UNCLASSIFIED

REGRADED BY AlfTHORllY

Rank and~$le in combat: What they are doing How they do it

Our Veterans

Armies

in

Europe

have in North

won Africa

their

victory.

of the campaigns forces

and Europe of the Pacific are coming the German man and ex-

are now joining
for the to grips soldier, different perienced

with the veterans Japan. different individual employed. the European They from

final a&auk

against

with n foe quite different as an

fighting Even

in the tactics soldier to learn. now bring we of

the most

battlefields~~nill

,’

have We

much must

to hear

against in

the Japanese’ every theater.

~~

all the

experience

have gained in “Combat Since, promptly, to

The suggestions’kade from must such’experienee. reach the soldier

Lessons” be

are drawn they is not

_

effective,

publication

delayed thoroughly

to

insure digested combat

that views

they

always

represent

the

of the War Department. learned from wery 6per. of leadership.

The great ation is the

lesson

importance

Our

equip

in 1;;
1, g, go: g; 8~ #~, ‘~

ment, our supply,
Aggressive factor success ,_ which and

and above all, our men, arc splendid. determined leadership is the priceless which all

inspires

a command

and upon

in battle

depends.

It is responsible

for success

or failure.

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ontents
Lead&ship . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . . . . . . i . L 8 13 13 16 19 20 24

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Page

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g~ep~~cement Orientation Iliver Crossing ~r,,ssirrg Suggestions

_ . . _ . . . .

by .Assault Boat

FootbTid~e-Constrccctiorl Shortcuts Ci~mmunicatio~~ at the Crossing $,cedirtg the Crossing . _

_ , _ . . .

A Song About The Story Pitrol flow

a Soldier-“Rodger . . . . . . . . . . . .

Young” . , . r . , . . . . . . . , . . .

, of Rodger Yckrrg . . . . . . . . . . 26

Pointers Not

_ . ,28 . . . 32, . 43 ~’

to Patrol

Photo-Orientation Engineering

Methods . . .

Ingenuities

_ . 47 _ . 56

OP atrd CP Security ,, ,,

next higher echelon in order that qualified ments will be available.”

replace.

The .Junior Leader’s Responsibility
Field junior leaders constantly emphasize when the need for of oflicers who will share the r&ponsibilities and take chsrge

their superiors

emergencies

a& in battle. Comments Major General John P. Lucas, Corn. mander of the VI Corps: “Prior to battle we must dev&p the feeling of responsibility in junior o&ers and
noncdmmissioned ,,, officers. 1 suggest doing this the during field exercises by suddenly and unexpectedly~ declaring the cdmmander second-in-command a ‘casualty’ and pk.&g in charge.”

The Commanding Oficer of the 119th Infantry, GERMANY, makes this statement: “In battle, nothing is more important than having leaders who will share theirs cd~mander’s responsibility for the accomplish.

ment of the mission.

One of the most

difficult

tasks

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for the junior leader is getting the men to move forward under fire. Issuing the orders is easy, but seeing that ounce the orders are carried and out may call for every of energy initiative the- officer or NC0

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,,

possesses.”
The work of Captain Leo L. Sautter, in an action, near ZAGAROLO, ITALY, is an illustration of what these commanders have in mind.

Responsible
Captain

Leadership

in Action
cane by an imme-

Sauttei

was at his CP when a soldier

in to report that two wiremen had been wounded enemy sniper about 500 yards away. He diately

took four men and set out to assist the wounded

men. Before arriving at their goal, the captain and his men observed a group of wiremen pinned down in an open Sautter field spotted by enemy positions, machine-gun but himself the enemy machine fire. Captain gun and ordered his took an exposed

men to covered

position from which he could gun. He opened fire suddenly

fire upon the machine and killed six of the

enemy crew, making it possible for the wounded men to he evacuated in safety and fdr the wiremen to continue their work. Captain Sautter had observed armored away. vehicle. more car The By that time,

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serious trouble in the vicinity. An enemy was parked beside B building some distance captain knew that part of another covered

advancing

regiment He

‘,

1

was in the sector

by the enemy

munediately sent back for a .50aliber machine gun at the CP and for two tanks to COWI the oncoming regiment during its approwh. While waiting for these 3

~4.io(~~__~~-_._-_~

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reinforcements,

he collected

a few of his men and re.

sumed fire on the enemy, with the result that many lvere forced to flee and 18 were wounded. While formed this was going that all officers regiment on, Captain had become Sautter was in. He

of one company with the
casualties. the company

approaching

~immediately took charge and reorganized

so that when other officers came up the unit was well.
He then gave first aid to dispersed and under control. the wounded olticer~ and saw that they wc11e evacuated

to a safer location for further care.~
The tanks arrived in time to assist the other regiment’s assauIt upon the enemy positions, and the objecHad it not been fdr Cap. tive was successfully taken. tain Sautter’s timely and decisive actions, casualties among our men would have been extremely heavy and attainment For his of the objective contribution questionable. emergency, Captain in this

Sautter was awarded the Silver Star.

Responsible
Another leadership Iplayed by

Leadership

88 the Soldier
of responsible

Sees It

fine example

and inspiring

is given,in the,following

account of the part

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,‘,’

Lieutenant William E. Everett, 14lst Infan. try, 36th Division, in an action in ITALY. This account was written by three of the enlisted men who served

tinder him during that action: ‘;,: “Our company led the attack on a hill and took it. The enemy counterattacked, laying down heavy artfllery, mortar, and machine-gun fire that knocked out a

,,

large number of our men and every oflicer except Lieutertaot Everett.

