial brief, the government
concedes by implication that if Defendants words and actions in establishing possession of the
Refuge in January 2016 were lawful, they remain protected by the First Amendment. (Doc. 958
at 19-21) Finally, the government has already admitted that the issue of adverse possession
presents a factual matter where perhaps the jury will decide maybe the government is wrong.
(7/18/2016 Hrg. 20:14-17) In considering whether the Court can preclude Defendants from
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presenting facts to the jury to support their defense on this matter, it is helpful to distinguish the
three phases involved in adverse possession (1) staking the claim, (2) holding the claim, and
(3) perfecting the claim.
The first stage is the entry, ouster, or disseizin often described as staking a claim.
For over 150 years, the Supreme Court has recognized that the entry by one man on the land of
another, is an ouster of the legal possession arising from the title, or not, according to the
intention with which it is done; if made under claim and color of right, it is an ouster, otherwise,
it is a mere trespass; in legal language, the intention guides the entry and fixes its character.
Ewing's Lessee, 36 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added); see also Probst, 129 U.S. at 189 (reversing
based on courts erroneous jury instructions at variance with the doctrine of adverse
possession: The whole of this doctrine is summed up in very few words, as laid down by Lord
COKE, (1 Inst. 153,) and recognized in terms in the case of Blunden v. Baugh, Cro. Car. 302, in
which it underwent very great consideration. Lord COKE says: A disseisin is when one enters
intending to usurp the possession and to oust another of his freehold; and therefore querendum
est judice quo animo hoc fecerit, why he entered and intruded. So the whole inquiry is reduced
to the fact of entering, and the intention to usurp possession.); Springer v. Young, 12 P. 400,
403 (Ore. 1886) ([A]dverse possession cannot begin until there has been a disseizin .).
The disseisor must unfurl his flag on the land, and keep it flying, so that the owner
may see, if he will, that an enemy has invaded his domains, and planted the
standard of conquest. He must intend to hold the land for himself, and that
intention must be made manifest by his acts. It is the intention that guides the
entry and fixes its character. No particular act, or series of acts, is necessary to
demonstrate an intention to claim ownership. Such a purpose is sufficiently shown
where one goes upon the land and uses it openly and notoriously, as owners of
similar lands use their property, to the exclusion of the true owner.
Robin v. Brown, 162 A. 161, 161 (Pa. 1932) (affirming judgment against adverse possession
where the claimant had merely enclosed the property with an old fence whose wires were broke
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down) (citation omitted). Whether a party is staking its claim under color of right, and thus
committing a legal act as opposed to trespass, is a fact question that should be presented to the
jury. Ewings Lessee, 36 U.S. at 52. If a party admits to the finder of fact that he simply
squatted for present convenience, without any color of title or claim of right to it in any
sense whatever, and that he did not even intend or think of obtaining title to it for many
years thereafter, courts will affirm the judgment of the trial court ejecting that party. Blake v.
Shriver, 68 P. 330, 332 (Wash. 1902). And what does it mean to act under claim of right,
claim of title, and claim of ownership in this respect? The Supreme Court has explained
those terms mean nothing more than the intention of the disseisor to appropriate and use the
land as his own to the exclusion of all others. Guar. Title & Trust Corp. v. United States, 264
U.S. 200, 204-05 (1924). The statements of Mr. Bundy and others from the January 2016 period
reveal their intent to do exactly that, and while the Court may disagree with the wisdom of their
actions, it cannot prevent them from presenting evidence to the jury to show that those actions
were lawful, in the context of asserting a claim for adverse possession of the Refuge.
The second stage of adverse possession is holding the claim for a prescribed period of
time (set by common law or statute). See, e.g., Quality Ag Serv. of Iowa, Inc. v. Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry., 809 F.3d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 2015) (rejecting adverse possession argument
concerning a sidetrack where the owner had reentered and began occupying the sidetrack
after [a] derailment 22 days before the 10-year adverse possession period ran). This stage is
distinct from the initial act necessary to commence a claim for adverse possession. And this
answers the question raised in the governments Motion as to whether Mr. Bundys stated
intention to possess the refuge property for years was somehow unlawful. In the context of
an adverse possession claim, such a statement is legally required.
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The third stage of adverse possession is perfecting the claim, or quieting title, after
staking the claim and holding it for the requisite time period. See Faulks v. Schrider, 114 F.2d
587, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (rejecting the argument that adverse possession could only be asserted
