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DHS attention has refocused on lone wolf now the threat is growing
Fobbs 14 Kevin Fobbs began writing professionally in 1975 and has been published in the "New York Times," and written for the "Detroit News," "Michigan Chronicle,", GOPUSA, "Soul Source" magazine and "Writers Digest" magazine. As the former Community Concerns columnist for 12 years with The Detroit News,
Is America ready U.S. officials fear radicalized lone-wolf terrorist plots maybe soon!

How prepared do you believe America is if ISIS or Al Qaeda terrorism crept into your neighborhood and attacked? Are you as afraid as many U.S. intelligence community officials are who fear radicalized citizens will carry out lone-wolf
terrorist plots? Maybe you and your family should be. Because, according to PBS News, Obama administration officials

are suggesting a far ranging list of threat assessments to Americas

national security. But chief among them are the lone-wolf terrorist plots because, they dont require large conspiracies of people whose emails or phone calls can be intercepted. Unlike the September
11th 2001 terrorist attacks on Americas homeland, these breed of terrorists are not only well trained but they have joined or are affiliated with ISIS; a well financed terrorist
organizational network. This extremist group has established a highly efficient caliphate, or Islamic state, in eastern Syrian and northern and western Iraq; it is also the group that is responsible for the beheading of American journalist James
Foley. Although Obama and his administration officials appear to be discounting the seriousness of terrorist attacks on America by lone-wolf operators to the same degree as Britain, they should. On Friday, England raised its terror threat to
its second highest level from substantial to severe. They have based this reaction to intelligence community information in Britain that cites that an a foreign fighter danger that made a terrorist attack highly likely, reported PBS News.
America does not have to wonder if this type of terrorism can happen, because it did with the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. Several people were killed and dozens of innocent citizens were injured. By apparent self-radicalized American
brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev. Then of course there was the New York Times bomb attempt in 2010 by Faisal Shahzad. Shahzad had received training and instructions while in Pakistan. Is America ready for this threat, even
though the White House refuses to declare the jihadists and ISIS declared terrorist intentions real? This should definitely concern the nation because it only take approximately 90 seconds of period of violence to harm hundred if not

The real pressing urgent matter lies in the terrorist trained Americans that
return to American soil. Rutgers University professor John Cohen who recently left as Homeland Security Departments counterterrorism coordinator stressed
that the officials worked very hard, to detect Westerners who have gone to Syria, no one knows for sure whether there are those who have gone there
undetected, reported PBS News. As the 9/11 terrorist attack anniversary approaches it is probably wise for all Americans to be aware of not just the possibility that a terrorist act could occur, but to report anything suspicious to law
thousands of Americans, from the alleged 200 plus citizens who have gone to fight for extremist terrorists in Iraq and Syria.

enforcement. Remember, America does not get a second chance to get it right.

Preparedness is increasing local law enforcement are ramping up vigilance
Perez and Prokupecz 15 -- Evan Perez joined CNN as a justice reporter in 2013. In his current role, he regularly writes for and appears
across the network's programs to report on his findings. Shimon Prokupecz covers law enforcement for CNN and is based in New York City. FBI
struggling with surge in homegrown terror cases
The New York Police Department and other law enforcement agencies around the nation are increasing their surveillance of ISIS supporters in the U.S.,
to aid the FBI which is struggling

New York (CNN)

in part
to keep up with a surge in the number of possible terror suspects, according to law enforcement officials. The change is part of the fallout from the terrorist attack in Garland, Texas earlier this month. The FBI says
two ISIS supporters attempted a gun attack on a Prophet Mohammad cartoon contest but were killed by police. One of the attackers, Elton Simpson, was already under investigation by the FBI but managed to elude surveillance to attempt the foiled attack. FBI Director James

the FBI needs help to keep tabs on hundreds of suspects. As a result, some police agencies are
adding surveillance teams to help the FBI monitor suspects . Teams of NYPD officers trained in surveillance are now helping the FBI's surveillance teams
to better keep track of suspects, law enforcement officials say. NYPD Commissioner William Bratton has said he wants to add 450 officers to the force's counterterrorism unit, partly to counter the increasing domestic threat posed
by ISIS sympathizers. The same is happening with other police departments around the country . The Los Angeles Police Department's counterterrorism unit is also beefing up its surveillance squads at the request of the
Comey told a group of police officials around the country in a secure conference call this month that

FBI, law enforcement officials say. Comey said at an unrelated news conference Wednesday that he has less confidence now that the FBI can keep up with the task. "It's an extraordinarily difficult challenge task to find -- that's the first challenge -- and then assess those who may be
on a journey from talking to doing and to find and assess in an environment where increasingly, as the attorney general said, their communications are unavailable to us even with court orders," Comey said. "They're on encrypted platforms, so it is an incredibly difficult task that we

"We are
working very, very hard on it but it is an enormous task." On Saturday, an FBI spokesman said the bureau doesn't have a shortage of resources and the Garland attack wasn't
the result of lack of surveillance personnel. If agents had any indication that Simpson was moving toward an attack, they would have done everything to stop it, the spokesman said. The appeal for local help isn't intended to seek more
surveillance, but more broadly to encourage local law enforcement to increase vigilance given the heightened threat, the FBI said. The Garland attack prompted a reassessment for FBI
are enlisting all of our state, local and federal partners in and we're working on it every single day, but I can't stand here with any high confidence when I confront the world that is increasingly dark to me and tell you that I've got it all covered," he said.

officials. Simpson's social media and other communications with known ISIS recruiters drew the FBI's interest earlier this year. FBI agents in Phoenix began regular surveillance of Simpson, though it was not round-the-clock monitoring, according to a U.S. official. The agents
watching Simpson noticed he disappeared for a few days. Investigators looked into his communications and found social media postings making reference to the Garland cartoon contest. That discovery is what prompted the FBI to send a bulletin to the joint terrorism task force
that was monitoring the Garland event. The bulletin arrived about three hours before the attack. Comey told reporters this month the FBI had no idea Simpson planned to attack the event or even that he had traveled from his home in Phoenix to Texas.


Were winning the war on terrorism now -- Continued vigilance is key
Zenko 4/8/15 Zenko covers the U.S. national security debate and offers insight on developments in international security and conflict prevention. CIA Director: Were Winning the War on Terror, But
It Will Never End

Director of Central Intelligence John Brennan participated in a question-and-answer session at Harvard Kennedy Schools Institute of Politics

Last night,
. The first
thirty-seven minutes consisted of an unusually probing exchange between Brennan and Harvard professor Graham Allison (full disclosure: Graham is a former boss of mine). Most notably, between 19:07 and 29:25 in the video, Allison pressed Brennan repeatedly about whether
the United States is winning the war on terrorism and why the number of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups has only increased since 9/11: There seem to be more of them than when we startedHow are we doing? Brennan replied: If I look across the board in terms of since 9/11 at

In intelligence, military, homeland security, law enforcement, diplomacy. If we were not as engaged against the
terrorists, I think we would be facing a horrendous, horrendous environment. Because they would have taken full advantage of the opportunities that they
have had across the region We have worked collectively as a government but also with our international partners very hard to try and root many of them out. Might some of these actions be stimulants to others joining their ranks? Sure, thats a possibility. I
think, though it has taken off of the battlefield a lot more terrorists, than it has put on. This statement is impossible to evaluate or measure because the U.S.
government has consistently refused to state publicly which terrorist organizations are deemed combatants, and can therefore be taken out on the battlefield. However, relying
upon the State Departments annual Country Reports on Terrorism,the estimated strength of all al-Qaeda-affiliated groups has grown or stayed the same
since President Obama came into office. Of course, non-al-Qaeda-affiliated groups have arisen since 9/11, including the self-proclaimed Islamic State, which the Central Intelligence Agency estimated
last September to contain up to 31,500 fighters, and Boko Haram , which has perhaps 10,000 committed members. However, the most interesting question posed to Brennan came at the very end from a Harvard freshman who identified himself as Julian: Weve been
fighting the war on terror since 2001. Is there an end in sight, or should we get used to this new state of existence? Brennan replied: Its a long war, unfortunately. But its been a war that has been in existence for millennia ,
at the same timethe use of violence for political purposes against noncombatants by either a state actor or a subnational group. Terrorism has taken many forms over the years. What is more challenging now is , again, the
technology that is available to terrorists, the great devastation that can be created by even a handful of folks, and also mass communication that just proliferates all of
this activity and incitement and encouragement. So you have an environment now thats very conducive to that type of propaganda and recruitment efforts, as well as the ability to get materials that are going to kill people. And so this is going
to be something, I think, that were always going to have to be vigilant about. There is evil in the world and some people just want to kill for the sake of killingThis is something that, whether its from this group right now or another
group, I think the ability to cause damage and violence and kill will be with us for many years to come. We just have to not kill our way out of this because thats not going to address it. We need to stop those attacks that are in train but we
also have to address some of those underlying factors and conditions . Im not saying that poverty causes somebody to become a terrorist, or a lack of governance, but they certainly do allow these terrorist organizations to
grow and they take full advantage of those opportunities. To summarize, the war on terrorism is working, compared to inaction or other policies . But, the American people
should expect it to continue for millennia, or as long as lethal technologies and mass communication remain available to evil people.
terrorist organizations, and if the United States in all of its various forms.

2NC Generic
Current strategies prevent attacks groups can still rebound intel key
Pomerleau 4/24/15 Mark, bachelor's degree in Political Science from Westfield State University. a freelance journalist in Washington covering politics and policy. Is the US Winning the War on Terror?
The War on Terror, or described differently, the global struggle to curb violent extremism, can be boiled down to optics and rhetoric. While military operations play a small role, the larger conflict encompasses so much more. The United

The United States deposed the Taliban regime that ruled Afghanistan
in the 1990s and early 2000s, that provided al-Qaeda safe-haven. The uprooting of these sanctuaries put both organizations on the run, which disrupted
their long-term planning against the U.S. homeland. Drone strikes and raids have allowed the U.S. to take out several key leaders of these terrorist entities, dealing a
States has struggled both on and off the battlefield to win this conflict but victory can be, and in this case, is subjective. Successes:

blow to operational planning. Documents and correspondence between Osama bin Laden and his associates unveiled in the trial of an al-Qaeda member in February that the robust aerial drone campaign expanded by the Obama
administration had a profound impact in limiting the movements of terrorist groups hiding out in Pakistan. The ability of drones to loiter 24/7 combined with Special Operations Forces raids allowed the United States to gain intrusive access
to and vital intelligence about the inner workings of terrorist organizations. There

has not been a successful attack on the homeland since 9/11, due in part to changes made
to the intelligence community after 9/11 and counterterrorism operations. Additionally, the U.S. has made great strides in monitoring
would-be domestic terror suspects and prosecuted them with the full extent of the law. Failures: While the U.S. was successful in degrading
terrorist entities, it was unsuccessful in destroying them. Consider the Islamic State groups predecessor organization, al-Qaeda in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq (AQI/ISI). The group was severely weakened as a
result of the Iraqi Tribal Awakening Movement when Iraqi tribes joined the U.S. surge to dispel the violent insurgents. AQI/ISI was, however, never officially destroyed and its survivors were able to regroup and rebuild. Despite the demise of
several key leaders of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated groups, the strategy of leadership decapitation has not worked in dismantling these organizations. The Obama administration has made the mistake of thinking that if you sort of lop
off the top of the pyramid, the whole thing crumbles, Tom Joscelyn, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies told lawmakersregarding the idea of destroying these terrorist groups by taking out their leadership. Al-Qaeda
is not organized that way Joscelyn stated. However, it is also entirely possible that the U.S. is simply just trying to eliminate as many terrorists as possible in a sort-of whack-a-mole campaign, which would be equally ineffective, though the
president has maintained he does not wish this as counterterrorism strategy. The drone campaign has been highly criticized by human rights groups for its collateral civilian damage. This collateral damage is also being touted as a recruiting
device, which incites more people to join terrorist groups so they can retaliate against the United States. By some estimates, in confirmed strikes that have taken place in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the number of civilians killed ranges
from 237-308. A recent figure released by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, considered one of the premier sources for on-the-ground reporting in Syrias volatile civil war, 66 civilians have been killed in coalition air strikes. Though,
collateral damage is expected in wars, the nature of drone strikes (e.g. zero risk to soldiers as well as controversial signature strikes that target a specific area based on behavioral patterns without knowing exactly who the targets are)
obfuscates this reality. Civilians in nations where U.S. drones prominently operate have long feared succumbing to death. This reality hit home for Americans as the U.S. officially acknowledged yesterday that an American hostage and an
Italian aid worker were killed in a strike that targeted a suspected militant compound. The government asserts that it was not aware the American was being held at that location. Similarly, U.S. raids by Special Operations Forces have also
rendered tragic results. A U.S. raid in Yemen to rescue a U.S. hostage failed when the militants were alerted to the presence of U.S. soldiers and killed the American and a South African being held by the group, whom the U.S. did not know
was present. Many of these failures boil down to intelligence and a willingness to pull the trigger. They contribute to a broader narrative of negative optics. The al-Qaeda vanguard movement was started by Osama bin Laden partially due to
an undesired American presence in Muslim lands. Several groups have continued this narrative calling for lone wolf actors to incite violence inside western nations. The fact that the U.S. continues operations in these nations despite
widespread reporting of collateral damage, that could preventable, only feeds this narrative. The U.S. has had great success in fighting terrorism over the last 14 years, especially in the military context. While the Islamic State group is
marginally losing ground on the battlefield, governments are still struggling to figure out how to curb radical messaging and recruitment online. The U.S. battlefield successes to oust the Taliban could be for naught if, as suspected, the Afghan

there has
been a greater need for the non-military counterterror metrics. Many have questioned if U.S. counterterror policies (military and non-military such as
controversial sting operations in American communities thought to drive non-violent individuals to commit crimes) are creating more terrorists than
killing them. Despite the great successes, however, it is not overtly clear that the U.S. is winning the War on Terror.
forces will not be able to stand up on their own against a formidable Taliban insurgency that is certain to continue to fight to reestablish their Islamic Emirate. With the online propaganda success of the Islamic State group,

Intel Key
Well win the WOT intel gathering is key
McDONOUGH 2/28/15 Doug, Citing American spy, James Olson U.S. winning the war on terror
our country is at war," he said Thursday while keynoting the annual Plainview Chamber of Commerce banquet. "It's a war on terror, and it will
be long, bloody and deadly. But America will win this war because our best young people today are stepping forward in droves." While many of those are putting on uniforms and joining the ranks of the
nation's combat forces on the front lines, still more are going in harm's way behind the scenes as counterintelligence operatives. "We are on the front lines in the war on terror," Olson warns. "And we will be hit again, inside our own borders. It
will be a weapon of mass destruction, and no region or sector is immune from this attack. The best way to combat this threat is through good
intelligence." Olson was in his final year as a law student at the University of Iowa on the fast track to fulfill his dream of practicing law in a rural town when he received a phone call one Friday afternoon.
After spending 31 years as an American spy, James Olson is blunt in his assessment. "Make no mistake,


The United States federal government should
- Streamline funding for fusion centers
- Require the FBI to share relevant information with state and local law enforcement
- Establish an office within the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate efforts countering violent extremism
That fills the holes in counterterrorism -- Perm cant solve
Inserra 15 -- David Inserra is a Research Associate for Homeland Security and Cyber Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. 68th Terrorist Plot Calls for Major Counterterrorism Reforms

the U.S. cannot be passive. Heritage has recommended numerous counterterrorism policies for Congress to address,
including: Streamlining U.S. fusion centers. Congress should limit fusion centers to the approximately 30 areas with the greatest level of risk as identified by the
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). Some exceptions might exist, such as certain fusion centers that are leading cybersecurity or other important topical efforts. The remaining centers
should then be fully funded and resourced by UASI. Pushing the FBI toward being more effectively driven by intelligence. While the FBI has made high-level changes to its mission and
organizational structure, the bureau is still working to integrate intelligence and law enforcement activities. This will require overcoming cultural barriers and
providing FBI intelligence personnel with resources, opportunities, and the stature they need to become a more effective and integral part of the FBI.
Ensuring that the FBI shares information more readily and regularly with state and local law enforceme nt and treats state and local partners as critical
actors in the fight against terrorism. State, local, and private-sector partners must send and receive timely information from the FBI. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should play a role in supporting these partners efforts by acting as a
source or conduit for information to partners and coordinating information sharing between the FBI and its partners. Designating an office in DHS to coordinate countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts. CVE
efforts are spread across all levels of government and society. DHS is uniquely situated to lead the federal governments efforts to empower local
partners. Currently, DHSs CVE working group coordinates efforts across DHS components, but a more substantial office will be necessary to manage this broader task. Supporting state, local, and civil society partners. Congress and the Administration should not lose sight
Strengthening the Counterterrorism Enterprise In light of these warnings,

of the fact that all of the federal governments efforts must be focused on empowering local partners. The federal government is not the tip of the spear for CVE efforts; it exists to support local partners who are in the best position to recognize and counter radicalization in their own

Support for important investigative tools is essential to maintaining the security of the U.S. and combating
terrorist threats. Legitimate government surveillance programs are also a vital component of U.S. national security and should be allowed
to continue. The need for effective counterterrorism operations, however, does not relieve the government of its obligation to follow the law and respect individual privacy and liberty. In the American system, the government must do both equally well. Ensuring
Security In the midst of this surge in terrorist activity, the U.S. must recommit itself to counterterrorism efforts. Improving intelligence tools,
information sharing with state and local law enforcement, and local civil society outreach to counter radicalization should be a priority for Congress.
communities. Maintaining essential counterterrorism tools.

2NC -- Fusion Centers

Fusion centers are crucial to support investigations into potential threats
Vicinanzo 15 -- HSToday, Amanda Vicinanzo, Senior Editor Gaps In Info Sharing Continue To Hinder Counterterrorism Efforts

The September

11, 2001 attacks demonstrated the importance of information sharing between local, state, tribal and federal law enforcement and homeland security partners in the wake of a
devastating terrorist attacks. However, while progress has been made, significant challenges continue to hinder state and local law enforcement from sharing
information on threats to the homeland. To address remaining gaps in federal, state and local information sharing, the House Committee on Homeland Securitys Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence recently convened a
hearing to examine areas where information sharing can be improved. A common trend in these different reviews is the need for federal departments and agencies to view state and local law enforcement as partners in national security and
counterterrorism, the need for leadership within organizations to ensure accountability for information sharing, wider access to necessary databases, and the professionalization of analysis and information sharing, said subcommittee
chairman Peter King (R-NY). Chief Richard Beary, president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), testified that the 9/11 Commission rightly asserted that ineffective information sharing severely handicapped our

the recommendations laid out

in the report of the Business Executives for National Security (BENS), particularly the recommendation that ownership and management of the integrated fusion
centers should continue to be managed by state and local stakeholders with the support of federal entities. Mike Sena, president of the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA),
testified that fusion centers have played a significant role in the dramatic progress law enforcement , public safety and intelligence communities have made
over the past decade in analyzing and sharing threat information. The Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion Centers issued by the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence
in July 2015 recognized the direct impact of fusion center information sharing on terrorism investigations. According to information provided by the FBI and Department of Justice, between December 2008 and December 2012, 176
SARs [suspicious activity reports] entered by fusion centers into the eGuardian or Shared Spaces SAR databases [] resulted in the FBI opening new
terrorism investigations. In addition, 289 Terrorist Watchlist encounters reported by fusion centers enhanced existing FBI cases. Sena also agreed with many of the
nations homeland security efforts. Since then, Beary explained there has been substantial movement in the right direction, but our work is not done. Beary stated IACP strongly agrees with

recommendations included in the BENS report, particularly the recommendation to establish a domestic threat framework for assessing and prioritizing threats and information needs. However, Sena disagreed with some of the assumptions
made by the report. For example, the BENS report recommended establishment of regional fusion centers on top of what is already in existence today. Sena believes this recommendation is unnecessary and could have a negative impact on
the ability of fusion centers in those areas to accomplish their core missions. Sena asserted fusion

centers are increasingly contributing analytical and information sharing efforts to

address cyber threats. For example, in late November and early December 2014 during the events in Ferguson, Missouri, the NFCA Cyber Intelligence Network hosted a virtual situational awareness room (referred to as
CINAWARE) on the Homeland Security Information Network. The CINAWARE room facilitated information sharing across agencies, with more than 350 individuals from fusion centers and other federal, state and local agencies around the
country participated in the CINAWARE room between mid-November and early December. That level of threat information sharing was impossible only a few years ago, yet it is becoming essential, Sena said.

