Arvin Alaigh

Kants Transcendental Freedom

Beginning in the Third Antinomy, Kant begins two possible discussions on
causality, one described under his Thesis, while the other under his Anti-Thesis. The
crux of his anti-thesis is that only causality of nature can be causality itself. In essence,
this is a deterministic viewpoint that absolves humans of making independent decisions
and thus, having freedom. Assuming a deterministic viewpoint, it is difficult to ascribe
moral responsibility for actions, as users seemingly have no control over the natural cause
of events that occur. In his Thesis, Kant presents freedom as a possible mode of
causality. He refers to freedom as the power of beginning a state spontaneously, and in
this instance, spontaneity refers to the absence of a precedent event or rule imposing on
decision-making.1 However, he does not present a positive doctrine defending freedom;
rather, he shows some difficulties within the Anti-Thesis. One such argument he makes
is that there is no completeness in a series of natural events: If, therefore, everything
takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature, there will always be only a relative
and never a first beginning []2 Assuming that all events are naturally caused, it is
impossible to naturally begin a chain of events, as every event must have one that
precedes it. As Jonathan Bennett remarks in Kants Dialectic, Kant could easily make a
point regarding infinity, specifically, how the Anti-Thesis gets lost in an infinite loop.
Instead, Kant concludes by stating that the law of nature dictates that nothing takes place
without a cause sufficiently determined a priori in this instance, a priori means
independently and in advance rather than without experience3. Bennett refers to
Kemp Smith and A.C. Ewings interpretations of this conclusion, both of who argue that
Kant intends to state, sufficiency is not to be found in natural causes which are
themselves derivative or conditioned.4 However, Bennett discounts this argument, on the
grounds that the causality of events does not necessarily require the same basis as other
justifications. He accounts for several other explanations of Kants Thesis, including
Schopenhaur, Heimsoeth, and Strawson, before concluding that he cannot logically
ascertain the role of the Thesis third antinomy.
C.D. Broads criticism of the Third Antinomy differs slightly, yet remains on the
subject of the Thesis. He focuses on Kants claim that the proposition that there exists no
causality except in accordance with the laws of nature is self-contradictory.5 Broad
points out a verbal trick that Kant employs; Kant subtly moves from referring to the
Laws of Nature (physical phenomena, such as the Laws of Gravitation), to the Law of
Nature, which he identifies with the aforementioned principle of sufficient reason. This
principle is quite far-reaching, in that it mandates that for every occurrence, there must be
an explanation as to why it happened at that very place and point in time, without any
need for further explanation. Kant believes that the notion of sufficient reason poses a
threat to universal, natural causality. His goal in introducing this difficulty is to introduce
the possibility of freedom as causality. Spontaneity is crucial when examining freedom,
1 Kant 223
2 Kant 222
3 Bennett 185
4 Bennett 184
5 Broad 371