as a defense because Congress did not mean to have one law adverse possession for a
defendant in ejectment and another for all other parties and actions); see also United States v.
Wooten, 40 F.2d 882, 884 (10th Cir. 1930) (rejecting the governments argument that the court
could not award title to adverse possession claimants under federal statute). It seems that this is
where the government would have the Court focus its attention seeking a ruling that
Defendants failed, as required by the Color of Title Act, to hold a tract of public land in good
faith and in peaceful, adverse, possession for more than twenty years. 43 U.S.C. 1068.
Two issues in response: first, Mr. Bundy does not seek in this matter to be awarded actual title of
the Refuge, only to show that he was lawfully exercising his rights to attempt such a claim; and
second, case law does not require perfection of an adverse possession claim before recognizing a
claimants right to possess and exclude others from the subject property. See Blumrosen v. St.
Surin, 1995 WL 918312, at *6 (Terr. V.I. Sept. 29, 1995) (recognizing that even before the
courts quieting of title, the adverse possessor can maintain an action for trespass against all who
allegedly enter onto the adversely possessed property without his consent).
Most significantly, the government cites no authority where a court held that a party
attempting adverse possession could simultaneously be prosecuted under criminal laws. As
illustrated below, the opposite is true. Adverse possession is lawful, and, thus, so is the attempt.
III.
Legitimate Adverse Possession Claims Against the United States.
The government correctly argues that, generally, adverse possession against the United
States is not permissible meaning that it will not succeed but that the Color of Title Act is
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an exception to that rule. See Cavin v. United States, 956 F.2d 1131, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(recognizing that the Color of Title Act is, in effect, an exception to 28 U.S.C. 2409a(n)).
The Code of Federal Regulations recognizes that [a]ny individual, group, or corporation
authorized to hold title to land in the State and who believes he has a valid claim under color of
title may attempt adverse possession and, after twenty years of holding that claim, may make
application for legal title. 43 CFR 2541.1. Significantly, the government cites no authority to
suggest that an attempt to establish adverse possession against the federal government is
unlawful, under the Color of Title Act or otherwise. Presumably, that is why it asserts a no
controlling legal authority argument. But, perhaps unwittingly, that is determinative as to why
the Motion should be denied. In other words, having shown how evidence of their intent is
relevant, the government now bears the burden of proving why that should not be admitted under
the United States Constitution, a federal statute, or applicable rules. Fed. R. Evid. 402.
The government does not argue how federal law, which expressly allows for any
individual to hold federal land by adverse possession under claim or color of title for more
than twenty years and then make application for legal title, can simultaneously criminalize the
exercise of this same right. Why? Because the law does no such thing. The government ignores
multiple examples in the case law showing the opposite that parties claiming adverse
possession against the federal government are protected until the government brings a civil
action and proves that the attempted adverse possession claim cannot succeed.
For example, the government cited Jackson v. United States, 56 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1932),
to argue that federal property is not subject to adverse possession. But, first, in the next
paragraph, the government acknowledges that the Color of Title Act is an exception to that
general rule. Second, it is significant that Jackson itself involved a civil ejectment as opposed
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to a criminal prosecution and that the adverse possession claimants who were in possession of
several structures and buildings on federal land in that case were not charged with any crime
and that law enforcement was not used to forcibly removed them. 56 F.2d at 341. At the close of
evidence, the district court directed a verdict in the governments favor. Id. In affirming, the
Ninth Circuit reviewed the undisputed evidence and held that the alleged adverse possessors
could not satisfy the relevant California statutes to establish their title. Id. at 341-43.
Other cases show a clear pattern on the governments part of resolving adverse
possession claims via civil as opposed to criminal litigation. In United States v. Gossett, 416 F.2d
565 (9th Cir. 1969), the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the governments action
for civil ejectment, noting that the parties being ejected lacked any evidence to support their
claim to title either by grant from the state, or by adverse possession. Id. at 567-69 ([T]here is
not a scintilla of proof that the property was used in a manner which would permit the
acquisition of title by adverse possession.). In United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406, 409-13
(9th Cir. 1975), also involving a civil ejectment action after the BLM informed the defendant
that he was trespassing and ordered him from the land the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