2NC -- FBI Plank

Info-sharing is crucial to preventing domestic lone-wolf terror decentralizes information and allows for specialization
Downing 13 -- Preventing the Next Lone Wolf Terrorist Attack Requires Stronger FederalStateLocal Capabilities Michael P. Downing is Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department.
Matt A. Mayer is a Visiting Fellow at The Heritage Foundation and author of Homeland Security and Federalism: Protecting America from Outside the Beltway.

state and local organizations recognize that outreach and engagement strategies build trust and solve community problems at the grassroots level. Indeed, state and local law enforcement have spent years
developing a relationship of trust with local leaders. No one knows this landscape better than the boots on the ground. The integration of these sometimes-isolated
communities into the greater fold of society has never been more importantand is not the job of federal authorities. It is, of course, impossible to know whether all of these puzzle piecesor even some of themwould have been pieced
together by the BPD and/or the FBI. Yet the goal of the U.S. domestic counterterrorism enterprise is not to provide an impenetrable defense against terrorism; rather, the objective
is to give federal, state, and local law enforcement the greatest possible number of constitutionally grounded opportunities to detect and stop potential
terrorists. Rather than again debate the dangerous proposal of a domestic intelligence agency, the counter-terrorism conversation should focus on how legally and ethically to take advantage of
the decentralized, community-focused, and well-positioned nature of state and local law enforcement. Without question, had the FBI shared its interview actions
with the BPD, local law enforcement would have had a much greater chance of detecting Tsarnaevs extremism. Federal law enforcement is not designed to fight against this kind of threat; it is built to

battle against cells, against groups, and against organizations, but not against individuals. As a consequence, U.S. national strategy reinforces the community policing, outreach, and engagement model of state and local enforcement. Why do we continue to underutilize these

The FBI must share more broadly with state and local law enforcement . Despite the lessons of 9/11 and other terrorist plots, the culture of the FBI
continues to resist sharing information with state and local law enforcement. This culture must change, and it must change rapidly. As large-scale, complicated terrorist attacks become
harder to execute, the lone wolf scenario becomes more of a threat . America therefore has to leverage the experience, capabilities, authorities, and
relationships found in local law enforcement to detect budding terrorists before they strike. If the FBI believes it could not effectively share the information related to Tsarnaev because of advice provided by
the United States Attorneys Office, then one of two things needs to happen: Either Congress should pass legislation allowing such information to be shared , or accountability for decision making needs to be assessed. Local
resources? Four Key Reforms Still Needed

cyber capabilities must be a priority. Building cyber investigation capabilities in the higher-risk urban areas must become a primary focus of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security grants. With so much terrorism-related activity occurring on the Internet, local law enforcement

Community outreach remains a vital tool. Federal grant funds should also be used to create robust
community outreach capabilities in higher-risk urban areas. Such capabilities are key to building trust in local communities, and if the United States is to thwart lone wolf terrorist attacks successfully, it must do
so by putting effective community outreach operations at the tip of the spear. Re-examine the FBIs lead agency function. The lone wolf attack in Boston was first a crime and then a terrorist act. The responsibility
must have the ability to constitutionally monitor and track violent extremist activity on the Web when reasonable suspicion exists to do so.

for public safety and the investigation of crimes at the local level rests with the local police agency, except in those cases in which the FBI determines that it will assume control of the investigation. With regard to public safety information and intelligence flow, such a policy relegates
both the police department and the state sovereign to a subordinateand potentially isolatedposition. Therefore, this policy should be re-examined both in terms of best practice and in terms of its legal framework. Additionally, federal entities are often reluctant to release
information that may prove embarrassinga practice that may arise during an investigation in local public safety matters. Information that comes first to the entity that leads an investigation is always subject to restriction by those in charge. The decision to censor or withhold
any information related to local public safety should always be in the hands of those who have the sovereign duty and obligation for public safety at the local level. Decisions related to the criminal investigations should belong to the local police department rather than the federal


Plan allows effective cyberterrorism -- Continued NSA metadata surveillance is key the NSA will fill current gaps but the plan
curtails that
Goldsmith 13 -- Jack Goldsmith, a contributing editor, teaches at Harvard Law School and is a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. We Need an Invasive NSA

The New York Times has published more than a dozen editorials excoriating the national surveillance state. It wants
the NSA to end the mass warehousing of everyones data and the use of back doors to break encrypted communications. A major element of the
Times critique is that the NSAs domestic sweeps are not justified by the terrorist threat they aim to prevent. At the end of August, in the midst of the Times assault on the NSA, the
newspaper suffered what it described as a malicious external attack on its domain name registrar at the hands of the Syrian Electronic Army, a group of hackers who support Syrian President
Bashar Al Assad. The papers website was down for several hours and, for some people, much longer. In terms of the sophistication of the attack, this is a big deal, said Marc Frons, the Times chief information officer. Ten months earlier, hackers stole
the corporate passwords for every employee at the Times, accessed the computers of 53 employees, and breached the e-mail accounts of two reporters
who cover China. We brought in the FBI, and the FBI said this had all the hallmarks of hacking by the Chinese military, Frons said at the time. He also acknowledged that the
hackers were in the Times system on election night in 2012 and could have wreaked havoc on its coverage if they wanted. Illustration by Harry Campbell Such cyber-intrusions threaten corporate America and the U.S. government every day. Relentless assaults
on Americas computer networks by China and other foreign governments, hackers and criminals have created an urgent need for safeguards to
protect these vital systems, theTimes editorial page noted last year while supporting legislation encouraging the private sector to share cybersecurity information with the government. It cited General Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, who
had noted a 17-fold increase in cyber-intrusions on critical infrastructure from 2009 to 2011 and who described the losses in the United States from cyber-theft as the greatest transfer of wealth in history. If a catastrophic cyber-attack occurs,
the Timesconcluded, Americans will be justified in asking why their lawmakers ... failed to protect them. When catastrophe strikes, the public will
adjust its tolerance for intrusive government measures. The Times editorial board is quite right about the seriousness of the cyber- threat and the federal
governments responsibility to redress it. What it does not appear to realize is the connection between the domestic NSA surveillance it detests and
the governmental assistance with cybersecurity it cherishes. To keep our computer and telecommunication networks secure, the government will eventually
need to monitor and collect intelligence on those networks using techniques similar to ones the Timesand many others find reprehensible when done for counterterrorism ends.
The fate of domestic surveillance is today being fought around the topic of whether it is needed to stop Al Qaeda from blowing things up . But the fight
tomorrow, and the more important fight, will be about whether it is necessary to protect our ways of life embedded in computer networks . Anyone anywhere with a
connection to the Internet can engage in cyber-operations within the United States. Most truly harmful cyber-operations, however, require group effort and significant skill. The attacking group or
nation must have clever hackers, significant computing power, and the sophisticated softwareknown as malwarethat enables the monitoring,
exfiltration, or destruction of information inside a computer. The supply of all of these resources has been growing fast for many yearsin governmental labs devoted to developing these tools and on sprawling black markets on the
Internet. Telecommunication networks are the channels through which malware typically travels , often anonymized or encrypted, and buried in the billions of communications that traverse the globe each day.
The targets are the communications networks themselves as well as the computers they connectthings like the Times servers, the computer systems that monitor nuclear plants, classified
documents on computers in the Pentagon, thenasdaq exchange, your local bank, and your social-network providers. To keep these computers and networks secure, the government needs powerful
intelligence capabilities abroad so that it can learn about planned cyber-intrusions . It also needs to raise defenses at home. An important first step is to correct the market failures that plague cybersecurity.
Ever since stories about the National Security Agencys (NSA) electronic intelligence-gathering capabilities began tumbling out last June,

Through law or regulation, the government must improve incentives for individuals to use security software, for private firms to harden their defenses and share information with one another, and for Internet service providers to crack down on the botnetsnetworks of
compromised zombie computersthat underlie many cyber-attacks. More, too, must be done to prevent insider threats like Edward Snowdens, and to control the stealth introduction of vulnerabilities during the manufacture of computer componentsvulnerabilities that can later
be used as windows for cyber-attacks. And yet thats still not enough. The U.S. government can fully monitor air, space, and sea for potential attacks from abroad. But it has limited access to the channels of cyber-attack and cyber-theft, because they are owned by private
telecommunication firms, and because Congress strictly limits government access to private communications. I cant defend the country until Im into all the networks, General Alexander reportedly told senior government officials a few months ago. For Alexander, being in the

access, he thinks, will give the government a

fighting chance to find the needle of known malware in the haystack of communications so that it can block or degrade the attack or exploitation. It will also allow it to discern patterns of malicious activity in
the swarm of communications, even when it doesnt possess the malwares signature. And it will better enable the government to trace back an attacks trajectory so that it can discover the identity and geographical origin of the threat. Alexanders domestic
cybersecurity plans look like pumped-up versions of the NSAs counterterrorism-related homeland surveillance that has sparked so much controversy in
network means having government computers scan the content and metadata of Internet communications in the United States and store some of these communications for extended periods. Such

recent months. That is why so many people in Washington think that Alexanders vision has virtually no chance of moving forward, as the Times recently reported. Whatever trust was there is now gone, a senior intelligence official told Times. There are two reasons to think that
these predictions are wrong and that the government, with extensive assistance from the NSA, will one day intimately monitor private networks. The first is that the cybersecurity threat is more pervasive and severe than the terrorism threat and is somewhat easier to see. If the
Times website goes down a few more times and for longer periods, and if the next penetration of its computer systems causes large intellectual property losses or a compromise in its reporting, even the editorial page would rethink the proper balance of privacy and security. The

As cyber-theft and cyber-attacks continue to spread (and they will), and especially when they result in a catastrophic disaster (like a banking compromise that
destroys market confidence, or a successful attack on an electrical grid), the public will demand government action to remedy the problem and will adjust
its tolerance for intrusive government measures. At that point, the nations willingness to adopt some version of Alexanders vision will depend on the possibility of credible
restraints on the NSAs activities and credible ways for the public to monitor, debate, and approve what the NSA is doing over time. Which leads to the second reason why skeptics about enhanced government involvement in the network might be
point generalizes:

wrong. The public mistrusts the NSA not just because of what it does, but also because of its extraordinary secrecy. To obtain the credibility it needs to secure permission from the American people to protect our networks, the NSA and the intelligence community must
fundamentally recalibrate their attitude toward disclosure and scrutiny. There are signs that this is happeningand that, despite the undoubted damage he inflicted on our national security in other respects, we have Edward Snowden to thank. Before the unauthorized disclosures,
we were always conservative about discussing specifics of our collection programs, based on the truism that the more adversaries know about what were doing, the more they can avoid our surveillance, testified Director of National Intelligence James Clapper last month. But the
disclosures, for better or worse, have lowered the threshold for discussing these matters in public. In the last few weeks, the NSA has done the unthinkable in releasing dozens of documents that implicitly confirm general elements of its collection capabilities. These revelations are
bewildering to most people in the intelligence community and no doubt hurt some elements of collection. But they are justified by the countervailing need for public debate about, and public confidence in, NSA activities that had run ahead of what the public expected. And they

not all revelations of NSA capabilities are equally harmful. Disclosure that it
sweeps up metadata is less damaging to its mission than disclosure of the fine-grained details about how it collects and analyzes that metadata. It is
unclear whether the governments new attitude toward secrecy is merely a somewhat panicked reaction to Snowden, or if its also part of a larger
rethinking about the need for greater tactical openness to secure strategic political legitimacy. Let us hope, for the sake of our cybersecurity, that it is the latter.
suggest that secrecy about collection capacities is one value, but not the only or even the most important one. They also show that

Cyber war causes nuclear lashout

Fritz 9 (Jason - former Captain of the U.S. Army, July, Hacking Nuclear Command and Control)
The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must
jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is
valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of
a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated
hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are
sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable
submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted a Pentagon review,
which showed a

potential electronic back door into the US Navys system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines (Peterson 2004). The
investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to elaborate new instructions for
validating launch orders (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating
system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is.

This may attract hackers and narrow the

necessary reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits . It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain.
Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable
information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate a launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UKs nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central
command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems . Open
source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear
attack in the event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack
on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military
sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on
mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had
taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level officialsanyone
who has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum
2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber

terrorists could cause incorrect information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command
and control centres, or shut down these centres computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine.
A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile

Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be

relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that
may provide an entry point, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the
closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent , yet they can
no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making process , and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to
launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the number of states who
was properly identifieda considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000).

possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities
neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they
deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting

the very nature of asymmetric

warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes . For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice
commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice
commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. In June 1998, a group of
or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the worlds most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and

international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of Indias Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text If a nuclear war does start, you will be the
first to scream (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more
common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007).
This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.

Goldsmith Impact Overview

1). Cyberterror causes nuclear war terrorists use spoofing to fool radars and make it look like an attack is taking place causes
miscalc and escalation thats Fritz
2). Turns econ terrorist attacks wreck market confidence and deter investment -- thats Goldsmith -- Best studies prove growth
solves conflict
Jedidiah Royal 10, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, Economic Integration, Economic Signalling And The Problem Of Economic Crises, in Economics of War
and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and
security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade
relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined
to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it
triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong
correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn . They write, The linkages between internal and
external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing . Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour .
Moreover, the presence of a recession lends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-rein force each other. (Blombcrj! & Hess. 2002. p. 89)
Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders
and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing
unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around
the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blombcrg. Mess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999). and
Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics arr greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic
leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support . DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak
economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

3). Terrorists could target the grid thats goldsmith causes extinction
WND 9/4 (WND, WorldNetDaily News Company, ISIS THREAT LOOMS OVER U.S. HOMELAND,, September 9, 2014)
*edited for language
'Militants expressing increased interest in notion they could infiltrate' ISIS bluster that threatens the U.S. Long-known al-Qaida links to south-of-theborder drug cartels. A porous U.S-Mexico border. Gunshots at a California power plant. The individual reports may not cause immediate alarm, but a panel of experts who
have connected the dots on threats against the U.S. is warning that the nation needs to be looking at the big picture and preparing its defenses
appropriately. Now. The warnings come from a panel set up by the Secure the Grid Coalition at the Washington-based Center for Security
Policy. At a National Press Club news conference this week were Frank Gaffney, former assistant secretary of defense for international
security affairs and now president of the CSP; threat expert Dr. Peter Vincent Pry; Ambassador Henry F. Cooper; actress and activist
Kelly Carson; and F. Michael Maloof, a former senior security policy analyst in the office of the secretary of defense and now a senior
writer with WND. Hes authored A Nation Forsaken on the dangers to the U.S. from an attack on its power grid, especially from
electromagnetic pulse. There have been multiple reports of ISIS terrorists in Iraq and Syria making statements threatening an attack on the
U.S. homeland. And its well-documented that al-Qaida, the Muslim terror worlds bad boy before ISIS arrived, is linked closely with drug cartels ,
many of which have a presence inside some 1,200 of Americas large cities. Further, the U.S. southern border now easily can be crossed
illegally. And there already may have been a dry run attack on the U.S. power grid, which, in a collapse, would leave Americas defense
capabilities severely handicapped. Such concerns have been underscored in recent days by an interview Judicial Watch had with U.S. intelligence
officials and the Texas Department Safety. It confirmed that ISIS is present across the Texas border in Juarez, Mexico , where an intelligence
unit has picked up increased chatter in recent days. While Mexican authorities have denied ISIS presence in Mexico and its ability to illegally enter the U.S., Maloof pointed out that three
hardened Ukrainian criminals walked into the U.S. from Mexico undetected and have yet to be apprehended. Similarly, there has been evidence
uncovered that various nationalities from Pakistan and various Arab countries have entered the U.S. undetected, taking advantage of the porous
southern border. Put it all together, panel members said at a news conference in Washington on Wednesday, and the threat the U.S. is facing should
be considered immediate and substantial. Its all related, Maloof said. One thing leads to another Its the domino effect. He noted a series of incidents at a
Metcalf power plant in San Jose, California, that suggest someone still unknown has been exploring what it takes to bring down a major component of the nations
grid. Former Rep. Allen West bluntly called the situation a dry run for something bigger. WND reported the utility company, whose operation was disabled in the attack, has offered a $250,000 reward for the arrest and conviction of
the perpetrators. West explained, On April 16, 2013, snipers waged a 52-minute attack on a central California electrical substation. According to reports by Fox News and the Wall Street Journal, the sniper attack started when at least one
person entered an underground vault to cut telephone cables, and attackers fired more than 100 shots into Pacific Gas & Electrics Metcalf transmission substation, knocking out 17 transformers. Electric officials were able to avert a blackout,
but it took 27 days to repair the damage, he wrote. My concern is that this may have been a dry run for something far bigger. We should be demanding an update on the investigation as to the perpetrators of this attack who escaped without
detection, he said. WB248Pry

pointed out that jihadists already are aware of the vulnerability of a countrys grid system by having knocked
out completely the entire grid of the country of Yemen last June. Read the book thats documenting the worry about the EMP threat, A Nation Forsaken. The Metcalf attack came one
day after the Boston Marathon bombing that killed three people and wounded 264 others. The Boston Marathon suspects are from the Russian North Caucasus, which prompted the Federal Bureau of Investigation to get involved in the
investigation of the sniper attack on the transformers. There is a large community of Chechen and North Caucasus immigrants in the San Jose area. Chechen jihadists also have been very prominent in Syria where it is battling to overthrow
the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. There also were reports only days after the California sniper attack of a shoot-out when a security guard at the TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Plant in Spring City, Tennessee, was confronted by a
suspect at 2 a.m. TVA spokesperson Jim Hopson said the subject traveled up to the plant on a boat and walked onto the property. When the officer questioned the suspect, the individual fired multiple shots at the officer. The officer shot
back, and when he called for backup, the suspect sped away on his boat, reports said. And

just a few days ago, the California plant, after spending millions of dollars on heightened
security, again was targeted by a break-in attempt, authorities have reported. Maloof explained after the news conference that the big picture
underscores the potential for an ISIS threat on the grid. He pointed out how al-Qaida, which is known to have drug cartel links and likely sleeper agents in the United States through those
organizations, has been morphing into ISIS, and the belligerent threats made against the U.S. by that group. And he noted that the U.S. grid remains vulnerable and taking it down in any
significant way could cause calamities for the U.S., since the nations food, fuel, energy, banking and communications industries all are
dependent on electricity. Whenever you start tampering with the grid, youre affecting the life-sustaining critical
infrastructures, Maloof said. Our entire survival is based on technology and electronics that, in turn, are based on the electrical flow. If thats
interrupted for any period of time, there are catastrophes over a wide geographic area. Reports just this week revealed social media chatter shows
Islamic State militants are keenly aware of the porous U.S.-Mexico border, and are expressing an increased interest in crossing over to carry out a
terrorist attack. A law enforcement advisory said, A review of ISIS social media messaging during the week ending August 26 shows that militants are expressing an increased interest in the notion that they could clandestinely
infiltrate the southwest border of U.S., for [a] terror attack. Maloof explained at the news conference that Americas enemies know the vulnerabilities of our grid they will at some point try
to attack. The threat is there, he said. ISIS operatives can easily come through the [southern] border. And because they [ISIS] have proxies in the
U.S., the potential for a catastrophe exists. The president could take his pen and make [the problem] a priority, he said. At the federal level they dont have a plan, so the state and local level wont have a plan.

4). Could also target nuclear plants thats goldsmith causes extinction
Wasserman 2, Harvey Wasserman, Senior Editor The Free Press, Americas Self-Imposed Terror Threat, The Earth Island Journal, Spring 2002,

the certainty of terror retaliation inside the US has turned our 103 nuclear powerplants into potential weapons of
apocalyptic destruction, just waiting to be used against us. One or both planes that crashed into the World Trade Center on September 11 could have easily obliterated the two atomic reactors now operating at Indian Point, about 40 miles up the Hudson River. Indian Point Unit One was shut long
ago by public outcry. But Units 2 and 3 have operated since the 1970s. Reactor containment domes were built to withstand a jetliner crash but today's jumbo jets are far larger than the planes that were flying in the 1970s . Had one of those hijacked jets hit one of the operating
reactors at Indian Point, the ensuing cloud of radiation would have dwarfed the ones at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. The intense radioactive heat within today's operating reactors is the hottest anywhere on the
As US bombs and missiles began to rain on Afghanistan,

planet. Because Indian Point has operated so long, its accumulated radioactive burden far exceeds that of Chernobyl. The safety systems are extremely complex and virtually indefensible. One or more could be wiped out with a small aircraft, ground-based weapons, truck bombs or even chemical/biological assaults aimed at the work

. A terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking water, they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive steam
into the atmosphere. Thousands of square miles would be saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created, depositing relentless genetic poisons that would kill forever. Infants and small children would quickly die en masse. Pregnant women would spontaneously abort or give birth to horribly deformed

offspring. Ghastly sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Heart attacks, stroke and multiple organ failure would kill thousands on the spot. Emphysema, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinence, sterility and impotence, asthma and blindness would afflict hundreds of
thousands, if not millions. Then comes the wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new names will have to be invented. Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees forced through Chernobyl's
seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up are still dying from their exposure. At Indian Point, the molten cores would burn uncontrolled for days, weeks and years. Who would volunteer for such an American task force? The immediate damage from an Indian Point attack (or a domestic accident) would render all five boroughs of

natural ecosystems would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed

New York City an apocalyptic wasteland. As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps,
. Spiritually, psychologically, financially and ecologically, our
nation would never recover. This is what we missed by a mere 40 miles on September 11. Now that we are at war, this is what could be happening as you read this. There are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse operating in the US. They generate a mere 8 percent of our total energy. Since its deregulation crisis, California cut
its electric consumption by some 15 percent. Within a year, the US could cheaply replace virtually all the reactors with increased efficiency. Yet, as the terror escalates, Congress is fast-tracking the extension of the Price-Anderson Act, a form of legal immunity that protects reactor operators from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist
attack. Do we take this war seriously? Are we committed to the survival of our nation? If so

, the ticking reactor bombs that could obliterate the very core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.

Links Generic
Domestic surveillance is key to intel gathering allows effective executive decision-making
Bolton 13 -- John Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, served as US ambassador to the United Nations in 2005-06. 3 views on NSA reform after Snowden leaks

America's enemies have yearned to cripple its foreign electronic intelligence-gathering capabilities. Now, the ongoing furor over the National Security Agency (NSA)
gives them the chance. Outright falsehoods, distortions, and hysteria have unfortunately been fueled by actual abuses and mistakes. We face a general debate about whether vital electronicsurveillance programs should be substantially curtailed. We must prevent hype and anger over specific abuses from harming the NSA's actual capabilities and the secrecy needed to protect them.
Intelligence exists not for its own sake but to support executive decisionmaking. Accordingly, President Obama is principally responsible for explaining and advocating clandestine activities. This, he appallingly failed to do. Mr. Obama must act like a
president, leading the defense of our embattled capabilities. The inevitable congressional proceedings must not repeat the irreparable damage that the 1970s-era congressional investigative committees caused
the CIA. Deficiencies there were, but our enemies were the principal beneficiaries of the committees' destructive investigations. Most important, whatever fixes are made today must
not deny America the tools to protect itself from terrorists, their state sponsors, and foreign adversaries, many of which are developing massive cyberwarfare
programs. Moreover, the largely preventable or imaginary invasions of privacy pale before security breakdowns that have allowed serious intelligence leaks. The NSA's opponents should be put on notice: If you materially restrict surveillance capabilities, you risk having
American blood on your hands. Yes, stop the abuses, increase constitutional oversight, tighten NSA security, and demand accountability. But do not render America deaf and blind.
For years,

Thats key the president is the cornerstone of national security

Berman 13 -- Emily Berman, Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School. New York University School of Law, LL.M. 2011, J.D. 2005. THE PARADOX OF COUNTERTERRORISM SUNSET PROVISIONS

the President dominates the formulation of national security and

foreign affairs policy in ways that he does not in any other policy area. This domination arises from many sources, including the drastic expansion of presidential power in the post-war era, which
is most highly pronounced in the national security context;228 the advantage that accompanies the Presidents position as first mover in responding to crises; the ability to act quickly and secretly; the
Presidents role as the sole organ of U.S. foreign affairs ;229 the executives information monopoly; substantive expertise in military and security matters;
and a norm of executive primacy that fosters expectations that the President will take the lead in national security.230
One crucial element of any discussion of counterterrorism powers goes unaddressed in the accounts of legislators and commentators who favor sunsets:

Domestic Surveillance is necessary to stop terror and foreign espionage the NSA has found a happy medium between privacy and
security now
Honorof 13 Marshall How the NSA's Spying Keeps You Safe,review-1899.html
The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) may have taken some fairly extreme liberties when it comes to collecting user data, but the organization hasn't acted on a whim. Call the
NSA's surveillance unethical or unconstitutional or dangerous, but it has a responsibility to protect the United States with every tool at its disposal. If you haven't been keeping up with the issue, Americans and Britons are very angry with
their governments right now. Reports from The Guardian and The New York Times indicate that the NSA and its British counterpart, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), have the capacity to intercept just about everything their citizens do online, from social

You can have total privacy or total national security, but you
cannot have both. A modern democratic society requires a compromise between the two extremes. The most important thing to keep in mind is that there is, at present, absolutely no indication
that the NSA has done anything illegal or outside the parameters of its mission statement. The NSA monitors external threats to the U.S., and, in theory, does not turn its attention to American citizens without
media information to encrypted emails. While this anger is both understandable and justifiable, relatively few people have stopped to consider the other side of the coin.

probable cause. There is no evidence to the contrary among the documents that Edward Snowden leaked. "How do we protect our nation? How do we defend it?" asked Gen. Keith Alexander, the NSA's director, at the Black Hat 2013 security conference, held in Las Vegas in July.

While the thought of the NSA controlling every bit of information that the
average American citizen posts online is disconcerting, Alexander maintained that a terrorist attack is even worse for a country's basic freedoms. "What we're
talking about is future terrorist attacks," Alexander said, discussing a number of planned attacks that the NSA foiled over the last 10 years. " It is worth considering what would have happened in the world if those
attacks 42 of those 54 were terrorist plots if they were successfully executed. What would that mean to our civil liberties and privacy?" James Lewis, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, agrees. "The NSA said there were 54 cases where they were able to detect plans and stop them, and 50 of them led to arrests ," Lewis told Tom's Guide. "Fifty doesn't sound like a lot
compared to the number of records [the NSA collected], but would you have preferred to have 50 more Boston bombings?" Counterterrorism is not the only function of the NSA's widespread surveillance. Although it cannot report exact numbers,
Lewis theorizes that the data-mining has allowed the NSA to put a stop to a number of international espionage plots. "The original intent of all these programs was
to find foreign spies," he said. "They haven't talked about that, but presumably there have been some successes there, too. A lot of times when you see things and there doesn't appear to be any explanation of how we seemed to magically know about it, it might very
well be espionage." As an example of how domestic surveillance can unearth international plots, Lewis pointed to the North Korean ship stopped in Panama in
August 2013. The vessel turned out to be smuggling illegal arms from Cuba. "The Panamanians just woke up one day and decided to look in their ship? I think not," Lewis said. The NSA is not the only government in the world
"[This information] is not classified to keep it from you: a good person. It's classified because sitting among you are people who wish us harm."

that runs surveillance programs. In fact, if the NSA is keeping tabs on you, there's a good chance that other countries are as well. If you're lucky, they'll be Germany and Australia; if not, then Russia and China may have you under the microscope. Robert David Graham, founder and
of Errata Security, spoke with Tom's Guide about how countries leverage surveillance data. "There are two parts to the information," he said. "Information about foreigners and information about your own citizens. The information you
get about your own citizens affects political processes within your own country." He went on to explain that if you stir up negative sentiment about Germany, for example, the Germans can hoard your emails just the
chief executive officer

same as the NSA. Just like the NSA, though, they are unlikely to do anything with those emails unless you represent some kind of clear threat. "The Russians and the Chinese don't have anything to learn about how to do surveillance from us," Lewis said. He explained that the
Scandinavian countries and Australia have programs that rival the NSA's as well.

