Plato, "Theaetetus" 171 A

Author(s): E. P. Arthur
Source: Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, Vol. 35, Fasc. 3/4 (1982), pp. 335-337
Published by: BRILL
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miscellanea

335

7) J. Ducatillon, Pol?miques dans la collection hippocratique (Lille-Paris

1977), 97-9? plausibly argues that f?s?? at VM 20 means 'human nature*.
Most speculations about the relation between Phdr. 270 ac and VM start
from the wrong assumption that t? ???? refers to the universe or to man's
physical surroundings: cf. the literature mentioned by Jouanna, 16 n. 1, to
which may be added L. Bourgey, Observation et exp?rience chez les m?decins
de la collection hippocratique (Paris 1953), 93-6.
8) Cf. Reg. I 2 f??? d? de?? t?? ??????ta ????? ??????fe?? pe?? d?a?t??
a????p???? p??t?? ??? pa?t?? f?s?? ?????p?? ????a?, Epid. ? 23 d?e?????s???e?
?a???te? ?? t?? ?????? f?s??? ap??t?? ?a? t?? ?d?????ast??.
9) Manetti (above, n. 6), 441 ff?? observes that the terms e?d?? and ?d?a in
the Hippocratic corpus usually mean 'type' or 'class', but that at Nat.
Horn. 5 ?d?? refers to the distinctive and permanent character of the four
humours.

PLATO,

THEAETETUS

171

The aim of this paper is to show that Socrates'

of
refutation
relativism
at Theaetetus
171 A is not valid.
Protagorean
it has been assumed
is invalid
Previously
*) that the refutation
Thus
because
Socrates
omits
vital
Socrates
qualifying
phrases.
that Protagoras'
belief that "All judgements
are true for
proves
those who make them1' 2) is false for Protagoras'
This
opponents.
entails merely that, according
must
to his own theories,
Protagoras
it is true that his belief is false 8).
accept that, for those opponents
It does not entail that for Protagoras
it is true that his belief is false.
The refutation
thus falls down.
In
doubt has been cast on this defence
of Protagoras.
Recently
a note to his translation
of the Theaetetus
McDowell
says: "If all
that Protagoras
'All judgecan say to us is "P (sc. the assertion
ments are true for those who make them') is true for me; it may or
in wondering
may not be true for you", we are justified
why we
It seemed
to be interesting
should find what he says interesting.
he seemed
to be asserting
the truth simpliciter,
because
originally
not just the truth for himself"
4).
in the
McDowell
makes
"It is, arguably,
the further
point:
that people
are authoritative,
not just
spirit of (P) to assume
but about what judgeabout the truth of their own judgements,
ments
are. Now Protagoras'
would
that
claim
they
opponents
their judgement
about (P) is not that (P) is false for them, but that
ProtaThus, given the above assumption,
(P) is false simpliciter.
to conceding
that it is true for his opponents
goras is committed
that (P) is false (not true) simpliciter,
as opposed
to his favoured
of
for
a
truth
concept
person" 6).
'The
similar
lines,
argues
along
concluding:
opTignere)
Vol.
Fase.
XXXV,
3-4
Mnemosyne,
(1982)