courts order directing the Secretary of Interior to grant the defendants application under the
Color of Title Act, but ruled that the government was estopped from its actions based on the
BLMs misrepresentations to defendant, remanding so that the Secretary could entertain an
application for his familys adverse possession claim under a more favorable act of Congress.
Finally, Beaver v. United States, 350 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1965), was a civil condemnation
proceeding where the district court concluded, after holding two nonjury trials, that because
appellants adverse possession [claim under the Color of Title Act] lacked one year and four
months of the required twenty-year period, they had no title or right to compensation. Beaver is
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significant because even though the federal government was of the opinion that it already
owned the property in question, it was still required to file proceedings to condemn the adverse
possession claim, because appellants claimed an adverse interest. Id. at 5; see also United
States v. Schwarz, 460 F.2d 1365, 1372 (7th Cir. 1972) (affirming judgment for government in
quiet title action brought on behalf of Indian heirs after adjacent landowner asserted adverse
possession). In each of the above cases, the party asserting adverse possession had the protected
and legal opportunity to establish its claim.
The practice of using civil actions to resolve adverse possession claims is consistent with
the so-called legality principle mandating that conduct is not criminal unless forbidden by
law which gives advance warning that such conduct is criminal. 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott,
Substantive Criminal Law 3.1, at 271 (1986); see also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,
228 (1957) (reversing criminal conviction for failure to register). Because a party has a right to
attempt, hold and perfect claims for adverse possession, it follows that, without more, they
cannot be guilty of a crime for attempting it. See Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228.
Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice. Notice is
sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend charges. Notice is
required before property interests are disturbed, before assessments are made,
before penalties are assessed. Notice is required in a myriad of situations where a
penalty or forfeiture might be suffered for mere failure to act.
Id. Nowhere does the government explain why it broke, in bringing this case as a criminal
matter, from prior practice and precedent of resolving adverse possession claims with civil
ejectment in fact, the government has falsely claimed that the FBI repeatedly told
[Defendants] to leave. (7/18/2016 Hrg. 10:4-18, 17:25-20:17) But, when challenged on this
point, the government admitted that no formal notice was served saying Its now time for you
to leave the property, but that it was relying on notice that was purportedly conveyed
through the local sheriff on January 7th when he asked them to leave town and [b]roadcast
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media [that] was replete at that time with messages, I guess, trickling down that it was time for
them to leave:
[T]he whole point of the bureau's presence at that time and this is the
governments position was to deescalate the situation.
So they were not going in there saying Get out now or else. The whole point
was to try to do it in such a way where there would not be a volatile or violent
conclusion to the occupation.
So, in that sense, Mr. Mumford is right that they weren't formally served papers to
leave a property they had no business being on in the first instance. That's a
factual matter that perhaps the jury will decide maybe the government is
wrong.
(Id. at 20:1-17) And yet, with the current Motion, the government is seeking to deprive the jury
of the ability to decide that the government is wrong.6
In fact, the only federal case that closely parallels the facts in this one was In re Timmons,
607 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1979). In that case, political protestors occupied and claimed title to a
federal wildlife refuge based on the broken promises of the federal government; they only faced
criminal liability after the federal government initiated a civil ejectment action and, in the
context of that action, an order to show cause why protestors should not be held in criminal
contempt, after those protestors refused to comply with the courts temporary restraining order
to cease bringing building materials onto the wildlife refuge, and to remove themselves and
all of their personal belongings by the following day at 5:00 p.m. Id. at 123. The Timmons case
bears remarkable similarities to this one. In 1979, a passionate and civic minded leader, after
6
Mr. Bundy also showed how, contrary to the governments argument, the local sheriff did not
make a demand to leave on January 7, but rather offer[ed] [the Defendants] the opportunity to
help you get out and get home and resolve this thing peacefully, pointing out that theres been
some positive stuff thats come out of this and I think that the people of the county are excited
about working out issues that that come from government (indiscernible), stating, in response
to Mr. Bundys claim to be there for the people of Harney County, that he (the sheriff) was