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“Lieutenant gerous

Everett

took over tbe company

the difficuli under

and danwith-

job of keeping

control

out any communications whatever. short of men that even the runners line fighting were coming bard At the time Lieutenant
up three

We had becomeso had to stay on the we bad won. the enemy our men everyon the mortar. enemy. giving on it, round. who had and

to help hold the ground Everett sides took charge, of the hill

were in trouble. “The Lieutenant side of the hill Our mortar He then located us trouble all knocking He personally

ordered and called

us to open fire with position to our fire orders

thing we had while he took an exposed fire finslly stopped

the advancing

an enemy mortar that hnd been day and adjusted our mortar hit on the third enemy daring +pers elimirrated two

it out with a direct

wounded several of our men. “It was largely through his tion that we were able to beat counterattacks. life by going machine-gun helping them he himself

and determinaenemy his he risked

off the strong

For 3 days and 4 nights

from one platoon to another under enemy fire, keeping the men under control and meet each problem carry as it came. to safer helped the wounded At times places. yet he by the for his

The Lieutenant never thought men who might leadership.”

was sick during all this lighting, of his own discomfort but stuck have lost out if it had not been

Discipline-First

Function

of Leadership

In the frequent discussions of battlefield leadership we are often prone to overlook the first function of
5

leadership--the

developmeot

of unit

and

individual Colonel

discipline. “The battle is the pay-off,” the leadership functioning ,,, which welded team.

said Lieutemmt individuals

Ralph Ingersoll, and it is exactly that-the

pay-off on

into a smoothly

Discipline Applies to AU Captain lack Gerrie, Company Commander of the 11th ~Iniantry writes: “Discipline is sometimes the de.
termining factor between winning snd losing. “I once listened to a wounded officer back from fighting the the field, field. in Africa, Keep who said all the ‘forget the formalities and NC0 distinction will in in light forget the officer I do not believe

eight-h&--they

like ‘hell.’

he had been very much

action or he would not have made such a statement. I have had a few ‘eight balls’ who did ‘fight like hell.’ But I have ,me trouble, disciplined, also had a lot of men who never caused who were quiet; men confident, much and nell. and these fought better.”

Discipline Is Based upon Confidence Only a few hours after he had lost both legs in combat, Lieutcnartt Tichenor, who had acted as a
platoon leader with the 5th Division, Twel/th Army

Group, made this comment to a military observei: “Ours onicers have to he real ,leaders: Discipline in
c&bat depends largely upon the men’s knowing his business risks.” that a& ^i, the officer in charge of them knows to take necessary

is not reluctant

A batialidn commander of the 6th Armored in FRANCE makes a similar comment: “U&se cer ‘or NC0 ,6 knows his job ,completely,

Division
the offi.

the men can

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have 110 faith

in him;

unless the men hwe

fai&in

their lenders their

battle discipline

will be poor.”

COMMENT: A leader who has not gained the respect and confidence of his men during training has tug strikes against him ruheu he e&rs combat: the element of~doubt in the minds of his men may be the difference between success end [ailwe of a mission.

: A Definition of Discipline Says Colonel E. L. Munson, Signa Corps: ‘fTrue
discipline is voluntary; it is based on knowledge, reason; stinse of duty, and idealism. A good leader develops in his men a cheerful and willing obedience that wants to respond-that wnnt~ to carry out his orders. This kind of discipline will in the end briq combat results as no other kind possibly can.” Confidence in rlre Lender
Is F’hl to Success.

0 rlentation
Replacement Instr~~ctio&---the Wrong

Kind

A Lieutenant comments on his ominous introduction to front&x existence: “On my way to the front as an officer replacement, I met several individuals who had come back from the line. Invariably they recounted to me their hair-raising experiences--their outfits had been ‘wiped out,’ or, ‘pinned down for days’; ‘officers didn’t have a dog’s chance of survival,’ etc. One platoon sergeant went statistical on me; he said his platoon had lost 16 oficers’ in one 2.week period. I expected confidently that I would be blown to bits within 15 minutes after my arrival at the front. “Later experience has shown me that enlisted men who come in as replacements are subjected to similar morale-breaking tales. I have tried to get my old men to ,give the new replacement a break by,being careful not to exaggerate their battle experiences or in any way distort the picture of front-line existence. Give the new men a common-sense introductiim to the timbat zone, and there will be fewer men going on sick call before an attack.” Noncoms and privates of Company “K,” 11th !nfantry, ETO, draw attention to the same problem:

,,

Wur

replacements

cmne to UJ filled with tensme.& by stories they have heard in the

2~

and dread caused

rear. Special instructors from the front should be used at replacement centers to talk the new men out of this unnecessary panic: Of COWER, the soundest occupy remedy posiis to have the replacements a defensive

tion for a time, but even then the kind of treatment they are given upon arrival at the front makes a big difference in the amount of good they will do their new outfit.”

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cmters. Knowing what to expect, even wken~ esthe petted is bad, is better than not knowing and conxquently imagining the wont.
-the Right Kind

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Poor orientation of replacements may seriously affect the fighting ability ond survival chances of the men themselves and may also endanger the unit with whom they first serve. For these reasons, leaders of platoons, squads, and companies should find out exactly what orientation and training have been given the men ‘and should provide essential orientation “on the spot” in so far as is practicable before sending them into combat. If B divisional training plan similar to that described bekw is in operation, the problem of inducting new men into the smaller units is much simplified, and lowerunit orientation can be modified accordingly. This effective training system is described by the Chief o/ Staff, 83d LX&ion, ETO: “Our division has received thousands of replacements since its first cornbat experience in Normandy. More than 90 per cent of these replacements have he& infantry. Many of the replacements came into the division lacking confidence in their ability and paralyzed by apprehension engendered by loose talk before and upon their arrival. ?3ome time ago we started a course of instruction for OUT replacements. It lasts 2’4 days and is conducted by battteaperienced personnel. Par&&r eq&asis is placed upon the following points: “a. How to liv6 in a jozhole. Thiq includes construction of the foxhole and informatign on preserving health and maintaining bodily cleanliness under combat conditions. 10 .,