"It's just par for the course everywhere in the world." Lewis believes that the NSA's surveillance is much less problematic than its transparency on the issue.

and privacy] have to be balanced, and the debate has largely been 'they should stop doing this,'" he said. "It's weird seeing Rand Paul and the ACLU getting together [to condemn the NSA]. If Rand Paul is for it, it's probably a bad idea." The NSA is also taking the lion's

There really isn't any privacy anymore,

and I don't think Americans have realized that," Lewis said. Credit card companies, for example, know just about everything about you, right down to what street you've lived on every year of your life. "This was commercial The NSA
just happens to be the poster child for this at the moment." There's one thing on which both staunch critics like Graham and fierce proponents like Lewis agree: The U.S. government must be clear and open with its citizens regarding the need for
security, even when that security becomes invasive. " Total security means zero privacy. Total privacy means zero security ," Graham said. "The extremes are what we have to fear The
NSA should be monitoring people. It's just the issue of monitoring Americans without probable cause that really bothers the heck out of me." "If you have the
right rules, if you have the right laws, if you have the right amount of transparency, you can feel comfortable with this," Lewis said. "Comfortable" is a very strong word, but if the
choice is between invasive surveillance and the very real threats of terrorism and espionage, it's not so easy to write the NSA off entirely.
share of the blame for a problem that began at the dawn of the consumer Internet age, got worse after 9/11, and still continues to this day: Internet privacy, or more accurately, the almost total lack thereof. "

Even altering metadata policy would eviscerate counterterrorism efforts

Wiser 15 Daniel Wiser is a staff writer for the Washington Free Beacon. U.S. Surveillance Programs Could Expire, Despite Terror Threat

decreased authorities for counterterrorism agents would come as the FBI is reportedly scrambling to cope with a proliferation of terror suspects
inspired by the Islamic State (IS). Two IS sympathizersincluding one who was monitored by the FBIwere killed by police in Garland, Texas, earlier this month before they could attack a Prophet Muhammad cartoon contest. James Comey, director of the FBI, said at a press conference on
Wednesday that terror suspects are increasingly using encrypted platforms to evade U.S. surveillance. I cant stand here with any high confidence when I confront the world that is increasingly dark to me and tell you that Ive got it all
covered, he said. We are working very, very hard on it but it is an enormous task. The House-passed USA Freedom Actwhich has the backing of the Obama administration and would transfer metadata storage from the government to telephone companies appears to
have the best chance of passage before the deadline. But it is not without critics. Sen. Richard Burr (R., N.C.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said earlier this month that the House bill provided illusory protection because it did not require
telecommunications companies to retain data. He has since introduced a bill that would gradually shift the storage of metadata to corporations but require them to inform the
government before they alter their data retention policies. Sen. Dan Coats (R., Ind.), another member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, wrote in a recent op-ed that the transfer of data to phone companies
would require an expansive regulatory system and might be operationally useless. I am deeply concerned that ending the current
program would render our counterterrorism tools less agile and unreliable, he said. The remaining capability would be less responsive, if not
operationally useless. The Patriot Act fight is likely to last right until the deadline, as proponents of the surveillance programs try to corral supporters during a congressional recess. Its all very up in the air right now, said one Senate aide tracking the debate.

Terrorists are paying attention to metadata collection if it stops theyll exploit holes
Newsmax 15 Citing CIA Chief John Brennan CIA Chief: Ending NSA Spying Would Boost Terror Threat
allowing vital surveillance programs to expire could increase terror threats , as the US Senate convened for a crunch debate on whether to renew the controversial provisions.
the bulk data collection of telephone records of millions of Americans
unconnected to terrorism has not abused civil liberties and only serves to safeguard citizens. "This is something that we can't afford to do right now," Brennan said of allowing the
expiration of counterterrorism provisions, which "sunset" at the end of May 31. "Because if you look at the horrific terrorist attacks and violence being perpetrated around the globe, we need to
keep our country safe, and our oceans are not keeping us safe the way they did century ago," he said CBS' "Face the Nation" talk show. Brennan added that groups like Islamic State have followed the
developments "very carefully" and are "looking for the seams to operate." The House has already passed a reform bill, the USA Freedom Act, that would end the telephone data dragnet by the National
CIA chief John Brennan warned Sunday that

With key counterterrorism programs set to expire at midnight Sunday, the top intelligence official made a final pitch to senators, arguing that

Security Agency and require a court order for the NSA to access specific records from the vast data base retained by telecommunications companies. If no action is taken by the Senate Sunday, authorities will be forced to shut down the bulk collection program and two other
provisions, which allow roving wiretaps of terror suspects who change their mobile phone numbers and the tracking of lone-wolf suspects. Senator Rand Paul, a Republican 2016 presidential candidate adamantly opposed to reauthorizing the surveillance, is threatening to delay
votes on the reform bill or an extension of the original USA Patriot Act. That would force the counterterrorism provisions to lapse until at least Wednesday. Former NSA chief Michael Hayden, who is also a former CIA director, equated such a temporary lapse as "giving up threads"
in a broader protective fabric. "It may not make a difference for a while. Then again, it might," he told CNN's State of the Union. "Over the longer term, I'm willing to wager, it will indeed make a difference."

Domestic surveillance is a key link informs troops on the ground

McLaughlin 14 -- John McLaughlin teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He was deputy director and acting
director of the CIA from 2000 to 2004. NSA intelligence-gathering programs keep us safe
Those who
advocate sharply limiting the agencys activities ought to consider that its work is the very foundation of U.S. intelligence . I dont mean to diminish the role of other intelligence agencies, and I
say this as a 30-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency who is CIA through and through. But in most cases, the NSA is the starting point for determining what holes need to be filled through other
means of intelligence-collection. Thats because its information on foreign developments is so comprehensive and generally so reliable. It is the core of intelligence support to U.S. troops in battle. Any efforts to
rein in the agency must allow for the possibility that change risks serious damage to U.S. security and the countrys ability to navigate in an increasingly
uncertain world. The presumption that the NSA spies on Americans should also be challenged. In my experience, NSA analysts err on the side of caution before touching any data having to do with U.S.
citizens. In 2010, at the request of then-Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, I chaired a panel investigating the intelligence communitys failure to be aware of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber who tried to blow up a commercial plane over Detroit on Dec. 25, 2009. The overall report remains
Its time we all came to our senses about the National Security Agency (NSA). If it is true, as many allege, that the United States went a little nuts in its all-out pursuit of al-Qaeda after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, it is equally true that we are going a little nuts again in our dogged pursuit of the post-Snowden NSA.

classified, but I can say that the government lost vital time because of the extraordinary care the NSA and others took in handling any data involving a U.S. person. (Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian, was recruited and trained by the late Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen based in Yemen.) Regarding outrage over the NSAs collection of telephone
calling records, or metadata, I dont know why anyone would have greater confidence in this information being held by private companies. And given the perceived threat to privacy, its astonishing how little attention has been paid to the Senate commerce committees recent report on companies that gather personal information on
hundreds of millions of Americans and sell it to marketers, often highlighting people with financial vulnerability. Some companies group the data into categories including rural and barely making it, retiring on empty and credit crunched: city families. The aim is often to sell financially risky products to transient consumers with

The NSA, of course, is not perfect. But it is less a victim of its actions theindependent commission appointed by President
than of the broad distrust of government that has taken root in the United States in recent decades . Studies by Pew and others show distrust of government around 80 percent, an
all-time high. This distrust is the only logical explanation I see for fear of data being held by the government and its not a circumstance the NSA created. Although our society lauds, in almost Stepford Wives-like fashion, the merits of transparency, it lacks a collective, mature
understanding of how intelligence works, how it integrates with foreign policy and how it contributes to the national welfare . Meanwhile, prurient interest in the details of leaked
intelligence skyrockets, and people devour material that is not evidence of abuse but merely fascinating and even more fascinating to U.S. adversaries. So what makes sense going forward? Clearly, the widespread perception that there is at least the potential
for abuse when the government holds information even as limited as telephone call metadata must be addressed . The recent presidential commission recommended adding a public privacy advocate to
the deliberation process of courts that approve warrants one proposal that would do no harm. But as the administration contemplates reform, it must reject any ideas that add time and process between the
moment the NSA picks up a lead overseas and the time it can cross-check records to determine whether there is a domestic dimension to overseas
plotting. As our debate continues, the terrorist threat is not receding but transforming. The core leadership of al-Qaeda has been degraded and remains under pressure, but robust al-Qaeda affiliates have multiplied.
With the decline of central government authority in the Middle East and North Africa in the wake of the Arab Spring and the war in Syria, terrorists have the largest havens and areas for operational planning in a decade. If
anything, the atomization of the movement has made the job of intelligence more labor-intensive, more detail-oriented and more demanding. Now is not the time to
give up any tool in the counterterrorism arsenal.
low incomes, the report found. Thats a real scandal and a universe away from the NSAs ethical standards and congressional oversight.
Obama found no illegality or abuses

Long list of potential state-sponsored cyber-attackers the NSA is key
Van Cleave 13 -- Michelle Van Cleave served as the head of US counterintelligence under President George W. Bush and is now a principal with the Jack Kemp Foundation. What It Takes: In Defense of the NSA

The United States has built a global intelligence apparatus because it has global interests and global responsibilities. We have taken seriously the duties of leader of the free world, as two world wars, Korea,
Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and freedom fighters in many parts of the world can attest. None of these duties in the last sixty years could have been met without the exceptional resources of NSA. Successive
presidents and Congresses, entrusted with preserving and defending our freedom, have judged these investments to be vital to our nations security. They have protected the core secrets that enable collection programs to succeed, as have those in US business and industry who have

The unquestioned qualitative edge of US intelligence has been as essential to defending this country and preserving our freedom as
have the forces we have built to arm and equip our military. But time has not stood still. China is attacking computer systems throughout the world, stealing information and implanting features
to enable future control. Chinas prominence in IT commercial markets means that they are in the supply chain, and their market share is growing as part of a purposeful, state-run
program for strategic position. A long roll call of spies from Russia, China, Cuba, and other nations have targeted the essential secrets of US intelligence capabilities in
order to be able to defeat them. And now they have the Snowdens and the WikiLeakers of the world helping them out. Interconnected global networks of digital data have become the single most
important source of intelligence warning of threats, enabling our defense at home and the advancement of freedom abroad. To say hands off, as some shortsighted privacy advocates
have been doing, will not preserve our liberties, it will endanger them . It should be possible for an enlightened citizenry to empower government action in that sphere without forfeiting the very rights that our government exists to secure.
been integral to their success.

That challenge is, at the very least, a part of the continuing experiment that is our democracy.

Ratchet Effect
Aggressive anti-terrorism creates a new security paradigm hardens the public to government intrusions scaling back
surveillance eliminates that paradigm and creates vulnerability
Givens 13 -- Austen D. Givens is a PhD student in the Department of Political Economy at Kings College London. His forthcoming book with Nathan E. Busch, The Business of Counterterrorism: Public-Private Partnerships in
Homeland Security, will be published by Peter Lang. The NSA Surveillance Controversy: How the Ratchet Effect Can Impact Anti-Terrorism Laws
The ratchet effect can occur because anti-terrorism laws create a new security paradigm. An

aggressive anti-terrorism law can fundamentally alter societal approaches to terrorism.

Surveillance may increase. Police powers can expand. Intelligence efforts may grow. Public expectations of privacy can diminish. In the aggregate, these types of changes can
represent a drastic change in a governments approach to terrorism, and effectively create a new normal level of security. Because this new normal is
linked to the law itself, reversing the law begins to dismantle the new security paradigm. From the publics perspective, this might be an unacceptable
option because it may increase societal vulnerability to terrorism. Government agencies also risk losing resourcespersonnel, money, and political supportby returning to
the status quo ante.

Link helper
Be skeptical of Aff ev the necessity of NSA secrecy makes the literature asymmetric
(AKA if we ACTUALLY explain our link arguments, the terrorists might hear us.)
Bolton 15 John R. Bolton, a diplomat and a lawyer, has spent many years in public service. From August 2005 to December 2006, he served as the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations. From 2001 to 2005, he was
under secretary of state for arms control and international security. At AEI, Ambassador Boltons area of research is U.S. foreign and national security policy. NSA activities key to terrorism fight

programs run by the National Security Agency that assess patterns of domestic and international telephone calls and emails to uncover linkages with
known terrorists. These NSA activities, initiated after al-Qaedas deadly 9/11 attacks, have played a vital role in protecting America and our citizens around the world from the still-metastasizing
terrorist threat. The NSA programs do not involve listening to or reading conversations, but rather seek to detect communications networks. If patterns are found, and more detailed investigation seems warranted, then NSA or other federal authorities, consistent with
Congress is poised to decide whether to re-authorize

the Fourth Amendments prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, must obtain judicial approval for more specific investigations. Indeed, even the collection of the so-called metadata is surrounded by procedural protections to prevent spying on U.S. citizens.

critics from the right and left have attacked the NSA for infringing on the legitimate expectations of privacy Americans enjoy under our Constitution. Unfortunately, many of these critics have
absolutely no idea what they are talking about; they are engaging in classic McCarthyite tactics, hoping to score political points with a public justifiably worried
about the abuses of power characteristic of the Obama administration. Other critics, following Vietnam-era antipathies to Americas intelligence community, have never reconciled themselves to the need for robust clandestine capabilities. Still others yearn for
simpler times, embodying Secretary of State Henry Stimsons famous comment that gentlemen dont read each others mail. The ill-informed nature of the debate has facilitated scare-mongering , with one wild accusation
about NSAs activities after another being launched before the mundane reality catches up. And there is an important asymmetry at work here as well. The critics can say whatever their
imaginations conjure up, but NSA and its defenders are significantly limited in how they can respond. By definition, the programs
success rests on the secrecy fundamental to all intelligence activities. Frequently, therefore, explaining what is not happening could well reveal
information about NSAs methods and capabilities that terrorists and others, in turn, could use to stymie future detection efforts. After six years of

President Obama, however, trust in government is in short supply. It is more than a little ironic that Obama finds himself defending the NSA (albeit with obvious hesitancy and discomfort), since his approach to foreign and defense issues has consistently reflected near-total
indifference, except when he has no alternative to confronting challenges to our security. Yet if harsh international realities can penetrate even Obamas White House, that alone is evidence of the seriousness of the threats America faces. In fact, just in the year since Congress last

the global terrorist threat has dramatically increased. ISIS is carving out an entirely new state from what used to be Syria and Iraq, which no longer exist within
the borders created from the former Ottoman Empire after World War I. In already-chaotic Libya, ISIS has grown rapidly, eclipsing al-Qaeda there and across the region as the largest terrorist threat. Boko Haram is expanding beyond Nigeria, declaring its own
considered the NSA programs,

caliphate, even while pledging allegiance to ISIS. Yemen has descended into chaos, following Libyas pattern, and Iran has expanded support for the terrorist Houthi coalition. Afghanistan is likely to fall back under Taliban control if, as Obama continually reaffirms, he withdraws all

This is not the time to cripple our intelligence-gathering capabilities against the rising terrorist threat. Congress should unquestionably reauthorize the NSA

American troops before the end of 2016.

programs, but only for three years. That would take us into a new presidency, hopefully one that inspires more confidence, where a calmer, more sensible debate can take place.

Impact Work


Its Possible
Its likely
Bunn et al 13 Matthew Bunn is a Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School and Co-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Universitys Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs. Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy) is a senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
and a Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. Martin Malin is the Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs. Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces) is a professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of
the Russian Academy of Sciences, and chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. (Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism:
Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment, September 2013,

In 2011, Harvards Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies published The U.S. Russia Joint Threat
Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism. The assessment analyzed the means, motives, and access of would-be nuclear terrorists, and concluded that the threat of nuclear
terrorism is urgent and real.
The Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits

in 2010 and 2012 established and demonstrated a consensus among political leaders from around the world that

nuclear terrorism poses a serious threat to the peace, security, and prosperity of our planet. For any country, a terrorist attack with a nuclear device would be an immediate and catastrophic
disaster, and the negative effects would reverberate around the world far beyond the location and moment of the detonation.
Preventing a nuclear terrorist attack requires international cooperation to secure nuclear materials, especially among those states producing nuclear materials and weapons. As the worlds two greatest nuclear
powers, the United States and Russia have the greatest experience and capabilities in securing nuclear materials and plants and, therefore, share a special responsibility to lead international efforts to prevent
terrorists from seizing such materials and plants.
The depth of convergence between U.S. and Russian vital national interests on the issue of nuclear security is best illustrated by the fact that bilateral cooperation on this issue has continued uninterrupted for
more than two decades, even when relations between the two countries occasionally became frosty, as in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia.
Russia and the United States have strong incentives to forge a close and trusting partnership to prevent nuclear terrorism and have made enormous progress in securing fissile material both at home and in
partnership with other countries. However, to meet the evolving threat posed by those individuals intent upon using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes, the United States and Russia need to deepen and
broaden their cooperation.
The 2011 U.S. - Russia Joint Threat Assessment offered both specific conclusions about the nature of the threat and general observations about how it might be addressed. This report builds on that foundation
and analyzes the existing framework for action, cites gaps and deficiencies, and makes specific recommendations for improvement.
The U.S. Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism (The 2011 report executive summary):
Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat. Urgent actions are required to reduce the risk. The

risk is driven by the rise of terrorists who seek to inflict unlimited damage, many of
the spread of information about the decades-old technology of nuclear weapons; by the
increased availability of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and by globalization, which makes it easier to move people, technologies, and materials
across the world.
whom have sought justification for their plans in radical interpretations of Islam; by

Making a crude nuclear bomb would not be easy, but is potentially within the capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group, as numerous government studies have
confirmed. Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for terrorists to accomplish, if the weapon was equipped with modern technical safeguards (such as the electronic locks known as
Permissive Action Links, or PALs). Terrorists

could, however, cut open a stolen nuclear weapon and make use of its nuclear material for a bomb of their own.

The nuclear material for a bomb is small and difficult to detect, making it a major challenge to stop nuclear smuggling or to recover nuclear material after it has been stolen. Hence, a
primary focus in reducing the risk must be to keep nuclear material and nuclear weapons from being stolen by continually improving their security, as agreed at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in
April 2010.

Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades. The group has repeatedly attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material or nuclear weapons, and has
repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise. Al-Qaeda reportedly conducted tests of conventional explosives for its nuclear program in the desert in Afghanistan. The groups nuclear
ambitions continued after its dispersal following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Recent writings from top al-Qaeda leadership are focused on justifying the mass
slaughter of civilians, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, and are in all likelihood intended to provide a formal religious justification for
nuclear use.
While there are significant gaps in coverage of the groups activities, al-Qaeda appears to have been frustrated thus far in acquiring a nuclear capability; it is unclear whether the the group has acquired weaponsusable nuclear material or the expertise needed to make such material into a bomb. Furthermore, pressure from a broad range of counter-terrorist actions probably has reduced the groups ability to manage
large, complex projects, but has not eliminated the danger. However, there is no sign
2008 indicate that the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.

the group has abandoned its nuclear ambitions . On the contrary, leadership statements as recently as

There are materials, expertise, and motives

Jaspal 12 Zafar is a professor of international relations at Quaid-i-Azam. (Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality? Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012,
The misperception,

miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state . Indeed, in an age of
transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dual-use nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of
terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does not eliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological
terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth.
Farsighted rationality obligates that one

should not miscalculate transnational terrorist groups whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish of acquiring nuclear, radiological,
huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the
globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a
few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February).
chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that

Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18).
Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was
areligious duty (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb. Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had revealed his
extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a
deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10). On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met
Osama bin Laden. He claimed that I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29). He was arrested in

Al Qaeda, but his

in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear
scientific bureaucracies. It also authenticates bin Ladens Deputy Ayman Zawahiris claim which he made in December 2001: If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the
central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available (Allison, 2010, January: 2).
2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with
meeting with Osama establishes the fact that the terrorist organization was

The covert

meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is

real. The 33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction,
especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2). Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological
terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out:
Evidence suggests, for example, that al

Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong
U.S. response, especially if it included catalytic effects on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the
consequences cannot be deterred (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187)

Retaliation -- Ayson
Terrorism causes extinction- retaliation
Ayson 10 - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert,
July. After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7. InformaWorld.)
some sort of terrorist attack , and especially an act of nuclear
could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and
tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war
between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a
But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that

considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States,
it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem
far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was
thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material
to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it
detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41
Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling
out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and
possibly Pakistan. But at

what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a
backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political
leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia
and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China
during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the
attack? Washingtons

early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For
the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces,
including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China
might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow,
example, in

although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant
conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might
interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in
Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42
American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the
question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China
would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in
some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply
underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to
groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then
draw about their culpability.

--Not Ayson
Nuclear terrorism causes US-Russia nuclear waronly scenario for extinctiondeterrence doesnt check
Barrett et al 13 Anthony has a PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, is a Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and is the Director of
Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. Seth Baum has a PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University is a Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and is the Executive
Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. Kelly Hostetler has a BS in Political Science from Columbia and is a Research Assistant at the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. (Analyzing and Reducing the
Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia, Science and Global Security 21(2), June 28, 2013,
Note: this version of the article is a little different from the one published in the actual journal; I cut this version from the link in the cite above.