there with a similar, and unspecified, mandate: I'm here because the citizens of Harney County
have asked me to come out and ask you folks to peacefully leave. I think that you respect their
wishes, and I want to help you guys get out of here. (7/18/2016 Hrg. at 22:5-23:10)
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failing to get a direct response to his prior petitions for redress, organized a group of like-minded
associates into the People Organized for Equal Rights, who occupied and took possession of a
federal wildlife refuge. Id. at 122-23. Like the present case, protestors in Timmons, entered the
wildlife refuge with the apparent intention of asserting claim to the land. Id. Approximately
25-40 individuals began possession without permits or authorization and informed the Project
Leader of the Savannah National Wildlife Refuge Complex, Department of Interior, that they
intended to remain indefinitely [and] said that they did not recognize the area as federal
property. Id. The leader of the occupation having previously tried to address the government,
the court described his efforts to appeal to God for help, while not relying solely on divine aid.
Id. The occupiers brought unauthorized off-road vehicles and cars onto the property and also
building materials, including concrete blocks, bags of mortar and ladders. Id. at 123.
Rather than militarizing the situation, and rather than demonizing protesters as religious
or political extremists, in Timmons, the federal government followed well-established and
predictable legal precedent, by acting first through the courts in a civil ejectment proceeding. Id.
The United States government then filed a complaint for ejectment, a civil action, against Edgar
Timmons, Jr., a group known as People Organized for Equal Rights and other unknown
individuals. Id. In connection with this complaint for ejectment, the government obtained an
ex parte TRO that required, inter alia, that defendants remove themselves and all of their
personal belongings by 5:00 p. m. on May 1, 1979. Id. Reflecting some similarities with the
present case, four hold-outs remained. But, in contrast with this case, after they refused to leave:
[T]he U.S. Attorney, an Assistant U.S. Attorney and the U.S. Marshal came to the
area to meet with [protesters] and discuss the order that had been entered. They
encouraged the [protesters] to leave the area voluntarily and pursue their claims
through normal judicial proceedings. The U.S. Attorney spoke personally with
[the protesters] and explained that he had no desire to arrest anyone. He also
attempted to convince them either to seek legal advice and file a civil action to
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quiet title to the wildlife refuge or to take their complaint to the Congress of the
United States, rather than to violate the district court order.
Id. Following this visit, some of the protestors still refused to leave. So, the federal court issued
an order to show cause why they should not be held in criminal contempt for their failure to
obey the April 30 order. Id. Finding that a jury trial was unnecessary for petty offenses, the
court convicted the defendants following a two-hour trial, and sentenced them to 30 days in jail
for criminal contempt. Id. The remaining discussion on appeal affirmed the district courts
conduct of the trial pursuant to criminal contempt standards. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that
the original TRO might be challenged as a prior restraint on First Amendment liberties, and:
[i]t may be that there is some valid basis to attack by legal process of the
governments acquisition of the Timmons tract two generations ago . But, until
the governments title is divested, the appellants must obey the process issued by
the court system that not only protects the governments property but also
preserves the appellants life and liberty while mounting their protest and
safeguards their access to a legal forum for their dispute. The marshals guns were
not drawn against appellants, the militia was not called and those who chose to
defy the court order were not injured. Even their confinement has been suspended
pending this appeal.
Id. at 124-26. Far from supporting the governments Motion to preclude the jury from hearing
evidence concerning the Defendants attempt to establish an adverse possession claim at the
Refuge, these cases show why they must be able to present that evidence as part of their
complete defense. Crane, 476 U.S. at 690.
IV.
The Governments Good Faith Reference, Is Irrelevant.
The government argues that, even if adverse possession were possible, there is no good
faith exception that would permit the adverse possession of federal property in defendants case,
citing to 43 C.F.R. 2540.0-5(b) which provides that a claim asserted under the Color of Title
Act is not held in good faith where held with knowledge that the land is owned by the United
States. (Doc. 959 at 3) But this argument is misplaced. At best, it is an argument in favor of a
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possible civil ejectment action which the government did not bring. While a finding regarding
the factual issue of good faith may support the Secretarys decision not to grant title under the
Act, it does not preclude a claimant from establishing a claim or support the conclusion that one
who purportedly lacks good faith is acting illegally. Here, it is significant that the very issue of
