You are on page 1of 8

Venice Joy Y.

Santisteban

Succession MonTue 7-9pm

Atty. Brenda Tangarorang

G.R. No. L-13386


October 27, 1920
SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.
Petitioner, Segunda was the alleged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. The latter was
married to Francisco Deocampo. Juliana and Francisco had a son named Alfeo
Deocampo. Juliana died intestate in 1889 and Alfeo inherited, ab intestate, parcels of land
from her. In 1890, Alfeo died intestate and without issue. Thereupon, the parcels of land
Alfeo inherited from Juliana was passed to his father, Francisco. Thereafter, Francisco
married Manuela Alcala. They then had a son named Jose Deocampo. Francisco died in
1914, whereupon his widow and son took possession of the parcels of land in question,
under the claim that the said son, Jose (a minor) had inherited the same ab intestate from
Francisco. In 1915, Petitionersm Segunda and Angel, the former claiming to be an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana, instituted the present action for the purposes
of recovering from the respondents the parcels of land in question, invoking Art. 811 of
the Civil Code. RTC ruled against petitioner saying (without deciding the status of
Segunda) that even if the petitioner was an acknowledged daugther of Juliana, she was
not entitled to the property here in question becaise, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative
has no right to the reseva troncal under Art 811 of the Civil Code.
Issue: 1. Whether or not Segunda was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana and;
2. Whether or not an acknowledge natural child is entitled to reserva troncal.
Ruling: 1. Yes Segunda was an ackowledge natural child of Juliana. As it appears from
the record, Juliana, while unmarried, gave birth to Segunda on March 29, 1882, and that
the latter was duly baptized as the former's natural daughter, of unknown father; that
Juliana nourished and reared her said child, segunda; and that the plaintiff lived with her
said mother until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother
treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter. These facts were
uncontroverted.
2. No. Art. 811 of the Civil Code states that: ''Any ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or
from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which such property came.'' The property in question was inherited, ipso
facto, by Francisco from his son (Alfeo), who, in turn, had inherited it, also ipso facto,
from Juliana (Origin.) There are a couple of points adopted by SC, from a well known
authority in the interpretation of the Civil Code-- Manresa. 1.) ''in said Code, the
legitimate relationship forms the general rule and the natural relationship the exception;
which is the reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks only of
children or parents, of ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of course
made of those who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable
only to natural relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural
mother; it does not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers
or parents in the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural parents.'';

Venice Joy Y. Santisteban

Succession MonTue 7-9pm

Atty. Brenda Tangarorang

2.) Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be
maintained that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently
establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of
article 807. And article 811, and as we will see also article 812, continues to treat of
this same legitime. The right of the natural parents and children in the testamentary
succession in wholly included in the eighth section and is limited to the parents, other
ascendants of such class being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the
place which article 811 occupies in the Code of proof that it refers only to legitimate
ascendants.; 3.) If there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of article
938, which states that the provisions of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which
is just established in favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939
to 945, which treat of intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles
840 to 847, treating of their testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or
indirectly to that provision.; 4.) Whether the provision is due to the desire that the
properties should not pass, by reason of new marriage, out of the family to which they
belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and
whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the
patrimony which is intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to
legitimate ascendants and descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as
they do from the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do
the special laws of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalua concede the right to succeed
with respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does
article 811 impose the duty to reserve.; 5.) Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the
right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that
natural parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the
article cited established a barrier between the two families; properties of the legitimate
family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family.
Comment: I really do feel that the result of this case defeats the purpose of the provision
on reserva troncal which is to keep the property in the family to which the property
belongs. Although Manresa makes an excellent point in saying that Art. 811 (Art 891 in
the New Civil Code) only applies to a reservees who are from legitimate ties. In the case
at bar, Segunda is an ackowledge natural child of Segunda, even if the former is not born
within the benefit of marriage of the latter, in the absence of any other legitimate
reservees, I strongly believe that she should be allowed to receive the reserved property
for after all she is undisputedly a daughter by blood. Also, other provisions of the Civil
Code provides for a hierarchy for those compulsory heirs. Why should said hierarchy not
apply in reserva troncal.
PRINCIPLE:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or
relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

Venice Joy Y. Santisteban

Succession MonTue 7-9pm

Atty. Brenda Tangarorang

Francisca Tioco DE PAPA, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.