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects
such as severely reducing food production for years,1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the extinction of humanity.2 Nuclear war between
the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or
detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first
attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches
nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack.3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or
inadvertent launches.4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, though numerous
measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities
to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counterattack. However, concerns

about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other sides
forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage
from the first attack.5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced.6
However, it has also been argued that inadvertent

nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk.7 While the United States and
Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False
indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip,
wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time.9 Second, terrorist

groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that
resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb,10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis
between the United States and Russia.11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible .12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them
against the United States.13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security.14
C3I vulnerability makes rapid US-Russia escalation inevitable
Ford 10 [Christopher, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., former U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, reserve
intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy, Playing for Time on the Edge of the Apocalypse: Maximizing Decision Time for Nuclear Leaders,

no matter
what official policy is, U.S. and Russian decision-makers face formidable incentives to launch on warning anyway as long as that option is technically available
because force and command-system vulnerabilities leave them with no alternative to LOW if they are to inflict the desired level of retaliatory damage on the enemy. Because
both sides effectively lack a genuine ride-out option, the argument goes, they would be left, in practice, with little choice but to adopt a de facto LOW policy, which is indeed
just as dangerously destabilizing and prone to accident as the more hawkish Wohlstetters and Kahns always believed. (Indeed, it is perhaps worse, insofar as the critics allege that the nuclear superpowers
Yet this is not the end of the story, for sophisticated advocates of de-alerting measures do not necessarily contend that LOW is actually official policy. Rather, scholars such as Blair suggest that

command-and-control systems are very likely at some point to give rise to an uncaught false alarm or some other accident likely to trip their de facto LOW postures into catastrophic motion.) Through this prism,
de-alerting is said to become necessary as a means to prevent vulnerabilities from giving rise to launch-on-warning decisions by making it technically impossible to launch during the very brief span of time
between detection of what looks like an enemy attack and its presumed time of impact.
Let us examine this argument in more detail, for it lies at the heart of the de-alerting debate and perhaps our way out of it. As indicated, the most sophisticated and articulate critiques of current nuclear force
postures, in which at least some forces are set up for extremely rapid launch, are Bruce Blair and Scott Sagan, who offer different but complimentary arguments. Blairs account revolves around the


for a launch-on-warning posture he says are created by the vulnerability not just (or even principally) of nuclear forces themselves (e.g., missile silos) but of the command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C3I) architectures upon which their employment in actual nuclear warfighting depends. In his view, in effect, both nuclear superpowers longstanding investments
in survivable second-strike nuclear weapons to some extent missed the point or at least proved radically incomplete insofar as they failed to provide Washington and Moscow with a
genuine ability to mount and manage a retaliatory strike because national C3I systems would be too damaged by a massive nuclear exchange to handle the demands of second-strike
battle management.32 Both countries are thus said to have faced tremendous incentives for launch-on-warning in practice, at least, whether or not this was official policy because it was presumably clear to
their nuclear planners that C3I degradation and outright force attrition (e.g., high losses of silo-based ballistic missiles and non-alerted bomber forces) from an enemy attack would prevent its recipient from
mounting the kind of retaliatory strike it deemed necessary.33


Exts Escalation
Escalates to global war
Lawson 9 (Sean, Assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the
Threat of Conflict, p., June 13, 2009)
At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing hysteria over the threat of cyber war,[1] network security expert Marcus Ranum delivered a refreshing talk recently, The Problem with Cyber War, that took a critical look at a number of the assumptions underlying contemporary cybersecurity discourse in the United

cyber attacks could escalate to the use of physical force. As I will show, his concerns are entirely legitimate as
current U.S. military cyber doctrine assumes the possibility of what I call cross-domain responses to cyberattacks. Backing Your Adversary (Mentally) into a Corner Based on the premise that completely blinding a potential adversary is a good indicator to that adversary that an attack is iminent, Ranum has argued that The
best thing that you could possibly do if you want to start World War III is launch a cyber attack. [...] When people talk about cyber war like its a practical thing, what theyre really doing is messing with the OK button
for starting World War III. We need to get them to sit the f-k down and shut the f-k up. [2] He is making a point similar to one that I have made in the past: Taking away an adversarys ability to make rational decisions could backfire . [3] For
example, Gregory Witol cautions that attacking the decision makers ability to perform rational calculations may cause more problems than it hopes to resolve Removing the capacity for rational action may result in completely
unforeseen consequences, including longer and bloodier battles than may otherwise have been. [4] Cross-Domain Response So, from a theoretical standpoint, I think his concerns are well founded. But the current state of U.S. policy may be cause for even greater concern. Its not just
worrisome that a hypothetical blinding attack via cyberspace could send a signal of imminent attack and therefore trigger an irrational response from the adversary. What is also cause for concern is that current U.S. policy indicates that kinetic attacks (i.e. physical use of force)
are seen as potentially legitimate responses to cyber attacks. Most worrisome is that current U.S. policy implies that a nuclear response is possible, something that policy
States. He addressed one issue in partiuclar that I would like to riff on here, the issue of conflict escalationi.e. the possibility that offensive use of

makers have not denied in recent press reports. The reason, in part, is that the U.S. defense community has increasingly come to see cyberspace as a domain of warfare equivalent to air, land, sea, and space. The definition of cyberspace as its own domain of warfare helps in its own right to blur the online/offline, physical-

what happens if the

U.S. is attacked in any of the other domains? It retaliates. But it usually does not respond only within the domain in which it was attacked. Rather, responses are typically cross-domain responsesi.e. a massive bombing on U.S. soil or vital U.S. interests abroad (e.g. think 9/11 or Pearl Harbor)
space/cyberspace boundary. But thinking logically about the potential consequences of this framing leads to some disconcerting conclusions. If cyberspace is a domain of warfare, then it becomes possible to define cyber attacks (whatever those may be said to entail) as acts of war. But

might lead to air strikes against the attacker. Even more likely given a U.S. military way of warfare that emphasizes multidimensional, joint operations is a massive conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) response against the attacker in all domains (air, land, sea, space), simultaneously. The possibility of kinetic action in response to cyber
attack, or as part of offensive U.S. cyber operations, is part of the current (2006) National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations [5]: (U) Kinetic Actions. DOD will conduct kinetic missions to preserve freedom of action and strategic advantage in cyberspace. Kinetic actions can be either offensive or defensive and used in

the possibility that a cyber attack on the U.S. could lead to a U.S. nuclear reply constitutes possibly the ultimate in cross-domain response. And while this may
has not been ruled out by U.S. defense policy makers

conjunction with other mission areas to achieve optimal military effects. Of course,

seem far fetched, it

and is, in fact, implied in current U.S. defense policy documents. From the National Military Strategy of the United States (2004): The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities
that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical weapons. They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or

Coupled with the declaratory policy on

nuclear weapons described earlier, this statement implies that the United States will regard certain kinds of cyberattacks against the United States as being in the same category as
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and thus that a nuclear response to certain kinds of cyberattacks (namely, cyberattacks with devastating impacts) may be possible. It also sets a relevant scalea
attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent. [6] The authors of a 2009 National Academies of Science report on cyberwarfare respond to this by saying,

cyberattack that has an impact larger than that associated with a relatively small release of a lethal agent is regarded with the same or greater seriousness. [7]

Independently Cyber-attacks breaks down command and control causes nuclear response. The bureaucratic decision to react
without information is a result of situating offensive cyber ops with the president
Cimbala 11(Stephen J. Cimbala 2011. Professor of Political Science at Penn State. Nuclear Crisis Management and Cyberwar Phishing for Trouble?
Strategic Studies Quarterly Spring 2011)
cyberwar might adversely affect nuclear crisis management. Readers are advised, however, that history is indeterminate.It might turn out that, in some fortuitous cases, the United States coulduse nuclear
deterrence and cyberwar as joint multipliers toward a success-ful outcome in crisis or war. For example, in facing down an opponentwith a comparatively small or no nuclear arsenal and inferior
conventionalstrike capabilities, the United States or another power could employ infor-mation warfare aggressively up front while forgoing explicit
mention ofits available nuclear capability. Russias five-day war against Georgia inAugust 2008 involved obvious cyber attacks as well as land and air opera-tions, but no explicit nuclear threats. On the other hand, had Georgia al-ready been taken
This section discusses how

into membership by NATO prior to August 2008 or hadRusso-Georgian fighting spread into NATO member-state territory, thevisibility of Russias nuclear arsenal as a latent and potentially explicitthreat would have been much greater.Notwithstanding the preceding disclaimers,

information warfare has the potential to attack or disrupt successful crisis management on each offour dimensions . First, it can
muddy the signals being sent from one side to the other in a crisis. This can be done deliberately or inadvertently. Sup-pose one side plants a virus or worm in the others communications net-works.19 The virus or worm
becomes activated during the crisis and destroys or alters information. The missing or altered information may make itmore difficult for the cyber victim to arrange a military attack. But de-stroyed or altered information may mislead either side into thinking that its signal has been
correctly interpreted when it has not. Thus, side A mayintend to signal resolve instead of yield to its opponent on a particularissue. Side B, misperceiving a yield message, may decide to continue its aggression, meeting unexpected resistance and causing a much more dan-

Infowar can also destroy or disrupt communication channels necessary for successful crisis management. One way it
can do this is to disrupt communication links between policymakers and military commanders during a period of high threat and
severe time pressure. Two kinds of un-anticipated problems, from the standpoint of civil-military relations, arepossible under these conditions. First, political leaders may have pre-delegated
limited authority for nuclear release or launch under restric-tive conditions; only when these few conditions obtain, according to the protocols of
predelegation, would military commanders be authorized toemploy nuclear weapons distributed within their command . Clogged,destroyed, or
disrupted communications could prevent top leaders from knowing that military commanders perceived a situation to be far
more desperate, and thus permissive of nuclear initiative, than it really was.During the Cold War, for example, disrupted communications betweenthe US National Command Authority and ballistic missile
gerous situation to develop.

submarines,once the latter came under attack, could have resulted in a joint decisionby submarine officers to launch in the absence of contrary instructions.Second, information warfare during a crisis will almost certainly in-crease the time pressure under which political leaders
operate. It may dothis literally, or it may affect the perceived timelines within which thepolicymaking process can make its decisions. Once either side sees parts ofits command, control, and communications (C3) system being subvertedby phony information or extraneous cyber
noise, its sense of panic at thepossible loss of military options will be enormous. In the case of US ColdWar nuclear war plans, for example, disruption of even portions of thestrategic C3 system could have prevented competent execution of parts ofthe SIOP (the strategic nuclear war
plan). The SIOP depended upon finelyorchestrated time-on-target estimates and precise damage expectanciesagainst various classes of targets. Partially misinformed or disinformednetworks and communications centers would have led to redundant at-tacks against the same target
sets and, quite possibly, unplanned attacks onfriendly military or civilian installations.A third potentially disruptive effect of infowar on nuclear crisis man-agement is that it may reduce the search for available alternatives to thefew and desperate. Policymakers searching for
escapes from crisis denoue-ments need flexible options and creative problem solving. Victims of in-formation warfare may have a diminished ability to solve problems routinely,let alone creatively, once information networks are filled with flotsam andjetsam. Questions to operators

. Retaliatory sys-tems that depend on launch-on-warning

instead of survival after riding out an attack are especially vulnerable to reduced time cycles and restricted alternatives: A well-designed warning system
cannot save commanders from misjudging the situation under the constraints of time and information imposed by a posture of
launch on warning. Such a posture truncates the decision process too early for iterative estimates to converge on reality. Rapid
reaction is inherently unstable because it cuts short the learning time needed to match perception with reality. 20 The propensity to search for the first available alternative that
meetsminimum satisfactory conditions of goal attainment is strong enough undernormal conditions in nonmilitary bureaucratic organizations. 21 In civil-military command and control systems under the stress of
nuclear crisis decision making, the first available alternative may quite literally be the last; or so policymakers and their military advisors may persuade
them-selves. Accordingly, the bias toward prompt and adequate solutions is strong. During the Cuban missile crisis, a number of members of thepresidential advisory group continued to propound an air strike
will be poorly posed, and responses (ifavailable at all) will be driven toward the least common denominator ofpreviously programmed standard operating procedures

and inva-sion of Cuba during the entire 13 days of crisis deliberation. Had less timebeen available for debate and had President Kennedy not deliberatelystructured the discussion in a way that forced alternatives to the surface,the air strike and invasion might well have been the
chosen alternative.22Fourth and finally on the issue of crisis management, infowar can cause flawed images of each sides intentions and capabilities to be conveyed tothe other, with potentially disastrous results. Another example from theCuban crisis demonstrates the possible
side effects of simple misunder-standing and noncommunication on US crisis management. At the mosttense period of the crisis, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft got off course andstrayed into Soviet airspace. US and Soviet fighters scrambled, and a pos-sible Arctic confrontation of
air forces loomed. Khrushchev later toldKennedy that Soviet air defenses might have interpreted the U-2 flight asa prestrike reconnaissance mission or as a bomber, calling for a compensa-tory response by Moscow.23 Fortunately Moscow chose to give the UnitedStates the benefit

the answer may be as simple as

bureaucratic inertia compounded by noncommunication down the chain of command by policymakers who failed to appreciate
the risk of normal reconnaissance under these extra-ordinary conditions.
of the doubt in this instance and to permit US fightersto escort the wayward U-2 back to Alaska. Why this scheduled U-2 mis-sion was not scrubbed once the crisis began has never been fully revealed;

Threat Real
The threat is real
Habiger 10 (Eugue, Retired Air Force General, Cyberwarfare and Cyberterrorism, The Cyber Security Institute, p. 11-19, February 1, 2010)
However, there are reasons to believe that what is going on now amounts to a fundamental shift as opposed to business as usual. Todays network exploitation or information operation trespasses possess a number of characteristics that suggest that the line between espionage and

the number of cyberattacks we are facing is growing significantly. Andrew Palowitch, a

former CIA official now consulting with the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which oversees the Defense Departments Joint Task Force
Global Network Operations, recently told a meeting of experts that the Defense Department has experienced almost 80,000 computer attacks, and some number of
these assaults have actually reduced the militarys operational capabilities.20 Second, the nature of these attacks is starting to shift from penetration attempts aimed at
gathering intelligence (cyber spying) to offensive efforts aimed at taking down systems (cyberattacks). Palowitch put this in stark terms last November, We are currently in a cyberwar and war is going on today.21 Third, these recent attacks need to be taken in
a broader strategic context. Both Russia and China have stepped up their offensive efforts and taken a much more aggressive cyberwarfare posture . The Chinese have
developed an openly discussed cyberwar strategy aimed at achieving electronic dominance over the U.S. and its allies by 2050. In 2007 the Department of Defense reported that for the first time China has developed first strike viruses,
marking a major shift from prior investments in defensive measures.22 And in the intervening period China has launched a series of offensive cyber operations against U.S. government and private sector networks and
conflict has been, or is close to being, crossed. (What that suggests for the proper response is a different matter.) First,

infrastructure. In 2007, Gen. James Cartwright, the former head of STRATCOM and now the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the USChina Economic and Security Review Commission that Chinas ability to launch denial of service attacks to overwhelm an IT

Russia also has already begun to wage offensive cyberwar. At the outset of the recent hostilities with Georgia, Russian assets launched a series of cyberattacks
against the Georgian government and its critical infrastructure systems, including media, banking and transportation sites.24 In 2007, cyberattacks that many experts attribute, directly or indirectly, to Russia shut
down the Estonia governments IT systems. Fourth, the current geopolitical context must also be factored into any effort to gauge the degree of threat of cyberwar. The start of the new Obama Administration has begun to help reduce tensions
between the United States and other nations. And, the new administration has taken initial steps to improve bilateral relations specifically with both China and Russia. However, it must be said that over the last few years the posture of both the Chinese
and Russian governments toward America has clearly become more assertive, and at times even aggressive. Some commentators have talked about the prospects of a
cyber Pearl Harbor, and the pattern of Chinese and Russian behavior to date gives reason for concern along these lines: both nations have offensive cyberwarfare
strategies in place; both nations have taken the cyber equivalent of building up their forces; both nations now regularly probe our cyber defenses looking for gaps to be exploited;
both nations have begun taking actions that cross the line from cyberespionage to cyberaggression; and, our bilateral relations with both nations are increasingly fractious and complicated by areas of
marked, direct competition. Clearly, there a sharp differences between current U.S. relations with these two nations and relations between the US and Japan just prior to World War II. However, from a strategic defense perspective, there are enough warning signs to
warrant preparation. In addition to the threat of cyberwar, the limited resources required to carry out even a large scale cyberattack also makes likely the potential for a significant cyberterror attack against
the United States. However, the lack of a long list of specific incidences of cyberterrorism should provide no comfort. There is strong evidence to suggest that al Qaeda has the ability to conduct
cyberterror attacks against the United States and its allies. Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are extremely active in cyberspace, using these technologies to communicate among themselves and others, carry out logistics, recruit members, and wage
system is of particular concern. 23

information warfare. For example, al Qaeda leaders used email to communicate with the 911 terrorists and the 911 terrorists used the Internet to make travel plans and book flights. Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda members routinely post videos and other messages to online

there is evidence of efforts that al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are actively developing cyberterrorism capabilities and seeking to
carry out cyberterrorist attacks. For example, the Washington Post has reported that U.S. investigators have found evidence in the logs that mark a browser's path through the Internet that al Qaeda operators spent time on
sites that offer software and programming instructions for the digital switches that run power, water, transport and communications grids . In some interrogations . . . al Qaeda prisoners have described intentions,
sites to communicate. Moreover,

in general terms, to use those tools.25 Similarly, a 2002 CIA report on the cyberterror threat to a member of the Senate stated that al Qaeda and Hezbollah have become "more adept at using the internet and computer technologies.26 The FBI has issued bulletins stating that, U.
S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies have received indications that Al Qaeda members have sought information on Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems available on multiple SCADA related web sites.27 In addition a number of jihadist websites,
such as, teach computer attack and hacking skills in the service of Islam.28 While al Qaeda may lack the cyberattack capability of nations like Russia and China, there is every reason to believe its operatives, and those of its ilk, are as capable as the cyber criminals and
hackers who routinely effect great harm on the worlds digital infrastructure generally and American assets specifically. In fact, perhaps, the most troubling indication of the level of the cyberterrorist threat is the countless, serious non terrorist cyberattacks routinely carried out by

If runofthemill criminals and hackers can threaten powergrids, hack vital military networks, steal vast sums of money,
take down a citys of traffic lights, compromise the Federal Aviation Administrations air traffic control systems, among other attacks, it is overwhelmingly likely that terrorists can carry out similar , if not more
malicious attacks. Moreover, even if the worlds terrorists are unable to breed these skills, they can certainly buy them. There are untold numbers of cybermercenaries around the worldsophisticated hackers with advanced training who would be willing to offer their services
for the right price. Finally, given the nature of our understanding of cyber threats, there is always the possibility that we have already been the victim or a cyberterrorist attack, or such an attack has already been set but not yet effectuated, and we dont know it yet. Instead, a well
designed cyberattack has the capacity cause widespread chaos, sow societal unrest, undermine national governments, spread paralyzing fear and anxiety, and create a state of
utter turmoil, all without taking a single life. A sophisticated cyberattack could throw a nations banking and finance system into chaos causing markets to crash, prompting runs on banks, degrading confidence in markets, perhaps even putting the nations currency in
play and making the government look helpless and hapless. In todays difficult economy, imagine how Americans would react if vast sums of money were taken from their accounts and their supporting financial records
were destroyed. A truly nefarious cyberattacker could carry out an attack in such a way (akin to Robin Hood) as to engender populist support and deepen rifts within our society, thereby making efforts to restore the system all the more difficult. A modestly
advanced enemy could use a cyberattack to shut down (if not physically damage) one or more regional power grids. An entire region could be cast into total darkness, powerdependent systems could be shutdown. An
attack on one or more regional power grids could also cause cascading effects that could jeopardize our entire national grid. When word leaks that the
blackout was caused by a cyberattack, the specter of a foreign enemy capable of sending the entire nation into darkness would only increase the fear, turmoil and unrest. While the
criminals, hackers, disgruntled insiders, crime syndicates and the like.

finance and energy sectors are considered prime targets for a cyberattack, an attack on any of the 17 delineated critical infrastructure sectors could have a major impact on the United States. For example, our healthcare system is already technologically driven and the Obama
Administrations ehealth efforts will only increase that dependency. A cyberattack on the U.S. ehealth infrastructure could send our healthcare system into chaos and put countless of lives at risk. Imagine if emergency room physicians and surgeons were suddenly no longer able to

A cyberattack on our nations water systems could likewise cause widespread disruption. An attack on the control systems for one or more dams could put entire communities at risk of
could create ripple effects across the water, agriculture, and energy sectors. Similar water control system attacks could be used to at least
temporarily deny water to otherwise arid regions, impacting everything from the quality of life in these areas to agriculture. In 2007, the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit determined that the destruction from a single wave of cyberattacks
access vital patient information.
being inundated, and

on critical infrastructures could exceed $700 billion, which would be the rough equivalent of 50 Katrinaesque hurricanes hitting the United States all at the same time.29 Similarly, one IT security source has estimated that the impact of a single day cyberwar attack that focused on
and disrupted U.S. credit and debit card transactions would be approximately $35 billion.30 Another way to gauge the potential for harm is in comparison to other similar noncyberattack infrastructure failures. For example, the August 2003 regional power grid blackout is
estimated to have cost the U.S. economy up to $10 billion, or roughly .1 percent of the nations GDP. 31 That said, a cyberattack of the exact same magnitude would most certainly have a much larger impact. The origin of the 2003 blackout was almost immediately disclosed as an
atypical system failure having nothing to do with terrorism. This made the event both less threatening and likely a single time occurrence. Had it been disclosed that the event was the result of an attack that could readily be repeated the impacts would likely have grown

a cyberattack could

be used to disrupt our nations defenses or distract our


substantially, if not exponentially. Additionally,

in advance of a more traditional conventional or
strategic attack. Many military leaders actually believe that such a disruptive cyber preoffensive is the most effective use of offensive cyber capabilities. This is, in fact, the way Russia utilized cyberattackerswhether government assets, governmentdirected/ coordinated assets, or

Widespread distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks were launched on the Georgian governments IT systems. Roughly a day later Russian
armor rolled into Georgian territory. The cyberattacks were used to prepare the battlefield; they denied the Georgian government a critical communications tool isolating it from its citizens and degrading its command
allied cyber irregularsin advance of the invasion of Georgia.

and control capabilities precisely at the time of attack. In this way, these attacks were the functional equivalent of conventional air and/or missile strikes on a nations communications infrastructure.32 One interesting element of the Georgian cyberattacks has been generally
overlooked: On July 20th, weeks before the August cyberattack, the website of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was overwhelmed by a more narrowly focused, but technologically similar DDOS attack.33 This should be particularly chilling to American national security

The ability of an enemy to use a cyberattack to counter our offensive capabilities or soften our
defenses for a wider offensive against the United States is much more than mere speculation. In fact, in Iraq it is already happening. Iraq insurgents are now using offtheshelf software (costing just $26) to hack U.S.
drones (costing $4.5 million each), allowing them to intercept the video feed from these drones.34 By hacking these drones the insurgents have succeeded in greatly reducing one of our most valuable
sources of realtime intelligence and situational awareness. If our enemies in Iraq are capable of such an effective cyberattack against one of our more sophisticated systems, consider what a more technologically advanced enemy could do. At the strategic
experts as our systems undergo the same sorts of focused, probing attacks on a constant basis.

level, in 2008, as the United States Central Command was leading wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, a cyber intruder compromised the security of the Command and sat within its IT systems, monitoring everything the Command was doing. 35 This time the attacker simply

the attacker could have used this access to wage cyberwaraltering information, disrupting the flow of
information, destroying information, taking down systemsagainst the United States forces already at war. Similarly, during 2003 as the United States prepared for and began the War in Iraq, the IT networks of
the Department of Defense were hacked 294 times.36 By August of 2004, with America at war, these ongoing attacks compelled thenDeputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to write in a memo that, "Recent exploits
have reduced operational capabilities on our networks."37 This wasnt the first time that our national security IT infrastructure was penetrated immediately in advance of a U.S. military option.38 In February of 1998 the Solar Sunrise
gathered vast amounts of intelligence. However, it is clear that

attacks systematically compromised a series of Department of Defense networks. What is often overlooked is that these attacks occurred during the ramp up period ahead of potential military action against Iraq. The attackers were able to obtain vast amounts of sensitive
informationinformation that would have certainly been of value to an enemys military leaders. There is no way to prove that these actions were purposefully launched with the specific intent to distract American military assets or degrade our capabilities. However, such
ambiguitiesthe inability to specifically attribute actions and motives to actorsare the very nature of cyberspace. Perhaps, these repeated patterns of behavior were mere coincidence, or perhaps they werent. The potential that an enemy might use a cyberattack to soften physical
defenses, increase the gravity of harms from kinetic attacks, or both, significantly increases the potential harms from a cyberattack. Consider the gravity of the threat and risk if an enemy, rightly or wrongly, believed that it could use a cyberattack to degrade our strategic weapons

Such an enemy might be convinced that it could win a war conventional or even nuclearagainst the U nited S tates. The effect of this would be to undermine
our deterrencebased defenses, making us significantly more at risk of a major war.