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“b. D~evelopment ojan aggressive attitude. We e& phasize particularly their better chances for sorvival if they avoid being pinned down. ‘%. Use o/ the fragmcntatior~ grenade, antitank gre. nude, and bazoolca. We give about 25 per cent of the re,placements a chance to fire the grenade and bazooka; all of them observe the effectiveness of these weapons. “Throughout the course, the men .,are trained in groups of 12. They are later aSsigned to organiz&io& by these same groups so that each man always has some acquaintances when he joins his combat unit. “We have found that this couise of instruction gives the replacements much greater self-confidence; it ‘debunks’ the notions they have picked up at the rear. The course has definitely improved not only the morale but also the fighting ability of our replacdments. We expect to continue the plan for all replacements who come to this division.” Common Failings

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Says a successful Third Army Ripe Company Commander, ETO: “The following failings are common among replacements. They must be strictly and promptly eliminated~if excessive casualties are to be avoided and combat efficiency obtained: “Lack of ordinary discipline (saying ‘Yeah’ instead of ‘Yes, sir,’ etc.). “Jumping at the gound of every outgoing or incoming artillery shell. 7Jnwillingness to use the rifle., (Many have been told never to fire without direct orders for fear of revealing positions.) “Lack of pride in self, organization, work. 8*fi@(*‘.,,... .g__~_~ 11

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River crossing Suggest,ions
“Practice makes perfect,” American Armies have used Paris and Be&n for “practice” Vhile the face of the enemy. the adage says, and all the rivers between in river crixsings they don’t claim in to be who high

‘~

perfect yet, the engineers and assault infantry have done the dirty work in spite of “hell and

water” have, learned a, lot about river crossings. ‘Typical of the lessons reported from many sources are the selections quoted below. 6y Assault

Crossing

Boats

~Aesult Boat Handling A Battalion
strongly

Commander

emphasizes

of the Fifth Division the responsibility of the individual

soldier

in conserving

assault boats during

resisted

crossings: “Personnel in lending waves of river-crossing assaults should make every effort to conserve boats for succeeding waved by diligently applying principles learned in training. Strict observation of the following cautions results in smaller losses of boats, person-

ml, and time:
“Load personnel in the boat properly to avoid capsizing in rough water and to Eacilitate steering. A zigzagging boat takes longer to cross and, if the current is swift, lands you far below the rest of your unitsometimes face to face with the enemy, in which ease both personnel and boat may become casualties. “Avoid shifting weight in the boat when you come under fire or when casualties occur; if you aren’t careful on this point while crossing over rough water,

you are sure to end up swimming.
“If there is no engineer crew to row the boat back, don’t abandon the boat to the current when you disembark-pull ,’ “Don’t “If it up on the bank or tie it. lose the paddles.

it is your job to return the boat to the near point, make every effort to pull, push, or

bank, Andy the current sweeps you far below the embarkation drag the boat back to the &mbarkation point or at least near enough~to that point so that the boat may be used for further crossings. ‘~Remember that these boats serve as your only life line until the engineers have, succeeded in building the bridge. available Make every effort to keep your boat for crossing the men and supplies still on

the near bank.”

:, ,’ 14 ,::;,,, ,,

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Awaitins H-hour

jor the

Row Crossing.

Life-Saving

Precautions

From Headquarters ET0 after the ROER crossing: to wear a life .“Ench man crossing was required preserver. Life booms were constructed from grope suspended between floats: PO&X 6oats were ,posted downstream from crossing sites. Engine&s were posted along the banks to help meri who f& into the river. With these precautions, nqt, one case of drowning occurred in Spite of the fact that the ergs&g was made at night.” ~From the Commanding O/j&r,, 143d Zn~antry, FRANCE: “A rope supported by several colored buoys 15 ,'.,;, )~;,

should

be stretched

from

the near t”

the far shore wweS a,,d

by one boat in the lradmg

waw: of each company.

~1,~ rqx

~emes as a guide to succeeding

may also be of help to personnel whose boat hiis been sunk or overturned during the crossing.” Allother ET0 signal lights report includes this suggestion: “Red during were used to the far

to guide troops
shore.” “Briefing

to loading

poirlts and to assist in maintaining
the crossing f?~orn a British report: after stream reconnaissance,

direction

of boat personnel,

helps avoid losses caused

by hitting shoals and/or landing on islands, etc.”

Footbridge~onstructiorr
The Cable Problem
Comments from engineers “As we had anticipated, bridge construction of the cable. proceeded

Shortcuts

after the Roett crossing: in footand a&ho&g

the main problem

was the crossing c+se.

Once that problem was solved, bridging were able to get the cable

rapidly in each

“At one site, the men

across during the night before the main crossing took place; they left it slack until time for its use. “At before another site, six unsuccessful attempts cable.” were made and the unit had to find a more suitable location they were able to anchor their

Projectitig Cable by Mortar Others of the 396h Iufantry, GERMANY,report a
successful used the cable solution 81.mm to the problem successfully of crossing the cables needed in footbridge mortar across obstacles construction: We “We have remove the

for projecting

or streams.

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charge frocl a high.e+plosive oi smoke shell and insert into the nose of the shell a l-in. pipelong enough to fm,ject past the n~uzzle of the mortar when the shell Four fins or grapnels are welded to the is seated. upper end of the pipe and a U-bolt is screwed or welded to the same end. A ki.in. cable is bolted to the U-bolt by means of B cleat or shackle welded to the cidrle. “l-he cable should be at least 215 yards long, al. though the range of the device will be somewhat less. The projectile will xvcrsc itself in flight and land shell-end first. “Great care must be taken to insure that the cable pays out freely; failure to do so may allow whipping and result in injuries, to the mm. To minimize friction, we used an inlprovised cableholding plate (about 3 ft. x 5 ft.) to which wrc welded two winding+asts sloping sharply to a point. The cable should he figure-eighted onto the posts carefully; no kinks or overlappings may be allowed. Before firing, the plate should be tilted up at an angle of 45 degrees, the
Cd/e-~e-,,n&cting Lhoiie.