Dalisay Tongko CAMACHO, et al., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-28032; September 24, 1986
FACTS: The petitioners are uncles and aunties of the respondent because the latter are
borhters and sister of respondents mother, Trinidad. during her lifetime, Trinidad received
parcels of land from Romana, the auntie of the former who gratuitously gave the said
parcels of land. When Trinidad died, the property in question was distributed equally by
the widower and their two children, Faustino and Dalisay. Thereafter, Faustino died and
the property he recived from his equal pro-indiviso share of the lots given by Romana to
his mother automatically went to his heirs, Estacio (father) and Dalisay (sister), Faustino
having died without an issue. Estacio died leaving his estate to Dalisay. Herein petitioners
claim the property allegedly under reserva troncal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not all the relatives of the propositus within the third degree in the
appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon
the death of the reservista.
2. Whether or not the rights of the plaintiffs are subject to, and should be
determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
RULING:
Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to
the line from which said property came.
The reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to whom
the property should be returned, but within that group, the individual right to the property
should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Article
891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that
the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly
needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on instestate
succession, the plaintiffs must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and
uncles, respectively, of Faustino (the propositus), they are excluded from the succession
by his niece, the defendant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the
latter. Had the reversionary property passed directly from the propositus, there is no
doubt that the plaintiffs would have been excluded by the defendant under the rules of
intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply
because the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the
reserva, i.e., the property took a detour through an ascendant thereby giving rise to
the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.

Venice Joy Y. Santisteban

Succession MonTue 7-9pm

Atty. Brenda Tangarorang

Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the


exclusion of the plaintiffs.
Comment: The Supreme Court was correct in ruling against the plaintiff because reserva
troncal only applies when the reservor dies intestate without an issue. In the case at bar,
the reservor had an hier, Dalisay, making henceforth the provision on reserva troncal
inapplicable.
PRINCIPLE:
Relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
________________________________________________________________________
Marcelina EDROSO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
Pablo and Basilio SABLAN, opponent-appellees.
G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913
FACTS:
Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro who
inherited two parcels of land upon the death of his father. Subsequently, Pedro died,
unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his
mother. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of
her ownership. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of
Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming that either the registration be denied or if
granted to her, the right reserved by law to them be recorded in the registration of each
parcel. The Court of Land Registration denied the registration holding that the land in
question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such
a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said
two uncles. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a reservable
property.
2. Whether or not Marcelina Edroso has the absolute title of the property to
cause its registration.
RULING:
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable
consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code,
for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a
very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of blood
relationship.
Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another descendant, or form a
brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has
acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are

Venice Joy Y. Santisteban

Succession MonTue 7-9pm

Atty. Brenda Tangarorang

within the third degree and belong to the line where the
property proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of
land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance
from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquire them by operation of law,
she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano
Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The
trial courts ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved
is therefore in accordance with the law.
The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the right has,
beyond any doubt at all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title
and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has under an express
provision of the law the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to
alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one
who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable
one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him
while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do
anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is
reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually or
constructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover, because they have no title
of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis
that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they
acquire it.
PRINCIPLES:
1. The reservistas/reservor's right over the reserved property is one of ownership.2. The
ownership is subject to a resolutory condition, i.e. the existence of reservatarios
(reservee) at the time of the reservistas/reservor death.3. The right of ownership is
alienable, but subject to the same resolutory condition.4. The reservistas/reservor right of
ownership is registrable.
________________________________________________________________________
FLORENTINO v. FLORENTINO
40 Phil. 480
FACTS:
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married Antonia Faz with whom he had 9 children. When
his wife died Apolonio married Severina with whom he had 2 children Mercedes and
Apolonio III. Apolonio II died and was survived by his second wife and the ten children,
Apolonio III being born after Apolonio II died. He was able to execute a will instituting
as universal heirs his 10 children, the posthumous Apolonio III and his widow Severina
and declaring that all of his property should be divided among all of his children in both
marriages. In the partition of his estate, Apolonio III was given six parcels of land and

Venice Joy Y. Santisteban

Succession MonTue 7-9pm

Atty. Brenda Tangarorang

some personal property of Apolonio II. Apolonio III later died and his mother Severina
succeeded to all these properties. She subsequently died, leaving a will instituting as her
universal heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes. As such heir, Mercedes took
possession of all the property left at the death of her mother, including the property
inherited by severinafrom Apolonio III which is said to be reservable property.
Accordingly, Mercedes had been gathering the fruits of the parcels of land.
Hence, the children of Apolonio II with first wife, as well as his grandchildren by the first
marriage, instituted an action for recovery of their share of the reservable property. The
defendants contend that no property can be reserved for the plaintiffs inasmuch as there is
a forced heiress and the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty to respect the
legitime. Also, the danger that the property coming from the same line might fall into the
hands of strangers has been avoided.
ISSUE:
Whether the property is subject to reserva troncal or not
HELD:
YES. Even if Severina left in her will said property to her only daughter and forced
heiress, nevertheless this property has not lost its reservable nature. The posthumous son,
Apolonio III, acquired the property by lucrative title or by inheritance from his legitimate
father. Although said property was inherited by Severina, nevertheless she was duty
bound to reserve the property thus acquired for the benefi t of the relatives within the
third degree of the line from which such property came. Ascendants do not inherit the
reservableproperty, but its enjoyment, use and trust merely for the reason that the law
imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve the same for certain designated persons
who, on the death of the said ascendants-reservor, acquire the ownership of said property
in fact and operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs
There are then 7 reservees entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio
III, to wit: Apolonio IIs 3 children from his fi rst marriage; the children of Apolonio IIs
deceased children, 12 in all; and Mercedes, Apolonio IIIs sister. All of the plaintiffs are
relatives of the posthumous son within the third degree (four as half-siblings and 12 as
his nephews and nieces). As the fi rst four are his relatives within the third degree in their
own right and the others by right of representation, all are entitled as reservees. The
properties in question came from the common ancestor Apolonio II, and when, on the
death of Apolonio III without issue, the same passed by operation of law into the hands of
his legitimate mother Severina, it became reservableproperty with the object that the
same should not fall into the possession of persons other than those comprehended within
the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio II, the origin of the property.
Severina could have disposed in her will all her own property in favor of her only living
daughter Mercedes as forced heir. But the provision concerning the reservable property
reducing the rights of the other reservees is null and void inasmuch as said property is not
her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fi duciary, with the right to deliver the
same to the reservees. Reservable property neither comes nor falls under the absolute
dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives the same from his descendant,