Mr. Bundys and others knowledge that the land is owned by the United States was one of the
primary purposes of their protest. The protesters asserted their adverse possession claim in hopes
that it would force the government to bring their civil ejectment action, where Defendants and
their group, the Citizens For Constitutional Freedom, could raise, inter alia, an argument under
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution to challenge the federal governments
illegal ownership. On this very point, the government cites Wharton, 54 F.2d 406. But that case
supports Mr. Bundys position. In Wharton, a husband and wife moved onto a track of Oregon
land in 1919 and attempted to gain title through the Desert-Land Entry Act of 1877 (now 43
U.S.C. 321). The government approved the application, and the Whartons improved the land,
lived and raised a family on the land, until their father died in 1949. Thereafter, in 1955, 1956
and through 1967 the government sent notices that the Wharton family was trespassing on
federal land. Id. at 407. For the first time in 1967, the federal government demanded that the
Whartons vacate the land, and sued for ejectment. Id. Being informed that the law had changed
and that they could no longer perfect their claim under the Desert-Land Entry Act, the Whartons
filed an application for title under the Color of Title Act, based upon the principle of adverse
possession. Id. The government denied the application, but the district court concluded the denial
was clearly erroneous and ordered the Secretary of the Interior to allow the Whartons to purchase
the land as provided in the statute. Id. On appeal, the government argued that the district court
abused its discretion in setting aside the Secretarys decision based on a lack of good faith on
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the part of the Whartons. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district courts ruling, but made the
express finding, contrary to the governments argument, that the Color of Title Act, 43 U.S.C.
1068(a) authorizes adverse possession claims against the United States acknowledging that it
might have come to a different conclusions on this issue if the facts had been before us. Id.
at 408. While recognizing the need to defer to the Secretarys findings regarding applications to
perfect claims asserted under the Color of Title Act, the Wharton Court goes on to rule in favor
of the Whartons adverse possession claim on estoppel grounds. Id.7 First, Wharton concerns
phase three of adverse possession perfecting the claim. Even more detrimental to the
governments theory here, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless ordered that the federal government
was still estopped from claiming ownership of the land. Id. On what grounds? Because the
government had engaged in misconduct, had not properly used the civil process available, and
the court held that estoppel may be applied against the government acting in its sovereign
capacity including in disputes over public land. Id. In short, Wharton does not stand for the
evidentiary preclusion order that the government seeks in this case, but rather opens up a number
of other arguments in favor of adverse possession. And it clearly establishes the fact that
perfecting an adverse possession claim is an entirely separate legal question from the lawfulness
of asserting a claim in the first instance. In other words, Wharton helps show how the
governments argument about good faith is not only wrong on the facts of this case but
irrelevant because attempted adverse possession is still lawful, regardless of whether a partys
claim under the Color of Title Act is ultimately successful. See also Coleman v. United States,
363 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1966), adhered to on reh'g, 379 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1967), and rev'd
7
As set forth in the authority provided in this memo, the government should similarly be
estopped from prosecuting defendants for actions and activities that took place as part of lawful
adverse possession, and from asserting that the defendants had no business being on [the
Refuge property] in the first instance. (7/18/2016 Tr. 20:14-17)
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on other grounds, 390 U.S. 599 (1968) (It has long been established that a qualified entryman
upon public lands of the United States, whether as a locator of a mining claim, as a homesteader,
or as one asserting rights under others of the multifarious laws governing entries on public lands,
who perfects his entry by compliance with the applicable Act of Congress, thereby acquires a
right to the land as against the sovereign itself, as well as third persons.). While it may not be a
popular right exercised as frequently as others, Mr. Bundys right to stake the claim, based upon
adverse possession, entitled him to protection of the law as opposed to prosecution until the
federal government or whoever the lawful owner of the property turned out to be obtained a
lawful court order resolving the matter and directing him off the claim. See Pillow v. Roberts, 54
U.S. 472, 477 (1851) (It is not necessary that an adverse possession claimant should have a
good title, or any title but possession. A wrongful possession, obtained by a forcible ouster of the
lawful owner, will amount to a disseisin, and the statute will protect the disseizor. One who