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posts mortar

poi&ing should

‘in the direction

of fin

About in front

30 feet of the

of cable

be laid out and coiled and to prevent

to allow for play

a violent jerk.

When the cable has been fired and anchored on the far end, a vehicle winch can be used to pull the cable

to desired
Boating From

tautness.” the Cabfe the &m&w Across Oa;cers of the 235th and

1103d Engineer Groups, GERMANY: “We had little success in crossing f/T.in_ and ‘/!-in. cables until we tried wound a method of using crew. man assault-boat the other the cable two reels and a husky eight. A single length of cable was

on two reels-one

being set up on shore and By securing in the stern of the assault boat. to the boat we were able to paddle part way the cable out from the reel on shore.

dragging

,.,

When

the drag so that

become

too great pay

for the paddlers the cable the out from

to from

_

make any headway, the boat the stern, Footbridge

we simply it could across.”

released

reel in

and continued

Expedient
Oficer,

Say? the Commanding
bat Battalion,
turned standard

319th Engineer

Com-

Gmmw:
on end,

the fioats footbridge

“When making

the swift current construction of a we built R foot-

impracticable,

bridge by using the duckboards was secured cable.”

&I2 assault boats for floats and lashing to the boats w*ith rope. Each boat the float cable and the anchor

to both

Comnrunications By Spiral-Four Cable
From spiraLfour carried knocked operating the Signal cable

at the Crossing
Division,
we used for wire was

GERMANY: “During
communication

Oficer, 102% Infantry the R~ER river crossing to field wire the river.

in preference across

The first cable

across by the assault wwe. out, a new cable was laid from assault boats. Both

When it was by wire crews cables wexe laid

under water. When the footbridge w.ss completed, an alternate spiraLfour cable was laid thereon.”

By Radio Says another
ET0 report: “Communications immediately after crossing were entirely by radio. Radio silence was ordinarily observed untjl contact with the enemy was made.

More Fire By Wire “In some

/or the
each

ZZridgeheorl.

battalions,

company

carried

across

a wire line in the hope would be operable after “Several lines across ,”

that at least crossing.

one of the lines

units reported su~ce& in shooting wire the narrow stream by attaching light lines or basooka shells.” (See page 46, ComETO: “During wires

to grenades

bat Lessons No. 6.) From the 84h Infantry the river-crossing operation;our cut by enemy distance from

Division,

communication

were repeatedly
the wire some

artillery until we moved the crossing sites.”

Speeding
Comment

the +ming
Engineer,

Battalion CO Supervisee
from the Division 5th Injantry opera.

.,

Division,
20

GERMANY: “During

river-crossing

,:,,

,,,. ,,,, :_,, ,,~. tions, it has been found very desirable to have the infantry battalion commander or one of his staff 06% cers present at the crossing site so that he can supervise his own troops during the crossing, direct men who have become separated from their organizations, and, by maintaining liaison with leaders of succeeding waves, minimize the time lag between waves.” Rehearsals Speed the Crossing Recent British reports reemphasize the necessity for training and rehearsals: “Pretraining of personnel who are to launch and carry the boats pays off in efficiency. Careful organization and drill in loading and shoving-off procedures are similarly important.” ,,’

Engiueer-Infantry Cooperation
Front a Fir-s infaatry report: “There times, both before and durmg a rwer

.

must be at ~111 crossing, the and

closest possible cooperation
engineers. as expected.” DUKW’s DUKW’s hi&s visions from away arounds Expedite Supply

between infantrymen

Each must understand the other and have

complete reliance on the other to carry

out his mission

have given

excellent service

as supply ve-

during several crossings

but require special pro-

for loading and turning, according to a report the 80th Division, FRANCE. “If DUKW’s are sites should be near roads and well turnfrom intended bridge-crossing sites;

used, crossing

and unloading should be proRamps, too, should vided on the near and far shores. be set up on both banks.” “In the Moselle crossing, banks made it necessary alongside “When steered points.” c&rents well are the steepness of the river be moored must be landing that the DUKW’s rapid, the DUKW’s from the intended

for loading

the bank during the loading upstream

and unloading.

Fast Crossing Method
From “Enough on the battalion) the 279th near bank. Cornbat Engineer two battalions the ,On sign& B&&m, first wwe ETO: (one boats to cross were lined up moved quickly

picked up every other boat,

to the water, and crossed.

When that battalion landed,

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bank,, and make vidually, designated IIIum’s

the

s&and

wwe Thereafter

Was given bats squads

the

signal

to

the crossing. pick+ priorities.” the Word

recrossed according

indito pre-

tip infantry

Reported “When crossing blanket truck we

by the 279th Combat Engineer Baklalion: move heavy equipment eliminate and up to, a rivereach of noise by placing section

site, we practically padding an extra mufller

over the hoods

and equipping an extra

with

tail pipe.”

Drying the “Dunked”
In the MOSEI.I.E operation, each bank was kept warmed clothing to provide for men one small building with net. on

and supplied

enough

who had become

Rope Inxues

Rapid Wirhdrad

in an Emergency.

“As the platwn

started to obey the order 10 withdmw,

Private Young storted creeping toward the emplacement Derpite~asecond wound, he mntinved his heroic advance, attmcting enemy fire and anrwering with rifle fire. When clore to hir objective, he began throwing hand grenades, and while doing se was hit again and killed.