Domestic Terror

Lone Wolf Impact

Lone wolves use WMDs
Gary A. ACKERMAN, Director of the Special Projects Division at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, AND Lauren E.
PINSON, Senior Research/Project Manager at START and PhD student at Yale University, 14 [An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells, Terrorism and
Political Violence, Vol. 26, Issue 1, 2014]
The first question to answer is whence the concerns about the nexus between CBRN weapons and isolated actors come and whether these are overblown. The general threat of mass violence posed by lone wolves
and small autonomous cells has been detailed in accompanying issue contributions, but the potential use of CBRN weapons by such perpetrators presents some singular features that either amplify or

Recent and emerging advances in

a variety of areas, from synthetic biology 3 to nanoscale engineering, 4 have opened doors not only to new medicines and materials, but also to new
possibilities for malefactors to inflict harm on others. What is most relevant in the context of lone actors and small autonomous cells is not so much the
pace of new invention, but rather the commercialization and consumerization of CBRN weapons-relevant technologies. This process often entails an
increase in the availability and safety of the technology, with a concurrent diminution in the cost, volume, and technical knowledge required to operate it .
Thus, for example, whereas fifty years ago producing large quantities of certain chemical weapons might have been a dangerous and inefficient affair requiring a large plant, expensive
equipment, and several chemical engineers, with the advent of chemical microreactors, 5 the same processes might be accomplished far more cheaply and safely on a desktop
assemblage, purchased commercially and monitored by a single chemistry graduate student. The rapid global spread and increased user-friendliness of
many technologies thus represents a potentially radical shift from the relatively small scale of harm a single individual or small autonomous group could historically
cause. 6 From the limited reach and killing power of the sword, spear, and bow, to the introduction of dynamite and eventually the use of our own infrastructures against us (as on September 11), the number of
people that an individual who was unsupported by a broader political entity could kill with a single action has increased from single digits to thousands. Indeed, it has even been asserted that over time as
the leverage provided by technology increases, this threshold will finally reach its culminationwith the ability of one man to declare war on the world and
win. 7 Nowhere is this trend more perceptible in the current age than in the area of unconventional weapons . These new technologies do not simply empower users on a
purely technical level. Globalization and the expansion of information networks provide new opportunities for disaffected individuals in the farthest corners of
the globe to become familiar with core weapon concepts and to purchase equipment online technical courses and eBay are undoubtedly a boon to would-be purveyors of violence.
Furthermore, even the most solipsistic misanthropes, people who would never be able to function socially as part of an operational terrorist group, can find radicalizing influences or
legitimation for their beliefs in the maelstrom of virtual identities on the Internet . All of this can spawn, it is feared, a more deleterious breed of lone actors, what have
been referred to in some quarters as super-empowered individuals. 8 Conceptually, super-empowered individuals are atomistic game-changers , i.e., they constitute a
single (and often singular) individual who can shock the entire system (whether national, regional, or global) by relying only on their own resources. Their core
characteristics are that they have superior intelligence, the capacity to use complex communications or tech nology systems, and act as an individual or a lone-wolf. 9
The end result, according to the pessimists, is that if one of these individuals chooses to attack the system, the unprecedented nature of his attack ensures that no
counter-measures are in place to prevent it. And when he strikes, his attack will not only kill massive amounts of people, but also profoundly change the financial, political,
and social systems that govern modern life. 10 It almost goes without saying that the same concerns attach to small autonomous cells, whose members' capabilities
and resources can be combined without appreciably increasing the operational footprint presented to intelligence and law enforcement agencies seeking
to detect such behavior. With the exception of the largest truck or aircraft bombs, the most likely means by which to accomplish this level of system perturbation is through the use of
CBRN agents as WMD. On the motivational side, therefore, lone actors and small autonomous cells may ironically be more likely to select CBRN weapons than
more established terrorist groupswho are usually more conservative in their tactical orientationbecause the extreme asymmetry of these weapons may provide the only
subjectively feasible option for such actors to achieve their grandiose aims of deeply affecting the system. The inherent technical challenges presented by
CBRN weapons may also make them attractive to self-assured individuals who may have a very different risk tolerance than larger, traditional terrorist
organizations that might have to be concerned with a variety of constituencies , from state patrons to prospective recruits. 11 Many other factors beyond a perceived potential to
supplement the attributes of the more general case and so are deserving of particular attention. Chief among these is the impact of rapid technological development.

achieve mass casualties might play into the decision to pursue CBRN weapons in lieu of conventional explosives, 12 including a fetishistic fascination with these weapons or the perception of direct referents in
the would-be perpetrator's belief system. Others are far more sanguine about the capabilities of lone actors (or indeed non-state actors in general) with respect to their potential for using CBRN agents to cause
mass fatalities, arguing that the barriers to a successful large-scale CBRN attack remain high, even in today's networked, tech-savvy environment. 13 Dolnik, for example, argues that even though homegrown
cells are less constrained in motivations, more challenging plots generally have an inverse relationship with capability, 14 while Michael Kenney cautions against making presumptions about the ease with
which individuals can learn to produce viable weapons using only the Internet. 15 However, even most of these pundits

concede that low-level CBR attacks emanating from this quarter

will probably lead to political, social, and economic disruption that extends well beyond the areas immediately affected by the attack. This raises an
essential point with respect to CBRN terrorism: irrespective of the harm potential of CBRN weapons or an actor's capability (or lack thereof) to successfully
employ them on a catastrophic scale, these weapons invariably exert a stronger psychological impact on audiences the essence of terrorismthan the traditional gun
and bomb. This is surely not lost on those lone actors or autonomous cells who are as interested in getting noticed as in causing casualties . Proven Capability and Intent While
legitimate debate can be had as to the level of potential threat posed by lone actors or small autonomous cells wielding CBRN weapons, possibly the best argument for engaging in a substantive examination of
the issue is the most concrete one of allthat these

actors have already demonstrated the motivation and capability to pursue and use CBRN weapons, in some cases even
close to the point of constituting a genuine WMD threat. In the context of bioterrorism, perhaps the most cogent illustration of this is the case of Dr. Bruce Ivins, the perpetrator behind
one of the most serious episodes of bioterrorism in living memory, the 2001 anthrax letters, which employed a highly virulent and sophisticated form of the agent and not only killed five and seriously sickened
17 people, but led to widespread disruption of the U.S. postal services and key government facilities. 16 Other historical cases of CBRN pursuit and use by lone actors and small autonomous cells highlight the
need for further exploration. Among the many extant examples: 17 Thomas Lavy was caught at the Alaska-Canada border in 1993 with 130 grams of 7% pure ricin. It is unclear how Lavy obtained the ricin, what
he planned to do with it, and what motivated him. In 1996, Diane Thompson deliberately infected twelve coworkers with shigella dysenteriae type 2. Her motives were unclear. In 1998, Larry Wayne Harris, a
white supremacist, was charged with producing and stockpiling a biological agentbacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax. In 1999, the Justice Department (an autonomous cell sympathetic to the
Animal Liberation Front) mailed over 100 razor blades dipped in rat poison to individuals involved in the fur industry. In 2000, Tsiugio Uchinshi was arrested for mailing samples of the mineral monazite with
trace amounts of radioactive thorium to several Japanese government agencies to persuade authorities to look into potential uranium being smuggled to North Korea. In 2002, Chen Zhengping put rat poison in
a rival snack shop's products and killed 42 people. In 2005, 10 letters containing a radioactive substance were mailed to major organizations in Belgium including the Royal Palace, NATO headquarters, and the
U.S. embassy in Brussels. No injuries were reported. In 2011, federal agents arrested four elderly men in Georgia who were plotting to use ricin and explosives to target federal buildings, Justice Department
officials, federal judges, and Internal Revenue Service agents. Two recent events may signal an even greater interest in CBRN by lone malefactors. First, based on one assessment of Norway's Anders Breivik's
treatise, his references to CBRN weapons a) suggest that CBRN

weapons could be used on a tactical level and b) reveal (to perhaps previously uninformed audiences) that even low-level
CBRN weapons could achieve far-reaching impacts driven by fear . 18 Whether or not Breivik would actually have sought or been able to pursue CBRN, he has garnered a following in
several (often far-right) extremist circles and his treatise might inspire other lone actors. Second, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ( AQAP) released two issues of Inspire magazine in 2012.
Articles, on the one hand, call for lone wolf jihad attacks to target non-combatant populations and, on the other, permit the use of chemical and biological
weapons. The combination of such directives may very well influence the weapon selection of lone actor jihadists in Western nations . 19
Nathan MYHRVOLD, PhD in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, former chief technology officer of Microsoft, 13 [July 2013, Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action, The Lawfare
Research Paper Series No.2,]
Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology now allows

stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund themselves in an

unprecedented fashion. That, coupled with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be lead players on the world stage. They
may act on their own, or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces to be reckoned with. At the same time, a different set of
technology trends means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a small group can be as lethal as
the largest superpower. Such a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern
civilizationperhaps even to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat our
nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform process is incomplete and inconsistent.
A real defense will require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and the efforts that
have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented. History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary
that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades.

Crushes the economy
Bandyopadhyay et al 15 -- Subhayu Bandyopadhyay is Research Officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Research Fellow at IZA, Bonn, Germany. Todd Sandler is Vibhooti Shukla Professor of Economics and
Political Economy at the University of Texas at Dallas. Javed Younasis Associate Professor of Economics at the American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. The Toll of Terrorism

*modified for ableist language*

New technology has lowered transportation costs and increased trade and capital flows across nations. But the same technology that has fostered international
economic growth has also allowed terrorism to spread easily among countries whose interests are tightly interwoven. Terrorism is no longer solely a local issue. Terrorists
can strike from thousands of miles away and cause vast destruction. The effects of terrorism can be terrifyingly direct. People are kidnapped or killed. Pipelines are sabotaged. Bombers strike
markets, buses, and restaurants with devastating effect. But terrorism inflicts more than human casualties and material losses. It can also cause serious indirect harm to countries and
economies by increasing the costs of economic transactions for example, because of enhanced security measures to ensure the safety of employees and customers or higher
insurance premiums. Terrorist attacks in Yemen on the USS Cole in 2000 and on the French tanker Limburg in 2002 seriously damaged that countrys shipping industry. These attacks contributed to a 300 percent rise in insurance premiums for ships using that route and led ships

It can take myriad forms, but we focus on three: national income losses and growth-[slowing]retarding
effects, dampened foreign direct investment, and disparate effects on international trade.
to bypass Yemen entirely (Enders and Sandler, 2012). In this article we explore the economic burden of terrorism.

Domestic Terrorism deters FDI even small attacks crush investor confidence
Bandyopadhyay et al 15 -- Subhayu Bandyopadhyay is Research Officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Research Fellow at IZA, Bonn, Germany. Todd Sandler is Vibhooti Shukla Professor of Economics and
Political Economy at the University of Texas at Dallas. Javed Younasis Associate Professor of Economics at the American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. The Toll of Terrorism
Scaring off investors Increased

terrorism in a particular area tends to depress the expected return on capital invested there, which shifts investment elsewhere. This reduces
the stock of productive capital and the flow of productivity-enhancing technology to the affected nation. For example, from the mid-1970s through 1991, terrorist incidents reduced net foreign
direct investment in Spain by 13.5 percent and in Greece by 11.9 percent (Enders and Sandler, 1996). In fact, the initial loss of productive resources as a result of terrorism may increase
manyfold because potential foreign investors shift their investments to other, presumably safer, destinations. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) showed that a relatively small
increase in the perceived risk of terrorism can cause an outsized reduction in a countrys net stock of foreign direct investment and inflict significant damage on its economy. We
analyzed 78 developing economies over the period 19842008 (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas, 2014) and found that on average a relatively small increase in a countrys domestic terrorist
incidents per 100,000 persons sharply reduced net foreign direct investment. There was a similarly large reduction in net investment if the terrorist
incidents originated abroad or involved foreigners or foreign assets in the attacked country. We also found that greater official aid flows can substantially offset the damage to foreign direct investmentperhaps in part because
the increased aid allows recipient nations to invest in more effective counterterrorism efforts. Most countries that experienced above-average domestic or transnational terrorist incidents during 19702011 received less foreign direct
investment or foreign aid than the average among the 122 in the sample (see table). It is difficult to assess causation, but the table suggests a troubling association between terrorism and depressed aid and foreign direct investment, both of
which are crucial for developing economies. It is generally believed that there are higher risks in trading with a nation afflicted by terrorism, which cause an increase in transaction costs and tend to reduce trade. For example, after the
September 11 attacks on New York City and the Washington, D.C., area, the U.S. border was temporarily closed, holding up truck traffic between the United States and Canada for an extended time. Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) analyzed a

when one of
two trading partners suffers at least one terrorist attack, it reduces trade between them to 91 percent of what it would be in the absence of terrorism.
sample of 200 countries over the period 196093 and found that when terrorism incidents in a pair of trading countries double in one year, trade between them falls by about 4 percent that same year. They also found that

Blomberg and Hess (2006) estimated that terrorism and other internal and external conflicts retard trade as much as a 30 percent tariff. More specifically, they found that any trading partner that experienced terrorism experienced close to a
4 percent reduction in bilateral trade. But Egger and Gassebner (2015) found more modest trade effects. Terrorism had few to no short-term effects; it was significant over the medium term, which they defined as more than one and a half
years after an attack/incident. Abstracting from the impact of transaction costs from terrorism, Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2014b) found that terrorism may not necessarily reduce trade, because resources can be reallocated. If terrorism
disproportionately harmed one productive resource (say land) relative to another (say labor), then resources would flow to the labor-intensive sector. If a country exported labor-intensive goods, such as textiles, terrorism could actually lead
to increased production and exportation. In other words, although terrorism may reduce trade in a particular product because it increases transaction costs, its ultimate impact may be either to raise or reduce overall trade. These apparently
contradictory empirical and theoretical findings present rich prospects for future study. Of course terrorism has repercussions beyond human and material destruction and the economic effects discussed in this article. Terrorism also
influences immigration and immigration policy. The traditional gains and losses from the international movement of labor may be magnified by national security considerations rooted in a terrorism response. For example, a recent study by
Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2014a) focused on a terrorist organization based in a developing country. It showed that the immigration policy of the developed country targeted by the terrorist group can be critical to containing transnational
terrorism. Transnational terrorism targeted at well-protected developed countries tends to be more skill intensive: it takes a relatively sophisticated terrorist to plan and successfully execute such an attack. Immigration policies that attract
highly skilled people to developed countries can drain the pool of highly skilled terrorist recruits and may cut down on transnational terrorism.

FDI competitiveness is vital to sustained economic recovery

Kornecki 13 [L.

PhD in Economics, Prof Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Universitys College of Business. Inward FDI in the United States and its policy context Columbia FDI Profiles, 2/4/13]
Inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) represents an integral

part of the United States (U.S.) economy, with its stock growing from US$ 83 billion in 1980 to US$ 3.5 trillion in
States, which had earlier been primarily a h ome for multinational enterprises (MNEs) rather than a host for affiliates of foreign MNEs, has become a preferred host country for FDI
since the 1980s. Foreign MNEs have contributed robu st flows of FDI into diverse industries of the U.S. economy, and total FDI inflows reached US$ 227 billion in 2011,
equivalent to 15% of global inflows, the single largest share of any eco nomy. Inflows of FDI, with a peak of US$ 314 billion in 2000 and another of US$ 306 billion in 2 008, have
been an important factor contributing to sustained economic growth in the Un ited States. The recent financial and economic crises negatively impacted FDI flows to th e United
States and opened a period of major uncertainty. The effectiveness of government policy responses at both the national and international levels in addressing the
financial cr isis and its economic consequences will play a crucial role for creating favorable conditions for a rebound in FDI inflows. Inward foreign direct investment is
an essential co mponent of the U.S. economy, contributing to production, exports and high-paying jobs for the co untrys workers. As the worlds
largest economy, the United States is well positioned to pa rticipate in the increasingly competitive international environment for FDI that has emerged
as both advanced and developing economies have recognized the value of such investment. The U .S. hosts the largest stock of IFDI among the worlds economies and continues to be at
the top as a destination for inward FDI flows.
2011. The United

Threat real
Homegrown terrorism is the most likely scenario for an attack
Zenko 15 -- Zenko covers the U.S. national security debate and offers insight on developments in international security and conflict prevention. Is US Foreign Policy Ignoring Homegrown Terrorists

Senior U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials increasingly warn of the threat of lone wolf individuals attempting terror attacks within the
United States. These potential perpetrators are characterized as externally motivated, but predominantly self-directed in plotting and attempting acts of politically and/or
ideologically motivated violence. They need not travel to purported foreign safe havens to receive training or guidance, nor be in direct contact with terrorist organizations based abroad. Rather, their inspiration, in large part, appears to stem from the
principles and narratives promoted by Islamist jihadist groups. On February 12, National Counterterrorism Center Director Nicholas Rasmussen told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: We face a much greater, more frequent, recurring
threat from lone offenders and probably loose networks of individuals. Measured in terms of frequency and numbers, it is attacks from those sources that are increasingly the
most noteworthy On February 26, during the annual worldwide threats hearing, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned: Home-grown violent extremists continue to pose the most likely
threat to the homeland. Last Friday, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson stated on MSNBC: Were in a new phasein the global terrorist threat where, because of effective use of social media, the Internet, by
ISIL, al-Qaeda, we have to be concerned about the independent actor who is here in the homeland who may strike with little or no warning Finally, yesterday, former CIA deputy director Michael Morell described the messaging efforts
of jihadist groups generally and the self-declared Islamic State (IS) more specifically: Their narrative is pretty powerful: The West, the United States, the modern world, is a significant threat to their religion. Their answer to that is to establish a caliphate. And they are being
attacked by the U.S. and other Western nations, and by these apostate regimes in the region. Because they are being attacked they need support in two ways; people coming to fight for them, and people coming to stand up and attack coalition nations in their home. In summary,

the most likelythough not most lethalterror threats to Americans come from individuals living within the United States who are partially motivated to undertake selfdirected attacks based upon their perception that the United States and the West are at war with the Muslim world. Remarkably, these two observations have had virtually no impact on U.S.foreign policy discourse. In Washington, there is an agreed-upon, bipartisan
understanding that under no circumstances will officials or politicians acknowledge, or even explore, the concept that foreign policy activities might play a role in compelling U.S.residents, who would not otherwise consider terrorism, to plot and attempt attacks. This is somewhat
understandable given that there are many different backgrounds, experiences, and precursors that lead people to become violent extremists. Yet, whereas there are constant hearings and debateseven White House summitsabout how to counter violent extremism, there is
rarely any consideration of which U.S. foreign policy activities might themselves be precursors to U.S. terrorism. In fact, the only foreign policy decisions that the Obama administration admits might inspire terrorism are those made by Obamas predecessor. The first is one that the
White House has tried to reverse since January 2009: detaining terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Most recently, at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on March 18, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter endorsed closing the military prison because, It still provides
a rallying point for Jihadi recruiting. The other decision is the 2003 invasion of Iraq; as President Obama stated on March 17, ISIL is a direct outgrowth of al-Qaeda in Iraq that grew out of our invasion, which is an example of unintended consequences. Of course, another
unintended consequence emerged from the U.S.-led airwar in 2011 that ensured the toppling of Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya. As a U.S. military official told The Wall Street Journal today, ISIL now has an operational presence in Libya, and they have aspirations to make Libya
their African hub. Libya is part of their terror map now. Compare this recent warning to how the State Department described Libya on the eve of the 2011 airwar: The Libyan government continued to demonstrate a strong and active commitment to combating terrorist
organizations and violent extremism through bilateral and regional counterterrorism and security cooperation, particularly on the issue of foreign fighter flow to Iraq. Now, foreign fighters are flowing from Iraq and Syria to establish a stronghold in Libya. This is clearly an
unintended, though not at all unsurprising, consequence, but not one that the Obama administration will acknowledge because it happened under its watch. (See also: Are We Downplaying the Risks of Homegrown Terrorism?) More critically, what foreign policy activities are
bolstering the narrative of Islamic jihadist groups today? Is it really just the 122 terror suspects still in Guantanamo? What about drone strikes, which themselves are universally hated? Or, what of the support for President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, whose government sentenced
that countrys first elected leader to death this week? Finally, is the U.S.-led airwar against ISfueling that narrative and making the likelihood of lone wolf attacks within the United States more likely? What else is the United States doing abroad that could be making Americans less
safe from lone wolf terrorism at home? Why is this never asked or considered when officials and politicians discuss how the thirteen-and-a-half-year war on terrorism is progressing?

ISIS is in the US
Piccoli 15 Sean, Ex-DHS, NSA Official: ISIS Terror Cells in US 'Probable'
there are people with terrorist ambitions and instructions from the Islamic State operating inside the United States today, says a former Department of
Homeland Security official, agreeing with a similar claim made by the agency's current chief. While hesitating to use the phrase "sleeper cells" to describe these attackers in waiting, former DHS assistant secretary Stewart A.
Baker told "MidPoint" host Ed Berliner onNewsmax TV Thursday that it is "more probable than not " that they are here, "and we certainly should be acting as though that's likely." "It is quite
possible that there were foreign fighters from the United States or from other countries whose names we never got and whose travel to Syria we never
flagged," said Baker, "and that those folks have come back to the United States with instructions to try to carry out an attack if that's possible." Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson said as much on
Sunday, telling CNN's "State of the Union" that a number of individuals living in the U.S. are in touch with the Islamic State (ISIS) and other terror groups that share "a desire to
conduct an attack" against America. Johnson said the problem of homegrown or reimported terrorists is worse in Europe than in the U.S., but that on both continents, social media make it easier for an ISIS or an alQaida to recruit fighters from afar or groom lone-wolf terrorists within the targeted countries. It's against that backdrop that President Barack Obama is grudgingly seeking a new congressional authorization for military force against
It's safe to assume that

ISIS in Iraq and Syria, said Baker. "It's obvious he would very much like not to be fighting this war," said Baker, a lawyer and former general counsel to the National Security Agency. Obama "came into office thinking he would put an end to the use of force abroad and to unilateral
executive decision-making about what force could be used," said Baker, "and he's found himself actually being more Bush than Bush on that topic, taking existing authorities and stretching them far. " His written request to Congress for a war authorization lasting three years is an
attempt to "thread a needle," said Baker, "to say, 'Give me a lot of authority but not as much authority as you've given the president in the past,' because he is genuinely ambivalent about whether this is a good idea. "He's written it in a way that authorizes ground troops, just not for
very long or in any large numbers," said Baker. "He is visibly uncomfortable doing what he feels he must do, both politically and militarily, and any limits he can come up with, he's glad to embrace, especially if those limitations will mostly be felt by his successor," said Baker. Baker
also discussed the new cease-fire in Ukraine agreed to by Russia, which has been hit with international sanctions for backing separatists rebels in Ukraine and annexing Ukrainian territory. German and French leaders Angela Merkel and Franois Hollande helped broker the truce,
but Baker was doubtful that it will last any longer than Russian President Vladimir Putin wants it to. "He is playing, especially, Europe, but he's playing us as well," said Baker. "He's managed to increase the [Ukrainian] territory that is largely under the control of his Special Forces
and the rebels, and now the West has more or less validated that new territory in exchange for the same promise he gave last time," when Russia signed a ceasefire agreement in September. "So whether there's a cease-fire depends entirely on whether Putin really wants one," said
Baker, "and right now he may simply be saying, 'Well, in order to head off the delivery of arms to the Ukraine, I'll promise them the cease-fire and in a week I can take it back.'"