enters claiming for himself upon any pretence or color of title, is equally protected with the
forcible disseizor.).
V.
Adverse Possession Is A Full Defense To The Pending Charges.
The government argues that there is no misunderstanding of the law defense. But, as
argued above, Mr. Bundys purported right to attempt adverse possession, whether valid or
invalid, was no mistake, was not a misunderstanding and was not unlawful. In the alternative,
even if Mr. Bundy was mistaken, the government cites no case where an attempted adverse
possession can or should result in criminal charges. Based on the legality principle described
above, and the fact that the Color of Title Act expressly allows any individual to claim an
adverse possession of real property purportedly owned by the federal government, for twenty
years, before having to bring a claim to perfect the title, and for a decision on the merits of the
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claim, it would be inconsistent and tragically unjust for the government be allowed to continue
seeking criminal sanction for exercising that very statutory right, as it is doing in this case. The
government cites Finn v. United States, 219 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1955), but its facts are inapposite
and even there, the Ninth Circuit expressly acknowledged the theory of the defense and the
growing field of cases where the law does negate the existence of the right kind of intent,
citing as examples cases such as Buchanan, 233 F. at 258, where the court reversed the
defendants conspiracy conviction based on the trial courts erroneous exclusion of evidence
going to the defendants belief regarding the ownership of the improvements [made to the
property], the grounds of their belief, and their intent in what they did. Id. at 259. Defendants in
that case had entered upon land held by James H. Scott and wife by virtue of an unperfected
homestead entry under the laws of the United States, and tore down and removed buildings and
improvements:
Buchanan was the leader and director; the others were men either in his general
service or specially employed by him to assist in what was done. In any aspect the
conduct of the accused was indefensible. Viewed most favorably for them, it was
a case of high-handed, lawless self-help. But there was a question, and rather a
close one as to most of them, whether their intent was to interfere with the
exercise by the Scotts of their homestead right, or, on the other hand, and wholly
aside from the character of the occupancy of the land, they believed Buchanan
owned the improvements and was entitled to remove them. If that belief was
entertained in good faith, and the intent of Buchanan's helpers was but to aid
him in the assertion of his supposed title they did not violate the act of
Congress. Intent in respect of the federal right is an essential element of the
offense charged.
Id. at 258 (citing Waddell, 112 U.S. at 80); see also Miller v. United States, 120 F.2d 968, 970
(10th Cir. 1941) (reversing conviction for mail fraud conspiracy where the trial court excluded
testimony from others that would corroborate defendants denials and explain what was meant
by these [defendants allegedly fraudulent] statements).
The government next argues that there is no controlling legal authority that permits
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adverse possession as an affirmative defense. First, as a matter of first principles, the question
raised by the governments charge is whether or not there was a conspiracy to impede, and the
existence of a deliberate attempt to assert a lawful adverse possession claim, as part of a political
protest directly answers the question. Second, the authority cited above amply explains how
each stage of an adverse possession claim, by itself, is lawful. Third, the governments own
authority shows that the appropriate and lawful response by the government should have been
civil proceedings not criminal action. Fourth, while there is no obvious record of criminal cases
on the topic (for reasons likely covered above), the theory of adverse possession is itself a long
recognized legal theory of defense to allegations of otherwise impermissible conduct. Faulks v.
Schrider, 114 F.2d 587, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (discussing the defense of adverse possession)
Fifth, in other contexts, the same legal principles at issue here are recognized as constitutionally
protected defenses. See e.g. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1925 (1967)
(holding that it is impermissible, under the Sixth Amendment, to make all defense testimony
inadmissible as a matter of procedural law by arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of
defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy
of belief.); United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 31516 (1998) (a defendant ought to be
allowed to present his own version of events in his own words); United States v. Whittemore,
776 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 89 (2015) (holding that the trial court
must allow the jury to consider any defense theory supported by law); United States v.
Santiago-Godinez, 12 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing entrapment, but explaining a
pretrial motion to prohibit the presentation of a defense theory is available only when it is clear
that the evidence to be offered by the defendant can, under no interpretation, be considered