~“F%vate Young’s bold o&an in closing with this Japanese pillbox and fbur diverting its fire, permitted hi; platoon IO dinengage Hralf, witbout loss, and was responsible for several enemy ca*u&ar.” ,;

.‘~

atro
ointers
Allow Time for Preparation
A Fifth following Army training points which memorandum should be of brings out the interest to .a11

officers who have responsibility

for patrol assignment,

selection, and supervision: “The most frequent error in the assignment of patrol missions is the stipulation of a return information sidered time which cannot be met if the mission is to be properly is the executed and the required items of The factor usually left unronobtained. time required for essential prelimipatrol members, assembling perthe patrol with special equipment, the patrol leader, to the starting briefing point. of movement

naries-selecting sonnel, providing initial personnel, and

reconnaissance.by

“Commanders and staffs, as well as patrol troops, should be made to realize the amount of detail essential to proper preparation Emphasize the fact of a patrol for each mission. leader must be his mission. that the patrol

given the means and time to accomplish

,,’

Contact With the Main Force
“Leaders of flank or security patrols should be impressed with the importance of maintaining contact with the main force at all times. Loss of contact has often proved disastrous; the opposite extreme, horv-

28
,,’

ever, can also have serious results. orerly zealous about maintaining

One patrol leader, contact, caused the

attack to involve the main body and develop into a major action for which the latter was not prepared.

Patrol Leadership
“Strictest patrol discipline must be maintained should duiing a operation. Rigid control be exercised

to eliminate unnecessary noise, and-most important-ill-advised ment must be regulated pitious conditions such as

talking, sneezing, firing. All moveof protemporary when

to take full advantage .rainstorms,’

obscuring of the mobn by clouds, etc. “One patrol had almost completed its mission its presence and location were revealed through an unguarded b&s. This betrayal that particular patrol. importance

to the enemy

movement by one of its memnullified the entire effort of Patience is of ‘the utmost

in patrolling.

“The final

success or failure

of a patrol depends, in the of leadership pasIn most cases, the comand NCO’s to

analysis,

upon the qualities

sessed by the patrol leader. oxmders perform this duty.

have selected their best &icers

O+n+g
permanent to furnish gressive,

“Professional” patrol groups personnel

Patrols whose principal function is

“Some commanders

have gone so far as to organize for baftle missidns. The off&% most agThey

selected for these groups are volunteers-the are permitted training to select from the unit

tough, and rugged officers in the unit. After a period

men who posof intensive

sess the same qualities. in scouting, cal hardening, headquarters “Fatigue mission location,

patrotting,

battle drill, and physiits missions.

the patrol group is attached to the unit from which it receives to assign the men rested,

and strain endured by battle patrols make &em more than one major Upon completion to a roan their next for should he moved and prepared

it impracticable of a mission, fed,

every two or three days.

group

in a

unit should not

be

cokdered a complete

,,: ,,, ,,:~

How Not to
A Sixth Army an unsuccessful report patrol includes action this

atrol
account of in NEW GUINEA.

Though some members of the patrol exhibited splendid courage and initiative, the mission was ,” ,:,‘:, not accomplished and casualties ‘IYWZhigh. The negative results of this patrol action were due in large part to several violations of basic patrol principles as pointed oat below. on the opposite A map of the area is shown page.

Terrnin
“The with ‘:~, coastal flat northwest of the river is covered interspersed with Trees Kunai grass 2 to 5 feet high,

wooded,areas;

travel is difficult~and exhausting.

in the wooded areas are not close together, underbrush is dense and visibility is limited. paralleling

b$ the A track

,, ,I~
I~ ,, ~,

the beach is about 8 feet wide and clear of

und6rbrwh. Along the beach is a 4 to 8.ft. enibankment suitable as cpyer @inst small-arms fire from inland.’ “The places width of the river varies from 15 feet in some to,35 feet in others; its current is swift. The ?tream bed is rocky and relatively shalknv except for the main channel, which at the time of this patrol action WBS mme than G,feet deep as a result of recent rains.

:.,, ~:

,:,, ,,,
,~,: ;::, I,

;, ,~ ,,~, :~ 32

,,‘:”

;;,,‘,,:“:,‘.:::i~, ,, ,~

::,

The

Patrol consisted of a rifle platoon one intelligence Second First reinforced by

“The patrol two 60mm operator, platoon

mortar

squads,

man, B radio Y, the X Lieutenant as observer

and an aid man. leader, was attached

Lieutenant

was in command.

from y’s company and coordinator.”

to the patrol

“The hig-her comnmder keeps the accmnplishment of the mission in mind ~u~;hen selects the patrol leader; he the tire important the m&.&m, the more c&efrd his sel&tion must be. A mod leader should have

ment, initiative, courage, endurance,
ski&d leader.” (FM 21-75.) The

and be a highly
attachment of

Lieutenant X as coordinator not only divided respond. sibility, but also indicated a doubt in the commander’s n&d (IS to Y’s ability to lead the patrol.

The Mission “The mission of the pair01 was to cross the river in the vicinity of A (abattalion outpost), to reconnoiter the coaspd anza from the mouth of the river to the village at D,and to destioy any enemy found in the area.)’
“The indefinite failures. eff%ently injormation, mission leader assigned must by the higher be specific commander to

the patrol

and unmistakable;

missions invite confusion, cnsaalties, and One patrol cmmot be expected to ezecwte a rrumber of missions.” patrols maintain their contact mission with (FM 21-75.

j
or

“Reconnaissance observe terrain. and accomplish

are used primarily

to secure combat Reconna~is-

the enemy,

. They avoid unnecessary
by stealth.

sancc patrols engage in l;rc fights only when necessary to nccornnlish their mission or to orotect themselves.” (FM 21-75.) “A quire p&h; combat fighting patrol to czecutes


mi&oons which may re. a&omplbh, or to kelp accomco mbot patrol secures information (‘FM 21-75.)

. Every w Q secondary mission.”
This

patrol has been given two primary missionsand combat-without any indication as recoILnawslzllce c

to which
enemy

has priorit y.