and as mentioned earlier, the definition of spontaneity is the absence of any rule or prior
events impact on decision-making. Assuming this, Broad critiques the Thesis on the
grounds that spontaneity cannot pass the test of sufficient reason any more than natural
causality. Kants problem with natural causality stems from its inability to sufficiently
reason any given event without referring to a previous event. Spontaneity suffers from the
same problem. A spontaneous action is initiated at a particular time and place; there is no
other mode by which that can be explained.
Both Broad and Bennetts criticisms of Kants Thesis within the Third Antimony
are convincing, and not mutually exclusive. The criticisms are similar in that they seek
out the clause of sufficient reason, albeit in different ways. I agree with both, although I
do prefer Broads. Bennetts dismissal of the Thesis rests more upon logical grounds, and
though they are undoubtedly valid, he does not address the notion of freedom as a result
of spontaneity. Freedom is the root of Kants Thesis, and Broads discussion of freedoms
pertinence to his ultimate rejection of the Thesis is pivotal in my preference of Broad
over Bennett.
Despite the shortcomings of the Thesis, both Broad and Bennett are assured that
Kants transcendental freedom is not seriously harmed in the long run. Kant attempts to
reconcile the worlds that he lays out in the Thesis and Anti-Thesis by first distinguishing
intelligible and empirical objects. Recall the distinction that Kant makes within his
explanation of Transcendental Idealism that is, objects as they are in themselves, and
objects as they appear. Intelligible objects correspond with objects as they are in
themselves, while empirical objects can be experienced, and thus correspond with objects
as they appear. An empirical object, which exists in the world of appearances, can be
thought of as a physical manifestation of an object in itself. With sufficient knowledge
(i.e., empirical characters, spatio-temporal relations, laws of nature), we can predict the
nature of empirical objects. However, we still do not possess any knowledge of objects in
themselves; that knowledge is not accessible through a spatio-temporal framework.
Therefore, knowledge of things-in-themselves must not be held to the same standard of
natural causation that empirical objects are. In this sense, objects as things-in-themselves
are produced spontaneously and thus freely, even though the empirical form of objects
adheres to the rules of natural causation. Taking everything into consideration, here is an
overall account of the interaction of Kants two worlds/perspectives and how they pertain
to an individuals freedom events and objects in the world of appearances adhere to the
rules of natural causality. That is, all events are preceded by other events; therefore mans
empirical self is deterministically observed. However, mans intelligible self is something
that is beyond the reach of experience. The phenomenal self cannot impact the noumenal
self and therefor, though the converse holds true. He equates the intelligible character
with reason and thus, reason can be a determinant of action.
In Kant, R.C.S. Walker provides a brief overview of Kants reconciliation of the
noumenal and phenomenal worlds as they pertain to freedom, before labelling it a
hopeless failure.6 He addresses the difficulty in claiming that all actions are causally
determined from a previous event within a series, yet still maintaining that there is moral
responsibility in decisions. Walker is worried that assuming total noumenal responsibility
for all actions, as he assumes Kant does, leads the user down a slippery slope. Assuming
the noumenal self is responsible for a given empirical event that occurred, he may be held
6 Walker, 149.

responsible for the series of events that culminated in that single event in the first place.
One may be as responsible for a particular decision made yesterday, as he is the entire
cause of events that led to that decision. Walker stretches this out in terms of the problem
of responsibility, asserting, I can be blamed for the First World War, and for the Lisbon
earthquake that so appalled Voltaire. Gandhi is no less guilty than Amin of the atrocities
of the Ugandan dictator.7 Though Walkers criticism may seem a bit stretched at times, I
believe that these points are valid and ought to be accounted for. Kants ambiguity in
regards to the relationship between freedom, the noumenal, and phenomenal proves to be
problematic when attempting to assign moral responsibility. Overall, this distinction may
be unclear in the Critique, but the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals attempts to
clarify Kants viewpoint.
He elaborates on the importance of reason in the Groundwork, stating that I
assert that we must necessarily lend to every rational being that has a will also the idea of
freedom, under which alone it would act.8 He makes an important clarification between
speculative and practical rationality. The former allows one to explain actions, while the
latter deals with reason in its application to moral and practical concerns. For the
purposes of freedom, practical rationality ought to be considered. He clarifies the nature
of the intelligible and sensible worlds, stating that if individuals solely existed in the
intelligible world, then we would make decisions based on the Categorical Imperative. If
we were to exist in the sensible world, then natural causation would dictate all
occurrences. He emphasises that the intelligible world is the primary mode by which
humans consider the world, and that indicates the importance of freedom. Unfortunately,
I do not believe that Kants discussion of freedom adds much to the dialogue that began
in the Critique. He attempts to include morality into the discussion, rightly so, though the
argument still retains the problems as detailed above.
In conclusion, Kants transcendental theory of freedom follows much of his
transcendental idealism. The notion of two worlds/two aspects remains vital to Kants
treatment of freedom. Though he acknowledges the importance of natural causality, he
still holds that the will, which is dictated by practical reason, is free to act independent of
previous events and rules.

7 Walker 149
8 Kant 66