Animal Traceability DA

Agro-terror attack is likely causes disease outbreak, price spikes, and collapses the economy
HSNW 15 Homeland Security News Wire, Agroterrorism is a major threat to America: Experts
Ever since the 9/11 attacks, farmers

across the United States have been on high alert because the U.S. food supply remains vulnerable to terrorists seeking to harm
Americans and damage the economy through non-violent means. Agriculture is vulnerable to terrorists because we cant put a 12-foot chain link fence around every farm in Alabama and the rest of America, said Brad
Fields, a veterinarian who is director of Emergency Programs with the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries. Farmers and livestock producers have been urged actively to monitor their
facilities with security in mind. An analysis of agroterrorism by the College of Agricultural Sciences at Pennsylvania State University notes that most cattle diseases
are introduced through the purchase of infected animals. Some farms now isolate new animals from the rest of the herd for several days to watch for any symptoms of disease. The economic effects
of a successful attack on the U.S. food supply would be devastating, as agriculture accounts for roughly 13 percent of the countrys gross annual domestic
product. An introduction of deadly pathogens intoU.S. livestock, poultry, or crops would not only result in a disease outbreak, but would disrupt the global food
industry and drive up food prices. Agroterrorism is not limited to the intentional introduction of harmful pathogens into U.S. farms and livestock. Terrorists can also
cyberattack industrial agriculture systems responsible for operating feeding machines, maintaining milk temperatures, and processing foods. The ease of a cyberattack, and its anonymous nature, have some terrorism analysts questioning the
likelihood of a physical bioattack on the U.S food supply. Robert A. Norton, a veterinary microbiologist with research interests in cybersecurity and public health, insists that terrorists are not likely to plan an attack for which the government
has prepared a response. They often seek the path of least resistance. Industrial agriculture systems are vulnerable to cyberattacks and terrorists have the expertise to exploit those vulnerabilities. Rather than using biological weapons to kill
cattle or poisons to contaminate milk, why not just turn off the electricity? Doing that can kill the animals (e.g., chickens in commercial operations), [it] spoils the milk and makes the ground beef inedible, with the extra special bonus that it
also causes everyone to plunge into darkness (widespread panic), shutters access to bank ATMs and fuel, causes breathtaking gridlock and makes the government look totally helpless and inept, Norton writes.

Animal ID and traceability is key to zoning and compartmentalization those resolve the impact of an attack
Greene 10 -- Joel L. Greene Analyst in Agricultural Policy Animal Identification and Traceability: Overview and Issues

an animal ID and traceability system: 1. Enhances animal health surveillance and disease eradication. According to USDA, animal ID would facilitate
early detection of dangerous and costly animal disease outbreaks, while a traceability system would help to identify the source as well as those animal populations that
were exposed to the disease, and to contain them via zoning or compartmentalization. Together, USDA claims that a national animal ID and traceability program would likely
reduce animal producers disease testing costs by controlling and/or eradicating animal diseases at both regional and national levels. 2. Minimizes economic impact of an animal disease
outbreak. Regionalization or compartmentalization is a disease management tool that contains a disease outbreak to a specific zone, while leaving the remaining areas outside of that zone free of
Proponents argue that

the particular disease and not at risk for international trade restrictions. Rapid identification and compartmentalization of a disease outbreak limits both the spread of commercially harmful diseases and, thereby, the number of animals that would otherwise have to be destroyed or

Compartmentalization also facilitates re-establishing international market access

removed from marketing channels.

and the reopening of lost export markets. The more rapid the response to a disease outbreak,
the more limited the economic damage. 3. Increases domestic marketing opportunities. Many farmers and ranchers already keep track of individual animals and how they are being raised, in order to identify and exploit desirable production characteristicssuch as organic or
grass-fed or hormone-freethat can command substantial price premiums in certain retail markets. Universal bar codes on processed food, including many meats, are widely used by processors and retailers to manage inventories, add value to products, and monitor consumer
buying. When consumers seek meat, eggs, or milk from animals raised according to specified organic, humane treatment, or environmental standards, ID and traceability can help firms verify production methods. Government-coordinated programs also have been established for
these purposes. For example, a process verification program operated by USDAs Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) provides livestock and meat producers an opportunity to assure customers of their ability to provide consistent quality products by having their written
manufacturing processes confirmed through independent, third party audits, according to AMS. USDA Process Verified suppliers can have marketing claims such as breeds and feeding practices, and so label them, under this voluntary, fee-for-service program. Other programs
employing varying levels and types of traceability include the domestic origin requirement for USDA-purchased commodities used in domestic feeding programs; the national organic certification program, which AMS also oversees; and the mandatory country-of-origin labeling
(COOL) program. 4. Provides a valuable management tool for producers. A traceability program that follows animal products to consumers would provide post-mortem information on cattle with respect to success of various production techniques (e.g., feed types, feed-pasture
ratios, or genetics). Similarly, an ID system would be ideally suited for tracking the performance history, along with other relevant criteria, of racing or show animals. It would also increase transparency in the supply chain from producers to consumers; thereby reducing the risk of

Addresses food safety and

national security concerns. Federal and state food safety agencies collaborate with APHIS to protect the food supply from the introduction, through animals, of
threats to human health, such as tuberculosis, and foodborne illnesses from bacteria like Salmonella and E. coli O157:H7.11 Generally, when local health officials can link an illness to a particular product, firms and their regulators have
unfounded liability claims against livestock producers. Finally, an animal ID and traceability program would help producers maintain records on animal movements and health, breed registries, and other marketing activities. 5.

been able to trace that product back to the processor and/or slaughter facility. It has been more difficult to determine which particular animals, herds, or flocks were involved. Some believe that a more rigorous traceback and animal ID system would facilitate food recalls, possibly
contain the spread of a foodborne illness, and help authorities stem future incidents.12 Others, particularly many within the food industry, strongly disagree, countering that such a system would not be based on sound science, and would be technically unworkable and costly.

Disease outbreak causes extinction

GREGER 08 M.D., is Director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture at The Humane Society of the United States (Michael Greger, , Bird Flu: A Virus of Our Own Hatching,
Senate Majority Leader Frist describes the recent slew of emerging diseases in almost biblical terms: All of these [new diseases]

were advance patrols of a great army that is preparing way

out of sight.3146 Scientists like Joshua Lederberg dont think this is mere rhetoric. He should know. Lederberg won the Nobel Prize in medicine at age 33 for his discoveries in bacterial
evolution. Lederberg went on to become president of Rockefeller University. Some people think I am being hysterical, he said, referring to pandemic influenza, but there are catastrophes ahead.
We live in evolutionary competition with microbesbacteria and viruses. There is no guarantee that we will be the survivors.3147 There is a concept in host-parasite
evolutionary dynamics called the Red Queen hypothesis, which attempts to describe the unremitting struggle between immune systems and the pathogens against which they fight, each constantly evolving to try
to outsmart the other.3148 The name is taken from Lewis Carrolls Through the Looking Glass in which the Red Queen instructs Alice, Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same
place.3149 Because the pathogens

keep evolving, our immune systems have to keep adapting as well just to keep up. According to the theory, animals who stop running go extinct. So far our
immune systems have largely retained the upper hand, but the fear is that given the current rate of disease emergence, the human race is losing the race.3150 In a
Scientific American article titled, Will We Survive?, one of the worlds leading immunologists writes: Has the immune system, then, reached its apogee after the few hundred million years it had taken to
develop? Can it respond in time to the new evolutionary challenges? These perfectly proper questions lack sure answers because we are in an utterly unprecedented situation [given the number of newly emerging

viruses, and protozoa had a more than two-billion-year head start in this war, a victory
by recently arrived Homo sapiens would be remarkable.3152 Lederberg ardently believes that emerging viruses may imperil human society itself. Says NIH medical
infections].3151 The research team who wrote Beasts of the Earth conclude, Considering that bacteria,

epidemiologist David Morens, When you look at the relationship between bugs and humans, the more important thing to look at is the bug. When an enterovirus like polio goes through the human
gastrointestinal tract in three days, its genome mutates about two percent. That level of mutationtwo percent of the genomehas taken the human species eight million years to accomplish. So whos going to
adapt to whom? Pitted against that kind of competition, Lederberg concludes that the human evolutionary capacity to keep up may be dismissed as almost totally inconsequential.3153 To help prevent the
evolution of viruses as threatening as H5N1, the least we can do is take away a few billion feathered test tubes in which viruses can experiment, a few billion fewer spins at pandemic roulette. The human

species has existed in something like our present form for approximately 200,000 years. Such a long run should itself give us confidence that our species will continue to survive, at least insofar as
the microbial world is concerned. Yet such optimism, wrote the Ehrlich prize-winning former chair of zoology at the University College of London, might easily transmute into a tune
whistled whilst passing a graveyard.3154
Best studies prove growth solves conflict
Jedidiah Royal 10, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, Economic Integration, Economic Signalling And The Problem Of Economic Crises, in Economics of War
and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and
security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade
relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined
to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it
triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong
correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn . They write, The linkages between internal and
external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing . Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour .
Moreover, the presence of a recession lends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-rein force each other. (Blombcrj! & Hess. 2002. p. 89)
Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders
and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing
unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around
the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blombcrg. Mess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999). and
Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics arr greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic
leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support . DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak
economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

Food insecurity sparks World War 3

Calvin 98 (William, Theoretical Neurophysiologist U Washington, Atlantic Monthly, January, Vol 281, No. 1, p. 47-64)
The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling .

Plummeting crop yields would cause some powerful countries to try to take over their neighbors or distant
lands -- if only because their armies, unpaid and lacking food, would go marauding, both at home and across the borders. The better-organized countries
would attempt to use their armies, before they fell apart entirely, to take over countries with significant remaining resources, driving out or starving their
inhabitants if not using modern weapons to accomplish the same end: eliminating competitors for the remaining food. This would be a worldwide problem -- and could lead to a Third
World War -- but Europe's vulnerability is particularly easy to analyze. The last abrupt cooling, the Younger Dryas, drastically altered Europe's climate as far east as Ukraine. Present-day Europe has more
than 650 million people. It has excellent soils, and largely grows its own food. It could no longer do so if it lost the extra warming from the North Atlantic.


Agro-terror likely
AQ documents reveal attacks on food are likely
Taylor 14 Dennis, Source: U.S. Centers for Disease Control Agroterrorism: A looming threat to food supply
U.S. and British troops were routing al-Qaeda extremists from the caves and villages of Afghanistan, they came across terrorist planning documents left behind, including U.S. agricultural
documents, according to the Department of Homeland Security. In another case, British intelligence raided a terrorist safe house in London and discovered an entire al-Qaeda training
manual, complete with bioterrorism instruction and references to food supplies . The training manual was subsequently leaked and posted to a website in the U.S. (The Californian is not disclosing the website, but an
abridged version can be found on the U.S. Department of Justice's website). " There's enough out there on the Internet to cause all kinds of harm ." Goldenberg said. Federal agencies are taking a two-prong approach. They are
What's on the horizon? As

focusing on training individuals on the local level who will be the first to be called on to manage ment the crisis. Food processing operations staff, fire and police departments, county agriculture officials and public health workers. The second prong involves a systematic research
effort with labs all across the country. Some are academic and others are government supported, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Project BioShield was launched a few years after the 9/11 attacks
when the federal government determined that it would need what it calls "new medical countermeasures," such as diagnostic tests, drugs and vaccines to respond to an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents, or "CBRN." And there are precious little of these
countermeasures available in the open market. "Since diseases and conditions caused by CBRN agents occur infrequently, the private sector did not have an economic incentive to invest the millions of dollars necessary to research and develop such measures," according to the

Much of the onus to manage an attack is going to fall on the food producers themselves, at least initially.

Association Of State And Territorial Health Officials.

In language recently added to the
Food Safety Modernization Act, which is still in draft form but nearing completion, officials added the word "security" to the mandate that food producers have food safety plans. They are now food safety and security plans. Goldenberg acknowledged that it will be tough hoeing,
noting that "unless someone takes a leadership role, many in the industry will just say, 'Oh, it's too hard.' " Then the question becomes: Who is going to pay for the stepped up security? If the industry has to shoulder the costs, then it's just going to roll right down to consumers.
Goldenberg said he would like to see an organized volunteer system similar to Neighborhood Watch designed for rural farming areas. Kennedy, the lettuce grower and former Salinas mayor, is optimistic about uniting as an industry to help thwart possible attacks. "Our industry has

A few
examples of biological agents that could be deployed in the food-supply chain. Anthrax:Bacillus anthracis is a soil-based bacterium. When nonfungal spores enter the human body, the bacteria become
activated. Respiratory infection in humans initially presents with cold or flu-like symptoms for several days, followed by pneumonia and severe respiratory collapse and death. Botulism: Clostridium botulinum is a food-borne bacteria that produces a toxin that causes muscle
paralysis, including respiratory muscles that can cause a person to stop breathing. Pneumonic plague: Yersinia pestis is a bacteria that can be weaponized in aerosol form. Without early treatment, pneumonic plague often leads to respiratory failure, shock and rapid
death. Smallpox: There are two types of the highly contagious disease, each with different fatality rates. Variola major, the most common form, can kill three in 10 of its victims. In its naturally occurring state, smallpox has been eradicated, but there are concerns that
stockpiles may still exist. Tularemia: A bacteria that is highly infectious, requiring only 10-50 organisms to cause disease. Weaponized tularemia would be made airborne. It can cause lethal pneumonia.
Hemorrhagic fevers: A class of naturally occurring viruses that attack multiple human organ systems. Ebola is one such virus a current outbreak in West Africa has killed at least 2,400 in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Source: U.S. Centers for Disease Control
a pretty good history of organizing around critical issues," he said. It will need to. Certainly the bad guys are organizing. Senior Writer Dennis L. Taylor covers agriculture for The Follow him on Twitter @taylor_salnews. Know thine enemy

Its likely and not hard to do

Taylor 14 Dennis, Source: U.S. Centers for Disease Control Agroterrorism: A looming threat to food supply
there is one thing all farmers have in common: The food they produce is extremely vulnerable to a devastating act of agroterrorism. The
government is becoming increasingly anxious about potential attacks on our food supply, principally because introducing agents that would cause mass sickness or
economic calamity isn't that hard to do, and there are precious few defenses in place to prevent such a misdeed. Crisis management and recovery planning get most of the
attention but prevention is a moving target because of limited technology, funding and awareness. Agroterrorism is defined as an intentional criminal act perpetrated on some segment of the agriculture industry and/or the food system, intended
to inflict harm, either through a health crisis or economic disruption. There are hundreds of ways pathogens, poisons, chemicals, toxins or radiological agents could be introduced into
the supply chain at any time. It could come as a small amount of botulism introduced into a tanker carrying milk ultimately destined for elementary schools. Or other deadly germs or lethal toxins could be mixed with fertilizer and then sprayed onto crops.
From California to New England,

Well heads could be tampered with. One of the most effective and devastating attacks would be to target processed produce immediately after it is washed and before it is bagged and loaded onto trucks for mass distribution. The coastal Salinas Valley of Monterey County is
home to the largest production of lettuce and leafy greens in the United States and half the state's strawberry crop. Billions of dollars' worth of salad greens, strawberries and commodity crops are grown and processed every year in this valley. Cool nights and warm days make
Salinas one of the most ideal climates in the world for growing specialty crops. The Salinas Valley is a microcosm that can serve to illustrate how, in one incident, a terrorist could sicken or kill thousands, cause billions of dollars in damage to the food industry, instill fear in the
populace and destroy faith in the government's ability to protect its citizens.


Traceability detects, deters, and allows rapid response to agro-terror and disease
Brewster 04 the Prairie Star Traceability in the beef industry
One of this nation's beef industry experts outlined the benefits of traceability identification program during a keynote address at the 53rd Annual Montana Livestock Forum and Nutrition
Conference at the GranTree Inn here. "We are interested in traceability because it can do some things for us in food safety, and it can do some things for us in protecting us from agroterrorism," Dr Gary
Smith said. "It can also help to protect us from disease, it can help us to identify productive cattle and it can help us to sell our products more effectively." Smith, professor of meat science and holder of the MontFort chair at Colorado State University
in Fort Collins, said through traceability the industry is trying to capture data and share information so that producers know what they are producing and can share
the awards associated with their products. "They can start by tracking the performance of weanling cattle," he said. "In terms of health, their feedlot performance and it can follow through to their performance in
the cooler so we know what kind of carcass and what kind of a product they produce." Smith said that people get confused with the term animal identification. "Animal ID is easy to do," he said. "You put a tag in their ear. Traceability is
something completely different. In traceability, you are trying to assure that you can get your arms around a population of cattle in the case of a
catastrophe." His detailed comments came during an update on traceability in the beef industry and the pending animal identification program. Smith said that a comprehensive traceability program with a workable animal ID
program is also needed because of homeland security concerns regarding food terrorism and by intentional food contamination. " The main deterrent to a
bio terrorist in agriculture is traceability," he said. "If they know we can trace exactly where the animal has been and where it is going - where the products are going - they will be much less likely to try to use a terrorist act." But he said U.S. Department of
Health experts are concerned that there is a high likelihood that in the next year people will get sick because of a case of food terrorism or by an incident
of intentional food contamination. The animal ID program is up and ready and close to working in the United States according to Smith. "Our program was accelerated because we had difficulty in
BOZEMAN, Mont. -

identifying the animals that came into the United States with the original indexed cow after the first BSE case was identified," he said. "We gave up on tracing up and tracing back and we still never found 58 of those cattle that came with the identified cow." In conjunction with the Meat Export Federation, he said his faculty members
looked at the worldwide traceability programs. Those programs had objectives such as animal disease prevention and management, fraud management, food safety, building consumer confidence, meeting foreign country requirements and production improvement. The program in the United States was very unsatisfactory, he said. The
countries that did a tremendous job of meeting those objectives included Canada, Australia, Japan the European Union and Brazil. Before the Canadian BSE case, he said Canada had a cosmetic system that failed because the system didn't include tagging until the animal left the farm. Canada is now moving toward an electronic
individual identification program using radio frequency individual identification. The United States, he said, was no where when it came to tracking and tracing animal movements. The hormone-free beef program in the United States that sells beef to the European Union ranked among the best but only 8,000 head went through the
program. Australia and Brazil are doing the best job of group identification, he said. "We are so horribly behind in the worldwide picture because we haven't had an export mentality and have not considered that it is important in selling our product," he said. A traceability program would also save the industry money because with proper
identification, determining which cattle are over 30 months of age could be a lot more accurate. The professor said the industry is losing between $71 and $123 on cattle older than 30 months of age. The technology is already in place around the world to make traceability work, he said. The United Kingdom uses an accurate program that
includes tagging and a passport but the number being harvested is only in the hundreds instead of in the thousands that are processed at large United States packing plants. When over 6,000 head enter a plant every day, he said, it is impossible to wipe off tags and write down numbers.The best way to do it, he said is with a radio
frequency identification system.

In addition to the U.S. Animal Identification Plan that has been proposed there are nine bills working through Congress that provide

alternatives. Along with the issue of whether a program should be voluntary or mandatory, there is concern about the government and others obtaining information on producers through the Freedom of Information Act. The best approach, he said, is to use a group of data service providers who can collect data. The data
would go to a data trustee who would hold the information. The federal government would only obtain access to the data in the case of a national emergency. Because of the upcoming election, he said the administration is not trying to force things. That's one reason for the voluntary-mandatory approach being proposed by the
Department of Agriculture. While the issue is being debated by the ag industry, Smith said Microsoft has been asked by Wal-Mart to put chips on everything they sell. Before long, he said, they will be putting them on steaks roasts and ground beef. In the meantime, meat processors selling to McDonalds were meeting recently with
company officials to talk about traceability. McDonalds is telling them that they want traceability and will pay a premium for traceability until everyone has traceability or they won't be able to sell to McDonalds. "It appears that that the people who sell our products to end users are going to force the system back through the chain." He
said John Paterson recently put it in the right perspective when he said the consumer will place greater demand on the livestock producer to tell them where meat came from and how it was produced. "Failure to respond is not an option, he said."

Traceability is constantly being innovated k2 prevent terrorist attack

Nightingale 04 -- Stephen D. Nightingale, MD New Technologies for Food Traceability: Package and Product Markers
The market for technologies to trace consumable products such as foods and drugs is driven by three forces. The first is the safety of foods and drugs, which must be
continuously monitored and occasionally recalled to prevent intrinsic or emerging pathogens, or human error during production processes, from adulterating the product and harming the consumer. The second is the security
of foods and drugs, which is increasingly threatened by theft, counterfeiting, adulteration and the possibility of terrorism. The third is consumer demand for traceability, which reflects public perception of the safety and security of
foods and drugs, as influenced by local cultural and economic factors. Consumer demand for traceability, agricultural or pharmaceutical, is expressed directly at the cash register by
willingness to pay for it, and expressed indirectly through government regulations and import/export policies. The globalization of both the food and drug industries has substantially increased each of these forces.
Control needed to assure the safety and security of any manufactured product diminishes over distance, and traceability is needed to compensate for this loss of control. Furthermore, when a product is marketed in many countries, it must meet consumer, regulatory and border
protection agent standards in each of those countries. As a result, the most stringent requirement in any of these countries becomes the de facto standard for them all. However, the market for tracing technologies has been restrained by three complementary forces. The first is cost,
which is particularly important in the low-margin, high-volume food business. However, globalization and the Internet make this issue prominent in the drug industry, as well, as the debate over reimportation of pharmaceuticals illustrates. The second is skepticism, by some
manufacturers but also by some consumers, about whether the symbolic benefits of traceability to the consumer are accompanied by meaningful consumer benefits, such as increased product safety or availability. The third is concern that facilitating traceability back to the
manufacturer will facilitate tracing product liability back to the manufacturer, as well. To overcome these restraints, marketers of tracing technologies need to develop value propositions for their products. For food safety, the proposition might be that the opportunity to perform a
more efficient recall or lookback can lower the overall cost of quality control and quality assurance. For food security, the proposition might be that the presence of an overt or covert marking system either deters or increases recovery from theft or terrorism. For customer demand,

Fortunately for inventors and entrepreneurs, as long as there is a value

proposition for tracing technologies, there will be a value proposition for new tracing technologies. This is because the life cycle of all defensive
technologies is finite, and tracing technologies are fundamentally defensive technologies . The U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing, for example, estimates the life cycle of an anticounterfeiting technology to
the proposition might be that the premium the consumer is willing to pay exceeds the increased exposure to product liability claims.

be seven years.

A2: Doesnt Work

Even if it doesnt prevent an attack, it contains the spread and solves the economy impact
Greene 10 -- Joel L. Greene Analyst in Agricultural Policy Animal Identification and Traceability: Overview and Issues

Minimizes economic impact of an animal disease outbreak. Regionalization or compartmentalization is a disease management tool that contains a disease outbreak to
a specific zone, while leaving the remaining areas outside of that zone free of the particular disease and not at risk for international trade restrictions. Rapid
identification and compartmentalization of a disease outbreak limits both the spread of commercially harmful diseases and, thereby, the number of animals that would otherwise have to be
destroyed or removed from marketing channels. Compartmentalization also facilitates re-establishing international market access and the reopening of lost export markets. The more rapid the
response to a disease outbreak, the more limited the economic damage.