sufficient to sustain a defense to the charged elements and that such decisions are typically not
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amendable to pretrial resolution because whether or not a defense exists is intertwined with the
issue of intent and such decisions are traditionally reserved for jury resolution).
Finally, if Mr. Bundy and his co-defendants were engaged in an attempt at setting up an
adverse possession claim, the refuge property was not a federal facility during the occupation.
Consistent with the principles of adverse possession, the occupiers changed the name, attempted
to change the utilities and signs, began exercising exclusive possession and control including
ingress and egress and while this occupation was pending, under long standing legal principles,
it was the occupiers who lawfully could set the rules and uses on the property, in fact their
exclusive use and control of the property is the legally protected status of adverse possession.
See, e.g., Air Stream Corp. v. 3300 Lawson Corp., 952 N.Y.S.2d 608, 612 (2012) (examining the
exclusive possession and control requirement for adverse possession and that such possession
be accompanied by the usual acts of ownership). Mr. Bundy and the Citizens for Constitutional
Freedom, by admission of the government, did in fact occupy and exclusively possess the
property at the refuge, both the land and other property, and protected that occupation, and
exercised control over that property. This fundamentally changed the nature of the property from
what it was to what its new possessors say it is. See The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession,
89 Geo. L.J. 2419, 2424 (2001) (recognizing that adverse possessors must act as a true owner
would act and this includes all typical elements of control and full exercise of dominion);
see also Blumrosen, 1995 WL 918312, at *6 ([B]efore the courts quieting of title, the adverse
possessor can maintain an action for trespass against all who allegedly enter onto the adversely
possessed property without his consent.). Thus, at the time of the occupation, the property at
issue was not the Malhuer National Wildlife Refuge, it was the Harney County Resource
Center as its occupiers had so determined, and the rules and control of the property was firmly
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in the hands of the adverse possessors, and should have remained so, until the government
lawfully succeeded at retaking possession assuming it could. In fact, this is one of the
ubiquitous conditions of adverse possession. See Blickenstaff v. Bromley, 220 A.2d 558 (Md.
1966); see also Peck v. Bigelow, 613 N.E.2d 134, 138 (Mass. 1993) (explaining that when
evaluating actual and open use, the court examines the nature of the occupancy in relation to the
character of the land and the occupants use of the disputed area must exhibit a control and
dominion so as to be readily considered acts similar to those ordinarily associated with
ownership). Thus, the more poignant issue is that the government presents no authority let
alone controlling authority that supports the bringing of any criminal charges for conduct of
those adversely possessing land, federal, public, or otherwise, while possessing that same land,
under the possessors actual and lawful control and direction prior to legal ejectment. See e.g.
Scott v. Mineral Dev. Co., 130 F. 497, 499 (6th Cir. 1904) (explaining that the rights of an
adverse possessor begin to accrue when the occupier takes adverse possession of the owner's
lands).
Further, aside from the issue of mistake, Mr. Bundy has a right to defend his lawful
conduct, and it is well established that protected conduct which otherwise amounts to the lawful
exercise of a right to petition for redress cannot be an unlawful conspiracy. See, e.g., Stern v.
U.S. Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1346 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a petition for redress
cannot also be an impermissible act of impeding federal officers: No citation of authorities is
needed for the proposition that the rights our founding fathers set down in the First Amendment
are the subject of special protection by the courts. Those rights despite their theoretical strength
as a constituent of democratic government have demonstrated remarkable fragility when exposed
to the air of autocracy.); see also United States v. Hylton, 710 F.2d 1106, 1112 (5th Cir. 1983)
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(recognizing that actions amounting to a petition for redress of grievances could not be the basis
of an indictment charging a defendant with corruptly endeavoring to intimidate or impede IRS
agents: [W]e likewise cannot condone the imposition of criminal sanction for Hylton's exercise
of her constitutional right.).
On the other side of the spectrum, federal courts have long recognized that prosecutions
seeking to retaliate for or discourage the exercise of constitutional rights are brought in [b]ad
faith. Lewellen v. Raff, 843 F.2d 1103, 1109 (8th Cir. 1988). Scrutiny is especially warranted in
cases charging conspiracy, where, since at least Poulterers Case, decided by the Star Chamber
in 1611, courts have allowed prosecutors to expand the law away from targeting clearly
dangerous and operative conspiracies and toward enabling the prosecution of unpopular ideas,
and the speech that expresses them.8 Here, the government has now admitted that it was not the