Venice Joy Y. Santisteban

Succession MonTue 7-9pm

Atty. Brenda Tangarorang

therefore it does not form part of his own property nor become the legitime of his forced
heirs. It becomes his own property only in case all the relatives of his descendant died, in
which case the said reservable property loses such character.
PRINCIPLE:
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the
ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does not form
part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his
own property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall have died
(reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such character.
________________________________________________________________________
TUAZON vs. REYES
G.R. NO. 25039, MARCH 2, 1926
FACTS:
The case stemmed from an action brought by Roberto Siochi against Petronilo David et
al. for the partition of a tract of land, this court, ordered the partition in equal shares
between the plaintiff and the defendant Petronilo David of some 15 hectares of the land
and the case was ordered returned to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings in
accordance with sections 184 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure.
However pending partition, Petronilo David obtained Torrens certificates of title for the
land in cadastral case No. 10 of the Province of Pampanga and, on July 30, 1921, sold the
land to the petitioner herein, Vicente Tuazon, the deed containing a recital to the effect
that of the land so sold, an area of 7 hectares and 50 ares was in dispute between the
vendor and Roberto Siochi and that the purchaser Vicente Fuazon was merely subrogated
to the rights and obligations of the vendor in relation to said disputed portion, and that
said vendor did not warrant the title to the same. Thereafter transfer certificates of title
were issued in favor of Vicente Tuazon on March 8, 1923, but through the negligence of
the register of deeds, the reservation made in regard to the land in dispute with Siochi
was; not entered upon the certificates of title.
Tuazon presented to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a written protest against the
partition on the ground that he held Torrens certificates of title to all of the land and by
reason of said protest, the Honorable Guillermo Guevara, Judge of that court, aset aside
the order of partition and revoked the appointment of the commissioners in an order dated
February 4, 1924. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Siochi, herein respondent,
the Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, then Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, revoked the order of his predecessor and ordered the commissioners to
execute the partition of the land.
The commissioners presented their report adjudicating to Siochi his share of the land in
dispute which report was duly approved by said judge but Tuazon refused to deliver
possession to Siochi of the land awarded the latter and, on April 1, 1925, the respondent

Venice Joy Y. Santisteban

Succession MonTue 7-9pm

Atty. Brenda Tangarorang

judge issued an order directing that Siochi be placed in possession of the land adjudicated
to him.
This action was thereupon brought, the petitioner maintaining that not being a party to the
original action, his title was not affected by the partition proceedings and that therefore
the order of April 1, 1925, directing that Siochi be placed in possession of the portion
adjudicated to him in said proceedings was beyond the jurisdiction of the court
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is bound by the order not being a party to the case and being a
buyer in good faith
RULING:
Petition denied. A purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in
good faith holds an indefeasible title to the land and, if such was the case here, the
petitioner's contention would be perfectly valid. But here the element of good faith is
lacking. The defendant acquired his title while the partition proceedings were pending
and his title is therefore subject to the incidents and results of the pending litigation and is
no better than that of the vendor in whose shoes he now stands. In these circumstances,
the petitioner's transfer certificates of title can afford him no special protection. The deed
under which the title was acquired expressly recites that the land was in dispute and that
as to the disputed portion only the interest of the vendor was conveyed. In ordering the
execution of the judgment of partition, the respondent judge did therefore not exceed his
jurisdiction and a writ of certiorari will not lie.
For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of certiorari is hereby denied with the costs
PRINCIPLE:
1. LAND REGISTRATION; CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. A purchaser of registered
land who takes a certificate of title for value and in good faith, holds an indefeasible title
to the land.
2. ID.; GOOD FAITH; PURCHASER WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF PENDING
LITIGATION. A purchaser who buys registered land with full notice of the fact that it
is in litigation between the vendor and a third party, is not a purchaser in good faith
within the meaning of section 39 of the Land Registration Act, but stands n the shoes of
his vendor and his title is subject to the incidents and results of the pending litigation; his
transfer certificate of title will, in that respect, afford him no special protection.