The directive

to destroy

any. mis-

found in the area, ij taken as the primary

Sicrr, will preclude success~rrl operation as i reconnnisSmCe ptrol. 77~e&sim .shoeld. been either hove combat, with reconnaissome sccmdlary mission, ns n
or reconrrnissoace alone, in which case the patrol would engage in combat only to the e.wrt~ necessary to cornplete ils rccor~nnissnrux nrission.

The Trip Oot
“The patrol departed from outpost to furnish A at 1015, leaving fire sitpport of

one 6Omm mortar

squad

the crossing on call. A rope secored to both banks was used to help the patrol wade across the stream. Weapons protected personnel waiting and ammonition were ferried mortar across in a 2. man rubber boat. The 60.mm sqoad which had

tbe crossing w5 last to cross. By 1115, all and equipment had been crossed and were for the scheduled artillery concentration before

moving forward. At 1130, 80 rounds of 105.mm nmmunition were fired on the CoCooot grove at ll and along grove. “After completion &ng of the artillery fire, the patrol
Ikept

the

coastal

track

in

both

directions

from

the

reconnoitered for the killing tact was made

route K to the beach at C.

of three Japs by the rear point nwcona,nd the trip was uneventful. At t@oS,, at C. A perimeter defense was e&b-

the patrol arrived

lished while plans were made and the patrol reorganized:

“h purposes of conltiand and control, the patrol was then divided into 3 sections, consisting, respeetively, of Second Lieuteimnt Y and 10 men, the platoon sex+ant and 13 men, and First Lieutennnt X and 20 men.”

~’
:

“The ,‘,,,,ol

Reconrroirerrd nlong Rnate K.”

coatr-01 were mt improd Lieuden~or~stratedher. mmnt Y in addition to corrkmandir~g the patrol was nlso commanding one a/ the sectionr. Lieutennst X ns a section leader um now under the command o] his junior, Lieutertnnt Y.
Actdly, corrmancl

ml

by this

orgarriiorionas

was

“At

this time, radio

communication went out and

with

talion commar&r thereafter. CWltaCt

at outpost A was established.

the batHow-

ever, the radio soon

did not function

“The first contact the reorganization armed with automatic from the southrvest.

had been completed.

with the enemy came shortly after About 20 Japs weapons attacked the perimeter Apparently this group had fol-

lowed the trail made by the patrol rrhilc~ enwttte
coast. In the brief ensuing skirmish, 10 enemy along killed and the rrn~ninder dispersed.

to the were ,’

“The patrol then moved southeast track toward the coconut grove atB. 10 Jnps (presumably

the constal

A perry of &out the remainder of tbe party which

had previously attacked) followed a parallel i&ad route, and a running exchange of fire cootinned for about 20 minutes. When the advarm clenlents of the ” patrol reached they received the northwest edge of the coconut grove, heavy machine-gun, rifle, mortar, and

hand-grenade fire from their front and right flank. Three members of the patrol were wounded. It was

estimated

tbot ibout

50 enemy were in the grove. command, and because

Lieutenant
heavy beach

X assumed

First of the

fire ordered the patrol to return to the former position at C. Two of the wounded men hod to be assisted. ~~“After temporary two sections moved them their arrival at C the firing stopped and a perimeter defense was orgranized. Lieuthe men too closely grouped: ordered to move farther. farther inland. X intended, Apparently Neither this section was so he signaled signal

tenant .X: finding

as far as Lieutenant to move

interpreted

to mean

that

the sections

were to return

to

the river via separate &wlier when the patrol both sec$ons moved with his section

routes, as had first reorganized out leaving

been discussed at C, because X at C

Lieutenant

of 20 men.”

irrthe pntrol

or-gnniintiotr, srrildut to the
1’ to Lieutenant

chwrge

in corn--

mand /r.om Lieutenant patrol was in contact

X mhilc the

with the enemy, nrtd to a failtuc oj plans nnd ,&nnls.

to reach a clear urrdrrstnnding

The Trip Back
“The platen sergeant without with his 13 men followed incident, crossed, and route

&I to the river

reported

to the battalion commander at outpost A at 1600 hours. Second Lieutenant Y and his IO-man section made a wider circuit commander over route N and reported an hour later without X realized to the battalion contwted having

the enemy. “When First sections with his section

Lieutenant sod

that the other two men. One of the The that a

had gone, he proceeded

to the river via route 1,

the wounded

wounded died enroute and the body was carried. section reached E without diff~cficnlty but found crossing at that point would be ahnost

impossible.

Here the river was about 30 feet wide, the current was very swift, and there were many boulders. Crossing

at this point would have been dangerous
lent swimmers. As attempt

even for excelcross-

to reach the original

ing site near A was unsuccessful because of enemy in position along the northwest bank of the river between E and A.” Patrols should return]rom a missions over a differetit crossing points could before the cr3n.,

route to avoid ambush. have been determined

Alternate

J

by recorznaissnnce

bat patrol was sent out. It’ appears that the enemy allowed the patrol to cross the river unopposed and planned to ambush it by closing in behind. 39 :,,

,,,

: .~;,

“Upon contacted ing site mission

returning

to E, Lieutenant of an attack to reach was then river and

X set up B perimhe had crossto the the original sent reporting

eter in anticipation at A.

by the enemy

while attempting A sergeant the of crossing

out with the

battalion commander at A for help.