occupation of the refuge itself that spurred law enforcement to arrest Mr. Bundy and his brother
on January 26, 2016, as they drove to their planned public presentation on property rights in
neighboring Grant County, Oregon. Contemporary newspaper accounts report how, a mere
hours before the arrest, Oregons two federal senators met with prosecutors and FBI Director
James Comey and determined that action needed to be taken against the Bundys protest in order
to stop the virus [that] was spreading by imposing consequences.9
CONCLUSION
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes referred to the strange and wonderful doctrine of
adverse possession. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to William James (Apr. 1, 1907), in
Steven R. Morrison, System of Modern Criminal Conspiracy, 63 Catholic Univ. L. Rev. 371,
372, 377 (2014) (citing Kenneth A. David, The Movement Toward Statute-Based Conspiracy
Law in the United Kingdom and United States, 25 Vand. J. Transnatl L. 951, 954-55 (1993)).
9
KOIN 6 News Staff, Militia at Malheur: Virus was spreading, January 29, 2016,
http://koin.com/2016/01/29/militia-at-malheur-virus-was-spreading (last visited July 13, 2016).
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The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes: His Speeches, Essays, Letters and Judicial Opinions 417,
417-18 (Max Lerner ed., 1943). In the present case, there is simply no legal authority either
presented by the government in its Motion, or that Defendant could find, that raises any question
whatsoever but that the attempt at adverse possession is lawful, that it is uniquely described and
conditions uniquely prescribed, and that a true owners remedy is first, civil in nature. Until that
remedy, an adverse possessor is rightfully protected by the law.
The fact that Ammon Bundy was involved in political protest, the fact that some of the
occupiers were openly and obviously engaged in carrying out their right to bear arms, the fact
that the land in question was purportedly owned by the federal government none of these
things change the basic issue. Ammon Bundy should not be impeded from presenting his
complete defense that he did not engage in a conspiracy to impede federal officers, but rather
that he engaged in a legitimate political protest, using the lawful principles and rights pertaining
to setting up and attempting an adverse possession claim and it was the governments overreaction, political motivations, and distain for his person political views that have distorted the
nature of the protest and occupation, and tragically altered the course of what took place in
January 2016. While at the Harney County Resource Center, the occupiers exercised the wellrecognized characteristics and requirements of adverse possession, and the government now
admits that for its own strategic reasons, neither Mr. Bundy nor any other occupiers were ever
expressly told to leave, and there is no evidence that the federal government ever sought to a)
establish its lawful ownership; or b) challenge the adverse possession. Instead, the government
skirted the issue entirely, used overwhelming force, arrested Mr. Bundy and his co-defendants,
and charged them with conspiracy and federal firearms violations. Mr. Bundy has a right to put
on a full defense to these charges, including all legal theories that establish a defense to the
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elements charged.
In this memorandum, Defendant has presented the court with a wide survey of legal
authority on the doctrine of adverse possession from as far back as 1861 to as recent as 2015.
There is not one case provided by the government, or identified by Defendant that holds
contrary to Mr. Bundys main defense. The defense is simple, a citizen of the United States has
the lawful right to assert a claim of ownership over land, including specifically through adverse
possession, for whatever purpose he choses, whether political or personal. And this same right,
is expressly and statutorily protected by the United States Congress and its continued support of
the Color of Title Act, as well as repeated and undistributed United States Supreme Court
decisions endorsing the fundamental lawfulness of attempted adverse possession. The exercise of
this right, and the lawfulness of that exercise, is a compete defense to the elements charged in
this case. On this point, the governments motion in limine and trial brief are wholly
unsubstantiated, seeking impermissible rulings from this Court, and should be denied.
DATED: August 17, 2016
/s/ Marcus R. Mumford
Marcus R. Mumford
J. Morgan Philpot
Attorneys for Ammon Bundy
28

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Case 3:16-cr-00051-BR

J. Morgan Philpot (Oregon Bar No. 144811)

Case No. 3:16-cr-00051-BR

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

Adverse Possession Claims, Generally.

The Contours Of Adverse Possession.

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

Legitimate Adverse Possession Claims Against the United States.

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

The Governments Good Faith Reference, Is Irrelevant.

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

Adverse Possession Is A Full Defense To The Pending Charges.

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

Opposition to Governments Motion In Limine to Exclude Defense of Adverse Possession

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