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US v. TANEDO [15 Phil.

196 (1910)]
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Tarlac

Facts: On January 26, 1909, Cecilio Tanedo, a landowner, went with some workers to work
on the dam on his land, carrying with him his shotgun & a few shells. Upon reaching the
dam, the accused went on his way to hunt for wild chickens, meeting the victim, Feliciano
Sanchez, the latter's Mother & Uncle. The accused went into the forest upon the
recommendation of the deceased to continue his search for the elusive wild chickens. Upon
seeing one, Tanedo shot one, but simultaneously, he heard a human cry out in pain. After
seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo ran back to his workers and asked one,
Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body, which they did by putting it amidst the tall
cogon grass, & later burying in an old well. Only 1 shot was heard that morning & a
chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene of the
crime. There was no enmity between the accused and the deceased. Prior to the trial, the
accused denied all knowledge of the crime, but later confessed during the trial. The lower
court found the accused guilty of homicide, having invited the deceased into the forest &
intentionally shooting him in the chest. Accused was sentenced to 14 yrs, 8 mos & 1 day of
reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnifications & costs. The accused appealed.

Issue: WON the accused is guilty

Held: No. The idea that Tanedo intended to kill Sanchez is negated by the fact that the
chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having only one shot fired. Also,
according to:

Article 1 of the Penal Code: Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and
omissions punished by law

Article 8: He who while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by
mere accident without liability or intention of causing it.

Section 57 of Code of Criminal Procedure: A defendant in a criminal action shall be

presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt
that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.

In this case there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the accused, nor is it disputed
that the accused was engaged in a legal act, nor is there evidence that the accused
intended to kill the deceased. The only thing suspicious is his denial of the act and his
concealment of the body.

The court quoted State vs. Legg: "Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the
accused is not required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence,
because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the state to show
that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the

state and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was
accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit."

Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
Decision: Judgment of Conviction is reversed, the accused acquitted, and discharged from

GR No. 6897 | February 15, 1912 | J. Moreland

Driver Policarpio Tayongtong files for an appeal from the judgment of the lower court,
which found him guilty of homicide by negligence for running over Severino Resume, while
the latter was painting telephone poles along the highway of Jaro and Iloilo.

Tayongtong was driving a large passenger automobile at the time of the incident and was
making his third trip from Iloilo to Jaro, with the vehicle loaded at its fullest capacity
(capable of carrying 35 passengers and their baggage).

Principal witness Pablo Tayson alleges that the driver was moving very fast towards them,
raising a cloud of dust, moving the steering wheel from one direction to another, causing
the vehicle to zigzag from its track, cross the other side of the road and strike the deceased
eventually creating a suction which drew the victim under the vehicles wheel. From
the testimony, the deceased did not appear to have moved or stirred to avoid the collision.

The driver denies these, saying he was driving at a moderate speed when the victim
suddenly crossed the road.

W/N the driver run over the victim by negligence or pure accident


Accident. Conviction was reversed and the accused acquitted because the Court finds that
the witness made unreasonable, improbable and conflicting comments in his testimony. It
was established by the Court upon fair preponderance of evidence that the driver, having
been a thoroughly qualified driver who served his apprenticeship on the very road, using

the very machine employed, was actually driving the vehicle under a moderate speed.
There was no reason to show that he was doing otherwise, as corroborated by other
disinterested witnesses, and the fact that a vehicle so large couldnt have gone at the rate
of speed described. Per Taysons testimony, it was also unreasonable that the deceased,
seeing plainly that the vehicle was moving towards him, did not move to save himself.

It was finally established in the trial that the deceased, upon seeing the cloud of dust,
decided to cross the street to avoid it, but upon miscalculation of time and distance, was
struck by the automobile and run over. The Court finds that where the death is due to the
negligence of the decedent himself and not the negligence of the driver, the latter cannot
be held for homicide.

People vs Praxedes AYAYA GR- L-29396 (umbrella)

Jose Fajardo(chief of police) went to the house of Benito de la Cruz(deceased)(because of a
complaint of some drunk guy vomiting) only to find the latter wounded on the left upper
eyelid which was bleeding. He was brought to the hospital where he died 4 days later. The
cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage due to the wound inflicted. Ayaya then was tried
and charged for the death of his husband.
On appeal, Ayaya defense states She, Benito, and her son Emilio drank tuba and went to
the cinema. No quarrels occurred on that night or even before the incident. But on their
way home, Benito gave a blow without warning to ayaya which she dodged. Benito then
went home before them. When Ayaya and Emilio arrived at their house, Benito was
preventing the door from being opened. The door slightly gave an opening and Emilio
succeeded in putting his head between the wall and door, however, the door was crushing
Emilios head and when Benito poked his head on the door,
Ayaya jabbed him with his umbrella. When they gained access to the door, they found
Benito already lying in bed with a wound on his head. The testimony was supported by her
Ayayas action in thrusting her umbrella was did so to free her son from imminent danger
of beingcrushed in the head, the absence of any reasonable motive to her husband made
the court believe that it was a mere accident without any fault or intention of causing it.
She incurred no criminal liability because it was a licit act to free her son from the grave
danger of crushing his head. Ayaya is acquitted.

People vs PO3 Fallorina

G.R. No. 137347
March 4, 2004


At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent Jorojoro, an eleven-year old minor and
the third child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro, residing at Sitio Militar, Brgy. Bahay Toro,
Project 8, Quezon City, asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play
outside. She agreed. Together with his playmate Whilcon Buddha Rodriguez, Vincent
played with his kite on top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road.

Beside the carinderia was a basketball court, where a fourteen-year old witness Ricardo
Salvo and his three friends, were playing basketball. Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a
motorcycle coming from the main road across the basketball court. Cognizant to Ricardo of
the appellant, PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina, a Philippine National Police (PNP) officer, detailed
in the Traffic Management Group (TMG), knew that he abhorred kids playing on the roof,
since one of his friends was previously been scolded by the appellant before.

Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When PO3 Fallorina
saw them, the former stopped his motorcycle, he shouted and badmouthed at them. After
hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon rushed to jump off from the roof while Vincent
was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard the appellants shouts,
Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. As soon as Vincent turned his back, ready to get
down from the roof, suddenly, the appellant pointed the .45 caliber pistol towards the
direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the
canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball court.

The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latters hapless body in a waiting
tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced
dead on arrival caused by a single gunshot wound in the head.

(a) Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability?
(b) Whether or not the appellant can offset the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of public position from a mitigating circumstance of his voluntary surrender?


The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cites that the basis for exemption from a criminal
liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is the complete
absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty
for a felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.

Thusly, the elements of exempting circumstances are (1) a person is performing a lawful
act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without
any fault or intention of causing it.

In the case at bar, the Court a quo erred in inequitably appreciating exculpatory and
inculpatory facts and circumstances which should have been considered in favor of the
accused. The court also failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in favor of the accused since it was only after three days that the appellant gave
himself up and surrendered his service firearm. And lastly, the court considered the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his position by the accused.

On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant-accused of
murder, qualified by treachery and aggravated by abuse of public position. The trial court
did not appreciate in favor of the appellant the mitigating circumstances of voluntary

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, found the accused PO3 Ferdinand
Fallorina y Fernando GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined and
penalized by Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by the Republic Act No. 7659, and in view
of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage by the accused of his
public position (par. 1, Art. 14, RPC). Hence, the accused is hereby ordered to indemnify
the heirs of late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amounts of actual damages of P49,174.00 (paid for
funeral services); P50,000.00 for moral damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
P50,000.00 as death indemnity. The court a quo sentenced the appellant to suffer the Death