Impact Things

Turns econ
Destroys the economy 3 internal links
1). Cost of response
2). Compensation
3). Embargos

Kimery 10 -- Anthony L. Kimery, Editor-in-Chief, draws on more than 30 years of experience and extensive contacts as he investigates and analyzes homeland security, counterterrorism and border security. "The Kimery Report" was awarded a 2008 National ASBPE
Award for Original Web News Section. He most recently won a 2014 regional gold ASBPE award for impact/investigative journalism. His report, "Savage Struggle on the Border," was the lead report in the series of the same title that won the 2010 National ASBPE Gold Award for
best magazine series. The Threat Of Bioterrorism And The Ability To Detect It\

An attack or attacks could cause mass disruption and pockets of illnesses, Larsen said, but the larger impact would be economic, noting that one in seven people work
in the food industry in production, processing and retail sales. Larsen pointed out that a sophisticated attack on our meat supply using Hoof and Mouth disease would require the destruction of 50 million cloven-hoofed animals to get the disease under control and to control the economic impact. I worry more
about the economic impact than I do a mass casualty impact, Larsen said. Indeed. The HHS-FDA report stated that the deliberate or accidental contamination of food [could] have enormous economic implications in
the US, where one out of every eight Americans is estimated to work in an occupation directly linked to food production. The study said food terrorists may have economic disruption as their primary motive. At least three types of economic effects may be
generated by an act of food terrorism, the study concluded. These could be from direct economic losses attributable to the costs of responding to the act; indirect multiplier effects from
compensation paid to affected producers and the losses suffered by affiliated industries, such as suppliers, transporters, distributors and restaurant chains; and international costs in the form
of trade embargoes imposed by trading partners. Though the costs associated with the food sabotage are unavailable, the study said, reports from unintentional contamination incidents demonstrate the tremendous costs of responding to such events. In 1998, a company in the US recalled nearly 16,000
metric tons of frankfurters and luncheon meats potentially contaminated with Listeria monocytogenes, at a total cost of $50 million to $70 million. The company reported spending more than $100 million in the following two years to improve food safety and convince consumers that its products were safe. Indirect
costs, HHS and FDA concluded, can be staggering as well. The US Department of Agriculture estimates that foodborne illnesses linked to five pathogens costs the economy $6.9 billion annually, noting that the outbreak from Salmonella-contaminated ice cream was estimated to have cost the US
economy about $18.1 million in medical care and time lost from work. Agriculture and the general food industry remain absolutely critical to the social, economic and, arguably, political stability of the US, indirectly constituting roughly two percent of the countrys overall domestic gross domestic product (GDP), stated RAND Corp.
policy analyst Peter Chalk during a Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, in October 2001. Reiterating that one in eight people work in some component of agriculture more if food production is included, this makes the industry one of the US largest employers.
Cattle and dairy farmers alone earn between $50 and $54 billion a year through meat and milk sales, while roughly $50 billion is raised every year through agricultural exports. The share of produce sold overseas is more than double that of other US industries, which gives agriculture major importance in terms of the American balance

the downstream effect of

any deliberate act of sabotage/destruction to this highly valuable industry would be enormous; creating a tidal wave effect that would be felt by all
these sectors, impacting, ultimately, on the ordinary citizen him/herself. Unfortunately, Chalk warned lawmakers, the agricultural and food industries remain highly vulnerable to deliberate (and accidental) disruption. But, Chalk said although
of trade. Chalk told the subcommittee that these figures represent only a fraction of the total value of agriculture to the country, as they do not take into account allied services and industries such as suppliers, transporters, distributors and restaurant chains. He noted that

over the [previous] decade many states, particularly in North America and Western Europe, have made substantial investments in improving their ability to detect, prevent and respond to terrorist threats and incidents [that] has fed into an increasingly well-protected public infrastructure throughout much of the developed world
where, at a minimum, effectively developed vulnerability-threat analyses have been used to maximize both anti-terrorist contingencies and consequence management modalities Agriculture [nevertheless] is one area that has received very little attention in this regard. In terms of accurate threat assessments, response structures and
preparedness initiatives, Chalk said, the sector continues to exist as a glaring exception to the wide-ranging emphasis that has been given to critical infrastructure protection in this country. And still does, authorities told

Genetic Diversity
destroys genetic diversity
Dudley 2 JP Dudley, Institute of Arctic Biology U Alaska Fairbanks, and M.H. Wolford, Not Kurt, Chair Office International des Epizooties Working Group on Wildlife Diseases, Portugal, Bioweapons,
Bioterrorism, and Biodiversity, 2002,

bioweapon diseases present a very real danger to agricultural

ecosystems, wildlife faunas and wildlife habitats. Genetically modified zoonotic and epizootic diseases (plague, tularemia, anthrax) and cultivated diseases of
livestock (foot and mouth disease IFMD], rinderpest, brucellosis) are potentially very serious threats to livestock, wildlife and endangered species populations. There are
concerns that plant diseases developed for use against cereal crops, opium poppies (Papaver somnferum), and coca (Eiythrnxylon spp.) (e.g. Fusarium spp. and Pleospora papaveraceae)
might infect and proliferate among non-target plant species (35). The genetic diversity of local crop varieties and traditional livestock breeds is a critically
important asset of global agriculture that may be subject to severe damage from deliberate or accidental bioweapon releases.
Military and terrorist applications of biotechnology are threats to more than just human lives and human societies; certain

Genetic diversity prevents extinction

Fowler and Mooney 90, Cary Fowler and Pat Mooney, Rural Advancement Fund International, Shattering: Food, Politics, and the Loss of Genetic Diversity, 1990, p. ix
While many may ponder the consequences of global warming, perhaps the

biggest single environmental catastrophe in human history is unfolding in the garden . While all
are rightly concerned about the possibility of nuclear war, an equally devastating time bomb is ticking away in the fields of farmers all over the world. Loss of genetic
diversity in agriculturesilent, rapid, inexorableis leading us to a rendezvous with extinctionto the doorstep of hunger on a scale we refuse to
imagine. To simplify the environment as we have done with agriculture is to destroy the complex interrelationships that hold the natural world together. Reducing the diversity of life, we
narrow our options for the future and render our own survival more precarious. It is life at the end of the limb. That is the subject of this book. Agronomists in the
Philippines warned of what became known as southern corn leaf blight in 1061.' The disease was reported in Mexico not long after. In the summer of 1968, the first faint hint that the blight was in the United
States came from seed growers in the Midwest. The danger was ignored. By the spring of 19701 the disease had taken hold in the Florida corn crop. But it was not until corn prices leapt thirty cents a bushel on
the Chicago Board of Trade that the world took notice; by then it was Augustand too late. By the close of the year, Americans had lost fifteen percent of their most important cropmore than a billion bushels.
Some southern states lost half their harvest and many of their farmers. While consumers suffered in the grocery stores, producers were out a billion dollars in lost yield. And the disaster was not solely domestic.
U.S. seed exports may have spread the blight to Africa, Latin America and Asia .

Defense of Price Spikes Impact

Empirical data proves food price spikes crush low-income countries and cause instability
Arezki and Brckner 11 International Monetary Fund (Arezki) and University of Adelaide (Brckner). Food Prices and Political Instability
We examined in this paper empirically the effects that changes in the international food prices have on measures of democracy and intra-state stability in a
panel of over 120 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding was that during times of international food price increases political institutions in Low
Income Countries significantly deteriorated. To explain this finding we documented that food price increases in Low Income Countries significantly increased the likelihood of civil
conflict and other forms of civil strife, such as anti-government demonstrations and riots. From a macroeconomic perspective, it is worthwhile to restate that international food price increases induced in the net food exporting countries a significant increase in real
per capita GDP and real per capita investment (the terms of trade effect). At the same time, international food price increases induced a significant decrease in real per capita consumption and a
significant increase in income inequality. Thus, increases in the international food prices had real macroeconomic effects that went beyond average per capita income: they
were associated with a significant decrease in consumption and a significant increase in the gap between rich and poor. All in all, our empirical results are broadly
consistent with the often made claim by policy makers and the press that food price increases put at stake the socio-economic and political stability of the
world's poorest countries. Arguably a large share of the variation in the international food prices is due to changes in the demand and supply of the High and Middle Income Countries. A natural question beyond the scope of this paper is what can and should be
done by the developed world and international organizations in response to drastic increases in international food prices.

Threat Real
attacks on food are possible and likely they go global even unintentional contamination kills hundreds of thousands
Kimery 10 -- Anthony L. Kimery, Editor-in-Chief, draws on more than 30 years of experience and extensive contacts as he investigates and analyzes homeland security, counterterrorism and border security. "The Kimery Report" was awarded a 2008 National ASBPE
Award for Original Web News Section. He most recently won a 2014 regional gold ASBPE award for impact/investigative journalism. His report, "Savage Struggle on the Border," was the lead report in the series of the same title that won the 2010 National ASBPE Gold Award for
best magazine series. The Threat Of Bioterrorism And The Ability To Detect It\

DHS has stated that the prospect of a mass-scale food contamination event is of particular concern because the nation is subject to major unintentional foodborne illness
individuals with malevolent aims could reproduce these outbreaks with more dire consequences. Now, can you imagine what a well-coordinated
terrorist attack could do if theyre using a really nasty pathogen? asked a veteran counterterrorism official who has been dealing with the threat of a biological terrorist attack. The October 2003 Department of Health and Human Services ( HHS) and FDA
report, Risk Assessment for Food Terrorism and Other Food Safety Concerns, noted that just major outbreaks of foodborne illness occur all too frequently, and sometimes affect hundreds of
thousands of people. Among the largest reported outbreaks caused by unintentional biological contamination, the report stated, was an outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium infection that sickened approximately 170,000 people in 1985 and was linked to postTerror bio-attack is real

outbreaks. Experts reason that an individual or

pasteurization contamination of milk from a US dairy plant. An outbreak of hepatitis A caused by tainted clams affected nearly 300,000 people in China in 1991 and may be the largest foodborne disease incident in history. Then, in 1994, an outbreak of Salmonella Enteritidis

today's global marketplace, the contamination of food in one country can have a significant effect on public health in other parts of the world, the joint
infection linked to a contaminated ice cream pre-mix sickened an estimated 224,000 people in 41 states in the US, and in 1996, about 8,000 children in Japan became ill, and some died, after eating E. coli 0157:H7-tainted radish sprouts served in school lunches.

HHS-FDA report emphasized, noting that in 1989, approximately 25,000 people in 30 states in the US were sickened by Salmonella Chester in cantaloupes imported from Mexico. And, in 1996 and 1997, 2,500 people in 21 states in the US and two Canadian provinces developed

If an unintentional contamination of one food , such as clams, can affect 300,000 individuals, a concerted, deliberate attack
on food could be devastating, especially if a more dangerous chemical, biological or radionuclear agent were used, the HHS-FDA report concluded, adding, it would be reasonable to assume that
a terrorist using the food supply as a vehicle for attack would use an agent that would maximize the number of deaths associated with the contamination, and that many of
Cyclospora infections after eating tainted Guatemalan raspberries.

these agents are the same pathogens that have been linked to significant outbreaks of foodborne illness due to unintentional contamination. A top government public health official told on background because of the politically sensitive nature of his position that while
most foodborne pathogens cause relatively mild self-limited illnesses, [they] certainly could cause nationwide distress. The ones which would have a greater potential for more serious life-threatening illnesses would include E. coli O157 and Botulism. The later is especially of great
concern due to the fact that very miniscule amounts of the toxin are needed to contaminate food to cause the paralytic disease, and you dont need viable replicating organisms - only the pre-formed toxin. The incubation period for both would be very short, within 24 hours or so
depending on dosage. In 2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) adopted a resolution stating it was "[d]eeply concerned that foodborne illness associated with microbial pathogens, biotoxins and chemical contaminants in food represent a serious threat to the health of

The recent scare that Al Qaeda or one of its affiliated movements (AQAM) might try to carry out a biological attack in the US was brought to light
by a DHS intelligence alert distributed to selected hotel and restaurant executives. Officials said the alert was in response to a credible threat. But this is isn't a new AQ threat,
veteran WMD counterterrorism intelligence officials stressed. The officials told that theyve been aware for some time of AQs desire to contaminate fresh foods in the United States,
especially with highly pathogenic bacteria cultured in large batches that, for example, could be put in syringes that could then be used to spray the potentially deadly pathogens on fresh food like produce and vegetables. The
officials said intelligence indicated AQ has considered deploying cadres of Americans whod been recruited and converted into jihadists who could get jobs in fresh food production, distribution and transportation. Through their access to large bulk
packaging, distribution and transportation inside the nations massive food processing system, they might be able to contaminate large amounts of fresh
food shipments. Former Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell said one of our greatest concerns continues to be that a terrorist group or some other dangerous group might acquire and employ biological agents to create casualties greater than
September 11. In his 2004 resignation speech, former HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson declared: I, for the life of me, cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do. Homeland Security Today earlier
reported (see The WMD Connection in January 2010) that counterterrorism authorities have long been concerned that AQ is much more likely to attempt to carry out a mass casualty attack using biological
agents rather than lethal chemicals or radiological or nuclear weapons. Pathogenic bacteria are bacteria that cause bacterial infection like tuberculosis, which is caused by the bacterium Mycobacterium Tuberculosis, which kills roughly two million people a year. Other
millions of people in the world."

pathogenic bacteria include those that cause foodborne illnesses like Salmonella. Pathogenic bacteria also are responsible for tetanus, typhoid fever, diphtheria, syphilis and leprosy.



We arent winning the GWOT organizations are growing
Rothkopf 14 David Rothkopf is CEO and Editor of the FP Group. His latest book, National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear was published in October., We Are Losing the War on Terror

Terrorism is spreading worldwide. Our enemies have sustained our blows, adapted,
and grown. Two questions loom large as a consequence: Where did we go wrong and what do we do now? Recent headlines and new studies support the conclusion that global terror trends are heading in an ever more
dangerous direction. In early June, the Rand Corporation released a study that detailed the growing threat. It reports that in 2007, there were 28 Salafi-jihadist groups like al Qaeda. As of last year, there were 49. In 2007, these groups conducted 100 attacks. Last
The ground truth about the spread of terrorism will be a hard one for many Americans to swallow after 13 costly years of war.

year, they conducted 950. The study estimates that there were between 18,000 and 42,000 such terrorists active seven years ago. The low-end estimate for last year, at 44,000, is higher than the top estimate for 2007, and the new high-end estimate is 105,000. The administration

core al Qaeda" has sustained "huge" damage. But "core al Qaeda" no longer poses the principle threat to the U.S. homeland. That comes, according to the
The most
significant threat to the United States, the report concludes, comes from terrorist groups operating in Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan ." As legitimate as
rightly argues that "

Rand report, from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As Rand summarizes the report: "Since 2010, there has been a 58 percent increase in the number of jihadist groups, a doubling of jihadist fighters and a tripling of attacks by Al Qaeda affiliates.

the questions that have emerged in the Bowe Bergdahl case may be, they are secondary to the deteriorating situation associated with the war the recently released prisoner went to Afghanistan to fight. There is no denying that the contempt for Congress shown in failing to inform it
of the deal even as perhaps 100 in the administration knew of it starkly reveals the cynicism behind last years faux deferral to Congress on Syria. But it would be far more cynical to continue with the Obama teams variation on the "mission accomplished" misrepresentations of
his predecessor. The war in Iraq was not over or won when we said it was. Nor is the war on terror won or the threat it poses resolved simply by no longer using the term or suggesting our goal was merely to inflict damage on the tiny fraction of terrorists who were associated with

The reality is that we are still fighting the last war on terror even as a new set of risks loom and are made worse by our minimizing their implications for political purposes. In its recent
assessment, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2013," the State Department acknowledged the trend. It observes that last year attacks worldwide increased almost by half , from
6,700 to 9,700. Nearly 18,000 people died and nearly 33,000 were injured. While the report hails allied forces for making progress combating al Qaedas core in the AfPak region, it also notes that the groups affiliates are becoming more dangerous. The report takes
the 9/11 attacks.

particular note of the threat posed by foreign extremists in Syria, which has become a kind of petri dish in which a growing global terror threat is being cultivated. Estimates on the number of such fighters range from 7,000 to over 20,000. The news that one recent suicide bomberin
Syria was an American and that one of the attackers behind the recent shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium spent time in Syria suggests how this threat may evolve over time. Its not unlikely that, if left unchecked, the long-term consequences of a cadre of fighters trained in
Syria who will soon return to their home countries will be one of the darkest legacies of that war a legacy that may well echo the long-term costs associated with training jihadists in the battle against the Russians in Afghanistan in the 1980s, among whom, of course, was Osama
bin Laden.

Losing the GWOT bad leadership and info fails

Seidel 14 -- Jamie Seidel News Corp Australia Network US General Daniel Bolger frankly admits the War on Terror was lost by poor leadership
I AM a United States Army General, and I lost the global war on terrorism These chilling words are those of Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger. And he doesnt expect things to get any better. From this opening sentence in his book, Why We Lost: A Generals Inside Account of the
Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, General Bolger paints a bleak picture of conflicts of interests, confused agendas and a general lack of knowing what victory is anyway. Its like Alcoholics Anonymous, he says. Step one is admitting you have a problem. Well, I have a problem. So do my

now all of America has a problem. To wit: two lost campaigns and a war gone awry. Its not the soldiers Theyre fighting harder than ever before, he says. The courage,
discipline, and lethality of our Americans in uniform stand with anything accomplished in the Civil War, both world wars, Korea, or Vietnam. That all went very right. What went wrong squandered the bravery, sweat, and blood of these fine Americans. Our primary
failing in the war involved generalship. If you prefer the war-college lexicon, we guys like me demonstrated poor strategic and operational leadership. He went on to tell National Public Radio
earlier this week: The mistakes, the errors made by guys like me have to be accounted for and explained so we can learn and do better in the event we have to do something like this again. In his book and in public, General Bolger is surprisingly
frank about his and his militarys failures: I was present when key decisions were made, delayed, or avoided . I made, delayed, or avoided a few myself. By the enemys hand, abetted by my ignorance, my arrogance, and
peers. And thanks to our problem,

the inexorable fortunes of war, I lost eighty men and women under my charge; more than three times that number were wounded. Those sad losses are all my fault. Things started going wrong before the War on Terror even started. We should have known this one was going
to go bad when we couldnt even settle on a name. In the wake of the horrific al-Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001, we tried out various labels, General Bolger writes. The guys in the Pentagon basement at first offered Operation Infinite Justice, which sounded fine, both

what was his biggest problem? Fighting the right enemy We knew
United States went to war against Iraq. We ended up fighting Sunni Arab insurgents who again although they might make common cause with alQaeda those werent the guys who attacked us on 9/11, General Bolger said. We waged a Global War on Terrorism against enemies referred to vaguely as
terrorists, cowards, evildoers, and extremists. Although those descriptions were rather generic, somehow we always ended up going after the same old bunch of Islamists and their ilk. Our opponents had no illusions about who our targets were,
even if some of us did. His cause also had little support. It became obvious that we were fighting an insurgent enemy mixed into a civil population that was suspicious of us anyway as outsiders -and that was true in both Afghanistan and Iraq, he said. The next
problem was information Despite the billions spent on spy networks that reach into the mobile phones and email accounts of almost everyone on earth,
little was known about the US Armys actual opponents . Its very, very difficult to take even the great troops that we have and send them into a village to try and sort out which ... might be insurgents, who might be just people living in
almighty and righteous. Then various hand-wringers noted that it might upset the Muslims Well, better incoherent than insensitive, I guess. Aside from semantics,

within a day or two of the 9/11 attacks that it was al-Qaeda, a terrorist network that had a headquarters element, if you would call it that, or a chairman of the board in Osama bin Laden But thats not who we ended up fighting most of the time, he said. Instead,

the area (and) who might potentially be government supporters, he said, especially when you dont speak the language and you really dont understand whats going on in that village very well.

Domestic terror growing internet anonymity
Konstantinides 15 -- ANNETA KONSTANTINIDES FOR DAILYMAIL.COM Report claims 'Lone Wolf' domestic terrorism is on the rise... with an attack or plan foiled every 34 days since 2009
While recent attacks in Paris and Sydney dominate the headlines, a new report has found that

domestic terrorism by 'lone wolf' assailants is on the rise. A terrorist attack or foiled encounter has

taken place, on average, every 34 days in the US since 2009, according to a study released today by the Southern Poverty Law Center. The watchdog group urged the government to pay more attention to domestic terrorist attacks, citing 63 victims in six
years from plots carried out by American extremists, including right-wing radicals and homegrown jihadists. Mark Potok, the study's editor, said the report was not 'trying to diminish the very real jihadist threat' abroad, but rather implored the
government to take notice of the dangers at home as well, according to Yahoo! News. 'We have known since Timothy McVeigh murdered 168 people in Oklahoma City in 1995 that there is a very real and very substantial threat in terms
of terrorism from our fellow Americans,' he said. The concept of the 'lone wolf', defined as a person who carries out a terrorist attack entirely on his own, gained popularity in the 1980s from a violent member of the Ku Klux Klan. Louis Beam advocated for radicals to stop acting
together in large groups - which only made it easier for them to get caught - and instead called for 'lone wolf action or leaderless resistance' that involved no more than six men. The SPLC study found that 74 per cent of the 63 incidents examined from April 1, 2009, through
Feburary 1, 2015, were carried out or planned by a single person. And 90 per cent of the incidents were just the work of one or two people. According to the report, lone wolf's are all the more dangerous because often nobody else knows about their plan for violence.

This is

because homegrown terrorists are hiding themselves 'in the anonymity and safety of the Internet', Potok said. +4 +4 The 2012 massacre of six people at a Wisconsin Sikh temple by a neo-Nazi, and the
murder of two police officers and a bystander last summer by a Las Vegas couple with anti-government views, were two of the incidents included in the study. Following the recent attacks in Sydney and Paris, the White House will hold a summit
next week to discuss countering violent extremism. Another recent terrorist act included was the massacre of six people at a Wisconsin Sikh temple by neo-Nazi Wade Michael Page (pictured) But Potok has concerns the meeting will focus
too heavily 'on the threat of Islamist terrorism'. 'The government, at least in our view, has fallen down in many ways with respect to dealing with domestic terrorism' he said. National Security Council spokesman Ned Price said the summit will not focus 'on any particular religion,
ideology or political movement,' he wrote in an email to Yahoo News. He said the summit will 'address contemporary challenges' and attempt to 'draw lessons that are applicable to the full spectrum of violent extremists'. A task force dedicated to domestic terrorism was created
after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, but it disbanded not long after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Department of Homeland Security's team dedicated to non-Islamic domestic terrorism similarly fell apart in 2009 after it was heavily criticized for a report stating that
right-wing radicalism grew exponentially following the election of Barack Obama to office in 2009. Attorney General Eric Holder announced last summer that the task force that disintegrated in 2001 would be revived, although the SPLC has noted that a meeting has yet to be held.
The report found that there were two main motivations fueling domestic terrorism. Almost half of the attacks in the last six years were fueled by anti-government radicals, whereas 51 per cent of the incidents were inspired by ideologies 'of hate', including both white supremacy and
radical Islamism. But after the recent attacks in Paris and Sydney, combined with the ongoing brutality of ISIS, Potok said Muslims in America are 'clearly under fire'. This week three young American-born Muslim students in North Carolina were brutally executed by their neighbor
Craig Stephen Hicks. Although the most recent shooting in Chapel Hill has yet to be ruled a hate crime - police believe it was caused by a parking dispute - Potok said he believes the country will only continue to see similar violence. '

before it gets better.'