The

Rescue the battalion commander had received

“Meanwhile

a situation report from the leader of the section which bad returned over route M. Acting upon this information, the battalion about river commander had formed a group of 20 men and had proceeded to the vicinity of E on the island. ‘Shis group was preparing to cross the to aid the remainder of the patrol‘when they oh served Lieutenant Y and his section crossing about 800 yards farther upstream. Believing this to be the balance of the patrol, the battalion commander returned Shortly after the commander his group to the outpost. and his group had departed from E, the sergeant from Lieutenant X’s section crossed the river and proceeded to A to report. Again the battalion commander proceeded with his group X at E. to evacuate be used. with the wounded, Several the, rope were it was decided by Lieu: unsuccessful. attempts to the island, this time contacting Lieutenant “In order tenant

that a rope must X to cross

Firially the battalion commander and four others grasped hands and forked a human chain out into the water. ‘plunged Lieutenant X removed his clothes and tied upstream he in reaching

the rope to his waist.
into the river

From a point and was successful

16 :: ,’ ,_;:, ,;~ : ,, ,’

R patrol action is obvious.

“Subsequently the enemy subjected the island to heavy machine-gun and mortar fire; however, the n~en

on the island stayed in position to covw the crossing
of the remaining 17 men on the far hank. One of th,e 2 wounded men with this group of 17 was successfully evacua+d, hut the other was swept away and drowned while trying to cross. 8 succeeded Of the remaining 15 men only in getting across the river before the Japs

closed in. Thwe men said they had been subjected to heavy mortar and grenade fire, an?l it was believed that the others were killed. “It is believed that all of the uninjured men in the group could have crossed the river before the enemy closed in on them, if they had not chosen to ‘stick it out’ in the hope of getting the wounded across.”

,,,

The patrol crossed a dificult obstacle and moved rapidly deep into hostile territory where the enemy situation was obscure. There was apparently very little rcconnaimance on the part of the patrol, and it WC+ unnware of the enemy slrength in the immediate vicinity. The patrol tms of suficient strength to fight its way out against a superior number of enemy, but when control uxzs ‘lost and the patrol was disorganized, and split : upi it was susceptible to defeat in detail.

‘,,’ : ‘42 ~A>,’ ,,~,,, :, ,, ,_,~ i:, ,,

~’Methods


Orientation by Ground Photn,

Preattack

Reported by Herdquarters, 4th Tnnlc Bottnliori, ITALY: “Ground photographs of the zone of advance assist considerably in coordination of units engaged in an attack. “For an infantry-tank operation involving direct.fire support against an enemy strongpoint in the Central Apennines, a ground photo of the objective area effectively supplemented maps and aerial photos. The picture was ‘shot’ from a forward position about l,@ yards from the strongpoint. “Enlargements (855 x 11) ~vere made and distributed to echelons down to and including each tank Known enemy points of resistance and commander. other likely positions were marked on a master sheet, and from that a number of targets were selected. These targets were assigned to specific sections within ‘, the supporting tank company. “AU tank commanders were taken into the front &is to observe tbeir own targets from the positions their tanks were to occupy. Azimuths to ihe individual tar& were shot and quadrant elevations were figured so that accurate fire could be brought to bear 43

even each

if adverse tank crew

weather had

conditions to the data all other range to each called by

prevailed targets

during by

the attack. number, “The by using porting fire called direct to the “The= the infantry of approach. easier :,, Exact

In addition and the exact

on its own target, marked one was marked concentrations This sup of the

on the individual attacking a code to tanks, and

photograph. infantry word the for oil&r followed a number.

WBS relayed

commanding he in turn gave

that concentration If additional tanks could would be be done of this our by deal all this

to the tank &eady to come

laid in on the target. to bear, the target; Because fear

was to he brought in on time. ,$thout

in a very short infantry

of the accuracy of casualties can make by these

fire, it was possible

to ,give very close support from

own fire. ground The were for photographs photographs assisted also be used it a great in the selection personnel and designation before‘an attack. enlargements. out cciuld be worked of routes

to orient too, coordinates

“FO’s,

key points

,,,,

beforehand, nod ~vhen an attack occurred, it was easier to locate esnctlp the points of enemy resistnnce.”

PanoramicPhotos
Suggested “While in by the

fur Orientation worst Special Service the

Force:
French:h-

B defensive

position

aloag

Italian border, we used from all forward ground patrols, agents, civilians and artillery observers.”

enlarged paw~amas taken OP’s to assist in orieatinp contributing information,

Gridded
From speed greatly gridded cate of

Panoramas
a Regirnentnl target improved panorama

for OP’s
S-2, ETO: “The accuracy personnel IUKI were by OP

designation

when we supplied each OP with B Dupliof its sector of observation. and grids were given to

copies

of photographs

the Battalion CP, the Regimental Cl’, and the Battalion Artillery Liaison Officer. To designate a target, the observer would merely locate the corresponding point on the photograph, orient the grid on the photograph, ad then “These transmit d&g&ions the photograph are extremely number accurate and target for close ,’ aoordinates and medium to the point To m&t to the CP. ranges but are inaccurate of being unsuitable for observers at long ranges artillery fires. to select

‘~

this difficulty,

were taught

map coordinates against reference the photograph. “Panoramic

for distant targets after checking points marked both on the map and views taken from the OP’s However, in one situation were the we sub45

most effective.

stituted taken

satisfactorily by artilleiy

wme &iSm

low-angle planes

aerial

obliques imof

from locations on pieces

mediately above the MLR. “The coordinate grid can be drawn

cellulose acetate. Each copy~ of a photograph must bear identical orientation marks gnd the photograph number.”

Photo Coordiaale Grid.