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MISCELLANEA

336

of Protagoras'
are not merely true8judgments
position
believed
in Protagoras'
by them-'true'
(i.e. merely
is
but
must
also
be true8-forcorrect,
they
sense),
if Protagoras
in their intended objective sense of 'true. In other words,
Protagoras
it must be trues-for-Protagoras
that they are true0. Protagoras
himself
must believe
that they are what they are composed
and
to him as being: objectively true".
presented
This seems quite cogent.
If what he is saying
is to be of any
if
must
his
concede
that
are false to
theories
interest,
Protagoras
his opponents,
they are false simpliciter
(and thus, in a sense, false
to him). However,
even if this is correct, the refutation
of Socrates
will not do.
that Protagoras
must agree that his theory
After "proving"
is
Socrates goes on to say, "Well then, since
"disputed
by everyone"
it is disputed
it would seem that Protagoras'
Truth is
by everyone
not true for anyone;
not for anyone
else, and not for Protagoras
himself"
7).
This does not follow. While it is true that Protagoras'
doctrines
are false to his opponents
and hence absolutely
false, they are also
true. The same doctrines
true to Protagoras
and hence absolutely
are both absolutely
true and absolutely
false. Furthermore,
since
would accept that they are such, the same doctrines
are
Protagoras
and false to Protagoras
both true to Protagoras
8).
At this point Socrates might well claim to have forced Protagoras
is no paradox
into paradox.
In fact the paradox
but an essential
It is basic Protagorean
doctrine
feature of the Protagorean
system.
that if I believe that the world is flat then that belief is true for me
can prove, true absolutely.
and, so far as anyone
If, on the other
else believes
the world is not flat 9), his belief is
hand, someone
true. For a Protagorean
likewise absolutely
both beliefs are equally
All Socrates
true (and true to that Protagorean).
has done is
"The beliefs of Protagoras
substitute
the statement
are false" for
the statement
"The earth is flat". As an elementary
consequence
of his doctrine,
would have to accept that the statement
Protagoras
of Protagoras
and the statement
"The
"The beliefs
are false"
true (and
beliefs of Protagoras
are not false" are both absolutely
true to himself)
and should
feel no qualms
about
doing so 10).
refutation
out what is really
Socrates'
merely
points
attempted
the fact that in such a
about the Protagorean
universe,
interesting
universe
can at any one point in
absolutely
any object or statement
time possess totally
attributes.
contradictory
ponents'
for-them

University

of Newcastle

(Australia)

E. P. Arthur

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MISCELLANEA

337

?) Cf. Vlastos, Plato's Protagoras (Indianapolis 1956), xiv, n. 27; Cornford,

Plato's Theory of Knowledge (Indianapolis 1957), 79?
2) This is McDowelTs [Plato Theaetus (Oxford 1973), 169] rendering of
Protagoras' basic thesis.
3) I.e. it is true for him that his theory is false for his opponents.
4) Op. cit., 171.
5) Ibid.
6) The 'Exquisite' Argument at Theaetus iyi A, Mnem. IV 24 (1971), 369.
7) Th. 171 c 5-7. Tr. McDowell. Greek text: ?????? epe?d? a?f?s??te?ta?
?p? p??t??, ??de?? ?? e?? ? ???ta?????
'????e?a a?????, ??te t??? ???? o?V
a?tf e?e???.
8) If Protagoras' famous 'Man is the measure' is not to be reduced to the
trivial "What I think is hot, is hot to me".
9) Exactly what he does think the world to be is not immediately relevant.
from being really effective
is
10) What prevents Plato's refutation
insistence on continuing to employ the
Protagoras' (perhaps illegitimate)
word 'true'. Plato seems to be moving towards a version of the classic Stoic
refutation of the scepticism of the New Academy, to the effect that if
everything is uncertain then the contention that everything is uncertain is
itself uncertain. What protects Protagoras from this sort of argument is his
retention of the right to say that his beliefs are true (as well as false).

STATISTICAL
EPISTULAE

TESTS

AND

AD CAESAREM

THE
SENEM

The continuing
but inconclusive
search for objective
criteria to
of the authenticity
of the Epistulae
ad Caesaapply to the problems
in this journal by K. Thraede's
rem senem was illustrated
recently
modifications
of some aspects
of the
of Skard's statistical
analysis
letters'
The
note
to
of
this
is
communicate
language1).
purpose
the results of statistical
tests carried out in an attempt
to obviate
the impasse to which the various historical
and linguistic
arguments
over Sallustian
have lead since Justus
authorLipsius'
scepticism
was directly
ship was voiced in 1567 2). This approach
inspired
by
efforts in English
and Greek to isolate discriminators
which could
be used to solve
of disputed
In these
questions
authorship8).
the search was directed
towards
characteristics
inquiries,
finding
of style that were unconsciously
determined
and as such, would
even the most careful imitator4).
Such stylistic
traits had
betray
to be constant
to a certain degree or be such that their variation
and be sufficiently
could be predicted
individual
to allow separation
If it could be demonstrated
from the works of other authors.
that
such differences
between
were greater
different
authors
than any
between
texts written
difference
then clearly
by the same author,
it would afford a useful supplement
to the more traditional
approaches.
Mnemosyne, Vol. XXXV, Fase. 3-4 (1982)

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