It is very likely to get worse

Link biz

Surveillance not key

Soo many other problems with the FBI surveillance doesnt solve
Sink and Wilber 15 Justin, Del Quentin Bloomberg politics Lone Wolf Terrorists, Cyber Threats Put New Pressure on FBI

The FBI urgently needs to accelerate intelligence-gathering capabilities at home and abroad to confront evolving terrorist threats, a panel
reviewing the bureaus response since the Sept. 11 attacks said. Returning foreign fighters, extremists acting alone, and a new breed of criminals in
cyberspace mean the agency needs to build up its domestic intelligence operation, the yearlong review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation found. The FBI has not yet met its potential - or its
mandate from the president and Congress - to develop a specialized and integrated national security workforce that can serve as the hub of Americas domestic intelligence agency, according to the report, which was presented to FBI Director James
(Bloomberg) --

Comey. The review was undertaken at the request of Congress, which sought an update on how the FBI is fulfilling its mission since the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. It was led by Edwin Meese, attorney general under President Ronald Reagan, former Representative Tim Roemer, an Indiana Democrat, and
Georgetown University counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman. The report was released during a press conference with Comey and members of the panel Wednesday at FBI headquarters in Washington. Counterterrorism Priority The panel found that the FBI had largely succeeded at transforming itself after Sept. 11, developing a

The FBI needs to do more to support, train and equip agents and analysts with the latest technologies to
combat the changing nature of threats from jihadist groups such as Islamic State, it said. Some things are necessary, we feel, to keep pace with the accelerating threat
we find around the world, Meese said. So there has to be an acceleration, obviously, in the amount of effort and the changes being made to bring the FBI up to date, he said. Comey said that he generally agrees with the reports findings, including the recommendation that the agency must change further.
Leadership at the agency isnt unified or consistent in driving cultural change, partially because of frequent turnover, according to the report. An office dedicated to
countering violent extremism is underfunded and should be moved under the Department of Homeland Security, and the agencys efforts to counter cyberthreats arent integrated well enough with other agencies, according to the report. Intelligence Integration The review said
the FBI needs to invest more in collaborative relationships with foreign partners as it seeks to combat terrorist threats. In the U.S., the FBI isnt sufficiently integrated into the intelligence
community, to the detriment of its own criminal investigations, according to the report. Regional FBI leaders were found to often give competing interests priority over intelligence-collection and coordination with other agencies. The panel urged Comey to work more closely with Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper to help the U.S. national security community. FBI agents and analysts should also participate in interagency collaboration and training assignments , according to the panel. The FBI must better use its
workforce attuned to the importance of intelligence-gathering and putting a priority on counterterrorism.

strategic processes to drive the intelligence cycle for its law enforcement and intelligence missions, according to the review. More Pressure Pressure on the FBI to combat terrorism within the U.S. has intensified since the Islamic State emerged, with top administration officials repeatedly warning that the terror group could target the
U.S. homeland. Last month, the White House hosted a summit on countering violent extremism, and President Barack Obama has pushed efforts at the United Nations to target foreign fighters. The panel recommended that FBI leaders communicate to Congress the value of laws integral to several successful investigations since 2008,
such as the USA Patriot Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Privacy advocates and some companies are opposed to some provisions of those laws. The FBI showed lax communication, coordination, collaboration and use of human intelligence in five case studies analyzed by the

The FBI will fulfill its domestic intelligence

role when its analysts and collectors, like its special agents, are grounded in criminal investigation; have ready access to state-of-the-art technology;
continuously exploit the systems, tools, and relationships of the national intelligence agencies, the report concluded.
review commission. Those included U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan and the Fort Hood shooting, Faisal Shahzad and the bungled Times Square car-bomb attack, and Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and the Boston Marathon bombing.

2AC -- NSA link D

NSA doesnt aid in detection efforts surveillance has a negligible impact
Benkler 13 -- Yochai Benkler is a law professor and director of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University. Fact: the NSA gets negligible intel from Americans' metadata. So end collection
Congress may be on the verge of prohibiting the NSA from continuing its bulk telephony metadata collection program. Two weeks ago, the Senate national security dissenters: Wyden, Udall, Paul, and Blumenthal proposed prohibition. Last week, the move received a major boost

Dragnet surveillance, or bulk collection, goes to the

heart of what is wrong with the turn the NSA has taken since 2001. It implements a perpetual "state of emergency" mentality that inverts the basic model outlined by the fourth amendment: that there are
vast domains of private action about which the state should remain ignorant unless it provides clear prior justification. And all public evidence suggests that, from its inception in 2001 to this day, bulk collection has never made more than a
marginal contribution to securing Americans from terrorism, despite its costs. In a 2 October hearing of the Senate judiciary committee, Senator Leahychallenged the NSA chief, General Keith Alexander: Would you
agree that the 54 cases that keep getting cited by the administration were not all plots, and that of the 54 only 13 had some nexus to the US ? Would you agree with that, yes or
no? Alexander responded: Yes. Leahy then demanded that Alexander confirm what his deputy, Christopher Inglis, had said in the prior week's testimony: that there is only one example where collection of bulk data is what
stopped a terrorist activity. Alexander responded that Inglis might have said two, not one. Advertisement In fact, what Inglis had said the week before was that there was one case "that comes close to a but-for example and that's the case of Basaaly Moalin". So,
from a bipartisan proposal by core establishment figures: Senator Patrick Leahy, and Representatives Jim Sensenbrenner and John Conyers. It's a prohibition whose time has come.

who is Moalin, on whose fate the NSA places the entire burden of justifying its metadata collection program? Did his capture foil a second 9/11? A cabby from San Diego, Moalin had immigrated as a teenager from Somalia. In February, he was convicted of providing material
assistance to a terrorist organization: he had transferred $8,500 to al-Shabaab in Somalia. After the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, few would argue that al-Shabaab is not a terrorist organization. But al-Shabaab is involved in a local war, and is not invested in attacking the US
homeland. The indictment against Moalin explicitly stated that al-Shabaab's enemies were the present Somali government and "its Ethiopian and African Union supporters". Perhaps, it makes sense for prosecutors to pursue Somali Americans for doing essentially what some Irish

a vague criminal statute, which stopped a few thousand dollars from reaching one side in a local conflict
in the Horn of Africa, is the sole success story for the NSA bulk domestic surveillance program . At the hearing, perhaps trying to bolster Alexander's feeble defense of the program's effectiveness, Director
Americans did to help the IRA; perhaps not. But this single successful prosecution, under

of National Intelligence James Clappercomplained that "plots foiled" should not be the metric. He said: There's another metric I would use; let's call it the "peace of mind metric". In the case of the Boston Marathon bomber, we were able to use these tools to determine whether
there was, or was not, a subsequent plot in NYC. Clapper actually used the clearest example that his program offers Americans little real security its failure to pick up the Tsarnaev brothers before they attacked as a way of persuading us that we should use an amorphous and
unmeasurable "peace of mind" metric; peace of mind we should gain from knowing that the same system that failed to detect the Boston bombers also detected no bombers in New York. One is left picturing Inspector Clouseau: I did not know the bank was being robbed because I
was engaged in my sworn duty as a police officer. The admissions Leahy forced out of the NSA heads and DNI Clapper that they have been systematically overstating the effectiveness of bulk collection are consistent with the only other official assessments of bulk collection. The sole
publicly available FISC opinion (pdf) that assesses the impact of bulk collection from 2006 to 2009 was unimpressed that: [T]he government's submission cites three examples in which the FBI opened three new preliminary investigations of persons in the US based on tips from the
BR metadata program. Judge Walton wrote that this achievement "does not seem particularly significant". Perhaps most damning are the results of the consensus report authored by the five inspectors general of the Departments of Defense and Justice and the CIA, NSA, and Office
of DNI, mandated by Congress as part of the Fisa Amendments Act of 2008. That report provides the most detailed official assessment of the effectiveness of bulk collection, from inception as the President's Surveillance Program (PSP) in the fall of 2001 until 2007. It is revealing

The NSA's inspector general only reported the agency's top brass beliefs; his report merely quoted then NSA Director
Michael Hayden in his view that there were "no communications more important to NSA efforts to defend the nation". Other inspectors general were
more skeptical. The Department of Justice "concluded that although PSP-derived information had value in some counterterrorism investigations, it
generally played a limited role in the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts". The CIA reported: [W]orking-level CIA analysts and targeting officers who were read into the PSP had too many competing priorities, and too
about both the NSA and its bulk collection program.

many other information sources and analytic tools available to them, to fully utilize PSP reporting. Officials also stated that much of the PSP reporting was vague or without context, which led analysts and targeting officers to rely more heavily on other information sources and
analytic tools, which were more easily accessed and timely than the PSP. The inspector general of the DNI reported that "National Counterterrorism Centeranalysts characterized the PSP information as being a useful tool, but noted that the information was only one of several
valuable sources of information available to them", and "not of greater value than other sources of intelligence". It is hardly surprising that supporters of bulk collection fervently believe it is critical to national security. No psychologically well-balanced person could permit herself to
support a program that compromises the privacy of tens of millions of Americans, costs billions of dollars, and imposes direct and articulable harm to cyber security by undermining the security of commercial products and public standards without holding such a belief truly and

. A dozen years of experience has produced many public overstatements and much
hype from insiders, but nothing to support the proposition that the program works at all, much less that its marginal contribution is significant enough to
justify its enormous costs in money, freedom, and destabilization of internet security. No rational cost-benefit analysis could justify such a leap of faith . If
the NSA cannot show real, measurable evidence of its effectiveness, evidence that doesn't collapse as soon as it is examined and isn't a vague appeal to
amorphous, measurement-free "peace of mind", its bulk collection program has to go.
honestly. But the honest faith of insiders that their bureaucratic mission is true and critical is no substitute for credible evidence

--- 1AR
NSA ineffective info-overload
Puiu 15 Tibi, ZME Science The NSA is gathering so much data, its become swamped and ironically ineffective at preventing terrorism
One of the most famous NSA whistleblowers (or the original NSA whistleblower), William Binney, said the

agency is collecting stupendous amounts of data so much that its actually

hampering intelligence operations. Binney worked for three decades for the intelligence agency, but left shortly after the 9/11 attacks. A program he had developed was scrapped and replaced with
a system he said was more expensive and more intrusive, which made him feel he worked for an incompetent employer. Plans to enact the now controversial Patriot Act was the last straw, so he quit. Since
then, Binney has frequently criticized the agency and revealed some of its operations hazards and weaknesses. Among these, he alleges: The NSA buried key intelligence that could have prevented 9/11;
The agencys bulk data collection from internet and telephone communications is unconstitutional and illegal in the US; Electronic intelligence gathering
is being used for covert law enforcement, political control and industrial espionage, both in and beyond the US; Edward Snowdens leaks could have been prevented. Ironically,
Snowden cites Binney as an inspiration. His greatest insights however is that the NSA is ineffective at preventing terrorism because analysts are too swamped with information under
its bulk collection programme. Considering Binneys impeccable track record he was co-founder and director of the World Geopolitical & Military
Analysis at the Signals Intelligence Automation Research Center (SARC), a branch with 6,000 employees I can only presume he knows what hes
talking about. The Patriot Act is a U.S. law passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Its goals are to strengthen domestic security and broaden the powers of law-enforcement agencies with regards to identifying
and stopping terrorists. In effect, the law laxes the restrictions authorities have to search telephone, e-mail communications, medical, financial, and other records.
Because a lot of people use web services whose servers are located in the US, this means that the records of people not located or doing business in the US
are also spied upon by the NSA. All this information, however, comes at a price: overload. According to the Guardian, the NSA buffers a whooping 21
petabytes a day! In this flood of information, an NSA analyst will quickly find himself overwhelmed . Queering keywords like bomb or drugs might prove a nightmare for the analyst
in question. Its impossible not to, considering four billion people around two-thirds of the worlds population are under the NSA and partner agencies watchful eyes, according to Binney. Thats why they couldnt stop the Boston
bombing, or the Paris shootings, because the data was all there, said Binney for ZDnet.

Info isnt used or shared properly

Eddington 15 -- Patrick Eddington is a policy analyst in homeland security and civil liberties at the Cato Institute. He was formerly a senior policy advisor to Rep. Rush Holt (D-N.J.) and a military imagery analyst at the CIAs
National Photographic Interpretation Center. No, Mass Surveillance Won't Stop Terrorist Attacks
Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) said that while "Congress
having oversight certainly is important ... what is more important relative to these types of events is ensuring we don't overly hamstring the NSA's ability
to collect this kind of information in advance and keep these kinds of activities from occurring." Similarly, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) spoke of his "fear" that "our intelligence capabilities, those designed to prevent such an attack from taking place on
our shores, are quickly eroding," adding that the government surveillance "designed to prevent these types of attacks from occurring is under siege." A recent poll demonstrates that their sentiments are widely shared in the
The recent terrorist attack on the office of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo generated a now-familiar meme: Another terrorist attack means we need more surveillance.

wake of the attack. But would more mass surveillance have prevented the assault on the Charlie Hebdo office? Events from 9/11 to the present help provide the answer: 2009: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallabi.e., the "underwear bomber"nearly succeeded in downing the airline he

the federal Intelligence Community(IC) failed "to connect, integrate, and fully understand
the intelligence" it had collected. 2009: Army Major Nidal Hasan was able to conduct his deadly, Anwar al-Awlaki-inspired rampage at Ft. Hood, Texas, because the FBI bungled its Hasan investigation. 2013: The Boston Marathon bombing happened, at
least in part, because the CIA, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FBI, NCC, and National Security Agency (NSA) failed to properly coordinate and share
information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his family, associations, and travel to and from Russia in 2012. Those failures were detailed in a 2014 report prepared by the Inspectors General of the IC, Department of Justice, CIA, and DHS. 2014: The Charlie Hebdo and
was on over Detroit because, according to then-National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) director Michael Leiter,

French grocery store attackers were not only known to French and U.S. authorities but one had a prior terrorism conviction and another was monitored for years by French authorities until less than a year before the attack on the magazine. No, mass surveillance does not prevent

that the mass surveillance programs initiated by the U.S. government after the 9/11 attacksthe legal ones and the
constitutionally-dubious oneswere premised on the belief that bin Ladens hijacker-terrorists were able to pull off the attacks because of a failure to
collect enough data. Yet in their subsequent reports on the attacks, the Congressional Joint Inquiry (2002) and the 9/11 Commission found exactly the opposite. The data to detect (and thus foil) the plots was in the U.S. governments hands prior to the attacks; the
terrorist attacks. Its worth remembering

failures were ones of sharing, analysis, and dissemination. That malady perfectly describes every intelligence failure from Pearl Harbor to the present day. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (created by Congress in 2004) was supposed to be the answer to the "failure-

the problem remains, the IC bureaucracy is bigger than ever, and our government is continuing to rely on mass surveillance
programs that have failed time and again to stop terrorists while simultaneously undermining the civil liberties and personal privacy of every American. The quest to "collect it all," to borrow a phrase from NSA Director Keith
to-connect-the-dots" problem. Ten years on,

Alexander, only leads to the accumulation of masses of useless information, making it harder to find real threats and costing billions to store. A recent Guardian editorial noted that such mass-surveillance myopia is spreading among European political leaders as well, despite the
fact that "terrorists, from 9/11 to the Woolwich jihadists and the neo-Nazi Anders Breivik, have almost always come to the authorities attention before murdering." Mass surveillance is not only destructive of our liberties, its continued use is a virtual guarantee of more lethal
intelligence failures. And our continued will to disbelieve those facts is a mental dodge we engage in at our peril.


A2: Economy
Developed economies are resilient to attacks
Bandyopadhyay et al 15 -- Subhayu Bandyopadhyay is Research Officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Research Fellow at IZA, Bonn, Germany. Todd Sandler is Vibhooti Shukla Professor of Economics and
Political Economy at the University of Texas at Dallas. Javed Younasis Associate Professor of Economics at the American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. The Toll of Terrorism

Economic researchers have found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that rich, large, and diversified economies are better able to withstand the effects of terrorist
attacks than small, poor, and more specialized economies. If terrorism disrupts productive activities in one sector in a diversified economy, resources can easily
flow to another unaffected sector. In addition, richer economies have more and better resources to devote to counterterrorism efforts, which presumably reduces the
number of terrorist activities with which they must cope. In contrast, small developing economies, which are specialized in a few sectors, may not have such resilience. Resources such as labor or capital may either flow from an affected sector to less
productive activities within the country or move to another country entirely. Moreover, developing economies are likely to lack specialized resources such as surveillance equipment or a technologically advanced police force or
armythat can be employed in counterterrorism. This allows the terrorist threat to persist, which can scare away potential investors. A terrorist attack against such a nation is likely to impose
larger and more lasting macroeconomic costs. The dramatic attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, for example, caused an estimated $80 billion in losses. Large as they were, however, the losses
were a tiny fraction (less than 0.1 percent) of the nearly $10.6 trillion 2001 U.S. GDP. Similarly, Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2004) found rather modest effects on average in 177 nations from transnational terrorist attacks during 19682000. Per
Disrupting production

capita GDP growth was reduced by 0.048 percent on an annual basis. But the effects are more dire in smaller nations, such as Colombia and Israel, and regions, such as the Basque Country in Spain, where terrorism-related damage has been much more significant. For example,

terrorism affects economies differently,

depending on their stage of development. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) divided a sample of 42 Asian countries into 7 developed and 35 developing economies. Their estimates suggest that terrorism did not significantly hamper growth in the
terrorism cost the Basque Country more than 10 percent in per capita GDP losses from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, when the problem was acute (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). Moreover,

developed economies, but they show that each additional transnational terrorist incident (per million people) reduced an affected developing economys growth rate by about 1.4 percent. These findings further support the notion that smaller developing economies are more
economically vulnerable to terrorism than those that are richer and diversified.

A2: Lone Wolf

Surveillance doesnt solve independence makes communications limited
Barrabi 15 -- Tom Barrabi is a reporter for the International Business Times. He graduated from Fairfield University in 2011, and has also written for Men's Fitness, Complex, GuySpeed, and Handlebar Magazine. 'Lone Wolf' Terrorism: US, Europe Adopt New Security
Tactics To Counteract Homegrown Threats

Charlie Hebdo magazine massacre, along with a recent rash

made it clear that mass casualty events are no longer perpetrated solely by traditional militant groups. Faced with the enhanced surveillance and collaboration from Western
intelligence agencies after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, militant groups like the Islamic State or al Qaeda have increasingly called on sympathizers to act individually against
their own communities. Other lone wolves develop their own ideology or reason for taking violent action against their neighbors. Traditional law enforcement
tactics have proven ineffective at counteracting this new foe. The consequences of attacks from terrorist groups are higher than from lone wolves. However, the likelihood of a lone wolf attack happening is
higher, precisely because its so difficult to prevent, said Max Abrahms, a terrorism theorist with the Council on Foreign Relations. Usually, authorities are able to foil attacks by intercepting
communications among people. But lone wolves by definition are more solitary, and so the writing often isnt on the wall. The Kouachi brothers, along with apparent co-conspirator and Paris supermarket hostage-taker Amedy Coulibaly, were each known to
Said and Cherif Kouachis fatal shooting of 12 people in Paris last week cast an international spotlight on the global intelligence community's ongoing struggle to identify and eliminate lone wolf terrorism. The
of other attacks, have

intelligence officials in Europe and the United States prior to the terrorist murders last week. All three were French citizens who lived among the communities that they later targeted for attacks, with known ties to domestic radical organizations. Cherif Kouachi, for example, once
appeared on a French television documentary on local Muslims who were outraged by Western intervention in Iraq, and served prison time on terrorism charges in 2008. Said Kouachi was never arrested for ties to radical groups, but U.S. and European authorities knew that he
traveled to Yemen in 2011 to meet with al Qaeda preacher Anwar al-Awlaki, who publicly advocated for lone wolf-style attacks before he was killed in a U.S. drone strike, according to The Daily Beast. Coulibaly and the Kouachis were known members of Frances ButtesChaumont Islamist network, a group with ties to the Islamic State that trained on French soil, the Telegraph reports. Known militant entities, such as the Islamic State group or Yemens al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), purportedly inspired the Kouachis and Coulibaly to

Under the traditional paradigms of

counterterrorism, law enforcement agencies have relied on surveillance and informants to foil major terrorist plots. But lone wolves operate
independently from the known structure of Islamist militancy. A would-be terrorist doesnt have to meet directly with al Qaeda or the Islamic State group to gain the expertise
necessary to carry out a mass-casualty event. It used to be, even in the world of violent extremism, you had pockets of people who were separated by geography, said John Cohen, a former counterterrorism coordinator at the U.S. Department
commit their acts. But early indications suggest that neither group provided direct operational support or was in direct communication with the alleged terrorists at the time of the assaults.

of Homeland Security and a professor at Rutgers University in New Jersey. Today, thats all different. You no longer have to travel thousands of miles to meet up with people who share your view of an extremist ideology. You no longer have to go out into the woods and train in
person. You can actually acquire materials, acquire expertise, acquire abilities while never leaving your house. The Islamic State group has especially embraced the potential of online propaganda, producing everything from pamphlets to music videos to attract recruits. Authorities
found ISIS flags at Coulibalys hideout, and the 32-year-old made a video declaring his allegiance to the group despite there being no indication that he had engaged in direct contact with its leaders, Newsday reports. Its a problem that isnt limited to Europe. Tamerlan and
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the brothers responsible for the lone wolf Boston Marathon bombing that left three dead and hundreds injured in 2013, werepurportedly inspired to commit their act after listening to al-Awlakis Internet sermons. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev later admitted that they
learned how to make the pressure-cooker explosives used in the attack by reading AQAPs instructions online. Similar self-radicalization motivated Man Haron Monis, a preacher in Australia who pledged solidarity with the Islamic State group in his deadly seizure of hostages at a

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security relies on the convergence of traditional tactics
undercover operations, surveillance and wiretaps with psychological analysis of individuals who could pose a threat to their communities . Efforts are made to
Sydney caf last December. Without direct ties to link lone wolf terrorists to known radical entities,

identify proactive intervention strategies to head off attacks before they can occur, such as mental health counseling and faith education. Rather than simply react to a prospective threats radicalization, law enforcement officials are making an effort to understand why that
radicalization occurred in the first place. You hear a lot of emphasis from some in government about, We have to counter the narrative. That may be true, but I think the bigger issue is we need to really understand why in Western Europe and Canada and the United States that a
growing number of people seem to find resonance with the narrative of these [radical] groups, and figure out what those underlying issues are and address those underlying issues, Cohen said.

A2: Agro-terror
Theyll find vulnerabilities traceability doesnt solve
iHLS News Desk 15 -- Agroterrorism is this a real threat?
Is the food supply in the U.S a potential target for terrorists? The economic effects of a successful attack on the U.S. food supply would be devastating, as agriculture accounts for roughly 13 percent of the countrys gross annual
domestic product. An introduction of deadly pathogens into U.S. livestock, poultry, or crops would not only result in a disease outbreak, but would disrupt the global food industry and drive up food prices. Agroterrorism is not limited to the intentional introduction of harmful
pathogens into U.S. farms and livestock. Terrorists can also cyberattack industrial agriculture systems responsible for operating feeding machines, maintaining milk temperatures, and processing foods. - See more at:

Robert A. Norton, a
veterinary microbiologist with research interests in cybersecurity and public health, insists that terrorists are not likely to plan an attack for which
the government has prepared a response. They often seek the path of least resistance. Industrial agriculture systems are vulnerable to
cyberattacks and terrorists have the expertise to exploit those vulnerabilities. - See more at:
threat/#sthash.ABg1TV2T.dpuf According to HomeLand Security News Wire, the ease of a cyberattack, and its anonymous nature, have some terrorism analysts questioning the likelihood of a physical bioattack on the U.S food supply.

Agro-terror is more complex than just targeting livestock traceability wont solve
Norton 14 -- Robert Norton, Auburn University Open Source Intelligence LabAgroterrorism is the threat real?
it wont come in the direction for which the government has
planned (and spent) to respond. Terrorists, like most people tend to be lazy and most often seek the path of least resistance, so as to better assure a probable success. Rather than using biological
weapons to kill cattle or poisons to contaminate milk, why not just turn off the electricity? Doing that can kill the animals (e.g., chickens in commercial operations), spoils the milk and makes the ground beef inedible, with the extra
Are terrorists going to target the food we eat? In my professional estimation the likelihood is moderately high, but if proven a reality, I would seriously wager that

special bonus that it also causes everyone to plunge into darkness (widespread panic), shutters access to bank ATMs and fuel, causes breathtaking gridlock and makes the government look totally helpless and inept. More importantly, all can be done from the comfort of the local
cyber cafe where the hacker(s) dont even to have to break a sweat.

The cyber realm is where the greatest vulnerability in food and agriculture resides ; therefore it by definition it becomes the most

likely target. Also importantly, the adversary has both the means (expertise) and the access points (the web), by which that vulnerability can be attacked. The U.S. government should continue to plan for all contingencies, including those attacks that emanate from the very
computers that make modern life possible. Failure to adequately defend will not only enable tragedy to be assured, but at a scale that we cannot even imagine.