,, ,’ ,, 46 ,,” ,I, ,, ‘,.‘;, ,~, ‘, (,

‘;_ .:

Supply-in
Reported

Spite of High Water!
by S@J Sergeants of the Volturno razirixntal

James
dark

R. Gaveske,
to the

Lewis E. McKcn& end 135th Infantry, ITALY: “On the
River, we came tbat up after there was water, downCP and found

first crossing

no way to cross the river by truck. Rations, and ammunition had to he gotten across. “First, we tried a jeep, but the jeep went

stream. The next thing we tried was puiling a 2y This worked okay ton 6 x 6 truck across by its winch. so, we loaded a jeep and supplies on tbe truck and We kept that up until we had then dragged it across. 4 jeeps across with which’ we could haul the supplies We moved out to the companies about n mile away. all of the rations and ammunition that night by the samiz process. that w&y.” We also took all of the casualties back

Bridge
The Soputa,

Consteuction
successful use

Expedient
of an e+edient bridge near by Captain

NEW GUINEA, is reported

IL Reed, Lhttaliorc:
bottomed

Company
“The stream

Conunartder,
River

Combat

Ralph Engineer
sandytbe 47

‘~

Girua subject

is a shallow,

to Rash floods

during

,,

~, ,, :

‘::~ ,,~; : :,:

,:~,‘;

,’ ,, ,,:,

and driver;

in the pushing method,

both driver ‘and

dozer are directly

over the mine xhen it is detdnated.

“The initial path of the dozer should be swept for mines before tbr dozer traverses it in the next: drag. Aftei the barbed-wire entanglerrtent has been removed the area should be thoroughly swept again, this tinie to locate deeply buried rnincs.” Raising Bridge Caps

An Engineer way of raising

Ger~ernl &mice

Regiment,

MIDDLE

EAST THEATER, has ‘sketched

8, simple hut effective

B bridge cap for shimming, which often,

becomes necessary because of ,the sinking of the piers of military bridges soon after construction.

~,

PreGenting Prevention

Brake-Hose is easier

Tears thno and repair tearing ends inside according of the brake to the hose chain. out to

634th
eliminate

Engineer

Light
loose

Equipment
of tire

Company: “TO ‘, ,,,
chain, we re-

the catching by the links two from

on vehicles
moved ,, ,When insure

the

longitudin&l

being’mounted that the short

the chain must he laid chain is on the inside.”

Road-Repair Expedient “A nearly
effectively materials tile,” reports impassable repaired as baled hay, ZOO-yard building stretch such bricks, of road was unorthodox and roofing road the by the use of

the Comrnnrrding Ofker,

Cornppany A,
“The To stabilize

297th Engineer
was a quagmire mire, covered with of 30 bales with more roofing

Combat Battalion, ETO.
to n depth of hay were layer was layer resulting of 3 feet. spread topped in turn surface of building over the

road and mixed layer by

/

a thick Each The

bricks was was

straw. tile.

This

by a 3.i”. packed

passing

traffic.

excellent.”

Using Mine Detectors Under Water
Standard in Italy. a 10.50-16 clip. up the pulled 54 The over &ine From inner detectors under Allied have, he&i water data: over sleeve waterproofed troops of half

,‘;’

and used successfully

by Engine& “One end

Force Headquarters, Engineer
by &ans of a’Jubilee and cape ,is the end

Section, came the following
opewend arm. the other ,is drawn The end

tube is closed

~,

,z

tlie detector of a gas inside

detector

and placed

,:

of the around

inner

tube.

The arm

two

are

fastened Jubilee

together clip.

the detector

by mother

“A weight the buoyancy be supplied

of 6 to 10 lbs. is required to counteract of the rubber tube. This weight may by platiing a brick between the coil and

‘the rubber bag, or by draping a sandbag full of grnyel in saddlebag fashipn about half-way up the ‘detector arm, lashing it round; and anchoring in water for it. three hours, this

‘:

“After

immersioh

model showed no seepage and the detector worked normally, picking up metal dn deep water nt I, 2, and

even 3 feet under

the detector.”

“$1 think yoriu find this ~colls ior special preporatiori, Bud!”

55 ,_>,,~” j’ ‘,,, ,. ,,

,~:

days.
forgot dry-an

Eventually, or disregarded towels of effective Three

however, and signal shirts

a few of the men and hung thetn

either o& to

their instructions. for enemy
were

They w&d fire upon

so1114 white

artillery

our CP.

‘OUT men

killed in the shelling

that followed Learning Reported ETO: a sadly the same a large entire “After (the first time

this breach

of security.”

Security by

the Hard Way
an Irz/anar~try Battalion out and of two opened only Commander, CP ,locations for by and b&ness OP in passing the direct Since we reorganized, battalion landing.

being shelled
with severe CP group could

casualties)

depleted building open

in another

building. window was under

A third-story be reached enemy on a stair to crawl All

village that

observation a sentry well had

fire, it was’ necessary To insure tioned discovered the opening ,sentiy could in the that

past this open went Major until just ‘so

window. was stait wag covered that the the wire

this would stairway. the Sergeant B huge be released

be done,

with

sheet for

of tin

work ~with

team.” We abandoned ,the CP in haste and moved ,’ ‘~ to an already established &ernate CP (the only ‘re.
maining hardly direct .’ “This location left the artillery incident in the building town) before, .’ The it ws last men had sunder ‘., ” taken our

fire ,and rapidly thgrciughly df ~signalling occupancy.

disintegrated. personnel to of a, was

impressed

with the folly the enemy building not repeated.” after

OP and ~CP locatioitv appearance particular error That

by .&ring

the outwrd

57

,,

,.,

,!::

‘,0&z &stake

IS Too Many

I~‘:.‘:‘,, ::,~~

Reported by the Commnr~dirrg General, Irt I,z~nntry ,Diuision: “Officers visiting front-line units should be

: &r&d

against actions that might reveal to the enemy

:,,,,:

,,,,_,

&i locations of our installations. “In one case, an oLst%rvation post was located in a wrecked building. ‘&noutlaged careful Inside walls of the rooms had be& instruments to give a dark background,

had ‘been set well hack in the rooms, the observers were ,,,,

well until
by.

to move about only in the shadows. All went the day when some visiting officers stopped Within half an hour,

,’ ‘.~

They moved ahout freely, even leaning out of the was conmletelv d&roved bv enemv fire.

windows with their field glasses. the huildine